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
RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON FRENCH SECURITY POLICY: A READER

Preface and Selections Chosen by Robbin Laird
Translations by Susan L. Clark

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1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. This Research Memorandum, part of a CNA project on issues and developments in the Western Alliance, looks at European security through Soviet eyes. Materials selected for original translation have been drawn from the more authoritative Soviet journals and periodicals. The selections provide a rich overview of how the Soviets have analyzed European security issues, with particular emphasis on the French role in European security.



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Naval Planning, Manpower, and Logistics Division

A Division of

CNA

Hudson Institute

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

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ABSTRACT

While much attention is paid in the United States to Soviet perspectives on U.S. security policy, less is known about contemporary Soviet thinking about European security issues. This memorandum is a collection of original translations of the more authoritative Soviet journals, newspapers and monographs. The selections provide an overview of how the Soviets have analyzed European security issues, with special emphasis on the French role in European security.

PREFACE

These selections provide an overview of how the Soviets have analyzed European security issues, with special emphasis on the French role in European security. They have been taken from the more authoritative Soviet journals, newspapers and monographs. They are representative of Soviet analyses on European security issues and reflect the relatively high quality of Soviet analyses.

The Soviet publications are organized proceeding from the most general to the most specific. The first part provides three selections on how Soviet analysts have looked at the emergence of the West European "power center" in world politics. Soviet concern with the emergence of Western Europe as an active player in world politics is clearly reflected in these selections. The second part provides two articles which reveal how Soviet analysts have understood the "contradictions" between the West Europeans and the Americans. There is a strong sense in these articles of the emergence of strong West-West relations inspite of serious tensions within the Alliance. The third part provides three selections which analyze the phenomenon of the Alliance's Eurostrategic forces. Special emphasis is placed upon the significance of the British and French nuclear forces in NATO's "Eurostrategy". The fourth part contains four specific analyses of the evolution of French security policy. Special emphasis is placed in these tracts upon the re-emergence of France as a critical player in the Western Alliance. The final section provides specific Soviet perspectives on the French navy. Notably, the one by Volodin underscores the counterforce mission of the sea-based strategic forces of the French navy.

In sum, these selections provide the reader with a good overview of contemporary Soviet thinking concerning European security issues. For those who think the Soviets anticipate an early Finlandization of Western Europe, these writings may provide a useful corrective.

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PART ONE

SOVIET GENERAL PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

SELECTION ONE

Shenayev, V.N., et al. (eds.), *Western Europe Today: Economics, Politics, The Class Struggle, International Relations* (Moscow: Progress, 1980), pp. 158-176.

CHAPTER 9: "The Military-Political Aspect of Mutual Relations Among the West European States"

In the situation of post-war Europe, where there existed two opposing systems, socialist and capitalist, unique relations of interdependence in the military sphere emerged among the countries of the North Atlantic bloc. These relations are characterized by the dependence of West European states on the United States, above all in respect to nuclear weapons. In connection with this, centripetal tendencies in relations between Western Europe and the United States were far more strongly felt in the military sphere than in the economic or political spheres. The persistent disparity between the predominantly continental character of economic and political links among the states of capitalist Europe and the predominantly Atlantic character of their military links explains the feebleness with which West European integration has proceeded in the military sphere by comparison with the economic or political spheres. This does not mean that military-political links between the countries of the West European region are absent: the emergence of a West European system of military interconnections represents a new phenomenon in the evolution of post-war inter-imperialist relations.

The formation of this system is inseparably linked to the evolution of the Atlantic system headed by the United States, especially since at the present stage the separate system of capitalist Europe is taking shape, as it were, in the bowels of NATO. However, the two systems have their own patterns of development, since the sources of the impulses operating in each of them by no means completely coincide. In this context the evolution of military-political interconnections in the West European center of power, the characteristic features of these interconnections, their limits and the prospects for their development form, in a way, an indicator of the interaction between the processes of detente and integration in the military sphere.

1. The Motive Forces of Military-Political Relations in the West European Center

The contradiction between capitalism and socialism is the principal motive force underlying the formation and development of both the West European and the Atlantic systems of military-political links. The prospects for the evolution of both systems are primarily bound up with the evolution of relations between the socialist and the capitalist

states, as well as with a change in the policy of the imperialist powers concerning the correlation between the two opposing tendencies towards military confrontation, on the one hand, and detente, on the other. The impact of this contradiction determines the predominance in the military policies of the West European powers of the Atlantic over the European tendency: the United States still represents for these powers the indispensable military counter-balance to the forces of socialism and, above all, the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the effects of the law of capitalism's uneven development, in particular the contradictions between the three centers of power, as well as the result of factors lying at the basis of West European integration and changes in the balance and disposition of political forces in Western Europe are especially manifested in the distinctive features of relations between France and Greece, on the one hand, and NATO, on the other, in strengthening co-operation between the military corporations of capitalist Europe, the emergence and consolidation of the Eurogroup and the advancing at state level of various far-reaching plans for military co-operation. It is these factors above all which give rise to the opposing Atlantic and Eurocentric tendencies in the military policies of the capitalist European states. Of course, the uneven development of capitalism also causes acute contradictions in the military sphere within the West European center itself. Uneven development predetermines, too, the general desire of all leading states in the West European region to bring, in one way or another, their military relations with the United States into line with today's changed balance of economic and political forces between the West European and U.S. centers.

The presence of U.S. armed forces in Europe and the maintenance of U.S. military "obligations" to its West European NATO partners have always held a firm place in the foreign policy strategy of West European powers. At the same time, the policies of each of these powers are directed to varying degrees towards affirming more equal relations with the United States in the Atlantic system of a military interrelationship.

In this respect the dual role of NATO's Eurogroup in the policy of West European states is indicative. On the one hand, the group is intended to strengthen the alliance with the United States by ensuring an increase in the collective material and financial contribution to NATO by its West European members. On the other hand, the Eurogroup is an instrument for co-ordinating the efforts of the West European states to extend West European military-industrial co-operation (and, in particular, the standardization of weapons) primarily within the framework of Western Europe and not on the scale of NATO as a whole.

West European integration is playing an important role in the dynamics of development of military interconnections among the states of capitalist Europe. The profound changes in the productive forces which for decades have been pushing West European state-monopoly capitalism in the direction of economic integration have always had a perceptible influence on military policy. At the same time, a quintessential difference has existed between the situation that emerged in the military-industrial sphere and that which took shape in the military-political sphere.

While links between integration and the military-political interrelationships of the West European states were indirect in character, weapons production was one of the branches of West European industry where integration advanced more rapidly than anywhere else.

The internal political factor has played an important and, in recent years, perhaps, a constantly expanding role in the general complex of motive forces examined here. Experience shows that the military-political policies of individual West European states vary perceptibly in conformity with changes in the balance of political and class forces in a particular country. On one level these changes influence the correlation of Eurocentric and Atlantic tendencies in military policy; on another, more profound level, they influence the proportion of the military component in foreign policy.

It may be said in connection with the first level, to simplify the picture slightly, that the Gaullists in France, the British Conservatives and the CDU/CSU in the FRG are foremost in efforts to push ahead the development of a separate West European system of military interconnections, while the trend towards Atlanticism in military policy is manifested most strongly in the programs of the leaderships of such centrist and reformist parties as the British Labour Party and the West German Social-Democrats. With regard to the more profound level, it may be stated that, under the conditions of the bourgeois-democratic system, the leaders of ruling parties of all trends are forced in defining their military-political policies to reckon with the mood of the masses, for whom the implementation of decisive measures directed at disarmament and reducing the danger of war on both a global and a regional scale, not the differences between various military policies, are most important.

2. Mutual Relations in the Sphere of Nuclear Weapons

Among the individual elements of military-political relations between the capitalist European states, their relations in the sphere of nuclear weapons have always been of decisive importance. At the contemporary stage of the scientific and technological revolution in military affairs, the actual military potential of a given state depends primarily on its possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons and the level of development of its nuclear-missile systems. It is not surprising, therefore, that access by the FRG to nuclear weapons and

Anglo-French relations in the nuclear field, the latter closely linked in turn to the problem of the Anglo-American "special relationship" in the same area, proved especially sensitive and politically tense issues during the 1960s and 1970s.

In the nuclear field the disposition of forces within the framework of the London-Paris-Bonn triangle is principally determined by the fundamental difference between the military-political status and military potential of Britain and France, on the one hand, and West Germany, on the other. London and Paris come close to each other in their common desire to preserve the special status of the nuclear powers and their common interest in maintaining the non-nuclear status of the FRG.

At the same time, the policies of London and Paris concerning the nuclear partnership of the two powers diverge as a result, primarily, of London's "special relationship" with Washington. In 1970-1974, when the Conservatives were in power, Britain was the most active proponent of extending West European or, more precisely, Anglo-French co-operation in nuclear weapons. The Heath Plan, put forward as early as 1967, provided for the gradual establishment of Anglo-French nuclear strike forces on the basis of the existing nuclear armaments of the two countries. Further expansion of these forces was to be accomplished through the extension of current British and French programs, the elaboration of new forms of Anglo-French co-operation and, in part, by the development of new forms of trilateral Anglo-French-U.S. co-operation.¹ Subsequently Edward Heath, who had by then become British Prime Minister, declared that he saw no reason why such Anglo-French co-operation should not take place either inside or outside NATO.²

Thus, British ruling circles were at this time clearly seeking to make use of the advantages arising from Britain's comparatively strong position in the nuclear field within Western Europe and its role as a privileged partner of the United States in order to seize a position of leadership in West European military integration. However, the onset of a profound economic and internal political crisis in Britain, accompanied by a change of government and the coming to power of the Labour Party in 1974, brought about a definite shift in London's policy.

For many years the leadership of the Labour Party, while opposing access by the FRG to nuclear weapons, had been ambiguous in its attitude towards an Anglo-French nuclear partnership. At the end of the 1960s acknowledging the possibility of such partnership, it put forward as a preliminary condition for this France's renewed participation in NATO.³ In spring 1976 London declared that it was not co-operating with France in nuclear weapons and that there were no plans for such co-operation.⁴ The categorical nature of this declaration was evidently prompted above all by the specific internal political situation in Britain: during the mid-1970s the left wing of the Labour Party

conducted an active struggle against continued British participation in the arms race, and, in particular, against any steps leading to the formation of a separate West European military bloc.

France's approach to relations among the West European powers in the nuclear field partially coincides with the British position. Moreover, Paris's policy, like London's, underwent a definite evolution in the course of the 1970s. The policy of maintaining the FRG's non-nuclear status remained unchanged; however, France's former attitude towards the formation of "West European nuclear forces" in partnership with Britain changed. France's success in developing its own nuclear forces without U.S. or British help and its achievement of "nuclear parity" with Britain in recent years had a role to play in this. Paris's policy is one of rivalry rather than co-operation with Britain in nuclear weapons.

At the end of the 1960s the position of France's ruling circles was based on the following considerations: that, in the light of the international obligations assumed by the FRG in the area of nuclear weapons, co-operation was possible only with Britain, not with the FRG, and that, following British entry into the EEC, such co-operation could become wholly feasible in which case France's "national efforts" in the nuclear field would become "European" efforts.⁵ Anglo-French co-operation outside the framework of NATO was also envisaged, i.e. outside the framework of the Atlantic system of military interconnections.

Subsequently Paris, like London, moved to a position of essentially denying the expediency of Anglo-French nuclear partnership, although for different reasons than those advanced by London. In the program statements of the leaders of the Fifth Republic an important place was acquired by French claims to sole leadership of Western Europe in the nuclear field and the desire to present Britain's nuclear forces as no more than an appendage of those of the United States. In a speech delivered in summer 1976 President Giscard d'Estaing stated that France held and should continue to hold third place after the United States and the USSR among the nuclear powers, since Britain did not independently produce all the elements of its own nuclear weapons (this was a reference to the Anglo-American system of co-operation). France thus represented an "autonomous" nuclear power among Western states.⁶

Naturally, the possibility that the former policy of establishing "West European nuclear forces" on the basis of Anglo-French co-operation may be resumed in the future cannot be excluded. However, the contradiction between London and Paris in this area remains extremely deep, as it has been throughout the entire post-war period

Until the end of the 1960s the government of the FRG openly sought to change the country's non-nuclear status by one means or other. Subsequently, however, it adopted a passive, temporizing stance, renouncing official initiatives aimed at gaining West German entrance into the ranks of the nuclear powers. The events of 1968-1969 marked a turning point: the signing by the USSR, the United States, Britain and other countries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1 July 1968), the coming to power in Bonn of the "small coalition" led by Willy Brandt (October 1969) and the fact that the FRG signed the Treaty (28 November 1969).*

The evolving tactics employed by the government of the FRG to gain access to nuclear weapons are of interest in this connection. After the collapse of the West German-U.S. plan to form a "multilateral nuclear force," which Washington was obliged to reject in the mid-1960s, Bonn continued to pursue the same objective, placing its hopes on help from Britain and France rather than from the United States and counting on implementation of the plans for nuclear partnership being drawn up by British and French ruling circles.

In a speech delivered in London in May 1969 Franz Josef Strauss then Minister of Finance in the government of the FRG, expressed support for the idea of uniting British and French nuclear forces as part of a broader plan to establish West European nuclear forces, a corresponding contribution to the development of which could be made by other European countries (i.e., the FRG). Control over this force should be transferred from national governmental bodies to Community bodies, to the central government in the sovereign figure of the president of the European federation. Strauss' proposal was flatly rejected by the then British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who pointed to the obvious fact that putting it into effect would be "a breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty."⁸

After the FRG's signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the accent of Bonn's policy shifted. It cannot be said that Strauss' proposal was completely dropped from the agenda. In 1972 it was put forward again by the then leader of the CDU Rainer Barzel, speaking on behalf of the main opposition party. (This proposal will evidently remain part of the declared or undeclared program of revanchism for a long time.)

Demands for access to nuclear weapons have not figured in the programs of FRG governments headed by the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party. The attitude towards plans to form Anglo-French nuclear forces has become essentially negative; emphasis is laid upon the decisive importance from the point of view of Bonn's interests of the nuclear forces of the United States, not those of its West European partners.

* The FRG ratified the Treaty on 2 May 1975.

Two principal elements may be singled out in the 1973 position of the FRG as stated by Chancellor Brandt. First, the FRG was quite happy about the kind of qualified consultation which it had built up in the nuclear group (the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO) and did not want to give anyone the impression that it was maneuvering to gain access indirectly to nuclear weapons through participation in Anglo-French nuclear co-operation. Second, West Germany, while not objecting to Anglo-French rapprochement in the nuclear field, was obliged to take into account the fact that as the two countries have a quite different attitude towards NATO, co-operation between them in this field would be difficult to implement.

Among the military-political conceptions of the government led by Helmut Schmidt, the possibility of Western use of nuclear weapons is regarded as an indispensable condition for ensuring the "security" of capitalist Europe. The nuclear forces to which this conception refers are those of the United States, not the West European powers. Europeans cannot guarantee their own security "even when including the nuclear forces of Britain and France," wrote Georg Leber, former Minister of Defense of the FRG. Therefore, even in the event of the formation of a union of West European states, the union "would have to continue to rely on the nuclear protection of the United States."¹⁰ Bonn's position is conditioned to a significant extent by the logic of inter-imperialist rivalry. In view of an international and internal political situation hostile towards the "affiliation" of the FRG with the two West European nuclear powers, the attitude of the government of the FRG towards the conception of "West European nuclear forces" naturally cooled. However, West Germany's right-wing forces are unlikely to have lost hope of achieving, sooner or later, their cherished object of gaining access to nuclear weapons through such "affiliation."

Two principal features should be noted in the position of Italy, the Scandinavian countries, the Benelux countries and the other states of Western Europe. First, the view prevails in broad sections of the West European public that, in the light of historical experience, discrimination against West Germany in the area of nuclear weapons is justified and necessary. It is indicative that, even when the United States was giving active support to the formation of a "multilateral nuclear force" with the participation of Bonn, perhaps not a single West European state genuinely associated itself with Washington's position.

Second--the opposition between the Atlantic and Eurocentric tendencies in military policy that exists in all West European participants in the North Atlantic bloc. Although the balance between these tendencies varies at different periods, it may be confidently stated that the desire of Britain and France at various times to present their nuclear forces as "guarantors of West European security" has, generally speaking, not aroused especial enthusiasm among their non-nuclear partners. The present position of both Italy and the other states of capitalist Europe (and not only the FRG) is characteristically

one of emphasizing the decisive importance in this context of U.S. nuclear might.

Detente and the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are having an increasing impact on the position of France, the FRG, Britain and other West European countries concerning nuclear weapons. The slow but consistent deepening and broadening of the positive content of SALT is obliging participants in the West European center increasingly to review their mutual relations in the nuclear sphere with constant regard to the place and role of the subcontinent in the global process of limiting the nuclear arms race.

3. Mutual Relations in the Non-Nuclear Sphere

With the exception of Finland and a small group of neutral countries, all the states of Western Europe participate directly or indirectly (Spain) in the North Atlantic pact and support a continued military alliance with the United States. Moreover, all West European participant states see the U.S. military presence in Europe as a counterbalance to the forces of socialism and, above all, the Soviet Union in the military sphere. At the same time, they are all interested to varying degrees in increasing Western Europe's share in the system of Atlantic military interlinks either through gradual Europeanization of NATO or by the transfer of certain of the latter's functions to autonomous West European military co-operation machinery. As the experience of the Eurogroup has shown, in either case the separate system of military links among West European countries has continued to develop further. The only difference consists in the degree of separateness.

During recent decades two multilateral bodies intended by their participants to regularize [sic] military co-operation in capitalist Europe have been established. They are the Western European Union (WEU, 1954) and NATO's Eurogroup (early 1969). The former includes all members of the Nine except Denmark and Ireland, while the latter embraces the Nine except France and Ireland, together with Greece, Turkey, Norway and Portugal. Before embarking upon an analysis of the place and role of each of these bodies in the mutual relations of West European states, attention should be directed towards two general factors.

First, neither the WEU nor the Eurogroup have as yet a direct link either with the institutions established in accordance with the Treaty of Rome or with the system of foreign policy co-ordination within the framework of the Nine. Although certain circles in Western Europe are showing a desire to add a military dimension to the system of interconnections of the Nine, this system in fact still lacks such a dimension.

West European states have for a long time discussed "individual military issues" among themselves and are establishing special new machinery of co-ordination in the military-industrial sphere. But as yet this is proceeding not within the framework of the Nine but among a somewhat different group of countries.

Second, although the Eurogroup and the WEU are both operative organisms and although each fulfills definite functions in the general complex of military-political relations among the states of Western Europe, the role of the Eurogroup became significantly greater than that of the WEU during the 1970s. The former is at a stage of quite dynamic development, while the sphere of effective action of the WEU remains comparatively limited. The two bodies, as will subsequently be shown, are in a certain sense complimentary, but they have proved at the same time to be alternative focal points for developing military-political co-operation and thus rivals of a kind. The Eurogroup of NATO is a constituent part of both the Atlantic and West European systems of military interconnections; it is simultaneously a subdivision of the central military-political machinery of the North Atlantic bloc and the operative military-political center of the separate West European system of co-operation. One aspect of its activity consists in strengthening military links with the United States, the other reflects the desire of participating countries in this group to increase Western Europe's military autonomy. In the years since its establishment the activity of the Eurogroup has been characterized by a constant increase in measures directed at ensuring its Eurocentric functions.

The effectiveness of the Eurogroup as a mechanism for military co-operation among the states of capitalist Europe is reduced primarily by the refusal of France to participate in it--a refusal arising in turn from the contradiction between the Eurogroup's function as a constituent of the Atlantic system and its role in ensuring the development of an autonomous West European system. At the same time, changes have occurred since 1975 in the policies of both France and the members of the Eurogroup, leading in their total effect to a rapprochement between the positions of the two sides on the basis of a certain increase in the autonomy of the activity of Eurogroup members in relation to the machinery of NATO.

Since the end of the 1960s an unvarying disposition of forces has taken shape in the London-Paris-Bonn triangle concerning participation in the Eurogroup, with London and Bonn in favor and Paris opposed. In this Britain and the FRG have enjoyed the support of the United States and the other West European countries, above all Italy. Greece, which officially refused to participate in NATO in 1974, remained a member of the Eurogroup. Until the mid-1970s France consistently supported the establishment of a system of military co-operation among EEC member-countries outside NATO (within the framework of the Fouchet Plan, the articles of the Elysee Treaty or the WEU) and boycotted the Eurogroup.

Quite strong Eurocentric elements have always been present in the policies of Britain and the FRG towards the Eurogroup. In numerous pronouncements on this subject by the Eurogroup's "spiritual father," the then British Secretary of State for Defense Denis Healey, the argument that a group of this kind was necessary as a means of strengthening NATO was accompanied by an argument of a wholly different character. According to Healey, closer co-operation of European NATO members "is...the only way in which Europe can play its necessary role in the dialogue with the United States and between the United States and Russia."¹¹ In the FRG, governmental circles close to the SPD/FDP have always regarded the Eurogroup as a key mechanism in extending West European military integration. As one of Bonn's official publications emphasized, the Eurogroup is intended to serve as a beginning for the organization of Western Europe's military "unity," corresponding to its economic, monetary and political "unity."¹² It is not surprising, therefore, that when France began to move away from the policy of establishing an autonomous system of military co-operation outside the NATO framework, positions within the London-Paris-Bonn triangle on the role of the Eurogroup and means of expanding it simultaneously drew closer and the elaboration of a compromise approach began.

The compromise achieved between France, Britain, the FRG, Italy and the other European members of NATO principally concerned the special and very acute problem of regulating the division of labor in the European arms market at state level. Since France plays a leading role in the West European system of military-industrial interconnections, the Eurogroup was, without its participation, effectively unable fully to discharge its function as supreme co-ordinator and regulator of this system. The resultant disharmony led to the persistent aspiration of London, Bonn, Rome and their partners in the Eurogroup to find a means of reaching compromise with Paris, above all in this area. Similar impulses towards compromise emerged and strengthened in the policies of Paris, which found itself confronted by the Eurogroup's constantly increasing role in a sphere of primary importance to the interests of French military-industrial corporations.

The partial compromise achieved amounted in essence to the joint establishment in early 1976 by the members of the Eurogroup, on the one hand, and France, on the other, of the so-called European Program Group (EPG), the purpose of which was to co-ordinate arms production programs, reach agreement on the joint production of individual types of arms and, consequently, to prevent duplication in this area. The first meeting of the EPG was held in February 1976 in Rome and was attended by representatives of all members of the Eurogroup and France. Later, in a communique issued by the Eurogroup on 5 December 1977 Ministers of Defense confirmed that, although the EPG was not an organ of the Eurogroup, it was the principal forum for collaboration among West European countries on military equipment matters. The issue of France's

entrance into the Eurogroup itself was thus evaded. Although the group continues to exist without France, an extremely important Eurogroup function is now exercised with the direct participation of Paris.

In its composition and powers the Western European Union (WEU) was conceived as a means of expanding all forms of military co-operation among the seven WEU participating states. Under the Paris Treaty of 1954, the object of the WEU was established as being to further "the unity and stage-by-stage integration" of Western Europe in the military-political field and to promote joint production and standardization of arms. However, these mandates still remain to be implemented because, first, the military-political hegemony of the United States in Western Europe means that military co-operation among WEU members is conducted primarily within the framework of NATO; and second, under the Paris Treaty the functions of the WEU include supervision of the observance by the FRG of limitations on its armed forces in the nuclear and non-nuclear fields. Thus the WEU in the hands of its six other members, principally Britain and France, serves as an instrument for preserving the FRG's "unequal" status in the military sphere. Naturally, the WEU is not, from the point of view of Bonn, an appropriate body for military co-operation with its European partners.

During the 1960s and 1970s individual members of the WEU, above all Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, put forward various proposals aimed at turning the WEU into the principal center for co-operation among the West European states now in the foreign policy and now in the military sphere, or in both taken together. However, the conflicting interests of the main participants in the grouping has meant that none of these initiatives has been successful.

At the November 1973 session of the WEU assembly, for example, France's Foreign Minister Michel Jobert made a direct demand that the union begin fulfilling its functions as the organizer and stimulator of military-political co-operation and the joint production and standardization of arms within the framework of Western Europe.¹³ As was to be expected, FRG Defence Minister Georg Leber immediately rejected the French minister's proposal on the grounds that the WEU should not duplicate the functions of NATO's Eurogroup.¹⁴ Subsequently, as already noted, the role of stimulating joint arms production was in effect transferred to the newly created European Program Group which, however, operates outside the framework of the WEU.

The activities of WEU institutions now exercise comparatively little influence on the course of events. It is also evident that certain circles in the FRG are interested, if not in eliminating the WEU entirely, then in terminating its functions as "supervisor" of West German armed forces. However, all the other participants in the union still retain their interest in preserving these very functions of the WEU as an important military-political component of the balance of forces in the capitalist part of Europe.

On the whole, centripetal tendencies predominate in relations among West European states in the non-nuclear field. However, a significant disharmony continues to exist between the still narrow bounds of military-political co-operation and the broader framework of the system of military-industrial co-operation.

4. The Formation of a Military-Industrial Complex: Limits and Specific Qualities

While the dependence of Western Europe on the United States in the military opposition between the states of the two systems, inter-imperialist contradictions in the West European center and other factors still sharply limit the expansion of military-political links among the countries of capitalist Europe, this is certainly not true of their relations in the military-industrial sphere. As already noted, the production of arms and military equipment was among the branches of West European industry in which integration made most rapid progress. Beginning from nothing at the end of World War II, military-industrial co-operation among the states of capitalist Europe developed unevenly but has not ceased to broaden and deepen. The relative importance of joint programs in military-industrial projects and production has increased, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, when approximately 10 per cent of the total volume of armaments of the West European states was being developed and produced under joint programs.

The production of armaments and military equipment has been accompanied by the formation of military-industrial concerns and consortia involving firms from two or more West European countries, principally Britain, France and the FRG. An integrated West European military-industrial complex is gradually taking shape on the basis of the military-industrial complexes of individual countries.

At the same time, limits are set upon West European military-industrial co-operation by a number of factors. First, the production and development of British and French nuclear weapons are still excluded from such co-operation. Of course, this does not mean that integration is not proceeding in branches of civilian production closely associated with the nuclear missile industry. The Anglo-West German-Dutch consortium for the development and application of a new method of enriching uranium may be cited as an example. Special attention is merited by the establishment in May 1975 of the new European Space Agency, which involves all the leading members of the EEC, as well as Sweden, Switzerland and Spain, and is intended to co-ordinate national space research and exploration programs.

Second, a profound contradiction remains between the desire of each large West European state to increase the autonomy and scale of its own armaments industry and the impulse towards integration arising from the scientific and technological revolution in the military sphere. The depth of this contradiction is evidenced by the protracted and complex

struggle among the chief participants in the West European center over the formation of common machinery for co-ordinating military-industrial programs.

It is envisaged that in "l'Europe des patries" armaments production will continue for a long time on a primarily national basis. This supposition is still more well-founded in relation to Britain and France, since these two powers are particularly concerned to maintain their positions as exporters of the products of national armaments industries—Mirage aircraft, Chieftain tanks, various missile systems, etc.

Third, the long-standing system of military-industrial interconnections within the framework of NATO, in which the principal role is played by the United States, continues to function. This involves not only the sale to Western Europe of US-made armaments but also cooperation in the production and exploitation of various types of armaments developed in the United States. This system hinders the growth of a separate West European system.

Until the mid-1970s Washington made successful use of the subordinate, dependent political status of the FRG in the struggle between U.S. and West European interests on the West European arms market. Every year Bonn was forced to place expensive orders for U.S. weapons as a form of compensation for the foreign-exchange costs borne by the United States in maintaining its troops in West Germany. But in recent years the FRG has declined to conclude these regular compensation agreements with the United States, thereby acquiring a large measure of freedom in the field of armaments. For a long time, however, these agreements hindered not only the development of arms production in the FRG itself but also its participation in West European military-industrial programs.

Despite the effects of the limiting factors indicated here, a West European military-industrial complex has not only been formed but is even expanding quite rapidly. What are its characteristic features?

Integration has advanced furthest in military aviation and missile systems. The list of joint programs in these areas is quite long. Production of the Anglo-French Jaguar fighter and the Franco-West German Alpha-Jet attack plane and the Franco-West German Roland and the Franco-British Martel missile systems, for example, is based on programs of this kind. Britain and the FRG have become involved in the production and exploitation of the French Exocet missile. By 1978 no fewer than 10 types of missiles of various classes were being developed or produced through the joint efforts of the countries of Western Europe. Britain, the FRG, France, Italy, and Belgium are involved in the joint development and production of modern engines for warplanes.

The Anglo-West German-Italian program for developing, producing and exploiting the multipurpose Tornado aircraft holds a special place. The development and production costs of the Tornado are apportioned as follows: Britain—42.5 per cent, the FRG—42.5 per cent and Italy—15 per cent. Britain has earmarked 385 machines for itself from serial production of the aircraft; the FRG will acquire 322 and Italy—100.

Seven West European states are involved in various joint programs to develop and produce artillery systems. A broad Anglo-French program for the production of three types of military helicopters is being implemented. The needs of British and Belgian armed forces for armoured vehicles are substantially met by a joint Anglo-Belgian program of serial production. Co-operation among West European states is implemented primarily in the development or manufacture of the latest, high-technology and especially expensive types of weapons.

The heavy preponderance of Britain, France and the FRG in the existing West European complex is obvious: this means that the three states disposing of the most powerful national military-industrial resources in capitalist Europe predominate. In terms of relative importance in the West European complex, fourth place is occupied by Italy; among the other states Belgium is marginally more prominent.

The proportional shares of Britain, France and the FRG in joint programs may be considered to be approximately the same, i.e. instead of the hegemony of one of the three states there exists a dominant "triumvirate." Anglo-French, Franco-West German and Anglo-West German partnership in the development, production and exploitation of any given type of armament is approximately equal. Of course, the role of each of these countries has its own specific features. For example, Britain's leading role in aero-engines resulting from the high scientific and technical production level of the Rolls Royce concern and the predominance of French military-industrial amalgamations in joint missile-systems programs may be noted. It cannot, however, be said that the special roles of participants in the triangle have become firmly defined. Although a trend towards such specialization obviously exists, the powerful opposing trend arising from the desire of Britain, France, and the FRG to keep the levers of all key areas of armaments production in their own hands as far as possible remains decisive.

The extremely disharmonious internal structure of the West European military-industrial complex is another notable characteristic of this complex. As an example, we may point to the relative abundance of joint programs in military aviation and the virtual absence of such programs in tank construction. Although an Anglo-West German MBT-80 (a so-called main battle tank for the 1980s) has long been planned, even a prototype of this tank still does not exist, reflecting not only the hard-fought struggle between London and Bonn for the leading role in carrying out this project, but also the intervention of Washington. Discerning in Anglo-West German plans a serious threat to the position of U.S.

monopolies in the world capitalist arms market, the United States conceived an alternative project for U.S.-West German co-operation in the same area. The advancement of this project served to impede the expansion of co-operation within Western Europe still further.

It seems obvious that during the next few decades the development of a West European military-industrial complex under the conditions of "l'Europe des patries" will remain somewhat chaotic in character. Nevertheless, the desire of West European states to achieve increasing co-ordination of their military-industrial programs, and [?] not least of joint programs, is evident. We believe that the European Program Group will play a significant role both in expanding the system of military-industrial interconnections and in rationalizing its structure.

However, the long-term prospect for the development of both the West European military-industrial complex and the West European system of military-political interconnections depends to a decisive extent on the dynamics of mutual relations among the states of the two systems and the evolution of detente.

5. The Military-Political Interconnections of West European Countries and Relations Among the States of the Two Systems

As has been stressed time and again, the contradiction between capitalism and socialism is the most important of the entire complex of the factors determining the dynamics of development of the West European system of military interconnections. The development of mutual relations among the states of the two systems on both a global and a regional scale directly affects the evolution of military-political relations among West European countries. At a time when major positive changes have already taken place in this area and when the implementation of decisive measures to ensure military detente has become central to world politics, the conditions and prospects for mutual links among participants in the West European center in the military sphere are changing quite fundamentally. The nature and extent of the influence that deepening and consolidating detente or, on the contrary, retarding this process may exercise upon the development of a separate West European system of military interconnections is especially topical.

At first glance this issue may seem quite simple, since it is clear to every sensible person that the very concept of "military detente" includes, among its other elements, reduction in the role and eventual elimination of military blocs. It is completely obvious that the formation and development of both the Atlantic and West European military systems derive in essence from the tense state of relations between socialist and capitalist states. However, this issue also has other aspects.

First, the approach of individual West European countries to the broad range of problems associated with relations between socialist and capitalist countries in the military sphere is determined not only by the homogeneous social system uniting them, but also by specific economic, military, internal political, geographical and other factors. For example, the United States, the major nuclear power of the capitalist world, and the West European states, including two middle-ranking nuclear powers, do not regard strategic arms limitation from identical standpoints and are not playing identical roles in attempts to achieve this end. While the Soviet Union, in initiating the first, highly important steps toward limiting the nuclear arms race during the 1960s, conducted negotiations with the United States and Britain, the principal forum for discussing further measures by the mid-1970s was SALT--the bilateral Soviet-American talks. The positions and roles of individual participants in the West European center concerning reductions in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe--not to mention the role and standpoint of the United States--by no means fully coincide. The special position of France towards the Vienna talks is well known: Paris has refused to participate in these negotiations.

Second, military detente is capable of exercising a highly specific influence on the corresponding roles in world politics of the Atlantic and West European systems of military links. Centrifugal tendencies are strengthening within both these systems of military links but not to an identical degree. Reduced tension in mutual relations among the states of the two systems, other conditions being equal, leads to a weakening in the Atlantic orientation of the military policies pursued by participants in the West European center and to a certain change in the military policies of West European countries concerning the correlation between Atlantic and Eurocentric tendencies in favor of the latter.

As has already been stated, participants in the West European center are being obliged to an increasing extent to consider their mutual relations in the nuclear sphere in the constant light of the place and role of Western Europe in the global process of limiting strategic armaments. Here we are referring in particular to such major achievements as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 1963, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 and, in particular, the results of the Soviet-American SALT talks in the 1970s.

Despite differences in the positions of individual West European states, it may in general be stated that their attitude towards the understandings achieved in SALT and to the further co-ordinated steps taken by the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the level of strategic forces was positive. Such an attitude is, naturally, typical of such neutral countries as Austria and Sweden, as well as Finland. However, it is typical not only of these countries but also to some degree of all states in the region, including the two nuclear powers--Britain and France. The opinion of Jan Smart, a leading bourgeois

scholar in this area, is characteristic in this respect. Although West Europeans do not wish to diminish the ability of the United States to contribute "to the military strength of NATO...in general terms, Western Europe hopes that SALT-2 will proceed in a successful manner and that it will yield a more substantial agreement on the limitation and, if possible, reduction of offensive armament."¹⁵

The results of the conference of heads of state or government of the USA, France, the FRG and Britain on the island of Guadeloupe between 4-6 January 1979, at which the question of limiting the nuclear weapons race occupied a central place, were indicative. The representatives of all three West European countries expressed their support for the successful conclusion of SALT-2, the second stage of the Soviet-American talks on limiting strategic offensive weapons.* Immediately after the signing of this treaty by Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and President Carter of the USA in Vienna on 18 June 1979, they reaffirmed their position. The government of Britain welcomed the signing in Vienna by the Soviet Union and the United States of the SALT-2 Treaty, a representative of Britain's Foreign Office declared. The British government expressed the hope that this treaty would be ratified. The French cabinet described the Soviet-American treaty as a "globally balanced document" and "an important stage on the road of international detente." Chancellor Schmidt of the FRG expressed support for the SALT-2 Treaty.¹⁶

In our view, the participants in the West European center have, for wholly comprehensible reasons, a much greater interest in limiting the strategic armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States than in further development of existing West European (British and French) strike forces. In determining their policies in the nuclear sphere, ruling circles are forced to proceed from the unalterable fact that the West European powers are not in a position to compete with the Soviet Union or the United States and that attempts significantly to reduce the enormous gap between the West European level and the level of the USSR and the United States by means of quantitative and qualitative development of existing forces are doomed to failure.

At the same time, it is realized in West European capitals that, as a result of SALT-1, the narrowing of this gap has begun. Thus, the Soviet-American agreement on the partial limitation of anti-missile systems meant that the strategic aging of British and French nuclear forces was slowed down. The opinion also exists in the West that the present British and French submarine strike systems thereby gained a few extra years of "strategic life."

* For example, see the January 1979 statement by the British Prime-Minister in the House of Commons (*Parliamentary Debates*, 16 January 1979, Cols. 1497-1506).

It is considered in London and Paris, not without grounds, that further successful development of the SALT talks will gain Britain and France extremely valuable political and "status" advantages in the Western world since, as these talks deepen in content, they will ultimately lead to the inclusion of Britain and France as junior partners in the group of participants and to their direct involvement in regulating global problems of strategic armaments. That the prospect of this does, in fact, exist is stated in the documents of the 25th Congress of the CPSU. "Certainly, the time will come," it is stated in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee, "when the inevitable association of other nuclear powers with the process of strategic arms limitation will arise on the agenda."¹⁷

In the non-nuclear sphere, however, the level of co-operation achieved between socialist and capitalist countries in eliminating the danger of war in Europe is at present lower than that in the nuclear sphere.

On 23 November 1978 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, the Warsaw Treaty countries issued an appeal to all states and peoples of the world "to work towards talks in the near future among the five nuclear powers--the USSR, the United States, France, Britain, and China--aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons of all kinds from the arsenals of states and directing nuclear energy exclusively towards peaceful needs."¹⁸

As has already been stated, detente is capable, as it develops, of strengthening Eurocentric tendencies in the military policies of the West European powers, both within the framework of NATO and outside it.

The Europeanization of NATO, i.e. the increase in the relative importance within it of its European participants, may strengthen. The principal mechanism of Europeanization could well be the Eurogroup of NATO, which is capable of becoming a major center for co-ordinating many key aspects of the military policies of member-states.

The development of military links among West European powers outside NATO, too, may continue in parallel, above all in the military-industrial sphere, i.e. in the area where the military side of integration is most strongly manifested. Further development of military-industrial co-operation in Western Europe is encountering stubborn resistance from the United States.

In examining the situation as a whole, it is striking that the ruling circles of West European states, with the exception of the neutral countries and Finland, still continue to think in terms of opposing military blocs, although they admit the possibility and, with regard to strategic weapons, even the desirability of some reduction in the quantitative and qualitative levels of the armed forces and armaments of capitalist and socialist countries. At the same time,

neither Eurocentric nor Atlantic tendencies in military policy are leading to the main objective of the peoples of Western Europe-- elimination of the danger of war once and for all.

From the viewpoint of the interests of everyone in Europe, the road ahead lies through consistent measures radically to reduce all types of armaments and armed forces on a regional and global scale. However, it must be stated that, unfortunately, an immense gap still exists between the aspirations of the broad popular masses and the behavior on the international stage of representatives of ruling circles in many West European states. This shows yet again how timely was the call issued by participating countries in the Warsaw Treaty in 1976 to all states "not to undertake actions which could lead to the expansion of existing closed groupings or military-political alliances or the establishment of new groupings or alliances of this kind."¹⁹

In November 1978 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, participating countries affirmed their "readiness to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty Organization simultaneously with the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, as a first step, to eliminate their military organizations, beginning with the mutual reduction of military activities."²⁰

This would form a major stage in building a durable peace on a regional and global scale.

FOOTNOTES

1. Edward Heath, *Old World, New Horizons. Britain, the Common Market, and the Atlantic Alliance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 4, 70-73.
2. *The Times*, 22 July 1970, p. 6.
3. *Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs* (London, 29 August 1969), pp. 760-762.
4. *The Times*, 10 March 1976, p. 6.
5. *Le Monde*, 29-30 June 1969, p. 8.
6. *Le Monde*, 4 June 1973, p. 14.
7. *Archiv der Gegenwart. Die weltweite Dokumentation für Politik und Wirtschaft*, Bonn, 39. Jg. Folge 21, 22 May 1969, p. 14698.
8. *Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 787. House of Commons Official Report, 14th-25th July 1969* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1969), Cols. 878-879.
9. *The Times*, 27 February 1976, p. 14.
10. *NATO Review*, No. 2, 1976, p. 9.
11. *Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs*, 9 May 1969, p. 422.
12. *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Bulletin. Sonderausgabe*, (Bonn, 30 June 1972), p. 1300.
13. *Le Monde*, 23 November 1973, p. 8.
14. *The Times*, 23 November 1973, p. 6.
15. *SALT. The Moscow Agreements and Beyond* (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1974), p. 204.
16. *Survey of Current Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1979, p. 187; *Le Monde*, 28 June 1979, p. 14; *Survey of Current Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 1979, p. 25.

17. *Documents and Resolutions. XIVth Congress of the CPSU* (Moscow, 1976), p. 28.
18. "Soveshchanie Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora. Moskva, 22-23 noiabria 1978 goda" (Moscow, 1978), p. 26.
19. See "Soveshchanie Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora. Bukharest, 25-26 noiabria 1976 goda" (Moscow, 1976), p. 15.
20. "Soveshchanie Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora. Moskva, 22-23 noiabria 1978 goda" (Moscow, 1978), p. 18.

SELECTION TWO

Lukin, V.P., *"Tsentry sily": kontseptsii i real'nost'* [*Power Centers: Conceptions and Reality*] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1983), pp. 62-98.

Chapter 2: "Na puti k zapadnoevropeiskomu 'tsentru sily'" [Towards a West European "Power Center"]

Ideas of European unity were born long before a series of practical initiatives which were concluded in 1957 by the signing of the Treaty of Rome which, as is known, commenced the creation of the European Economic Community. The apologists of today's "Europeanism" attribute their primordial unifying experiences as much to Charles the Great who ostensibly personified "the first apparition of European unity."¹ Also numbering among the "Europeanists" were Pope Pius V, the inspiration for crusades, and, of course, Napoleon I, who created a "continental system" with fire and sword. It would be logical to also include in this very loose historical list the Hitlerite "new order" of 1940-1944, however this episode of "European unity" is hushed up, for it obviously does not blend in with the "positive context" of Europeanist ideological development.

The two world wars were a true stimulus for the crystallization and confirmation of West European aspirations within the ruling circles of the continent's leading countries. These wars--having broken out on European territory to a considerable extent and having brought about quite appreciable suffering and destruction to the European continent--led, apart from everything else, to a substantial weakening of the West European capitalist states. Europe, which was the cradle of modern industrial civilization, which in the XVIII and XIX centuries--like the Chinese empire in an earlier period--naturally felt itself in the person of its intellectual leaders to be the "center of the world," in the middle of the XX century has gradually been losing its sense of self which had seemed so natural and eternal. In the eastern half of Europe socialist states came into being and were firmly established, challenging the order which was perceived as the traditional and "normal" structure of European life.

Within the world capitalist system the United States shot sharply forward and assumed a dominating position; it was viewed by the West Europeans as an inordinately expanded outgrowth of European civilization. Matters reached the point that after World War II this outgrowth had turned into the guardian and "savior" of West European capitalism, essentially dictating its domestic (the "Marshall Plan") and foreign policy. This actual situation was, on an ideological level, synthesized into the ideology of Atlanticism. In depending on objective centripetal

tendencies in the development of state-monopolistic capitalism, particularly on such concrete manifestations of this tendency as the transatlantic transfer of capital, the appearance and rapid development of multinational corporations (MNCs), whose activity encompasses the entire non-socialist world, but is mainly concentrated on either side of the Atlantic and, finally, in depending on the common military-strategic interests of modern capitalism--embodied in the alliance between the U.S. and the West European capitalist states called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), this ideological current became, in the postwar period, a mouthpiece for the aspirations of that part of the ruling classes in the leading capitalist states that saw the future of the "Western world" in its gradual, universal international integration. The Atlanticist trend assumed a particularly strong position during the first postwar period, when there was a sole, obvious, undisputed leader in world capitalism--the United States of America. During this period, Atlanticism--represented most expressively on the American side by such political figures as Dean Acheson, George Ball, Christian Herter, Clarence Streit, etc.--was a form of substantiating and projecting into the future American domination within the capitalist world. As for West European Atlantists (represented in the political arena by such figures as [?] V. Robertson, [?] W. Clayton, Paul-Henri Spaak), they expressed the views held by those groups in the European ruling circles who considered the shifting of world capitalism's center to the U.S. to be an accomplished and inevitable fact and who saw no other (except recognizing American domination) alternative for West European capitalism.

During the first postwar period the Europeanist trend was in the shadows and represented an exotic, marginal current which continued to develop the slogans of "Pan-Europe" introduced during the inter-war period by the prominent French politician Aristide Briand and not in any way actually realized.

However the situation begins to change noticeably in the mid-50s. By this time Western Europe had begun to reap the first fruits of the restoration of the economies that had been destroyed during World War II and to display the first signs of independent foreign policy activity. It became obvious that the contours of the old world, so customary to the West European bourgeois vision, were losing their former clarity before their very eyes. After World War II, the designation of a "bipolar world" came into the language of American political strategists, where Western Europe turned from the former center into the front-line zone of confrontation between the two systems, into one of the instruments of American global strategy. The situation was complicated even more by the fact that fundamental and inevitable changes also took place in the other direction. The old colonial world collapsed. Former West European metropolises lost their reliable great-power reserve and they swiftly turned from enormous empires into relatively small-scale states.

The first reaction of Western Europe's ruling circles was to take cover behind the American coat of armor, which seemed to be so reliable. Hence, the dissemination of Atlanticist views during these postwar years.

However the signs of economic restoration and socio-political stabilization entailed intensified searches for a long-term strategy which, in the context of the new, postwar world, would lead to the restoration of the West European countries' previous, seemingly "natural," central position in world politics. The response to this demand by the West European states' bourgeoisie which was gradually reinforcing its position was the revival of the Europeanist course.

"Europeanism," writes a leading Soviet analyst in this field, A.I. Utkin, "is an ideology of isolating Western Europe, of forming the West European alliance as an autonomous center in the world arena. This ideo-political phenomenon, which absorbs the Eurocentrist views of the West European bourgeoisie, is aimed at "returning" to a narrow circle of former colonial metropolises their former world influence. Europeanism as an ideology focuses on greater independence from the hegemonic power of the capitalist world in the postwar period--the U.S., whence results the definite anti-American trend of Europeanism."²

The present-day Europeanist course was generated on the basis of a traditional Europeanist disposition* and received a new negative impulse as a result of the rapid dissemination of Atlanticist opinions. Being a reaction of anti-American circles in the bourgeoisie of the West European states, as well as in the middle strata and the working class, this course is extremely complex and heterogeneous in its social composition, political aims and entire orientation.

The course favoring the creation of a special West European "power center" is extremely wide-spread and diffused. It includes, first of all, a considerable portion of the bourgeois centrist trends. Particularly influential among them are the so-called "technocrats"--representatives of the bourgeois and bureaucratic circles who are convinced that Europeans can solve their own economic and social problems with greater effectiveness and expediency by doing it independently, without the domination of the Americans; secondly, there are influential left-centrist groups (social democrats, socialists, and a certain part of the radicals). Finally, third of all, the Europeanism

* "The present course toward European unity," writes one of the FRG's leading "European" theoreticians and practitioners, Walter Hallstein, in his book, "draws its strength equally from two sources: insight and practical common sense, from a centuries-old dream for a united Europe and the demands of the space era. Europe is not a new undertaking. It is merely an old one reopened." (W. Hallstein, *Europe in the Making* (N.Y., 1974), p. 15.)

activists are of a different kind of nationalistic trend (including rightist) who realize the narrow-mindedness and incompetence of any area-limited nationalism emanating from Western Europe. Hence their determination of coordinate traditional great-power aspirations of their own ex-metropole with the same aspirations of recent European rivals and competitors.

A classic variety of just such "Europeanism" is the Gaullist trend. Gaullism is mainly and above all the direct continuation of the French bourgeoisie's traditional nationalism. Its entire ideological enthusiasm and exaltation and its entire foreign policy activity were aimed at recreating "French grandeur" in postwar conditions. In comparison to this, any other strategic orientation appeared subordinate and secondary in the eyes of orthodox representatives of Gaullism. Hence their extreme mistrust and often hostile attitude towards any supranational projects if they were not connected with the French leadership. "What are the realities of Europe? What are the foundations on which it can be built?" inquired General de Gaulle at a press conference on 5 December 1960. He answered these questions in the following way: "States are, of course, very different from each other-- each of them has its own spiritual domain, its own history, its own language, its own misfortunes, glory and ambitions; but these states are the only organisms having the power to command and to act. Imagining that something having the ability to act could be constructed and approved by the people outside the bounds of states is just a dream." It was precisely this severe sentence of French nationalism on the prospects of a supranational Europe that served as a prelude to a whole series of practical actions by France which significantly slowed down the movement towards West European integration.

However, Gaullism also has another face. General de Gaulle and his supporters were well aware of the real correlation of forces in the world arena overall and between France and the other great powers (especially the United States) in particular. They understood that in any selection of a strategy, in any efforts having to do with accumulating the physical factors of great-power influence, France could not by herself effectively oppose the United States on a global level. Hence arose the task of locating effective additional resources in order to realize the strategy of "grandeur." The answer was the Gaullist concept of West European unity, synthesized in the slogan "European Fatherland." If one opens up the quotation marks around the slogan, it turns out that the Gaullists imagined, at least for a considerable period of time, the structure of a West European association as a coalition basically not overstepping the bounds of traditional interstate coalitions. France was accorded a leading role in this association since it had a whole number of important advantages over the economically-stronger FRG (great-power status, a lot of political maneuverability, its own nuclear potential). Gaullism's support of a "Franco-German reconciliation" and

its stubborn opposition to allowing Great Britain into the "European Fatherland" can be explained namely by its desire to leave a decisive "French mark" on the West European coalition.

It would seem that on the structural side of affairs, Gaullist "Europeanism" was of a fairly superficial, "applied" nature. And at the same time there is scarcely any doubt that it was namely the Gaullist trend which played the decisive role in forcing Atlanticism into the background, which had ruled supreme in the first postwar period in Western Europe, and in breaking through the political surface of the Europeanist attitude and practical initiatives. The fact of the matter is that it was namely Gaullism which found within itself sufficiently strong-willed resources to overcome the inertia--which had seemed so natural and indisputable--of following American global domination and to "throw down the gauntlet" at Washington's diktat. It took the influence of such a distinguished personality as General de Gaulle for the urgent process of the political self-determination of the West European capitalist states' bourgeoisie to change from possibility into reality, to traverse the path--in a short period of time--from being the plans of individual theoreticians to becoming an integral part of the world and transatlantic political process.

Thus, the role of the Gaullist course consisted primarily in functioning to destroy the old, Atlanticist ideo-psychological and political stereotype. Another ideological trend laid down, to a considerable extent, the prerequisites for implementing the structural and creative tasks of developing a West European "power center."

The basis of this trend's approach to the problems being examined was a thesis on the need and potential for gradually creating a "United States of Europe," in other words, a supranational structure on behalf of which individual West European states would turn over a considerable portion of their own economic, military, foreign policy, and legal prerogatives. This type of Europeanist ideology frequently does not express itself as garishly and grandiloquently as the Gaullist trend; its anti-American and anti-Atlantic intonations were muffled and seemingly rationalized. However in its weight and objective content, this trend is a more radical, more well-founded challenge to the foundations of the Americanocentric capitalist world order.

Many supporters of this Europeanism orientation have for a long time been successfully and actively operating within the general Atlanticist boundaries. They have been propagating the thesis that the task of organizing and designing centripetal intra-European tendencies is an important and necessary stage on the way to constructing broader, overall Atlantic unity. They have thereby been able to ensure the benevolent neutrality and, in certain important relations, even the support of United States' ruling circles for its actions.

Since the '50s, energetic efforts have been made to lay out the Europeanist course in an orderly way. And here one should note above all the activity of the French political figure, Jean Monnet, whom the Western press calls the "father of European unity."*

In 1955 under Monnet's leadership the Action Committee for a United States of Europe was created. Its task consisted in winning over the most influential West European bourgeois politicians to the European concepts and thereby setting their realization in motion.

The Committee was conceived of and implemented as an extraordinarily elite group, uniting within its ranks no more than a few dozen people. However, these were the most influential political figures from the interested countries and, thanks to them, effective lobbying of the ideas of Monnet and his confederates were carried out and, above all, the idea of forming a system of common organs of power in the West European countries was moved up to the level of practical political examination.

Besides the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, there also exist about 20 major international organizations of a similar orientation in the West European countries....⁵

During the quarter century of its existence, the Europeanist current has succeeded in achieving sizable practical results towards the realization of its objective--turning capitalist Western Europe into an independent "power center." These results have been possible, of course, not only and not so much as a result of energetic strong-willed efforts by the ideologues and practitioners of Europeanism as as a result of objective shifts that have taken place in the correlation of forces within the capitalist world and, on a more concrete plane, as a result of the strengthening of the West European countries' position relative to their senior partner--the United States of America.

Western Europe occupies a territory of 3.7 million sq. km., which is 2.7 percent of the globe's area. On this small territory there are 25 capitalist states with a population of about 350 million, or a little more than 12 percent of the earth's population.⁶ However, these figures in no way settle the question of the West European region's role in the world economy and politics. Throughout the entire postwar period, the process of the West European capitalist states' economic development outstripping the United States' has expanded, with certain oscillations but, none the less, steadily. This process led to the fact that by 1980 the EEC countries had not only caught up with the U.S., but had surpassed it in volume of gross national product.

* For Jean Monnet's activities in greater detail, see A.I. Utkin's above-mentioned book.

THE DYNAMICS OF GNP GROWTH OF THE U.S. AND EEC⁷
(In billions of dollars)

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>
U.S.	399	506	688	982	1516	2586.5
EEC	193	263	411	628	1371	2762

During the postwar period the U.S.' relative weight in industrial production in the capitalist world has decreased by approximately 15 percent, while the 10 West European countries now making up the European Economic Community have substantially increased their share.

Whereas U.S. currency reserves during the period 1950-1980 decreased from 22.8 to 20.6 billion dollars, the EEC countries' currency reserves during this same period grew from 2.9 to 124.7 billion dollars. The volume of trade by the EEC countries exceeds by more than triple the volume of American trade (in 1980 the U.S. exported goods of 222.4 billion dollars, while the EEC--677.9 billion). The U.S. and the West European countries were practically even during the '70s in the place they occupied in the capitalist world's industrial production (their portions in 1980 were 36.1 and 35.8 percent, respectively).⁸

Recently there has appeared a tendency towards a certain alignment of the tempos of economic growth among the developed capitalist states. Thus, there is no sense of the potential for revenge on the part of the U.S. in the near term. And this means that the break between the West European countries and the U.S. in the level of economic development which, in the opinion of certain economists, took shape more than 100 years ago and assumed particularly contrasting forms after the end of World War II, has, on the whole, been abolished and this fact could not help but have extremely significant political consequences.

In analyzing the reasons for Western Europe's so energetic abolition of its economic lag behind the U.S. that has lasted more than a century, V.M. Kudrov writes: "In the '40s-'50s the U.S.' breakaway from its competitors in this area grew even more. At the same time, the U.S. was practically the sole 'power center' in the capitalist world, it sharply expanded its production capacities and economic potential. World War II hurled Western Europe backwards. Exploiting its superiority and at the same time striving to restore the economies of Western Europe and Japan more quickly and to consolidate capitalism's general position in the face of the growth of socialism's forces, the U.S. at first transferred equipment and technology, as well as technical knowledge developed or obtained before and during the war, to them rather extensively. The massive borrowing of American equipment and technology, although it did move the West European countries forward,

nevertheless at first greatly fortified the technological break since it did not stimulate the development of their own scientific research or the introduction of native equipment and technology. Only at the end of the '50s and start of the '60s did the West European countries begin to create a broad base for RDT&E. This enabled them to begin catching up to the U.S. in many areas, both in an economic and in a scientific-technological respect.¹⁰

One of the most substantial indicators of the shift from Western Europe's long-standing unilateral dependence on the U.S. to a complex structure of interdependence has been the significant increase in the export of West European capital to the U.S. Whereas in the first postwar period the movement of capital was in one direction--from the U.S. to Europe--at the turn of the '80s the situation had changed acutely. By this time period, the West European export of capital (for direct investments) to the U.S. economy was already practically equal in volume to the export of American capital to Western Europe. During the period 1970 to 1979 direct foreign capital investments in the U.S. increased from 13.3 billion dollars to 52.3 billion, or almost quadruple. The main portion of these investments falls to the countries of Western Europe--62 percent. Foreign investments in the American economy in recent years have grown particularly as a result of such phenomena as the fall of the dollar, the relative growth of production costs in West European countries, the rise in interest rates and the fall of the U.S. stock market, the traditional "open door" policy (the U.S. limits foreign capital access only in nuclear energy, radio-electronics, domestic air transportation, and river and coastal shipping), and the increased threat of protectionism sharply expanding.¹¹ One should also make note of the tendency to reduce the U.S. share in the overall volume of direct capital investments abroad (from 55.1 percent in 1960 to 47.7 percent in 1976) while Western Europe has retained its share (37.1 and 37.3 percent respectively).¹²

It goes without saying that the indicators cited and a number of other facts regarding the increase in Western Europe's relative weight in the world capitalist economy do not settle the entire complex and multi-faceted picture. In a number of important parameters the West European countries still lag behind their partner across the ocean (and also behind Japan). For example, the countries of Western Europe are still noticeably inferior to the U.S. in expenditures on RDT&E dealing with a number of key and most promising fields of production (mastering space and the World Ocean, producing output from the newest branches of industry, utilizing modern types of technology, raising the level of development in agriculture, education, etc.).

On the whole, however, certification of the significant increase in the role of the West European capitalist states in the world economy is generally accepted. And this is a very vital, objective prerequisite for the development of a regional West European "power center."

Naturally, it is still namely a question of the prerequisite. For the potential of turning Western Europe into a "power center" to become a reality, very important political decisions and actions are required. "The growth in the international political weight of the West European center has been slow in keeping pace with the strengthening of its economic might, which has resulted in a disparity between the role of Western Europe in the world economy and its political influence," justly emphasize the authors of the informative monograph *Western Europe in the System of International Relations*, prepared by a collective of authors from the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO [Institute of the World Economy and International Relations]. "This disparity is one of the basic reasons for the exacerbation of the contradictions between Western Europe's role in the world economy and its political influence."¹³ However, in order to eliminate this disparity it was necessary first of all to transform (if only partially) the total economic might of the West European capitalist states into combined economic might. So the idea of European economic integration has really gotten going.

It should be immediately emphasized that the economic integration of a number of West European capitalist states is by no means equivalent to the creation of a West European "power center." The first represents an objective process and is one of the consequences of the existence of centripetal tendencies in the development of the world capitalist economy. In this sense, West European economic integration is not at variance with the broader transatlantic integration tendency, but is, along with it, one of the links in the chain of laying down world-wide capitalist interdependence in the economic sphere.

However, along with centripetal tendencies in the world capitalist economy, centrifugal tendencies, as is well known, exist and are being actively manifested. On the economic plane, they are reflected in a keen competitive struggle on many levels, but primarily on the level of rivalry among various national state-monopolistic enterprises. On the politico-ideological level in the case we are examining, it is a question of an attempt by the Europeanist current to exploit regional centripetal processes in order to contrast them to broader transatlantic centrifugal processes. And so, unlike the Gaullists, who have tried as the main lever in creating a European "power center" to make a political coalition of a more or less traditional form (not excluding, by the way, a limited economic alliance), the main Europeanist current has basically preferred to rely on the economic integration of Western Europe.

As for the actual process of a West European "power center" taking shape, efforts in this direction have been, basically, the result of a series of difficult incomplete compromises between the first and second approaches.

In the most general sense, the process of a West European "power center" taking shape can be divided into three basic stages.¹⁴

The first stage encompasses the period between the end of World War II and 1957. This was the period of indisputable U.S. supremacy in the capitalist world and of the preponderance of ideas and practical activities motivated by the Atlanticist trend. However, even in this period the first careful and partial, but quite concrete steps were taken to create all-European institutions. In particular, during this period such associations come into being as the European Council and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). These were the first sprouts of West European power-center development.

The second period encompasses the interim between 1957 and 1973. Its initial stage is the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and, in accordance with it, the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), known in world economic and political literature as the Common Market. Originally, six states joined the EEC: France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. Shortly after the creation of the Common Market, there arose a competing economic organization headed by England--the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). During the '60s and beginning of the '70s, there is an acute struggle over which organization will head up the process of West European integration.

In this period the formation of many West European institutions takes place (the European Investment Bank, the European Social Fund, the European Foundation for Management Development, etc.). Efforts are made to repair ties with "outside countries": agreements are signed on an association between the EEC and several other European bourgeois states, in particular Greece and Turkey. The first steps are taken to expand the principle of an association in a non-European sphere, in particular, in a number of the West European states' former colonies.

The third stage begins in 1973 with the collapse of the EFTA and the entry of Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland into the Common Market.

This stage, which continues right up to the present time, represents a qualitatively-new level of European integration. The number of EEC members has grown to 10 (on 1 January 1981 Greece entered this organization). By 1984, Spain and Portugal might also be admitted to the Common Market and the EEC would thereby embrace an overwhelming majority of the West European capitalist states, so that in a purely geographic, territorial respect, the creation of the contours of a West European "power center" will draw near to completion.

At the same time, the third, current stage of West European integration is characterized by extremely acute economic and political complications which are dangerous for the continuation of this undertaking in the future and are connected with a whole number of factors, among which are: the unfavorable status of the world capitalist

economy, the strengthening of centrifugal phenomena caused by the increase in the community's size, the growing opposition by the United States to the further growth of integrational processes,* and, finally, the struggle of a significant portion of the working class and leftist forces from West European states against a "Europe of trusts."

On the functional plane, it can be said that at first when the EEC was taking shape, the basis, the nucleus of this process was integration in the economic sphere. The basis for the measures connected with the implementation of the Treaty of Rome was, as is known, the creation of a customs alliance of "the Six" (subsequently applied to new members). By the end of the '60s the developing West European center had reached a significant degree of agreement in agrarian and trade policy. Stable points of contact were also noted in the currency-financial sphere, particularly with respect to the dollar. The trade interests of the participating countries were closely intertwined. Whereas in 1962, only 38 percent of the EEC countries' commodity circulation fell to commodity exchange within the Common Market, in 1973 this figure had grown to 52 percent.¹⁵ Thus, by the beginning of the '70s, the community on an economic plane had become an objective reality.

A highly important element of this initial process is the creation of all-European international administrative mechanisms which the most active Europeanists appraise as the prototypes for future supranational centers of political power.

The EEC's main executive organ is the European Commission. It has the right and the authority to put forward proposals for the agenda of the EEC's Council of Ministers or the European Council--the regular forum for the leaders of the countries in the community (in recent times the European Council has met regularly three times a year). The European Commission's legal foundation for existence are the articles of the Treaty of Rome which call upon "the Six" original EEC participant countries to establish common organs. During its existence, the European Commission has succeeded in substantially expanding its functions and in carrying out intense activity, stimulating integration processes.

* Incidentally, this destructive U.S. policy, especially during the Reagan Administration's tenure, has often led to an unexpected effect--the strengthening of the EEC countries' solidarity. As Italy's Prime Minister, Giovanni Spadolini, declared in March 1982, "between France, the FRG, and Italy an intensive and close cooperation has taken shape. Around this nucleus, made up of the continent's three strongest countries, a broader unity of EEC countries can take shape so as to respond from a position of strength, to U.S. policy, above all in the area of currency which is aimed at strangling the European Economy." (*L'Unita*, Anno LIX, N47, Mercoledì, 3 marzo, 1982.)

The European Commission's creation was the result of a complex and prolonged process of searches and compromises. Practical steps in West European political coordination were initiated by the resolutions of the high-level Hague summit in 1969. Thus, for the first time on a practical basis, the question was posed about the need to supplement the joint problems of economic integration with measures on political regulation. To this aim the so-called Davignon Committee was created which was concerned with elaborating the bases for the political mechanism of accord on the foreign policy courses of the EEC countries.

A new important stage in the political integration was the creation of the already-mentioned European Council in December 1974 during a high-level summit in Paris. It was a question of forming a permanently-operating community organ like the summits of the heads of states and governments of the Common Market countries. The extensive authority imparted to the European Council enabled certain commentators to declare for the creation of the embryo of a West European government--an organ in which is concentrated the functions of making highly important decisions regarding the community's political and economic problems.

In 1976 the European Council adopted a resolution of principle importance about conducting general elections in the European Parliament. Originally these elections were planned for 1978, but owing to a whole series of complications, were postponed for a year. In June 1979 more than 100 million voters from West European EEC member states took part in the elections in the first European Parliament in history. The European Parliament's 434 deputies are distributed not according to national principles, but according to political ones: three large international parties took shape--the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the Social Democrats. The European Parliament's functions are still extremely limited--it can in no way be compared in influence to the European Commission. Aside from controlling approximately 25 percent of the EEC's budget and the right (fairly ephemeral, however) to disband the European Commission, the Parliament is endowed with only consultative functions manifested during the debates of reports on the community's policies. Even if the Parliament were able to gather the 2/3 majority needed to dissolve the European Commission, this question would go to a special appellate organ--the so-called Court of Justice, authorized to repeal the Parliament's decision.

The future fate of the European Parliament is closely connected with the overall prospects for a supranational West European political structure. To what degree will it reflect the bourgeois-bureaucratic tendencies of a "Europe of trusts" and to what degree will the masses of the West European states be able to achieve an increase in the level of democratic control over multinational manipulating from above--the answer to this question is closely connected with the level of the future political significance and effectiveness of the European Parliament.

At the present time many of its deputies are expressing acute dissatisfaction with this organ's work and with the limited nature of the prerogatives allotted to it. Thus, the first president of the European Parliament, Simone Veil (France), demanded that this organ be allotted a veto right for certain resolutions by the EEC Council of Ministers and proposed the creation of special legislation for the European Economic Community.

No matter what the European Parliament's claims of being the "supreme leader" of the integration process, since 1972 the deciding role in this matter has belonged to the systematic meetings of the heads of state of the community's members, as well as to the European Commission in Brussels.

An important milestone on the path leading to the strengthening of the political alliance among the West European capitalist states was the so-called "Tindemans Report." In December 1974 during the first meeting of the European Council, Belgium's Prime Minister, one of the most active "structural" Europeanists, Leo Tindemans,* was charged with composing a report on the prospects for a European alliance. Throughout 1975 Tindemans visited all the capitals of "the Nine," talked with ministers and heads of state, and the higher bureaucrats and leaders of the bourgeois political parties. The result of his talks was a report which was sent to Tindemans' Common Market colleagues and subsequently, in January 1976, was published.

In the second chapter of the report plans and proposals were set forth to further increase elements of political and military-policy integration in the Common Market countries. The basis of these proposals was a focus on the EEC's further evolution towards centralism by creating in it a single center for the adoption of resolutions on basic political, as well as economic, problems. It was namely in Tindemans' report that the question was posed for the first time in a developed and concretized form about the adoption of appropriate legal commitments which would become the basis for a systematic elaboration and implementation of joint political resolutions. Toward this end, the Tindemans Report recommended the introduction of "qualitative changes in the mechanism of foreign policy consultations."²⁷ Thus, it was conceived to create the organizational and legal prerequisites to solve the basic task: gradually replacing the conventional coordination of their foreign policy courses with the elaboration of a single foreign policy for the community.

On the way to fulfilling this task it was, however, absolutely necessary to overcome the main obstacle: the principle of the community's unanimity when making highly important decisions. The

* In the early '80s Leo Tindemans became Belgium's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Tindemans Report contained precisely such a recommendation. It signified an appeal to reexamine the so-called "Luxembourg Compromise," adopted by the Common Market countries in 1966, according to which any EEC member-state could, by means of the veto right, block any resolution by the community.

As can be seen in the Tindemans Report, the "structural Europeanists" were once again endeavoring to circumvent opposition to further progress in the community's supranational institutionalization on the part of supporters of the concept of a "European Fatherland." Actually aimed at this were proposals to assign additional functions to the European Commission and to have elections in the European Parliament so as to afterwards accord to it legislative functions.

Although the Tindemans Report was formally approved in April 1976 at a session of the European Council, a number of its important tenets (in particular annulling the principle of unanimity) were not implemented in practice. At the same time, it should be noted that this report became an important milestone in the formation of the European "power center," because for the first time its long-term focal points were elaborated and publicized with considerable completeness and thoroughness.

An important problem throughout the EEC's entire existence has been the question of the prospects for military integration or, more precisely, of the correlation of West European military cooperation with the presently-existing system of unambiguous and indisputable American military-strategic domination.

This system was begun on 4 April 1949 when 12 countries (among which 10 were European: Belgium, Great Britain, France, Holland, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal) signed, together with the U.S. and Canada, the Brussels Treaty to create a North Atlantic military alliance. Later, Greece and Turkey (1952) and the FRG (1955) were included in this alliance.

The sense and substance of NATO was an attempt to change the correlation of forces which had taken shape after World War II in Europe by means of military pressure in accordance with the anti-communist views of the ruling circles in the states located on both sides of the Atlantic. An additional circumstance was the West European states' great military and economic weakness which prompted their leaders--at that time basically of a pro-Atlantic disposition--to willingly and unqualifiedly hand over the function of elaborating and implementing a global military strategy to Washington. In this connection, the main rational and technical argument was the certification of American military-strategic might and, ensuing from this, the reliability and sufficiency of the American military guarantees to the West European states. The United States' enormous superiority over its West European partners in the economic and military spheres stipulated, on the other

hand, the U.S.' encouraging attitude towards the first initial steps on the path towards coordination among the West European states in the area of defense. In particular, Washington supported the creation in 1948 of the West European Union (WEU) made up of England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg (afterwards the FRG and Italy joined this union). For a long time the West European Union was an organ of little importance, performing exclusively consultative functions which, naturally, did not represent any kind of "Europeanist challenge" to NATO's powerful military and bureaucratic structure. The nucleus of this structure has been the joint command of the NATO armed forces at whose disposal have been placed the best and most powerful subunits from the national armies of this military bloc's participating countries. NATO's military might was particularly strengthened after the mid-50s rearmament of the Bundeswehr and its transformation into the basic strike force of the NATO military divisions.

Of course, disagreements among the imperialist military bloc's transoceanic and West European participants existed even in the initial stages of its existence. In particular, they have touched upon the question of the treaty's sphere of operation. American foreign policy leaders have endeavored to turn the bloc into a strike force for the realization of American interventionist actions on practically any point of the globe. Thus, Washington spent a great deal of effort on drawing the NATO countries into the Korean War. However, this pressure met with stubborn opposition. For their part, the West European countries have tried to make use of NATO in order to retain and strengthen their power in colonial and dependent countries. But Washington was not inclined to meet them halfway in such questions (the U.S. did not support the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt in 1956 and it "washed its hands" of the French war in Algiers).

Mutual disillusionment led to the first serious rifts within NATO. In 1958 France's Gaullist leadership set forth a reorganization plan for the Atlantic bloc based on a trilateral leadership (the U.S., England and France). At the same time both London and Paris set about creating their own nuclear forces.

President Kennedy's Administration tried to root out the first weak sprouts of West European military-strategic autonomy. The plan advanced by the U.S. envisaged merging the nuclear forces being created by England and France with the American forces within NATO's general framework. On a more concrete plane, it was a question of turning NATO into a "fourth nuclear power" by creating "multilateral nuclear forces." The last word regarding their possible use was to belong to the American President alone. This plan was resolutely rejected by de Gaulle. France preferred to put its armed forces under its own control and thereby defied American domination in Western Europe in the military sphere. In 1966 France quit the NATO military organization (in so doing, having retained its membership in the North Atlantic alliance).

The Gaullist initiative of military-strategic self-assertion did not, of course, inflict irreparable damage on NATO's military structures and military planning. However, this precedent did create serious long-term problems: it placed on the agenda the question of whether Western Europe's unilateral and indisputable military dependence on the U.S. was the sole rational option from the viewpoint of the interests of the West European states' ruling classes in the new historical situation which had replaced the highly specific first postwar period. Since 1966 the discussion of this problem has turned from "thinking about the unthinkable" into one of the very real and concrete questions on the agenda. Moreover, the ever more open discussion on this problem within West European political and scientific circles has become in itself one of the fairly effective instruments of pressure on the senior partner.

The result of this pressure and of Washington's attempt to find "Atlanticist answers" to Europeanist aspirations was the creation in 1968 of the so-called Eurogroup within the NATO structure--an informational and consultative organ which is made up of the alliance's European members, with the exception of France and Iceland. In 1970 the Eurogroup elaborated the European Defense Improvement Program and in 1976, based on it, the Independent European Programme Group was formed which is concerned with examining stepping up the "West European states' contributions" to NATO activities.¹⁸

In the early '70s the United States made a serious attempt to sever the tendency--unfavorable for it--towards the "military autonomization" of its European allies.

Having come to power, President Nixon proclaimed the principle of conditionality of U.S. military support on "West European obedience" in economic interrelations on a transatlantic level.¹⁹ This was accompanied by an overall stepping up of U.S. European policy, which had until then, in fact, been in the background as a result of pressing "Indochina concerns." The year 1973 was proclaimed the "Year of Europe" and on 23 April Secretary of State Henry Kissinger came out with a plan for a "new Atlantic charter" which attempted to tie the military aspect of the American-West European alliance with economic and political problems. The basis of Kissinger's approach lay in the idea of allotting Western Europe a regional role, leaving the U.S. the prerogatives to elaborate and implement a global strategy. It has been namely since this period that discussions began to assume a form which has been kept to the present day on such highly important questions as the role of Western Europe in the "flexible response" doctrine, the distribution of the financial burdens of military needs between the U.S. and West European states, and the number and character of American armed forces in Europe.

The Nixon-Kissinger approach was unequivocally rejected by the West European side on France's initiative. Since that time strict coordination in the military sphere on an all-Atlantic level has been questioned by an ever greater number of representatives from influential political circles in the West European countries.

At the present time the disparity between the two major imperialist centers in the military-strategic sphere is extremely substantial and they have the tendency towards growing further. There are various opinions concerning the reasons for these differences. Certain specialists believe that underlying the "misunderstandings" are reasons of a purely psychological attribute which can be overcome once the mechanism of bilateral consultations has been improved.²⁰ However, in the '70s and the early '80s, consultations between American and West European leaders on questions of "Atlantic defense" have become more and more individual and the differences--more and more obvious and serious. Consequently, the matter is not one of psychology, but of the gradual demarcation of the vital interests of both components of the "Atlantic community."

As is well-known, the American-West European military alliance is aimed against the Soviet Union and its European allies. General anti-Soviet thinking lies at the base of NATO's creation. At the present time, however, differences in the approaches of the West European capitalist states and the U.S. towards the main opponent are discernible. This, naturally, concerns not the general ideological platform, but specific strategic aspects. In the most general sense, one could say that the West European ruling circles believe that they have gotten more out of international detente--which became particularly perceptible in the first half of the '70s--than their American allies. Moreover, they view the preservation of constructive relations with the Soviet Union and with other European socialist countries (in any event better [relations] compared to the U.S.) as one of the basic conditions for the solidity of their international situation as a full-fledged "power center," having its own character and its own political line.

Formed upon this has been a relatively less hysterical, more sensible and rational (although here, too, substantial oscillations and inconsistencies have appeared) attitude towards the problem of the so-called "Soviet military threat."

"There is no question that detente in Europe is real in a way that Soviet-American detente never was," emphasizes Professor Gregory Treverton, Assistant Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

This dissimilar attitude towards the main opponent has been accompanied by a growth in significant bilateral differences in military policy. The Europeanist ideological current has actively driven a wedge into these real differences on the general Atlantic military-strategic

problem with its determination to overcome them on the way to expanding the influence of the West European "power center" taking shape.

The substance of a book written by a collective of research analysts from the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales and bearing the title *Europe's Security in the Eighties*,²² is very characteristic of this trend. In the prefatory article its author, Pierre Lellouche, the head of the European Security Program at the above-mentioned institute, declares frankly that on the strategic plane, Western Europe at the turn of the '80s found itself in "a new situation, in obvious contrast to what had taken place 10 years ago."²³ The novelty of the situation, in the opinion of Lellouche and like-minded analysts, springs primarily from the sharp decline in the reliability of American strategic guarantees to the West European countries and from its reduction to a minimal threshold.²⁴ This phenomenon is analyzed, as a rule, on three different levels.

Above all it is the effectiveness of the American guarantees on a global-strategic level that is subject to doubt by the West European allies. They are convinced that the Soviet Union's attainment of a position of approximate equality in this sphere in the early '70s has led to the fact that the probability of the United States using its main "deterrent forces" in the event a military conflict breaks out in Europe has fallen to a minimum and cannot at the present time be recognized as a factor upon which the West European ruling circles could realistically base their expectations. Such outlooks are often not disputed by authoritative American politicians and specialists. For example, Henry Kissinger in his celebrated Brussels speech in September 1979 admitted that the "nuclear umbrella" with which he and his fellow secretaries of state rhetorically had covered Europe consisted of assurances "that cannot be true, and if my analysis is correct, we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide."²⁵ And so, the fact that the king had no clothes on was stated for everyone to hear by no one other than the king's former closest associate. It was precisely on an early interpretation of this tendency that the entire Gaullist military policy was based, the culmination of which was the above-mentioned withdrawal of France from the NATO military organization and the development of its own strategic forces. At the present time there is a slow, but quite definite process going on of pulling the "West European rear" towards the position and appraisals of the Gaullist vanguard of the '60s.

The second level of American-West European disagreements in the military sphere are the growing doubts among Western Europeans with regard to the true objectives of American military development in the European TVD. Many West European political figures (such as former FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt) connected the December 1979 NATO resolution, thrust by the United States upon its allies, to deploy 572 cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in West European countries by 1983-1984 with the American strategists' desire to "separate" the European

TVD from the Soviet-American strategic opposition so as to have the potential, in the event of a military conflict, to localize the exchange of nuclear strikes to European territory and to thereby leave the territory of the United States itself inviolable. So, the measures which originally pursued the objective of "changing the West Europeans' minds" about the unreliability of previous American strategic guarantees (including the resolution to produce neutron weapons) is leading to a diametrically opposite result and is stimulating the opening of a new front in Western Europe's mistrust of and alienation from the U.S.

The third level of disagreements and tension is connected with the growing uncertainty of the reliability and effectiveness of the American ally as far as the level of an eventual "conventional-type" conflict goes.

Numerous conversations and calculations regarding the weakness of American conventional forces in general and their 350,000-man contingent in Europe in particular could not help but evoke a single-minded response on the other side of the Atlantic. Naturally, serious and qualified observers are not inclined to base their analysis on the propagandistic noise in the U.S. about NATO's weakness in conventional arms compared to the Warsaw Pact forces. This is how the real state of affairs is appraised by the already-mentioned leading British specialist on strategic questions, Gregory Treverton:

There is no question that the Soviet force in Eastern Europe is impressive.... Yet the situation* hardly is as bleak as it is often portrayed.... If the Warsaw Pact attacked without mobilization, NATO could field almost as many men in the central region as the Pact.... Moreover, despite continuing Soviet force improvements, NATO's position should look better in several years, not worse, given the improvements undertaken in the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP).... Assessments of the conventional balance are bedeviled by bean counting and the distance between Eastern and Western worst-case analyses. Popular analyses of the balance too often still count numbers of divisions in East and West, ignoring differences in size and structure, or compare numbers of tanks, forgetting that not only may tanks fight other tanks, but so do anti-tank weapons and aircraft.

Thus, a serious analysis of the correlation of conventional-type forces in Europe (like, incidentally, the correlation of nuclear-missile arms too) makes it possible to conclude that it is not a particular fear by the West Europeans of the "Soviet military threat" that underlies the

* The Russian text replaces "situation" with "correlation of forces" [SLC].

tiffs between the U.S. and West European countries in the military-strategic sphere. On the contrary, the propaganda campaign regarding the intensification of this "threat" has been stepped up by Washington not lastly to "discipline" its Atlantic allies, to bind them more rigidly to American military-strategic schemes, and to eradicate tendencies of interpreting their own strategic tasks, autonomously of the U.S.

As for the West European ruling circles, they, often taking refuge in discussions about the specific West European perception of the "Soviet military threat," are attempting to incorporate the military-strategic problem into a complex of actions connected with the creation of an autonomous "power center."* Recently these real reasons for American-West European differences on strategic questions have been expressed more and more openly in the European press. "In order to ensure the security of the Atlantic world in the future, which is looking more and more like the age of fierce rivalry between civilizations, ideologies, races and continents," proclaims one of the leading French military-policy observers, "in-depth reforms in Western policy and strategy have become vitally necessary. Without them, the progressive descent of Western Europe's role in the world by the end of this century will be inevitable. The continuation of the previous orientation, the preservation of the military organization in its present forms or the simple transformation of structures no longer respond to the continuously more complex world situation."²⁷

In what direction should the Western alliance's military structure, guided by the United States, be transformed?

Another French analyst, Professor H. Paris, gives a precise and clear response to this question. He declares: "The Europeans are doomed to replace the Americans, at least partially, in defending their continent."²⁸ There is no doubt that the term "defend" in West European ruling circles is to an ever greater extent being understood very loosely and is far from being settled by the American postulates on the "Soviet military threat." A military observer from the Parisian newspaper *Le Figaro* talks about the Europeanists' real plans and ambitions:

* For an initial basis in appraising the potential of the West European circles to create their own autonomous military structure, the following basic facts should be kept in mind: in 1981 the countries who are members of the NATO Eurogroup spent approximately \$80 billion on defense. Of this impressive sum, approximately \$18.5 billion was spent on heavy combat equipment. The Eurogroup possesses the most modern military equipment and is continuously improving it. The size of the armed forces of the Eurogroup countries in 1981 came to approximately 2.5 million people, there being the potential to bring it up to 5 million in very short order.

The fact that NATO has suggested the thought that it, specifically, is the European foundation for defense has blocked and continues to block Europe's political development. Because--and this is where the whole difficulty lies--the creation of a European defense cannot precede the birth of a political community nor follow it: it is one of the main elements of this political development.... And, of course, neither weak impulses nor declarations by some government figure or other do not change anything at all in this situation. As long as the Old World begs for an American protectorate, it will have to renounce its own political freedom. This is nothing new under the sun: after all, Pericles declared more than some 2,000 years ago that Athens would not be obliged to answer to their allies as long as the Athenian fleet was defending them from the barbarians.²⁹

And so, behind the superficial, visible symptoms and vicissitudes of American-West European differences in the military sphere, one distinctly senses the determination of sections of European ruling circles to shift to a new level in the development of a European "power center," having united the military component of this development to the economic and political. In the early '80s, public reflections by European military strategists and political figures on the specific ways to "Europeanize" the West European military potential and strategic aims became very frequent. One of the most developed and consistent analyses of this trend is contained in the already-mentioned work by the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales.³⁰ Summarized, the recommendations by the authors of the analysis boil down to a significant quantitative improvement of the West European states' armed forces, their organization (primarily by France, the FRG and Great Britain) of joint arms production, as well as the elaboration of a system to mutually supplement the armed forces of the three militarily-strongest West European powers. In particular, it is proposed to specialize their armies in such a way that the Bundeswehr will basically represent the conventional armed forces, focused mainly on the European TVD. England and France have concentrated on providing the West European "nuclear umbrella," while France would, in addition, be granted the exclusive mission of foreign military intervention (primarily in the developing countries). In the nuclear sphere this project plans to return to the old idea of uniting French and British nuclear forces and of expanding the spheres of their potential operation so that they do not only "shield" the national territories of the two countries but, under certain circumstances, play the role of being their own kind of "detonator" of a nuclear conflict. In the latter case, this is the project of France's former Minister of Defense General Beaufre, according to whom, in the event a military conflict breaks out in Europe, the English and French nuclear forces, being under West European command, must be put into operation, thereby forcing the U.S. leadership to enter its own nuclear forces into the combat action, despite personal

oscillations. This plan (and others like it) was in no way aiming to abolish NATO or to break American-West European allied ties. It is a question of searching for forms of turning these ties into more equal, more acceptable ones for the growing great-power ambitions of the West European ruling circles.

Proof of the spread of these kinds of sentiments is the fact that after Francois Mitterrand came to power in France, they not only did not diminish, they became a component of the country's governmental course. In the early '80s statements became especially frequent (including by French government figures) on the fact that "the Europeans should give some thought to a future political community having its own defense means" (Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy) and on the creation of "a European defensive space which would finally make it possible to construct a European bastion in the Atlantic alliance (one of the chief socialist military experts, [?] R. Ponteon).³¹ In December 1981 the French government set forth a proposal to significantly step up the activity the West European Union, in particular, to create a system for interaction in this sole, purely West European organization concerned with defense problems and with the European Parliament to seek to include in its sphere of activity all EEC member states. Concomitantly with this demarche, the European parliaments, at the plenary meeting of the West European Union's Assembly, resolved to order the European Council to prepare the way which should lead to the creation of a European alliance based on the Treaty of Rome and the Brussels Treaty. This resolution, adopted by the majority (voting against were 17 Social Democrats from England, Holland and the FRG) is an extremely important symptom, which gives proof of the move by the West European rears closer to the French vanguard. Broad support is gradually taking shape to include the military-strategic problems in the general current of forming a West European "power center."

Of course, it would be incorrect to overestimate this tendency. Firstly, the Europeanist approach to military-strategic problems is by no means a dominating one. Within the ruling circles of the West European states (especially in the FRG, England and Italy) sentiments continue to remain strong which favor the improvement of American-West European relations in the military sphere in the Atlanticist clef. During its more than 30 years of existence the NATO structures have surrounded themselves with well-established traditions and are perceived by many influential politicians in Western Europe as something self-contained and natural. Outside-NATO (and, consequently, American) approaches to strategic problems, questions of West European security simply are not perceived (with the exception of France who has worked out her own traditions, beginning in General de Gaulle's time). There also exists a deep-rooted conviction that the West European complex, owing to a whole series of political, social, geographical, and

psychological reasons, is not in a position to play a military role, which would be adequate to the region's purely arithmetic, economic and human potentials.

Interstate contradictions play a large, obstructive role in the process of military-strategic coordination. Sharp political contradictions between France and England have, until now, placed nuclear cooperation between them outside the limits of what is politically possible. No less politically complex is the problem of the West German Bundeswehr's integration into the structure of European strategic planning. The French ruling circles' constant tendencies to combine West European group interests with French "national interests" has also not been conducive to organizing the daring projects advanced in Paris on a practical basis.

A serious, restraining factor in the process of the West European states' coordinated militarization is the activity of the leftist and anti-war forces in Western Europe. As we have seen, the Europeanists' concepts propose, in the final analysis, to turn the West European complex into a relatively autonomous from the United States and, at the same time, an extremely powerful, militaristic center. This signifies, apart from everything else, a significant augmentation of military efforts with the corresponding severe consequences for the West European workers, which is especially noticeable given the depression and mass unemployment that have been characteristic of the early '80s. It is not surprising that the tendencies towards a military frame for a "Europe of trusts" have evoked protests from the workers and their political organizations.

It is also important that the U.S. has been displaying decisive opposition to the plans to create an autonomous European military alliance. Washington has not gotten tired of repeating that, under any circumstances, it does not intend to share with anyone access to "the room with the buttons." Its reaction to the ideas like those expressed by General Beaufre consists in threatening to abandon its allies to the mercy of fate and thereby completely ignore the "conception of a detonator." It also resolutely rejects the idea of a "nuclear umbrella" over Western Europe by expanding the spheres of the operational length of the modernized English and French nuclear forces over the whole West European TVD (Lellouche accompanies this proposal with the idea of, in the future, deploying English and French euromissiles and bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons in the FRG).³² As a "retaliatory measure" to such far-reaching strategic displays by the Europeanists, American scientific and political periodicals close to the White House have begun to actively debate the idea of the expediency of gradually transferring the American nuclear-missile potential located in Western Europe to the sea, concentrating it on U.S. submarines and surface ships. Such an action would lead, in the opinion of nationalistic and anti-Europeanist conservatives--who enjoy considerable influence in the Reagan Administration--to the United States acquiring greater

maneuverability and would ensure it, under any circumstances, of having a completely free hand in strategic matters, regardless of the evolution of the situation on the European continent. Of course, these expectations have thus far not had a direct, practical purpose: their real task consists in blackmailing the Europeanists with a complete "U.S. withdrawal from Europe."

On the whole, one can say that in the complex and contradictory process of forming a West European capitalist "power center," the military-strategic aspect lags considerably behind the economic integration and politico-institutional coordination. Before the start of the '80s, this aspect was in an obviously embryonic state and had no serious practical significance. At the start of the present decade, however, the situation began to change appreciably. Firstly, the discussion in West European countries on problems connected with elaborating a general European strategy have been noticeably intensified and stepped up. Secondly, one can sense the erosion of old "taboos" engendered by the inertia of movement during the more than 30-year period of American military-strategic domination. Thirdly, discussions on possible scenarios for European integration in this sphere have been shifted to a high political level. Thus, in October 1982 the leaders of the two militarily-strongest EEC countries--France and the FRG--agreed to conduct regular (twice a year) consultations on security problems.

And so, at the present time something like an intermediary status has taken shape, characterized by Trevorton in the following way: "America can no longer lead as it did, but Europe is not yet in a position to fill the gap."³³ In the long-term, however, the Europeanist, power-center tendencies of Western Europe's ruling circles will, apparently, gradually gather strength and will be reflected in concrete political actions.

Finally, the last decade and the beginning of the present one are characterized by the first attempts of the developing West European "power center" to elaborate its own foreign policy aims and to implement them in a number of ways in practice.

Above all, the very aspiration to create a unified "West European look" is inconceivable without it being separated from the general "Atlanticist look." This assumes a certain opposition to the United States. Consequently, the very idea of creating a West European "power center" contained a foreign policy self-discovery, primarily in relation to the U.S. "Our societies have been moving in different directions for the better part of the 1970s; the Atlantic has become deeper and wider,"³⁴ Josef Joffe, a senior editor at the West German weekly *Die Zeit* vividly certifies. The differences between the two strongest centers of world capitalism are connected with many problems, including those that have already been examined. At the base of these differences lies a growing competition in the economic sphere. The West European countries are crowding the United States not only in markets of "third

countries," but also in America's own market. Complaints by American businessmen about the domination of European satellite business concerns in the U.S. are accompanied by the demands to strengthen protectionist measures against the Common Market, having protected its boundaries from foreign expansion with solid customs barriers. These demands led, in July 1982, to Washington's decision to sharply increase duties on steel imported into the U.S. from Western Europe, which forced the EEC in October 1982 to come to a compromise on the given problem which was extremely difficult for the community. Currency and finances are a highly important source of the differences and conflicts. The Reagan Administration's attempts to raise the efficiency of the American economy by introducing high bank rates is leading to the undermining of West European expansion in the American market, which cannot help but have an effect upon relations between the U.S. and EEC on a political level. The acuteness of this conflict was manifested particularly distinctly during meetings in Ottawa in July 1981 and in Versailles in June 1982 of the heads of states and governments of the seven strongest developed capitalist states. "This is precisely the area," said France's Minister of Foreign Affairs Claude Cheysson, "where, as we fear, the greatest difficulties in relations between the U.S. and West Europeans will arise. Can one imagine that a free market could develop when the course of the dollar during a year fluctuated by 20 percent in one direction or the other?"³⁵

Interimperialistic contradictions in the economic and financial spheres are accompanied by a reciprocal propaganda campaign based on the principle of "double standards": protectionism is harmful for the transatlantic economy when the other side uses it, but is helpful when it is used "on this side." The essence, however, lies in a growing rivalry, going beyond the limits of "professional routine" and becoming, along with debates on military-strategic questions, an important factor in political relations.

Attempts by the West European "power center" to find "its own worth" in East-West relations have been very noticeable. In another context it has already been recalled that the problem of international detente has been and is assessed differently by the ruling circles of the U.S. and Western Europe. "Europeans," noted former British Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Carrington, "living next door to the Warsaw Pact and with memories of a war fought on their own farms and in their own cities, inevitably have particular apprehensions about the possibility of nuclear war in Europe."³⁶ It is not surprising that the European ruling circles were the first to respond and responded most vigorously to the Soviet proposals for a fundamental improvement in the political climate on the European continent; proposals which led in 1975 to the adoption of the Helsinki Accords. To a considerable degree it was namely the joint efforts of the leading West European states which forced the United States to join the normalization process in Europe, although during this Washington displayed no small opposition to the movement towards European detente.³⁷ It was namely in their

reaction--surpassing the U.S.' with the greatest force--to the socialist countries' initiatives that the contours were manifested for a truly West European policy on detente.

This is caused largely by the fact that the EEC countries were to the greatest extent able to exploit the fruits of the improvement in the situation in the first half of the '70s. According to the calculations of the well-known industrialist and President of Fiat Giovanni Agnelli, at the turn of the '80s approximately 300,000 West European workers were directly employed in jobs produced by orders from the socialist countries. If you take into consideration indirect jobs connected with these orders, this figure, as Agnelli notes, will be considerably larger.³⁸ Of substantial importance for the West European states within the plan to diversify the sources of their energy supplies are the oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union. Proceeding from their vital interests, the leading EEC countries were able, after several vacillations, to overcome intensive American pressure and to sign a major long-term project with the USSR in early 1982 to construct a gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe and to subsequently oppose Washington's attempts to set up obstacles to [hinder] its implementation.

"For the Europeans," writes Pierre Lellouche, the experience of detente did not--and indeed could not--parallel that of the United States. From the very beginning, detente in Europe has meant a very concrete, day-to-day set of human and economic relationships. It means the stabilization of the territorial status quo on the Continent and the continued safety* of Berlin. Economically, it translates into an important market for European industrial goods and much-needed access of a new source of raw materials and energy. [Economically, it has transformed Europe into an important market for industrial energy and raw material trade.] Detente should also permit the stabilization of defense efforts at modest levels.** On a wider political level, detente has allowed the Europeans to enjoy more freedom of maneuver and has provided a convenient setting in which Europe can [relatively] safely assert her own identity [autonomy] against the leader of the Alliance."³⁹

* The Russian text replaces "safety" with "stability." Hereafter, differences between the English and Russian texts will be noted in the text, the Russian version appearing in brackets [SLC].

** Russian omits: "(between two and three percent of the gross national product of most European nations)."

Of course, in the given case it is not a question of opposing strategic aims. The most general ideological positions of the ruling circles from capitalism's two major centers concur and this concurrence finds its reflection in a number of important aspects of policy in relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In particular, it is manifested in the reaction on both sides of the Atlantic to various international-political crises both in Europe itself and beyond its borders. In this connection an extremely curious phenomenon is observed. At the stage of initial "detachment" from unambiguous and rigid American domination is observed a negative attitude towards certain concrete aspects of American policy which are aimed at destroying detente's achievements. Subsequently, once the process of "detachment" has already taken place, the EEC countries frequently undertake their own actions, sometimes parallel to the United States' actions, but done outside the limits of the "senior partner's" rigid diktat. Such, in particular, were the EEC countries' "own" repressive measures, separate from the U.S., in the early '80s in connection with the crisis events in Poland.

An important sphere for the manifestation of the EEC's autonomous foreign policy course is the Middle East and the Persian Gulf countries. The West European countries' ruling circles view this area of the world, from which about 60 percent of all their energy resources are received, as a region of direct and vitally important interests for the "power center" taking shape. "Although most European governments are reluctant to face this new reality," writes Lellouche, laying it on a bit thick, "the fact remains that defending Europe in the 1980s will also mean protecting the raw materials and energy sources located in faraway regions--particularly in the Middle East and Africa--without which European democracies cannot survive."⁴⁰ Facing us is a quite definite and unambiguous imperialist claim for "West European actions" of a military nature in the developing countries. At the end of the '70s this claim had already been corroborated by specific arguments such as the activation of the English and French Navies in areas of the Indian Ocean bordering the Middle East countries and the first appearance in these waters of West German combat ships during the postwar period.

On a diplomatic level, the Middle East has become an arena for the EEC countries' first official initiative taken separately from the U.S. and against its will. The prerequisites for this initiative were set down back in 1973 when the countries of, at that time, "the Nine" adopted a joint declaration which formulated the basic conditions for settling the Middle East conflict that were coordinated among the EEC countries. They included: the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force, the need for Israel to withdraw all troops from 1967-occupied territory, recognition of the legal rights of the Palestinian people, as well as recognition of the right of all countries in this region to live in peace and within secure borders. This program, in fact, signified a departure from the previously-conducted, openly pro-Israeli position and

a shift towards a balanced approach expected to strengthen West European positions in the region in the context of an acute energy crisis and obvious U.S. inability to cope with the situation that had been created.

The failure of the U.S. Camp David line in combination with new acute conflicts taking place in the region (above all, the Iranian revolution) gave rise at the turn of the '70s to '80s to a new splash in West European diplomatic activity in this direction. The result of this was the so-called EEC Venice Declaration, whose nucleus was a demand to include the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the Middle East peace talks as the spokesman for the interests of the Palestinian people. "We believed," the British Minister of Foreign Affairs subsequently stated, "and are even more convinced today, that a proper appreciation of the Palestinian aspect is essential if a lasting solution is to be found."⁴¹ It is not surprising that this initiative caused intense irritation in the U.S., who saw in it an attempt to oppose the American Camp David line with its own approach to the Middle East problem and to seize the initiative in its own hands. Washington spared no efforts to "dissolve" the EEC's Venice Declaration in calls for Atlantic unity and it fiercely checked practical actions aimed at its political development. There have also been differences among the leading West European states operating within this trend (this was reflected, for example, at the beginning of 1982 in the partial repudiation of the Venice Declaration by France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Claude Cheysson).

However, the significance of this EEC action goes beyond the bounds of private political maneuvering. It marks the beginning of an open and publically-declared foreign policy of the European "power center." The EEC countries' position during the Lebanon aggression by Israel in the summer of 1982 demonstrated that the Venice Declaration was not a remote episode, but reflects the views and orientations of influential European circles within the leading EEC countries.

On a broader plane one can speak of a gradual coordination of the West European states' approach to the complex and contradictory problems of the developing countries. This was manifested particularly distinctly during the so-called North-South dialogue. Western Europe, dependent to a greater extent than the U.S. on deliveries of energy and raw material from the developing countries, immediately took a less rigid position with respect to their demands. As a result, in 1975 the so-called Lome Convention was signed between the EEC and 46 countries from Africa, the Caribbean Basin and the Pacific Ocean, in accordance with which the West European countries were allowed to import 96 percent of the agricultural products from the developing countries participating in the agreement duty-free. A system was concomitantly created for the stabilization of export earnings from 12 types of raw material (Stabex) which, in the opinion of many specialists, became an example for more just relations between former colonies and metropolises forced to reckon with the growing strength and influence of the developing countries in

the world. Later, in October 1979, the EEC signed a second Lome Convention with 57 developing countries which largely reproduced the principles of the preceding agreement.⁴² Thus, for the first half of the '80s (the convention is valid for five years) preferential ties for the West European "power center" with an influential group of independent states is assured. Against the background of an openly uncompromising U.S. policy on this problem, the EEC strategy acquires a tinge of obviously distancing itself from Washington and, moreover, of countering it competitively.

The theoreticians and strategists of the West European "power center" consider the specific zone of its influence to be the Mediterranean and North Africa. This trend was particularly accentuated after Greece entered the EEC on 1 January 1981 and in light of the proposed entry of Spain and Portugal. In the early '80s attempts were stepped up, in particular, to impart a "European character" to the settlement of the Cyprus problem. In order to more closely draw the Mediterranean countries to the EEC's sphere of influence, a project is being discussed to introduce ties of an "intermediary status" for them with the community. In the '80s it is proposed to endow Turkey, Malta, Cyprus and a number of other countries in the region with this status.

EEC ties are gradually taking shape with more remote and less traditional spheres of European foreign policy activity.

Of them, the most promising one is considered to be Equatorial and South Africa. In Central Africa the EEC has a traditionally strong position, inherited from the colonial times. The United States' relatively weak influence here combined with the former colonial powers' traditional economic and cultural predominance make this region a zone in which the apologists of a European global strategy intend to secure their dominating position. As for South Africa, here one senses the determination of the West European countries to seize the initiative out of U.S. hands of settling the situation on terms favorable for imperialism. In this plan England's actions have been particularly vigorous, having played an appreciable role in the last stages of settling the Rhodesia problem, as well as in the Namibia talks.

In Africa, however, attempts for a joint West European approach quite often are stifled by state competitive ambitions nourished by the legacy of old colonial passions. Therefore thus far, competitive, and not coordinated, tendencies have dominated here within the West European group.

The EEC's activity has also been stepped up in Asia. Relations between the West European "power center" countries and Japan are highly complex and contradictory. Economically, both the EEC and Japan depend to a very considerable degree (substantially greater than the U.S.) on foreign trade. Hence the especially acute competition between these two capitalist "power centers." The first serious clashes between the West

European countries and Japan took place back in the '50s when, despite pressure from the U.S., for several years the West Europeans blocked Tokyo's entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).⁴³ In recent years Japanese capital's economic offensive in the West European market has led to the formation of an annual \$8 billion EEC deficit in trade with Japan. Such a situation gives rise to a sharp political reaction.

At the same time, there exists a trend towards coordinating the actions of the two "power centers" while they search for ways of overcoming their strict dependence on the United States. This trend is reflected in attempts to coordinate given political actions in relations with the socialist states in connection with various crisis situations in such a way so that "allied loyalty" with respect to Washington harmonizes with elements of an "autonomous approach."

As for the competitive aspects of Japanese-West European relations, they are graphically manifested in Southeast Asia. In striving to retain its position under the onslaught of Japanese capital in this region, in the '70s the EEC came to sign a series of special agreements with the ASEAN countries. The first industrial EEC-ASEAN conference took place in Brussels in 1978, the second in Djakarta in 1979.⁴⁴ Since that time contacts between the two groups have become systematic.

The EEC's position in Latin America is significant, where West European investments make up more than one-fourth of all foreign investments on the continent.⁴⁵ Politically, at the turn of the '70s to '80s the community succeeded in securing for itself a portion of the influence which the United States had lost in the traditional sphere of its supremacy. The West European states have for a long time already exploited the determination of certain states in the Southern cone (in particular, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) to offset American domination to a certain degree by emphasizing its European economic and cultural ties. Recently the formation of the West European "power center" has been leaving an ever greater mark upon this phenomenon.

The start of the '80s was marked by the fairly energetic display of West European political activity in an area of American domination that until recently was off limits--Central America. The EEC countries' reaction--extremely different from that of the U.S.--to the revolutionary events in Nicaragua and El Salvador and the attempts by the West European "power center," most actively represented by French diplomacy, to coordinate its position on this problem with Mexico became important factors in the development of the situation in Central America.

And so, gradually, the basic geographical and problem contours of the West European "power center's" foreign policy activity have emerged.

Of course, this is a process that has only begun to take shape. The substance of this chapter has naturally intended to accentuate attention on those facts and phenomena in the economics, politics and ideology of the West European capitalist states which testify to the reality and significance of regional centripetal processes. These processes, however, by no means settle the complex and multipurpose picture of West European activity.

It can be said that today's Western Europe is a complex phenomenon in whose bowels the united "power center" taking shape coexists, frequently very uneasily and tensely, with various national "power centers" (above all the "great four"--France, the FRG, Great Britain and Italy) which have their own considerable interests in the world and levers of influence.

Along with this, the processes of an all-Atlantic integration continue to function and at times even gain strength. On an economic level they are stimulated by the activity of major multi-national corporations and on a political level by U.S. claims--which have gotten stronger during the Reagan Administration's tenure--to the role of the unambiguous and indisputable leader of world capitalism. On an ideological level the priority of the unity of the entire capitalist world over its crawling away into various "power centers" is underscored, as was noted earlier, by the concept of mutual dependence which has influential adherents in the West European capitalist states.

A serious obstacle and one difficult to overcome while accelerating the process of forming a "power center" in Western Europe is the internal (with respect to the EEC), in other words, interstate contradictions and conflicts. They have been especially exacerbated in recent times in the economic sphere. In the early '80s the most acute problems connected with the implementation of the community's so-called "common agricultural policy" was advanced to the forefront. This program, aimed at "evening out the revenues" in the agricultural sector of various EEC member states, has in fact proved to be so costly and ineffective that it has led to a budget crisis in the Common Market and to a sharp exacerbation of disputes among the participants, accompanied by threats to withdraw from the EEC (England's conservative government in 1981 and Greece's socialist government in 1982 resorted to such threats). The tension in this area reached such scales that the British journal, *The Economist*, an active adherent of its country's participation in the EEC published an article entitled "Why Did We Ever Invent the EEC?"^{*46}

Earlier we spoke about the difficulties and contradictions engendered by narrow nationalistic ambitions and competition in the

* Actually, this was the title of the issue on the front cover. The article was entitled "Saving the EEC" [SLC].

political sphere. A keen struggle for leadership flares up every time that a routine project is advanced to strengthen military-strategic cooperation, looking back to the "senior partner" less than before.

CIA specialist on European affairs, Paula Scalingi, writes:

The 1980s will be a crucial decade for the European Economic Community. This quasi-federal apparatus, nearly a quarter of a century old, today faces a formidable array of interrelated internal problems which stem from two fundamental causes: inherent weaknesses in the EEC's institutional and financial structure and the Community's inability to adjust with changing times. The prospects for maintaining the present level of economic and political cooperation will depend on the member states' willingness to address and rectify the most pressing of these problems.

Such pessimistic appraisals at the turn of the '70s to '80s became fairly frequent.

However, such statements, especially from the American side, at times contain a powerful element of "wishful thinking." The EEC's real difficulties are indisputable. They were especially exacerbated during the economic recession at the end of the '70s and the beginning of the '80s when, within the ruling groups of various countries, incentives to "get out of the quagmire on one's own" became extremely vigorous. But if one approaches this problem from the position of a longer-term prospect (and such, namely, was the task of this analysis), the preservation and augmentation of objective tendencies and subjective motivations, operating towards the consolidation of the West European "power center" become obvious. The results that have already been attained while shaping West European economic and political integration are an extremely ponderable argument in favor of the viewpoint that this tendency will subsequently force its way through numerous difficulties and obstacles.

FOOTNOTES

¹R. Dubail, *Une monde en mutation. De George Pompidou a Valery Giscard d'Estaing* (Paris, 1974), pp. 69-72.

²A.I. Utkin, *Doktriny atlantizma i evropeiskaia integratsiia* (Moscow, 1979), p. 73.

³*Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁶*International Economic Report of the President*, Jan. 1977, p. 138; OECD, *Main Economic Indicators*, Feb. 1981, p. 72.

⁷"Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie kapitalisticheskikh i razvivaiushchikhsia stran," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 8, 1980, p. 7.

⁸"Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie kapitalisticheskikh i razvivaiushchikhsia stran," *Ibid.*, No. 8, 1981, p. 8.

⁹A. Medison, *Ekonomicheskoe razvitie v stranakh Zapada* (Moscow, 1967), p. 52.

¹⁰V.M. Kudrov, "Tri tsentra imperializma: tendentsii sootnosheniia sil," *SSSR: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, No. 9, 1981, p. 5.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

¹³*Zapadnaia Evropa v sisteme sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii* (Moscow, 1979), p. 47.

¹⁴See L. Maier, D. Mel'nikov, V. Shenaev, "Zapadnoevropeiskii tsentr imperialisticheskogo sopernichestva," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 12, 1978, p. 23.

¹⁵See D. Mel'nikov, "Zapadnoevropeiskii tsentr--aspekt politicheskii," *Ibid.*, No. 5, 1978, p. 23.

¹⁶*International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 20, 1982.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 95.

- ¹⁸*The Military Balance, 1981-1982* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 22.
- ¹⁹R. Nixon, *The Memories*, pp. 371-372.
- ²⁰*International Security*, Winter 1980/81 (Vol. 5, No. 3), pp. 104-105.
- ²¹*Ibid.*, Fall 1980 (Vol. 5, No. 2), p. 153.
- ²²*La Securite de l'Europe dans les annees 80* (Paris, 1981).
- ²³*Ibid.*, p. 15.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 22.
- ²⁵*International Security*, Fall 1980 (Vol. 5, No. 2), p. 144.
- ²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.
- ²⁷F. Miksche, "La Securite de l'Europe Occidentale," *Defense Nationale*, Feb. 1981, p. 62.
- ²⁸H. Paris, "Strategie Sovietique et Americaine," *Cahiers de la Fondation pour les etudes de defense nationale*, 3rd trimestre, 1980, p. 117.
- ²⁹*Le Figaro*, Nov. 5, 1981, p. 4.
- ³⁰*La Securite de l'Europe dans les annees 80*.
- ³¹*L'Express*, Dec. 4, 1981, pp. 7-8.
- ³²P. Lellouche, "Europe and Her Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981, p. 820 [sic-p. 832].
- ³³*International Security*, Fall 1980 (Vol. 5, No. 2), p. 158.
- ³⁴J. Joffe, "European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981, p. 839.
- ³⁵Cited in *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1982.
- ³⁶*Vital Speeches of the Day*, Oct. 15, 1981 (Vol. XLVIII, No. 1), p. 8.
- ³⁷See H. Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston, Toronto, 1979), pp. 380-433.
- ³⁸G. Agnelli, "East-West Trade: A European View," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980, p. 1030.

³⁹*Ibid.*, Spring 1981, p. 820.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 816-817.

⁴¹Lord Carrington, "The Foreign Policy of the EEC. Europe in the 1980's," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Oct. 15, 1981, p. 8.

⁴²See V.A. Kremeniuk, V.P. Lukin, V.S. Rudnev (eds.), *SSHA i razvivaiushchiesia strany. 70-e gody* (Moscow, 1981), p. 101.

⁴³A. Utkin, "Atlantizm i Iaponiia," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 6, 1976, p. 59.

⁴⁴Iu. Iudanov, "Zapadnoevropeiskii kapital v Azii," *Ibid.*, No. 7, 1980, p. 80.

⁴⁵Iu. Iudanov, "Zapadnoevropeiskii kapital v stranakh Latinskoj Ameriki," *Ibid.*, No. 11, 1980, p. 81.

⁴⁶*The Economist*, 28 Nov.-4 Dec. 1981, pp. 13-16 [sic-pp. 11-13].

⁴⁷P. Scalingi, "The European Community in 1981; Pondering at the Crossroads," *Orbis*, Spring 1981 (Vol. 25, No. 1), p. 123.

SELECTION THREE

Kovalenko, Iu., "'Dinozavr' v upriazhke NATO" [The "Dinosaur" in NATO's Harness], *Izvestiia*, 12 July 1984, p. 5

Recently the topic of so-called "European defense" has not gotten off the pages of the French press. Scarcely had the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe begun when certain political and military figures began to discuss the necessity of further strengthening NATO's European flank. Taking refuge in the false thesis about the "Soviet military threat," they have been advancing various concepts intended to lay a contractual foundation under the creation of a "Eurodefense" system.

Characteristic in this regard was the seminar, recently organized by *Le Figaro Magazine* on the topic, "The Birth of the European Nation." The course of the discussions showed that for the seminar participants--representing ultraconservative circles from a number of West European countries--Europe's "political development" is inextricably linked with questions of military cooperation.

At the seminar quite a few "daring" ideas were promulgated which are, at the present time, worrying the minds of West European strategists. For example, some of them insisted on the need to create a European interventionist corps--like the American Rapid Deployment Force--which, if necessary, could operate beyond Western Europe. Others proposed to accelerate armaments standardization and to develop joint weapons production on a European scale. Still others set forth plans to create a "European space corps," including a spy satellite, missile launch installations, and a military space station. In arguing the "timeliness" of this idea, one of the directors of *Le Figaro Magazine* [?] A. Griotre maintained that tomorrow, so he says, space will become the "forward line of defense and the independence of the Europeans."

When, on the banks of the Seine, they talk about strengthening "European defense," they primarily have in mind a Paris-Bonn military tandem. In the French capital they have actively supported lifting the "archaic" restrictions on the FRG on producing non-nuclear weapons. But not just non-nuclear. Some rightist opposition leaders are proposing giving the FRG access to nuclear weapons. This has been repeatedly discussed, in particular, by the head of the Rassemblement pour la Republique party, Jacques Chirac. One of the leaders of the Union pour la Democratie Francaise party, Simone Veil, has frankly stated that West Germany must be given nuclear weapons in order to prevent it from slipping into a "swamp of pacificism."

It must be said that Paris, as the newspaper *Le Quotidien de Paris* writes, has over the past three years gradually expanded the concept of

"vital interests," which means using nuclear deterrent forces. For some strategists, France's defense must begin not at the Rhine but at the Elbe, that is, at the FRG's eastern borders. So, for example, the former commander of France's naval strategic forces, Admiral Bonnemaison, believes that France must open its "nuclear umbrella" over West Germany.

Such an approach naturally meets with a warm response on the banks of the Rhine. The West German newspaper *Die Welt* has not only demanded that France take the FRG's "interests" into consideration in her nuclear planning, but is also supporting the creation of "European nuclear forces."

They are now shifting from theorizing about "Eurodefense" to making practical decisions. In mid-June in the French capital there were two conferences, one right after the other. First there was a session of the Council of the West European Union and then a week later this organization's Assembly met.

These two meetings discussed "stimulating" the WEU, established in 1955 and which united seven countries: France, the FRG, England, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. It was resolved, in the words of *Le Quotidien de Paris*, to wake up the "sleeping dinosaur," the existence of which West European society has known little about.

NATO experts came to the conclusion that the WEU had all the "qualities" necessary to become the foundation of the "Eurodefense" and, at the same time, a "reliable pillar" for NATO in Europe (the treaty creating the WEU provides for the mutual rendering of military aid in the event one of the countries becomes the victim of aggression). Paris and Bonn took upon themselves all the troubles of reawakening the "dinosaur." As if by an accidental combination of circumstances, for the past three years, a Frenchman has been selected to be the chairman of the WEU Assembly, a parliamentary deputy from the Union pour la Democratie Francaise party, [?] J.-M. Careau. The FRG's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, occupies the post of chairman of the WEU Council. It is this duo, so they believe on both sides of the Rhine, which is to promote the "revival" of the WEU.

At present, the main task facing this organization, so a document prepared by a special WEU working group implies, consists in increasing its contribution to the strengthening of NATO's European flank.

Just what ways of "stimulating the WEU" are Paris and Bonn proposing? Much is still being kept in the dark but certain aspects have become known. Above all: the abolition of the last restrictions on the FRG's production of conventional types of arms, including strategic bombers and missiles.

In addition, they envision expanding cooperation among all "the seven" countries in producing the latest weapons systems. Finally, various organs in the WEU--in hibernation until this--will be fortified, including the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. The role of the WEU's Assembly and the Council, which from now on will regularly have not only the Ministers of Foreign Affairs participating in their sessions, but also the Ministers of Defense, will increase significantly.

Judging from everything, France and the FRG intend to complete the WEU's resuscitation in time for its 30th anniversary celebration. This is planned to take place in Rome in October of this year under the banner of a sort of "second birth" of this organization.

On the other side of the Atlantic the plans for the rebirth of "Eurodefense" are regarded very favorably. And how! In London, for example, they have repeatedly underscored the fact that this has the aim of strengthening, not weakening, the North Atlantic alliance. In the words of the U.S. Ambassador to France, Evan Galbraith, the WEU will become a "good addition" to NATO. Washington believes that France's active participation in the WEU compensates for its "non-participation" in the military organization of the Atlantic alliance.

Will not the process of creating a new "European defense community," having a supranational character and possessing common armed forces, pass by? Observers in France are asking themselves this question ever more frequently. Let us recall that the treaty signed in 1952 to establish a "European defense community" aimed against the Soviet Union was, as a result of decisive actions by progressive forces, not ratified by France's National Assembly. Today, more than thirty years later, events are moving in the direction of establishing a "new defense community" under the WEU's flag, of waking up the sleeping "dinosaur" and of fastening it to NATO's military harness.

PART TWO

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONS

SELECTION FOUR

Utkin, A.I., "Vashington i problemy NATO" [Washington and NATO's Problems], *SSHA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologija*, No. 8 (August), 1983, pp. 7-17.

For the U.S. under the Reagan Administration, just as 20 or 30 years ago, the North Atlantic alliance is still one of the most important military-political alliances of those that it set up during the postwar period and it remains a guarantee of U.S. domination in the West. At the same time, under the present administration, its leadership, the determination of the bloc's future policy, the nature of relations between the military alliance's strongest member and its increasingly strong partners are being questioned more pointedly now than ever before.

The intensity of these questions is compounded by the struggle which is unfolding in Western Europe surrounding the deployment of American medium-range missiles in five West European NATO countries, scheduled to begin this year. These plans, directly aimed at turning Western Europe into a nuclear hostage of the U.S., touch upon a vitally important problem--national security.

The struggle surrounding this problem and the participation of increasingly broad segments of the masses in it is one of the factors indicating that latently-ripening processes within the bloc are shaping new correlations of forces among its main participants.

Prerequisites for Change

The basic prerequisites for change are: the growth in the relative weight of NATO's West European branch militarily and politically (following the strengthening of its economic position); the greater coordination in the relations of West European NATO members; the intensification of the "crisis of faith" in U.S. "nuclear guarantees"; the build-up of its own nuclear potential (England and France); the divergence of American and West European perceptions of international detente and of the tendencies and actions opposing or promoting this process.

The first prerequisite's development continued over more than a decade, but by the beginning of the '80s, an absolute and relative (within the NATO framework) increase in the West European countries' military might had taken place. Whereas in 1970 the U.S. European allies spent slightly more than 24 billion dollars for military purposes while the U.S. spent 76 billion (i.e., three times as much), in 1980 the expenditures of the West European NATO countries totaled 84.4 billion dollars versus 142.7 billion spent by the U.S., i.e., instead of the 3:1 U.S. superiority, by the beginning of the '80s the ratio had already

become 1:0.6. At the beginning of the '80s U.S. naval ships of all types numbered 1,888, while the West European members had 2,086.¹ Even more in the West European countries' favor, so to speak, is the correlation of troops and arms between the U.S. and its allies in the European TVD where the West European NATO members account for 91 percent of all ground forces, 86 percent of all air forces and more than 90 percent of all tank divisions (including armored personnel carriers).² These changes have affected not only the quantity of arms but also their qualitative indices. A decade and a half ago, American armed forces had better military equipment than the West Europeans; but today military planes built in Western Europe such as the Alpha-Jet, Jaguar, Harrier and Mirage are not inferior to corresponding American models. The West German Leonard-2 tank has been acknowledged to be NATO's best tank, the best training plane of the bloc's Air Force is the English Hawk, and the best antitank system is the Franco-West German Roland. One could go on and on with such proof of the military consolidation of NATO's West European members.

The second important prerequisite is the intensification of internal coordination between the West European NATO members. In the '60s the U.S. was still dealing with disparate and weak partners in the bloc. Over the past decade and a half the role of NATO's Eurogroup has increased; it is the organization in which the West European countries discuss their military problems without the dominating participation of the Americans. Essentially, the Eurogroup has become a kind of coordination center which, although it does not usurp the prerogatives of the supreme NATO command, nevertheless does to a certain extent allow the West Europeans to come out with their own coordinated line. Also contributing to this was the formation of the independent European program group (IEPG) in 1976, through which the West European countries began to coordinate the production of their own weapons, which considerably complicated the problem of "standardizing" NATO armaments since before this time the U.S. had exploited the disparity of its West European partners and had imposed its own weapons on the bloc's members.

The third prerequisite is the growth in the distrust of U.S. "nuclear guarantees." The fear that the U.S. will make a choice in favor of a regional war--a war in the European theater of military action (i.e., in the event a conflict arises which threatens to escalate into an exchange of nuclear strikes between the U.S. and USSR, Western Europe will be sacrificed in order to preserve the U.S.)--has even penetrated circles previously loyal to the Americans. The term "disengagement" has entered the political lexicon; it means that a kind of watershed lies between the U.S. armed forces in Europe and the American strategic forces and that a conflict involving Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons will by no means definitely lead to the use of the main American strategic arsenal. As a group of well-known American "Atlanticists" has written, "the fear of disengagement is constantly present in the West European capitals."³

The fourth prerequisite was the build-up of England and France's own nuclear potential in the mid-'70s. In 1974, then English Prime Minister Edward Heath publically advocated Anglo-French nuclear cooperation and the creation of "European nuclear forces" on this basis, proposing an agreement to this effect within the framework of the NATO Eurogroup. France suggested the idea of activating West European efforts, but not within the NATO Eurogroup, but rather within the framework of a West European alliance not directly connected with NATO and the U.S. (this proposal was made, in particular, by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing).⁴ However, the creation of "European nuclear forces" based on an Anglo-French bloc did not suit the FRG. Reflecting its position, the West German magazine *Aussenpolitik* wrote: "Anglo-French cooperation might provide technical, economic, and operational advantages, but it will serve national interests exclusively. From the other partner's point of view, it will not promote the creation of united nuclear forces or the corresponding reinforcement of European integration."⁵ The West German 1977 proposal, set forth by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at the London Institute for Strategic Studies, on the advisability of deploying American medium-range missiles in Western Europe is explained to a considerable extent by their fears of military development in neighboring countries.⁶ The American side has viewed this initiative as a long-awaited opportunity to neutralize the separatism tendency in this most important area and it has proposed a related option for NATO's nuclear "rearmament" in Europe--which was adopted in December 1979 by the NATO Council as the plan for deploying 108 American medium-range Pershing-2 missiles and 464 land-based cruise missiles (GLCMs), capable of covering up to 2,500 kilometers at low altitudes, in five West European countries in 1983-1986.

The fifth important circumstance is the divergence of views on the detente process, its results and its future. The present administration's approach to this problem has been to try to intensify its active opposition to the socialist community and to exacerbate the struggle against the socialist world. This aspiration has evoked discord among the Atlantic allies. "The most ticklish problems in relations between Western Europe and America," the *Financial Times* wrote, "are those lying in the center of the East-West axis."⁷ In analyzing the allies' reaction to the turn in American diplomacy, President Thomas Hughes of the Carnegie Foundation wrote that the Reagan Administration's attempt "to create a worldwide alliance against the USSR was not met with a warm response among the West Europeans: the Western allies, including Mrs. Thatcher, do not intend, like many figures in the Reagan Administration, to confuse political problems with military ones, to see nationalism as communism or to view all regional conflicts through the prism of East-West relations."⁸

The colossal budget deficit, the delivery of weapons to dictatorial regimes, and advice to rely on capitalist "free enterprise" do not seem to the U.S. allies to be an effective world policy for the '80s. On the contrary, from the West Europeans' point of view, such a policy could

lead to the alienation of a considerable number of developing countries and to the increase of contradictions between the centers of present-day capitalism.

"The problem of opposing views of detente is a more serious one" among those that are "creating tension in relations between the Atlantic allies," writes Harvard University Professor Eliot Cohen. "The root of this problem lies in the European belief that detente can and should continue and the American conviction to the contrary: detente cannot continue, nor should it."⁹ "The growing tempo of disintegration," Johns Hopkins University Professor Robert Tucker writes with alarm, "cannot fail to make an impression on all but the most inveterate optimists. Today's reality is such that Western Europe, including--and this is most important--West Germany, is just as devoted to detente as to the Atlantic alliance.... As long as this situation continues, the corrosion of the alliance will continue."¹⁰

Discord over the value of the policy of detente and the approach to it have become a constant factor in the interrelations of NATO member blocs and Washington's renunciation of the policy of detente has exacerbated intrawestern contradictions.

Growing Criticism of NATO in the U.S.

"Indications of growing dissatisfaction with the Atlantic alliance are visible everywhere today in the U.S. The feeling of disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the behavior of our main allies has suddenly come to the surface and has met with widespread agreement," wrote Tucker. Cohen noted that "on both sides of the Atlantic the structure and the very spirit of the alliance with which the new generation has grown up is being subjected to attacks...." "The intensity of the debates, stemming from amplified feelings of mutual distrust" has forced him to conclude that the "present crisis in the alliance is very serious."¹²

Inveterate "Atlanticists" considered it "natural" that the U.S. could--inasmuch as it had "overextended" itself by expending material resources in "many directions"--reduce its contribution to the "strengthening of the West's military might" in those areas having considerable financial potential of their own. And it seems to them that the primary region of this type is Western Europe, where the allies "have lost their previous loyalty" and, by exploiting American aid and support are, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's words, "pursuing their own egotistical national objectives."¹³

The external manifestations of the U.S. towards NATO have remained unchanged and, judging by the material resources and armed forces sent to Europe, NATO is still the most important alliance for the U.S. But under the cover of mutual vows of loyalty, there is growing skepticism

in the U.S. One hears ever more frequently discussions about the fact that in the pre-nuclear era the acquisition of powerful allies strengthened the main power of the military alliance proportionally to the forces gathered under its auspices; whereas in the nuclear age, the situation is changing. "If a great nuclear power is absolutely vulnerable to another opposing great nuclear power, he cannot significantly decrease, let alone completely abolish, his vulnerability by creating an alliance. Moreover, whereas the alliances cannot improve the physical security of the great nuclear power, they can decrease this security since the prospects for utilizing nuclear weapons will most likely increase as a result of another great nuclear power threatening the allies' security," Tucker argues, for example, and he concludes that now one can no longer maintain, as was done in the past, that America's alliance with Western Europe is dictated by considerations of U.S. security. On the contrary, from a certain point of view, this alliance now represents a very great threat to American security.¹⁴

The concept known as "global universalism" has begun to take shape in U.S. political and academic circles as a kind of reaction to the complication of interalliance relations in Western Europe, one of its central ideas being to place U.S. European policy on the same level as the other lines of Washington's global policy. For "Atlanticism," which has prevailed for more than three decades in the U.S. and has laid claim to exclusivity in international policy, the advancement of "global universalism" (its activation on all the world's main axes) would mean that the complex of inter-Atlantic relations would be less significant.

Arguments in favor of a departure from "Atlanticism" have been set forth by Carnegie Foundation researcher Ronald Steel in his article, "The End of the American Protectorate over Europe." Close ties with Western Europe, he declares, are only a waste of American resources; they do not strengthen the U.S.' overall position in the world and they weaken Washington as a "power center." Steel notes that in fiscal year 1981, the cost of maintaining American troops, either directly or indirectly operating in Western Europe, came to 81 billion dollars. Transferring or disbanding six of the ten divisions presently attached to NATO would save 30 billion dollars per year. He regards the support of Europe and what he calls the "overinvolvement" in European affairs a tribute to an outdated tradition and a result of pressure from monopolies with European connections. The NATO bloc, from his viewpoint, is essentially just an obstacle to a more regional and effective application of American might in the world. "The time has come to put an end to military ties with Europe that had been necessary in the past but that are now obsolete and undesirable. The United States no longer has the means to be Europe's protector or to extinguish social dissatisfaction throughout the noncommunist world.... The United States no longer has the economic surplus to do for others what these others have long been able to do themselves."¹⁵

Another advocate and ideologue of the "departure from Europe"-- Irving Kristol--goes even further, questioning NATO's value as an alliance: "What is the sense of insisting on consultations with our partners? In order to move ahead, we must rid ourselves of the alliance." He considers it expedient to replace NATO with a system of bilateral agreements.¹⁶

Naturally, the statements by these and certain other American political analysts contain a certain factor of blackmail, of frightening Western Europe in order to pressure her. But undoubtedly these statements also contain an element of serious disillusionment with the alliance with Western Europe and a determination to look for new ways and new methods of strengthening the American position in the world.

Noticable among U.S. political analysts is not only a weakened faith in their allies, but also a change in emphasis on deploying American troops to potential crisis regions without any substantial help from the allies.

There is a growing number of supporters of the point of view that at the current stage of development of international relations, most of all the United States needs its own pair of "long arms," i.e., a considerably larger Navy and mobile "rapid deployment forces," and not the dubious loyalty of its allies. The advocates of a "maritime strategy" point out that over the past decade, Western Europe has not been able to generate sufficient forces to make NATO superior to the Warsaw Pact countries in Europe and it has actually not wanted to include West European resources to help the U.S. resolve such strategic tasks as controlling the Persian Gulf or creating forces capable of intervening in the development of the "Third World" countries in "times of crisis."¹⁷

It is important to point to changes in the climate of the legislators' positions. In the spring of 1983, the U.S. Congress voted to set limits for the first time on the number of American servicemen in Europe and to refuse to finance a number of important, NATO-related programs.¹⁸

The Preliminary Results of Reagan's Policy

There have been noticeable changes in the West European policy of the Republican administration which took office in 1981 and which had been dissatisfied with the results of the activities of its predecessors. The single-minded and accentuated cultivation of ally relations with Western Europe and Japan stemming from Carter's "trilateral" concept, gave way to a more rigid, more detached perception of West European processes and to the treatment of this region more as a junior partner than as an equal. We will single out the basic traits of this new approach.

The first is the considerably reduced desire for coordinated action (presupposing political consultations), previously cultivated by the advocates of "trilateralism." Based on the fact that no effective mechanism of coordination had been created in the past and that the allies had demonstrated their obstinacy and inclination towards independence, Washington--under Reagan--has resolved to strengthen its leadership. The basic decisions which affect the West European allies one way or another have been made unilaterally by the Reagan Administration: producing neutron weapons (expected to be used on the European "battlefield"); curtailing economic ties with the USSR and Poland (measures affecting Western Europe most); taking stances sharply different from West European ones regarding the developing countries at the "North-South" meeting in Cancun (in October 1981); and conducting a policy vis a vis El Salvador that has evoked criticism among West Europeans.

The second is the sharply increased emphasis placed on anti-Sovietism as the main criterion for allied relations between the West European countries and the U.S.

The third is that problems of West European integration have ceased to be a subject of special concern to the American government; Washington has pushed them into the background. The Reagan Administration has been fairly indifferent to the integration process in the EEC and to its intensive (spreading integration to new spheres) and extensive (enlisting new members) aspects.

As has already been said, the North Atlantic alliance continues to be the main pillar of U.S. foreign policy and the NATO bloc--the foundation of Washington's military strategy. However, the Reagan Administration has reordered the priorities of American policy within this bloc. To a certain extent, it has renounced attempts to rally the bloc by stimulating "collective" discussions on important problems at the NATO council meetings. On the contrary, NATO problems have come to be examined basically during West European leaders' visits to Washington, i.e., primarily on a bilateral basis and under conditions where the initiators of the talks have been the West Europeans.

This reflects the Republican administration's general distrust of the NATO "collective" and its determination to regain and consolidate the U.S.' role as NATO's indisputable leader. It has strengthened contacts with individual members of the alliance on a bilateral basis. Thus, an agreement was reached with the West German government to prepare reserve bases and warehouses for the immediate transfer of considerable (what would essentially double the number of American troops) supplementary contingents in the event of a crisis in Central Europe. A similar agreement was reached with Norway, Denmark, and several other NATO countries. This reflects a quite definite tendency: the U.S. wishes to increase its own freedom to maneuver and to select the targets, place and time for action by American troops in

Europe. The sharp increase (double) of military aid to Turkey in 1981-1982 can also be viewed as a preference for contacts on a bilateral basis and with selected allies and, at the same time, as a means of strengthening its own position in a strategically-important country without paying any particular attention to the reaction of other members of the alliance.

One of the most far-reaching "initiatives" in the U.S.' NATO policy in 1981-1983 has been the determination to expand the bloc's sphere of influence in the South East, in the Middle East, and on the Persian Gulf oil route. In concentrating its efforts on bilateral agreements, the Reagan Administration has obtained consent for additional efforts in this area from England's conservative government and from Paris (for reinforcing the French squadron in Djibouti). There have also been joint contingents of American and West European forces formed in the Sinai (under the command of a NATO general from Norway) and in Lebanon.

The Reagan Presidency's West European policy is distinguished by the further "legitimization" of the French and English nuclear-missile potential. In the '80s, the U.S. is, as usual, counting on England to be a reliable conductor of American policy in Western Europe (for example, as regards the expansion of NATO's zones of action). Washington's behavior during the armed conflict in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands was a reciprocal act of loyalty to London.

Thus, selecting the key countries of the bloc's members, developing bilateral contacts with these countries, and including them in a broader sphere of activity than the NATO zone treaty envisages, represent--both in geographic terms and in fact--the very essence of the Reagan Administration's policy on NATO. In this connection, Washington has reserved the right to take unilateral actions affecting the bloc's other members, like its decision to produce neutron weapons. As a result of previous disillusionments (in particular, the failure of many attempts to alleviate economic contradictions through consultations, including ones on the highest level), the present administration has, to a considerable extent, lost interest in joint declarations and "collective programs" (like the "new Atlantic Charter" of 1973).

Summing up these innovations, the *New York Times* wrote on 2 November 1981 that whereas over the previous 30 years of NATO's existence the U.S. had made Western Europe the focal point of its foreign policy, "now it is elaborating a global strategy which envisages the broader utilization of air and naval forces in other regions of the globe, although the NATO European countries still occupy first place." "Europe plays only a subordinate role in this administration's (Reagan's) designs," declared a State Department spokesman. "We have other priorities." -20

To all appearances, we are witnesses to a definite turning point in Washington's West European policy: although ties with its NATO allies

remain very vital to the U.S., at the same time it is already refusing to view all other world processes purely from the "Atlantic" point of view. After Carter's four-year deliberate cultivation of a "compromise approach" and after the contradictory sudden reversals in the Democrats' "trilateral" diplomacy, in 1981 the Reagan Administration began to move towards a more "Americanocentric" policy, towards unilateral actions expected to reestablish the U.S.' leading position within the Western bloc. The U.S. is making an energetic attempt to fortify its domination in the bloc by attempting to "minimize" the effect of the growing independence of the NATO West European members and of their strengthened position within the North Atlantic alliance.

Nuclear "Rearmament" and Europe

Problems connected with nuclear weapons have acquired a politically explosive force in relations between the U.S. and its NATO allies in the '80s. Disagreements on the question of deploying American medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the diverse attitudes towards the nuclear strategy of the bloc's members have caused visible cracks in NATO's solidarity. There are three reasons that should be mentioned above all which caused these arguments, following the NATO Council's December 1979 decision to deploy American medium-range missiles on five West European countries.

First, in refusing to ratify the SALT-2 treaty, the U.S. changed the situation in which its West European partners considered the deployment of 572 American medium-range missiles on their territory to be desirable. The allies were striving for the coordination of the U.S. strategic arsenal and the U.S. arsenal located in Europe, not for a total nuclear armament (both on the strategic level and on the European TVD level) which in no way increases security.

Second, U.S. strategic planning has evolved in such a way that scenarios for a regional conflict in Western Europe and for engagements on the European battlefield which would not shift over to central strategic systems began to be viewed as a highly realistic turn of events.

Beginning with the notorious Presidential (Carter's) Directive N° 59, and especially after President Reagan's public recognition of it on 19 October 1981, the U.S.' NATO allies could not help but see that Washington was examining with cynical serenity the possibility of provoking a nuclear conflict in Europe and of attempting to confine it to Europe.

Third, the American leadership, which had made talks with the Soviet Union on reducing medium-range nuclear weapons one of the main prerequisites of NATO's nuclear "rearmament," deliberately delayed the

start of these talks and while they were being conducted, proved that it was the side who was not trying to reach any kind of agreement.

The effect of these three factors has been felt in both inter-governmental relations between the U.S. and its West European NATO members and on the public level where there has been a massive protest against U.S. nuclear policy in the '80s.

The new Soviet peace initiatives have had an extremely strong influence on relations in the NATO camp. At the end of 1982, the USSR reaffirmed its desire to save Europe from all nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical, both the Soviet Union's and NATO's. Concomitantly, it set forth, as an option, a proposal for both sides to reduce their medium-range arms (missiles and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons) by more than two-thirds. "As a result," Yu.V. Andropov declared, "there would be no Soviet and American medium-range missiles opposing each other here at all and the USSR would keep only the same amount of missiles as England and France have. In planes, too, we are for complete equality on a significantly lower level than is now the case. In a word, we do not want to have a single missile or a single plane more than the NATO countries do in the European zone."²¹

Even earlier the Soviet Union had unilaterally pledged not to use nuclear weapons first and it called upon all the nuclear powers to follow its example, to make the same pledge.

The member-states of the Warsaw Pact came out with important peace initiatives in January 1983; in particular, they proposed that the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations.

Soviet diplomacy's peaceful initiatives have had a great influence on the cooperation between various political forces in the Western camp. The question of medium-range nuclear weapons is the primary one in intra-NATO debates; various points of view have been expressed on this question. "Reagan is adhering to his zero option--a proposal which will prohibit the deployment of new Pershings and cruise missiles only in the event the Russians dismantle all their SS-20 missiles. But the West European leaders have declared that the NATO organization must reconsider its proposal,"²² reported an American weekly.

"The leaders of Italy, West Germany, and even England," the *New York Times* writes, "have begun to pressure President Reagan, demanding that he find some way to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union and with critics in their own countries and to agree to something less than the 'zero option'."²³ Even Prime Minister Thatcher, who has the reputation of being the most ardent supporter of Reagan's foreign policy in Europe, declared in the House of Commons that the American side should consent to a change in its position.

But the official position is far from an exhaustive testimonial to the situation in the West European countries. It reflects an ostentatious tribute to NATO loyalty and a determination to strengthen the American position in the talks. A much more serious political struggle is going on in the domestic arena. In the final analysis, it is a question of Europe's survival, and the Reagan Administration has quite clearly demonstrated its disregard for this.

In the West European countries many understand that Washington's artificial injection of fear and its undisguised, increasing pressure rest on a false foundation: Soviet medium-range missiles have been in the European part of the USSR for 20 years and when the new SS-20 missiles became part of the inventory, the overall quantity of Soviet medium-range missiles in fact decreased. In addition, during all this time neither NATO nor the five U.S. administrations saw any "particular threat" in the fact that the USSR possessed medium-range missiles.

At the same time, the West European governments cannot ignore the growing wave of public anti-nuclear and anti-missile protest. "When the leaders of the West European countries realized that by ignoring the peace movement and by maintaining that this movement was created as a result of Kremlin activity, they were alienating potential voters, in their public statement these leaders began to say that the Soviet proposals were serious and acceptable for discussion,"²⁴ England's *Observer* wrote.

In Great Britain the Soviet proposals were highly valued by the public. Many people unequivocally condemned Washington's negative attitude towards the Soviet proposals to reduce medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Even in this singular pillar of "Reaganism" in Western Europe, the influence of those who consider it necessary to bring pressure on Washington's rigid position is growing. The English press has noted that Washington's reaction to the Soviet proposals is "so muddled and so politically stupid that it will subject NATO's solidarity to a very severe test.... Never in its entire history has NATO been subjected to such a severe and prolonged test, not only as a result of differences of opinion among the alliance's members, but also as a result of the growing influence of the peace movement."²⁵ In England's political arena, opposition to the hopeless course of NATO's rightist forces is growing visibly. "The time has come," writes *The Times* "to openly question the right of Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher to act as NATO's sole and authentic spokesmen.... NATO must set forth positive counterproposals instead of simply rejecting all the Soviet initiatives."²⁶ A number of England's political figures and press organs have acknowledged the need to begin a dialogue with the Soviet Union regarding the official position of England and France relative to their nuclear weapons, inasmuch as it would be foolish to expect the USSR to ignore the French and English nuclear potential.

Despite official support by the French government of President Reagan's "zero option," it has always evoked great doubts in French political circles. "This proposal," writes the well-known French political analyst [?] P.M. de la Gorse, "was, of course, unrealistic: we cannot think that the Russians will renounce existing systems in exchange for the renunciation of something that still does not exist."²⁷ Sober-minded people are warning that France, by persisting in its obstructionist attitude towards the Soviet proposals, could become one of the main obstacles in the path of an acceptable compromise, which the remaining countries in Europe are striving for.

In West Germany, which, in a sense, occupies the key position among the five states designated to become the launching pads for American medium-range nuclear missiles, the question of the U.S. position on this problem is in the center of wide-spread public discussions and unprecedented mass demonstrations with thousands of participants.

On the whole, a situation has taken shape where the West European public is beginning to see that it is the American position, and not the Soviet one, that holds the danger of a crisis which would be fatal for Europe.

At the end of March 1983, President Reagan, largely forced to demonstrate a diplomatic initiative because of the development of anti-war demonstrations in Western Europe, came out with a proposal to conclude an "interim agreement." At a press conference in Moscow on 2 April 1983, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko stated that this "interim option" was unacceptable because it did not take into consideration English and French medium-range nuclear weapons, nor many hundreds of American nuclear weapons-carrying aircraft based in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers. In addition, it envisages liquidating Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR too, which have nothing to do with Europe.

The false premise that English and French weapons are completely independent of and separate from American weapons cannot hide the simple and obvious fact that all three NATO allies are interconnected. The political and military leaders of these countries have repeatedly admitted the anti-Soviet orientation of their nuclear arms and this absolutely cuts the ground out from under the feet of those who deny the need to count the English and French arsenals aimed against the USSR.

* * *

An examination of the Reagan Administration's West European policy in connection with NATO bloc problems makes it possible to draw several conclusions. First, disillusionment with the course for an "integrated Western Europe" in the '70s and '80s has caused U.S. ruling circles to doubt the policy of seeking compromises to the whole wide spectrum of American-West European relations. To spite its leading allies, a new

wave of sentiment has arisen in the U.S.: to resolve problems arising during relations with its NATO partners, based on vigorous unilateral political actions (a sharp increase in American military expenditures, a "demonstration of muscle" outside the North Atlantic treaty's zone, the cessation of attempts to work out a common approach with the West Europeans to the problems of the developing countries, etc.). The conceptual reasoning for such unilateral action has, perhaps for the first time in the postwar period, come to seriously rival the concept of "Atlanticism" which made strengthening ties with the West European region the number one priority.

Second, there are differences in the evolution of domestic politics in the U.S. and Western Europe which have stimulated the inter-Atlantic allies' mutual disillusionment of the partner's position as well as a distrust which, during the Reagan Presidency, has turned into an open disbelief in the U.S. ability to find a correct approach to global problems.

Third, some "Atlanticists" admit that a number of previous compromises undertaken within the NATO framework were unwarranted and they are trying to find a new "rational" basis for the military-political alliance and for economic rapprochement when the allies' actions are politically coordinated. These tenets are being set forth ever more frequently when Washington's unbalanced and egotistical course is being criticized.

Fourth, the section of the American political elite that follow the well-trodden path of "Atlanticism" has detected the inconsistency of the Reagan Administration's current policy vis a vis Western Europe, the lack of preparation behind its basic initiatives, the confusion of reality with its expectations, and its ignorance of possible reaction by the West Europeans to these or other U.S. actions.

Western Europe does not nourish illusions with respect to the possibility of a rapid change in the American position. During Vice-President Bush's trip at the beginning of the year, it became obvious that the U.S. does not wish to understand the West Europeans' foreign and domestic political problems, nor does it wish to take a constructive position regarding Western Europe's problems. The invariability of Washington's official position was once again graphically demonstrated at the subsequent session of the NATO Council in June 1983. The rigidity of the American course inevitably leads to a clash between the interests of the U.S. and the West European countries on the most important and pressing problem--on preventing nuclear war. The mass involvement of the West European public in the struggle to avert the nuclear-missile threat is having an influence on the governments of the NATO states.

It is perfectly obvious that the U.S. administration's position is not only exacerbating the problems in relations among the NATO countries, but is also creating a situation that is extremely dangerous to the cause of peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Strategic Balance, 1980-1981," London, 1981, p. 5; "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981," p. 914.
2. *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1982, pp. 63-64.
3. "Atlantic Community in Crisis. A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship," edited by W. Hahn and R. Pfaltzgraff (N.Y., 1979), p. 73.
4. *Le Monde*, 3 May 1974 (also *SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologija*, No. 2, 1983, pp. 21-23).
5. *Aussenpolitik* (English edition), No. 3, 1974, p. 283.
6. *Survival*, October 1977, pp. 10-17.
7. *Financial Times*, 8 December 1981.
8. T. Hughes, "Up from Reaganism," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1981, p. 12.
9. E. Cohen, "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83, p. 326.
10. *Commentary*, May 1982, p. 72.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
12. *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83, pp. 325, 327.
13. *U.S. News and World Report*, 11 January 1982, p. 31.
14. *Commentary*, May 1982, p. 66.
15. R. Steel, "The End of the American Protectorate over Europe," *Harper's*, July 1982, p. 14.
16. *Le Figaro*, 5 February 1982.
17. R. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, p. 1130.
18. *The Wall Street Journal*, 29 March 1983.
19. *The Washington Post*, 2 March 1981.
20. *Der Spiegel*, 12 September 1981, p. 31.

FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)

21. *Pravda*, 31 December 1982.
22. *Newsweek*, 18 January 1983, p. 37.
23. *The New York Times*, 25 January 1983.
24. *Coverer*, 23 January 1983.
25. *Sunday Express*, 18 January 1983.
26. *The Times*, 8 January 1983.
27. *Le Figaro*, 14 January 1983.

SELECTION FIVE

Mikheev, V.S. "Vashington-Parizh: Sovremennyi etap otnoshenii" [Washington-Paris: The Present-Day Stage of Relations], *SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, No. 2 (February), 1983. Excerpt, pp. 20-23.

The "East-West" Problem

One of the U.S.' main objectives is to have France return to NATO's military organization, from which it withdrew in 1966, and to reintegrate the French Armed Forces, which include 144 medium-range nuclear weapons (98 missiles and 46 bombers), into NATO.

What is the French Government's position on this matter? The French Socialist Party's campaign platform, approved in January 1981 by a special congress and entitled "100 Proposals for France," said that France would remain a member of the North Atlantic alliance but would demand a "precise definition of the meaning and substance of this alliance." In an interview with TIME magazine, Francois Mitterrand said that his government is loyal to the alliance which "reflects the common values of civilization."

Many scholars and journalists in the West have stressed the current French president's adherence to the ideas of "Atlanticism." For example, Raymond Aron, a well-known journalist in France, wrote in the weekly *L'Express* that "not a single (French) government since 1958 has used language so notably Atlantic as the government of Francois Mitterrand."⁸ Paris has taken the same stand as Washington on the situation in Poland and in Afghanistan. "We live in an age of paradoxes," *Le Monde* remarked on 12 June 1982. "The France of the Socialists is very nearly becoming the best pupil in the Atlantic class. Pierre Mauroy is asking the NATO council to revitalize the European public's faith in the effectiveness of the United States' nuclear guarantees."

The crux of the matter, however, lies in the fact that people in France by no means see increased solidarity among NATO members in the same way as people in the U.S. do, and they are advocating an independent position for Western Europe in NATO. For the United States, the best proof of Paris' intentions to strengthen NATO would be the reintegration of the French Armed Forces in the bloc's military organization. But this is precisely what the French Government does not plan to do. At a press conference in Paris on 9 June 1982, Mitterrand again stressed that France's return to the NATO military organization "is not even open to discussion."

France is also opposed to the American strategy of "limited" nuclear war, believing that such a war would inevitably escalate into a general nuclear war.

Assistant Director of the French Institute of International Relations, Dominique Moisi, believes that France's present military policy "is more a continuation of the policy of General de Gaulle than of Giscard d'Estaing."⁹ Whereas d'Estaing placed greater emphasis than his predecessors on the development of conventional armed forces and the Gaullists resolutely objected to this because it would result in stronger ties with the NATO military organization, Mitterrand gives preference to nuclear weapons, and this--according to American political analyst Bruce Marshall, a specialist on U.S.-French military-political relations--would signify weaker ties with bloc partners.¹⁰ France's military doctrine is based on the use of nuclear forces.¹¹ Hence, Prime Minister Mauroy did not sign any of the documents of the NATO council's Bonn session which pertained to military cooperation among bloc countries and which stressed the need for a conventional arms buildup.

Since France is not a member of the NATO bloc's military organization, it has only one obligation to its allies--to consult with them in the event of a crisis--and, as Western analysts have written, it "does not wish to make any of those concrete changes in practical policy that would give its pro-Atlantic rhetoric more credibility."¹²

Official French circles have implied that the idea of closer relations among NATO members has not yet made its way well enough in the world, and bilateral talks have not progressed to the point where important debates can begin concerning the "meaning and substance" of the North Atlantic alliance.

Consequently, the stronger pro-Atlantic tendencies in French foreign policy are accompanied by an obvious reluctance for a rapprochement with the NATO military organization. Furthermore, although the present French leadership is trying to level off the friction in relations with the U.S. over communist participation in the cabinet and over a number of other problems, it has not only not taken any of the steps Washington desires, it is even moving further away from the policy of Giscard d'Estaing, who--to a certain extent--met NATO halfway, and it is moving closer to the line of Charles de Gaulle.

At the same time, at the session in Bonn in summer 1982 France again supported the American position on the important issue of deploying American medium-range missiles in Western Europe--in spite of Mitterrand's campaign statement that, in his opinion, if the resolution of the NATO council's December (1979) session were implemented, a "global imbalance" in favor of the U.S. would ensue. The French support was extremely important to Washington after its plans had encountered strong opposition and had engendered an antiwar movement of

unprecedented dimensions in Western Europe. At the same time, France did not have to sacrifice anything since it is not a question of deploying missiles in France.

As for the military programs of the United States and France, Washington has been impressed by the French Government's efforts in this area. France is the sole major European country whose military budget increased by more than 17 percent in 1982. In absolute terms, it exceeds the military budget of any other European NATO-member country. In turn, the French leaders have supported the U.S. decisions to produce B-1 bombers, MX missiles and neutron weapons.

Bilateral U.S.-French military cooperation has not undergone any special development. The plans to re-equip American KS-135 planes with engines of joint U.S.-French production have been funded in full. The U.S. shares intelligence information with Paris. The Pentagon has refused, however, to purchase French light AMX-10 tanks and guns for the "rapid deployment force" as well as the French-West German Alpha-Jet fighter planes. In addition, it has rejected a plan for the joint production of the Roland anti-aircraft missile mounts manufactured by France and the FRG and has reduced its original order for them. General M. Cauchy, head of the international affairs department of the main armaments administration of the French Ministry of Defense, angrily declared that "the French and West Germans virtually made a gift of their technology to the Americans" as a result of the change in the U.S. stand.¹³

As for the economic cooperation between socialist and capitalist states, which is such an important aspect of the "East-West" problem and has recently caused intense friction between the U.S. and its allies, "the United States and France have taken opposite stands on the matter of trade relations with the USSR," *Le Quotidien de Paris* wrote on 8 June 1982. France refused to join in the American sanctions against the USSR. It particularly does not wish to give up mutually beneficial economic ties with the Soviet Union at a time when U.S. economic policy is damaging her directly.

As we know, the Soviet Soyuzgazeksport foreign trade association and the French Government's Gaz de France company signed a contract to deliver 8 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from the USSR to France for 25 years. France will send the USSR 5 billion francs' worth of equipment for the pipeline, which will provide thousands of workers with jobs for a long time to come. In Washington, where the prevailing view is that almost any technology will promote the growth of "Soviet military potential," this commercial transaction met with a hostile reception. Reagan categorically objected to it. In response to this, at the National Assembly on 29 January 1982, Mauroy declared: "I cannot agree with the sermons some people are trying to preach to us. In particular, I cannot agree with the fact that the Americans, who have squandered their energy for so many years, should lecture countries

devoid of any energy resources." In his words, adhering to the logic of an economic blockade means adhering to the logic of war, and the policy of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union is viewed as "an act with dangerous consequences," particularly for the cause of peace.

In June 1982 the Americans were able to include statements in the declaration by the Versailles conference participants about the improvement of the "international system of control over exports of strategic goods" to the socialist countries, about a cautious approach to financial relations with them, and about the need to limit their export credit. However, as the *New York Times* reported on 8 June, Paris clearly indicated that each country would continue to make its own decisions in this area. France did this in June 1982, when the White House--without conferring with its allies--prohibited shipments of gas turbines and other equipment produced in Western Europe on American licenses to the Soviet Union. France's president declared that the American actions were "offensive, unfair and dangerous" and the French Government instructed French branches of the American firms to ship the equipment to the USSR.

France's tough stand on the U.S. attempts to impede the construction of the pipeline played an important role in the United States' decision to ultimately abandon the embargo. Despite the fact that in his 13 November 1982 statement, Reagan connected the rejection of the ban on shipments of oil and gas equipment with an agreement by the allies to strengthen other restrictions on trade with the USSR, France resolutely dissociated itself from this position. Mitterrand informed journalists that there was no U.S.-French agreement on the regulation of trade with the Soviet Union whatsoever. In a *Le Monde* interview on 27 November 1982, the president of France felt it necessary once again to stress that he is against any form of economic blockade of the USSR and that France has no intention of reducing Franco-Soviet trade by expanding the list of so-called "strategic goods."

FOOTNOTES

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11. *Le Monde*, 10 July 1982.
12. *The New York Times*, 11 June 1982.
13. *Le Monde*, 26 December 1981.

PART THREE

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON THE WESTERN ALLIANCE'S EUROSTRATEGIC FORCES

SELECTION SIX

Belov, Colonel-Engineer I., "'Evrostrategiia' i evrostrategicheskie iadernye sily NATO" ["Eurostrategy" and NATO Eurostrategic Nuclear Forces], *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie [Foreign Military Review]*, No. 10 (October), 1981, pp. 7-10.

Adventurism has always been inherent in the U.S.' military-policy course. However, recently it has intensified considerably. The Reagan Administration, by stirring up the arms race to unprecedented proportions, has chosen the road of exacerbating international tension and confrontation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. It considers the basic means for realizing its aggressive plans of action to be strategic nuclear weapons.

In counting on unleashing a nuclear war, the U.S. ruling elite is well aware that in it, in contrast to past military conflicts, the United States will not succeed in remaining beyond the reach of the probable opponent. Its retaliatory strikes will be no less powerful than those which the nuclear maniacs from the U.S. plan to deliver. This is why material has begun to appear in the American press about new strategic concepts aimed at limiting armed conflicts to beyond U.S. borders and at turning Europe into an arena for nuclear battles. It is precisely such an objective which, so foreign specialists believe, is pursued by the recent U.S. Presidential Directive No. 59--and the proposals ensuing from it--to elaborate a so-called "NATO Eurostrategy" and to create Eurostrategic nuclear forces for this bloc. The creation of such forces will also contribute, to no lesser extent, to an increase in the factor of surprise of a nuclear strike against the opponent owing to the stationing of strategic nuclear means closer to his territory, which reduces the flight time of the missiles to their targets and, consequently, their detection ahead of time.

U.S. and NATO ruling circles have always tried to breath "new life" into the North Atlantic bloc when serious disagreements arise within it. Therefore, the proposal to create NATO Eurostrategic nuclear forces, presented under the false slogan of defending "European interests" in the bloc, apparently also pursues the objective of consolidating the solidarity of the member-countries. After all, the fanatical militarism of the American ruling circles has evoked within practically all the bloc's European countries not only discontent, but also fear of the serious consequences of such a course.

Also not without interest is the fact that the idea of NATO Eurostrategic nuclear forces was dragged to light just before the U.S. came out with the proposal to station new ballistic and cruise missiles in a number of the bloc's European countries. Apparently, the objective was thereby being pursued of facilitating the adoption of a resolution in NATO on this problem, too.

With the official creation of Eurostrategic nuclear forces, the U.S. leadership is attempting to fasten its European allies even more tightly to its adventuristic course and to involve them even more actively in a new round in the arms race. Here is visible the determination by American militarists to deflect an opponents' powerful retaliatory strike away from the U.S., to make its allies the target of such a strike, and to limit a nuclear war it began to the European continent. However, such traitorous plans by the U.S. in relation to its NATO partners have apparently not gone unobserved by them. Not by chance, France--in contrast to the American plans--proposed to create Eurostrategic nuclear forces that are independent of the U.S., consisting of French and British contingents and located under French or joint Franco-British command. As can be seen, the American proposals have not diminished the disagreements within the bloc and the very question of officially creating Eurostrategic nuclear forces remains open still. But it is namely about their official creation; after all, they have actually had them for a long time. And now it has been decided to reinforce them to a considerable degree with new American ballistic and medium-range cruise missiles.

Just what constitutes NATO's strategic nuclear forces in Europe at the present time?

As the foreign press reports, in the event of war, earmarked to be transferred to the disposal of the Supreme High Command of the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe are five American SSBNs (figure 1) [not reproduced], with Poseidon-C3 missiles on board (a total of 80 missiles with MIRVs--having ten or 14 Mk3 warheads, each having a yield of 50 kt and a range of 4,600 km). The magazine *NATO's Fifteen Nations* also attributes 170 (according to other reports--156) F-111E and F fighter-bombers--nuclear-weapon carriers stationed at American air bases in Great Britain (their range--2,400 km) to the Eurostrategic forces.

Great Britain plans to transfer four Resolution-class SSBNs with Polaris-A3 missiles (a total of 64 missiles with 192 Mk2 warheads, having an equivalent yield of 200 kt each and range of 4,000 km) and 56 medium-range Vulcan B-2 strategic bombers (figure 2) [not reproduced], 48 of which are in combat units (each such plane carries nuclear bombs and its range is 2,800-4,600 km). The British government has made the decision to replace the SSBNs on-hand by building in the '90s four or five new nuclear-powered, missile-carrying submarines armed with American Trident-1 missiles (each missile will have a MIRV--eight Mk4 warheads having an equivalent yield of 100 kt and range of 7,400 km). Five billion pounds of sterling are being allocated to implement this program. However, in the next few years it is planned to equip available Polaris-A3 missiles with new MIRV-class warheads, developed according to the Chevaline program.

The British government is hedging the transfer of strategic forces to NATO with the condition of "preserving higher national interests," which signifies its intention to reserve for itself the right to make the final decision, depending on the situation.

The U.S. and NATO leadership does not discount the French strategic forces, although France withdrew from the bloc's military organization in 1966. At the present time they consist of 18 launchers for intermediate range S-2 and S-3 ballistic missiles (the S-2 missiles are being replaced by S-3 missiles, scheduled to be completed by the end of 1982). The S-2 has a 150 kt warhead (and range of 2,750 km), while the S-3 is a megaton-type thermonuclear warhead (more than 3,000 km). Also included in these forces are five SSBNs with 16 M-2 missiles on each (500 kt warhead, 2,400 km range) which are now being replaced by M-20 missiles (a megaton-type warhead, range up to 3,000 km). By 1985 it is proposed to commission one more SSBN, and it is intended to equip all of them with more powerful M-4 missiles with MIRVs (seven warheads each having a yield of 150 kt and range of 4,500 km). Instead of the 80 warheads now on French submarine nuclear-missile systems, in 1985 there will be 672. The new French government is examining the question of possibly building another two SSBNs.

The foreign press reports that whereas at the present time Great Britain and France allocate one or two SSBNs for combat patrol, in 1985 France will be able to send up to three missile-carrying submarines for this.

France has 50 medium-range Mirage-4A strategic bombers, 36 of which are in combat subunits. Each of them carries a nuclear bomb (60 kt) and has a range of 1,200-1,800 km.

In accordance with the resolution by the NATO ruling organs, imposed by the Pentagon, in 1983 it is planned to begin the deployment of 108 new Pershing 2 missiles (range of 1,800 km)* and 464 land-based cruise missiles (2,500 km) in Europe. All these will be highly accurate, mobile-based missiles. Missile subunits are to be made up of American personnel and stationed in the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, although the latter two countries have still not made the final decision on this matter. All NATO members, except France, have agreed to take part in financing the deployment installations for these missiles.

The West European press has noted that the American strategic nuclear forces assigned to NATO will actually be employed not with the knowledge of the bloc's organs, but according to the U.S. President's orders, since the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe are permanently

* 2,500 km according to other Western press information (ed.).

headed up by a U.S. general who is, concomitantly, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and is, first and foremost subordinate to the Pentagon and the President of the United States.

In regard to the prospects for developing the bloc's strategic nuclear forces in Europe, the foreign press reports that the ruling circles of the U.S. and North Atlantic alliance intend to arm them by the mid-80s with higher-yield nuclear warheads (megaton-type) and with MIRVed warheads. It is not ruled out that in the future European cruise missiles will become part of the inventory and the number of SSBNs will increase. Among the participating countries the tendency is growing to create European strategic nuclear forces within NATO that are independent of the U.S. It is believed that the mid-80s could signify a "new step" in the development of NATO nuclear forces in Europe.

Thus, although an official decision on creating NATO Eurostrategic nuclear forces still has not been made, they do, in fact, exist and are constantly being strengthened. Plans for their use pursue patently aggressive objectives and are aimed against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. This obligates the Soviet soldiers to vigilantly keep an eye on the imperialists' schemes and, in association with the soldiers of fraternal armies, to alertly stand guard over socialism's achievements.

SELECTION SEVEN

Pustov, V., "Narastaiushchaya ugroza: Iadernye sily Anglii i Frantsii v planakh NATO" [The Growing Threat: England and France's Nuclear Forces in NATO's Plans], *Krasnaia zvezda [Red Star]*, 31 January 1984, p. 3.

The numerous organs of the West's enormous propaganda machine which usually present a united position, are admitting a striking dissonance in their appraisals of the English and French nuclear forces. This fact is highly noteworthy since the U.S.' stubborn refusal to count these forces in the over-all balance of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European zone has become one of the reasons for the failure of the nuclear arms limitation talks in Europe. The unsubstantiated statements by official Washington, and at the same time by London and Paris, that the English and French nuclear potentials are supposedly designed only for national defense purposes, are independent and, owing to their limited size, cannot--so they say--represent a threat to the USSR, have been clearly refuted by the unwilling admissions of a number of American and other NATO newspapers and by factual data cited by military specialists.

What kind of genuine independence can there be if, given a large-scale war, the British nuclear forces "would be," as the *New York Times* has stated, "immediately integrated into NATO"? The independence of France's nuclear forces has also been questioned, for example, in a report recently prepared by the Congressional Research Service. "The fact of whether France will participate in the NATO military organization is not of serious significance," the document notes. "The treaty on the creation of NATO engages France to the same extent as it does the other countries who signed it." One of the authors of the report, Charles Gellner, discusses the probable "existence of a definite coordination or exchange of information when the targets for the French nuclear weapons are selected." Because of this, as well as because of the fact that France's strike forces represent the third most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world, they "are becoming," the *Christian Science Monitor* concludes, "an important factor in any scenario for a war in Europe." Finally, General Rogers himself--the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe--has declared that in the event of war, France will add its forces to the Atlantic alliance's forces "very quickly."

Once in while during discordant discussions there can be heard revelations smacking of saber-rattling, this time the rattling of nuclear sabers. "France has a formidable nuclear arsenal," proclaims the *Washington Post*. According to the newspaper's facts, taken from top secret American intelligence documents, the French nuclear missiles are "capable of annihilating a minimum of 30 major Soviet cities." In the words of one American military specialist "the Russians will always have to take this factor into consideration." Scarcely-veiled threats resound from time to time on the British Isles as well. Even a few

years ago, England's government pointed out in the *White Book* that its nuclear forces, being an "inseparable part" of NATO's nuclear potential, "are capable of inflicting so much damage on the Soviet Union that the Soviet leadership has to take them into account."

Naturally, the Soviet Union cannot fail to take this into consideration. And, being guided by interests of its security and the security of its allies and friends, it is, quite naturally, demanding that the English and French nuclear forces be counted when determining NATO's nuclear potential in Europe.

As is well known, England and France's nuclear weapons--aimed at the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries--represent an extremely imposing force. They make up one quarter of NATO's nuclear potential in Europe and now number more than 200 carriers, including 162 missiles with 420-430 nuclear warheads, each of these warheads having a yield ten times greater than the American atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

The British fleet has four nuclear-powered submarines carrying 64 Polaris ballistic missiles, each with three warheads. They are now being replaced by improved missiles having six warheads each. The Conservatives' government has decided to replace the present missile-carrying submarines in the future with new, more powerful ones and to purchase Trident-2 missiles for them from the U.S. This missile will be many times superior to the Polaris missile in range (11,000 km), in its circular error probable (90 m), and in the number and yield of its warheads (7 warheads of 600 kilotons or 14 warheads of 150 kilotons each).

The modernization of the French nuclear arsenal is also being carried out at an accelerated pace; it is, in the words of the Minister of Defense, Charles Hernu, "the foremost of foremost tasks." At the present time, the French nuclear strike forces include 98 single-warhead ballistic missiles (80 of them on board the five nuclear-powered submarines and 18 in silos on the Albion Plateau in southeastern France), as well as 46 Mirage IV nuclear-missile carrying bombers.

Next year they plan to commission a sixth nuclear-powered submarine which will carry the new M-4 missiles having six reentry vehicles and capable, so Paris declares, of destroying an area 350 by 150km. The M-4 will have an improved range--up to 4,400 km. Later on, they also contemplate using these missiles to arm four of the first five nuclear-powered submarines that are in operation. Thus, the number of nuclear warheads on French submarines will increase from 80 to 176 in 1985 and will grow even more in the early '90s when the seventh submarine is commissioned--the first of the new generation of nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines.

As for the ground component of the French strategic forces, all 18 S-2 missiles having a 150-kiloton yield are being replaced by improved S-3s, each with a megaton warhead and a range of more than 3,000 km. Steps are being taken to further harden the silos in which these missiles are deployed.

The West is also paying attention to France's impending development of the new Hades missile with a nuclear warhead. Nor has it been ruled out to outfit it with a neutron warhead. Paris has officially stated that from 1984 to 1988 work will continue "on improving higher-radiation weapons," that is, neutron weapons. The range of the Hades missile exceeds 350 km, that is, it is more than double that of its predecessor missile, the Pluton. And this means that, launched from Eastern France, the Hades could hit targets in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

The might of the third component of the French nuclear forces--aviation--is also being constantly built up. Work is going on to re-equip the Mirage IV planes: starting in 1985 they will be outfitted with "air-to-surface" nuclear missiles, with a range of 200 km. In addition, it is envisaged to bring in new, improved Mirage 2000 planes, capable of carrying nuclear weapons. They plan to order 165 such airplanes, as well as a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. In announcing this, Charles Hernu declared that "air supremacy is the key to a war today."

An analogous process can be observed in England too. To supplement existing multi-purpose aircraft, the new fighter-bomber Tornado is joining the inventory; it is also designed to carry nuclear weapons. Additional squadrons of these planes are already being formed, of which seven of the squadrons will be based in the FRG, that is, near the borders of the socialist community countries and two squadrons will be on the British Isles.

Thus, according to estimates by Western experts, by 1990 England and France will have up to 1,200 nuclear warheads. And according to the *Washington Post*, by that year the "French and English nuclear forces will be improved such that their systems will be in a position to hit up to two thousand of the opponent's targets. The fact that the opponent is implied to be the Soviet Union and its allies is openly discussed in London, in Paris and, of course, in Washington. There they also make no secret of the fact that the strategic plans of these three countries are based on a refusal to follow the USSR's example to pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, as well as on a widely-publicized intention to launch these weapons by surprise.

"Secretary of Defense Weinberger and I understand each other," declared France's Minister of Defense Hernu in coming out in support of his demands, in particular, to increase military expenditures, record-breaking ones as they already are. The French minister is willing to advertise his mutual understanding with his colleague across the

ocean. However, broad segments of the European and world public are demonstrating totally different feelings. They decidedly refuse to understand or believe the Pentagon's present chief who, in the words of *Newsweek*, simply "wants to drive" his new weapons systems "down the allies' throats" and who has played a far from insignificant role in provoking the arms race in nuclear missiles and other weapons and in wrecking the Geneva talks.

In order to break the existing military balance in Europe, during these talks Washington has tried to leave the Soviet Union without weapons which would correspond to the English and French nuclear forces targeted against her. It hasn't worked! In pursuit of military superiority, the U.S. has, in agreement with its NATO allies, begun to deploy first-strike weapons in Western Europe--new American missiles which has made it impossible to continue the Geneva talks and has led to an increase in the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union was forced to take retaliatory steps, adequate for the threat that has arisen. However, the USSR does not consider this situation to be irreversible. As Comrade Iu.V. Andropov declared, if the NATO countries would demonstrate a readiness to return to the way things were before the deployment of the American medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR would be prepared to do the same. Talks on nuclear arms reductions both in the West and in the East are possible only when based on equality and identical security for both the sides. And this means, besides everything else, the sine qua non of counting England and France's nuclear arms on the NATO side. The Soviet Union must and will, in any event, have an equivalent to these arms.

SELECTION EIGHT

Davydov, V.F., "Diskussiiia o evropeiskikh iadernykh silakh" [A Discussion on European Nuclear Forces], *SSHA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, No. 3 (March), 1976, pp. 28-38.

The successful conclusion of the work at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has created the real prerequisites for further developing detente processes on the European continent and overcoming its split into enemy blocs. The question has been put on the agenda of supplementing political detente with military detente and of substantiating detente further which, as the General Secretary of the CC CPSU L.I. Brezhnev stated, should "make peace in Europe truly lasting and steadfast."¹

However, despite the new horizons that are opening up in Europe, influential military-policy circles in the West are still continuing to think in categories of "force" and rigid "bloc policy" and are feeling nostalgia for the times of the "Cold War." Supporters of the strengthening of NATO and adherents of the idea of military integration among the West European countries are not abandoning their attempts to give a new push to the arms race in Europe. Whereas before the myth about the so-called "Soviet threat" served as the pretext for this aim, now, in the atmosphere of discrediting it, arguments are often set forth about the need to redistribute the "burden of responsibility" among the allies within NATO and about attaining an "equal partnership" between the U.S. and a militarily-integrated Western Europe. In order to resolve the contradictions among the North Atlantic bloc allies plans and schemes are being elaborated which, in their content and spirit, not only have nothing in common with the processes of detente but are even directed against their further materialization.

Numbering among these schemes is the idea of creating European nuclear forces (ENF) which has been intensively discussed by Western political analysts throughout the '70s. A plan to unite British and French nuclear forces as the foundation for the ENF was advanced for the first time in 1967 by the former leader of the British conservatives, Edward Heath. He argued that it would be expedient for England and France to begin to collaborate both in the production of modern nuclear-missile weapons and in their operational employment within NATO or, if France refuses, outside of it--within the West European Union (WEU).²

This idea then attracted the attention of scientific-political circles in the United States, although from the very start many American politicians and military theoreticians regarded it without particular enthusiasm, having immediately seen through the fact that the ENF could, aside from everything else, also have a potentially anti-American character and, in any event, could be outside of Washington's control. These American fears visibly intensified in the '70s when the expansion

and deepening of integrational processes in Western Europe gave rise to a tendency towards achieving greater independence from the U.S. not only in the economic and political spheres, but also in the military sphere of U.S.-West European relations, including those relations directly connected with nuclear weapons. In Washington they could not fail to note that the supporters of integration in Western Europe have come more and more frequently to view the idea of creating European nuclear forces based on uniting the nuclear potentials of England and France as an alternative to the existing dependence on the U.S.³ Such a prospect has also led to extremely intense discussions in the U.S. about the possibility of realizing these plans and the probable consequences for American interests.

It should be noted that it is true that this discussion does not have the same kind of scale as in the first half of the '60s when the question of "multilateral nuclear force" (MLF) was being discussed. The problem of ENF was not brought up openly during official meetings between American and West European leaders. The discussion is basically being conducted at the level of political and military experts, former State Department and Ministry of Defense employees who are now working in various scientific research centers which are concerned with the long-term elaboration of U.S. foreign policy problems. However, this does not lessen its acuteness and it is now already possible to single out both supporters and opponents of the very idea of creating ENF.

In various American periodicals, in particular on the pages of foreign policy and military-policy journals (*Foreign Affairs*, *Military Review*, *Orbis*, *Foreign Policy*, etc.) publications appear fairly regularly which are devoted to plans for creating ENF. It is characteristic that almost all of them contain practical recommendations for the Washington administration. Major analyses have also been published on U.S. and West European policy in nuclear weapons. Among them are: *Nuclear Politics* by Andrew Pierre, former State Department employee and presently a Senior Fellow at the influential Council on Foreign Relations; *French Nuclear Diplomacy* by Wilfrid Kohl, a former member of the National Security Council and Deputy Director of the Institute of Western Europe at Columbia; *Nuclear Politics: America, France, and Britain* by Wynfred Joshua and Walter Hahn (the former--Assistant Director of the Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, and the latter--Associate Director for Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia). The problems of U.S. relations with its West European allies in the nuclear weapons sphere are examined in a number of foreign policy analyses published in recent years.

ENF and a "mature partnership"

American supporters of uniting British and French forces as the foundation for future ENF believe that in the long-term the realization of these plans would yield substantial dividends for the U.S., in particular a more consistent implementation of the doctrine of a "mature partnership" in the Atlantic region. Anglo-French cooperation in nuclear weapons could, in their opinion, become a distinctive center around which the processes of West European military-policy integration would develop at an accelerated pace which, in the final analysis, would lead to the creation of a pillar "entrusted with greater responsibilities for Europe's defence."^{4*}

ENF supporters understand that given present circumstances plans for at first creating a "nuclear alliance" between England and France cannot be implemented without Washington's official consent and approval. The fact of the matter is that according to a 1958 U.S.-British agreement on cooperation in nuclear weapons, England does not have the right to transfer to a third country (in this case France) secret nuclear information obtained from the U.S. Washington has to either release London from these restrictions or extend the effect of this agreement to France.

At the same time, France, as a nation producing nuclear weapons independently, falls under the formula of the 1958 amendment to the McMahon Act.⁵ Incidentally, even under favorable relations between the administrations, nuclear cooperation cannot be extended to France automatically: the consent of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and of the Congress as a whole are necessary. Thus, the U.S. position is of decisive importance to the fate of such plans.

In this connection, ENF supporters steadfastly recommend the inclusion of France in the circle of the U.S.' nuclear partners. In their opinion, granting it rights in the nuclear sphere analogous to those which England has would provide a number of results favorable to American interests: first, it would nullify differences in Anglo-French relations which have in the past hampered military integration in Western Europe; second, it would have a beneficial effect on the evolution of U.S.-French relations which the nature of the development of interatlantic ties as a whole depend on to a considerable extent; third, it is possible that it would facilitate Paris' return to NATO's military organization or, in any case, its closer cooperation with the North Atlantic alliance; and, finally, it would be one of the starting points in the creation of the ENF in which the U.S. could retain for itself basic levers of influence over the West European allies.⁶

* Russian translation: "capable of bearing a heavier burden in the defense of Western Europe"--SLC.

In the main matter, of principle importance for Western Europe, of whether joint Anglo-French forces would operate independently of U.S. forces, ENF supporters take up quite an ambiguous position. On the one hand, they formally acknowledge the right for them to exist independently but on the other hand, they stress the desirability and need for coordinating the actions of these forces with the American forces within NATO. In particular, Pierre stresses that the creation of "an Anglo-French force *outside* NATO would have grave disadvantages.* The United States would not support it." However, considering France's resistance to attempts to get it back into NATO's military organization, American experts, in particular Wynfred Joshua and Walter Hahn, believe that at the present moment it is inexpedient to insist on prior American conditions for creating the ENF.⁸

Behind such a point of view is the expectation that joint Anglo-French nuclear forces could hardly handle nuclear strategy tasks independently, without the help of U.S. forces and that as a result of its technological lag behind the U.S., England and France will aspire not only to American aid to further improve their national nuclear forces, but also to close cooperation in their operational utilization with the United States' forces.⁹ Thus, they are relying on the fact that Washington's refusal to aid the ENF technologically will, one way or another, become the main U.S. pressure-lever on Western Europe's nuclear policy and strategy.

On the whole, an analysis of the line of reasoning by American ENF supporters leads to the conclusion that they consider it expedient to utilize, with respect to France's nuclear forces and the ENF in the future, the existing (accordingly developed and supplemented) model of relations with England whose nuclear forces operate in close coordination with American forces within NATO's framework. The evolution of trilateral U.S.-Franco-British nuclear cooperation in a reorganized North Atlantic alliance would be, so the American experts believe, a step forward towards closer West European integration, without at the same time damaging its "Atlantic partnership" with the U.S.¹⁰

In discussing plans to settle relations within the "nuclear triangle" (the U.S., England, and France) the question of the FRG's position is also examined. ENF supporters emphasize that the creation of a nuclear alliance between England and France outside NATO, which would cause Bonn to be in a subordinate position with respect to Paris and London, will assuredly evoke a negative reaction from West Germany and that its reaction will be completely different if Anglo-French relations promote France's closer cooperation with NATO. However, in any event, the problem of creating ENF, either within NATO or the West European Union, must envisage some kind of role and participation of the

* Russian translation uses the word "complications"--SLC.

FRG in them.¹¹ As a result, American experts often stress the fact that plans to unite British and French nuclear potential enjoy the support of sections of the West German ruling circles, in particular Franz Strauss' group.

Supporters of the ENF and of an accelerated tempo of West European military integration note the "paradoxicalness" of the present situation when the West European allies, while taking the American "nuclear umbrella" as a given, frequently come out against U.S. policy in the international arena. Western Europe's position during the flare-up of the Middle East crisis in 1973 is generally cited as one of the vivid examples of this "anti-Americanism." They also see this "paradoxicalness" in the failure of U.S. attempts during 1973-1974 to realize its obvious advantages in the military sphere and to exchange Western Europe's "nuclear guarantees" for concessions in economic and political matters.

All this leads certain American experts to conclude that during the easing of tensions between East and West exploiting Western Europe's dependence on the U.S. proves ineffectual in relations between the allies and that this very dependence occasions both increased apathy towards American concerns about the fate of the capitalist world and the West European countries' conduct of an "irresponsible," often anti-American course in world politics; it leads to the intensification of contradictions among the Western countries. Therefore, the creation of a West European "power center" endowed with "responsibility" in nuclear weapons would, so they believe, lead to a cardinal change in the existing situation in interatlantic relations, to the U.S.' release from bearing the greater portion of expenses in ensuring Western Europe's "security," to a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, to the acquisition of greater freedom of action for the U.S. in world affairs and it would become the foundation of a U.S.-West European partnership on a global scale.¹² As American analysts Joshua and Hahn underscore, such an evolution "would preserve Western Europe as the necessary frontier of* American freedom."¹³

However, opponents of a militarily-united Western Europe and ENF have their own arguments. For example, they emphasize the fact that the creation of the Common Market has already led to an acute exacerbation of U.S.-West European contradictions in the economic sphere and that the early stages of Western Europe's political integration are fraught with similar consequences. Therefore, they declare, in the event Western Europe obtains independence in nuclear weapons, these contradictions could expand into "mature rivalry." In their opinion, as a result of the implementation of such plans "an independent and united Europe would clash with American economic interests and complicate American diplomacy in an area that is as important to us as Alaska."¹⁴

* Russian text: "a border of defense for..."--SLC.

It is not only the prospect of increased economic and political contradictions between the U.S. and Western Europe that determines the position of U.S. opponents of the ENF. Of no small importance is the thinking that the creation of these forces, which could also be employed by the West Europeans contrary to Washington's will, would, in the final analysis, weaken the security of the United States itself. In the long-term perspective such plans could lead to the emergence of a "multipolar" nuclear world in which the problems of preventing a nuclear war and curbing the arms race would be much more difficult to resolve. At the same time, the realization of plans to share "nuclear responsibility" with Western Europe could be a precedent for future relations with other U.S. partners, particularly with Japan. In other words, ENF opponents resolutely come out against such a policy with respect to the NATO allies which could contribute to the transformation of Western Europe, and in the future Japan too, into centers of nuclear power.

In this context the position of Harvard University professor Stanley Hoffmann is indicative, who believes that the course of the allies' nuclear armaments is not only not desirable but is also dangerous for American interests.¹⁵ An analogous opinion can frequently be encountered on the pages of the American journal *Military Review* when the question is raised about the consequences of the appearance of independent nuclear power centers for U.S. strategy. "Deterring attack by one--or even two--other nuclear powers is difficult enough but, when there are potential threats from five or more sources, the opportunities for establishing a credible deterrent and for controlling the arms race are virtually minimal."¹⁶ Such is the conclusion, for example, that American military expert Harold Molineu comes to.

ENF and the Problem of Limiting Nuclear Arms

Supporters of the creation of ENF cannot help but see that at the present stage the realization of plans to redistribute the "burden of nuclear responsibility" within NATO would threaten the further development of bilaterally limiting U.S. and USSR strategic arms since such "nuclear diplomacy" would be regarded by the USSR, with good reason, as an attempt to acquire unilateral strategic advantages for the West.¹⁷ However, the recognition of this obvious truth is accompanied by recommendations from the U.S. Administration to conduct talks on limiting strategic arms in such a way so as not to create obstacles for the possible realization of ENF plans in the future. One of the directions of this tactic has been persistent appeals not to include in a strategic arms limitation agreement points about the non-transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology to American allies possessing nuclear weapons because otherwise the path earmarked for implementing the ENF project would be blocked to a considerable extent. In this connection Pierre underscores the fact that prohibiting--within the framework of a new agreement--the transfer of nuclear weapons and

technology "...would strengthen the notion of decoupling, add to Europe's sense of vulnerability, and could have unfavorable consequences for European-American relations."¹⁸

ENF supporters further argue that their creation will not necessarily be at variance with the U.S.' obvious interest in maintaining strategic equality within the on-going talks with the USSR, "rather, the rise of fully independent European nuclear power centers, devoid of any U.S. influence, could jeopardize these talks. Much more in harmony with their goals would be the emergence of European nuclear forces that, by dint of U.S. support, would be amenable to U.S. influence,"¹⁹ Joshua and Hahn maintain. However, in this case, *Military Review* notes reasonably, the attainment of strategic stability would necessitate expanding the circle of participants in the nuclear arms limitation talks and conducting a "series of super-talks" whose results would be difficult to foresee given the complexities which exist in the purely bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks on this matter.²⁰

Given that Washington's support of plans to create ENF would place the U.S. in a difficult position vis-a-vis the USSR, the supporters of European nuclear forces underscore the fact that the initiative to create them must come from the West Europeans themselves, that it would be most advisable for Washington not to come out officially with various plans, as was the case with the MLF plan in the '60s and, as much as possible, not to exert overt pressure in this direction on its allies.²¹

The opponents of redistributing the "burden of nuclear responsibility" within NATO rightly note that the realization of ENF plans would threaten not only the development of U.S.-Soviet relations, but also the detente process on the European continent; the negative consequences would also have an effect on the FRG's "Eastern policy," on Anglo-Soviet, and on Franco-Soviet relations. Also vulnerable would be the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna and, to a considerable extent, the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could also be brought to naught. In continuing to advocate the retention of American "commitments" within the North Atlantic alliance, they believe that at the present stage the U.S. must concentrate its basic attention on the creation of a more effective system of consultations within NATO in order to resolve contradictions which could arise among the allies over detente as well as on searches for ways other nuclear powers, primarily England and France, could participate in subsequent strategic arms limitation talks, proceeding from the fact that "European safety is strengthened more by shutting off the arms race than by threatening a nuclear war."²²

ENF and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ENF supporters persistently declare that the given problem does not affect the question of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons since it is a matter of U.S. relations with its allies who already possess nuclear weapons. They further argue that if the partnership between England and France leads to a centralized command of Anglo-French nuclear forces, it would only "...promote the goals of nonproliferation by reducing the existing number of nuclear forces under independent* national control."²³ In this connection, it is maintained that the subsequent expansion of the ENF owing to the participation in them of other West European countries who do not possess nuclear weapons will not be at variance with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons which the majority of these countries has already signed and ratified. The official U.S. position is also, in their opinion, not at variance with these plans: with the 1969 ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty, Administration representatives assured the U.S. Congress that the treaty would not impede the European federated alliance (in the event it was created) in acquiring nuclear power status.²⁴ At the present stage, ENF supporters argue, the main threat of nuclear weapons proliferation comes from the developing countries and not the industrial countries of Western Europe.²⁵

However, we note that a nonproliferation policy cannot be artfully divided into relations with nuclear and nonnuclear countries or broken up according to regions. The problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has become a world problem demanding a consistent, logical and identical approach to all countries since both the existing forms of its proliferation--"horizontal" (when the technology for manufacturing nuclear weapons or the weapons themselves are transferred to nonnuclear countries) and "vertical" (when technological aid is given for the further development of the nuclear potential of a country already possessing nuclear weapons) lead to one and the same result: decreased stability in present international relations and increased risk of a nuclear war breaking out.

In this connection many serious analysts of this problem (for example, former consultant to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Bader) point out that the U.S. position in the postwar period has favored--if not directly, then indirectly--and continues to favor to this day the proliferation of nuclear weapons: the U.S. has deployed its nuclear weapons to the European continent, including NATO countries not possessing these weapons. In 1958, on President Eisenhower's initiative, amendments to the McMahon Act were adopted which made up the foundation for U.S. nuclear cooperation with England.²⁶

* Russian translation omits "independent"--SLC.

In the experts' opinion, U.S.-British nuclear cooperation not only stimulated the efforts of other countries (in particular, France) to create their own nuclear weapons, but it was also perceived to be encouragement by Washington to further proliferate nuclear weapons in the world. In fact, with the adoption of the 1958 amendment the U.S. placed itself in a position where any allied country, by creating nuclear weapons independently, could count on U.S. technological aid. In the opinion of a majority of nuclear experts, this precedent is fraught with serious consequences for U.S. interests.²⁷ It was not by chance that a number of U.S. political figures recommended that cooperation with England in nuclear weapons be ceased or, in any case, significantly narrowed.²⁸ American analysts Joshua and Hahn note among the obstacles in the way of expanding the influence of the 1958 amendment to the law on nuclear energy to other West European countries--primarily to France--anti-French sentiment in the Congress evoked on the one hand by France's withdrawal from NATO's military organization and on the other by its reluctance to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty.²⁹

After the United States signed the International Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, plans to expand nuclear cooperation with Western countries, which envision Washington's rendering of technological and other aid in implementing the ENF project, came into direct conflict with official U.S. policy and with efforts to prevent nuclear war. Critics of plans to create the ENF believe that U.S. nuclear policy must be fully subordinate to the attainment of more significant results both in U.S.-Soviet talks to further limit strategic arms and in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In particular, Research Associate at the Center for International Studies at Cornell University, Milton Leitenberg considers this task to be the basic one.³⁰ At the same time, American analysts cannot fail to note the fact that the conference in Geneva in May 1975, convened to review the effects of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, drew a great positive reaction throughout the world. The ratification of the treaty by even more states (including the FRG and Italy) on the eve of the opening of the conference was testimony to the enormous importance of nonproliferation at the present stage for world society.

The signing in February 1975, during a visit of England's Prime Minister Harold Wilson to the USSR, of a joint Anglo-Soviet declaration on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which asserted the intention of the parties to strictly observe the 1968 Treaty and to try to expand the number of its participants,³¹ evoked a positive response.

As a result, a number of American experts and political figures are expressing the opinion that, first and foremost, it is necessary to settle intraalliance attitudes towards nonproliferation and nuclear weapons limitations and not to examine projects connected with the nuclear arms race. In particular, Senator Adlai Stevenson proposes to

create a special committee in the North Atlantic alliance on nonproliferation and he is urgently recommending that the Administration strive more effectively to get France to endorse the Nonproliferation Treaty.³² It is also underscored that after the conclusion of a number of U.S.-Soviet agreements on strategic arms limitations, the trend has intensified in the Congress to examine nuclear weapons relations with their allies in a broad context with efforts for further nuclear arms limitations and their nonproliferation in the world. This was vividly attested to by Senator Edward Kennedy's speech at the conference in Geneva and by Senator Mike Mansfield's speech at Georgetown University in May 1975.

The ENF and Detente

American analysts note that the Republican Administration is avoiding stating its opinion about plans to create ENF and about the possibility of bilateral nuclear cooperation between England and France. True, in the *New York Times* in May 1973 there appeared a report by Cyrus Sulzberger, well-known for his knowledgability about sentiment in the White House, about the fact that the U.S., within the framework of "European diplomacy, hinted to London and Paris that it might actively advocate the creation of Anglo-French nuclear forces."³³ A spokesman from the British foreign office subsequently characterized this report as "conjectural." However, it is difficult to judge to what extent it reflects Washington's actual position.

At a press conference on 29 May 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in characterizing the U.S. position, declared that Washington did not intend to display the initiative in these matters and that its attitude towards them should not be determined before the allies had officially presented their proposals on this count.

Despite the lack of a precise definition of the Administration's position regarding plans to create ENF, a number of American experts believe that, in the '70s, in the American approach one can clearly trace an evolution towards recognizing the rights of Western Europe to independence from the U.S. in nuclear weapons.³⁴ This conclusion is often supported by reference to the U.S. President's statement about the positive role of England and France's nuclear forces when drawing up the West's general military-policy strategy, which was contained in his 1972 foreign policy message. It said: "The nuclear forces of the United States, supplemented by the nuclear forces of our allies, remain the backbone of our deterrent."³⁵ This statement attests to the definite change in the U.S. position regarding England and France's nuclear forces compared to the '60s when their existence was repeatedly subjected to public ostracism by official U.S. circles, in particular Secretary of Defense McNamara.³⁶

However, to draw the conclusion on this basis that the Administration views the idea of creating ENF positively would be premature.

On the one hand, in view of the serious failures of U.S. foreign policy and its forced withdrawal from Southeast Asia, U.S. ruling circles are becoming more interested in creating a new "power center" in the person of a united Western Europe which would take upon itself a larger share of military and political responsibility commensurate with its economic might in protecting, jointly with the Americans, the foundations of capitalism in Western Europe. It is no accident that precisely at this moment the American press has intensified appeals to support the West European nuclear alliance. In particular, in a symposium on the problems of U.S.-West European relations organized in June 1975 by *Time* magazine, MIT Professor William Griffiths argued that,

the United States must clearly and publically declare its position of benevolent neutrality with respect to plans to create European nuclear forces and that it must not digress from its views even in spite of what the Soviet Union could say or do in response.³⁷*

However, on the other hand, the opinion is being expressed that serious fears of an even greater exacerbation of interatlantic contradiction is caused in great part by the U.S. aspiration to accomplish a redistribution of the "burden of responsibility" with its NATO allies in such a way that the U.S. will retain the main levers of influence over their policy by preserving the American "nuclear guarantees." American analysts note in this connection that the Washington Administration, despite its official benevolent attitude towards ideas of West European military integration is, in actuality, not conducting a policy which would promote the accelerated formation of an independent "power center."³⁸ U.S. analysts also cannot overlook the fact that the detente process between East and West both on the European continent as a whole and between the USSR and U.S. has played a not insignificant role in the U.S. approach to this problem. The implementation of ENF plans would, in the opinion of American specialists, have a negative effect not only on the further development of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations (in particular, on the strategic nuclear arms limitation talks), but also on the realization of the resolutions by the all-European Conference on Security and Cooperation aimed at abolishing the effects of the "cold war" in Europe.

As is apparent from an analysis of the existing American concepts, searches for new forms of partnership with Western Europe in nuclear

* There is no statement even vaguely resembling this in the entire issue. Moreover, I cannot find any indication that there even was such a symposium--SLC.

weapons are leading in two directions. On the one hand, attempts are being made by U.S. supporters of "Atlanticism" to resolve the differences with Western Europe by regrouping the military forces within the North Atlantic alliance in order to further strengthen them in the struggle against the socialist countries. This is, essentially, what the ENF project boils down to.

On the other hand, there also exists an influential group of people who advocate that the U.S., in partnership with Western Europe, resolve the current problems of detente between East and West, in particular the problems of limiting and reducing conventional and nuclear armaments on the European continent.

It appears that supplementing political detente with military detente would allow the United States the possibility of reducing the expenses of its involvement in the so-called "defense" of Western Europe; in turn, for the West European countries the processes of gradually abolishing the NATO structures formed during the "cold war" years would open up the way for decreased dependence on the U.S. without needing a sharp increase in military expenditures, including on nuclear forces, which presupposes the redistribution of the "burden of responsibility" within NATO.

The Soviet Union has always advocated such a resolution of detente problems in Europe where all the West European countries, as well as the U.S. and Canada, would play an active role and we have advocated that this resolution respond to the interests of all states. General Secretary of the CC CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, discussing the positive influence of the development of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations in strengthening peace, security and international cooperation, stated: "In constructing a new building of peaceful relations through joint efforts, we by no means intend to turn it into a secluded mansion isolated from the outside world by a gateless fence. We want this spacious building to be open for everyone to whom peace and the well-being of people is dear."³⁹ It is quite natural that the majority of the West European countries has appraised the results of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic nuclear arms limitations positively and are actively participating in multilateral all-European talks on various problems of detente.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 *Pravda*, 1 August 1975.
- 2 *The Times*, 14 July 1970.
- 3 See, for example, I. Smart, "Future Conditional: the Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 78 (London, 1971); L. Gladwyn, "The Defence of Western Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973.
- 4 A. Pierre, *Nuclear Politics. The British Experience with Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970* (London, 1972), p. 340.
- 5 The McMahon Act, adopted in 1946, officially proclaimed a U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Western world (for more detail, see *SSHA: ekonomika, politika, ideologija*, No. 12, 1973, pp. 119-123)--Editor's note.
- 6 A. Pierre, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-340.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 338.
- 8 W. Joshua and W. Hahn, *Nuclear Politics: America, France, and Britain* (Washington, 1973), p. 76.
- 9 R. Ball, "Rethinking the Defence of Europe," *Fortune*, February 1973, p. 142.
- 10 W. Kohl, *French Nuclear Diplomacy* (Princeton, 1971), p. 368;
A. Pierre, *op. cit.*, p. 342.
- 11 P. Davis, "A European Nuclear Force: Utility and Prospects," *Orbis*, Spring 1973, p. 126; J. Newhouse, "The United States and Western Europe," *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy* (New York, 1973), p. 39.
- 12 These thoughts underlie D. Calleo's recommendation--a Professor at Johns Hopkins University--of the need to immediately create European Nuclear Forces. D. Calleo, *The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO and Europe* (Baltimore, 1970), pp. 126-127.
- 13 W. Joshua and W. Hahn, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
- 14 R. Osgood and others, *Retreat from Empire* (New York, 1973), pp. 191-192.
- 15 S. Hoffmann, "Weighing the Balance of Power," in A. Jones (ed.), *U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New York, 1973), p. 267.

FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)

- 16 H. Molineu, "Stability in a Multipolar Nuclear World," *Military Review*, May 1974, p. 7.
- 17 W. Kintner and R. Pfaltzgauff (eds.), *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's* (London, 1973), p. 180.
- 18 *Foreign Affairs*, July 1973, pp. 773-774.
- 19 W. Joshua and W. Hahn, *op. cit.*, p. 31 [actually p. 77].
- 20 *Military Review*, May 1974, p. 11.
- 21 A. Pierre, "Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France, and America," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1971, p. 300.
- 22 *The New Republic*, 20 May 1972, p. 20.
- 23 W. Joshua and W. Hahn, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
- 24 V.G. Mitiaev, *Iadernaia politika SSHA v NATO* (Moscow, 1973), p. 195.
- 25 A. Pierre, *Nuclear Politics.....*, p. 341.
- 26 W.B. Bader, *The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York, 1969), p. 30.
- 27 L. Beaton, *The Strategic and Political Issues Facing America, Britain, and Canada* (London, 1971), p. 8.
- 28 See, for example, G. Ball, *The Discipline of Power*, pp. 96-110.
- 29 W. Joshua and W. Hahn, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
- 30 "Detente," *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House of Representatives (Washington, 1974), pp. 588-589.
- 31 *Dokumenty i materialy sovetsko-angliiskikh peregovorov v Moskve, 13-17 fevralia 1975 g.* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 48-50.
- 32 *Congressional Record*, 3 June 1975, p. S9411.
- 33 *The New York Times*, 27 May 1973.
- 34 See, for example, *Fortune*, February 1973, p. 142 and February 1974, p. 116.

FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)

- 35 **U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972** (Washington, 1972), p. 43.
- 36 W.W. Kaufmann, **The McNamara Strategy** (New York, 1964), p. 124.
- 37 **Time**, 2 June 1975, p. 11. [See note in text.]
- 38 R. Osgood and others, **Retreat from Empire**, p. 191. H. Owen (ed.), **The Next Phase in Foreign Policy** (Washington, 1973), p. 34.
- 39 **Vizit L.I. Brezhneva v Soedinennye Shtati Ameriki 18-25 iunia 1973g. Rechi i dokumenty** (Moscow, 1973), pp. 23-24.

PART FOUR

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON THE EVOLUTION OF FRENCH SECURITY POLICY

SELECTION NINE

Sulitskaia, T.I., *Kitai i Frantsiia (1949-1981) [China and France (1949-1981)]* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), pp. 122-141.

Chapter 3: "Kitaisko-frantsuzskie otnosheniia v 1970-1981 gg." [Sino-French Relations, 1970-1981]

The Positions of the PRC and France With Respect to Appraisals and Prospects for Change in the Military-Strategic Situation in Europe

One of the basic trends in the PRC's European policy since the beginning of the '70s has been the encouragement of integrational processes in Western Europe. During this period the Chinese leadership has viewed the creation of a united Europe and one that is strong in both a military-political and an economic sense, as one of the highly important regional elements for a "broad united front" directed against the USSR.

The importance which Peking has come to attach to the problem of European integration has influenced the entire complex of Sino-French relations.

China's increased interest in Western Europe was actually first manifested with the activation of bilateral relations with the leading EEC members--France, the FRG and England. Subsequently these bilateral relations became to an ever greater extent a part of the sphere of China's overall European policy. Peking is ever more inclined to view France as a highly important integral part of the Common Market and as one of the political leaders of Western Europe which influences the entire system of Sino-West European relations.

But despite China's unconditional support of capitalist integration in all its forms, Western Europe's international role and the nature of its political objectives have been treated differently in Peking than in the West European capitals (including Paris).

Peking has viewed West European integration as the most realistic alternative to overall European cooperation and as a method for preserving economic, political and military confrontations on the continent.

The strengthening of Western Europe's economic and military-political potential as an imperialist "power center" which has encircled a part of Soviet foreign policy activity, primarily European, has seemed to Peking to be a factor which creates more favorable conditions for action by China in the international arena, particularly in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean region.

For the ruling circles of the West European countries integration has been the sole method for resolving a whole series of problems in the postwar period which have been caused by capitalism's general crisis. First, the integration was to serve as a factor promoting a more effective opposition by the West to the strengthened positions of the socialist community countries in Europe. Second, the aim of the initiators of West European integration was to create the conditions to more successfully combat the increased influence of leftist forces within their countries. Third, agreement in economic policy with respect to the developing countries was to strengthen the position of West European capital as a whole in the face of a growing reluctance on the part of the suppliers of raw material to submit to the diktat of Western monopolies. Fourth, the acceleration of the integration process was called upon to redistribute the overall balance of forces in American-West European relations in the '60s and '70s. This redistribution, not benefiting the United States in retaining its military superiority, has required the West Europeans to strengthen their political unity in order to assert their specific interests in the face of their partner across the ocean.

As for France, its ruling circles have proceeded from the fact that a "Little Europe" will be able to provide the French monopolies with more favorable conditions for foreign economic expansion through widespread participation in multinational concerns. Undertaking initiatives favoring the strengthening of cooperation among the Common Market countries, de Gaulle--and subsequently his replacement President Pompidou--strove to ensure a leadership role for France in the EEC. Additionally, domestic-policy type reasons pushed Pompidou onto the path of activizing "European development." The expansion of the ruling majority after de Gaulle's departure at the expense of centrist groupings who traditionally support far-reaching West European integration--including the creation of supranational organs--required Pompidou to make certain changes in France's position on this matter.

The ideas of increasing Western Europe's political integration were further developed after the 1974 French Presidential election of the leader of the "independent Republicans," Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Giscard d'Estaing's proclamation during the campaign that one of the most important objectives was the attainment of a "European political alliance" by 1980 was, essentially, a departure from the Gaullist principles of opposing any attempts to give the EEC a supranational character. The question of how to approach the integration problem was, at the end of the '70s, the cause of very serious disagreements within the governmental coalition of that time. Thus, after the adoption of the resolution at the end of 1978 to create a "European currency system," Gaullist Jacques Chirac called the supporters of further integration the "foreign party" which was leading to the weakening of France's role in the international arena. Several Gaullists, for

example former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Michel Debre, declared that if their demands for guarantees of France's independence were not satisfied, they would immediately quit the ruling majority.

In striving to smooth over the differences within the ruling camp, President Giscard d'Estaing was forced to declare at a press conference in January 1979 that he would oppose giving the EEC a supranational character and would not limit national sovereignty.

In carefully observing the struggle surrounding the plans for further integration of the West European countries, China has fought for an acceleration of this process, has called upon the EEC countries "to overcome their differences," and has, as far as it has been able, tried to promote the integration process and the strengthening of the Common Market's international position. In particular, the April 1978 signing of the trade agreement between the PRC and the EEC in Brussels was to serve these objectives, since this action strengthened, to a certain extent, the position of those forces within the EEC who were trying to expand the power of the Association's supranational organs. "We are pleased," declared Deng Xiaoping at a reception honoring France's Prime Minister Raymond Barre, "that the EEC is gradually coordinating the policy and actions of its members and that it is playing an ever-increasing role in the international arena."

The Chinese foreign policy's aim to encourage West European integration has been of a clearly-expressed class nature. This position was exposed to sharp criticism at the January 1974 meeting of the communist and workers parties of the European capitalist countries in Brussels. "As a result," PCF General Secretary Georges Marchais stated at the meeting, "our delegation cannot but declare that support on the part of the present leaders of China's Communist Party for this undertaking by the prominent imperialist bourgeoisie is an illustration of their departure from the position of proletarian internationalism."

The process of reviewing the Chinese leadership's attitude towards the problem of European integration has taken place in several stages.

In the '50s China conducted, on the whole, a positive foreign policy; together with the socialist countries, it condemned the measures undertaken by the capitalist states, including France, which were aimed at preserving Europe's schism. All the West's measures underlying military-political and economic integration such as the creation of NATO (1949), the signing of the Paris agreements to create the West European Union and the inclusion of the FRG in NATO (1954), the signing of the treaty to create the European Economic Council and the European Atomic Energy Council (1957) were assessed by China's leadership as "causing serious damage to the cause of peace" and as "deepening the schism in Europe." A joint Soviet-Sino declaration on 18 January 1957 pointed

out: "Both parties believe that all the exclusive military groupings must be replaced by a system of collective peace and collective security."

At the beginning of the '60s when, as was noted at the CCP XII Congress, "leftism...intensified in political, ideological and cultural respects," there was a review of the Chinese leadership's attitude toward West European integration.

At the turn of the '60s-'70s, a gradual shift away from criticism of integration "from the left" towards support of it was observed. The wide-spread use by the Peking leadership of anti-American slogans which was characteristic for the '60s had considerable influence on China's evaluation of capitalist integration as a process as well as on its attitude towards NATO and the EEC. Right up to the middle of 1971, Chinese propaganda saw the EEC primarily as strengthening interimperialist contradictions. Within the framework of "the theory of intermediary zones," the Common Market was accorded the role of being a factor hampering the "policy of control carried out by the U.S. in Western Europe."

As China has realized the importance of West European integration as a factor hampering the development of general European cooperation and as a means weakening the economic position of the socialist community in Europe, Chinese propaganda has also changed the accent of its analysis of the situation in the region. Along with anti-American motives in appraising West European integration, anti-Soviet notes are heard ever more clearly. Since mid-1971 Peking has begun to view integration as an "aspiration toward unification which will help (the West European countries--T.S.) compete with the American and Soviet superpowers."

The first steps on the path to normalizing Sino-American relations in the early '70s also had a noticeable effect on China's approach to West European integration. The thesis about the EEC's anti-American trend is gradually falling into the background and is assuming an ever purer propagandistic sense, although Peking is still keeping it as a pressure-lever on the U.S.

China's support of West European integration formally began with a vindication of the Common Market. But ever since 1971 Peking has viewed the EEC not simply as the economic unification of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, but also as a step towards creating a military-political grouping of leading West European states opposing the socialist community.

The first statements by the Peking leaders in support of integrated processes in Western Europe were in such striking contrast to the leftist radical political principles which were circulating during the first years after the "cultural revolution" that, at first, this evoked

a certain bewilderment among West European politicians. In July 1971, being in China on a visit, Alain Peyrefitte--who has already been mentioned above--wrote about Chou En-lai's statements regarding West European integration: "It is surprising that the Chinese appraisal is more diplomatic than ideological: to them the EEC represents not a transaction among the capitalist countries that deserves condemnation or lack of attention, but, on the contrary, it represents an interesting and commendable phenomenon, a new factor on the geopolitical chessboard."

Peking's new point of view that the centripetal tendencies in the imperialist camp can be of a long-term nature contradicts both the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the realities of international relations. In his time, V.I. Lenin pointed out that relations among the capitalist states are determined by two tendencies: "one, making an alliance of all imperialists inevitable, the other--placing some imperialists in opposition to others--two tendencies neither of which has a solid basis under it."

The characteristic of capitalist integration as a temporary, forced phenomenon is also set forth in the materials from the XXV Congress of the CPSU: "The capitalist countries' governments make one attempt after another to smooth over contradictions and to agree on joint measures in overcoming the crisis. But the nature of imperialism is such that each strives to acquire advantages at the expense of others and to impose its will. The differences are being displayed in new forms, the contradictions are flaring up with new force."

Despite the fact that, even after 1971, Chinese propaganda continued to exploit the thesis about the EEC's opposition to the "two hegemonies," in actuality Peking supported all the West's initiatives having to do with smoothing over the contradictions between the EEC and the U.S. and even with strengthening the U.S. position on the European continent. It is precisely this which explains China's support of England's desire to join the Common Market. It is well known that underlying the negative attitude of the French ruling circles towards England joining the EEC in the '60s was the conviction that this would lead to an intensification of American influence in the Common Market since the U.S. and Great Britain had especially close military-political and economic bonds. The change at the turn of the '60s-'70s in the French government's attitude towards the problem of the EEC's expansion was the result of President Pompidou's general policy to improve Franco-American relations. For its part, the Chinese leadership was counting on the fact that the entrance into the EEC of such a strong nuclear power as England could be an important stage in the military-political and economic strengthening of the Common Market. Additionally, Peking was hoping that the English conservatives' policy aimed at opposing detente in Europe would influence the "Eastern policy" of the FRG, France, and the other "Six" states who actively supported the idea of calling a General European meeting.

The problem of the EEC's political orientation was specially discussed during talks between the Chinese leadership and a delegation from France's National Assembly headed up by Alain Peyrefitte in July 1971, as well as during a visit to France by the first PRC government delegation headed up by the Minister of Foreign Trade [?] Bi Xiang in September of the same year. In an interview in the newspaper *La Croix* Peyrefitte declared: "The Chinese...were satisfied with President Pompidou's initiative at the Hague (in December 1969, where he approved, in principle, England's admission into the Common Market--T.S.) aiming to stimulate Europe's development and they were satisfied with the favorable outcome of the talks regarding England's entry into the Common Market. It is possible that they believed that a strong Europe...would be a great support for them in counterbalancing the 'two hegemonies'."

Since the middle of 1972 China's determination to promote the transformation of the EEC into an economic and political supplement to NATO has assumed an ever more distinct character. This was connected with the fact that in 1972-1973 a whole series of initiatives were undertaken which were aimed at the practical realization of ideas of European security and cooperation. The initiation of multilateral consultations in Helsinki to prepare a conference on European security and cooperation, the process of normalizing Soviet-American relations, and the start of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks were concrete manifestations of the European peoples' desire for peace and cooperation.

In this context, the Chinese leadership stepped up its support for those circles in the West who, while not directly denying the need for detente as an alternative to World War III, have at the same time endeavored to ensure military superiority over the socialist countries and to maintain their exclusive military-political and economic groupings.

In 1972-1973 the exchange of high-level delegations between Peking and Paris grew sharply....

The Chinese utilized these political contacts with representatives from French governmental, parliamentary and economic trade circles to demonstrate its unconditional support for the military-political consolidation of the West European states.

In commenting on the talks between the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Chi Peng-fei, *Les Echos*, a newspaper for business circles, wrote: "As for Schumann, he personally heard from his interlocutors their desire to create a strong association in Western Europe capable of serving as a counterweight to Soviet force."

It must be said that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs displayed realism when he diplomatically dissociated himself from the

Chinese position. At a banquet in Peking he declared that there was a difference in the two countries' approach both to the role of the EEC and to the problem of detente in Europe as a whole. "It is quite right," he stated, "that the Chinese government is paying great attention to the development of a European association. The Chinese government also understands why we wish to make our contribution to peace by replacing confrontation between the blocs with a dialogue between the peoples of all of Europe."

It is interesting to note that in June 1972, not long before the start of Schumann's visit, a number of West European newspapers... published articles concerning Peking's desire to establish direct ties between the PRC and the ruling organs of the Common Market and to create its own representation within it. It could be surmised that the Chinese leaders raised this question in their talks with Schumann. In any event, the French Minister repeatedly referred to the "great importance which the Chinese government attaches to the development of a European association."

The elucidation of the possibility of closer economic cooperation with France, as well as with the European economic community as a whole, was one of the most important tasks of Chi Peng-fei's visit to France in June 1973. During meetings with Giscard d'Estaing, who was then France's Minister of Economy and Finance, and with experts on the Common Market, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs displayed great interest in technical details connected with the structure and functioning of the EEC and in "the Association's relations with third world countries." It could be surmised that this kind of information was needed by the Chinese in order to elaborate the rights and responsibilities which they could take upon themselves in the event PRC representation was established within the Common Market. Chi Peng-fei's visit to France and Jacques Chaban-Delmas' talks going on at the same time in Peking with Chinese leaders confirmed the fact that Peking was interested in the development of the process of West European integration. Having expressed his "doubt in the sincerity of the Soviet policy of detente in Europe," the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs declared, in Paris, China's full support for all steps "by the West European countries aimed at unification and fortification."

At this time, in Peking, Chou En-lai tried to convince Chaban-Delmas that the possible Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks would supposedly lead to "the creation of a vacuum which any Soviet leader...would fill up if the West European countries meanwhile, not wanting to undermine the Atlantic alliance, were not to set up an organization and were not to procure modern weapons for their defense."

On the whole, the theme of military integration and of strengthening the West's defense might since 1973 has occupied an ever greater place in the Chinese leaders' talks with the French. In contrast to its partners who believed military integration to be attainable only after a

"political alliance" of the EEC countries was created, the Chinese have been interested in placing the military integration process in the foreground. "China supports the political unity of the West European countries, but as long as that does not exist, it desires the military and economic strengthening of Western Europe," wrote France's former military attache to the PRC, J. Guillermaz.

During President Pompidou's talks with Chinese leaders in Peking the different approaches by the leaderships of the two countries to the problem of integration was more acutely apparent.

Whereas the Chinese side confirmed its "support of efforts by the (West) European peoples aimed at...joining together to defend their common security," i.e., essentially aimed at military integration, France avoided concretizing its policy on this matter, having limited itself to the formula of conducting "a policy aimed at creating a genuine European alliance of the nine EEC member-countries." "China has actually become a more zealous supporter of NATO than any member of NATO," wrote the *Daily Telegraph* in connection with the Chinese position at the talks with President Pompidou.

The Chinese leaders have supported the consolidation of European defense as a system--not an opposing one, but a supplementary one--being a component of Atlantic defense, strengthening the West's "aggregate might."

A natural result of the Chinese leadership's political evolution was their review of their policy towards NATO as a whole and American military presence in Europe in particular. While continuing to stick to the principle of an "independent Europe" in its propaganda, at the same time the Chinese leadership could not fail to take into consideration the fact that utilizing American military-political, economic, and scientific-technical potential would contribute to the strengthening of the West European Union. Therefore, beginning in 1972 Peking consistently supported the preservation of U.S. military presence in Europe and the consolidation of NATO's position in Europe with the U.S.' leading position in the Atlantic alliance being retained. The Chinese leadership was counting on the fact that this would allow the Americans to exploit the military factor in their relations with their allies in order to control the initiatives by the leaders of the West European countries aimed at developing cooperation with the socialist states on a European regional level.

Chou En-lai declared the need to preserve the American military presence in Western Europe for the first time to U.S. Congressmen Hale Boggs and Gerald Ford in July 1972. Subsequently, in October 1973 in an interview with the American journalist Cyrus Sulzberger, Chou En-lai concretized the Chinese leadership's viewpoint on the NATO problem. The Chinese Premier acknowledged that he "wanted NATO and Western Europe to remain strong, although he had initially been against this alliance."

He proclaimed NATO to be a "defensive alliance against the aggressive Warsaw Pact."

Peking displayed an enormous interest in the plan for a "new Atlantic charter" advanced by Henry Kissinger in the spring of 1973 in which the U.S. wished to settle contractually the factor of U.S. military presence on the European continent as a guarantee of retaining the U.S. leadership position in the North Atlantic. Immediately after this plan was published, Chou En-lai, in a conversation with the French journalist Jean Marin, not only spoke favorably of the American initiative, but he even attempted to induce France to support this plan. Having intentionally "forgotten" about the fact that France had withdrawn from NATO's military organization (which Marin was forced to remind his interlocutor about), Chou En-lai called upon the NATO partners to act according to the Chinese proverb which says that those who "share the same joys must also share the same difficulties."

Peking's determination to weaken intra-Atlantic contradictions by pushing France into closer cooperation with NATO has become ever more apparent. In its commentaries regarding the activities of this alliance's ruling organs, Chinese propaganda has invariably singled out those statements by French leaders that could be construed as a readiness by France to start along this path.

Thus, in commenting on the 1973 Spring session of the NATO Council, the Hinhua agency cited a statement by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs that "the presence of American troops in Europe will remain a fundamental factor for our (French) security." In describing the ceremony of the June 1974 signing of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations, this agency underscored the French Prime Minister's statement "concerning their resolve to fulfill their obligations stipulated by the North Atlantic Treaty."

China's determination not to permit a reduction in American military presence on this continent was also expressed in the Peking leadership's negative attitude towards the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks taking place in Vienna. From the very start of these talks China declared itself to be a principle opponent of any initiatives aimed at arms reductions. Chinese propaganda consistently pursued a policy of supporting the position of those Western participants of the Vienna talks who strove to complicate the course of the talks by citing the "military superiority" of the socialist states.

Peking expected that it would succeed in influencing the position of the Western participants at the Vienna talks, citing France, who had refused to participate in these talks, as an example. In this connection, it was ignoring the fact that the negative attitudes of the PRC and France towards the Vienna talks had completely different bases. Paris believed that the success of these talks would deprive France of certain levers of influence over the FRG, would stimulate Bonn

to conduct a more active policy in the East, and would lead to the loss of its superiority over West Germany in the political sphere. At the same time, Paris reserved the possibility of participating in the Vienna talks in the event the course of the talks suited France's ruling circles. Thus, during a high-level Soviet-French meeting in Zaslavl' (Belorussia) in January 1973, President Pompidou announced that France might change its position in accordance with the results attained in Vienna. At the same time, not wanting to tie itself to any specific principles which might be adopted in Vienna, the French side declared that if resolutions were adopted which did not oppose the interests of French security, the latter might agree to a reduction in French armed forces located on FRG territory "through an agreement between Bonn and Paris."

As the position in France of those forces who considered closer cooperation with the NATO military organization to be "vitally necessary" increased, China attempted to push Paris towards such cooperation.

In connection with this, China advanced a number of proposals which *The Times* characterized as a plan for turning Europe into a "military machine aimed against the Soviet Union." According to this plan (in the words of a correspondent from *Le Nouvel Observateur*), "Europe must free itself from American tutelage in two stages. At first it must unite politically and provide its own defense. Throughout the whole first stage, when it is still very vulnerable, Europe must retain its joint defense with the Americans. And only when it becomes, in truth, strong and united, will Western Europe be able to become one of the independent centers of the multipolar world."

In essence, this was indirectly criticizing France for withdrawing from the NATO military organization.

However, France resolutely rejected the possibility of its return to the NATO military organization. In an interview which Valery Giscard d'Estaing gave to the newspaper *Le Figaro* after the conclusion of Deng Xiaoping's visit to France, the French President declared absolutely unequivocally that "France does not intend to participate in a joint defense with America." He subsequently added: "In no way would we return to an integrated system (i.e., NATO's military organization--T.S.). The only thing that existed before I came to office and that had been undertaken back in 1967 were technological contacts."

But nevertheless, despite the lack of a formal change in France's position with respect to NATO's military organization, the Chinese leadership took into consideration the fact that beginning in 1975 Paris implemented a number of serious compromise measures which were aimed at stabilizing its ties with the NATO military organization. This stabilization, along with stimulating technical cooperation with the NATO Eurogroup and having the French Navy participate in NATO naval

maneuvers, was also manifested in a change in French military-strategic concepts since 1976. The essence of this concept, the so-called "doctrine of expanded security zones," consists in the fact that in the event of a conflict between NATO member countries and the socialist countries, the French armed forces could be immediately flung into the battle against the socialist countries at a "forward line of defense," i.e., on the borders of Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Chinese propaganda welcomed the adoption of France's new military doctrine and set it forth in detail on the pages of *Renmin Ribao* and one of its authors--Chief of the General Staff of the French Armed Forces General Mery--being in China in June 1976 by invitation of the PRC's Minister of Defense, was greeted with great ceremony in Peking.

General Mery was the first Chief of the General Staff from an Atlantic alliance member-country to make an official trip to China. He had talks with then-Premier of the State Council Hua Kuo-feng, Minister of National Defense Yeh Chien-ying, as well as Deputy Chief of the PRC General Staff Yang Cheng-wu. "We are happy to see," declared Deputy Chief of the PRC General Staff Yang Cheng-wu, "that more and more the West European countries and peoples are beginning to understand whence the threat of an impending war (is emanating). Their voice, calling for unity in the name of might and the defense of security, is resounding ever more loudly."

Peking has emphasized in every way possible that an arms build-up in every European country must be combined with a "united struggle of the West European countries against hegemony," i.e., with a strengthening of NATO and its Eurogroup. *Renmin Ribao*, in setting forth the doctrine of "expanded security zones," particularly singled out those places in General Mery's article--published in the French military monthly *Revue de Defense Nationale* on the eve of his trip to Peking--where he spoke of the fact that "France is now a sincere and honest ally of NATO" and that "without an American ally it is impossible to imagine measures being adopted to ensure security in Europe."

China's interest in preserving the American military presence in Western Europe and in strengthening NATO was also manifested in aggressive statements by the Peking leadership favoring the deployment of neutron weapons on the territory of NATO European countries and in attacks on the Soviet proposal to reach an agreement on the mutual refusal to produce these weapons. Peking also welcomed the American plan to deploy the Pershing-2 American medium-range missiles in a number of West European countries which would signify the beginning of a new twist in the arms race and the consolidation of U.S. military presence in Western Europe.

During the visit to France in October 1978 of Vice Premier of the State Council and Chairman of the State Scientific and Technological Commission Fang I, the Chinese side "explained that it would not be advantageous for France to approve the idea of abolishing the two

military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), even if they were to be abolished simultaneously." The French press noted in connection with this that "the Chinese implied to their French interlocutors that the dissolution of NATO would disarm Europe."

Since the beginning of the '80s, Peking's interest in turning France's foreign policy towards Atlanticism has become even more evident. Chinese propaganda has persistently called upon the West European countries "to set aside differences (between Western Europe and the U.S.--T.S.) as secondary problems" and "to give priority to joint interests and common strategic tasks."

However, between the Chinese and French viewpoints on the question of American military presence in Western Europe there exists a principle difference. Supporting, on the whole, the retention of American troops in Europe, the French government nevertheless considers it necessary from time to time to point out that this position is not absolute nor is it unconditional. Thus, back in 1974 France's then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Jobert, declared that "if one tries to contrast the retention of American troops (in Europe--T.S.) with its value to France, retaining them is not an absolute priority."

China's attitude towards American military presence in Europe was also not unambiguous. Although it has supported this presence, at the same time China considers it desirable for Western Europe to keep a certain military-political and economic autonomy, in the hope of exploiting U.S.-West European contradictions in order to maneuver more successfully in the international arena--pressuring both the U.S. and its West European allies.

Peking could also not fail to take into account the probability of the U.S.' military "departure" from Western Europe in the remote future. By the time this "departure" occurs--which could be caused by an aggravation of interimperialist contradictions due to a strengthening of Western Europe's economic position or by any number of other reasons--Western Europe must, in Peking's opinion, have attained a level of military potential such that the U.S.' departure would not cause a redistribution of forces on the continent that would be negative for the West. Therefore, while encouraging an increase in military preparations within NATO, Peking has at the same time actively supported various initiatives aimed at strengthening defense at the West European regional level.

These initiatives, reflected in the appearance in various West European states (including France) of numerous projects for strengthening European defense based on the EEC, the West European alliance or NATO's Eurogroup, were stepped up at the beginning of the '70s. They were the singular reaction by detente opponents to the process of mending general European cooperation. The flow of such projects increased particularly as a result of definitive successes in

the matter of normalizing Soviet-American relations during these years. Within certain West European circles there was noted the determination to exploit these tendencies in order to build up the military potential of their countries under the pretext that alleviating tensions between the USSR and U.S. could lead to a decrease in American military presence in Europe.

For its part, Peking decided to exploit a certain normalization of Soviet-American relations and the 1972-1973 SALT talks to force tensions in Europe by urging West European military integration. In this connection, stress was laid on the thesis advanced by the X Congress of the CCP that Europe is the "strategic center of gravity for skirmishes" between the USSR and U.S. This thesis...was appraised in France as a determination by the Chinese leadership to revitalize Western Europe's military-political integration "using fright" and "to grasp the Soviet Union in the Chinese-European pincers," finding a "European substitute for America." In order to speed up military preparations by the West European states, Peking began to vigorously utilize the thesis of "doubting the durability of American guarantees to Western Europe."

On this question Chinese propaganda has, for its purposes, partially exploited the French government's ambivalent attitude towards the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

On the one hand, the French government has correctly assumed that an improvement in Soviet-American relations is a basic factor in the easing of international tension. But at the same time Paris is worried about the fact that Soviet-American understandings could supposedly decrease Western Europe's role and, accordingly, France's role as one of its political leaders in world affairs. At a press conference on 3 January 1974, President Pompidou declared that although "an agreement... between the Soviet Union and the United States" is "not directed against Europe," nevertheless, in the given situation, the West European states ought to "try to group together, to begin to speak with one voice and to thereby acquire a certain weight in order to make itself respected."

The French government believed that the detente process had to parallel a strengthening of the military potential of each West European country and all of Western Europe as a whole. It was no accident that the French proposal to strengthen "European defense," put forward in June 1973, coincided in time both with the activation of preparations for a general European conference and with the period of a general improvement in the health of Soviet-American relations. Political observers in France appraised the proposal put forward by then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Jobert on "Europe's autonomy in defense questions" as an "attempt to complicate the course of the SALT talks." In a review article devoted to Pompidou's policy, a former close associate of the President...wrote that France's position regarding the SALT talks

consisted in "contrasting them (the talks--T.S.) with the French government's clear-cut determination not to cut back its efforts in the area of defense."

If one takes into consideration the fact that Peking considered fortifying the military potential of every European country to be a necessary component for strengthening the military might of Western Europe as a whole, it is then clear that the policy of France's ruling circles, traditionally attaching exceptional importance to improving and fortifying national armed forces, impressed the Chinese leadership. Back in 1970, during the first French government delegation's visit to the PRC, Mao Tse-tung openly called upon the West European countries to build up their military might and France--its nuclear-missile potential. "You are making efforts militarily," he stated in a conversation with the leader of the delegation, Andre Bettencourt. "You are creating atomic bombs.... If I were in your shoes, I would make even greater efforts."

Members of the French parliamentary delegation who visited China in early 1972 noted that the Chinese leaders "emphasize and welcome the expansion of the French strike forces every time."

The Peking leadership also expressed its support of France's efforts to increase its military potential to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Sauvagnarques, during his official visit to the PRC in November 1975. The Chinese emphasized that "the West European countries must build their policy and actions mainly on the basis of their own forces." Also displaying "interest in the autonomy of the military policy" of France and Western Europe was the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ch'iao Kuan-hua during his brief visit to France in October 1976.

The report that France was developing neutron weapons was greeted with satisfaction in Peking, Chinese propaganda particularly emphasizing that "French neutron bombs...will make it possible to change the correlation of forces in Europe in the West's favor."

In October 1980, during a visit by the then President of France Valery Giscard d'Estaing to the PRC, the Premier of the State Council Zhao Zi-yang expressed "delight with the efforts France had made to...strengthen its defense capability." Peking also called upon France's current President, Francois Mitterrand to augment its military efforts and to "increase its vigilance" during his visit to the PRC in February 1981.

The Chinese support the thesis of the "independent status" of the French nuclear forces and they approve of the French government's refusal to have them taken into account in the medium-range weapons limitation talks for Europe. However, it is perfectly clear--and this

was pointed out directly by Iu.V. Andropov in an interview with the magazine *Der Spiegel*--that references to an "independent status" in this case are illegal.

Its approval of France's efforts in building up its military potential have by no means meant that Peking is giving preference to an autonomous defense for each West European country over an integrated military system for the West. Along with popularizing the idea of "standing on one's own forces" in the matter of arms build-ups, the Chinese leaders have called upon the West European leaders to "overcome their difficulties in uniting Western Europe."

The Chinese press has readily published articles by French advocates of creating a "European defense" system which contained appeals "to create a powerful, varied, common defense, capable of countering the USSR and which would require of the European countries even greater and--what is more important--more expensive efforts."

After the Soviet Union and U.S. signed the SALT-2 Treaty in the summer of 1979, Chinese propaganda maintained that the SALT-2 Treaty only "deepened Western Europe's feeling of uncertainty about the U.S. 'nuclear defense umbrella'" and it called upon the West European leaders "to implement a nuclear modernization plan" and "to strengthen West European defense."

Peking greeted with satisfaction the subsequent measures to strengthen military cooperation between France and the FRG as well as the initiatives by Paris aimed at strengthening its ties with NATO.

The Chinese leadership's support of further military-political and economic West European integration while preserving the American-West European political and military alliance coincided to a great extent with the viewpoint of Atlantic circles who, believing that France's conduct of a more "coordinated Western policy" would help to gradually return it to the NATO military organization, is having a definite, restraining effect on its policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

SELECTION TEN

Leonidov, Capt. N., "Chto proiskhodit s voennoi politikoii Frantsii?" [What is Happening With French Military Policy?], *Krasnaia zvezda [Red Star]*, 19 April 1983, p. 3.

The wave of antiwar activity in Western Europe is continuing to rise. The nuclear threat, intensified by the arms race that Washington has also spread to Europe, is stirring people to join the ranks of the peace fighters. Sensible European statesmen, politicians, and public figures cannot fail to see the real danger emanating from U.S. plans to build up NATO's European nuclear potential and from the U.S. course striving for military superiority. Many prominent West European socialists and social democrats, and religious figures in many countries are also opposing the U.S. policy of nuclear war brinkmanship in favor of a responsible attitude toward the Soviet Union's peace initiatives and of continuation in the policy of detente.

The French leadership's position seems to stand alone against that backdrop. Despite their preelection pledges to actively struggle for peace and collective security in Europe and for disarmament, the new French leaders from the very first days of their advent to power declared their firm adherence to the North Atlantic bloc and, under clear U.S. and NATO pressure, actively supported the North Atlantic alliance's plans and practical measures aimed at upsetting the prevailing parity and achieving military superiority over the Warsaw Pact states.

During the first visits to the alliance state capitals, French statesmen were already trying in every way possible to stress their loyalty to Atlantic bloc principles and ideals. In an interview in the *Washington Post* in May 1981, French Foreign Affairs Minister Claude Cheysson gave assurance that "as for the North Atlantic alliance, the U.S. leadership can have no better partner than France." One month later, President Mitterrand stressed in an interview with AFP [Agence France-Presse] journalists that "France is a reliable partner of the United States.... We have common interests which are independent of the events of the moment."

French leaders demonstrated their Atlantic bloc loyalty so persistently that President Reagan noted with satisfaction at one of his press conferences in February 1982 that "France is continuing to cooperate with NATO in all areas."

True, France has stated that it intends to continue pursuing an independent military policy, that its nuclear forces will remain autonomous and that French troops will not rejoin NATO's integrated military organization. These statements were received with great

interest and attention, since it was precisely General de Gaulle's withdrawal of France from the North Atlantic bloc's military structure that was perceived as evidence of an independent military policy and was accordingly considered by other countries as highly significant.

However, the French military-political leadership, in unison with the U.S. President and the NATO hierarchy, soon began talking of a "Soviet military threat" and USSR "military superiority." As the Western press has noted, the French Government in this respect has almost outdone the governments of a number of other European NATO members. It has supported the White House's false thesis on the "Soviet Union's disruption of the balance" and advocated that NATO "upgrade its arms" by means of medium-range missiles before holding disarmament talks with the Soviet Union even though, it would seem, NATO's "arms upgrading" plans do not directly concern France.

The French military leadership is displeased that the USSR has missiles on the European part of its territory. Well, what is the situation regarding France's own nuclear weapons, whose development is in the forefront of its military structuring plans? The French military itself remarks that France is already the world's "third nuclear power." After all, the French nuclear arsenal now numbers 18 IRBM launchers, 5 nuclear submarines each equipped with 16 M-20 missiles, and 46 Mirage-IV bombers carrying 60-kiloton nuclear bombs. Plans are being implemented for further updating French nuclear forces. The construction of a sixth nuclear missile-carrying submarine, which will be equipped with 16 M-4 missiles with 6 warheads each, is being stepped up in particular. And these weapons are obviously targeted against the USSR and its allies.

As is well known, French leaders categorically refuse to include these nuclear weapons in the overall NATO balance at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. On what grounds, might one ask? On the grounds, Paris replies, that they are "purely a national defense system." How can that tally with President Mitterrand's statement to the West German magazine *Stern* in July 1981, for example, that France "will unhesitatingly supplement" U.S. nuclear weapons with its own "deterrence weapons"? Or with Cheysson's recent statement to the *Wall Street Journal* that France, which possesses a nuclear potential, is an Atlantic ally "standing firm with the United States and our neighbors and European partners"? Does Paris' officially proclaimed "independence" in nuclear weapons really change the targeting of the French missiles or make them less lethal? It is obvious to any sensible person that the French nuclear weapons, like Britain's moreover, are a component of the North Atlantic alliance's potential and must be taken into account at the Geneva talks.

It is also appropriate to recall the French stance on the neutron weapons. Paris has officially announced the completion of research and testing of neutron weapons, and essentially it is a question of putting it into production, albeit with certain provisos. Such a possibility is

causing particularly great alarm among broad circles of the European public. An impression is created that France intends to become one of the leaders in this new direction of the arms race.

French Government pro-Atlantic trends can also be seen in French practical cooperation with both the NATO military organization as a whole and with individual bloc members. They are expressed in coordinated planning for the possible use of armed forces, combined military exercises and maneuvers, joint development and production of weapons and military equipment, and also NATO use of support facilities on French territory. The plans to reorganize and reequip the French Armed Forces objectively promote the intensification of the aggressive NATO bloc's military power. Military spending is increasing. This year, the country's military budget has increased by 10 percent to the record sum of 158.9 billion francs.

French Armed Forces' combat training is planned and implemented in the light of the NATO Joint Armed Forces' activities. About two dozen exercises are held annually either according to a NATO plan or in conjunction with individual bloc members' armed forces. In conjunction with Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy, France is developing and producing the Jaguar and Alpha jet, Gazelle, Puma, and Lynx helicopters, antiaircraft and antitank guided missiles, and other weaponry and military equipment. About 20 types of armaments are being developed in conjunction with the United States and the above countries. France is continuing to cooperate in NATO's unified air defense system in Europe, uses NATO's control and communications system, and cooperates on a number of questions of logistical support of troops.

It is clear that French military cooperation with NATO is tending to expand and is acquiring the scale that objectively brings France closer to the bloc's integrated military organization. All this provides grounds for asking whether France is departing from the traditional independent policy which over the course of many years has enhanced its prestige and influence in the international arena.

SELECTION ELEVEN

Shchedrov, I., "Mify i real'nost'" [Myths and Reality], *Pravda*, 1 June 1983, p. 4.

The credits for the film, "World War III. 1987..." are passing by on the t.v. screen in close-up. The advance announcement for this routine anti-Soviet hit movie, made in the U.S. and shown to the French, is curious. The makers of the film, one Paris newspaper writes, are trying to show that everything in the world inexorably leads to war in which France cannot be a side-lines observer.

And here is reliable information appearing on the pages of one of the capital's other major newspapers: Jaguars--the bombers of the French Air Force's tactical armed forces--are, it says, mastering, together with allied NATO subunits, the tactics of strikes from the air against "the Soviet Air Defense complex located deep in the USSR." Exercises are carried out in Nevada at the Nellis military base. Divisions from France's Air Force took part in them in 1981 and 1982. In January next year the French Jaguars will continue to perfect strikes "against Soviet targets" in the Nevada desert in concert with the NATO allies.

Concomitantly with "adjusting" its domestic policy and implementing "rigid economics," French authorities are now changing a number of important foreign policy foci while also reexamining the previous strategic doctrine of "nuclear deterrence." Never, probably, in recent times have France's military problems and her nuclear-missile forces been accorded so much attention. Never has the patently instigated campaign of "spy-o-mania" been so noisy, with its cutting edge aimed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and against democratic forces in France itself.

In a year critical for Europe, selected by Washington to be the start of realizing plans to deploy new American nuclear-missile weapons in a number of NATO West European countries, France's adjustment of its military policy appears to be no accident.

Day in and day out, t.v. viewers and newspaper and magazine readers are accosted with assertions about the alleged disruption of the balance of nuclear-missile weapons in Europe in the Soviet Union's favor and "as a result of this, the growing Soviet threat." In Williamsburg the Republic's President Francois Mitterrand once again confirmed his well-known position, consisting in full support of Reagan's plan to deploy new American nuclear-missile weapons on the territory of France's neighbors.

At the same time, official circles in Paris, as in London, categorically declare their disagreement with the fact that France and

England's nuclear-missile weapons should be counted in the overall balance of forces between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on the European continent. What kind of arguments do they cite to support this position?

The main argument lies in the fact that France's nuclear-missile weapons are part of her "independent national" armed forces which were withdrawn from NATO's integrated military organization by President de Gaulle in 1966. So they are no longer subordinate to the NATO command and they serve the defense of France itself exclusively. In this connection, special attention is usually focused on the fact that the right to put France's nuclear-missile and conventional armed forces into operation is held by the President of the country and not by the NATO command.

Another argument is also cited. From the statement that the U.S. and USSR have the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons and delivery means they draw the unexpected conclusion that against this backdrop, they say, the French nuclear-missile forces cannot either at present or in the near future be compared to them in any way nor do they represent a real threat, say, for the Soviet Union and its allies and therefore "they are not subject to examination."

Just how do matters stand in reality? According to press reports, France's expenditures on military needs last year were already higher than a number of other NATO West European states. As *L'Humanite* notes, in 1981 France spent 4.2 percent of her gross national product on these needs. The 1983 budget provides for an increase in military expenditures of 10 percent, the absolute priority being given to building up the nuclear potential. Expenditures on the production of nuclear-missile weapons are increasing by 14.4 percent and on the construction of missile-carrying submarines--by 26.2 percent.

Already France now considers herself to be the third nuclear power--after the U.S. and USSR. According to press reports, the nuclear might of the country's armed forces more than doubled between 1975 and 1980--from 30 to 75 megatons. French land-based ballistic missiles (18) have a range of up to 3,700 kilometers while the ballistic missiles onboard the five nuclear-powered submarines (80) have a range of up to 3,200 kilometers. The range of the Mirage IV (46 of them) reaches 1,600 kilometers.

In the near term it is intended to commence production of new systems which will create "nuclear striking power comparable to the technological level of the U.S. and USSR." As *Le Monde* reported, General [?] M. Rouet, one of the leaders of the Pacific Ocean nuclear testing center, stated to the members of the Parliamentary Defense Committee regarding the French neutron bomb: "the technical problems have been solved. Everything is ready." By 1990, according to existing plans, France's nuclear might is to triple.

France also has tactical nuclear weapons and delivery means: Mirage III and Jaguar bombers and surface-to-surface missiles. Such are the nuclear-missile means of the West's second nuclear power. And here they demand "not to make note of," "not to count" all this when the ensurance of the security of the USSR and other socialist countries is being discussed.

Also not surprising is the argument about the "independent status" of the French nuclear forces, about the fact that they are exclusively at the disposal of France herself. So doesn't the USSR have its own nuclear-missile potential at its disposal? Then why, one asks, must her forces be counted in the overall calculations but not the French? And in general, by withdrawing from NATO's integrated military organization, would France honestly cease to be a member of the Atlantic alliance and would it really refuse to fulfill its allied commitments?

President Mitterrand, Minister of Defense Charles Hernu and Minister of Foreign Affairs Claude Cheysson have recently come out with official statements about France's unconditional adherence to the North Atlantic alliance and about its readiness to fulfill its ensuing allied commitments. The position recently taken by the French government of open support for the new American plan to "additionally arm" the NATO countries with nuclear missiles is, as we can see, supplemented by its own program to sharply increase its nuclear-missile potential. France does not even make this dependent upon the results of the Geneva talks nor upon the changes as a whole in the political climate in Europe and the world.

Also drawing attention is the concurrence between France's new long-term military program and the chronological framework of NATO's analogous five-year program for 1985-1989. The very substantial adjustments in the French doctrine of nuclear deterrence recently introduced to draw it closer to the NATO concepts as well as its actual long-term plans attest to its tendency to crawl towards "Atlanticism."

The five-year program for 1985-1989, approved by the government at the end of April, gives priority to the build-up and modernization of France's nuclear-missile potential. Cardinal changes will affect both the strategic and tactical nuclear-missile arms. Already last year, *Le Monde* reports, more than one-third of the state expenditures on scientific research were earmarked for military purposes. The new long-term military program will cost the taxpayers, according to the most modest calculations, a record sum of 830 billion francs.

The present French military doctrine for the '80s and '90s, which approximates U.S.-NATO models, partially answers the question of what objectives a sharp build-up in the nuclear-missile might and the modernization of the armed forces pursue. The previous doctrine, elaborated after France withdrew from NATO's military organization, limited the use of nuclear weapons strictly to defending its own

territory. For the doctrine being reviewed, it is now a matter of expanding the notion of France's "vital interests" beyond the boundaries of the country's territory.

The military-policy doctrine for the '80s and '90s, as the Minister of Defense explained in a recent interview with journalists, sets the task of defending France's "vital interests" into three "zones." The first of them, Hernu declared, embraces France's own territory. The second refers to the territory of allied West European countries and the Mediterranean. The third--to African countries and states located in other areas of the world "with whom it has allied obligations."

In connection with these tasks, it is envisaged to create a special tactical nuclear forces command, as well as to form a rapid action force--its own version of the American rapid deployment forces.

The course Paris has taken to build up its nuclear-missile forces and its support of Washington's plans to "additionally arm" Western Europe have evoked an ambiguous reaction within the country. At the same time as the extreme wing of "Atlanticists" are advocating further speeding up these plans and even deploying American missiles on French territory, many prominent sober-minded figures, anti-war spokesmen, and a number of progressive and democratic organizations are opposing the arms race in Western Europe and supporting the preservation of detente and the development of good-neighbor relations between France and the socialist states.

Conferences are being held in various departments in France-- "General Staffs for Disarmament" and on 19 June a Peace March is planned in Paris. At these forums at issue is whether France can or should play an important role, as was often the case in the past, in strengthening peace and security in Europe, preserving detente and good-neighborliness, and mutually beneficial cooperation. This responds to the interests of all peoples, including the French.

SELECTION TWELVE

Arsen'ev, Z., "Frantsiia: Kovarstvo kholodnykh vetrov" [France: The Treachery of Cold Winds], *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 13 April 1984, p. 7.

The "Atlantic cyclone" has, it seems, come down upon France. What does this mean? Intense action by this country's rightist political circles to further strengthen Paris' ties with NATO. Thus, Jean Lecanuet, the leader of one of the main rightist groups, is urging the creation of a kind of "European Security Council"--a supranational organ for military-policy problems. He has long supported a military nuclear triumviral alliance--of France, England and the FRG. This essentially signifies an almost uncamouflaged attempt to grant West Germany nuclear weapons and to return France to the NATO military organization.

The country's former President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, is also moving in the maelstrom of the "Atlantic cyclone." Apparently, finding himself without a job after 1981, he decided to abandon his own previous political realism. "The feeling of belonging to a national state is," he writes, "a 19th century approach." And he proposes beginning, without any dawdling, the creation of a national "political Europe" and a "European Defense Community." It would, in his opinion, rely on a Paris-Bonn axis, and would also have special relations with the United States. Giscard d'Estaing proposes opening the French "nuclear umbrella" over the FRG and he is even laying claim to the crown of supporting the idea of "additionally arming NATO."

Coming from the extreme rightist position is Jacques Chirac, president of the Rassemblement pour la Republique, the main [political] force of the French bourgeoisie. Having flirted with the Gaullists at one time, Chirac in recent years has more and more frequently tried on the armor of a knight of "cold war" and supporter of "Reaganism a la francais." He believes that France's security can be ensured only by a close military alliance with the U.S. and by admitting the FRG into the club of NATO nuclear powers. Chirac talks endlessly about the "Soviet threat" and urges the build-up of nuclear arms and the start of neutron bomb production. It is he whose phrase is: since the Soviet Union opposes neutron weapons, we must start producing them.

Several representatives from France's military elite have also done their bit for the Atlantic circles' campaign. Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Copel recently published a book. Its basic theses coincide with the concepts of NATO's strategies which aspire to military superiority over the Soviet Union. Copel is calling for "winning the war." But how? Not by ceasing the nuclear arms race and reducing these arms, but by organizing a new military alliance of

the West European countries within NATO's framework and creating new types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and neutron ones.

All these efforts receive encouragement from across the ocean in every way possible. U.S. and NATO leaders are trying to draw France into the groove of its military-political strategy at any price and to force her, like the other West European countries, to bear an ever greater share of the burden of military expenditures. As the French newspaper *Les Echos* has written, "Washington is not losing hope of one day getting Paris to return to the bloc's military organization."

The U.S. objective also consists in strengthening--either by carrot or stick--NATO's West European foothold. Already 44 percent of the bloc's military expenditures, three quarters of its ground troops in Europe and as many tanks, and 65 percent of its military aircraft fall to these countries. Finally, the nuclear missiles of England and France taken together make up more than one quarter of NATO's medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

The maneuvers by the Atlanticists in France and the pressure from the U.S. and NATO have not been without influence on her foreign and military policy, the more so as several of the Atlanticists' concepts have something in common with the policy of the ruling Socialist Party's leadership.

While declaring that France does not intend to return to the NATO military organization, the French government has, at the same time, undertaken a whole series of actions which have introduced new aspects of its policy. There is the question, for example, of strengthening Paris' military cooperation with the other NATO countries, and primarily with the FRG. The French army is the largest one in Western Europe after West Germany's (about 550 thousand people). Of them, approximately 50 thousand are located on FRG territory and are viewed as their own kind of NATO's second echelon. Recently they have been reorganized into "rapid action forces," expected to participate in joint actions with NATO troops "on the forward lines" in Central Europe.

"We have expressed alarm about the tasks which could be entrusted to the 'rapid action forces' in the center of Europe," declared General Secretary of the PCF Georges Marchais. "Does this really not harbor a danger of France returning to the NATO military organization and a reexamination of the decision made by de Gaulle in 1966 and supported by the Communist Party?"

In addition, the French units located near the FRG border will, in the coming years, be reinforced with new Hades tactical nuclear missiles, having a range of up to 450-500 kilometers, that is capable of inflicting a strike on the socialist countries' territory.

Judging from recent statements by Mitterrand, France is continuing to develop and test neutron weapons. Their production could begin in several months or, possibly, it has begun already. As Defense Minister Charles Hernu has acknowledged, this would signify a fundamental change in France's military strategy and a definitive transition to the position of the Atlantic strategy of "fighting on the forward line." After all, neutron weapons, like medium-range missiles, are primarily first strike weapons and intended for offensive actions. They are necessary to those militant NATO circles who are relying on using nuclear weapons first.

The French press has noted that military cooperation between Bonn and Paris is experiencing a real boom. They also tie this in with the French proposal to remove the ban on FRG production of non-nuclear weapons, including long-range missiles and heavy bombers. Such a measure would be to the liking of FRG militarist, revanchist circles, but it patently contradicts the interests of security on the European continent.

The Atlanticists are thereby undertaking more and more new actions aimed at drawing France into the groove of NATO's militant course step by step. New pressure was placed on France during Mitterrand's recent visit to the U.S.

However, the majority of the French people have a steadfast immunity to Atlanticism. They realize that the appearance of ever newer American missiles in Western Europe intensifies the nuclear threat on the European continent. As the results of a recent public opinion poll in France have shown, the problem of war and peace along with the problem of unemployment cause the greatest concern among broad segments of the population, primarily the laborers--workers, peasants, and also young people.

Participants in the anti-war movement are speaking in clear, expressive language: "It is better to be active today than radioactive tomorrow!" They support a reduction in nuclear arms based on equality and identical security and oppose any options for creating a "European army" and the involvement of their country in NATO's military adventure; they oppose neutron weapons and support [the idea of] France conducting an independent, peace-loving policy. The Atlanticists' maneuvers run into resistance from French communists and other supporters of an independent foreign policy. The PCF is unmasking the manifestation of Atlanticism in France's foreign policy and it is resolutely opposing any plans to create "national" organs and is opposing allowing the FRG to have nuclear weapons.

...Paris' coat of arms depicts a small boat with the inscription: "It pitches, but will not sink." Historical experience has shown that the French ship follows a steady course in the international arena only if its sails are filled not with the winds of "cold war" but with the winds of peace and cooperation.

PART FIVE

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON THE FRENCH NAVY

SELECTION THIRTEEN

Rudas, S., "VMS Frantsii: Perspektivy razvitiia" [France's Naval Forces: Prospects for Development], *Morskoi sbornik [Naval Digest]*, No. 1 (January), 1977, pp. 96-98

The uniqueness of France's geographical location, having an outlet to two sea theaters--the Atlantic and the Mediterranean--and having kept a number of overseas territories for herself, stipulates--in the opinion of the country's military-policy leadership--the need to deploy a sufficiently powerful navy, capable of simultaneously conducting independent action in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean Sea and of protecting the state's military and political interests in various areas of the World Ocean. The postwar development of the French Navy pursued this objective, as a result of which it consolidated its position considerably as being the third in the world among the foreign navies (after the American and English Navies). The country's withdrawal from NATO's military organization and the subordination of its armed forces to a national command only aided the Navy's concentration in resolving the tasks facing it, the fundamental ones being: participating in the national nuclear-missile "system of deterrence," providing protection for national merchant shipping, and fulfilling the functions of "showing the flag."

The Navy is an independent branch of the armed forces which is controlled, along with the Army, Air Force and strategic nuclear forces, by the Ministry of Defense. Directly at the head of the Navy is the Conseil Supérieur de la Marine, made up of seven admirals. Its chairman--the Chief of the Navy's General Staff--is, in fact, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Operationally, the commanders in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters as well as the Navy's commander in Polynesia--where the French nuclear testing center is located on Mururoa Island--are subordinate to him.

The fleet's main forces are concentrated in home waters. Territorially, they are subdivided into three naval districts (prefectures)--two Atlantic (headquarters in Cherbourg and Brest) and one Mediterranean (headquarters in Toulon). The naval prefects in Brest and Toulon are concomitantly the naval commanders in the corresponding theaters. The main basing areas are: Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient (the Atlantic Coast) and Toulon (the Mediterranean Sea).

On the organizational level, the Navy is subdivided into the oceanic strategic forces [FOST] (one of the components of the national nuclear-missile "system of deterrence") and general purpose forces. The Atlantic and Mediterranean squadrons are formed on the basis of the latter. A special division was created in order to operate the Pacific testing center.

Naval aviation, including land-based air, is fully under the command of the Navy. Only the initial training of flight personnel is carried out in Air Force schools.

The oceanic strategic forces are concentrated in the Atlantic theater where a special base has been established for them on Ile Longe (Brest), equipped with a dry dock. The headquarters for the commander-in-chief is located in Houilles. Each missile-carrying submarine is staffed by two crew shifts. The average duration of a combat patrol is about 60 days and the inter-repair cycle--2.5 years.

The torpedo submarines are based in Lorient and Toulon.

Until recently, the basing system for the submarine fleet has been, despite France's withdrawal from the NATO military organization, mechanically subordinated to "Atlantic interests." The combat nucleus of the submarine forces, which includes the largest and most combat-capable ships--two aircraft carriers, the cruiser Colbert, and the guided missile destroyer Suffren were located in Brest. However, in 1975, as a result of the growth in France's new military-political interest in the Mediterranean, the decision was made to transfer them to Toulon. To provide a permanent basing for the aircraft carriers here, they began the planning for suitably equipping the base in full, including the building of new piers.

The development and modernization of the Navy is being carried out according to the "Blue Plan" which was elaborated at the end of the '60s (and finally ratified in 1972). It encompasses the period from 1970 through 1985 and reflects the overall trends in ship building and in expanding the naval air yard. The purpose of the plan initially was to ensure the creation of a "balanced Navy" by 1985 in the following manner: 6 nuclear-powered missile submarines and 20 torpedo submarines, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 helicopter carriers, 65 escort ships, 30 combat patrol craft, as well as a sufficient number of mine-sweepers, amphibious means and support means (including 5 general-purpose tanker supply ships). Sea-based aviation was to number 50 long-range patrol planes, while ship-based aviation was to receive new carrier-based fighter strike aircraft, the Super Etendard (100 of them), and the multi-purpose Lynx helicopter (60 of them) of Anglo-French manufacture. It was planned to increase the number of naval personnel by 5,000 people.

The plan only firmly stipulated the *classes* of ships which they were planning to build. Their *characteristics* were to be elaborated during the execution of the contemplated ship-building programs. This practice made it possible, when modernizing the escort forces, for example, to reject the construction of a series of eight Tourville guided-missile destroyers, which had proven to be too expensive, and to limit construction to just three ships. The program was retargeted to create lighter and more simply structured guided-missile destroyers. At first the Aconit was built as the prototype. However, its use of [?] an underwater television device as well as a number of defects in the

design, in the end forced them to decide on serial construction of destroyers with a turbo-charged diesel electronic amplifier--24 of the C 70 class. To supplement them it was planned to build 14 A 69 class destroyer escorts.

The realization of the selected plans so far has been carried out fairly successfully. For example, according to the last five-year plan for developing the armed forces (1971-1975), they financed the construction for 34 of the 36 ships they had planned to build. Only the backing for the PH 75 nuclear-powered air-capable ship was deferred. Instead, appropriations were allocated for the construction of a sixth missile-carrying submarine and for the first French nuclear-powered torpedo boat--the leading one in a series of three. In the future they plan to deploy two divisions of these ships--one in the Atlantic and one in the Mediterranean theater.

Nevertheless, the effects of the general world economic and energy crisis of 1973-1974 have told so heavily on the French economy that the government was forced to reexamine the previously-adopted commitments of the program. They had to temporarily abandon the elaboration of the next five-year plan for developing the armed forces. In 1975 the future plans of the Ministry of Defense were subjected to a thorough reexamination. The 1976 budget still provided the financing for work on already-functioning programs, but the plan proposed for 1977-1982 had undergone significant changes. Work on the sixth French missile-carrying submarine was shut down temporarily. It was announced that this nuclear-powered submarine would be built after 1982 according to a new design. For the future it was resolved to limit the development of the general purpose forces, whose main combat body consists of 12 nuclear-powered torpedo submarines, 3 air-capable ships, and 27 escort ships. The exacerbation of financial difficulties even led to the sale in 1976 to the Republic of South Africa of two small A 69 class escort ships which had been built earlier for the French Navy. In compliance with this, an adjusted program for new equipment purchases for the Navy was ratified (see table).

Along with the construction of new ships and vessels, a wide-range modernization of the combat units which remain in operation is also being carried out. The modernization is aimed primarily at renovating missile armaments, including the replacement of ICBMs, at equipping the fleet and naval air with anti-ship cruise missiles (including with tactical missiles having nuclear warheads for the Super Etendards in the future), at additionally arming surface ships with anti-aircraft guided missile systems for self-defense from low-flying objects, as well as at improving radio-electronic means. The rearmament of the first French nuclear-missile submarine, Redoutable, with higher performance missiles has been completed. Work is going on to modernize the radio-electronic armaments of the Daphne-class submarines. At the beginning of 1976 anti-ship missile systems for firing Exocet MM 38 missiles were installed on seven ships.

OUTLINE OF NEW EQUIPMENT PURCHASES
FOR FRANCE'S NAVY FOR 1977-1982

<u>Classes of ships and airborne platforms</u>	<u>Number of units</u>		
	<u>Ordered during 1977-1982</u>	<u>Supplied to the Navy</u>	
		<u>1977-1982</u>	<u>After 1982</u>
Nuclear-powered submarines	4	1	4
Nuclear-powered PH 75 helicopter carriers	1	--	1
C 70 class guided-missile destroyers	6	4	5
Small A 69 class escort ships (frigates)	0	11	--
Mine sweepers	12	3	9
Combat patrol craft	6	1	6
Carrier-based Super Etendard planes	44	80	--
Lynx WG 13 helicopters	14	40	--

While carrying out all these measures, the Navy's leadership is focusing on utilizing weapons systems developed by French firms, although development work is also being conducted jointly with navies from other countries. Thus, the design for the new mine-sweeper (serial construction is envisaged during 1977-1982) was created in collaboration with the Netherlands and Belgian Navies, while research on creating deep- and variable-depth sonar is being conducted with the U.S. Navy.

As a result of the successive implementation of this technical policy, over the past decade the Navy has secured virtually complete independence from foreign arms deliveries. In certain instances (for example, in creating the nuclear-missile forces) when France--unlike England--was forced to manage without help from the U.S., it required no small amount of money and time.

With the aim of reducing expenditures, weapons exports have been intensified (including naval weapons). In terms of cost, France is presently in second place among the capitalist countries (after the U.S.). In order to stimulate exports, a special joint organization has been created on the Navy's initiative and with the participation of private firms. Every two years it arranges an exhibition of new naval technology and equipment in Paris, to which it invites representatives of potential clients. In a number of cases, weapons models are offered for export that have still not been adopted for the home fleet. This was the case, for example, in the sale of the Exocet MM 38 anti-ship missiles. Such a practice makes it possible for France's Navy to determine the effectiveness of the new weapon without additional expenditures and, only after this, to make the final decision on the scales of its use on its own carriers.

The regular long voyages of French ships in various regions of the World Ocean (for example, the 1974 cruise in Arctic waters, several cruises in 1974-1975 in the Indian Ocean, in one of which the aircraft carrier Clemenceau took part, etc.) are devoted to achieving certain military-political objectives as well as to amassing experience in diverse climatic conditions.

As a result of all these successively-implemented measures, France's Navy--so foreign military specialists believe--firmly occupies at present one of the leading positions in the world and will, apparently, retain it in the future. The way the Navy's structure has taken shape, it is--in the opinion of the French military leadership-- well-balanced and meets the tasks which face it.

SELECTION FOURTEEN

Volodin, Capt. 1st Rank I., "Voenno-morskije sily Frantsii" [France's Navy], *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 9 (September), 1980, pp. 59-67.

France's Navy is accorded an important place within the system of the country's armed forces. A distinctive feature of its present development, so foreign specialists believe, is the construction of nuclear missile and torpedo submarines that has begun and the introduction into the fleet of nuclear weapons.

In number of ships, state of being equipped, and armaments, France's Navy is in third place among the navies of the capitalist states (after the U.S. and Great Britain). Judging from reports in the foreign press, it is entrusted with the following tasks: delivering nuclear strikes against the opponent's highly important military and administrative-industrial targets, providing national defense from maritime axes, conducting combat action at sea employing conventional or nuclear weapons, protecting sea lines of communication and national interests in her territory and in areas which France considers to be her zones of influence, and supporting the combat action of other branches of the armed forces.

The Navy is headed up by the chief of staff (he is a commander) who is responsible for planning and calculating combat funds, determining the budget, selecting new equipment, constructing coastal facilities, providing logistical support, ensuring the combat training of ships and tactical formations, and for bringing personnel up to full strength and training them.

In accordance with its assignment, the Navy is subdivided into naval strategic forces and general purpose forces.

The *naval strategic forces* are one of the components of France's strategic nuclear forces and include a squadron of nuclear missile submarines based at Ile Longue (Brest) and a very-long-range transmitter at Rosnay. The squadron numbers five Redoutable-class SSBNS (Le Redoutable, fig. 1 [not reproduced], Le Terrible, Le Foudroyant, L'Indomptable and Le Tonnant) each of which has 16 M-20 ballistic missiles with a single thermonuclear warhead having a yield of 1 megaton and a range of 3,200 km. In the future it is planned to rearm these boats with new MIRVed M-4 missiles having six or seven 150 kt nuclear warheads (a range of more than 4,000 km).

The *general purpose forces* are made up of the fleet, naval air, and naval infantry. The *fleet* includes submarines (excluding SSBNS), the Atlantic and Mediterranean squadrons, a group of multipurpose aircraft

carriers, three flotillas belonging to the naval districts, and four naval commands overseas. A detailed organizational structure of the fleet and naval forces as a whole is given in figure 2 [not reproduced].

Naval air is subdivided into carrier-based and land-based patrol aircraft. It consists of 140 combat and up to 160 auxiliary planes and helicopters. The carrier-based aircraft includes three fighter-assault air flotillas (two of them outfitted with Super Etendards carrying tactical nuclear weapons and one with deck-based Etendard 4M strike aircraft), one fighter (Crusader), one reconnaissance (Etendard 4R), two antisubmarine aircraft (Alize), four antisubmarine helicopters (Lynx, Super Frelon, and Alouette 3) and one assault-transport helicopter (Super Frelon).

The land-based patrol aircraft consists of five air flotillas, four of which are armed with Atlantic aircraft and one with Neptune.

The *naval infantry* is designed to participate in amphibious assault operations in the first wave detachment, to conduct commando-type reconnaissance operations, to guard naval bases, and to execute police functions on the ships. It includes five commando-type reconnaissance detachments, a detachment of frogmen, three guard companies for the naval bases (Cherbourg, Brest, Toulon) and ship detachments of naval infantry.

France's coast and adjoining waters are divided into three naval districts: I (headquarters at the Cherbourg naval base) includes the English Channel and the North Sea coasts, II (Brest)--the Atlantic coast and III (Toulon)--the Mediterranean coast. Their commanders are responsible for providing defense of the shore, naval base and ports, for the daily activity of the fleet and naval air forces under their command, and for protecting sea lines of communication. In addition, they are entrusted with border service in coastal waters as well as the coordination of actions when conducting search and rescue operations at sea and when exploiting the continental shelf.

The chief of staff carries out the navy's operational leadership (except SSBNs) through the naval commanders on ocean (Atlantic) and sea (Mediterranean) TVDs and naval commanders of zonal commands (the English Channel and North Sea, North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Guiana and the Antilles, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean). The commander of naval district II is concomitantly the naval commander in the Atlantic and the commander of III is the naval commander in the Mediterranean Sea.

According to data from the foreign press, at the start of 1980 the fighting strength of France's naval forces numbered about 380 combat ships, patrol and rescue craft, including five nuclear missile and 23 diesel torpedo submarines, two multipurpose aircraft carriers (fig. 3) [not reproduced], two cruisers (one a helicopter carrier and the other a

guided missile cruiser), ten guided missile destroyers, nine destroyers, 17 guided missile frigates, and five guided-missile, 14 patrol and 36 assault craft. The tactical and technical characteristics of the basic types of ships are given in the table [no table in the text].

France's naval command pays particular attention to the development of the submarine fleet, emphasizing nuclear-powered submarines. Serving as confirmation of this is the construction of the sixth SSBN, L'Inflexible, which will be armed with M-4 ballistic missiles and the construction of the first three Provence-class [now called the Rubis-class] torpedo submarines (the SNA 72 plan). In all, it is intended to build not less than ten SSNs of this class. At the present time, the leading one has already been launched and should be put into service in 1982. Its tactical and technical characteristics are: displacement: 2,385 tons surfaced, 2,670 dived; length: 72.1 meters, width: 7.6, draft: 6.4; fastest surface speed: 20 knots, submerged: 25 knots; armaments: four torpedo tubes and 14 reserve torpedoes. A crew of 68 men.*

Great importance is attached to the modernization of existing ships and to the development of new combat ships of the basic types. For example, Suffren-class guided missile destroyers (fig. 4) [not reproduced] are having Exocet guided missile systems installed (instead of 30-mm antiaircraft guns) and two 20-mm antiaircraft guns, while the Tourville-class guided missile destroyer is getting a Crotale antiaircraft guided missile system (instead of an after 100-mm gun). Another five D'Estienne d'Orves-class frigates were also outfitted with the Exocet guided missile system that had not been armed with this system before. Construction is continuing on the Georges Leygues-class guided missile destroyer and on the D'Estienne d'Orves-class guided missile frigate.

As a result of the expiration of the service life of the Foch and Clemenceau aircraft carriers, the question is being examined of possibly replacing them with two nuclear aircraft carriers of a new design. In addition, it is intended to build a nuclear-powered assault helicopter carrier (earlier this ship was classified as a PH 75 nuclear-powered cruiser-helicopter carrier), although the specific time periods have not yet been determined.

The navy's amphibious forces include two helicopter-capable landing ships (docks) (8,500 tons full load displacement, 9,000 mile range at 15 knots, armaments: six 30-mm antiaircraft guns, two 120-mm mortars, it can take four Super Frelon or 13 Alouette helicopters, capacity: 1,500 tons of cargo and 470 assault troops fully outfitted), seven tank landing ships, five of them the Trieux-class (4,225 full load

* For more detail about the nuclear submarine SNA 72 plan, see *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie*, No. 1, 1979, pp. 73-76. (ed.)

displacement) and two Champlain-class (1,409 tons), as well as 12 small landing craft (670 tons) and 36 assault craft. Two Champlain-class tank landing ships are being built.

The mine warfare forces consist of 12 minehunter, including five Circe-class (see colored insert) [not reproduced] and seven Berneval-class (refitted from sea minesweepers, 780 tons full load displacement), four Berneval-class sea minesweepers and 22 Sirius- and Acacia-class coastal minesweepers. In addition, they have 11 net layers. At the present time construction is being carried out on the new Eridan-class minehunter. Its full load displacement is 544 tons, range is 3,000 miles at 12 knots, armaments are: a 20-mm antiaircraft gun, a sonar station, and two PAP systems. They propose building 15 of these ships, the lead one already having been launched.

The La Combattante I-class (one) and the Trident-class (four) missile attack craft as well as 14 Le [?] Fugeau-class, Sirius-class, La Dunkerquoise-class and Ham-class patrol craft (the three later are former coastal and harbor minesweepers) are the types of vessels.

By 2004, according to estimates by French military specialists, the national naval forces will have in their combat make-up: six nuclear missile submarines, ten nuclear torpedo submarines (Provence-class) and four diesel-powered submarines (Agosta-class), two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, a nuclear assault helicopter-carrier, 27 guided missile destroyers (Georges Leygues-class), 18 D'Estienne d'Orves guided missile frigates, nine amphibious warfare ships, 40 Eridan- and Circe-class minehunters, as well as ten missile patrol craft and 12 mobile rear support vessels.

The Navy's personnel numbers 70,000 men, including approximately 5,000 officers and 29,000 non-commissioned officers.

France's Navy is brought up to full strength with personnel drafted for a fixed period of time (12 months) based on the law of a universal draft and with volunteers who have signed a contract for three, five, 15 or 25 years. The draftee has the right to select his service on a surface ship, submarine, in aviation or in shore units. After a month-long course of initial training in the Navy's single training center in Hourtin (Brest), the drafted sailors are sent to ships and to units where they study a specialty. As a rule, they are assigned to a position corresponding to their civilian specialty or to a secondary position not requiring complex or prolonged training. During their service they are granted only one military rank: seaman, first class.

Volunteers who have signed a contract and had not previously served in the Navy at first take a course in initial military training in Hourtin and then select a naval specialty. They study at the navy's training centers in St. Mandrier (Toulon), Querqueville (Cherbourg) and Hourtin and in aviation training centers in Rochefort and Nimes Caron

(the Western and Southern sections of France, respectively). The training of non-commissioned officers and highly qualified specialists is carried out in courses through the training centers. Military ranks are conferred depending on the length of service, the position taken and the results of the qualifying tests.

Officers are taken from civilians (two years of study) and noncommissioned officers at the Naval Academy at Lanveoc Poulmic (Brest). Graduates spend a year of on-the-job training onboard the cruiser-helicopter carrier Jeanne d'Arc and the destroyer Forbin. Their specialties are perfected in courses through the training centers of the fleet and naval air. Officers receive higher military education at the Higher Naval School (Paris) and certain senior officers (Captain 1st Rank and higher) at the Center for Military Analysis (Paris).

Officers serve in one post for not longer than three years. It is considered obligatory to alternate the officers' sea duty with shore duty. It is also the practice to send officers who are pilots and submariners to surface ships and to appoint them as ship commanders.

France's naval forces, according to the appraisal of the Navy's command, possess a developed basing system in metropolises and in overseas territories. The Navy's main bases are: Brest, Toulon (the principle ones), Cherbourg, Lorient, and basing points: Ile Longue, La Pallice, Aspretto (Corsica), Dakar (Senegal), Fort de France [Martinique] (the Antilles), Djibouti and Reunion Island (Indian Ocean), Papeete and Noumea (Pacific Ocean). They have sufficient ship repair potential and significant reserves of all types of supplies.

Carrier-based aircraft is based at Landvisiau (Brest) and Hyeres (Toulon), coastal patrol at Lann Bihoue (Lorient) and Nimes Garon and helicopters at Lanveoc Poulmic and St. Mandrier.

As the foreign press reports, during combat and operational training the naval forces master the tasks confronting them both independently and in cooperation with the Ground Troops and Air Force. A significant place is accorded the mastering of joint actions with the bloc's Navies during exercises in the Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean (Fregate, Display Determination, Open Gate, Dawn Patrol, [?] Norminex, Ile d'Or, etc.). Bearing witness to the intensified participation of France's Navy in recent years in the combat and operational training of NATO's joint armed forces is the declaration by the country's military-policy leadership of its loyalty to its North Atlantic bloc allies which [statement] is appraised by Western military specialists as direct support of NATO's military interests.