A Prototype Model for Allocating Army Enlistment Incentives: A Feasibility Phase.
Abstract
The US Army currently provides various types of enlistment incentives to quality recruits, both to expand the market for obtaining recruits and to redistribute the recruits as needed across the various Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). Two of these enlistment incentives are (1) the Army College Fund (ACF), with different benefits for 2, 3, and 4-year terms; and (2) enlistment bonuses (EBs), for a 3- or 4-year terms of service. The latter range up to 8,000 for critical MOSs. For FY1986 EBs have been budgeted at $115M and the ACF at $187M, for a total of $302M. Approximately one fourth of all MOSs have, at any given time, an enlistment incentive, the application and removal of which is based on observed individual fill rates and contract requirements by MOS for quality recruits. The total dollar level of incentives needed and their efficient allocation to individual MOSs are quite complex due to such factors as interactive competitive effects (i.e., competition for recruits between different MOSs); the well known diminishing returns nature of recruiting resources, whereby each additional quality recruit becomes more difficult and expensive to obtain; the impacts of key demographic and economic variables; and the impacts of other recruiting resources (e.g., recruiters, Army advertising, military/civilian pay ratios).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA177516
Entities
People
- C. A. Lovell
- Richard C. Morey
Organizations
- Battelle Memorial Institute