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NAVY RESERVE REINFORCING UNITS--IS THERE A BETTER WAY?

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

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NAVY RESERVE REINFORCING UNITS--IS THERE A BETTER WAY?

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

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REQUIREMENT

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DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Navy Reserve Reinforcing Units--Is There a Better Way?

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Navy Reserve reinforcing units are structured to augment Navy ships and air squadrons during mobilization. Reinforcing units for active ships and air squadrons have many problems, specifically with respect to training and with respect to mobilization capability. This has led to instability, negative cohesion and morale, and poor retention in reinforcing units.

There are alternative sources for providing surge requirements to ships and air squadrons that are more efficient in terms of rapid build-up, will provide personnel at least as well trained as personnel in reinforcing units, and are more cost-effective. The alternative sources are examined, their advantages and disadvantages weighed, and the cost benefits analyzed. Suggestions are made for overcoming disadvantages, and arguments are presented for accepting alternative sources for planning of mobilization personnel in lieu of Navy Reserve reinforcing units.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Commander Mary E. Wuest (B.S. in Mathematics, University of Detroit; M.S. in Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey) has had numerous assignments as an operations research analyst. She has been assigned as Head of the Analysis Department on the staff of Commander Oceanographic System Atlantic, Norfolk; Head Analyst in the Enlisted Force Plans and Policies Branch, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C.; and Operations Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C. Studies conducted by CDR Wuest during the latter assignment include studies on Navy Reserve manpower issues. CDR Wuest is a proven subspecialist in operations research for manpower and personnel, and for plans and programs.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With the formal initiation of the Total Force Policy in 1972, the services entered a period in which the Reserve Components have become a cornerstone of strategy. This policy links Active and Reserve Components into a single force designed to deter war or, if required, to fight a war.

This heightened reliance on Reserve Components embodies requirements for increased readiness, improved mobilization, and rapid deployment. Central to each of these issues, and paramount to total readiness, is time. Today's Guard and Reserve units must, for all practical purposes, deploy concurrently with Active Component units. (10:133)

Do Navy Reserve reinforcing units meet these requirements? Many members of the military (and of other government agencies) believe that they do not. These critics charge that members of the Navy Reserve reinforcing units are not sufficiently trained, are not adequately integrated into the active force, and cannot be readily mobilized to meet the time constraints in deploying concurrently with their active force receiving units.

This paper will examine these assertions, identify and analyze underlying causes for problems that exist, and examine and assess alternative solutions.

CHAPTER II

THE NAVY RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURE

Definitions

The Navy Reserve forces are broken down into the following basic categories: (See Figure 1.)

1. Ready Reserve. The Ready Reserve is comprised of the Selected Reserve (organized units that drill together) and the Individual Ready Reserve (nondrilling individual reservists). The Ready Reserve is liable for active duty in time of war or national emergency declared by congress or proclaimed by the President. The Ready Reserve is the source of immediate mobilization assets.

a. Selected Reserve (SELRES). SELRES personnel are in a drill pay status and are assigned to a reserve commissioned unit, a reinforcing unit, or to a sustaining unit.

(1) Commissioned Unit. A commissioned unit is a complete operational and organizational entity. Reserve commissioned units include those for frigates, minesweepers, cargo-handling battalions, construction battalions (Sea Bees), and air wings. (14:63) Reserve commissioned units will deploy with their own surface vessels or aircraft, and their own equipment. (5:61)

(2) Reinforcing Unit. Reinforcing Units

NAVY RESERVE*



*The above statistics come from several different sources, but are all of the end FY84 and early FY85 time frame.
**eligible for mobilization.

Figure 1

will augment active Navy ships, air squadrons, and afloat operational staffs, and provide marine corps support (e.g., hospital corpsmen). There are also reinforcing units for reserve commissioned ships and squadrons. When referring to reinforcing units in this paper, the reference will generally be to the reinforcing units which will augment active ships and air squadrons. Reinforcing units are assigned to most active Navy surface ships and air squadrons.

(3) Sustaining unit. Sustaining units will augment active Navy bases, stations, and other support organizations during mobilization.

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). IRR personnel are personnel in a nondrill nonpay status who have residual contract obligations from prior active or reserve service.

2. Standby Reserves. These personnel have completed all military obligated service and have chosen to remain in the reserves, but do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. (11:32) They are liable for active duty only in time of war or emergency declared by congress, and only after the Ready Reserve has been recalled. (5:61) IRR and Standby Reserve will augment active and selected reserve units during mobilization and serve as casualty replacements. (13:6)

3. Retirees. Retirees have completed at least 20 years of active duty or 20 years of creditable service for reserve retirement. Category I retirees are retirees who have retired within the last five years, are under age 60, and are not disabled. Category II retirees have been retired for more than five years, are under age 60, and are not disabled. (9:58) Category I and Category II retirees are subject to recall to active duty in time of war or emergency declared by congress, but only after the Ready Reserve has been recalled. (5:61) Authority for mobilization of retired members of the regular Navy can be invoked by the Secretary of the Navy. (2:6)

Ready Reservists provide the manpower pool that can be quickly recalled. Standby and retired reservists would take longer to be processed and mobilized.

CHAPTER III

THE SELECTED RESERVE

As described in Chapter II, the Selected Reserve consists of commissioned units, reinforcing units, and sustaining units. Although the purpose of this paper is to examine the reinforcing units, it would be beneficial to begin by examining reinforcing units in the light of the functions of the other two types of units: to compare them, to evaluate their associated advantages and disadvantages, and in this manner, to come to an understanding of the relative utility of the reinforcing units.

Those functions in which the Naval Reserve can assist best are those in which there is no significant forward deployment requirement until mobilization, in which a small active-duty cadre can handle the Navy's needs during peacetime, and in which training availability is in close proximity to the location of the assets (ships, aircraft, etc.). (7:97)

Commissioned and sustaining units meet most of these requirements. Reinforcing units do not. Except for limited deployment for training and for participation in exercises with the active forces, commissioned units generally do not deploy until mobilization. Therefore, reservists assigned to commissioned units are usually able

to train with their gaining commands and to train on the actual equipment they will be using during mobilization. They also will not have to rendezvous with a ship or squadron that is already in the theater of operation since they will leave with their ship or squadron when it deploys. Sustaining units, as well as some commissioned units, will be mainly augmenting shore establishments, and thus, will have relatively little difficulty in reporting for duty during mobilization and are able to receive beneficial training during peacetime.

Most Navy Reserve programs which can be put to use immediately in the event of mobilization are commissioned and sustaining reserve programs. These programs are earmarked for missions in defense of the continental United States (mine countermeasures); for missions that do not require predeployment (reserve commissioned ships and air squadrons, construction battalions, control of shipping, and convoy escorts) (18:50); or for missions that are also beneficial peacetime missions (intelligence, medical, and technical units). Many of these units have an excellent record of responding to numerous calls and providing immediate critical services. (6:122) There is also useful peacetime utilization of reservists in drug interdiction.

Most of these missions require little fulltime manning during peacetime. Approximately 14,000 career

fulltime active duty reservists (TARs) are responsible for the training and administration of reservists. (5:61)

CHAPTER IV

REINFORCING UNITS

The main difference between reinforcing units and commissioned and sustaining reserve units is that personnel of reinforcing units will augment forces that are subject to predeployment during peacetime. This adversely affects the ability of reinforcing units to train with their gaining commands, to train on the equipment they are responsible for operating during mobilization, and in reporting to their commands during mobilization. "The Secretary of the Navy [John F. Lehman Jr.] has stated, '. . . [Y]ou can't have a "weekend warriors" manning a fleet that is forward deployed.' " (6:122)

Training Problems

> . . . [T]he Naval Reserve is tasked with keeping up with the latest developments in naval weaponry, engineering systems, tactics, and operations for a wide variety of "parent commands" without being afforded the opportunity to obtain the training it needs and deserves. Reserve units reporting to Navy ships may get to their training platform only once a year at best. Many times, active duty training (AcDuTra) periods available to a given unit do not coincide with the ship's schedule. Deployments remove a parent command from the continental United States, and, given the always sorry state of reserve funding, it is impossible for the unit to meet its ship or activity even if the schedule permits such a rendezvous.
>
> The schools required . . . are full and unavailable; the promised weekend away training (WET) is cancelled the day before the unit's scheduled departure for the training because the transportation falls through. (17:43)

Members of reinforcing units for forward deployed Navy air squadrons have the same problems as the units for surface forces in getting training where the assets are, and thus do not get the air time necessary to achieve or maintain the necessary skills. Training that is achieved is often with reserve commissioned units on equipment that more often than not is dissimilar to the equipment the reinforcing units would be mobilized to. (23) Reserve reinforcing units for maritime patrol (VP) squadrons are an exception in that the reservists have P-3C patrol aircraft dedicated to their use and they fly actual peacetime missions along with their gaining commands.

The relatively small size of reinforcing units and the geographic distribution of its members throughout the U.S. precludes any significant improvement in efficiency in getting personnel to AcDuTra. However, even if training with the gaining command were not a problem, two weeks and 12 weekends a year is too short a period for the average reservist to keep up with the rapid changes in Navy technology, tactics, and operations. For example, the new AEGIS defense equipment, complex computerized systems being installed aboard cruisers to defend carrier battle groups, renders the skills of many reservists obsolete. An individual without the appropriate training would require a crash training course of 30 days or more before he could be

effectively utilized. This is simply not feasible after mobilization, unless one is expecting a long protracted war or a war at a slow enough tempo that other operators can be pulled to provide the training. The gap between the skills of the selected reserves and the active forces is constantly widening. (19)

> Although it is true that the knowledge a reservist gains during active duty is retained for a long time, day-to-day practice of these skills is generally not available at the Naval Reserve centers. For a young officer skilled in conning a destroyer past Point Loma, California, driving a blip across a radar screen in a shipboard simulator will never be the same. Similarly, the young reserve boatswain's mate just off active duty will not benefit as much from tossing lines across a street as from securing them to another ship during underway replenishment. (17:43)

Skill degradation, or the loss of military skills, occurs through lack of use or obsolescence of the skills. This is particularly true with technical skills which require long initial training and periodic skill improvement training. (13:10)

During FY 1983 and FY 1984, the major limiting factor to unit readiness for Naval Reserve reinforcing and sustaining units combined was training. This includes both individual training and unit training. (Available information here combines reinforcing and sustaining units together, i.e., the data is not separated out.) In comparison to reserve commissioned units whose personnel have more opportunity for training with their mobilization

forces, the reinforcing and sustaining units had significantly less training readiness for FY 1982 through FY 1984 (more recent data was not available). See Table I. (9:28-29; 10:23,28) It should be noted that although the data is not separated out between reinforcing and sustaining units, the reinforcing units most likely were the greatest contributor to lack of training readiness.

Table I

Training Readiness

	Percent of Units C-3 or Better		
	1982	1983	1984*
Commissioned Units	77%	76%	87%
Reinforcing/Sustaining Units	44%	35%	77%

*Much of the improvement for FY1984 is from a change in the way training readiness was measured.

Because of insufficient training for the mission, members of reinforcing units often are not welcomed with open arms by gaining commands or perceived by gaining commands as critical mobilization assets, i.e., they are often looked upon as "freebies". Thus, reservists of reinforcing units do not become truly integrated with their

gaining commands.

Reserve reinforcing units also suffer significant instability. Instability is due to several factors such as frequent change of requirements and personnel resources being pulled from reinforcing units to be reassigned to reserve commissioned units. Stability in reinforcing units is a problem in both personnel inventory management and billet structure. Billets approved one day are deleted the next. Personnel assigned to deleted billets must often be reassigned to other reinforcing units, or go to a nonpay status until appropriate billets open. (28) The recent Training and Education CNO Executive Board (CEB) identified instability as an impediment to training improvement. (21)

Insufficient training and personnel instability have significant negative impact on unit identity, cohesion, and morale. One of the most visible results of this impact is the high turnover rate in the Navy Selected Reserve. (Again, the data is not broken out separately for reinforcing units.) Compared to the selected reserves of the other services, the Navy Selected Reserve has historically had the poorest first term retention (See Table II). Although retention in the Navy Selected Reserve improved in FY 1984, it was still less than the total Department of Defense average for FY 1984. As can be seen, career retention has also been consistently less than the

TABLE II

Selected Reserve: Continuation Rates

The following charts show the percentages of individuals (officers and enlisted) who continue service in the Selected Reserve from one fiscal year to the next. Thus, continuation rates are not the same as reenlistment rates.

FIRST TERM
(less than six years total service)

	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84
Army National Guard	74.7	79.0	79.0	78.5	77.8	80.9
Army Reserve	67.3	71.5	71.2	71.3	67.2	70.9
Naval Reserve	60.5	58.6	60.5	62.6	59.3	74.6
Marine Corps Reserve	74.2	76.1	74.1	77.0	74.1	70.4
Air National Guard	80.7	82.6	80.7	82.8	85.5	87.0
Air Force Reserve	77.5	78.7	77.0	76.8	75.2	80.0
Total DOD	72.9	76.0	75.7	76.0	74.1	77.5

CAREER
(six or more years total service)

	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84
Army National Guard	81.3	83.6	85.9	87.1	86.8	87.3
Army Reserve	79.9	83.5	85.2	86.6	85.5	85.2
Naval Reserve	81.8	79.2	81.8	84.2	84.0	85.2
Marine Corps Reserve	71.4	74.0	75.1	81.4	72.9	65.8
Air National Guard	88.3	88.9	90.6	91.3	92.7	92.6
Air Force Reserve	86.4	86.8	87.2	88.1	88.6	90.4
Total DOD	82.4	84.1	86.0	87.4	86.9	87.2

Department of Defense average. (1:34)

Mobilization Problems

Today, approximately one-third of active U.S. Navy forces are forward deployed in or near the theaters of operations in which they will fight should the next war occur. (18:46) How will reserve personnel located within the United States augment these forces in time of need? The problem is aggravated by the fact that large groups of personnel are not assigned to specific platforms. Rather, individuals scattered throughout the United States are intended to deploy to ships and squadrons scattered throughout the world. (18:50) Many members of a reinforcing unit do not live in the same geographic location as other members of the same reinforcing unit.

The job of meeting transportation requirements falls to the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). But in examining MAC, which will be the prime mover of personnel, a study by the Association of the United States Army in 1984 has shown that "MAC's resources, even at full mobilization, are not nearly sufficient to meet current airlift requirements". Sealift is not expected to be any more capable or responsive. (2:19-20)

Thus, it appears that because of training and

mobilization problems, reinforcing units of the Selected Reserve are not an efficient means of meeting the mobilization requirements of active commissioned ships and squadrons. How did the reinforcing units come into being?

Chapter V

History of Reinforcing Units

Previous to the late 1970's, members of the Navy Reserve who would augment the active force were organized in manpower pools called naval air reserve divisions or surface reserve divisions. The personnel of these manpower pools did not have adequate training opportunities to maintain their skills gained on active duty because they did not know what specific training was required of them, and the Navy Reserve did not have the capability to train them. In the late 1970's, the Navy Reserve was restructured to form reinforcing and sustaining units which linked them directly to their gaining commands. There are now designated mobilization billets for all augmentation personnel. (5:60-61)

In theory, this restructuring of the Selected Reserve seems sound. It answers the problem of not knowing what reserve training should be provided, and links a reservist to each mobilization requirement. But, as shown above, although the training required for members of reinforcing units is now known, it is very difficult to attain.

To accommodate the lack of skilled reservists in reinforcing units and due to doubts about the ability of

reservists to mobilize to predeployed units, there has been a gradual change in the programming of mobilization requirements and thus to the active/reserve force mix.

Chapter VI

Impact of Training/Mobilization Deficiencies

All reserve units fall within the purview of a program sponsor in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav). The sponsor is either a deputy chief of naval operations or a director of a major staff office. The program sponsor is charged with determining peacetime requirements for Navy forces within his purview. (8:71) Mobilization requirements (total wartime reqirements less peacetime requirements) are often what has been left over, i.e., what a sponsor has been unable to "buy" (get approved) as peacetime requirements. (8:66) Most sponsors attempt to "buy" all billets as peacetime billets so as not to have to depend on the reserves. The Report of the House of Representatives Committee on the Armed Services covering the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1984 singled out the Navy as being particularly reluctant to use reserves. "The Navy presents a unique case, and, in fact, it has the weakest record of supporting or utilizing reserve components." (26:34)

Since, in most cases, the sponsors are not able to buy all billets as peacetime billets, they buy as rich a mix as they can, rich in high skill requirements and high paygrades (particularly in those high skilled sea-intensive

ratings that have low retention [11]).

This has generated not only a growing proportion of E-4 and below billets in reserve reinforcing units, but has also generated billets with "soft" skills where little training is required. Table III presents the current paygrade structure of reinforcing units for the enlisted forces and compares it to the paygrade structure for reserve commissioned units and to the paygrade structure for the overall active Navy.

Instability

The trend toward a large junior base has a significant negative impact on advancement and career opportunity contributing even further to the high loss rate of personnel in reinforcing units.

As the result of an analysis conducted by OP-12 (Director Total Force Programming/Manpower Division) in 1985 in response to key issues raised by the Naval Reserve Baseline Area Appraisal (BAA), it was recommended by OP-12 ". . .that Resource Sponsors should review their active billet paygrade mix with a view to reversing the trend in increasing experience mix." However, ". . .[t]o maintain readiness at an acceptable level, Resouce Sponsors should be allowed to program for the maximum attainable paygrade structure in mission critical ratings, consistent with

TABLE III

ENLISTED PAYGRADE STRUCTURE

Reserve Reinforcing Units
for Augmentation of Active Ships & Air Squadrons
(as of 29 Feb 84)

TOTAL BILLETS	E1-E4	E1-E3	AN/FN/SN	
14,703	11,089 (75%)	9,190 (63%)	4,971 (34%9	(21:1-2)

Commissioned Reserve Units for Ships & Air Squadrons
(as of 29 Feb 84)

TOTAL BILLETS	E1-E4	E1-E3	AN/FN/SN	
9,606	5,687 (59%)	2,196 (23%)	1,561 (16%)	(21:1-2)

Total Active Navy
(as of 31 Mar 85)

TOTAL BILLETS	E1-E4	E1-E3	
491,849	271,350* (55%)	170,598 (35%)	(1:27)

*Total Active Navy has a large number of lower paygrade personnel in the training pipeline whereas reinforcing units do not. Thus, the proportion of active duty lower paygrade personnel to higher paygrade personnel available for deployment is even less for the active force than the numbers here indicate.

requirements". (22:1)

Cost Ineffectiveness

In the active force, the trend toward the higher paygrade mix results in significant cost increases, since active duty personnel cost more than reserve personnel. (22:1) Additionally, lowering the paygrade mix of reserve personnel results in difficulty in recruiting personnel with prior service, as most personnel leaving the active service are E-5s or are close to making E-5. Because of this difficulty, many low-paygrade billets in Navy reinforcing units are actually filled with high-paygrade personnel. Thus, the reserve program costs more than programmed for.

This has led to the Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) program, which was implemented in October 1983. The SAM program was implemented to recruit nonprior service men and women to the Selected Reserve. SAMs enlist for six years, receive boot camp training, followed by general apprenticeship training or by a Navy "A" school for a particular skill, and then return to their hometown reserve unit for additional on-the-job training. Many will also be selected for follow-on Navy "C" schools for more advanced training in their skill. (5:63)

Because of their limited active duty time and

because they are recruited to fill the requirements for lower paygrades, SAMs necessarily do not enter the high-skill areas. (20) SAMs, however, are very expensive and so increase reserve costs rather than decrease them. Much money is spent on their recruitment and training, with no active duty payback period. And even though they enlist for six years, attrition of SAMs is such that they average only 3.2 years in the reserves (27), compared to 4.7 years for Navy veterans (NAVETS). (22:encl[3]) Because of their recruiting and formal training costs and high attrition, the average cost per man year for SAMs is $5164, compared to $2733 per man year for NAVETS, even though NAVETS average a higher paygrade mix. These figures are based on personnel cost factors provided in reference 22. (22:encl[3])

CHAPTER VII

Is There A Better Way?

Two questions need to be answered. Do we need additional personnel to augment active ships and squadrons during mobilization? If so, are the reinforcing units of the Selected Reserve the best alternative?

In answer to the first question, additional personnel are definitely needed; critical battle stations will require 24-hour watch-standing, for which there is insufficient peacetime personnel. Carrier air groups in particular will require additional aircrews to sustain higher tempos of air operations. (16:25) The general plan for mobilization manpower requirements calls for all combat forces to attain wartime manning by M+1 months. Support activities should attain wartime manning by M+3 months. (22:encl[2])

Existing requirements for additional personnel in some skill areas, however, is questionable. Questionable mobilization requirements include those for journalists, legalmen, mess specialists, masters-at-arms, yeomen, and personnelmen. (21:2)

In answering the second question: what is the best alternative for providing additional manning to meet mobilization requirements, some of the assumptions that

underly the present reserve force structure need to be examined.

The major assumption and the underlying reason for the formation of reinforcing units, as discussed in Chapter V, is that in order to provide mobilization personnel with the appropriate skills, each augmentee needs to be designated for a particular mobilization billet of the gaining command. Thus, a reserve reinforcing unit was formed for each gaining command, with each reserve billet designed to be filled by an individual possessing the skills for his or her particular mobilization assignment.

It goes without question that mobilization requirements should be filled by personnel with the appropriate skills. But when the skill requirements are met in a timely manner, it should be of lesser importance as to where the resources come from.

There is the additional argument that reinforcing units are designed to permit reservists to become integrated with their gaining commands and to become familiar with their actual mobilization stations and equipment. However, as shown in Chapter IV, this integration generally does not occur, and in fact, reservists of reinforcing units seldom drill with their gaining commands.

There are many alternative sources for appropriate

augment personnel for ships and Navy air squadrons during mobilization. "Stop Loss" and "Rip to Fill" are two concepts that have been examined in depth, and are intended for implementation as ordered during general mobilizaton.

Stop Loss

"To immediately increase trained manpower certain stop-loss actions would take place to include denial of voluntary retirement requests, denial of officer resignations and requests for relief from active duty and extensions of terms of service for enlisted and officer personnel." (2:18)

With Stop Loss, all personnel will be extended on active duty by declaration of war or Presidential declaration of national emergency for a minimum of one year from M-Day (mobilization day). If M-Day had been in FY 1984, it is projected that this action would have increased the active force by approximately 44,000 personnel in the one-year period. 23,000 would have been E-5 and above; 13,000 E-4; 4,000 E-3 designated strikers (personnel with some skilled training who are "striking" for a particular rating); and 4,000 E-3 and below non-skilled general detail personnel. (21:2)

See Table IV for expected initial increases in the active force through Stop Loss action. (22:encl[1])

TABLE IV

ACTIVE PERSONNEL SUPPLY FROM STOP LOSS

The expected supply of active duty personnel available at mobilization through Stop Loss actions only for 30, 60 and 90 day windows are as follows:

WINDOW	E1-E9 TOTAL	E1-E3	E1-E4	E1-E5
30 days	6291	2691	4277	5346
60 days	12581	5792	8559	10699
90 days	18877	8684	12835	16045

Rip to Fill

The concept of "Rip to Fill" takes advantage of the ample supply of active duty personnel with critical sea-intensive ratings (e.g., operations specialists, fire control technicians, electronics technicians) who are currently on shore duty. They may be employed in billets such as in Ships Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs), or in billets where their particular skills are not needed but where the billets are providing them with shore duty after several years at sea. The latter includes billets at brigs and at boot camps.

The most efficient way to deploy trained personnel forward as fast as possible during mobilization is to use the skilled active duty personnel on shore, for these personnel can be assembled in one place much more quickly than reservists scattered throughout CONUS can. It is stated CNO policy that one-third of Navy combatant forces will be forward deployed during peacetime, one-third ready to deploy within two days, and the remainder to deploy as needed or able to. Thus, one-third of combat forces will only have two days to receive their augment units. For units already forward deployed, the active duty shore personnel will already be somewhat grouped together on shore and thus more easily accessible for airlift or sealift forward.

Additionally, combat units would be gaining the more highly skilled personnel since shore-based active duty personnel have more recent proficiency than reservists do.

There is already in existence a program (EFLAP--Emergency Fleet Augment Program) to automatically identify critical skills on shore and to send mobilization orders to the incumbants. (This in itself implies that many personnel of reinforcing units are a double-buy since they are intended to mobilize to billets to which active duty personnel on shore are also programmed to mobilize.)

Since many of the shore billets do not require the skills of the incumbants that are in them, less skilled reservists can be used to backfill the vacancies on shore. An investigation is currently being made to determine if EFLAP can be further used to match members of the Selected Reserve to shore billets that would require backfill. (11)

Other Active Duty Sources

Other actions that would take place to provide manpower would be to call personnel in the delayed entry program to active duty early; to accelerate or truncate training courses; to commission Navy Academy and NROTC students if they have completed their third year; and to disestablish peacetime only activities (e.g., human resource social programs). Disestablishment of peacetime

only activities will make an estimated 2100 additional personnel available for reassignment at M+1 (mobilzation day + 1 month) (22:encl[1]), and 10,000 additional personnel by M+3 (21:3). Personnel aboard ships in overhaul are another source of quickly deployable trained resources.

Retirees

Retired personnel are a vast and valuable potential source of augment personnel that has been insufficiently evaluated and planned for. (3:151)

Category I and Category II retirees, as described in Chapter II, are all subject to recall during mobilization. Although their numbers are not known exactly, it is estimated that there were 253,811 Navy retirees from these categories as of end FY 1984. Of this number, 47,127 were estimated to be in Category I, i.e., having retired within the last five years. (9:58)

Furthermore, with respect to availability, it is estimated that by M+3, at least 70 percent of eligible retired personnel can be processed and available for duty. (2:15)

Currently, data maintained on the number and location of retirees is fraught with error. (3:151) There needs to be a way of tracking retirees: their current

location, skills, age, and time out of service.

The total number of Category I and Category II Reserve retirees is suspect since there has not been a system in place to properly track Reserve Component personnel who have completed 20 or more years service, are eligible for retirement, but have not yet reached age 60. The[Reserve Forces Policy] Board suspects that the number shown is substantially understated. (9:56)

The Reserve Force Policy Board has recommended that

. . . in order to assure that the individual (eligible Reserve retiree) is a mobilizable asset (after retirement but before receiving retired pay), an appropriate I.D. card be issued to the retired service member and the service member's (eligible) dependents every two years in exchange for keeping the service informed of current address and a signed statement of current state of physical health. This appropriate I.D. card would entitle the member access to two no cost/low cost privileges, the PX (BX) and Space A travel. (9:57)

Whatever method is utilized in tracking retired personnel, retirees could then be screened to make adjunct mobilization assignments, primarily to shore billets because of the longer time involved in activating retirees during mobilization. Other longer-term utilization would be, e.g., to man ships as they leave overhaul, to replace shore-based personnel who deploy, and to help provide replacements for the casualties of war. Current Navy instruction states that "Replacements for overseas casualties will be sourced primarily from active duty personnel in shore commands, ships in overhaul and freed-up manpower not otherwise assigned". (24:AB-5) Navy retireees could provide much of the needed manpower, either

as direct replacements or as replacements for freed-up manpower of the regular Navy.

Low-Intensity Conflict

Another argument for or assumption underlying continuation of Navy Reserve reinforcing units is that their peacetime utilization proves their necessity. Peacetime utilization here means utilization during low-intensity conflicts. (There has been no general mobilization since World War II.)

Reservists have been reactivated many times since World War II. For example, when North Korea invaded the South in 1950, reservists comprised 25 percent of U.S. Navy manpower in Korea. In the Vietnam conflict, reservists comprised 10 per cent of the U.S. Navy Force. (16:23) More than 100 reservists reported to USS New Jersey (Battleship BB62) off of Lebanon in December 1983, to relieve active duty personnel so that they could take leave. But these reservists were primarily volunteers. They were not "called up". There has been much political reluctance to calling up reserves in order to avoid flames of dissent. This was particularly true during the Vietnam conflict, and this tendency has continued.

It is obvious that the Navy would not wish to invoke Stop Loss or Rip to Fill for every different crisis

or period of low-intensity conflict. This would cause too much personnel instability and would wreck havoc on retention of those personnel with sea-intensive skills who are finally serving in much-deserved and long-awaited shore assignments.

However, there is no reason that, should they be needed, volunteers for crises short of all-out mobilization cannot be obtained from the many other reservist categories such as reserve commissioned units, individual ready reservists, retirees (as in the case of the USS New Jersey), etc.

Surging the size of the military force enhances sustainability, but sustainability is a relatively inconsequential consideration in a low-intensity conflict. (15:57) This is because crises short of a general war are either of shorter duration or of less intensity. The major U.S. response to regional crises since World War II has been to merely shift existing resources from one place to another. In no instances since 1945 has general mobilization of either manpower or industry been undertaken. (15:52)

Activation of personnel from reserve reinforcing units during low-intensty conflicts has been too sparse to justify continuation of reinforcing units for this reason alone.

Chapter VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

There appears to be little argument for continuance of reserve reinforcing units in the Navy.

Use Other Available Sources

With the "Rip to Fill" plan described in Chapter VII, many if not most of the mobilization requirements for combat forces can be filled with active duty personnel who are "ripped" from the shore establishment. This is certainly true in the case of the lower paygrades which comprise the bulk of reinforcing requirements. In a memorandum to Vice Chief of Naval Operations by Vice Admiral C.A.H. Trost, Director Navy Program Planning, Vice Admiral Trost states: "There are other sources of manpower available to us at mobilization (estimated at 20,000 E-3 and below personnel from management actions such as Stop Loss) which preclude the necessity of programming SELRES resouces for this category of people [E3 & below]". (25)

To backfill the shore billets from which personnel are ripped, to man ships leaving overhaul, and to replace losses at sea, there are many sources from which personnel can be made available within M+3 months. Sources include the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Standby Reserve,

as well as personnel freed up from Stop Loss and other actions as outlined in Chapter VII. The Navy IRR is expected to grow to 95,000 by 1990 due to an 1984 enactment of an IRR reenlistment bonus and the extension of the military reserve obligation (MSO) from 6 to 8 years. (2:19)

Track Retirees

As also discussed in Chapter VII, retirees are a valuable resource. The Navy estimates that by M+3, 70 Percent of eligible retirees can be mobilized and made available. (2:15) This equates to roughly 33,000 personnel who have been on active duty within the past five years, and another 144,700 within the past ten years. Ways to better and more adequately track retired personnel eligible for mobilization need to be established and implemented.

Do Not Require Micro-Management

The above actions and resources will more than meet augment requirements for active ships and aircraft squadrons without reserve reinforcing units. (It is to be reminded that the reinforcing units which are recommended for disestablishment are those programmed to augment active ships and air squadrons, not the other categories of

reinforcing units as defined in Chapter II.)

A particular active duty individual on shore may not be identified for each combat mobilization billet on a day to day basis since the number and types of personnel that would be affected, e.g., by Stop Loss actions, changes continually, especially through seasonal changes. However, reasonable estimates even by quantity and quality can usually be projected. (28) To require micro-management in matching resources to mobilization billets in order to consider alternatives to reserve reinforcing units is not realistic, nor does it permit a practical or cost effective approach.

Effect of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act

It is possible that the effects of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act or the difficulty in getting active duty manpower approved for a 600-ship Navy could result in the Navy being forced to lower the size of its active duty force or its active duty paygrade mix and thus have to depend more on the reservists. Even if this should occur, the actions and resources described above could very possibly meet the additional needs.

However, should it be projected that the higher paygrades and skills cannot be achieved through Rip to Fill, Stop Loss and other actions or cannot be filled by

retirees and other reservists, then reinforcing units will probably again be a consideration. If so, consideration should be given to a reinforcing pool as formerly, but with the pool consisting of just a small select number of personnel with critical skills that cannot be met elsewhere. It has been shown (Chapter IV) that personnel of individual reinforcing units are usually unable to train with their gaining commands so that this particular perceived advantage of individual reinforcing units has not come to fruition.

The other problem of a general pool of personnel was the problem of identifying what individuals should train for. With a small select group however, this problem could be basically overcome by the easier tracking of a smaller list of requirements, focusing on a few critical skills.

Reexamine Mobilization Requirements

In addition to planning for utilization of sources of mobilization manpower other than reinforcing units, it is recommended that the mobilization requirements themselves be reexamined, particularly in the "soft skill" areas (journalists, legalmen, etc.) and in the lower paygrades. Are these billets really vital to a wartime mission, or are they actually peacetime requirements that

got "traded" for higher-skilled higher-paygrade requirements which the sponsors managed to "buy" as peacetime requirements because they did not want to chance that should war break out they would not be able to depend on the reserves to provide these critical resources?

It has been recommended that resource sponsors maintain programming for maximum attainable paygrade structure in mission critical skills (see Chapter VI); however, there are many skill areas where the resource sponsor should be able to trust that the necessary resources both by skill area and experience level can be provided by other sources during mobilization. Periodic estimates of attainable resources by paygrade and skill area would help to assuage fears to the contrary, and permit more balanced programming between peacetime requirements and wartime requirements.

Projected Cost Savings

From Table II, it is seen that 63 percent of the billets for reinforcing units are for E1-E3 personnel. It is reasonable to estimate then that at least one-third of billets for reinforcing units are probably filled by SAMs.

Annual savings resulting from deletion of reinforcing units just from pay and allowances, formal training costs, and recruiting costs for SAMs would be:

2/3 x 14,703 x 2733 = 26.8 M

plus

1/3 x 14,703 x 5164 = 25.3 M,

for a total of $52.1 million. These figures are based on an average manyear cost of $2733 for Navets and an average manyear cost of $5164 for SAMs. (See Chapter VI.) As shown in Table III, 14,703 is the total number of reinforcing billets for augmentation of active ships and air squadrons. There would also be other cost savings such as from the elimination of travel costs for weekend duty, equipment for on the job training, and the full time staff required for the training and administration of the reinforcing units.

Chapter IX

CONCLUSION

The Navy Reserve reinforcing units structured to augment Navy ships and air squadrons during mobilization suffer many problems. Because of the peacetime forward deployment of active force ships and air squadrons, reserve reinforcing units experience much difficulty in training with their receiving units and cannot readily deploy to their receiving units during time of mobilization. This has led to a general lack of faith in the reinforcing units by the active Navy, artificial inefficient rewriting of the billet structure, and subsequent instability and loss of cohesion in the reinforcing units.

There are alternative sources to reinforcing units that provide a much more practical and appropriate means of providing needed augment personnel of the right quality and skills. These sources include the skilled personnel that can be made readily available through the Rip to Fill and the Stop Loss programs; personnel made available through other actions such as disestablishment of peacetime only activities; and retirees, particulary skilled recent retirees. Along with better planning in utilization of these resources, there needs to be a thorough reexamination of actual wartime and peacetime requirements for ships and

air squadrons.

By taking advantage of alternative sources of mobilization manpower that already exist, the Navy would be taking cost-effective steps in providing augment personnel to active commissioned ships and air squadrons who would be at least as well trained and skilled as personnel of reinforcing units. The Navy would be better able to quickly deploy its wartime requirements, and would resolve the problem of that portion of the Navy Reserve (reinforcing units) which has the most volatile billet structure, highest turnover, and lowest morale.

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