War Planning Assumptions and Errors in Military Strategy
Abstract
This paper analyzes and assesses opposing strategies at Guadalcanal and at Dien Bien Phu. The analysis shows basic strategy, highlights key planning assumptions, and identifies force structures. The author concludes that battles are lost and campaigns fail because commanders make classic, but avoidable, errors in military thinking from which come the faulty planning assumptions upon which their losing strategies are based. He shows that Japan failed to hold Guadalcanal because the Imperial General HQ did not have an integrated strategy for defense of the southeast perimeter of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and it chose positions in the southern Solomons that over-reached the range of land-based air power. He concludes that the French beat themselves at Dien Bien Phu because they: lost sight of any clear war aims in Indochina; underestimated the capabilities of the Viet Minh; overestimated their own capabilities while ignoring significant limitations on their own military power; did not to use advantage the terrain on which they chose to accept battle; and failed to plan adequately for retreat.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA177846
Entities
People
- Gale E. Heaivilin
Organizations
- Air War College