


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
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THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

By LT COL DIETRICH K. KRAUSHAAR, GERMAN AF

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THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

by

Dietrich K. Kraushaar
Lieutenant Colonel, German Air Force

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Colonel George W. Allen

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1986

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Peace Movement and Terrorist Organizations
in the Federal Republic of Germany

AUTHOR: Dietrich K. Kraushaar, Lieutenant Colonel,
German Air Force (GAF)

An investigation of the possible relationship between the peace movement and terrorist groups in the Federal Republic of Germany. The focus is on the thesis that the peace movement provides a climate of opinion for terrorists and that political/military leaders should recognize and understand the threat of terrorist attacks. A description of the origins and components of the peace movement and terrorist organizations will provide the necessary background.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Dietrich K. Kraushaar has been interested in the peace movement and terrorist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1979. From March 1982 to June 1985, he was the Commander of the Tactical Group of the German Air Force Pershing Missile Wing One in Landsberg/Lech. While in Landsberg, he was charged with preparing the remote Quick Reaction Alert Pershing Missile Site for anti-nuclear demonstrations protesting the stationing of Pershing missiles. In light of the increased terrorist threat, he was responsible for the improvement of security training and physical security measures.

Lieutenant Colonel Kraushaar is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1986.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The media in the United States have been reporting on the activities of a so-called peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany for many years. Their reports have captured a particular measure of interest on the part of the American public due to the fact that the actions of this peace movement have in many cases been directed against the United States as the NATO alliance's main nuclear power.

Since late 1979, after NATO announced its decision to deploy new U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany has been developing into an anti-nuclear, extraparliamentary protest movement. Since that year, it has evolved through successful propaganda, effective organization, and disproportionate coverage in the media into a considerable political force. The movement was able to mobilize hundreds of thousands for their protest campaigns. Since 1981 through spectacular mass demonstrations the peace movement has gained widespread support and stimulated a public debate about peace and nuclear deterrence.

While its effect at large is difficult to determine, the peace movement has become a major factor in political life, because it reflects the political views of part of the population and acts as a reservoir of discontent from which others may draw. The movement finds expression not only in peace marches, mass demonstrations, and peace camps, but

also in the platforms and views of various political parties and social/religious organizations. The election of members of the Green Party to the Federal Parliament and to some state governments in the Federal Republic of Germany gave the peace movement an official voice in the legislature even though a very small one.

Despite the essentially non-violent nature of the peace movement to date, the question of violence is becoming more and more divisive within its membership and some of the more prominent leaders in the movement are beginning to advocate the use of violent tactics. For the most part, the German government has been fairly successful in dealing with the peace movement and its activities. At the present time, the biggest concern of the government is to keep the protests from flaring into violence. In the current atmosphere of violent terrorist activity there exists the great danger that terrorist groups might use the protest as a cover for their activities. This possibility exists because there is evidence that the latest terrorist activities of bombing and assassinations are aimed at U.S. and NATO personnel and facilities. The campaign is no surprise. At the inception of terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, the aims of the terrorists were the destruction of the existing political establishment and the economic system that it represented. Now, however, according to recent announcements, a new terrorist aim appears to be surfacing. Konrad Kellen suggested that:

Equally, if not even more important for the terrorists, is that the new aim -- anti-imperialism and withdrawal of U.S. troops or U.S. missiles rather than the establishment of a utopian society by "urban guerilla" means -- is, as expert observers say, "more limited." This makes it automatically more realistic and convincing for outsiders, and better suited to win proselytes or at least sympathizers.(1:6)

This research report will present an investigation of the possible relationship between the peace movement and terrorist groups in the Federal Republic of Germany. The focus is on the thesis that the peace movement provides a climate of opinion for terrorists and that political/military leaders should recognize and understand the threat of terrorist attacks. To provide the reader with the necessary background on this subject, the paper will first discuss the origins and components of the peace movement and terrorist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany.

CHAPTER II
THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY

The emerging German peace movement of the late 1970s was a cluster of various groups, many of which were rooted in the anti-Parliamentarian opposition movement of the 1960s. Until roughly 1979, the movement was mainly focused on the opposition to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As such the protest had very little political impact on the public. This changed when the peace movement started with their campaign against the NATO double-track decision in 1979. In its decision of 12 December 1979, all the countries that were members of NATO at that time decided to deploy 572 U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, beginning at the end of 1983. This modernization decision was combined with an offer to the Soviet Union to enter immediately into negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear systems. The offer included the West's willingness to forego the deployment of missiles provided the Soviet Union eliminated all her intermediate-range missiles. The peace movement used the double-track decision as a vehicle to shift its principle focus into the field of military security. As present West German Minister of Defense Manfred Wörner stated:

The vehicle was a convenient one because it offered both the sincere and phony (i.e., communist directed) members of the budding "Peace Movement" the chance to move the debate into the domain of nuclear weapons of mass destruction -- a domain in which rational argumentation is difficult to sustain. Moreover, since the debate was waged according to the terms not of

deterrence theory, but rather actual war-fighting scenarios, the consequence was predictable: more and more Germans have perceived in pacifism the only alternative to a nuclear holocaust.(2:16)

In short, the new kind of protest pushed discussion into broader issues. Now, rather than focusing entirely on political change, peace protestors were also protesting against the deployment of the new U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles. However, it soon became clear that the demonstrators were not opposed to the missiles as such. Instead, these nuclear weapons systems were merely symbols of the peace movement's fight against U.S. and NATO defense issues in general. This evolving situation is stated by Mr. Wörner:

In the meantime, however, the ambitions of the "Peace Movement" have been cast much farther afield. The old slogans "Peace without Weapons!" and "To Live Without Armaments!" have been elevated into a political program.... At its core, the movement has long since evolved into an "alternative political subculture." Its representatives simply will not respond to the "givens" of facts, contexts, causalities and historically determined relations, structures and interdependences: one is free to believe what one wants to believe. Discussion with acknowledged experts is rejected. The movement's members operate not only with their set opinions, but also an array of "facts" which are manufactured by a counter-elite of "experts" who do not shy away from outright falsifications and manipulation of data. There is no longer a bridge of rational argument. Indeed, it seems as if today two separate languages of security policy are spoken in the Federal Republic -- and no interpreters are available.(2:17)

From the beginning, the tactics of the peace movement included legal intervention, protest marches and rallies. All activities have generally been characterized by careful planning and nonviolence. In almost all cases, protesters have publicly announced upcoming actions and disseminated

information pertaining to detailed plans and proposed actions. Protests have been executed with sufficient numbers of organizers on hand to maintain order and cooperation. The peace movement's commitment to nonviolence was based on the many pacifist currents reflected in the movement as stated by Manfred Wörner:

1. The "pacifism of faith," which attracts essentially representatives of organized religions and appeals to the conscience of the individual citizen.

2. The "pacifism of fear," which represents a mixture of war psychosis and fear of the future: its (predominantly youthful) exponents in the Federal Republic seem convinced that only a radical pacifism can stem what they see as a relentless drift toward World War III.

3. The "pacifism of welfare," whose adherents are basically intent upon protecting their own economic well-being against the rough waters that face the German economy -- and doing so by scuttling the Federal Republic's defense outlays in favor of heightened subsidies to the welfare state.

4. The "pacifism of expedience," whose representatives take their orders straight from Moscow in working diligently for the unilateral disarmament of the West. The Soviets have made clear their own cynical view of pacifism as a tool that must be exploited in capitalist countries but that is impermissible in socialist society, contradicting as it does the Leninist canons regarding the international class struggle.

5. A "reunification pacifism," which might also be called a "nationalist-neutralist pacifism." This phenomenon has become more clearly visible only in recent months. Its representatives have little in common with the naively idealistic youths who make up the bulk of the "Peace Movement"; rather they hail from intellectual circles in the left wing of the Social Democratic Party.(2:17)

Although pacifism and a growing sense of fear focusing on the deployment of U.S. nuclear missile systems are primary factors, they are not the sole driving forces behind the rise of the peace movement. In addition, there are several other social and political forces present in the

Federal Republic of Germany which are also significant players in molding the direction of the peace movement.

These include:

- groups who share a certain dissatisfaction with the state and the political parties;
- members of the ecology movement;
- youth protestors with the desire for alternative ways of life;
- emancipation movements in which women take the lead;
- democratic movements and citizen initiatives who research into peace and war, and criticize the present NATO doctrine;
- communist groups with their politically harnessed pacifism, and;
- some trade union elements and parts of political parties.

The peace movement has proved most attractive to educated young people and young adults; it is they who form the active and dynamic part of the movement. It should not be overlooked however, that much broader sections of the population, of all ages, have been caught up in the movement or at least have begun to sympathize with its ideas. It was expected that the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Germany at the end of 1983 would stop the activities of the peace movement. Nonetheless, the movement managed to modify the political climate, and after gaining momentum, decided to widen its protest. Today the peace movement has several

features, such as its aggressiveness, its great variety of action forms, and its broad political range, which make it an important domestic factor in security issues, notably U.S. nuclear missiles and nuclear deterrence.

The movement long ago left its initial phase of "innocence" behind, in which it limited itself to ostensibly honest protests for righteous causes, devoid of any political ambitions. Ever since some prominent German politicians legitimized it with their approval, and the organized churches gave it their moral blessing, the movement has become a major factor in the Federal Republic's political life.(2:16)

Here Mr. Wörner effectively noted within the peace movement a growing trend of political involvement and a "loss of innocence" which may be manifested toward violence or even terrorist groups. There is no doubt that some of the more radical groups within the peace movement have advocated more forceful direct actions, including civil disobedience and disturbances at NATO military facilities with the intention of necessitating the removal and jailing of protesters.

Christopher Coker stated:

In February 1984 the peace movement in Germany decided to widen its protest against nuclear weapons into an attack on what it termed "the war-fighting strategies of the United States and NATO." It also resolved to interfere with NATO maneuvers in the Fulda Gap. . .(3:103)

It appears that the peace movement has adopted more violent tactics designed to regain public attention by damaging and destroying military property in an effort to disrupt operations at these facilities. Violence against persons is the exception but it seems that the radicals within the peace movement are ready to accept increased violence as a tactic. The expansion of the protest agenda and the

diffusion of protest activity pose new challenges on both the pacifist elements of the peace movement and military authorities.

CHAPTER III

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The challenges to security created by the peace movement have been intensified because of the potential relationship between the movement and terrorist organizations within the Federal Republic of Germany.

Although terrorism has been around since the dawn of mankind, this phenomenon has never been more visible and dangerous than it is today. Like many other countries, the Federal Republic of Germany has not been immune from terrorist attacks in recent years. While terrorist groups that were active in West Germany over the last ten years or so are varied in their composition and ideology, it is useful to consider two major categories: right-wing and left-wing terrorists. The path of joining either left- or right-wing terrorist groups tends to be slow and deliberate with an individual progressing from sympathizer to passive supporter to active supporter and finally joining the group itself. Klaus Wasmund concluded that terrorism in West Germany represents a unique phenomenon:

In West Germany, terrorism is not based on genuine social conflict or on the objective suppression of justified political demands, which make terrorist actions by national and ethnic minorities in other countries and regions applicable.

In looking at the social and political situation in West Germany during the seventies and eighties, one can surmise that it is terrorism without a real cause, a rebellion with terrorist dimensions. And thus it becomes even more important to inquire into the causes and motives of this extreme form of deviant political behavior. Terrorists' careers are influenced by individual, group-dynamic, and social conditions that intermingle with each other.(4:239)

A. German Right-Wing Terrorism

Right-wing terrorism has two roots, which are described by Hans Joseph Horchem as follows:

One is the National Democratic Party (NPD) which is still the strongest force in German right-wing extremism, at least in numbers. The NPD is undergoing a continuing process of decline. In the last 15 years it has lost 20,000 members. Today it has only 7,000 members. This process of decay worked to bolster some small neo-Nazi groups which are the second root of the present German right-wing terrorism. Young members of the NPD went into the ranks of these neo-Nazi groups and made their organizations more militant.

Neo-Nazi groups which became a hotbed for terrorism are the "Aktionsgemeinschaft Nationaler Sozialisten" (The "Fuhrer" is a former lieutenant of the Bundeswehr, Michael Kuhnen, now in jail) and the "Deutsche Aktionsgruppen" (head of this organization is a former lawyer, Manfred Roeder, now on trial in Stuttgart-Stammheim).

Two other right-wing extremist organizations, which later embraced terrorism, were the "Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann" and the "Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands/Partei der Arbeit" (VSBd/PdA). The "Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann" has been destroyed; Hoffmann and some of his followers are expecting prosecution in Nuremberg. The VSBd/PdA and its youth organization, "Junge Front," were forbidden and declared illegal by the Federal Minister of the Interior on January 26, 1982. (5:29/30)

For many years there was very little activity by the various groups. However, since the late seventies, these young neo-Nazi terrorist groups have committed a number of bank robberies and a series of bomb attacks that shook West Germany. These indiscriminate actions were aimed at killing and injuring large numbers of innocent people. The bombing of public gathering places (Munich Oktoberfest, Nuremberg discotheque) appeared to be designed to produce a climate of disorder and despair. Most recently, the new generation of right-wing terrorists has added to their traditional anti-communist and racist views a strong anti-American

sentiment. To these groups, the military is considered to be an occupation force, an attitude which found its expression in bomb attacks in the Rhine-Main area against U.S. military personnel and facilities. In a Rand study the threat is assessed as follows:

Thus, the emergence of right-wing terrorism makes overall terrorist activity broader, harder to assess, and more difficult to counter. There is also a possibility that right-wing terrorists may attract Communist-fearing people from the most conservative elements in the establishment and obtain their hidden or even overt support.(6:25)

B. German Left-Wing Terrorism

As in other Western countries student revolts erupted in the Federal Republic of Germany in the late 1960s. The time seemed ripe for revolution: students representing the left were demanding changes at home and abroad. In West Germany one of the most popular causes was support for Iranians suffering at the hands of the Shah's brutal secret police. During a visit by the Shah to West Berlin on 2 June 1967, student riots broke out culminating in the death of a student named Benno Ohnesorg who was accidentally shot and killed by the police. This event would prove to be the spark that set off many years of terrorism in Germany. At that time, the "Red Army Faction" (RAF), originally called the Baader-Meinhof gang, the oldest and most dangerous German terrorist organization gradually began its activities. The formation of the RAF is not to be regarded as a result of political decision aimed at changing the political situation in the Federal Republic of Germany in a revolutionary way by the use of terror, but rather as a

result of a gradual downward slide into violent crime, with political and private motives becoming intermingled. In 1972 the group began an urban guerrilla campaign with assaults against U.S. facilities and German police officers, indiscriminately killing U.S. and German personnel.

In a radical Berlin commune, a new group came into being calling itself the "Second of June Movement," a reminder of the date on which the student Benno Ohnesorg had been killed. In 1980 this second terrorist group was integrated in the RAF structure. Hierarchical order did not exist between these two groups and decisions were made collectively. Hans Horchem described the organization of the RAF terrorist group as follows:

The organization of the RAF consists of three circles which touch each other and overlap to some extent. There is first of all the hardcore -- also called the commando group. Then there is the "legal" periphery of helpers and sympathizers. And finally there are the terrorists in prison.(7:12)

As a result of the 1977 suicide of early members in Stammheim Prison and the arrest of other leaders, today the RAF hardcore consists of very few people. Of the RAF of the 1970s only Inge Viett and Henning Beer are active. The other terrorists are all fairly new to the business having joined the hardcore only in 1983. The RAF periphery of sympathizers, now as before, encompasses roughly 200 persons. In 1984, 37 members of the RAF were still in prison.

The third organization of left-wing terrorism is the "Revolutionary Cells" (RZ) who first appeared in the

Frankfurt area in 1972/1973. This group is described as follows by Hans Josef Horchem:

From the beginning the policy of the RZ was to distinguish their strategy from the political concept of the RAF. They opposed the theory of the RAF that only student elites should guide the revolution. They emphasized that each action should be fed back to the "masses." Each single revolutionary activity should be tied up and brought into contact with existing conflicts in society. Operating on the basis of these principles, the RZ developed the so-called "contact theory."(5:29)

A fourth group of left-wing terrorists "Guerilla Diffusa" (GD) began operating in West Germany in the summer of 1981. This group is described as follows by Horchem:

It is composed of former members of Maoist groupings, members of the so-called "Autonomous Left," stragglers of hard-core terrorist groups, low-level anarchists without any existing organization, punks, and homosexuals. Their age is between 16 and 20. They mainly operate as squatters and during demonstrations point to problems of ecology.(5:29)

Their strategy is to initiate violence under the cover of demonstrations to provoke fights with the police.

Despite the differences between right- and left-wing terrorist organizations terrorism will not fade away.

Horchem concluded his overview of West German terrorism as follows:

Probably rightist terrorists will remain bereft for quite some time of leaders and ideologues. A revival of these groups that would go beyond pure criminality and could lay claim to serious political activities is not in the cards. Thus, in the next few years rightist terrorists will not be dangerous.

The Guerilla Diffusa carries no political weight. It only consists of leftist rowdies committing acts of violence and does not represent a danger to public safety and order.(7:16)

But he also concludes that continued dangers were emanating from the Red Army Faction and the Revolutionary Cells, and that both groups would focus their future activities on NATO.

The RAF, despite the many setbacks it has suffered in the last few years, has not surrendered its basic concepts. Its criminal energy is unbroken. Its circle of active helpers is intact, even though some of the sympathizers may have left. . . the RAF now aims at the destruction of NATO installations....(7:16)

This conclusion is emphasized by Konrad Kellen:

And whereas they had lost most sympathizers before, because of the nature of their earlier diffuse and other irrational aims, they now have a good chance of regaining old and gaining new sympathies by pushing themselves into the forefront of a sentiment that is strong and ubiquitous all over Europe: the sentiment against the NATO alliance, the United States, and nuclear arms.(1:3)

For the near future more problems can be expected. Konrad Kellen believed:

By shifting their principal targets from domestic revolution to NATO, the terrorists have attained several advantages aside from the most obvious one: they now can agree on a target and cooperate in its pursuit. Another advantage of the new terrorist policy is that this new target is more easily and logically pursued by pinpointed assassination than by kidnapping and subsequent efforts at blackmailing governments to fulfill certain demands...

Not only that, but the new common aim is likely to help provide for the terrorists more than ever the water that the fish so badly needs -- the reservoir of loyal and helpful sympathizers....(1:5)

This commonality of objectives aimed principally at the demise of NATO by both terrorist and peace groups presents the Federal Republic of Germany, United States, and the other Western allies with a potentially dangerous situation. Peace activists have gained some measure of legitimacy over the past few years and they potentially can provide a

cover/support system for terrorists. This is especially possible if the more radical elements of the peace movement have their way and these groups adopt a more violent stance.

CHAPTER IV

POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The growing protest wave originated by the peace movement that has changed the political climate over the last years and the scale and scope of terrorist activities discussed in the preceding chapters have all been essential in not only presenting the differing characteristics of the German peace movement and terrorist organizations, but also providing a necessary background for the following discussion of a possible relationship between both.

During 1985, the Federal Republic of Germany has seen the growth of terrorist activities directed against U.S. and NATO targets to the point that the incidents are commonplace. West German police described the outbursts as follows:

The terrorist campaign to eliminate the American military presence from Western Europe and emasculate NATO received a boost when large-scale protests rocked West Germany. These demonstrators, anarchists linked to the terrorist Red Army Faction (RAF), showed a capability to mobilize thousands in prolonged street battles throughout Germany as the third quarter of the year ended. They were activists in search of a theme. This development, together with an upsurge in RAF attacks against U.S. military targets, provided some worrisome possible future scenarios for U.S. interests.(8:31)

It would appear that the terrorists consider their current operations an attempt to exploit the protest campaign of the peace movement and use the anti-U.S. and anti-NATO sentiment for recruitment. The longevity, indeed the very existence of the terrorist groups, centers around

their attracting or contriving a viable means of sponsorship and support. It is the sponsors and supporters of terror that give longevity to terrorist organizations. It is only with this promise and commitment of aid that these groups can continue to exist.

This section of the paper will attempt to analyze the possible relationship between the peace movement and terrorist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany. The main interest is to find connections. For this reason the investigation is concerned with an examination of how and if active support and/or passive support is provided. The successful deployment of theater nuclear missiles by NATO initiated ideological and tactical conflicts within the peace movement. This polarization may lead to the emergence of a radical wing within the movement. Polarization may also increase the probability of infiltration by extremists who favor terrorist activities. Such extremists may not require active support within the peace movement, but may instead take advantage of unwitting cooperation by individuals. West German authorities claim to have uncovered evidence linking radical elements of the peace movement with terrorist safehouses in various West German cities.(8:27) But this is not sufficient evidence to link the peace movement as an active supporter to terrorist groups. As things stand at the moment it has not been possible to compromise, isolate, or split the peace movement, and despite the hope of the terrorist groups, it is evident there is no active support in the form of

intelligence, logistics, training, and surveillance. What one now knows hardly justifies talking about active support by the peace movement for terrorist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany. While there is no doubt that the peace movement does not provide active support to terrorism, there is disagreement among observers as to the degree of passive support and influence.

An assessment of the potential for passive support includes a look at anti-establishment initial recruitment, commonality of interests between terrorists and the peace movement, and the potential sympathy this can invoke. These elements are hard to define and quantify. Obviously, the starting point for assessing these factors is to look at steps on the road to terrorism. Alex P. Schmidt in a recent research suggested how initial recruitment into the ranks of terrorists evolves:

Point of departure is a broad social protest movement... The members of the protest movement undergo key experiences of repressive violence during the course of conflict with their adversaries... The first violent actions have more the character of a test in order to see how far one's own energy goes and what freedom of action is available... The further development is determined through the interplay of internal dynamics and experiences of prosecution by the state, which both produce an escalation...(9:233/234)

Although there is no detailed corroborating evidence that peace activists are actively switching their allegiance to terrorism, this comment by Schmid certainly supports the view that peace activists provide a lucrative climate for support to terrorists. Additionally, commonality of interests/objectives between these groups also promotes

greater linkage. Schmid addressed this concept as follows:

The span of life of a ... terrorist group is not only determined by the effectiveness of the police, but primarily by the resonance... which it obtains from certain sectors of society. The quantitative size as well as the qualitative element of the willingness to use violence of such sectors... plays a role in this.(9:234)

U.S. News and World Report quoted a security specialist in stating:

...indications that "fringe elements" of the peace movement, which has been relatively inactive in recent months, may be drawn into violence alongside the hard-line terrorists.

One big reason for this would be the growing frustration among the peace groups over their inability to prevent the deployment of nuclear-armed U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles in Germany...(10:34)

During September and October of 1985 West Germany was hit by a wave of violence. According to West German police, the prolonged protests were led by anarchists well-versed in street fighting who exist on the fringes of groups such as the notorious Red Army Faction (RAF).(8:17) In addition to the experienced core, police also noted that most were "young people." Protesters holding a vigil in Frankfurt at the spot where Guenther Sare was killed on September 28 were also described by police as "mostly young."(8:18)

This shows that there is a potential for violence and sympathetic support from a variety of fringe groups. As obvious as these factors are they should not be construed to mean that the peace movement purposely provides an environment which enables terrorist groups to gain passive support.

Peace movement leaders have recognized the potential

danger of providing passive support for terrorism. During a congress in November 1985 Bundestag (MP) General Gert Bastian (ret'd) called the peace movement: "the conscience of the world. . . its aim is to prevent the superpowers from progressing any further with their nuclear arms build up."^(11:12) He sounded an optimistic note in saying: "that the peace movement could feel proud of itself despite missile deployment. Preventing it had not been the only objective: another had been to make people aware of the problem."^(11:12) He concluded: "the peace movement can only succeed if it strictly adheres to non violence."^(11:12)

The majority of the peace movement is committed to non-violent activities. And, contrary to the fears of some, particularly before the "hot autumn" of 1983, its large demonstrations have in fact actually gone off peacefully. But now that missiles are being stationed in West Germany the peace movement will be faced with new challenges. What is uncertain is whether the peace movement will allow itself to be driven into violence.

This brief investigation of a possible relationship between the peace movement and terrorist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany has made no attempt to explain all elements of support and aid. There is not sufficient evidence to link the peace movement directly or indirectly to terrorist organizations as an active or willing passive supporter. The point remains, however, that the peace movement is still a minority which in a brief time has attracted much sympathy and approval. While the peace

movement has failed to halt deployment, it was successful in mobilizing masses of people. By staging spectacular demonstrations and civil disobedience it has squeezed the democratic right of opposition to the very last drop and thus provided a climate of opinion for terrorist activities or at least for violent activities.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL/MILITARY LEADERS

Faced with the potential that frustration could spur greater violence in the German peace movement and the recent terrorist campaign aimed at American Forces, American installations, and NATO interests in the Federal Republic of Germany, it is becoming more and more important for NATO political and military leaders to recognize, understand, and appreciate the possible dangers. Only through understanding and appreciation of the motives of these groups can the NATO alliance develop a viable strategy to cope with and combat these groups. While it sometimes might be difficult to distinguish between violent resistance of protesters and terrorist acts of violence, a thorough knowledge of the objectives and motives of both the peace movement and the different terrorist groups is required for the protection of personnel and facilities. In dealing with demonstrators a major concern of military leaders should be the tendency of demonstrations to become violent. Therefore all military installations must be protected and confrontation, if it occurs, must be controlled by personnel thoroughly familiar with the peaceful control of such situations. In light of the increased terrorist threat to U.S. personnel it is essential that security training and physical security measures are further improved. Despite all the precautions at U.S. and NATO facilities, terrorist activities are a problem in the Federal Republic of Germany that will not fade away. The problem may eventually take new and even

more widespread and murderous forms. Resource constraints may make it impossible or impractical to guard against all acts of terrorism, but with a well planned counter terrorism program -- applied in integrated fashion -- the chances are far better than without a program. A strong beginning has been made. It should be remembered that despite differences between both right-wing and left-wing terrorist groups, the threat to political stability is increased. To deal with the large threat effectively, military leaders will have to devote much more systematic attention and sustained protective measures to peace movement activities and terrorism than they have in the past.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has highlighted the directions taken by the peace movement and terrorist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany. When both started they were extremely far apart with the peace movement totally advocating peaceful actions and the terrorists, as usual, using violent means. The views and actions of several more radical peace activists have moved the direction of these two groups closer together. Although there is no actual proof of ties between these two groups, it appears as if the activities of the peace movement have provided a climate of opinion for terrorist organizations to operate. The large peace and anti-nuclear rallies and the recent riots in West Germany have left a growing number of young people feeling frustrated and helpless. These forces work in favor of terrorists by producing a climate more supportive and sympathetic to their cause. This is especially problematic since the objectives of German terrorist organizations and the peace movement are now more closely aligned in opposition to NATO and continued American military presence. Therefore, although NATO's political/military leaders must continue to focus their main efforts at countering terrorist actions, they must also devote considerable attention at keeping the peace movement peaceful. This can only be accomplished by carrying on a dialogue with the leadership in these peace groups and convincing them that working within the political system provides the greatest

opportunity for success. This will require NATO's leaders to understand the root causes behind the peace movement and to demonstrate a willingness and desire to listen to the peace activists' views and work together for the common good of the German people. This will take patience on the part of the German political/military leadership, but the alternative course of action (i.e., ignoring the demands of the peace movement) will only increase the level of frustration and could push the peace activists over the edge and into the waiting arms of the terrorists.

Based on recent trends (12:7F) it appears the peace movement is losing some of its momentum. Much of this may be due to the fact that the movement failed to prevent the deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and Pershing II Missiles into Germany. Another possible reason for this is the apparent shift by German youth into a more conservative stance which focuses on being responsible members of society rather than rebels promoting change through demonstration. German political leaders must make a concerted effort to promote the growth of this more conservative position and thereby preclude a resurgence of the peace movement and its potential spread into more violent actions.

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