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
RESEARCH REPORT

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SOVIET USE OF SPETZNAZ FORCES

By LT COL DAVID A. BURTT, II

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Mr. Clarence O. Huntley

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Soviet Use of Spetznaz Forces

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Introductory remarks encompass the historical precedents leading up to the creation of the Soviet Spetznaz forces from WW II experience using partisans. A description of today's current Spetznaz units follows to include: mission, organization, manning, training, weapons, and tactics. The role of special forces and Spetznaz units in modern Soviet doctrine is discussed, as well as, Spetznaz use in conjunction with the Soviet Operational Maneuver Group. Finally Spetznaz vulnerabilities are discussed, as well as, potential ways to counteract the use of Spetznaz.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Burtt II (M.A. Ball State University) has been interested in the Soviet intelligence threat to the United States since coming into active duty in the US Air Force with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) in October 1969. He has received specialized counterintelligence/counterespionage training from AFOSI and has served as a Detachment Commander at Iraklion AS, Crete; Rome, Italy; and Chief of the Counterintelligence Division for AFOSI District 68 and Deputy Commander for Operations AFOSI District 68 Torrejon AFB, Spain. Lieutenant Colonel Burtt is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1986.

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SOVIET USE OF SPETZNAZ FORCES

I. INTRODUCTION

"The first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy's center of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one.

The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive."

Clausewitz on War (2:619)

"All warfare is based on deceptions. A skilled general must be master of the complementary arts of simulation and dissimulation; while creating shapes to confuse and delude the enemy he conceals his true dispositions and ultimate intent. When capable he feigns incapacity; when near he makes it appear that he is far away; when far away, that he is near. Moving as intangibly as a ghost in the starlight, he is obscure, inaudible. His primary target is the mind of the opposing commander; the victorious situation, a product of his creative imagination."

Sun Tzu The Art of War (5:41)

The Soviet Union has relied heavily if not almost totally on the use of its armed forces as the prime instrument of its expansionist policies throughout the world. The USSR is totally geared to equip, train, supply and ready these

military forces for employment to further their expansionist aims. The Soviets spend more money and more of their GNP on their military budget than any country in the world. The threat from their military buildup is evident, and their willingness to use military force to achieve their objective is well documented.

The Soviets have in their military buildup given much thought to and use of the special operations forces, or special purpose forces. Soviet special purposes forces are called by several names, including reydiviki (from the English word raid), diversionary troops, and reconnaissance - sabotage troops, but they are most popularly known as SPETZNAZ, an acronym from the Russian "spetsialnoe naznachenie," meaning special purpose. (19:1))

The Soviet thought and use of special forces can be traced back to World War II and the role of the partisans in the Soviet Intelligence apparatus. In more recent history the Soviets called upon these special operations units in Manchuria (1945), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). The Spetznaz played a key role in each of these campaigns and set the ground work for the larger Soviet forces that followed.

In this paper I will: 1) trace the emergence and growth of Soviet special forces from World War II to the present; 2) outline their structure, organization, and make-up; 3) examine

the role of special operations in contemporary Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy; 4) look at potential vulnerabilities of these Special Forces.

II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE

I feel that the reason the Soviets are so committed to the creation, utilization, and deployment of these Special Forces goes back to their experience in WWII. The Germans had very good success in employing diversionary teams against the USSR, behind the Soviet lines. These teams were small but managed to create problems in the Soviet supply lines, disturb Soviet lines of communication, and cause Soviet morale problems.

Learning from this experience the Soviets, toward the end of the War made extensive use of partisans in their area of operation. The Soviets used the partisans because they were indigenous to the area and intimately familiar with its customs, terrain, and inhabitants. They acted as guides and sources of local information. They weren't trusted with Soviet mission plans because of the possibilities of treachery. A formal chain of cooperation was established between the partisans and Soviet intelligence (NKVD). "By 1943 the organizational ties between partisans and Soviet Intelligence were apparently well developed and a chain of command had been worked out. This is indicated in the Bulletin on Partisan Warfare No. 1: Cooperation between (Soviet) Intelligence and partisans had found its highest expression in the attachment of intelligence sections both of

the Red Army (Razvedotel) and the NKVD (Osoby;Otdel) to the headquarters staffs of the partisans down to brigade level. (Annex 6)" (17:10) The chart referred to as Annex 6 in the above quotation is reproduced as Appendix A.

Basically the partisans functions were broken out as follows: 1) Gather intelligence for the Soviets, 2) Gather intelligence for the Soviet political agencies, and 3) Gather intelligence to provide for the security of the partisan band itself. (17:13)

The Soviets provided training to selected partisans in special schools in the USSR, and maintained operational contact with the bands by radio. People that were selected to join the partisans had to have a good cover, i.e. old people, women, and children. The Soviets also developed the technique of using partisans in German agencies to spread disinformation. It is hard, of course, to quantify the exact contribution these partisan bands had on German forces, but they did exact a toll in the form of sabotage, collecting intelligence, propaganda, spreading rumors and disinformation, etc. They were, in fact, the germ of the seed, and forerunner of todays current use by the USSR of the Spetznaz.

Drawing upon this successful experience in WWII, the Soviet's next use of and experience with special operations forces was in August 1945 in the Manchurian Operation. "The first airborne or seaborne assaults would be deployed at the

most only hours before the launching of the fullscale offensive, so as not to alert the defenders. At the outset of the Manchurian Operation, the theater commander deployed against strategic targets some 20 airborne assaults of 35-40 men each, drawn, it would appear, from a special unit of about 600 men. The groups were dropped close to central Manchurian cities on the Lyodon Peninsula and in North Korea with task of causing as much disruption as possible by sabotage and raids against strategic points, military and industrial targets. At the same time, fast MTBs were used to drop small teams of men, in boats and as frogmen, in all the North Korean ports to disrupt the port operations by, once again, sabotage and diversion.

The teams used were small, and their employment was not on a large scale. There is no evidence that they were able to create a significant level of destruction deep in the enemy rear. What they did was to create panic, particularly among the Japanese military authorities in central Manchuria, which greatly increased the shock effect of the Soviet's massive surprise attack." (8:37,38)

In 1968, the airborne special operations troops took an active part in the capture of Prague, Czechoslovakia. In the "events" that took place in that country, the reconnaissance - sabotage unit of the airborne division played a key role. It had to land first in Prague and secure the

safe landing of the divisions main forces. Several days prior to the occupation of Czechoslovakia the unit studied Prague, its airport and the area. On D-Day, through subterfuge, the unit landed at the Prague airport, seized the airport, key objectives in Prague, and chokepoints within Prague itself. They held until they were reinforced by Soviet and bloc forces. (13:3)

During the entire occupation of Prague, the special forces were always in the fore. They led the way and took orders directly from the KGB, arresting people and creating confusion. They even took Alexander Dubcek forcibly to the airport, for a flight to Moscow to hold a talk with Brezhnev. (3:204)

"In short, the operation was audacious but highly successful. A combination of KGB and military (probably airborne) Spetznaz elements struck with little notice, achieving full surprise even though prolonged Soviet political and military pressure should have alerted the Czech leadership. "Key points" were quickly seized, and local agents were activated who were then teamed with KGB elements in security political control throughout the country. Other agents helped to sow confusion and doubt, especially among the military, thus limiting the possibility of a coordinated and meaningful Czech military response - a possibility Soviet leaders took seriously and actively planned against." (1:115)

All available evidence points to the fact that the Soviets sent in Spetznaz units to Afghanistan in December 1979. These forces quietly infiltrated President Amin's palace, killed everyone including Amin and seized control of the palace, the capital (Kabul) and the Afghan military forces in Kabul. They then held the capital until the larger Soviet forces arrived on the scene.

So in both Prague in 1968 and in Afghanistan today the Soviets have had real world experience for employing and using special operations, in a way that has been absent since WWII. In Czechoslovakia, the special operation itself virtually achieved the Soviet strategic objective. In Afghanistan, the use of special forces achieved its tactical purpose and would have achieved its strategic purpose also, but the Soviets misread the depth of the Afghan insurgency.

So it is historically evident that the USSR, for the past 40 years or more has maintained specialized military/security units. "The Communist Party has always seen fit to maintain discrete units of politically reliable troops to carry out sensitive assignments which, for a variety of reasons, it chose not to entrust to regular military formations." (1:98) This created an operational style that gave special troops top priority over regular Army troops, especially if Party control in a region was in trouble.

The two key factors in the past half-century that allowed the Soviets to change their strategic views and start their massive military build up were: 1) U.S. strategic - nuclear monopoly came to an end, 2) thus allowing the Soviet armed forces to change from their traditional continental focus toward global reach - power projection. For this they needed a group of politically ready reliable troops who could be called upon to go anywhere and do anything - military men under political control of the KGB and the Communist party. . Out of this historical setting and background the Spetznaz was born and developed to the integral part of Soviet force structure it occupies today.

III. SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES (SPETZNAZ)

Today Spetznaz is the name generally associated with the Soviet Special Forces controlled by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). In discussing the Spetznaz, I will delve into it's: A) Mission, B) Organization, C) Manning, D) Training, E) Weapons and F) Tactics.

A. Mission - Quite simply stated the mission of the Spetznaz is to neutralize the military and political - economic systems of their enemies through surprise, shock, and pre-emption by deployment. Operating mainly in their enemies rear, their mission is mainly to reduce the enemy's capacity to resist, thus making it easier for their main battle forces to carry out their role and win.

"In war Spetznaz units are tasked with: 1) Hunting down and assassinating the enemy's political and military leaders. This task is also carried out by the KGB. 2) Seeking out the enemy's nuclear facilities and either designating them as targets for Soviet aircraft and missiles or destroying them by independent action. 3) Neutralizing command systems by acting against command centres, staffs, and lines of communication. 4) Destroying important targets such as airfields, naval bases and air-defense installations in enemy territory. 5) Disrupting of the enemy's power system, the most important

targets being power stations, electricity power lines, oil and gas storage centers, pipelines, and transformer stations. Spetznaz units are not tasked, however, to engage in guerilla warfare. (15:1210)

B. Organization

"The GRU is responsible for Spetznaz training and operations. The GRU Central apparatus is known as the 2nd Chief Directorate of the General Staff. Spetznaz units are deployed from army level upwards.

The 2nd Department of the Staff of every all-arms and tank army consists of five groups, numbered as follows:

- I. Reconnaissance
- II. Intelligence
- III. Spetznaz
- IV. Information Processing
- V. Radio Interception

At Army Formation level, the Spetznaz group of the 2nd Department has under it an independent Spetznaz company which may, however, be given information for the intelligence group's clandestine agents by the 2nd Department Commander, in order to direct the company toward its targets." (15:1210)(See Appendix B)

"At the Front level headquarters that are set-up in wartime these activities (clandestine agents) are controlled

by the 2nd Directorate, which consists of five departments having the same title and numbering, but which are more powerful in their make-up and influence. The Spetznaz department of the 2nd Directorate has under its command a Spetznaz brigade plus a Spetznaz intelligence centre, which is responsible for recruiting its own clandestine foreign agents.

The Front 2nd Directorate thus controls two independent networks of foreign agents, one run by the intelligence department and one by the Spetznaz." (15:1210) (See Appendix C)

"A Spetznaz brigade comprises a headquarters element, a headquarters company, three or four parachute battalions and supporting units. The strength of a brigade's fighting units is between 1,000 and 1,300 men." (15:1210) (See Appendix D)

"A Spetznaz naval brigade has a Headquarters element, a Headquarters company (with the same role and the same unofficial title of "anti-VIP" unit as its land-based counterpart), a group of midget submarines, two or three battalions of combat swimmers, one parachute battalion and supporting units." (15:1210) (See Appendix E)

During a war these forces would infiltrate and fight as small teams. Each brigade could field about 100 Spetznaz teams. The team would be composed of from 8-10 men. An officer would be in charge, a warrant officer or Soviet sergeant would be second in command, and the remainder of the

team composed of functional specialists. These would include a demolitions expert, radio operator, weapons expert, and reconnaissance expert. Cross-training is practiced to various degrees in case a specialist in one field is lost, another who has cross-trained can take his place.

In the event of the outbreak of war the following is the breakout of Spetznaz units available to the Soviet military:

41 independent Spetznaz companies - one to each Soviet Army.

16 Spetznaz brigades - one per front formation.

4 Spetznaz naval brigades - one per fleet.

20 Spetznaz intelligence units - one per front and fleet.

An educated guess as to peacetime Spetznaz strength would be between 27,000 and 30,000 troops. (15:1211)

C. Manning

Most Spetznaz units are manned by ordinary conscript soldiers. They are tested to be stronger and more cunning but ordinary conscripts nonetheless. The Spetznaz selection process begins before the recruit enters military service. Recruits are categorized prior to call-up according to physical development, intellectual development and loyalty to the USSR. This allows the Spetznaz to pick the best men and get first crack over other elite outfits.

Once soldiers get to their Spetznaz unit, they undergo a short intensive course of military training and the natural leaders are singled out. These men are then sent to special training battalions to become sergeants. The procedure for this is very unique to the Soviet Union. Many more men are sent to this training than sergeants are needed. This is expensive but serves a dual purpose. It makes the competition so intense that only the best make it through, and it makes it possible to have a permanent reserve of sergeants who are waiting in the wings to take over for those who do not live up to the high Spetznaz standards or are lost in combat. Over one-third of all Spetznaz soldiers pass through this training, and as a result the lower command echelons would not be seriously weakened by heavy wartime casualties.

Since the Spetznaz looks for and recruits only the best physical specimens, it stands to reason that there are a number of top athletes in the Spetznaz. Recruiting Olympic quality athletes into the Spetznaz provides an opportunity to visit areas they may have to operate in in time of war. It is interesting to note that the number of women athletes in the Spetznaz is unusually high.

The final groups of individuals used by the Spetznaz are: 1) Spetznaz intelligence agents and 2) Spetznaz sabotage agents. The intelligence agents are foreigners recruited by the GRU who are not involved with classified matters and are

mature persons. They can be recruited within or outside the USSR. They do not try to spy or penetrate restricted areas or draw any undue attention to themselves. Instead the GRU provides money so they can locate homes near important military targets. The information they provide on these targets is low key and fragmentary, their main job is to provide intelligence to the Spetznaz sabotage units to perform sudden, accurate strikes. The sabotage agents find jobs or live near key transport or power installations. When war comes they are loosed to take these installations out. They also set up houses or land where sabotage agents can seek refuge in time of war. These agents have no connection with the USSR, and form "sleeping" agent networks, brought into action only in time of war.

D. Training

"In addition to the normal military training all are trained in:

- 1) infiltration tactics;
- 2) sabotage methods using explosives, incendiaries, acids and abrasives;
- 3) airborne operations;
- 4) clandestine communications;
- 5) hand-to-hand combat and silent killing techniques;
- 6) psychological operations;

- 7) language customs of the target country;
- 8) survival behind enemy lines; and
- 9) reconnaissance and target location."(18:73)

To illustrate the extent that rigorous realism is strived for by the Spetznaz in their training program, I submit the following account of an actual ski exercise revealed by a former captain. "Once the sabotage group which I commanded was ordered to take part in an exercise which involved being dropped by parachute in the woods of Belorussia some 400 km from our base to "destroy" the opposition's communications centre, even if it were to cost the lives of the whole group to do so. The group was then to destroy two railway bridges, start a forest fire, attack some population centres and make its own way back to base. The targets were guarded by motorized infantry, and, of course we were forbidden to cause any casualties during the exercise. It was winter and we had to cover some 800 km on skis.

We were allowed 24 hours to prepare for our mission, and were issued with special explosives, incendiary materials and radio equipment; the latter, known as the "radiogram" is able to shoot a message to the centre in just 8-10 seconds. Our machine-guns were designed to fire silently and without showing flashes. We were issued with dry rations for three days, but on my order took only enough for one day in order to carry more ammunition. We paid particular attention to the

skis, which were to be dropped separately in protective wrapping containing a small radio transmitter.

Each paratrooper carried a tiny receiver which emitted a homing signal in his earphones when he faced the transmitter so that the group could assemble as quickly as possible on landing. Using models and maps we planned our operation down to the last detail, including contingency plans for possible problems, such as the transmitter failing to function.

The night of the operation was dark and cloudy and snow was falling thickly. At 10 p.m. we jumped from the aircraft and 15 minutes later the whole group had assembled, looking like ghosts in their white camouflage. By 1 a.m. we had covered the 18 kms to our target. The six guards were easily overpowered and tied up. The doors and windows of the barracks were booby trapped with quantities of explosives sufficient to give a nasty fright to the 20 men inside without causing injuries. At the same time mines were planted on the communications building. We could hear the explosions as we set off. By midday we had covered about 70 kms and, concealed among the trees, slept for four hours, lying in pairs for greater warmth.

We continued to operate at night and sleep during the day, stealing provisions from the peasants until we had carried out all our tasks. At one time we were spotted from the air and were soon surrounded by ground troops who were

gradually tightening the noose around us. We decided to seize an armored troop carrier from the opposition to escape from the closing ring of troops, but these normally carried 10-15 men - too many to be easily overpowered by our small group. We waited for a command vehicle, which usually carries only two or three men.

When one appeared a soldier dressed in clothes stolen from a peasant waved it to a halt. When the officer got out to investigate, we seized him, his driver and the armored vehicle in which we then made our escape and returned to our base, looking more like unshaven forest bandits than regular soldiers. Through exercises such as this the sabotage groups are prepared for their role in a war against the West." (13:5)

Because the training is so strenuous on officers and warrant officers, each year of service for these men counts as 18 months (20 years service as a Spetznaz officer counts as 30 years normal service). Additionally, Spetznaz officers and warrant officers receive 50% more pay and additional money for each parachute jump.

E. Weapons

"For combat every Spetznaz soldier has a standard range of weapons: a Kalashnikov automatic rifle, 300 rounds of ammunition, a P6 silenced pistol, a knife, six hand grenades or a light grenade-launcher, and food and medical packs. Each

group of saboteurs has an R-350M radio set with encryption and burst transmission facilities. Depending on the actual assignment, the group may have SA-7 Stela 2 (NATO codename - Grail) surface to air missiles, directional mines and explosives.

The Spetznaz has no heavy weapons but, when operating in the enemy's rear, saboteurs may seize enemy tanks, APCs or other vehicles. While doing this, they may even wear enemy uniforms.

In a series of experimental exercises Spetznaz units have used light motorcycles and specially constructed, small cross-country vehicles. It is difficult to say, however, whether these will become standard equipment." (15:1215)

F. Tactics

To be successful Spetznaz operations must employ several elements in a grand and simultaneous fashion. Prior to the war or action to be undertaken they would/could infiltrate enemy territory as tourists, workers, sports teams, diplomats, etc. These personnel would have specific tasks to accomplish to create confusion and make the job of the follow-on troops easier. They would be followed by a massive drop of Spetznaz units behind enemy lines in the early part of the war.

Spetznaz troops can be dropped by parachute deep into enemy territory (front brigades 310 to 620 miles, and Army companies

62 to 310 miles). Upon landing these units would go after set targets. Primary targets are: nuclear weapons systems, command and control elements, electronic warning and reconnaissance equipment, key airfields and ports, and key industrial targets. Secondary targets include: troops in garrisons, key transport chokepoints, key areas of terrain, drop zones, logistic installations, and capture of prisoners. The Spetznaz units will move slowly under cover of darkness and make extensive use of camouflage. Spetznaz units have a great deal of independence of action. Usually higher headquarters will not try to interfere with a Spetznaz commander once he is behind enemy lines, believing he is in the best spot to analyze the situation clearly.

IV. THE ROLE OF SPETZNAZ AND SPECIAL FORCES IN MODERN SOVIET DOCTRINE

As I stated previously, Soviet military doctrine began to change as the U.S. lost its nuclear monopoly and the Soviets realized their power projection capability and began to shift away from their continental focus on the USSR. As has been seen the Soviets have had good luck using their special forces in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and are pursuing new strategies for defeating our Airland Battle Doctrine. Having a major politically reliable special purpose force such as Spetznaz gives the Soviets a third force element after nuclear and conventional. These troops are prepared to execute missions in both conventional and nuclear environments.

In order to counter NATO defense plans the Soviets have developed the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) which combines the talents and equipment of the traditional special operations forces with the Spetznaz. The OMG objectives would be to: shift the enemy's fighting focus to its rear; achieve chaos of enemy forces; cut enemy supply lines; prevent enemy retreat; destroy objectives that can't be destroyed by other means; and limit the enemy's freedom of movement. The concept of OMG is to insert as an OMG, a strong division behind the main NATO defense line within the first two days of the offensive.

Under existing Soviet military doctrine Spetznaz missions are characterized as 1) Strategic 2) Operational and 3) Tactical. Strategic missions are conducted deep in the rear of enemy territory, and are more political in nature, trying to demoralize or disrupt national cohesiveness. The operational missions fall within front commands to a depth of 200 to 600 miles, focusing on sabotage and are more of a clearly military nature. Tactical missions would be to less depth (to 60 miles) and require less organizational support. Naval Spetznaz would support fleet and ground operations and span all mission categories.

Employing the above Soviet doctrine, recent development of the OMG, and the diverse Spetznaz missions, the following scenarios are presented as probable uses of Spetznaz forces in the current world situation. Scenario number 1 would be theater war in Europe. A Warsaw pact invasion of the NATO central region in which the principal Soviet target would be US/NATO nukes. With GLCM becoming the prime threat to the Soviets, the Spetznaz would be targeted against it early on. Another scenario involves Soviet use of Spetznaz in the Third World. The Soviets can very quickly inject the Spetznaz into a particular arena that would probably be superior to local troops for at least a short period of time. This would pose a threat to our rapid deployment forces. Another scenario involves Soviet use of Third World Soviet-trained surrogate

special forces. They can operate for the Soviets indirectly. The final scenario of course would involve a Spetznaz attack on the CONUS and Alaska. There are many targets in North America that are vulnerable to assault by Spetznaz. (1:12)

V. SPETZNAZ VULNERABILITIES

One of the first vulnerabilities is the Spetznaz soldier himself. He is only a conscript and serves but two years. His motivation and training probably are lacking as opposed to U.S. Special Forces training.

Another vulnerability is found within the pact nations. There is still much hatred of the Soviets by the Baltic states, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Finland. So much so that if things don't go extremely well for the Soviets early on, they may find themselves fighting a war in all directions.

Another problem the Soviets could face would be that because they put such a premium on offensive special operations, it should conversely hold that they spend an inordinate amount of time planning defenses against hostile special forces. So while they would send many forces forward, they would also keep many to protect the rear and the homeland USSR.

Not to be overlooked is our own and our allies special operations forces. We have an outstanding corps of special operations troops that could cause the Soviets significant problems in their own right.

Of course, finally to get these combat troops to their targets one must have control of the air, as well as

specialized aircraft for combat insertion. The Soviets lack infiltration aircraft and without control of the air, Soviet transport would prove lucrative targets.

Given the vulnerabilities outlined above there are certain measures we can take to counteract the use of the Spetznaz. Some of these could be:

- 1) Emphasize and establish good physical security at key installations.

- 2) Create partisan/special operations troops of our own.

- 3) Make all personnel aware of Spetznaz threat, and improve our rear area combat doctrine.

- 4) Improve training for special operations personnel to include emphasis on independence and leadership. More emphasis on a wider array of language skills.

- 5) Establishing our own network of sleeper agents behind the Iron Curtain and throughout the third world, to be activated as world situations evolve.


VI. CONCLUSIONS

The Soviets learned their lessons well in WW II. They saw the effective use by Germany of partisans and then successfully employed partisans against the Germans. This experience coupled with Soviet paranoia led to the ultimate creation of the Spetznaz unit. The Spetznaz was set up basically to be a politically secure and reliable arm of the Soviet military to use behind enemy lines or in special situations as warranted. Their most recent use was in Afghanistan to help put in place a government more favorable to the USSR. The Soviets have organized, equipped, and trained the Spetznaz for their special missions behind enemy lines, and made them an integral part of their Soviet military doctrine. Of course the Spetznaz is not an indestructible, invincible unit and have several weaknesses which can be exploited by the U.S. and our allies to counter this Spetznaz threat.


Finally, since I am preparing this paper based upon a query for information on the Spetznaz by AFOSI. I would like to submit the following matrix (Appendix F) to illustrate the AFOSI response to the Spetznaz threat. I would like to credit Lt.Col. Jim Giermanski (AFOSI Reserves, CADRE, AWC Class of 1986) for compiling the information used in preparation of this matrix. This matrix addresses all of the threats to U.S.

forces from partisans up to conventional forces and for which acts AFOSI is prepared to respond to the threat in peacetime and wartime.


APPENDIX A
Cooperation Between Partisans and Soviet Intelligence




APPENDIX B



APPENDIX C




APPENDIX D



- 1 - HQ company (anti-VIP)
- 2 - Parachute battalions
- 3 - Signals company
- 4 - Supporting units

APPENDIX E



- 1 - HQ company (anti-VIP)
- 2 - Midget submarine group
- 3 - Combat swimmer battalions
- 4 - Parachute battalion
- 5 - Signals company
- 6 - Supporting units

THREAT LEVEL		ACTORS										AFOSI RESPO TO T		CR- 7		CE OPS	
I PEACETIME	PARTISANS SYMPATHISERS ACTIVATED SLEEPER AGENTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	
II TACTICAL	PROFESSIONAL SPECIAL PURP. FORCES OF CONV. ARMY (LESS THAN BN) ACTIVATED SLEEPER AGENTS	NO	NO/YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
III TACTICAL OPERATIONAL	CONVENTIONAL FORCES (BN OR LARGER)	NO	NO	NO/YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	

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