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A RAND NOTE

COURT DEPOSITIONS OF THREE RED BRIGADISTS

Sue Ellen Moran, editor

February 1986

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PREFACE

This Note was prepared in support of ongoing research in Rand's Security and Subnational Conflict Program. It provides English translations of court depositions taken between 1980 and 1982 from three repentant terrorists of the Italian Red Brigades. The terrorists decided to cooperate with the authorities in exchange for reduced sentences as promised by a special parliamentary law.

The three depositions were taken from Patrizio Peci (1980), Massimo Cianfanelli (1981), and Enrico Fenzi (1982). They furnish information about terrorist operations, modus operandi, daily life and routines, salaries, and links with other groups within Italy and abroad.

The three collaborating brigadists were connected with the Turin, Rome, and Genoa columns, respectively. Hence, through their depositions a picture emerges of activities spanning northern and central Italy over a period of approximately five years. (Peci begins his odyssey in 1977; Fenzi ends his in 1982.) The depositions are offered to allow wider access to information regarding the practices and thinking of an important terrorist group. Besides their intrinsic interest, they are revealing in the larger context of terrorist behavior.

The translations into English, provided by editor Sue E. Moran, have been made intentionally close to the original Italian to convey the texture of the court testimony.

This collection was assembled and indexed with support from The Rand Corporation using its own funds.

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INTRODUCTION

→ The Red Brigades, Italy's major left-wing terrorist group, first gained international attention in 1978 when its members kidnapped and later assassinated former Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Since then, the group has survived a number of government-sponsored attempts at extermination, including the highly effective efforts of DIGOS, the counterterrorist agency headed until 1982 by General Alberto Dalla Chiesa.

The Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*, or BR) were founded in 1968. The group engaged in domestic terrorism until December 1981, when it entered the realm of international terrorism by kidnapping an American, General James L. Dozier, the chief of administration and logistics at NATO land forces headquarters, in Verona. A crack Italian police squad rescued General Dozier in January 1982, but two years later the BR resurfaced to assassinate Leamon Hunt, the U.S. director-general of the civilian and military forces monitoring observance of the peace treaty in the Sinai peninsula. Then in March 1985, in an effort to call attention to a referendum on wage indexing, the BR killed Christian Democrat economist Ezio Tarantelli.

The BR has published communiques after each operation and has issued other documents at frequent intervals, providing a wealth of information for analysts. ← In a broader context, the BR has provided valuable insights into how a terrorist group operates, how it acquires weapons, how it links with groups both inside and outside the country, and how it sets up communication systems within its ranks. The patterns established by the BR may or may not be similar to those of other groups, but the information the group has provided does add to the larger and developing picture of known terrorist practices. The BR carried out 439 actions between 1969 and 1980. We have analyzed the documents of the group for indications of new directions and priorities in targets, tactics, and strategy.

In May 1982, after much debate and discussion, the Italian Parliament passed an amnesty law providing for early release and reduced sentences for terrorists who would cooperate with the authorities (by providing information about other terrorists, hideouts, etc.). Terrorists who had cooperated before 1982 were also entitled to its benefits. Between 1980 and 1983, several especially highly placed terrorist cooperated. Their depositions provided an even broader and more concrete picture of the planning and implementation of operations, contacts among terrorists, and internal splits within the groups. The depositions also cover the more personal realm of everyday living arrangements, and they furnish clues about how groups move from the abstract world of strategy and tactics to the concrete world of staging operations, preparing weapons, and choosing participants.

Each deposition offers a distinctive perspective, since the ages and bases of operation of the defendants vary. At the time their depositions were taken, Patrizio Peci was 27, Massimo Cianfanelli was about 29, and Enrico Fenzi was in his forties. Peci led the Turin column of the BR, Cianfanelli belonged to the Roman column, and Fenzi was a peripheral member of the Genoa column who later became part of the cutting edge of the prison movement in the Palmi top security prison.

The depositions also offer distinct views of separate aspects of the BR. Patrizio Peci was a member of the logistics front (responsible for procuring weapons for the whole BR organization) and thus has a good overview of the group from 1977 to 1980. In addition, he developed his political leanings through involvement in militant groups in central Italy. His testimony was the first to be taken in Italy, and he gave it with the understanding that he would receive a reduced sentence for collaborating. His deposition caused a public stir when it was leaked to the press in 1980. The translation in this Note follows the version that appeared in *Lotta Continua* that year, although some pages, reportedly pertaining to foreign links, are missing here. The deposition contains information about the participants in several actions dating back to 1977, about the structure of the BR, about ties with foreign groups and with key figures of *Prima Linea* (Italy's second-most lethal leftist terrorist band), and Peci's reasons for cooperating

with the authorities. One year after Peci's collaboration, the BR brutally murdered his brother Roberto. Peci was finally released from prison on a reduced sentence in 1983, was given a new identity, and has since published a book, *Io, l'infame (I, the Scoundrel)*. Peci's book is more explicit about personal relationships and daily life in the BR than is his deposition.

Massimo Cianfanelli was a student at the University of Rome when he was invited to join the BR in 1978. He had been involved in leftist political organizations throughout high school and college. Through the Roman column, he came into contact with the people who masterminded the Moro operation. As a member of the column, Cianfanelli was not in a position of power, but he was able to provide first-hand insights about some of the leaders, in particular, Moretti, Gallinari, Morucci, Faranda, and Savasta. His deposition includes an inside discussion of the Morucci and Faranda rift--the so-called dissidents' split. It does not contradict the Peci account.

Enrico Renzi, the third "repentant," is the most anomalous of the trio. A professor of Italian literature at the University of Genoa, his contact with the BR prior to his arrest was minimal. He was ordered to participate in one action (so as not to be dropped from the membership). However, once having been arrested, he landed in a top-security prison where the most powerful leaders of the "historical nucleus"--the founding fathers of the group--were incarcerated. He describes the "prison university," the developing prison brigades, and the Prison Front movement. (He is related by marriage to Prison Front organizer Giovanni Senzani.) Finally, he discusses the situation in Milan (to which he was exposed after his first release). Renzi adopts the stance of a curious but impartial observer.

This Note provides translations of the depositions of Peci (1980), Cianfanelli (1981), and Renzi (1983). A general topical index is given at the end of the Note, as well as indexes of key names, weapons, and actions. (In the indexes, the initials P, C, and F indicate the deposition in which the information is located.) The translation from Italian into English has been rendered in a more simplified style than

that of the original testimony. However, a careful effort has been made to follow the language of the original closely, so there is a deliberately literal quality to the text.

PECI DEPOSITION

RECORD OF INTERROGATION

Today, April 1, 1980, in Cambiano Police Headquarters, at 8:30 a.m., the accused [whose name is] written below appears before the investigating judges of the Turin tribunal, Giancarlo Caselli and Mario Griffey, with the assistance of the Public Prosecutor, Dr. Alberto Berardi. At the outset, it is affirmed that the Investigating Judge Caselli received word by telephone at 7:05 today that Patrizio Peci, during his transfer from the prison in the Turin district to another [prison], asked to confer with the head escort, informing him that he wanted to speak with a judge urgently and without delay (as is stated in the record that is attached to the present document).

Peci responds to a question: I am called Patrizio Peci, born in Ripatrasone on July 9, 1953. Resident of San Benedetto del Tronto, via Morosini, without a house number; prisoner. The office stresses the urgency [to proceed] because of the nature of Peci's statements, which will aid investigative developments. Peci confirms the above-mentioned statement. It is established that Peci belonged to the Red Brigades.

Peci responds to a question: I reaffirm that I revoke the attorneys Sergio Spazzali of Milan and Edoardo Arnaldi of Genoa.

To a question Peci responds: I do not intend to name another lawyer. I testify that the office names [for] me, as public defender, Aldo Albanesi of Foro di Torino. At this point the office decides to proceed immediately, invoking the "law of urgency," asking at the same time that Aldo Albanese, the just-named public defender, be given immediate notice so that he can be present at the interrogation.

WHY PECI IS COOPERATING

The accused testifies the following:

I am a member of the Red Brigades and head of the Turin column. I was part of the strategic management and a member of the logistic front. At the time of my arrest, I calmly reappraised my years in the Red Brigades, first as a semi-clandestine member and then as a clandestine

member. Today, I am compelled to criticize the organization's proposals and debate as "insipid," although the debate may be intense. The Red Brigades are not helping the working class but are hurting it. The Red Brigades and other groups are playing a game that forces the state to react in a repressive manner. So the working class loses the little power it originally had. After making these conclusions, I decided to ask for an immediate meeting with a judge after learning that the Supreme Court and other ministers and the President of the Republic were willing to grant amnesty to terrorists collaborating with the law. I am collaborating because I hope for amnesty and for the chance to rebuild my life outside of prison.

I have collaborated with the police already; I shall mention the precise points when they come up in the course of the interrogation.

**SOME SUSPECTED BR MEMBERS: ARANCIO, COLETTA,
TOFFOLO, CHIAVOLIN**

At this point the Public Prosecutor asks that the accused expound, first of all, on what he knows about Silvia Arancio, Italo Coletta, and Claudio Toffolo, now behind bars.

The accused states: Silvia Arancio has been a member of the Red Brigades organization for at least a year or a year and a half. I knew her in my capacity as head of the Turin column. Since Silvia Arancio lived near the column headquarters, we decided to have her rent an apartment in which some clandestine members would be lodged (clandestines of the Red Brigades). So immediately after the August holidays of 1979 Silvia Arancio rented an apartment in her name in Turin in Piazza Villari on the corner of Via Viterbo. In that apartment Rocco Micaletto, whose *nom de guerre* is "Lucio," was lodged. Silvia Arancio obviously knew that the person who would live in the apartment would be a clandestine member of the BR.

As far as I know, she did not know that she would be keeping Rocco Micaletto. Micaletto and Arancio lived together in this apartment until Micaletto was arrested. The two tried not to be seen together too much, because they could not pass for an engaged or married couple, given the differences in their ages. Arancio is much younger than Micaletto. Silvia Arancio's actions were not limited to those described by me; she also did political work consisting of updating file

cards of people working within the Fiat Mirafiori factory where she worked in the [auto] body section. Micaletto did not live in Turin on a continual basis but commuted between Turin and Genoa. In fact, since he was a member of the executive [committee] of the BR, he had to operate in these two cities in a special manner. The cohabitation of the two was limited to the days on which Micaletto was in Turin; when Micaletto had to leave for other places, Arancio was free to leave the apartment or to stay there. The only essential thing is that she was obliged to stay in the apartment, at least during the night, when Micaletto was in Turin. It was her job to "manage" Micaletto, that is, to provide him with a cover in that apartment with respect to the neighbors. For example, if they rang at the door, she had to answer. I have not had direct contact with Silvia Arancio, nor have I known her personally. Silvia Arancio is a name that I furnished to investigators in the course of the preceding collaboration to which I have already alluded.

Italo Coletta is another BR member, one whom I knew personally. He was recruited about two years ago by an acquaintance, a certain Nadia Ponti, already a clandestine member. Ponti, while a clandestine member in that period (that is, salaried by the organization and working full-time under the BR umbrella) was, however, a "legal regular" clandestine in the sense that she was not sought [by the police] and she had genuine documents of identification. Coletta hosted Giuseppe Mattioli for a brief period of about 20 days after the discovery of the base on Corso Regina Margherita of Turin. The reason for the brief span of hospitality was that Coletta wanted it that way for personal reasons.

In his apartment, which is located in the Vallette district, Coletta lived with his mother who seemed to be suffering from a leg ailment. His *nom de guerre* is "Amilcare." At his apartment he had a device that manufactures phony [license] plates. This machine was certainly confiscated by the police, and I think it was located in Fiore's and Acella's car--the same car confiscated at the time of their arrest. In addition, until four or five months ago, Coletta kept a 7.65 caliber pistol hidden in a closet or, rather, underneath a piece of house furniture. At least, this is what he told me. Then he got rid of the pistol for fear it might be found. Specifically, Coletta worked in the

logistic sector and passed information regarding the Vallette district to the organization. This he did in collaboration with a certain Chiavolin (whose last name I cannot be sure of) Claudio, whose *nom de guerre* is "Lino," inhabitant of Settimo Torinese and now employed in some office for the Region, or something of the kind. in Via Francesco da Paola di Turin. Coletta had and still has in his possession a cache of weapons that can be found hidden underground in a mountainous-hilly area; a hiding place known also to Chiavolin and perhaps also to other persons of the Vallette quarter. I cannot furnish the names of these people. Coletta, before joining the organization about five or six years ago, placed a bomb that did not explode near the Agnelli villa. If I remember well, the bomb was found by the police. I know that Coletta gave Giuseppe Mattioli a box of 7.65 caliber bullets, probably taken from the already-mentioned cache. I knew this because, afterwards, Mattioli gave me a box of bullets and said that they had been given to him by Coletta [missing word]. Coletta [says] that Chiavolin was a member of the BR. Both work in the logistic front. I shall spell out later the details of my acquaintance with Chiavolin.

Regarding Coletta, I state that I furnished his name to investigators in the course of the collaboration preceding this present interrogation. Italo Coletta owns a red Fiat 127, licensed TOR or S (I do not remember the numbers). Coletta is a land surveyor and works in an office located in the area of Via Po di Torino. He is employed by a building contractor who constructs roads, but not roads exclusively. Coletta proposed his employer's name to the organization as a possible kidnap victim for extortion purposes in order to subsidize the BR organization. The proposal was rejected because this "entrepreneur" was "too small," since the BR, in general, kidnaps [people] of multinational importance so as to be able to exact payment of ransom, possibly even from abroad, and to avoid possible obstructive blockage of money or goods by Italian judges. Coletta gave the organization information about a person, whose name I do not remember, who had drawn up, according to Coletta, a floorplan of the prisons of Ivrea and perhaps of [the prison] of Le Vallette of Turin.

Coletta, however, said that this person was not associated with the Navone (BR) staff; so I was skeptical about the matter. Coletta and Chievolin tried to build or modify some recording devices so that, once they were put into operation, they could not be turned off until the end of the tapes. Some of these tape recorders, complete with tapes of texts of political documents, were put in operation at Lancia of Chivasso and at Fiat Mirafiori, in the [auto] presses and body divisions. At the moment it seems to me that there is no more to say about Coletta; if later, something comes to mind, I shall mention it.

Another member of the organization is Claudio Toffolo about whom I was asked to expound in the beginning [of the interrogation]. His *nom de guerre* is "Mario." He lives, I think, in Nichelino Via Rossini; rather, I mean, he lives in Nichelino, not in Via Rossini. I do not remember the address, although I would know how to get there. I have been entertained there occasionally. I had the keys to that apartment; those keys were confiscated at the time of my arrest. Toffolo works at the SORAT agency, which, according to the yellow pages, is in Moncalieri. They retail auto spare parts; I know the telephone number of the factory by heart--it is 6062224. In fact, I telephoned that number several times. Toffolo is an "irregular"; he belonged to the logistic sector. At his home he had all the equipment to reproduce stamps for document falsification. After the discovery of the base, or rather after the BR discovered that the Corso Lecce base was under surveillance, they moved the M12 machine gun, used when Aldo Moro was kidnapped and the members of his escort were killed, to Toffolo's apartment garage. (This is the same M12 used in the homicide of two guards, Lanza and Porceddu, at the Nuove of Turin, and again used against the commissioner of Ser Donato.) On all three occasions, Raffaele Fiore, called "Marcello," head of the Turin column (and the person I succeeded after his arrest) was the one to use the M12. The BR also moved from Corso Lecce to Toffolo's garage a 7.65 caliber Beretta pistol, model 81, which I had purchased by using a phony gun license registered to "Vincent Mortari." Along with this pistol, the BR also brought a file of supporters of the Christian Democrats (DC) in the Turin area. Toffolo participated in many actions that I shall now list:

the disarming of Marshal de Tommasi;
the kneecapping of Giuliano Farina, the former, head of a section
at Fiat, and the latter, a supervisor at Fiat;
the search of the DC office in Via Cantoira.

[The office here states that many terms, such as "disarmament,"
"laming," and other jargon were used by the accused and are terms of
current usage within the organization.]

Antonio Delfino was the person who shot Giuliano Farina with a
pistol that Jovine kept at Biella. I also participated. In this action
(as in other actions) there were three of us: Delfino, Jovine, and I.
But Delfino was the only one to fire. Three persons participated in the
Giovanni Farina action: Toffolo, I, and Lorenzo Betassa, whom I knew by
the *nom de guerre* "Roberto" and who was recently killed in Genoa (as I
learned from the newspapers). I knew that he lived in Genoa in an
apartment on Via Fracchia. To be able to state unequivocally that the
person killed is Lorenzo Betassa, however, I would have to see a photo
[of the deceased]--something I haven't done yet. Toffolo, Angela Vai,
Antonio Delfino, and Silvana Innocenzi participated in the search [of the
DC office] of Via Cantoira. Acella, Toffolo, Raffaele Pisano, and I
participated in disarming De Tommasi. Acella is called "Filippo."
Delfino originally had the *nom de guerre* "Tiziano"; later we changed it
to "Marino." Angela Vai's *nom de guerre* was "Augusta," and we jokingly
called her "Mangusta." Silvana Innocenzi's *nom de guerre* was "Marzia."
Pisano also had a *nom de guerre* that I cannot remember right now.
Pisano participated in the above-mentioned action, then did not participate
in the others because he left the organization after about a month. He did
not want to continue his militancy for personal reasons.

Toffolo lived with a girl, Anna, who was not a member of the
organization. In essence, she lived with him only because she liked him
but not because she shared his ideas or actions. This is an anomalous
case within the society of the organization. She was so determined to
remain outside the organization that when she saw BR weapons [in the
garage], she no longer went in there--not even to get her car. I state
that prior to this interrogation and prior to the arrests of Toffolo
and his girl, I furnished information to investigators about them.

THE CALLA BROTHERS

[The Office asks Patrizio Peci to state what he knows about Guido and Ettore Calla.]

These are two brothers. I distinguish them as the older and the younger, because I do not remember their first names. The elder's *nom de guerre* was "Pietro" and the younger's was "Gianni." Both were irregulars in all aspects. The elder, "Pietro," injured a shoulder when he did black [market] work. "Gianni," the younger, is now in the military service at Novara. In the military he works in the office where military permits are issued. Pietro entered the organization about one and a half years ago and kept Innocenzi at his home in Gassino for about six months. During this period, Innocenzi herself met Pietro's brother and recruited him. He entered the organization with the *nom de guerre* of Gianni. At the time of my arrest, I had the keys to the two brothers' dwelling in Gassino. There, in the cellar, they kept a machine for making automobile licenses. About two months ago, Pietro went to a town near Palmi, his native area, in order to study the place as a possible locale in which to establish himself. His position in the organization was taken over by Gianni. He placed at the disposition of the BR the dwelling in Gassino in which Jovine ("Marco") and I were going to establish ourselves as a twosome. This did not happen because I was arrested. It seems to me that the sister of the two brothers lives in another dwelling in Gassino; she is totally extraneous to the BR organization. Innocenzi always carried a weapon even when she lived with the two brothers in Gassino. They, however, did not have weapons. It is obvious, however, that Innocenzi did not or could not hide from them the fact that she was armed. The two brothers, Pietro and Gianni, never participated in any action. I also pointed out these two brothers to the investigators before this interrogation; their arrest came as a result.

[At this point, the office asks Peci to illustrate the organizational structure of the Red Brigades. In making his oral statements, Peci avails himself handwritten notes, which the office labels with the number 1 in order to attach them to the testimony.]

[At this point, it is stated that, from the beginning of the interrogation, Patrizio Peci was advised of his right not to respond to questions and not to make any statement; and that he had stated that he did not want to "take the Fifth Amendment." In fact, it was he who requested to be interrogated by the judge.

The office decides to reread what had been recorded up to this point. Peci states: I reaffirm the entire contents of the seven-page document drawn up a short time ago.]

ORGANIZATION OF THE BR

The Column

The BR organization is divided into: strategic management, executive committee (normally called the "executive"), logistic front, front of the masses, columns, brigades.

To better understand the functioning of the organization, it is opportune to begin with the regulars--that is, the militants who work full-time for the organization and who can be "legals" (that means they live with their real identities) or else "clandestines," that is, those who live with false identities because they are sought or at least singled out [by the police].

Each column operates in a "pole"--that is, in a certain geographical area. Today columns operate in the following areas: in the Veneto, in Milan, in Turin, in Genoa, and in Rome. They are establishing one in Naples, and it is doing well; the one in Sardinia is only beginning. In Florence there is no column, because in that city there is no political referent, at least of a primary nature. In fact, the BRs concern themselves, above all, with industrial areas (as Turin, Milan, Genoa, and the Veneto) and also with Rome because the state government is there.

The column's duty is that of directing all the activity of the organization within its "pole." Each column has a single leader.

On the column depend various brigades all composed of militants, the majority of whom are irregulars but with possibly some regulars. The regulars [are in the brigades] perhaps to maintain the necessary

connections with the column or for special reasons. An example is Mattioli whom we were forced to make clandestine because he had been identified by the police. (Up to that time, Mattioli's activities were confined to keeping us in his apartment.) But one cannot belong to the column merely to be clandestine; experience and capacity for political management are also necessary. Mattioli did not yet possess these prerequisites and so, while still being clandestine, he continued to do brigade work. Returning to the brigades, it must be said that there is, first of all, a logistic brigade, which occupies itself with the falsification of documents, weapons, [judicial] codes, health service, the making of false (license) plates, assistance in finding lodging to rent or buy, etc.

Brigades of the Masses

There are, therefore, the brigades of the masses that are divided into three categories: factory brigades, brigades of the so-called "triple," and the brigades who work with the DC, or rather with the political forces in general. With regard to Turin, there are four brigades, or at least it was that way before recent arrests: They were the [auto] body division, [auto] presses, Rivalta, and Lancia. At the most, the brigade may be composed of five militants, although we at Turin have never reached that number--not so much for want of people as in order to run fewer risks, fragmenting whenever possible the various groups so as to assure the most security. Also, the brigade may be composed of one person only. Essentially, the number in each brigade depends on both employment needs and availability of personnel.

The so-called brigade of the "triple" is concerned with police (*carabinieri* and the police), with the courts, and with the prisons. The *carabinieri* and the police, in the language of the organization, are indicated by the formulation of "repressive forces," which includes even the custom officers and the urban police (these last two bodies up to now considered more in terms of political interest than anything else, while in the future they will certainly become targets to strike). The brigade of the political forces operates in a normal manner, but it is clear that it is granted extra power when the political life of the country demonstrates a need for it, for example, during the elections.

Regarding the factory and the actual situation of the column of Turin, there were coordinating efforts between the various brigades in that they met with the factory "co-op" (cooperative group), which was supervised by Vai. She met with the leaders of the various brigades of the factory to coordinate their activities. Innocenzi assisted Vai in factory coordination, since Vai could not do it alone. The regulars bring about centralization of the various brigades with their column. Members of the column of Turin were: I, since I belonged to the logistic front; Vai, as a regular who worked with the factory brigades; Innocenzi; and Micaletto, who participated in the column meetings only now and then because, as I have already said, he was involved elsewhere, too.

The liaison between the column and the front is usually handled by two persons. I was one: I made the connection with the national logistic front (since I was responsible for the logistics of the column). The other was Micaletto, who made the liaison with the front of the masses and the Turin column.

The Front

The front is the organism of the BR that takes care of the political management on the national level. For example, it decides to execute campaigns; it begins with a political discussion because the military action is always a consequence [of political discussion]. For example, I am alluding to campaigns on the DC or on the courts. It is also the duty of the front to evaluate the proposals for interventions (actions) formulated by various columns, and to grant permission [to undertake them]. The front must also formulate complete proposals. These complete proposals (for actions) are then translated into concrete actions by the individual columns which enjoy some autonomy because they must make the proposal suit their specific circumstances. As I have already said, there is a logistic front and a front of the masses. But there is no clean division between the two fronts, because we want to avoid the debate of the armed sector: the argument regarding the distinction between those who think and those who do. In other words, both the logistic front and the front of the masses participate in the

activities of the political management at the national level in an equal manner. Once the general political discussion is exhausted, then (and only then) do the distinctions between the front of the masses and the logistic front enter, in the sense that the former is more specialized for certain general problems, while the logistic front is obviously more prepared for the sectors of its competence.

The Executive

The executive (committee) represents the highest level of the organization; its function is that of approving definitively the proposals formulated by the front. It intervenes, furthermore, in exceptional cases, for example, when the BR experiences defeats by repressive forces (the police) or when the executive perceives dangerous situations and must take the problem directly in hand. The executive intervenes, furthermore, to execute "large" actions. In fact, it intervened to kidnap Moro and Costa. In these cases, everything was in the hands of the executive since that body remained permanently convened. They (the members of the executive) interrogated Moro; in fact, Moro was always interrogated by the same person, who was a member of the executive. The executive (committee) was convened in permanent plenary session, and it also conducted political discussion of each interrogation. Then it sent [copies of] the political assessment to the various columns. The members of the executive include two militants of the logistic front and two militants of the front of the masses. Those belonging to the executive may also belong to the column, but the tendency is not to employ them in the column but to use them only for management. It is the executive that cultivates and has cultivated relations of an international character with the Red Army Faction (RAF), Basque Liberty and Fatherland (ETA), and the Palestinians.

The Strategic Management

The supreme organ of the BR is the strategic management, formed in such a manner as to guarantee the representation of the entire organization. They meet in order to draw up the strategic political line of the BR as well as to act in exceptional cases. An exceptional case, for example, occurred last December when the imprisoned comrades sent us a letter

(which must be among the things recently confiscated in Corso Lecce) criticizing the executive; they maintained that the organization had never adequately intervened (to assist) the prison front, because the executive committee had taken the wrong road. And, furthermore (according to the imprisoned comrades), the executive had not adequately developed the debate on the organisms of the masses. The imprisoned comrades blamed the executive for an organizationalist political line that suffocated debate and left every decision, in practice, to the executive. Having heard these insistent complaints from prison, or rather having understood that beneath these criticisms the imprisoned comrades were actually demanding a meeting of the strategic management to replace the executive with new persons (drafted to the job), we called a meeting of the strategic management last December in which 15 or 16 militants participated.

Except for unusual cases, such as the one just now exemplified, the strategic management ordinarily convenes every six or twelve months. Or else it convenes when a column makes a request for valid reasons. I repeat that the strategic management works out and defines the strategic line of the BR and that all the organization is represented by it. Specifically, members of the strategic management include: all the members of the executive, some members from the front of the masses and the logistic front, some from various columns, and, finally, some militants at the simple level of brigade when they have a special kind of representational value. For example, at the last strategic management meeting, the following people from Turin went to Genoa to Via Fracchia (where the meeting was held): Micaletto, and Betassa, who in that period was working in Turin and who has (recently) been found (by the police) in Genoa, and I. Betassa was on the factory board (or the factory cadre) and had about four or five years of experience. And since in Turin (with the exception of the police and the judges) everything is Fiat, a Fiat worker with Betassa's experience has, for Turin, representational value that justifies his participation in the meetings of the strategic management. I reemphasize that at the meeting of the strategic management the proposal comes after the topic is discussed at various levels of the organization. The strategic management will approve the argument in a decisive way, beginning from the draft (fruit

of preceding drafts), with which draft one opens the debate at the innermost circle of the strategic management.

ROLE OF IMPRISONED COMRADES

I note that, concerning the relations between the imprisoned militants and those who are outside prison, the rule is that anyone who goes to prison loses everything, as a representative of the organization, and [loses] his power to make decisions. However, this is not always the case, because when the imprisoned comrades wrote, giving some assignments for new tasks (for the BR), they were listened to and were accepted unconditionally by the Red Brigadists outside prison. But the imprisoned comrades, seeing things from jail, erred in their analyses, creating difficulties for the organization, which was constrained (by them) to take mistaken roads and, worse, to make bad decisions. With regard to the letter that provoked the last meeting of the strategic management, those in jail complained that nothing was being done to free them. Meanwhile, we were practically all prepared to pull off an *en masse* escape from Asinara. But the imprisoned comrades must have allowed something to leak, because if we had acted, we would have found police awaiting us. Anyway, we had killed Palma and two guards at the Nuove, and Tartaglione, and a third person besides. All of these actions pertained to the prison front about which the we answered our incarcerated comrades point by point. Another sore point between the active forces and the militants in prison was that we were the organisms of the masses. From prison came the recommendation to construct and organize the organisms in the revolutionary masses. However, the political situation of the factories in particular did not permit the materialization of these organisms. This illustrates the error in political assessment made by the imprisoned comrades.

[At this point, at 2:00 p.m., the interrogation was suspended.

The interrogation reopened at 5:15 with the assistance of the same judges (mentioned at the beginning).]

THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIONAL COMMITTEES

Patrizio Peci states: In talking about the organization of the BR, one must mention also the "revolutionary regional committees." These committees are not ever a fixed entity but rather a thing to bring into existence (or terminate) according to local needs. In practice, they are dissolved when they become substantially weakened. They take care of situations not pertaining to the "pole," because the "revolutionary regional committees" relate to a territorial reality in which they are a force that cannot be dispersed. But at the same time, the committees do not constitute a sufficient backup so that some regular forces could implant themselves and live in that area. Examples of committees that come to my mind are the Tuscan one (in fact, in Tuscany they are trying to create two of them); the one in the Marches, and the Biella committee. This latter committee is the only one that has worked out well, primarily because it has been employed almost exclusively in a logistic function, that is, we have given them material to guard, and they have done it. There is, however, a certain tendency to make regional committees into a kind of logistic support of the organization, even though that creates many problems, because people want to fight, too, and not only be employed as a support.

The committees have been employed in a decisive way in the service of the nearest column; for example, the Marches committee [is] at the service of the Roman column. The mistake was that of thinking that the armed struggle could be waged in the little cities, a thing that has proved almost impossible in this phase. Proof is that, for example, when the Marches committee tried its only action of some prominence, the assault on the DC headquarters in Ancona, the result was that the committee, for all practical purposes, was annihilated.

LAST STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT MEETING IN GENOA (12/79)

Concerning the meeting of the strategic management occurring in Genoa last December upon the request of the imprisoned comrades, I state that the following militants of the BR participated:

for Milan: Vincenzo Guagliardo and Nadia Ponti;
for Turin: Micaletto, Betassa, and I;
for Genoa: a Turin man whose *nom de guerre* was "Valentino";
also a Genoa worker perhaps from Italsider, or
rather an ex-worker who had entered the clandestine
phase; a certain "Roberto" (*nom de guerre*), a marine
and member of the executive, one of those people found
in the past days at the dwelling of Via Fracchia in
Genoa, the dwelling to which the police went and
searched on my tip.

Roberto (in contrast to the others of Via Fracchia)--in fact, I clarify:
I have seen some photos of the people found in Via Fracchia, after the
break-in there by the police. And since I have seen these photos, I
modify what I have stated previously, which was not well
understood by the office. In the apartment on Via Fracchia of Genoa
[both] Betassa, whom I had known by the *nom de guerre* "Robert," and the
ex-marine, who also had the *nom de guerre* "Roberto," were found. It
seems to me, however, that when Betassa went to work in the column of Genoa
(I will tell you why and under what conditions), he assumed the *nom de*
guerre of "Antonio." Observing the photos of the persons found in the
dwelling of Via Fracchia in Genoa, I recognized Betassa (alias Roberto
and Antonio) and also Roberto, the ex-marine and member of the executive
committee. I also recognized Panciarelli as well as the woman whose
name was used as the cover name so that her dwelling could be employed
by the organization. In this very apartment on Via Fracchia in Genoa
the meeting of the strategic management of last December--the
one I have already discussed--took place. Participating in this meeting
besides the already listed persons were:

For Rome: "Claudio" (*nom de guerre*), member of the executive
about whom I have already furnished information for identification to the
investigators. There was another person representing Rome who had just
recently become a regular and who worked in a hospital (certainly a
hospital in Rome, but I do not know which; I recall that Moretti
used this hospital worker's passport--changing the photo--to go to France).
I have also furnished information to the investigators for identification
of this BR militant.

Also participating in the meeting at Genoa of last December were Marcello--*nom de guerre*--a militant who lived in Rome but who was responsible for establishing the BR column in Naples. I have also furnished to the investigators information for [his] possible identification. Last, there was "Diego"--*nom de guerre*--who is a BR militant responsible for establishing the column in Sardinia. No one else was present except the lady who lived in the dwelling. She, however, was present in the apartment but did not actually participate in the meeting, of whose nature, however, she was aware.

Concerning Valentino, I must clarify that he, although working in Genoa, was a native of Turin. He was the type who, instead of enlisting in the military, decided to go underground; and so we discussed how to employ him. The column of Turin discussed the matter. The decision was to send him to Genoa. Valentino was known personally by Cristoforo Piancone and by Nadia Ponti (*nom de guerre* "Marta"), who, in that period, was in Turin. I did not know Valentino personally; however, I seem to recall that the name Valentino was associated with that of a certain Nicolotti (when in the periodical, *Nuova Societa*, almost two and a half or three years ago, Nicolotti was named as a person who, when he was drafted for military service, disappeared from view). I recall that Piancone made the connection between the name Valentino and the surname Nicolotti published by *Nuova Societa*.

Regarding Betassa (alias Roberto or Antonio), as previously promised, I state what follows. After the "blitz" of December 1979 which, among other things, led to the discovery (by the police) of the base of Corso Lecce in Turin, we decided to send away some militants who, we felt, were wanted by the police but had not yet been arrested, with the intention of [forcing the police] to widen the area of their investigations. Among those was Betassa, who was sent to Genoa and who found housing in Via Fracchia, where he had already been.

This meeting, of which I have already spoken, was the only gathering of the strategic management in which I participated. The preceding one was held before the Moro kidnapping, and I did not participate. So I cannot even say where it took place. Representing Turin were Micaletto and Fiore. I do not know who the other participants were.

Regarding other meetings of the strategic management, I recall only one other a long time ago in the Biella region in the epoch of the "Dog," the nickname of Curcio (whose *nom de guerre* was "Carmelo" during the period in which he worked in Milan prior to his second arrest; I do not know, however, his *nom de guerre* in the period before his first arrest). Concerning this meeting in Biella, I specify that I heard about it from Fiore. However, I was not in Turin in that period. In fact, I was not even clandestine then. In addition, I state, having been asked just now to clarify the point, that many militants of the BR, besides their *noms de guerre*, also have nicknames. I have already said that Curcio was nicknamed "Dog"; Franceschini, whose *nom de guerre* I do not know, was nicknamed "Chap" (Tizio); Micaletto was nicknamed "Little Red Riding Hood"; Moretti, "The Fox"; and so forth.

CHANGES IN THE EXECUTIVE AND IN THE FRONT

The executive committee, before the latest arrests and police interventions, was comprised of the following members: Claudio of Rome; Roberto, the ex-marine who died in Genoa; Micaletto; and Moretti.

In the period of the Moro kidnapping, the executive was composed of Azzolini (*nom de guerre* "Menco," a diminutive of Emanuele), Bonisoli (*nom de guerre*, "Gigi"), Moretti (he had many *noms de guerre*, the first was "Nico," then Maurizio when he moved to Rome, and now it is "Bruno"), and Micaletto. I specify that the member of the executive committee who carried out the interrogation of Moro was Moretti.

After the Moro kidnapping, "Gallo," that is, Prospero Gallinari, entered the executive committee. After the arrest of Azzolini and Bonisoli, Fiore and Anna Maria Brioschi (*nom de guerre* "Monica") took their places.

The very first executive committee chronologically was composed of Franceschini, Moretti, Antonio Morlacchi (whose *nom de guerre* I do not know), and Curcio. Then Morlacchi left the organization and went to Switzerland, because he had personal and family problems.

At this moment I do not recall other names of persons who participated through the course of the years in the executive committee. However, I recall now that Semeria (whose first name and whose *nom de*

guerre I do not remember well--I recall only that one was Giorgio and the other "Franco") took part in the executive committee. The logistic front at the time of my arrest was composed of Moretti (who managed it) and me; Nadia Ponti; Roberto (the ex-marine killed in Genoa), Diego, of whom I have already spoken in regard to the strategic management as organizer of the Sardinia column; and finally a certain "Rocco" (*nom de guerre*), first known as "Marco" (also a *nom de guerre*) of Rome (about whom I have already furnished information to the investigators).

The front of the masses was composed of, at the time of my arrest, Micaletto (manager), Guagliardo, Valentino (Nicolotti), Claudio of Rome, and Balzarani. Besides these, there is a woman in Genoa whose *nom de guerre*, it seems to me, is "Nora."

Right now I do not remember anybody who was a member of the logistic front or the front of the masses who has not been mentioned, except for Cristoforo Piancone, who was a member of the front of the masses. I do not know whether Piancone had other notable duties in the BR. With regard to Turin, he was a member of the column but not head of it.

PECI'S HISTORY OF INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

At this point the office asks Peci to describe the salient points of his political activities up to his militancy in the BR and the various phases of that militancy.

At San Benedetto del Tronto, as an operant in this territorial area, I, along with some friends, established a group called PAIL, already dedicated to and oriented towards the armed struggle. This was a little after the Sossi kidnapping. I recall that we organized some actions, such as the burning of the car of some fascists and the [assault] and battering of a fascist professor (ITI of Fermo).

The friends with whom I worked in PAIL are Claudio Piutti and Lucio Spina. Both are now imprisoned and charged with belonging to the BR. In fact, they later became part of the BR. My first contact with the BR was provided by Ugo Iacopini of Fermo, who limited himself to making a contact for us with his brother Fausto, employed at Siemens of Milan; Fausto then was already a member of the BR. Ugo was never really a member of the BR; he knew that his brother, Fausto, was a member. He had some knowledge of the BR, based on conversations about the organization with his brother.

Another person who (together with Fausto Iacopini) contacted us in the name of the BR is Nicola Eleanori. He is also employed in Siemens of Milan. I recall that the latter and Fausto Iacopini, both natives of the Marches, came to San Benedetto. They knew that we were interested in entering the BR, and we discussed it.

They told us what we were supposed to do to enter the BR; they told us that if one wanted to fight, it was much more practical to do it in a large city. For this reason, I moved (in the summer, actually immediately after summer) to Milan. I moved alone, since I found work in a small factory of Lambrate, whose name at the moment I do not recall.

My friends Piunti and Spina remained in San Benedetto since they did not find work in Milan or in any other large city. However, they continued their activity. Here I refer to the discussion of the Regional Committee of the Marches, a structure to which I have already alluded. They recruited to that group Carlo Guazzaroni, who later became head of the committee.

Guazzaroni has a history whose details I shall furnish later. Proceeding with the account of my activities, I recall that I began to work in Milan in the logistic sector. I began to work with Angelo Basone (*nom de guerre* "Dario"), already then clandestine, and with Angelo Morlacchi (I do not recall his *nom de guerre*).

I participated in my first action in Milan: the search of the headquarters of Confindustria. Involved were Silvana Rossi, Marchesa (wife of Guagliardi; I do not remember the *nom de guerre* of the woman), Semeria, a worker who even now works at Alfa Romeo of Arese, and I. This worker, I recall, was employed by Alfa more or less at the same time as the attack on the barracks of the policemen of Rho; in that very period he got married. He lives in the outskirts of Milan. He has red hair and a physique very similar to mine. He is more or less my age, if not a few years older. He is a native of Milan. Sometimes he wears a beard but only in some periods. His beard is red. He was searched by the police and in the period of his employment and of his wedding [incomprehensible word] of the attack on Rho. I worked in

Confindustria of Milan with this person. Outside there was a support group consisting of Nadia Mantovani (*nom de guerre* "Giulia"), Giuliano Isa (I do not recall the *nom de guerre*), Walter Alasia ("Luca").

Afterwards, I participated in the already-mentioned action of attacking the barracks of the policemen of Rho together with Azzolini, the worker from Alfa of Arese, already mentioned, and the son of Petra Krause, of whom I only know that the *nom de guerre* was "the Young One" (or "the Small One") because he was so young.

Afterwards, I returned to San Benedetto di Tronto where I resumed working in the committee again. The committee, while I was still in Milan, had carried out an action--that of attacking the barracks of the policemen in Fermo. Lucio Spina and another, whose name I do not know, participated. They fired rounds of machine gun fire against the barracks. This was its first action as the Marches Committee of the BR; the committee claimed it as such. I found the situation one that had grown and matured. I discovered that Guazzaroni, who had been recruited, had immediately become one of its most active and capable members. I recall that we decided on an action against the barracks of the policemen of San Benedetto. The plan was to burn some cars, rather, to set fire to the barracks by setting the cars on fire: by spilling gasoline under the rolling shutters behind which the cars were located.

I did not actually participate. Guazzaroni and another, whose name I do not know, executed the action. This action was also claimed under the name of the Marches Committee of the BR.

We recruited a girl named Caterina Piunti (not related to Piunti). We therefore decided to make a quality leap in both the political and military sense. We decided, that is, on an action against the headquarters of Confapi of Ancona. We carried out an armed search of those headquarters and confiscated documents. Participating were Caterina Piunti, the other Piunti, and I. All three of us were armed. Again the action was claimed by the Marches Committee of the BR.

It is noted that at this point the lawyer Aldo Albanese, named public defender, arrives. An entire reading of what was stated to this point is made. Peci states: I confirm entirely my statements of which I have now heard a complete reading in the presence of the public defender.

The public defender states that he does not have observations or objections to make.

I specify that the revocation of defense attorneys that I had already named (Arnaldi and Spazzali) pertains not only to the judicial proceedings in my behalf by the judiciary authority of Turin but also to any other proceeding, including the one pending in Ancona and the other in Rome for the Moro kidnapping.

Peci states again: In the actions against Confapi, a person participated whose name I do not recall because I never knew him

After Confapi, the Carabinieri found the dwelling in Via Morosini and the weapons contained there. I was the only one who had keys to the dwelling and, for this reason, I left the Marches and became clandestine. The Marchigiano comrades, whom I have mentioned above, continued to operate in the area, but in contact with Rome. From direct knowledge I am no longer able to say anything about it. Having left the Marches, I arrived in Milan and went to the home of Nicola Eleanori through whom I made contact with the organization.

Eleanori sent me to the home of Fausto Iacopini, who set me up in the home of Mario Bondesan, who lives in Milan on Via Ca' Grande. Bondesan is an ex-partisan about 50-60 years old. He works in strict contact with Fausto Iacopini. In practice the two constitute practically a brigade. Both are radio-electronics buffs, etc.; they both keep up contacts between each other by radio without direct appointments. In some cases they resort to this method less than in others. Bondesan also has at his home, as the safe-keeping depository of the organization, gold, weapons, and other things. He also had kept Moretti, Franceschini, and Semeria at his home. (These are all things he himself told me.) Bondesan was perfectly aware that this was material of the militants of the BR. His wife also agreed with Bondesan in this decision. In substance, Bondesan and his wife were part of the network of logistic support. Both Bondesan and his wife had *noms de guerres* which, however, I do not remember. The two also had a house at the sea, at Marotta, in the Marches.

I learned that lately Bondesan was allowed to participate in actions, although his participation necessarily had to be limited because of his age. I stayed at Bondesan's home for 15 or maybe 20 days.

Then Fausto Iacopini took me to a home of a certain Perotti whose first name is perhaps Angelo, a resident of Milan in Via Rembrandt 27. He lived alone. I remained at his home about 20 days, perhaps more. Speaking with me, he told me he was willing to provide the cover name (for the organization) and be the holder of the dwelling to which the organization could turn for its own purposes. It seems to me that he worked; in fact, I am sure he worked at Siemens.

I also left Milan, and from that moment I can say nothing more about that city. It was then about March or April of three years ago.

Fausto Iacopini is a BR militant from way back. He entered the organization in the period of the Siemens collective (whose exact name I do not recall but in which Moretti also participated). He was disposed to do everything and took active part in the operations of the organization. These are things he told me himself. Then, with the organization's consent, he resigned from Siemens and found other work (as a teacher). In reality, in his free time he worked in a print shop of the BR in Milan: This print shop afterwards fell (into police hands) without Iacopini's being involved, even though Iacopini worked there, since the printing office was in the name of another. I recall that some time later I myself picked up a suitcase containing about 300 D.S. (that means Resolutions of the Strategic Directorate), which I carried to Turin for distribution. Perhaps I had two suitcases of them. Anyway, we brigadists in Turin picked up about 500 D.S. from Iacopini.

These Resolutions of the Strategic Directorate contained the Spring Campaign.

Nicola Eleanorì is employed at Siemens. He is head of the Siemens brigade. He is a key element, one at a very high level. He is very good on the organizational level. In the period of my first stay in Milan I also knew a girl who lived with him and about whom I know nothing else, except that she worked at Siemens and belonged to the brigade.

When I returned to Milan and stayed in that city for a second period of time, I recall that the girl came to see me at Perotti's house. She came as a representative of the organization of which she was a member and of which I think she is still a member. Certainly she no longer lives with Eleanori. It seems to me that she is (still) employed at Siemens. She seems to be more or less my age. She is thin, with black hair, of Sicilian origin; in those days she had acne on her face.

Having arrived at Turin, I went to live first in villa Palli in a home across from a shoe store whose street number I do not recall. Our apartment was on the first floor [second floor in U.S. usage]. This habitation was registered to Carmela Cadeddu who, to be exact, was subletting it. In this apartment I lived with Fiore, whom I knew at...[four pages are missing from the record at this point--translator].

NH Besides a politician, we were supposed to kidnap a high-level Milan industrialist. Also in this case the discussion concerned the objective, general picture and there were no individual specifications. We were thinking of someone at a high level, for example, analogous to Schleyer in Germany. The action against a politician was supposed to be followed by one against an industrialist. After the action was analyzed, the front of the masses and the logistic front, together with the agreement of the executive, established that the target would be Moro. But then a decree was enacted requiring a declaration of dwellings and of their occupants. This action caused some concern on the part of the organization, and so we abandoned the plan to kidnap an industrialist. The Moro kidnapping was executed at the conclusion of the debate carried out according to the above-mentioned procedures. Since the kidnapping occurred in the period of the Turin trial, we sought to obtain an additional political concession.

I repeat that during the Moro kidnapping the executive remained permanently convened in a locality not far from Rome; as far as I know, it could have been at Florence.

THE MORO ACTION (ACCORDING TO FIORE)

From what I understood of Fiore's confidential account, Moro was held captive outside Rome in a store. This store, from what I understood, was managed by a married couple, certainly providing the cover name (for the BR), but they were clean. The store was furnished with a movable wall that would fool whoever made only a visual inspection without feeling and testing the wall's strength. From Fiore I also learned that Gallinari was supposed to be chosen as the guard of the Moro hideout. Fiore told me this with an air of certainty. As I have already said, Moretti always handled the interrogations of Moro.

During the Moro kidnapping, Micaletto maintained the relations of the executive with the Turin column. It was he who distributed the fliers prepared by the executive itself. To move about in that period the members of the executive also used airplanes.

THE COCO ACTION

Regarding the Coco murder, I know that almost all the regulars participated--which in that period was a very small number. In that period I was still irregular. What I know I learned from Fiore less than a year after the murder. Micaletto, for his part, only made vague allusions. He confined himself, in other words, to indicating his participation in the deed without adding anything else. From Fiore I learned that practically all the regulars of that period, except Fiore, participated in the murder of Coco and of the men in his escort. Participating were Micaletto, Moretti, Azzolini, and Naria. Also Bonisoli certainly participated in the Coco action. Perhaps even Roberto of Genoa participated, because in that period he was already a member of the Genoa column.

Regarding Naria in particular, Fiore said that in that period there were two irregulars of the Turin column of the BR: Fiore (*nom de guerre* "Marcello") and Naria (I do not recall the *nom de guerre*). Fiore told me that Naria had left Turin for Genoa expressly for the Coco homicide, while Fiore remained in Turin and listened to the radio to hear news of Coco's murder in Genoa.

I do not know who actually used the Skorpion that, according to the office, was employed in Genoa for the Coco murder. I know, however, that the Skorpion was brought to the organization by Morucci.

DISSENTING BRIGADISTS AND THE SPLIT IN THE BR

Concerning Morucci, I know that he came from the Armed Communist Formation that divided up--part of them joined the BR and another part joined Prima Linea. Morucci came to the BR and arrived--literally--with a little suitcase of weapons, among which was the Skorpion. I repeat, therefore, that it was Morucci who brought the Skorpion to the BR. Obviously, this occurred before Coco's murder. However, the fact that Morucci brought the Skorpion to the BR does not mean that he also participated in the Coco murder. He could have, but the only thing that I know is that he brought the Skorpion in question to the BR. Independently from the tentative conclusions of which the office speaks to me, it also seems to me that the Skorpion brought to the BR by Morucci was also used in the homicide of Coco. This was commonly known as an obvious fact within the organization. However, I do not know who actually had the Skorpion in hand at the homicide of Coco or at the homicide of Moro.

Spontaneously, he continues. Regarding Morucci, the whole discussion concerning his split with the BR must be clarified. Morucci had come to us with a political situation behind him that was what it was, and that is of a person who had already been at a high level of responsibility of POTOP and who had ties with Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace. As far as I know, he did not have ties with Negri, but I am not certain. When he joined the BR, we told him to forget the previous ties, because for us in the BR they meant nothing from a political point of view and besides posed a security threat. Since the ties were "contaminated," we ran the risk of bringing the police along with us, in the sense that all too easily, through them (Piperno, etc.), the police could find us.

The first period passed quietly, and there was agreement regarding the functioning of the Roman column. Then the first obstacles arose, in the sense that long, unrealistic, and abstract discussions began to develop.

But things went forward just the same, although with growing difficulties, because Morucci was a member of the logistic front and Faranda, of the front of the masses. Eventually not only the work of Rome, but also the work of the front (which in the course of a couple of meetings succeeded in concluding very little), began to be blocked. Thus, there arose the need for delving deeper into the problem. Besides Gallo, that is, Gallinari, who was at that time in the executive another member of the executive (Moretti) went to Rome to clarify the situation. The intention of the executive was not that of creating a split but of overcoming a contradiction that was not viewed as irreparable. The executive proposed to Morucci and Faranda that they write a position paper. Then the BR could really evaluate this debate about the movement. According to the executive, Morucci could have easily prepared a document on the subject for distribution and discussion. But they refused and, at the same time, Moretti left Rome. A little later, however, Morucci and Faranda resigned saying that they did not recognize the authority (of the BR) at any level. It was the beginning of the real schism, and the executive decided to take the matter seriously and resolve it in a definitive manner. It told Morucci and Faranda that they should go to a "clean house," that is, outside the pole, but belonging to the organization, to prepare their document. In other words, in a house in the country or at the beach--the kind rented for vacations--in order to have peace. At the same time, the executive asked Morucci and Faranda for a list of the things that they had in their possession. The understanding with the executive was that Morucci and Faranda would be heard from again, after a certain length of time, when their document was finished (if it weren't for the fact that Morucci and Faranda disappeared, leaving at their base a little sheet on which was written, "No to police arrests," to indicate that, in their view, being sent to a house to write a document was equivalent to being arrested by the police).

Besides, Morucci and Faranda took from their base all the weapons as well as the machines for falsification of (license) plates, and the material for falsification of documents. Furthermore, Morucci, as head of the logistic sector of Rome, before leaving his base, hoarded many other weapons, having them consigned to him by comrades who had contacts

with him and who were subject of his authority. Morucci and Faranda carried away from their base much more property than what was subsequently confiscated at the moment of their arrest. In particular, they carried away about 30 million lire. On the note, besides the phrase, "No to police arrests," Morucci wrote that he was carrying off the weapons, because he had introduced them to the organization, and that the money belonged to the proletariat (and it remained to be seen who represented them).

Morucci and Faranda wanted to let their action pass as an act of political division while, in reality, it was an act of piracy. It was so different from the case of Alunni, Pelli, and Ronconi, who left the organization but after a regular divisions of weapons without acts of robbery.

After what Morucci and Faranda did, we in the BR contacted all the groups that knew them, saying that with these groups we had neither good nor bad relations. However, Morucci and Faranda had committed a robbery and, if they were accepted by that group, we would consider them in the same way (as thieves). Morucci and Faranda are saying that other comrades left the BR with them: four or five or six. But they are talking only about a neighborhood group (on the fringe of the BR) that had developed an affinity with the organization.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE "BIG LEADERS"

They were talking about an organism of the masses, not about an organic part of the organization. Besides contacting various groups, we also contacted the "great leaders," that is, Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace, because we had heard that someone was fanning the fire. In particular, the *Espresso* had published a series of articles containing both false and true information. [It was] not intelligence, but still, from a political point of view, it would have been better had it not appeared. For example, [there was] information about the D.S. (strategic management) that only a militant could have leaked.

To the question of the Defense, Peci responds: With Negri, no contacts were established because, in our view, he had nothing to do with the Morucci and Faranda affair. Comrades of the Roman column, therefore, went to Scalzone and C. and told them that Morucci and his

people were thieves and that they (Scalzone and C.) were fanning the fire and that they had stage-managed the schism. They did this with the intention of assuming control of the BR from the outside (we told them). They, however, responded that they considered the BR the only Italian organization worth strengthening. Yes, they had some criticism of the BR regarding its political line, but it is one thing to criticize and another to intervene.

Later the story came out that Piperno (or someone acting for him) had found a home for Morucci; thus, the theory of [outside] support was verified--a theory they had denied. This denial came at the end of a very heated discussion in the course of which, on our part, we threatened to let some bullets fly--a thing that scared them.

THE NEWSPAPER PROPOSAL

They (the "great leaders") proposed to start a national newspaper (which would have been, for all I know, *Metropoli*) to establish a point of reference for the entire Movement. In other words, the newspaper was supposed to serve all the clandestine organizations and those on the level of Autonomy, with Piperno, Scalzone, Negri, Pace, Volsci, etc. at the head. Besides the disagreements of the kind that Volsci would have accepted if Negri had not, and vice versa, the proposal did not interest us in the BR, because one does not lead with a newspaper; one leads with actions. Moreover, we already had the experience of a newspaper in the period of *Contro-Informazione*, which, in certain ways, was the voice of the organization in legal terms, from our point of view. Then, in fact (because power does not feel secure if it is not exerted), it became clear that legal space does not exist for propagandizing the true themes of the armed movement; for which reason, from our point of view, the experience of *Contro-Informazione* ended in failure.

COCO ACTION AND INVOLVEMENT OF BR IN PRISON

It is not true that the Coco homicide was arranged through secret channels with the so-called historical heads of the BR, then imprisoned in Turin. I can affirm this with certainty by referring to a fact. In that very period, a little before, actually during the trial, a robbery claimed by the BR was carried out in Turin. The imprisoned comrades

thought this was the response to the trial that the BR (outside prison) intended to make. As a result, they thought that the organization was really tiny, reduced to zero. They were so convinced that they took into consideration right away the hypothesis of reorganizing an action themselves with their own forces. As part of the hypothesis, they took into consideration the possibility of dividing into groups, or assaulting the police and killing, or at least hitting, a judge at the trial, taking advantage of the fact that there were no cages yet. It is clear that the hypothetical plan would have been impossible to implement, but the fact that it was discussed shows the state of mind the imprisoned comrades were in, and it belies the hypothesis that they already could be part of the plan then developed for the homicide of Coco. When I spoke of a judge, I was not referring to anyone in particular. It was obviously a vague plan. I learned this all later while discussing themes that constitute the history of the organization-- a subject obviously discussed internally. When, finally, the Coco homicide was carried out, the [imprisoned] comrades were pleasantly surprised.

[At this point, since it is 1:50, April 2, the interrogation is suspended until 7:00 p.m. First, however, a complete reading of the statement to this point is made. Closed at 2:22 p.m. LCS) at 7:15 on April 2, 1980, the present proceeding is reopened.]

OTHER ACTIONS

The interrogatory record of Patrizio Peci follows. Before Judges Giancarlo Caselli and Mario Griffey and in the presence of the lawyer Aldo Albanese, in the police headquarters of Cambiano appears the prisoner, Patrizio Peci, who states: Regarding the Cusano homicide, committed in Biella, I know, since they said so in the organization [some incomprehensible words follow] that Azzolini committed it and the brigadist who was later arrested in Milan, that is, Diana. The two were about to commit a robbery.

The murder of Antonio Esposito in Genoa was committed by Roberto Di Canova (he told me himself, adding that Valentino participated with him). Roberto had a 9 length caliber (gun). Valentino had the Nagant of the Turin column that we had lent to the comrades of Genoa. I can

only say that the Nagant came from Rome. I do not know who got it-- [incomprehensible words]--from Turin. When it arrived, it had already been silenced. We then used it in the Turin column. No one in particular or exclusively.

I am sure that the Nagant arrived for the Croce action, a little before that crime.

THE COSTA KIDNAPPING

The kidnapping of Costa was executed on the national level and, therefore, was managed directly by the executive. Actually participating in the kidnapping were: Moretti (who directed the operation), Piancone for the Turin column, Azzolini, Roberto of Genoa, and perhaps, but I am not sure, Morucci for the Roman column. Micaletto worked in Genoa, but even though he was in that city, he did not take part (I mean at the level of direct participation) in the kidnapping. Costa's prison was supposed to be outside Genoa in the area between Genoa and Savona, because I recall that a possible roadblock established at the exit road of Genoa in the direction of Savona was considered dangerous. It was said that, since past the possible obstacle, they would be outside the city and, therefore, outside danger. The proceeds of the Costa kidnapping were distributed among the various columns in order to establish a deposit for each of them; at the Turin column the amount certainly neared the figure of 500 million lire. I received first-hand news of the Costa kidnapping from Piancone, mentioned previously.

MORE ACTIONS

Executing the triple homicide of the police agents in Milan (done recently) were Moretti, who in this case was the driver, Balzarani and two others; for one of them I know it was the first action of his life; they were irregular elements of the Milan column. Regarding the weapons two 92s were used; one was found on me. The other belonged to Claudio of Rome. In essence, we borrowed some weapons for the action. I knew that [incomprehensible] was programmed [incomprehensible] on the military, but instead of the patrol there could have been someone else in the military sector. Many times they searched for the vehicle to be assaulted, following it on motor bike.

The day of the attack a car was employed that at first followed the agents' car, then passed it in the vicinity of a ridge or tunnel that had been preselected as the place of the action, because it permitted rapid escape, even though there was the risk that another military vehicle would pass by (within a period of five minutes).

PIAZZA NICOSIA ACTION AND "MARCO ARENA"

I learned these things directly from Moretti.

The action of Piazza Nicosia was done by the Roman column. I can only say, without doubt, that a person called Rocco and later named Marco participated. (In fact, the warrants for arrest were issued against Marco Arena because during the action someone heard the name of Marco; but the Marco in the BR was not surnamed Arena.) Marco was the one with the Kalashnikoff (AK). Gallinari certainly participated. It was totally an undertaking of the Roman column. I learned this news personally from Rocco.

I know that the Roman column has access to a base in Chiusi, a base that prints, that is, contains machines for mimeographing and the like. We were supposed to hold a meeting of the logistic front there, but at the Chiusi station Rocco arrived and told us that the police had arrived, probably near our base; there was, therefore, the risk that they had located it; we left, and the meeting never took place. I had arrived from Turin via Milan, by train, together with Moretti. All those from the front were there. Having seen the danger signaled by Rocco, Roberto, Moretti, and I left together. We separated in Milan.

I do not know whether, during the stay of Piancone in the Molinette hospital of Turin, the BR succeeded in talking with him. Regarding Piancone, it came out that he had made some statements in the hospital. Then we learned that he had actually spoken at first, because he was afraid. This we learned when he was already in jail.

It is noted that the Public Prosecutor in the person of Dr. Alberto Bernardi intervenes.

Taking part in the two episodes in which an armored police wagon was targeted near the Lamamora barracks were: Giuseppe Di Cecco, Antonio Delfino, and I. We used stolen cars--one for the first action

and one for the second. The roles were the following: At the wheel was Di Cecco; I fired with a FAL; on the side of the car was Delfino. It turns out that the FAL [incomprehensible word] had been found, as a result of my directions, in Biella. The two containers of Energa bombs found in Corso Lecce are those in which were contained two devices used in these two episodes.

PALESTINIAN SOURCE OF ENERGA BOMBS

The Energa bombs are part of the material furnished by the Palestinians. We prepared the flier in the column, and we mimeographed it in Corso Lecce. Participating were Vai, Micaletto, and I. Vai did the writing. After the second episode, I remember that we abandoned the stolen car in Via Brunetta. Delfino got away on his motor bike. Di Cecco and I went home to Corso Lecce. We certainly did not venture out again immediately. Perhaps later, I left home. I do not recall; I mention that these possibilities advanced to me by the police in [incomprehensible word] of spontaneous collaboration, and I have said the same thing.

My *nom de guerre* was "Mauro."

Mau could be an abbreviatio. of my *nom de guerre* found written in some places.

Volcarino certainly had [incomprehensible word], however, in this moment I do not recall.

"Presta" was not the *nom de guerre* for Volcarino; it is a generic word, that is, a "dummysname" (cover name), and I have already explained what it means.

[The office continues to ask Peci to tell what he knows about the attacks committed in Turin and now being listed.]

OTHER ACTIONS (1977-1979)

Injury to Luciano Albertino, the head of the Fiat division, December 14, 1979.

Participating were Roberto, that is, Betassa; an ex-prisoner released from jail (he works at the body division of the Fiat Mirafiori). Released from prison, he was hosted by an older lady, that is, a lady over 50 years old, who also worked in the auto body section and

who was also arrested. I think her name is Matilde Carrera, but I am not 100% sure. I note that we are talking about mere hospitality of an irregular and, therefore, the older lady was not aware that, in doing this, she was working for the BR. The ex-prisoner was more than 30 years old; he was called Piripacchio but more as a nickname. I do not recall his *nom de guerre*; he left prison not more than a year before the action in question. Also participating was a new boy, very young, who was recruited by members of the (auto) body section and, therefore, by the group that revolved around Roberto (Betassa). I learned this news directly in my capacity as head of the Turin column. I do not know whether Mario Toffolo participated in the action.

Injury of Cesare Varetto, October 4, 1979: Participating were Jovine, the only one who fired with a model 81 that he was carrying at the time of his arrest (and one of those recently arrested at Biella as a result of my leads). I do not recall exactly, but it is possible that this pistol belonged to the group of those acquired under the false name of Ernesto Baldi. In reality, I was Baldi; to obtain these weapons, I worked together with Acella. Tartaglione, of whom I shall speak later, was outside as a support.

Still concerning the acquisition of weapons, I state that the purchases made under the false name of Vincenzo Mortari were made by me and Mattioli who accompanied me to the store; Tartaglione and Jovine provided support outside the store. Again with regard to acquisition of weapons, after the Baldi trip and the Mortari trip, we tried a third time, this time with a gun license falsely registered to (I do not recall the name anymore) and bearing the photo of Di Cecco [incomprehensible word]. But the attempt went wrong from the start. Participating were Di Cecco, I, Mattioli who waited outside, Toffolo, also outside with him. We went to an armory on Via Goito in front of or near the Corso cinema in which [armory], on another occasion, Piancone had purchased bullet-proof vests and had made other purchases. Furthermore, he had already surreptitiously gotten the 110 bullets for a 7.62 Nagant. Subsequently, in that same armory also, a [incomprehensible word] exactly made acquisitions of bullet-proof vests of the type confiscated from Michelino in Via G. Bruno. When we returned to that armory with the document falsely registered to Di Cecco, the gun

salesman (because he was on the alert or because he had an uneasy conscience) began to make a minute inspection of the document. We pretended to be irritated at his diffidence, and having been handed the document, we left without buying (anything).

Returning to the Varetto injury, besides Jovine, who fired, participating were Di Cecco, Giuseppe, who drove the car, Antonio Delfino, and I. The investigation was executed by the factory brigade, clearly under the direction of the head of the factory (brigade): I note it here once for all [actions]--either Vai or Innocenzi could have participated in the preparation of single attacks in the factory sector. I cannot recall, attack by attack, what role, whether general or specific, they played.

Attack against the Fiat guard, Giovanni Farina, June 3, 1979. Participating were Betassa, Toffolo, and I. It was I who was to draw with the usual 81. I personally conducted the investigation preceding the attack because, in that way, it would present minimal difficulty.

The siege of the Turin D.C., Via Cantoira, May 3, 1979: The action was materially completed by Silvana Innocenzi, Antonio Delfino, Angela Vai, and Claudio Toffolo. I remember that for this action we expected a limited number of persons to be present at the D.C. headquarters. Instead we found about 15 people. We took both personal documents of those present and documents of the [D.C.] section. I think that Toffolo was the driver.

The wounding of Piccinelli, RAI, April 24, 1979: Actually participating were Nadia Ponti, who was the driver, Roberto, that is, Betassa, killed in Genoa; and Di Carlo, who fired. The action against Piccinelli fitted into the picture of actions against the D.C. In fact, Piccinelli was hit not only for being a journalist but also for being an exponent of the D.C., although not enrolled. The BR wanted, however, to make it clear, particularly, that he was not actually an activist in the true sense of the word, but that he nevertheless played a role useful the D.C. interests. Piccinelli was a member of Gip. I do not really remember who did the investigation; perhaps it was Nadia.

Assault on the Turin D.C. Headquarters, Via Giordano Bruno, April 10, 1979: This action was carried out by Innocenzi, Tartaglione, by a certain Virgilio, of whom I shall speak later, and me. We thought that

we would find many people in the headquarters. Instead, most likely we had arrived too early, for we found only one person at first; then another arrived. Both were photographed. We carried material away from the section. We were armed as usual with revolvers and a machine gun. Everyone has a revolver; the one who has the machine gun is the one who directs the action. Sometimes one person has a bomb [grenade] in his hand, and usually it is the same person who has the machine gun. This time the machine (gun) stayed in the car; we didn't use it because we didn't need it and because it was awkward to use in tight places like those we were supposed to attack.

Injury of Giuliano Farina, Fiat, March 14, 1979: Participating were Delfino, Toffolo, and I. Delfino fired, again with the 81. In the course of the action, we were supposed to take a picture of Farina, but we did not execute this idea because a lady was leaning out a window; so we gave up. We had awaited this Farina for about ten days, and then we got fed up. One time he arrived with his wife; another time he changed the route of his car. In short, we had to put off the attack.

Wounding of Sanna and Cali, January 23, 1979: The act was actually committed by Acella; Vincenzo, who shot with the 81; and Pietro Panciarelli, who shot with the P38 Walter that subsequently broke and was destroyed. At the time of the action, Panciarelli was in Corso Regina Margherita at the home of Mattioli, commuting between there and Via Buenos Aires, because of the lack of kitchen and shower facilities in the dwelling on Corso Regina Margherita.

In short, when Panciarelli entered into the clandestine phase, we directed him to Mattioli. They were both able to use two apartments. They preferred to be in Corso Regina Margherita, since the apartment was not in Mattioli's name, and he wasn't even registered. They were also required in a decisive manner to be responsible for the dwelling on via Buenos Aires for the reasons already cited. The dwelling on Corso Regina Margherita was, furthermore, on the third floor (fourth floor in U.S.), for which reason it was easy to be noticed there.

The murder of the PS (police) agents, Lanza and Porceddu (Nuove prisons, December 15, 1978): Participating were Acella, Fiore, Panciarelli, and Nadia Ponti. A "shot gun" or 12 caliber was used by Panciarelli, if not the M12 found in Biella, used by Fiore. On that

occasion Acella was armed with the machine gun, later confiscated in Via Rossini from Nichelino at the time of Mattioli's arrest. However, no one used this weapon. For actions of this kind, the flier is designed at the column level for everyone.

The mimeograph machine that was in Corso Regina Margherita was used. In that period we only had those contents (the machine) kept in that apartment: Obviously I am referring to the situation of the Turin column. The investigation was done a little by everyone. In particular, Innocenzi [worked on it] besides me, naturally. The action was part of a campaign that had been proposed by the fronts. We employed some irregulars for the investigation. In practice, a good number of the people who fought in the BR in that period worked on the investigation. I remember that it was a complicated undertaking because, at first, a police car circled around the prison; then a parked van was used (by the police). Two cars were used for the action: one from which the rear light had been removed for the action; it seems to me that it was a Fiat 124, and also a black 128 (Fiat) for the second stage, that is, for the change of cars.

The recording of the police radio transmissions, which I knew about from the newspapers, was found immediately after the Lanza and Porceddu homicide at the home of the Cadeddu sisters and amazed me above all, since Mattioli was a recording "nut." This one I think he made himself, but that material should not have been at the Cadeddu house. I think that Mattioli, who was Carmela Cadeddu's boy friend, left the recordings in the Cadeddu home or forgot them. Mattioli was, in fact, rather careless. I also state that I had an appointment with two members of the Nucleus, actually Acella and Fiore, because immediately after the action those two were supposed to meet me in that bar. The others of the command (Nadia and Panciarelli) certainly stayed somewhere, and the most likely place is the dwelling of Mattioli on Corso Regina. I am stating all this after having learned from the office that, in listening to the recording of the transmission of the police radio, one can hear little pieces of conversation (such as that of people who have arrived at the place where the recording was being made) and that one can also hear the name of a woman.

I deny that Carmela Cadeddu took part in any way in the murders of Lanza and Porceddu. Mattioli might have known that there was an action, since he provided the cover name for Serafino and, that is, for Panciarelli, and seeing him (Panciarelli) leave with a machine gun early that morning, he must have understood. But as far as I know, Mattioli had no part in the Lanza and Porceddu murders, except obviously for what has been said about his subsequent recordings.

The robbery of and injury to the Marshal De Tommasi, November 17, 1978. Participating were Pisano, Raffaele, Acella, Toffolo, Claudio, and I. It was the only action in which Pisano took part. I confirm, therefore, what I stated yesterday on page 6. We used navy blue aprons purchased for the occasion and later discarded.

Murder of the head of the workshop of Lancia Piero Coggiola, September 28, 1979: Taking part was a certain "Franco" (*nom de guerre*), with the surname Cotugno, a person about whom I will speak more when I talk about the people in the presses division.

Also taking part were "Roberto," that is, Betassa, who fired, and I. The Beretta model 81 recently found in Bilella in the possession of Jovine was used. A weapon was lost--a Beretta 90 that fell off Betassa who had two pistols. I clarify that: In general, whoever fires at the target always has two weapons: one that he fires at the target itself and another that serves for self-defense.

Attack on Police commissary of S. Donato, June 21, 1978: Participating were Fiore, Panciarelli, a certain "Leo" (*nom de guerre*), about whom I shall say more when speaking of the presses; finally, a boy whose name I do not know and who soon after left the organization after having participated only in this action and in the injury of Ravaioli. On this occasion (S. Donato) they used an M12 machine gun (the one used on Moro). Some bullets were fired.

The injury of Ravaioli, June 6, 1978. Participating were Angela Vai, Franco Maticchini (*nom de guerre* "Giorgio"), I, and finally the boy about whom I spoke regarding the preceding episode, the one who took part only in the Ravaioli and the Commissary of S. Donato actions. Maticchini fired perhaps with the Beretta 70; I do not remember well.

Injury of Sergio Palmieri, head of the Fiat office, April 27, 1978: Participating were Vai, Panciarelli, Di Carlo, and I. Panciarelli and Vai fired--Vai with the Beretta 81. It seems to me that Panciarelli fired with the usual 70, but I do not recall well. He might have also used the Nagant, I do not remember well. In that period Panciarelli was not yet clandestine.

Killing of the custody agent, Lorenzo Cotugno, April 11, 1978: Participating were Nadia Ponti, Piancone, and Vincenzo Acella. As I can remember, three pistols were used: a 38 that was the one operated by Acella, who fired the fatal shot. I do not remember the other two pistols. The plan was that Nadia was supposed to shoot as soon as Cotugno exited the elevator. Since Cotugno reacted even before drawing out his weapon, Piancone also intervened by firing at Cotugno's legs. I clarify what I said, that Cotugno reacted, because, although he fell as a result of the first shots, he continued to rotate on the ground, still active.

After the intervention of Piancone, the comrades started leaving, but when they had barely gone through the entry door, Cotugno succeeded in standing up and, moving toward the exit of the building, he began to fire. Piancone was struck and fell. Cotugno continued to fire and was very close to Nadia. They fired at each other, and Nadia was also hit. Then even Acella intervened and fired a couple of bullets toward Cotugno. I do not know whether he hit him or not. Acella then fired the fatal shot in the head. This is the reconstruction that Nadia and Acella furnished me. Nadia was hit by two bullets--one in the right arm and the other in the left thigh or vice versa (left arm and right thigh).

Nadia and Acella, after having left Piancone at the hospital, went in a taxi to the Madonna di Campagna district and kept the appointment with a BR member who waited in a specified place for one or two of those who were involved, in order to know the outcome of the completed action. I, having seen the situation, called Fiore (then the head of the column) to intervene. We decided to take Nadia to her husband's home; her husband was a male nurse at Maria Vittoria.

Nadia had not lived with her husband for about a year and a half, that is, from the time she became clandestine. She went back to her husband because of her state of need. The husband, however, did not belong to the BR. He knew that his wife had left him to go underground as a BR member, but he disapproved of this choice. Before this episode, Nadia's husband had never helped anyone in the BR, and in this case he was helping his wife more than the organization.

Injury of Giovanni Picco, March 24, 1978: Participating were Leo, Tartaglione, and I. Perhaps also Vai as the driver, but I am not sure. Regarding weapons, I do not recall one [of them] because it was long ago; the other was, it seems a Beretta 76.65 parabellum 52. In general, I note that the weapons indicated by me for the various actions fall within a fairly wide margin of error because of the time elapsed and because of the large number of total episodes.

Homicide of Rosario Berardi, March 10, 1978: Participating were Nadia, Acella, Piancone, and I. Nadia was the driver. Piancone fired with the Nagant. Acella fired with a 7.65 model 70. The investigation was done by Coi and was requested by those who actually took part in the action. I acknowledge that the office has reminded me that the homicide in question coincided with the beginning of the trial in the Court of Assizes or around that period). I note, right away, that it is doubtful that it would be necessary to make a response (an action) to a trial of this sort. In fact, I clarify: There was no correlation between the trial and the action. The rationale of this murder is the following: We had done some work on antiterrorism; we had singled out one of its members of prominence. The logical consequence, given his importance, was to attack him.

Injury of Gustavo Giroto, January 19, 1978: Participating were Piancone, Acella, and Andrea, about whom I shall speak more later. Andrea fired. The investigation, as usual, was conducted by the brigades of the factory. I do not recall what weapon was used.

Casalegno homicide, November 16, 1977: Participating were Fiore, who fired, Acella, Panciarelli, and I. The investigation was carried out by Coi. With regard to this episode, at the request of the office, I will give more detailed description; in fact, I can draw a sketch. (It

is noted, in fact, that Peci draws a sketch, which is attached with the number 2 to the present record and which illustrates the following testimony.)

Casalegno was supposed to arrive in a car and drive onto the cross street, reversing the direction of the car and parking on the street right next to the side of the home. He might arrive from three directions, but in the end he was supposed to complete this maneuver. I indicated these movements with a stroke of red color. I indicated, besides, with the numbers 1,2,3,4, the operants respectively: Fiore, Panciarelli, Acella, and I. The numbers 1 and 2 waited in position (with the numbers indicated on the sketch). Casalegno was necessarily supposed to pass in his car in front of them, before executing the maneuver just described by me. Then these numbers 1 and 2 were supposed to cross the street with calm, calculating the right time so as to be at the entrance of the dwelling of Casalegno exactly when he, having already parked the car, would have entered the lobby. Numbers 3 and 4 were supposed to wait in the positions indicated by the letter A. When Casalegno arrived in the area, Number 3, following the precalculated timing, was supposed to get into the car calmly and drive it to position B. Number 4, that is, I, was supposed to advance toward Casalegno's lobby with a weapon in hand so as to cover the others.

The plan went off according to design. Casalegno was hit, having barely entered the lobby. Numbers 1,2, and 4, therefore, got into the car in position 5, and everyone left. I state also that the investigation for the Casalegno action was done by Andrea Coi (*nom de guerre*, "Alberto").

Casalegno was supposed to have been lamed as part of the campaign against journalists developed at the national level. But in the days chosen for the laming he never came home, and the action was postponed, while the campaign in the rest of Italy was carried out. As a result of this campaign, an escort was assigned to Casalegno, [which functioned] in a listless way and which followed him for a while. We therefore postponed the action. Meanwhile, Casalegno's position (with the BR) was worsening because of some of his articles, so we decided to bring him to justice.

The investigation for Casalegno, I repeat, was done by Andrea Coi. I note that in Cristoforo Piancone's home were found articles by Casalegno, some procured in the civic library of Turin. I think that it was Nadia who went to the library. In fact, after Coi's investigation, in the matter of preparing fliers we used Casalegno's articles; I mean a much more complete collection of the same. I note that a long manuscript of Coi was confiscated; according to the office, this manuscript could have been a rough draft of the Casalegno flier. This manuscript is not a rough draft of that flier; having done the investigation, Coi would have written these things as an outline or as notes, but the rough draft of the flier is another thing.

When someone does an investigation (and therefore also in the case of Casalegno) one investigates the designated target without, at the moment of the investigation, posing the problem of how this target should be hit. In the specific case of Casalegno, every column had presented to the front proposals of targets to strike. The front had presented (to the columns) information about the opportunity for a national campaign against journalists. The Turin column had proposed the name of Casalegno. The investigations were completed even before the suggestion of a certain name or specific objective. It is obvious, in fact, that when one proposed [a name] to the front, one had already completed the research work both from the military and political points of view. Specifically concerning Casalegno, the investigation of Coi was ended five or six months before the intended date of disabling him.

Injury of Pietrosella, November 10, 1977SD: (Preliminarily, Peci asks the office whether it concerns a person injured by one shot only.) Having learned that the episode occurred in Via Ventimiglia, Peci states: Participating were Piancone, Vai, and Betassa (Roberto). Vai had the Nagant, Roberto had a P35 caliber 7.65 parabellum; both Vai and Roberto fired. I recall that there was some confusion because he tried to escape.

Injury of the DC Advisor Cocozzello, October 25, 1977: I was there, and I fired. Together with a certain Marco who works in the body division and now is no longer with the organization (now he is a unionist). Andrea also participated. Andrea and Marco are both *noms de*

guerres. I deny that Jovine (Domenico) participated in the Coccozzello injury because, first of all, he has been a member of the organization for less than a year or for about a year. I fired with the Nagant. The ammunition for the Nagant was provided us in part by the armory of Via Goito of which I have spoken somewhat. The ammunition was purchased in the armories but never by us of the Turin column. I do not know who Augusto Rossi could be, the person who, I learn from the office, bought various weapons and cartridges, among the Nagant munitions.

Injury of Rinaldo Camaioni, October 11, 1977: Participating were Fiore, Panciarelli, and one whose *nom de guerre* was "Piero," of whom I shall speak later. Panciarelli fired; I do not recall with what weapon.

Injury of Puddu, July 13, 1977: Acting were Nadia, Roberto (Betassa), and Leo. Leo fired with the Nagant.

Injury of Franco Fisca, June 30, 1977: Coi, Piancone, Panciarelli, and I acted. Coi fired with the Nagant. The investigation was done by the factory brigade under the direction of Piancone.

THE CROCE ACTION

Homicide of the lawyer Fulvio Croce, April 28, 1977: Participating in the homicide were Micaletto (who fired), Angela Vai, Fiore, and Roberto (Betassa). The weapon used was the Nagant. The investigation was done by Nadia. We arrived at the decision of Croce as a result of the debate carried on by us and the imprisoned comrades concerning the break in the trial. On the vigil of the reopening of the trial, it was decided that we shoot a lawyer, and the choice was the president of the Bar Association. At first we only wanted to lame him, but the imprisoned comrades wanted the action extended. We agreed, and the action was thus carried out. I do not know how the recommendation leaked from prison. In that period I was practically new to Turin; although I had scarcely arrived, I was placed in the column and therefore knew about everything going on.

The preparation of the flier concerning the Croce murder was done, as usual, at the level of the column. There was no contribution by the imprisoned comrades. Anyway, all the fliers were the result of the exclusive development of the column. From outside the column, except for the fliers prepared directly by the executive on the Moro kidnapping,

only some fliers regarding national campaigns ever arrived at the Turin column. At the moment I recall the campaign against the DC translated into the slogan, "Transform the electoral swindle into class war," a campaign during which the Turin column injured Piccinelli. Now the pertinent flier contained a part from outside the column and a discussion of the campaign of a national character. By saying "from outside," I mean that the text came from the executive.

Corrado Alunni had no part in the Croce homicide. I already said that Alunni had already left the organization. Three left together: Alunni, Fabrizio Pelli, and Susanna Ronconi. I do not recall to what column or columns they belonged when they left. The departure was caused by [their] diverging political evaluations of the then present phase. It was a break without great trauma and without great rancor. The three who left first formed a group that, it seemed to me, was called Combatting Brigades or something similar. Then they entered Prima Linea (P.L.). I am certain that Alunni and Ronconi entered the PL. Regarding Pelli, in fact, I do not know whether at the time of his arrest his group had yet merged with the PL.

The news relative to the splintering off of the three brigadists mentioned their subsequent undertakings just now referred to are things that I learned within the organization where all this was the object of discussion.

OTHER ACTIONS

Injury of Antonio Munari, April 20, 1977: There were Fiore, Angela Vai, Coi, and I. I fired with a Beretta 70: 8 shots fired. The investigation was begun by the factory (brigade) as always, and then we in the nucleus developed it.

Injury of Dante Notaristefano, April 20, 1977: Participating were Piancone, Nadia, Leo, and Valentino (of whom I have already spoken with reference to the last name, Nicolo). Three people fired. Nadia was assigned to fire, but the weapon misfired: the bullet did not go off. At that point, the backup support, that is, Leo, shot a bullet with the 7.65 that he had. Since Notaristefano continued to escape, Piancone fired all his bullets, without hitting him. Nadia did the investigation. I do not know if there was some link with the Palace of Justice in Turin.

PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE TURIN COLUMN

At this point, the office asks Peci to indicate in the most detailed manner the persons who were members of and who had taken part in the organization of the BR in the Turin area.

Beginning with the column, referring to the most recent period, I can say the following people participated: I, as head of the column beginning March 1979 after the arrest of Fiore; Silvana Innocenzi (Marzia), and Angela Vai (Augusta). Mattioli was a member for a very brief time before he was expelled. Then at times Micaletto every now and then participated in the management of the column. When, in September 1979, Innocenzi was arrested, no one took her place in the management of the column. So, at the time of my arrest, Vai and I were managing the column alone.

THE MIRAFIORI BRIGADE

Coming now to speak of the various brigades, I shall begin with the factory brigades. One of them is the brigade of the presses division of Mirafiori. It is now composed of Michele Tartaglione (*nom de guerre* "Mirco") and of his wife (living with him), whose *nom de guerre* is "Mirca," whose real name I do not recall. He works in the presses of Mirafiori, and she is an elementary school teacher. Their work inside the factory consists of gathering information regarding the structuring of the factory and regarding personnel. I clarify that this kind of work is common to all the factory brigades. Part of their work is also the singling out of possible targets, the distribution of fliers, and the recruiting of other militants. Regarding this last task, I note that recruitment depends on irregulars who ascertain which persons qualify to be invited into the organization. It is obvious, however, that before revealing themselves as BR members, the irregulars consult with their political management. Mirco and Mirca are two irregulars. They have carried out some actions consisting of the burning of automobiles. They carried out some activities together, I recall--a car burning near Via Gorizia at the corner of Via Biston, if I remember well. It is in that area. Regarding the actions of Tartaglione, I refer to what has already been stated. The wife--Mirca--is a recent recruit.

OTHER PERSONS

A member of another brigade, also of the presses of Mirafiori, is a certain "Franco" (*nom de guerre*). He has been a member for a long time; now he is a unionist, about 30 and married, with a baby girl or boy who is very young. This Franco has a brother who works in the railroads and who rented an apartment at Finale Ligure for column meetings. He rented it with money from the (BR) organization. He can be traced in the following way. [It is noted that Peci draws a sketch, which is attached to the present record and labeled with the number 3.] He states: from Via Plava, at the terminus of [autobus] 63 and starting in the same direction of the parked pullman as drawn by me, one takes the first road to the right, a road flanked on one side by hedges. Turning, as said, to the right on that street, on the left of the same street, the side of the hedges, there are some portals. The second or third or fourth of these portals gives access to the dwelling of Franco's brother. The person is identifiable by the address plate on which is written a double name, one of which is Cotugno. Now I do not know if that is his name or his wife's. However, it is certain that we are dealing with this person. The [incomprehensible word] in that family is Franco's brother. I do not recall his *nom de guerre*, that of the one who works for the railroads. The dwelling in Finale Ligure has been actually used by the organization and has been rented for six months. I have been there, but I do not remember the address. There have been column meetings there, and it is used for the August holidays. Micaletto, Vai, and Innocenzi were there. They were on their holidays together.

A certain Piero (*nom de guerre*), living in Via Buenos Aires and a friend of Trozzi, works with Franco. Piero works at the presses and constitutes, together with Franco, a brigade. This is the Piero of whom I spoke with regard to the Camaioni attack. I have furnished information for his complete identification to investigators. Trozzi and Cardinale have nothing to do with the BR. I know them either because I read about them in the papers or because Piero pointed them out as people in the area of autonomy who thought in a certain manner. I clarify that he did not tell me these things personally, since I have never met this Piero in person.

Francc, brother of the railroad worker, is the one about whom I spoke in the discussion of the attacks as Franco Cotugno, a name that I have always understood to be his, with the reservation of the clarification just now made [sic].

Also working in the presses is a certain Pino (and he is called "Beard" because he has a very thick beard). He lives in Corso Peschiera, or rather in Corso Ferracci almost at the corner of Corso Peschiera; he has survived many [police] searches, and he is a member of the logistic front. He built the machine for production of [license] plates that was confiscated when Innocenzi was arrested. I clarify that on that occasion (the arrest of Innocenzi) in the dwelling of Nichelino two machines of that kind were confiscated: an older rusty one and the one made by Pino. Pino also made pointed nails to stop the machine, and he prepared small spare parts for weapons. I also provided a thorough identification of him for the investigators. He did not participate in the attacks.

Also in the presses there is Leo, whose baptismal name must be Gianni. I have also furnished investigators information regarding him. He worked as an irregular at the brigade level; most recently he was a little doubtful. For a certain period he left the organization, and lately he has been moving closer back.

There is also at the presses a boy who subsequently left the organization; it is the one who participated in the attack against Ravaioli, as well as that against the headquarters of the PS (police) commissary of San Donato. He left the organization about a year ago. He still works at the presses. The head of the brigade--which, however, was not very homogeneous--in the body division of Mirafiori was Roberto Betassa. Members of this brigade are: Piripacchio (nickname), the one in jail who later went to live with the older lady. I have already spoken of him, a certain Virgilio or Virginio. I have provided information to the investigators [about him]. One of the most active elements is the fiancée of Di Cecco, Maria Carmela.

The cover name for Micaletto is Silvia Arancio; she is also a worker in the body division and, besides providing the cover name, she does brigade work in the factory, but on limited terms so as to keep her

cover and not risk police identification of Micaletto. Then there is "Lucia" (*nom de guerre*), the fiancée of Giuseppe Di Cecco; she worked not so much in the body division brigade as in the triple (that is, she worked together with Di Cecco). This girl lives in Via Nizza, Corso Dante, in those parts, where the number 34 tram passes. Lucia, Virginio, Di Cecco, Giuseppe, and Maria Carmela were part of the Arianna cooperative, established for the reinsertion of ex-prisoners with headquarters in Via Carrone.

Then there is the fiancée of Silvia Arancio, who is, however, now a member of the military. His *nom de guerre* is "Pasolo." He is stationed at Novara; he is short, very young. He probably lives in the area of the terminus of the [autobus or tram] number 3, opposite the Parella neighborhood.

Also in the body division and related to the brigade is Mario Contu--I do not know his *nom de guerre*; he does the flier work in his division. He entered the organization a short time ago and has not carried out any specific actions.

Passing to Rivalta, I list: Antonio Delfino, an irregular, who has participated in various actions. Also Volgarino worked at Rivalta and helped Delfino, besides providing the cover name for Vai. I am sure that Delfino and Volgarino knew each other. [At this point in the record, one page is missing.]

BIELLA'S ROLE IN TERRORISM

Mauro Curinga (*nom de guerre* "Antonio") and his wife, Maria Cristina (*nom de guerre*, "Chiara") rented a house by the sea for a couple of years so that the column and the BR front could meet there. They kept explosives and bombs in the garden of their home. They were arrested through my help. Mauro Curinga participated in the already-cited action against the car of the lawyer Squillario. Furthermore, as already stated, he was in Mestre when we recovered bombs and explosives from the Palestinians. Falcone and Pietro and his wife have hosted various militants, knowing them to be militants of this organization even if he didn't know them by name. Among others, they hosted Mattioli and me. Lately, they also hosted Jovine. In their home they took care of the

engraver, the mimeographing machine [some words missing]...of the Belgian FAL type with the appropriate ammunition. Furthermore, they had transformed an attic into a sound-proof room by using polystyrene. Their arrest was the result of my help. In fact, once we had possession of a photo-engraver which I mentioned before; we tested it by using a flier of CGIL-CISL-UIL [trade unions] of Biella relating to fiscal problems. Either Giuseppina or Mattioli told me this; I was not present, I clarify, when they made the test.

Sergio Corli, the printer, was arrested at the base as a result of information I provided to the investigators. His *nom de guerre* is "Danilo." Like others of Biella, he had fought in the BR for a long time--since the time of Mara, that is, Margherita Cagol. Corli also participated in the destruction of attorney Squillario's car. In his house, he had all the material that was confiscated as a result of my instructions. I specify that Sergio Corli's wife has nothing to do with organization and that she knew nothing about it.

OTHER MEMBERS

Gigio is the baptismal name and perhaps the actual diminutive of an herbalist who has two stores, one at Orcpa and one at Biella. His wife is called Maria Grazia. He has a Russian Jeep and a wolf dog. They have supported the organization by keeping Giuseppe Mattioli for a couple of months, after which [time] he lived with Coletta. I sometimes went to their home and have passed the night there--three or four times. For three or four months they kept a bin of munitions that they then gave to Liburno, or rather, restituted to the organization, which then entrusted it to Liburno. They knew that they were keeping material for persons at the head of the BR.

After the episode in Via Millio, one of the PL members who had participated in it and who had been wounded in the arm, turned to Gigio who found him a doctor in Milan willing not to report him. Gigio himself told me this. Before their holidays--about four months ago--he told me that after his vacation he--not his wife--would rent an apartment for the organization. I do not know whether he has returned from his vacation.

COOPERATION BETWEEN TERRORIST GROUPS

There is a certain Babut (last name), an old POTOP of Biella, who entered the organization. However, about a year ago he left because of personal dissension with other militants of Biella. His *nom de guerre* is "Federico." He founded the group called "Nucleus for Red Power." One of his actions was that of burning the car of another DC of Biella, the mayor Borri Brunetto. Between us and them--the organization Nuclei for Red Power--a political relationship of collaboration was created. In fact, he gave me two pistols that we were supposed to silence for him. I left them in Via Sansovino; then I was arrested. I do not believe that these weapons were recovered; they were a Beretta 70 7.65 caliber and a 3.35 caliber. Babut is a teacher in Biella by profession. To buy weapons, he and his group finance themselves by robbing churches. His group consists of a dozen militants.

OTHER TERRORISTS

Concerning Livio Scanzio, I refer to what is stated on page 20 of the present record. I clarify only that the *nom de guerre* of Scanzio is "Ettore."

Salvatore De Carlo's *nom de guerre* is "Gino." His wife's *nom de guerre* is "Carla;" I do not know her real name. They are cover names; he also participated in the Piccinelli and Palmieri actions. They worked at their home, as a brigade, in the triple. In fact, in their home files on the triple were found.

A BR WORKSHOP

"Andrea" (*nom de guerre*) lives in Turin, Corso Regina in the neighborhood that I have already indicated to the police investigators. He participated in actions of which I have spoken in the relevant part of the present record. He is about 35, with white and blond hair; he graduated in I don't know what field. He worked in the region's Michelin office. Then we had him quit work so he could build a small machine shop on the periphery of Turin along with a certain "Ugo" (*nom de guerre*), another member of the organization.

Ugo had an accident working in the shop, while he was handling the detonators. The workshop was completely paid for with the money of the organization, and it cost 30 million lire. At the moment of my arrest, they were beginning negotiations to sell the shop, since Ugo proved to behave in an inappropriate manner and showed little seriousness; he was frequently absent from work. When the shop was finally to be sold (I clarify that--the sale openly concerned the real property and not the machines), the BR was planning to establish another one to entrust solely to Andrea. I clarify that the workshop might only be rented, in which case the negotiations of which I spoke could concern only the termination of the lease and the finding of new premises. In the workshop they fixed weapons and silenced them; they made anything needed, including the building of machines for making plates.

Umberto Farioli, after his release from prison during the trial in preparation at Turin, was not utilized by the BR; and I do not even know whether he asked to be used. Anyway, we could not have used him, above all, because of his physical condition.

Adriana Garizio, after leaving prison, almost a year after her release, made contact with the organization and continued her militancy, working in the triple. Micaletto had contact with her; obviously he was cautious when he saw her, which was seldom, because she was already "contaminated," that is, she had already been submitted to a penal procedure. It seems to me that her *nom de guerre* was "Francesca." She did research in the library; in particular, she took care of the course for doctors in the prison sector. I deny that she had files at her house; perhaps only some political documents.

THE PRIMA LINEA DEFECTOR AND THE SPLIT-UP IN THE PL

There is the ex-militant of the PL, introduced to us by Garizio, whom we called the "Piellino," because he fought in the PL (Prima Linea). This introduction occurred rather recently--about a week before my arrest. Obviously, Garizio had first profoundly developed discussions with the Piellino. Since the contact was between Micaletto and Garizio, and since I did not have any reason to meet him (Garizio), Micaletto and I decided to make a contact between the "Piellino" (already so nicknamed by

us) and me. The appointment was fixed near the prison of Turin or rather near the Principe theater and with the device of the system of newspapers under the arm. That is to say, the two persons who were supposed to meet each other would recognize each other through the presence of designated newspapers under their arms.

We met each other and exchanged opinions, particularly about the difference between the PL and the BR. My concern was that of sounding out and evaluating the situation for political and security reasons. I received a positive impression of him, and it was my idea to let him enter the BR--something that I think would have already taken place had I not fallen. He was the fiance of one of the daughters of Garizio and a university student. In the PL he had participated in an episode involving a Civitate base and also in a robbery near Cuneo, committed with ex-members of the PL. I learned all this directly from him in the course of the conversation. He has a dairy farm in the area of Acqui Terme. [At this point the interrogation is suspended for a brief interval; at 14:45 it is reopened.]

Quite recently there has been a division in the Prima Linea. From the outset, the PL has settled its scores through internal contradictions. But after the Via Millio action, these contradictions were exhausted; thus, many militants began debating about the political line of the organization. They started with the problem of reprisals. (I term the episode of Via Millio as a reprisal following the deaths of Cageggi and Lazzaroni.) The national executive [committee] of the PL sought to heal the break that was emerging by launching the FIAT campaign that, in the beginning, was agreed upon by all the militants. So Ghiglieno and Praxi joined the PL. [At this point of the testimony, one page is missing.]

At the lower level (of the PL) there are the Patrols; theoretically, they could be composed of one militant, even of a 16-year old boy. But in Turin the Patrols are composed of nine groups. All Patrols have good numerical strength. Coordination among the Patrols is arranged through a structure called Patrol Coordination for Turin, composed of nine elements, one per Patrol, who meet together. The "Piellino" told me about the Patrols. Two members of the Patrol coordination make the liaison between that group and the Command of the

PL, which, in Turin's case, is the highest level. I do not know how the PL is structured on the national level and how the commands of various cities related to the national levels.

In the sketch that I made, the Firing Squads are missing; they are the Nuclei expressed in the most complete and direct sense of the term for the PL. For the Patrols the example I shall now provide will suffice. I refer to the "night of gun fire," in the course of which the stations of the Urban Police were attacked. In this circumstance, 46 revolvers were used--an enormous number for Turin. Those belonging to the PL, however, wanted to know from the individual Patrols all the means of escape, all the modalities of action; and they wanted, furthermore, to fix the schedule of actions themselves. It appears clear from this example that the Patrols enjoy a limited autonomy; however, they are not organically part of the PL. They are a reservoir linked to the organization that recruits (activates) it. All the Patrols, moreover, see themselves as figuring in the political plan of the PL.

Returning to the BR militants of Turin, I can mention someone I call the "ex-partisan." I have furnished information to the investigating judges that could lead to a complete identification of this person. I know him because he made some purchases for me; I had actually entrusted the task to Andrea. The ex-partisan bought some 12 caliber cartridges for trap shooting for the total sum of 30,000 lire. We used them after modifying them for the "shot gun" hidden at Mattioli's. I never knew the ex-partisan personally.

THE RED BRIGADES FILES

All the files that the BR gathered in the Turin area on the DC, the Triple, and political forces in general as well as on the factories, were entrusted to this ex-partisan. (We gave him copies of the originals.) The ex-partisan, according to Andrea, entrusted them to one of his friends to keep in custody. The ex-partisan, in addition, had a machine gun that he modified so that we could make precision shots. He called himself a collector of weapons. In fact, he has a cache of weapons and a license to bear arms. He is some kind of dentist; I mean, he has a store in this field of activities. He participates in the target

practice of Madonna di Campagna; many police officials also attend, and the ex-partisan reports (to the BR) whatever he can learn.

Regarding Chiavolin, I refer to what I already said on page 4 of the present statement [court deposition].

BR MEMBERS--MORE INFORMATION

Domenico Iovine entered the BR a year or a year and a half ago. He worked in the Lancia (factory); in the BR he was part of the logistic sector. Then he was laid off his factory job. When the police singled him out, he went underground. He became a "regular" about one month prior to my arrest. We assigned him to Biella while the waters quieted down. Since he became a regular, he has not had a precise role to play within the organization.

Ernesto Curinga and Domenico Curinga are relatives of Mauro Curinga of whom I have already spoken. Ernesto and Domenico never had anything to do with the BR.

What I know about the Milan column I have already stated in speaking of Moretti, Balzarani, Bondesan, Iacopini, Eleanori, Perotti, the son of Krause, the worker of Arese, and Morlacchi.

Regarding the Roman column, I refer to the things already explained in the course of the present interrogation, when the discussion touched on Claudio, the one who is organizing the column in Sardegna; Marcello, who is organizing the column in Naples; Rocco, alias Marco of Piazza Nicosia.

THE COLUMNS AT A GLANCE: MILAN, ROME, GENOA, THE VENETO

Regarding the column of the Veneto, I can say that its structure is somewhat special in that it is looser [than others]. I know that the BR there has a home at Mestre, one in Venice, and one in Padua. I do not know any more about it. There are four regulars there: Nadia Ponti (*nom de guerre* "Marta") and Guagliardo. Then there is a person from the Veneto, a regular recently released from jail. Finally, there is a fourth person about whom I know nothing.

Concerning the Genoa column, I refer to what I stated in the present testimony when discussing Roberto, head of the column; Valentino; Panciarelli; and that member of the DS of whom I spoke on

page 13 of the testimony. Also belonging to the Genoa column is a girl whose *nom de guerre* is "Nora." Maria Giovanna Massa, after the discovery of the base in Corso Lecce (in Turin), was sent permanently to Genoa. The Genoa column had, and still has, a home at Recco that has been used for meetings of the [missing word]. For some time, the home has been "frozen" because we noticed that the police had been there. At least it seemed that way to us. I have pointed out this house already to the investigating police, and I have also identified the Turin business consultant of Sardinian origin who has an office in Piazza Vittoria; this man provides a cover name for a Turin BR office. But recently we [of the Turin BR] have lent this office to the Genoa column so they could use it as a cover for their office. Micaletto told me this.

Regarding the dwelling at Recco, it is being rented to a worker.

Concerning the murder of Colonel Varisco, I know only that a "pump gun" was used but not the "pump gun" found in Turin. I do not know anything more.

OTHER ACTIONS: TUTTOBENE

I know nothing of the Tartaglione murder.

These crimes are of the Casalegno type for the Turin column in the sense that many times debate among all the BR members concerns general political themes that various columns later translate into specific actions. After we carried out the Casalegno action, Red Brigades not of the Turin area (excluding obviously the executive committee) found out about it in the newspapers. When Varisco and Tartaglione were "brought to justice," we in Turin learned through the newspapers.

I learned from Roberto of Genoa the following concerning the homicide of Colonel Tuttobene. The BR of Genoa wanted to strike a captain originally, but the project looked very difficult because of the irregularity of the schedule of the subject and because of the risk of involving his wife as well. (They wanted to attack him after Mass, which he always attended at the same hour.) One day the Genoa column decided to murder him after Mass, but then the BR got the impression that the captain had noticed something, because he held his hand in an inner pocket of his jacket, as if to draw a weapon. After that experience, they decided to undertake, instead, an action in the [police] barracks

neighborhood. In this neighborhood they found a colonel with a precise schedule; that is why they chose him. His name was Colonel Tuttobene.

KITZLER AND INTERNATIONAL TIES

Concerning relations with the combatting foreign organizations, the BR has had contacts with the PLO and, at the European level, with the RAF-June 2, ETA, IRA, and NAPAP. The contacts with the Germans were held in the first period by Azzolino and Coi's lady, Kitzler, who was the interpreter. Kitzler, however, did not fit in too well because politically she was not at the top. Then she was substituted, as soon as possible, by another person, a lady who, I believe, was arrested in Milan. In the meantime, Azzolini was replaced, for German relations, by Moretti.

At the beginning, these relations with the European groups seemed to signify who knows what, perhaps a kind of [incomprehensible word] international, but then they were reshaped to revolve around the German political situation, when it became clear that...[At this point in the testimony three pages are missing.]

INVOLVEMENT OF LAWYERS IN TERRORISM

Gossip is one thing; the facts are another. I cannot say that there are lawyers in the BR, because I don't know. Certainly it is possible. It is certain that there are lawyers in whom one can confide. During the trial summarily granted to Micaletto and to me, the attorney Arnaldi spoke with us for about an hour. Arnaldi told us to tell him where we had fallen [were arrested], and we made a map of the place. Arnaldi also asked us whether we had had an appointment, and we said that Micaletto and I were supposed to meet each other in Piazza Vittorio. Then we also spoke of our families and of possible conversations with relatives. It was the first time that I had met Arnaldi in my entire life. Arnaldi told us also that our photo, published in the newspapers, was from the month of November--I mean the photo presented as one taken during police espionage. I do not know how Arnaldi could have had this information; perhaps he knew because in the photo I did not have a mustache. I, however, had not seen this photo published by the newspapers yet. I also remember that the lawyer

Arnaldi gave me a business card on which he wrote his name and address of [words missing] the lawyer Aldo Perla of Turin. Arnaldi said that, if I had problems, I could bring them to that attorney.

It is noted that Peci exhibits to the investigating judge the business card with the handwritten note.

Arnaldi told us, furthermore, that Vai had said after her arrest that in Via Nizza in the vicinity of the Colombino shoe store, someone had taken a photograph, which, according to the police, depicted me with Vai. But Vai said the man was not [me] but Micaletto.

THE PL: WEAPONS, OTHER MEMBERS

Regarding the Kalashnikov, which, according to the newspapers, the PL possesses, I observe: We of the BR have one at Rome whose origin I do not know. Regarding the PL, I think that they are refurnished through certain sectors of the NAPAP, which is a very vast and diversified group. I did not know that the PL had hidden Chinese hand bombs, as I learned from the office. It could be that their origin, in this case, is the NAPAP.

Spontaneously, he adds: Regarding the PL, I remember that the "Piellino" told me that Salvatore La Spina fought in the PL and was called Ciccio. La Spina was one of the 61 laid off by FIAT. One day Salvatore La Spina found Mattacchini and offered to put him in contact with the PL. La Spina did this obviously without knowing that Mattacchini was a BR. He acted as though he intended to recruit Mattacchini to the PL. This incident was obviously reported to our column, and it surprised me. [At this point in the testimony there is one page missing.]

PHOTO IDENTIFICATIONS

At this point the investigating judge exhibits to Peci the first page of the dailies *La Stampa* and *Stampa Sera* of February 22, 1980; in these papers appears the photo of two persons, in a larger form in *Stampa Sera*. They are the photographs indicated as having been taken by the police in the course of their surveillance on Peci and Micaletto. It is actually of Micaletto and me. Observing the photo, I do not know how one could say it was taken in November. In this regard, all I can say is

that Micaletto, after the blitz of December 1979, decided to wear a red tie always. For a change. Since I see in this photo that either he is not wearing a tie or that his tie is of a light color; I can say that the picture was taken before the above-mentioned blitz. This is all I can say to corroborate the photo in time, since our poses do not trigger [memories of] any particular circumstance.

In the newspapers shown to me, I saw the photo of Filippo Mastropasqua. I do not recognize him or his face at all.

During the period of the Moro kidnapping two boxes containing tape recorders arrived at our column from Milan. They were well made, and they could be placed in any passageway, put into operation by a recorded message. They were made in such a way that they could not be deactivated; so the message was entirely reproduced. Both of them were placed in front of the FIAT [factory]. I do not know who actually did it. Later, when I went to Milan, I spoke with Fausto Iacopini. Since he worked in electronics, the topic came up. He told me that it was he who fixed up the two boxes sent to us at Turin. He also said that he was preparing other similar machines that were smaller and, therefore, more easily transportable.

Fiore never spoke to me about cars placed in front of the FIAT after the Coco murder to vindicate the deed through tape-recorded messages.

NARIA: ANOTHER BR MEMBER

I know nothing about Simone Rossella, wife of Naria. Peci spontaneously states: Regarding Naria, I recall that in renting the house where he was arrested, in the Val d'Aosta, he committed an enormous impropriety in the eyes of the BR. We all knew that he was supposed to stay in Turin, and instead he went on vacation without saying anything to anyone. Even worse, he went with Simone who, as everyone knew, had been tainted, that is, through her the police could easily find Naria. We told Naria expressly not to meet Simone because of the "compromising" now mentioned. In fact, Naria has never been a member of the BR; perhaps he was a political prisoner (I learn from the office), but he was never considered a member because of that impropriety already mentioned. I learned all these things from Fiore,

but they are also well-known. When someone falls, assessments are always made; this occurred, obviously, after the arrest of Naria.

Angelo Morlacchi, a printer in Milan, taking advantage of his job, has been able to furnish false documents to the organization for years. It is sufficient to give him in advance the material on which to print and a photographic negative of the document that one wishes to obtain. Evidently in the printing office there are efficient machines; in fact, he produces documents of excellent quality. Obviously, Morlacchi does this work when he is not being supervised, since he is not the owner of the printing office but an employee. He is the only BR member in that printing office.

USE OF NICKNAMES

Rocco Micaletto in the historical times of the "Dog" (Curcio) was nicknamed "Little Red Riding Hood." In the period of the Costa kidnapping, he was called "Papaleo" jokingly; he was also called "Slow Coach" (or Handle with Care). About a year ago he made an appointment with me at Rapallo, and when we met he told that he had arrived by means of the bus.

OTHER BR MEMBERS

Panciarelli worked at the Lancia [factory] of Chivasso within the Committee of Struggle. I mean obviously that he undertook political work there. Already he had approached Matakchini who was a very interesting element [member]. When Panciarelli had to go underground after the arrest of Micaletto, he contacted Mattacchini and recruited him; he gave him the position in the organization that Panciarelli himself previously had. The Committee of Struggle of the Lancia factory is a formation within the circle of Autonomy; it is to the left of the unionist organization.

Andrea (of the office managed with Ugo) lives in Corso Regina or in that neighborhood. He usually keeps two cars parked below his home-- one his, and the other an office car--a van (equipped for camping) and a little truck of the [printing] office, which were discovered (by police), therefore belonging to the BR organization. I have already spoken of Ugo with whom Andrea worked; I can add that, in the accident that I mentioned, he lost four fingers of one hand.

Some days prior to the attack of November 24, that is, the second attack against Lamarmora, it was Lucia, of whom I have already spoken who brought me at Piazza Bernini the Energa bomb used in the attack. Lucia also took part in the car burnings along with Giuseppe Di Cecco.

Virginio is not very tall; his physique is slightly robust. He owns a white 500 [Fiat]; he lived in Borgata Parella up to 7 or 8 months ago; then he moved to Borgata Paradiso.

Regarding Piero, I add that he lives in a dwelling in the name of his fiancée. I also know that they had a fight, and she left. I don't know whether they were later reconciled.

Concerning the ex-partisan, I recall that he affixed a telescope to the machine gun. He owns an old 1100 of a light color. He is in his fifties.

Regarding the "Piellino," he told me that in the course of the robbery occurring near Cuneo, as I already mentioned, he brought a woman with him. On that occasion a bullet-proof window must have been shattered.

It was Chiavolin who built the device then placed by Coletta in the vicinity of the Agnelli villa. I personally entrusted to Chiavolin, competent in technical matters, a scheme for building an apparatus that could be inserted into the television transmission. The building plans had arrived from Milan. It was Lausto Iacopini who attended to these things. He is skilled in radio-television work.

The three tape recorder devices prepared by Chiavolin were placed--one at the Lancia [factory] of Chivasso by the brigade of Mattucchini; one at the [auto] presses of Mirafiori by "Franco"; one at the body works of Mirafiori by Virginio.

The business consultant that we "lent" to the column of Genoa (as a cover name), I recall, was introduced to Micaletto by Coi.

I know nothing about the murder of Bachelet. I learned during the trial in which I was judged summarily together with Micaletto, from him, that at the moment of his arrest they found on him, among other things, copies of fliers vindicating the murder. I think that he received them from Executive Headquarters, because usually it is the executive that

distributes them in various areas, entrusting them to someone. Therefore, those fliers were supposed to have been distributed specifically to the components of the Turin column.

AN UNSUCCESSFUL EXPROPRIATION

Nadia Ponti was sent to the Veneto after the fall of Fiore. In fact, she had been in Turin several years; she had participated in the Cotugno action. She was present along with Acella and Fiore a little before their arrest; in fact, she narrowly escaped arrest herself. She is very small in stature and therefore is of a physical type that one picks out very easily. These factors convinced [us] to transfer her. Once relocated in the Veneto, she proposed to the Front an expropriation of the major Hospital of Venice. The proposal was not carried out because they realized the difficulty of the execution. They would have had to kill three persons to realize their goal.

Nora of Genoa was the girl friend of Roberto of Genoa. I know that she caused a setback in Genoa when she lost a purse containing a million [lire], not to mention the investigations for the Taviani action.

PRIMA LINEA AND EXPROPRIATION

Among other things the "Piellino" also told me of a robbery that the PL had executed six months prior to our conversation, occurring a week before my arrest. The robbery had been committed in a little town on the outskirts of Turin and, according to the "Piellino," one of the members of the nucleus was injured by a bullet that grazed his cheek, rather, his two cheeks. According to the "Piellino," the injured person was a 21-year-old member of the national executive of the PL.

The "Piellino" also told me of a "double" robbery committed by the PL in the same period, more or less. By "double" robbery, I mean one in which one robs simultaneously two places near each other, for example, a bank and a post office. The "Piellino" said that this robbery was done in an area where there was a market that separated the two banks, targets of the same robbery. There was machine gun fire to intimidate people.

According to the "Piellino," the PL is not able to make strategic expropriations, meaning large expropriations and, especially, kidnappings for the purpose of extortion. The "Piellino," in explaining to me his criticisms of the PL, which he had left, told me that they spent too much money. So they had to commit many robberies. He related to me that the head of the command of the PL in Turin had fixed up the home that he shared with a woman by spending 36 million [lire] for carpeting alone. (This is what the "Piellino" told me.)

On the occasion of the purchase of the weapons with false documents titled to Mortari, the weapon dealer of Via Cecchi, not being able to sell us the over 300 bullets requested, sold us 200 bullets using that day's date and the remaining (100) bullets using the next day's date. It was not my request; he decided to handle it that way.

Concerning the murder of Guido Rossa of Genoa, I do not know anything other than common knowledge about any militant of the organization.

Actually, Di Carlo's father has an attic in which column meetings are held.

MORO'S WILL AND TESTAMENT

In relation to the Moro kidnapping, some documents handwritten by Moro remained in the possession of the Turin column. Otherwise, they were completely devoid of political interest. For example, a kind of will and testament, drawn up by Moro during his imprisonment, bequeathed personal belongings to specified persons. The presence of this document in the area of Biella can be explained by the fact that there has always been a considerable logistic BR depository there. If that depository were to be discovered, the existence of the Moro papers would mark, without a doubt, a defeat for the sole reason that they are documents pertaining to the Moro kidnapping. On the other hand, the items did not hold any real interest for us. We decided, therefore, to burn such material, and that is what we did. There were only a few sheets of paper. They were handwritten by Moro during his imprisonment.

A LAMP TO EXAMINE MONEY

Regarding the kidnapping of Costa, I recall that all the columns were furnished with a lamp for checking the ransom money. Since the ransom money had been dipped in a special powder that we discovered, we had to wash each bill with a little sponge and then check it under the lamp to be sure there was no phosphorescent substance on it.

Concerning Pino "Barba," I also recall that his brother has an office near Pino's home. He himself told me and added that in this office they did some logistic work.

I am looking at a photocopy of a document that, I am told, was taken from Vai; it is part of a "statement on counterspying." Among the various initials of persons indicated in the document, I state that "MK" could be Mirko, that is, Tartaglione; that "Mark" must be Iovine; "MR di RIV" I think is Marino of Rivalta, that is Antonio Delfino.

Vai had informed us that she was being followed; we asked her for a report when we had her move from Corso Peschiera (where she lived with Volgarino) to Via Rossini of Nichelino. The document now exhibited to me is the one requested of Vai. "W" stands for "Walter" (*nom de guerre*), one of the two of the Brigade of Lancia of Chivasso. (The other is Claudio.)

"Mau," in the document, refers to me.

The first name of "Scanzio" (*nom de guerre*) is Ettore.

CONCLUSION

At this point, having learned from the office that the interrogation has ended, Patrizio Peci states: I call attention to the motives that led me to collaborate with the police and courts, and I remind you of the motives that brought about this testimony. The first reason is my criticism of the [political] line of the Red Brigades; my second is the hope that I can take up a new life again outside. My collaboration has been full and complete. I decided to collaborate after reading in the newspapers that the State would intervene on behalf of those who assisted the State in the struggle against terrorism.

SECOND INTERROGATION

Tribunal of Rome, Office of Investigation

On April 4, 1980, at 11:00 a.m. in Fossombrone, Center for Preventive Custody, Patrizio Peci has appeared before us, Investigating Judge Dr. Francesco Amato, assisted by the Investigating Counsellor Dr. Achille Gallucci, with the help of the below-named Judiciary Assistant Mrs. Svampa. Peci is interrogated about his name, address, etc. He states:

I am Patrizio Peci, born at Ripatrasone, July 9, 1953.

I have no defending attorney, and I revoke any previous [court] appointments.

Spontaneously, he declares: I state immediately that I am being interrogated, having understood, after a deep moral crisis and a meditated reflection on the happenings of these recent years, that it is my duty as a man and as a Communist to tell the judge about the deeds committed by me as a member of the BR and then to relate my knowledge of the BR and of the terrorist organization.

The investigating judge, calling attention to the above, prefacing that he has named the lawyer Antonio De Vita as defender of Peci and has notified him of the place of the questioning and of the already-completed interrogation, maintains the absolute urgency of proceeding to the interrogation (as stated in ordinance 3.4.80 for the Investigating Judges of the Tribunal of Rome) in view of the real danger of flight of members of terrorist organizations and of contamination of the evidence. He thus invokes article 304, which allows procedure to the interrogation itself, waiving other procedures, in accordance with the cited article 304.

Peci is advised that he has the option of not responding and that his statements could be used against him. He clearly waives his right not to respond and specifies the crimes he is accused of, as well as those he is suspected of having committed. He refers to the warrants for his arrest of December 12, 1978. Peci, interrogated, answers:

I intend to respond immediately. I refer to what has already been stated to the judges in Turin.

THE MORO ACTION

The "nucleus of assault" of Via Fani was composed of eight elements (members) plus a woman. That is to say, Faranda. She also participated, driving the car, in investigations of the area. Together with Morucci. Morucci in particular was upset because she did not drive well. Among the participants in the undertaking of Via Fani, I name: Raffaele Fiore, Morucci, Faranda, Gallinari, Azzolini, Bonisoli, Moretti. I do not know who the other two members were. Moretti did not fire but was on the spot giving the orders.

Fiore was armed with an M12 submachine gun. He fired two shots but then the weapon jammed.

In the car with license plate letters CD there was certainly Gallinari; the other must have been Morucci.

Nine cars and a motor van or some motor vans were used. The honorable Moro was carried first aboard a car and then in a van. Inside the van there was a chest or racing type box where the parliamentarian was placed to allow his transport from the van to the prison. The prison was located in a store outside Rome, but very near Rome, as I have already stated to the Turin judges.

All this news I learned from Fiore, primarily.

I did not participate in the operation, and I never went to Rome for reasons relating to BR activities. Fiore told me that Moro's behavior was courageous, even dignified. He was told that if he denounced the scandals of the regime, as for example the behind-the-scenes intrigue of the massacre of Piazza Fontana, he certainly would have been freed. The honorable Moro, while affirming that the majority of the DC exponents were "squalid," vindicated the popular [democratic] function of the DC. Regarding the massacre of Piazza Fontana, he denied any direct co-responsibility of the exponents of the DC. In the course of the interrogations, which were conducted exclusively by Moretti, the parliamentarian was asked what he knew of various secrets of State. The honorable Moro answered in general terms without, however, giving exhaustive responses.

In the operation of Via Fani, immediately after the accident, the two occupants of the car licensed CD got out and fired at two of the escorts in the car of the honorable Moro. Fiore was hidden, together with others, behind the hedges; therefore, immediately after the impact, together with the others of the nucleus, he made his way toward the car of the honorable Moro after firing two shots in the direction of the escort car. It was actually Fiore who carried the honorable Moro away from the car. The undertaking succeeded perfectly from a military standpoint, but one of the participants was injured. I cannot tell which one was hurt, but it was not a serious injury, just a light one.

The "executive" [board] of the BR is composed of four or five elements (members), but there is no fixed rule. In the period of the Moro undertaking, the executive was composed of Moretti, Bonisoli, Azzolini, and Micaletto.

The afternoon of March 16, 1978, Fiore reached Turin by train; we met, and he told me what he had done.

I do not know in what neighborhood or in what locale Moro was transferred from the car to the van.

When the police discovered the print shop of Triaca, we (in the BR) commented upon how Moretti had narrowly escaped being arrested.

In the period of the murder of Via Fani, I was not a member of the Strategic Management, which I entered after the arrest of Fiore. The undertaking of Via Fani was decided upon by the Strategic Management. The executive is part of the the Strategic Management. During the Moro kidnapping, the latter was permanently in session.

BR CONTACTS WITH PL

I learned that in the first months of 1977 Micaletto, on behalf of the BR, contacted two exponents of Prima Linea whose names I do not know. In 1979 there were five or six contacts (meetings) always between Micaletto and exponents of the PL. In particular, in Rome there was a BR and PL meeting at the national level. I am not able to give the names of the persons who met in Rome. We thought Negri was in direct contact with the PL; we thought that he gave the PL the political line

to follow. Our evaluation stemmed from, at least in my case, the analysis of the writings of Negri and of the actions undertaken by the PL and only by them. When I used the term "we," I refer to myself and to other members of the Turin BR.

MORETTI'S ROLE IN THE MORO ACTION

With reference to the distribution of the communiques of the BR during the Moro kidnapping, I state that these were brought to Turin by Rocco Micaletto. I do not know who brought the communiques to Genoa and to Milan. Moretti drafted the fliers. The "resolutions" of the Strategic Management were elaborated in prison and then were subjected to discussion and to the approval of the various columns. The resolution of 1978 must have been prepared in the prison of Asinara.

The Roman column of the BR was founded by Moretti, Bonisoli, and Brioschi, now in prison. Moretti continued to manage the Roman column up to the Moro case, while the other two returned to Milan. In the previous period there was, on the part of Curcio and Franceschini, an attempt to establish a BR column in Rome. I learned that there an attempt was made to unite the NAP and the BR. It was, especially, Moretti who established the contacts, using Abatangelo, primarily, as interlocutor. In Rome, one action was completed by NAP and BR elements: It was the "expropriation" of some cars in a garage. In Milan an undertaking was carried out: the "search" of an institute that studied prisons. This was in 1976. Actually, it was in the period immediately after the actions against the [police] barracks executed by Nappists and brigadist elements and coordinated by both of them.

PECI'S WEAPON

Concerning the Beretta 92 pistol found in my possession at the time of my arrest (which, I was told, was used in a robbery committed in Rome to injure a junior level police officer), I can only say that the pistol was given to me by Micaletto to whom I had previously given, at his request, a pistol of the same make. The pistol that Micaletto gave me probably had been given to him by Claudio of Rome, a person that I have already identified in a photograph, as I already stated to the Turin judges.

MORE INTERNATIONAL LINKS

Regarding the relations between the BR and the RAF, Fiore told me that Moretti had contacts with the German exponent who was killed in a Chinese restaurant in Germany. The German came to Italy and met with Moretti.

I know nothing about Franco Pianna, Enrico Bianco, Oriana Marchionni, and Amadori Marchionni arrested in France. I do not know who Caloria is.

CLARIFICATIONS ABOUT THE "BIG LEADERS"

Regarding page 27 of the interrogation assembled by the judges of Turin, when I speak of "groups," I mean "clandestine structures." When on the same page it is written, "He also went to see the big leaders," I am referring to the members of the BR of Rome who went to Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace. Certainly Gallinari was included among such persons. Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace assured us both that they would not help either Morucci or Faranda in this matter and that they had not helped them [in the past]. They added that they were opposed to splits within the BR which, for them, was the only organization worth saving.

THE FLORIST AND THE MORO OPERATION

Fiore told me that the tires of the motor van of the florist of Via Fani had been lacerated the evening before the action. He added that if the florist had succeeded in procuring another van, or in finding other tires, the BR would have burned the vehicle, postponing the operation to the following day. All this to keep the florist out of the picture.

The BR began to discuss the execution of an undertaking as clamorous as that of the Moro kidnapping about six months before the action. The preparation required three months, more or less.

Gallinari moved to Rome in April of 1977. I do not know if he was head of the safe house on Via Gradoli.

NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN THE RED BRIGADES

The "regular" elements of the BR number about 50 at the most. There are about 500 BR members--counting regulars and irregulars--in all of Italy. In Turin, counting regulars and irregulars, there were 50 more or less.

The judges assigned to the ministerial offices that supervise imprisonment are among the primary targets. I refer to any judge who works in these offices. I state that if the actions to be executed are of a certain level--as, for example, homicides--it is always the "executive" that must approve the plan and give the go-ahead for its execution.

Belonging to the Strategic Management in the period of the Moro kidnapping (the Management gave the go-ahead in strategic terms to that operation), besides the members of the executive that I already mentioned, were Fiore, Morucci, perhaps Faranda, and presumably some members of the new Management to which I was elected (to replace those who had been arrested and were thus excluded). I learned that, before the undertaking of Via Fani, the BR conducted some military training with firearms (pistols and machine guns) on the Lazio coast near Ostia or somewhere near there. This training occurred approximately a month before the crime.

Morucci's *nom de guerre* was "Matteo."

MORE ON MORO CASE

I have been able to see some drawings (cartoons) published in "preprint" concerning the massacre of Via Fani and the kidnapping of the honorable Moro. I have found a correspondence between the drawings and the [descriptions of] witnesses. Probably it was Morucci who furnished the information received by "preprint."

[The interrogation is suspended, since it is 5:45 p.m. It will be taken up again tomorrow at 9:00 o'clock.]

THIRD INTERROGATION

On April 9, 1980, at 12 in the District Tribunal of Pescara, Patrizio Peci has appeared before us, the Investigating Judge Dr. Francesco Amato, assisted by the below-named clerk (Mrs. Bianca Svampa, typist-Judiciary Assistant), in the presence of the Substituting Public Prosecutor, Dr. Giorgio Ciampani. Peci's name and address, etc., have already been taken. He is represented by the public defender, Antonio De Vita.

Peci, interrogated, states:

I cannot indicate how many persons, other than those who constitute the "nucleus of assault," were employed in the Moro affair. When Moro was carried from the prison to the car, he said good-bye to his guards, telling them to give his greetings to the "other one," that is, to the one who had questioned him and who was not present. Fiore told me this.

Moro wrote some letters in which he stated his last wishes, consisting, for example, of the bequeathal of this or that object to some family members. For example, he had written that his pen or something similar was supposed to be given or, at least, left to his granddaughter, I think Tittina, or something similar. Fiore took care of the problem; he told me about the contents of the letters, which he then destroyed.

I am not able to say whether the store was connected to the apartment.

I cannot say where other BR bases in Rome, other than that of Via Gradoli, are. Moreover, I did not know of the existence of the base of Via Gradoli; I learned of its existence after its discovery.

Mario Borghi was Moretti. The fact was common knowledge within the organization.

I have not spoken over the telephone with either Moretti or Morucci.

Concerning the components of the Logistic Front and the Front of the Masses (in the period in which I entered the above-mentioned Logistic Front), I refer to the interrogation of the Turin judge. In the period of the Moro kidnapping, members of the Logistic Front

included: Moretti, Fiore, Morucci, Azzolini, and Roberto. Members of the Front of the Masses in the Moro period were: Piancone, Micaletto, Bonisoli, Valentino, Nicolotti, Gallinari. It could be that Faranda also was a member or Balzarani, but I am not sure.

Concerning the initiative to request a high DC exponent to intervene in relation to the Moro action, this proposal was certainly discussed by the Executive Board who were in charge of the undertaking. Whatever the [kind of] intervention [taken], it certainly would have effected favorable results in the Moro affair--at least the postponement of the execution and the basis for developing "negotiations." Such intervention, in fact, would have been considered political acknowledgment of the BR. The International Charity, although it intervened, could not provide this formal acknowledgment. At the most, I can say that the moment in which the execution of Moro was decided upon was when the communique with the phrase "executing the sentence" was composed and distributed. That communique dates from the period following the polls taken in the individual columns to decide the fate of the parliamentarian.

To the question of why two or three days elapsed between the distribution of the communique and the execution, I respond that this [delay] was probably occasioned by the fact that they [the BR] hoped against hope that there might be some new action of a political nature that could impede, I mean, stay the execution.

THE ROMAN COLUMN

The Roman column was and is numerically the strongest. I am not able to discuss the number and the composition of the individual brigades of the Roman column. However, I know that there are brigades in Rome: in the railroads, in the hospitals, in the university, in the SIP (telephone company).

I am not able to indicate what role Mara Nanni played in the Roman column or to say whether or not there was a BR base in the Mura Latine (district).

Transfer of weapons and exchange of arms among various columns was determined by individual technical needs. If the technical need involved a single undertaking, the transfer of arms from one column to another was effected through the executive committee. Otherwise, in relation to the need for arms of the individual columns, the logistic front, at the request of various columns, handled the transfer [of arms].

MIRCROFILM ARCHIVES

There does not exist within the organization either a national or foreign base for the conservation of documents of the BR. There is, however, a base where a file of microfilm copies of the leaflets is kept. That base is located in the Veneto, but I do not know where. I am not able to say who does the microfilming: He is, however, a regular clandestine member.

BOOKKEEPING

The bookkeeping for the individual columns is done every three months (on a "trimester" basis). There is no fixed rule regarding the person who does the bookkeeping. For example, in Turin, first I, then Innocenzi, was responsible. It was not, however, a fixed duty. The three-month balance was examined by the Executive Board, which approved it or, at least, made observations about it. Then the Executive Board made a report of the bookkeeping for the Strategic Management.

SALARIES

Salaries were paid to the regulars. Economic aid was also paid to those who had reduced work activities. Comrades with family problems received subsidies at the outset of their underground career.

FIXING MEETINGS

Concerning the meetings of the management of the column and of the D.S. (Strategic Direction or Management), both were set in the following manner: In the course of a meeting of the column management or of the front, the hour and the place of the following meeting were

established. There was a certain regularity of recurrence: for the column management, on the average, every ten days; for the front, every 15-20 days; for meetings of the D.S., the Executive Board notified the members (who were to attend) through personal contacts.

KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER BASES

In theory, the compartmentalization was supposed to be absolute. For example, I, as head of the column, was supposed to know about only two bases, that is to say, about the one where I lived and about another where there was another exponent. In practice, however, this was not always the case--we knew about more bases than that.

From the time I became a "regular" BR member, I never went to Rome for reasons relating to the organization. When, however, I was an irregular--I refer to 1976--I went to Rome both alone and with Guazzaroni. I met with Bonisoli, sometimes alone and sometimes with Guazzaroni. The meetings, however, did not occur in apartments (or in homes) but in a bar or in a restaurant. In that period at Rome, the head of the column was Moretti, who founded the Roman column from scratch.

When I lived in the Marches and was still an irregular, the Committee of the BR of the Marches had contacts with the Milan column, but rather sporadic ones. When I left the Marches and became a regular, that Committee came in contact with the Roman column which, in fact, became their director.

OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS

I am not able to say anything regarding the UCC and the activities of that organization in Rome. In particular, I know nothing about the transfer into the BR of some UCC members.

The "Combatting Communist Formations" (FCC) often had internal splits that caused the transfer of some members into the BR and of other members into the PL.

Regarding Valentino and Biondi, after the murder of Patrica, they contacted us for help. Afterwards they made a "political self-criticism," acknowledging that the thinking of the BR was correct, and they were accepted by the organization.

I am not able to say anything about the probable BR financing of the *Counter-Information* magazine.

I know nothing about the "Revolutionary Action" group or about Gianfranco Faina.

I cannot speak of Ivano and Giancarlo Devoli.

The printing office of Triaca was installed with the money from the BR organization. This was common knowledge for us in the BR.

At this point the interrogation is suspended for a brief period at 1:15.

The interrogation is recommenced at 2:10 (Investigating Judge Dr. F. Amato, Public Prosecutor Dr. Ciampani, and the clerk signing below, Judiciary Assistant Svampa).

Patrizio Peci, interrogated, declares:

I know nothing about the purchase by the BR of an apartment in Via Palombini.

Regarding the groups of which I spoke in the preceding statements (see pages 27 and 7 respectively of interrogations at Turin and Rome), I refer to military structures that functioned in Campania and in Lazio. In particular, I recall that they spoke to me, along with another, of the Cassino group. I am not able, however, to name persons of such groups who contacted the BR.

MORE ON THE GREAT LEADERS

Regarding the "great leaders," Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace, I state that I shall tell what I know. As we were able to deduce from the escape before the later capture of Morucci and Faranda, there was an attempt by the "great leaders," already in the period preceding the Moro kidnapping, to influence the activity of the BR, an attempt supported by Morucci. At first, Morucci maintained that more autonomy ought to be given to the brigades. Afterwards, with regard to relations of the BR with the movement, Morucci supported the theory, as that I have already mentioned in the preceding interrogation, that the BR was being loosened [from] within the movement [the overall proletariat struggle]. In practical terms, this did not spell the extinction of the BR but [dictated] the need for BR members to organize and manage groups

in the movement in a series of illegal actions, at first unsophisticated but more widespread than usual. Morucci would have them begin with individual local situations (the neighborhood, factories, etc.) This was in substance the thesis proposed by Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace, according to our information. I cannot say anything about Negri.

MORE ON THE NEWSPAPER PROPOSAL

The contacts of Morucci and Faranda with the "great leaders" took place in a period of time spanning their flight [from the BR] and April 7, 1979. Increasingly in that period of time, we discussed the newspaper that was supposed to create a point of reference for the movement and to serve all the clandestine organizations and the "area of autonomy." The newspaper proposal had been advanced by Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace. It was also the topic of debate within the BR organization, although in negative terms, because of the failure of the *Counter-Information* initiative.

S.V. tells me that a document entitled "Memorandum of the Discussion of the Newspaper" has been placed in evidence among the records in the case. In that document the plan to form a newspaper "inside the movement," based on an accord among various forces in the areas of autonomy, is discussed. Conceptually, my discussion regarding the newspaper plan could be the same discussion as the one mentioned in the just-cited document.

I am looking rather quickly at the contents of a typewritten [document] beginning with the sentence, "The counterrevolution has erected the walls in its own encirclement, building the fortress of its own future." The document concerns the concept of "red power"--actually the organisms of the masses with particular reference to the prison experience. Judged by its thematics, it appears to be a BR document.

Concerning the newspaper initiative, while Negri wished the Via dei Volsci group to participate, they did not want Negri. The episode caused us in the BR to laugh because the whole thing was a matter of abstract disputes among petty bourgeois intellectuals.

MORE NAMES

The "Resolution of the Strategic Direction '78" was published by the printing office of Triaca; in addition, it was prepared by the printing office of Milan discovered by the police.

I am not able to say anything relevant about the missiles already in the possession of Pifano and others.

I know nothing about who compiled the Bachelet flier.

I am not able to say anything about the "first shots of the guerrilla" and Pirri Ardizzone, Maria Piera, Caminiti Lanfranco, Leoni Andrea.

I cannot say anything about Ceriani Sebregondi, Stefano, and Paolo. Regarding the "Red Help," it is not an outgrowth of the BR.

Regarding the groups of the so-called M.R.P.O., I refer to what I already stated in the preceding interrogation. Some of those groups were not coordinated in any way with the BR.

I cannot say anything about Pancino Dalmaviva, Gloria Pescarolo, Elda Aurora, Rolando and Oreste Strano, Roberto Serafini, Roberto Ferrari.

I know nothing about the possible presence of BR members at the Autonomy conference at Bologna in 1977. I know nothing about the composition of the nucleus that assaulted the Padua Italian Socialist Party (MSI) and killed two MSI members.

I know nothing about the dwellings of the Brescians in Rome.

I have used a gun license registered to Vincenzo Mortari, a resident of Chivasso, to purchase various weapons at some armories in Turin. I refer to what I said previously.

THE MORO CASE: THREE TELEPHONE RECORDINGS

At this point Peci is asked to listen to the following tapes on a tape recorder, brand UHER 4000 Report IC:

I. The telephone call made to the Tritto family, to whom the speaker communicates that the body of the honorable Moro was to be found inside a Renault in Via Caetani;

II. The telephone call in which the speaker communicates to Don Mennini that he would call him again and then informs him about a letter placed in a wastebasket at the Clodia ring-road, to be taken and given to Mrs. Moro;

III. The telephone call made April 30, 1978, in which the caller spells out to Mrs. Moro the need for Zaccagnini to intervene and clarify [the Christian Democrat stand].

Peci states: I do not recognize the voices of telephone calls I and II. The voice of number III, in which the caller asks Mrs. Moro for a clarifying intervention of Zaccagnini, is that of Moretti. I am sure of it. I note that the characteristics of speech (cadence, combative force, nervous mannerisms) are those of Moretti.

As I have already said, I have never seen Morucci, and I have never talked with him even by telephone.

I have never talked by telephone with Moretti, but, as I have already said in the preceding testimony, I have spoken many times with him.

[The interrogation is recessed and will resume tomorrow at 9:00. Testimony is closed at 6:45 p.m.]

On April, 10, 1980, at 9:00 a.m. in the District Office of Pescara, Patrizio Peci has appeared before the Investigating Judge Dr. Ferdinando Imposimato, assisted by the below-named clerk (Mrs. Bianca Svampa, Typist-Judiciary Assistant), in the presence of the Public Prosecutor, Dr. Giorgio Ciampani.

Patrizio Peci has already given his name, address, etc.; he is [officially] represented by the public defender, attorney Antonio De Vita, regularly notified but not present.

Peci, interrogated and notified again that he has the right not to respond, states that he intends to respond.]

DOCUMENTS, LEAFLETS FOR IDENTIFICATION

I am looking at the typewritten document entitled, "On the Organization, Resolution of the Strategic Management no. 2 (provisory document)." I cannot say who worked on the document.

I am looking at a pamphlet of the BR no. 4, November 1977. It is the document that was prepared by the front of the masses for distribution within and outside of the movement.

I am looking at the pamphlet of the BR no. 5, October 1976. This, too, is a document originating from the front of the masses, whose formulation was owed to the notable contributions of Angela Vai, who was one of the components of the Turin column of the BR. Also Gallinari, who was a member of the front of the masses, made a contribution to the draft of the document in question.

I am looking at the document, "Red Brigades, no. 6, March 1979, Spring Campaign." This document was prepared by the front of the masses. The heads of the Milan column of the BR, that is, Azzolini and Bonisoli, furnished a special contribution. However, all contributed to the drafting of this document by furnishing a positive political assessment of the Moro operation and of the effects that originated from the action.

I have already spoken of the Costa kidnapping. This action was organized by Moretti. Those who actually participated in the kidnapping were Piancone, Moretti, Azzolini, and Roberto, alias Riccardo Dura. Obviously the decision to carry out the kidnapping must originate from the two fronts. The members of the Executive Board managed the operation. In that period, members of the executive were Micaletto, Bonisoli, Azzolini, and Moretti. Morucci might have participated in the operation. Perhaps he is the one who fractured his foot a few days before the kidnapping.

A part of the ransom was used to finance the Moro operation. The decision to make payment of the ransom occur in Rome grew from concern that the police had found the matrix of the BR operation. It was then necessary to set up negotiations in a strategically strong location from the point of view of the BR organization. At Rome in that period there already existed an excellent organizational structure.

The lady who participated in the collection of the ransom was probably Maria Carla Brioschi who, in that period, was a regular in Rome.

I do not believe that Faranda participated in the Costa kidnapping.

OTHER ACTIONS: ROSSI ACTION

The Peschiera kidnapping or, rather, the attack on Peschiera was executed by the Genoa column of the BR. The action was directed by Micaletto. In the newspaper I learned of the news that he had been recognized because he did not wear a disguise. When Micaletto came to Turin, he was criticized by me and by others for his superficial way of acting.

I know nothing about the people who participated in the Palma or the Tartaglione assassinations, the attack on Traversi, the attack on Publio Fiori, the attack on Girolamo Mechelli, the attack on Remo Cacciafesta, the attack on Emilio Rossi. With reference to the Rossi action, I can say that, at first, they decided to kill him. Then, assessing the entire situation, they decided to injure him. The Skorpion, if I recall, was used in the action; perhaps 13 shots were fired.

I do not know with whom Moretti made contact before establishing the Roman column of the BR. I know that some people from Rome came to Milan to make contacts with the BR for the purpose of building the Roman column.

The Skorpion was brought into the organization by Morucci. The weapon was used in various operations.

The proposal to kill Palma and Tartaglione was formulated certainly by the Roman column of the BR. The same proposal was brought to the front of the masses and to the logistic front, which approved it, as in all other actions of that kind.

ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS

The logistic front took care of the purchase of weapons for the organization. In 1976 Moretti and Morucci were members of the logistic front. I do not know the backgrounds of the so-called Rossi, Augusto, or of Pietro Tomba who, as S.V. says, made enormous acquisitions of arms and munitions in various armories in Rome and in other Italian cities. I recall that one day in 1976 or 1977 Micaletto told Piancone that he

would have to go to a [certain] place to meet a companion who would give him a suitcase of weapons in Turin. From this I understood that the weapons were bought with false documents in Turin. I think that the purchase was made by Moretti and Morucci; it was their duty in the organization. Reflecting again, I recall that the above-mentioned episode occurred in 1977.

ARNESANO ACTION: A NAZI OPERATION

The murder of the agent of the PS, Arnesano, was certainly not carried out by the BR. I recall that we spoke within the Turin column about this action, and it was believed that the murder was the work of Nazis.

THE MORO CASE: ITS PLANNING

The communiques of the BR distributed during the Moro kidnapping and appearing in the press were printed by means of an IBM typewriter, always using the same rotating head. These were written by the Executive Board at a base probably near Florence. Some samples of communiques were delivered to representatives of other columns who took care of duplicating them after having them retyped on their own typewriters. It was understood that the communiques were supposed to be distributed in various cities of Italy at the same predetermined hour.

The Moro operation was preceded by an attentive investigation, that is, by an examination of all the habitual routes of the parliamentarian, for the purpose of choosing the one considered most suitable from the "military" point of view. Fiore told me that Moro was observed even while in church where he went in the morning after he left the house. While Moro was in church, a companion of the organization succeeded in checking the car in which Moro traveled, noting that the glass was not bullet-proof.

With reference to the discovery on different days in Via Licinio Calvo of three cars used in the Moro kidnapping, I recall that Fiore told me that they were left in that street at the same time and that the police did not single them out immediately. I remember, in particular, that Fiore told me, after the [police] discovery of the first car, "Now they will find the others there." I recall also that Fiore told me after the

police found the three cars in Via Licinio Calvo, that two other abandoned cars, not yet discovered, were located in the same neighborhood. He did not tell me what kind of cars they were.

In the operation of Via Fani, the participants in the action disguised their identities; they used wigs, mustaches, false beards. This is a rule always observed for BR undertakings. I note that a witness described one of the participants in the Moro kidnapping as having a large nose, a stout build, fleshy lips, big ears, red hair and a mustache. The description, I am able to say, corresponds to a certain approximation of the physical characteristics of Fiore (except, for reasons mentioned above: the color of the hair and of the mustache). Fiore, in fact, has a very pronounced nose and, in fact, he is jokingly called "big nose" or "pluto." Besides, he is of robust physique, and he has fleshy lips.

I note that SV informs me of the fact that witnesses observed in Via Fani and along the route taken by the Red Brigadists immediately after the ambush three cars (later found in Via Licinio Calvo) in which ten brigadists altogether traveled: the command and the honorable Moro.

Also spotted in Via Fani was a motor bike with two armed persons aboard who left by way of Via Stresa immediately after the kidnapping. Such a reconstruction does not conflict with what I have said about the number of persons who composed the assault group. It is clear, in fact, that besides these, several other comrades with various functions were employed in the Moro operation. For example, there were comrades with support functions, probably, or with other tasks.

The telephone calls in which members of the press were informed of the presence of communiques in various places during the Moro kidnapping were made in Turin chiefly by Fiore or by Micaletto. I do not think I made any calls of this nature.

Fiore told me that immediately after the ambush of Via Fani, the machine gun of the escort was taken. Fiore told me that it was a rusty weapon, almost unusable. I do not know where that weapon is now.

We began to discuss in the various columns the opportunity of carrying out a large operation injuring an important exponent of the DC. We discussed it in general terms, six months before the Moro operation, more or less. At the beginning, no one mentioned the name of Moro. I

am not able to say when they decided on Moro. In that period I was not a member of the front, and I did not influence the choice in the least. I knew that there was a large operation that was supposed to be carried out toward the middle of March, but I did not know that it was to be [against] the honorable Moro. Only after the newspapers published the news--I recall that I learned it from the *Stampa Sera*--I knew that it involved the honorable Moro.

The Roman column has in its possession innumerable weapons: certainly a Belgian Fali machine gun, five or six Sterling machine guns, a Soviet A.M. assault gun, and pistols of various types, among which are a Beretta 81 and a Browning H.P. 9 calibers long, with a two-row loader. I know all this, because I was part of the logistic front that was in charge of weapons, among other things.

INFILTRATION: ATTRACTING MEMBERS

I am not able to say anything about the "basist" possibly involved in the recent robbery injuring the Minister of Transportation.

Question: In a document of the BR it states that these [potential recruits] "are developed" through internal lines in the area of autonomy. Would you specify how this is done in concrete terms?

Response: The BR planted some of their elements in the collectives or in assemblies. These elements did not qualify as brigadists, and they worked mostly to identify the most active comrades in the hope of their eventual "recruitment." They would also give a political address, if the situation permitted, but always a toned-down one in the sense that suspicion of their membership in the BR was not aroused. In such recruiting, one could differentiate the PL, since that organization planted in some collectives its members who did not [try to] hide their membership or, at least, did nothing to hide it. And they gave these collectives the political line of their organization. The "Barabba" Collective Circle of Turin was influenced in such a manner by the PL through the "patrols." However, this type of work carried out by the PL lasted until about a year ago, when it was then judged a political error. The subsequent PL changes resulted in a procedure analogous to that of the BR, and that is, one of moving along internal lines.

The presence of photocopies of stolen documents in several bases is explained by the organization's need for many copies of these papers, used for falsifications, in many places. For example, if someone wants a false license, he uses the true stolen license as the model and its [xeroxed] copy in a manner so as to avoid errors that could lead to discovery of its inauthenticity.

BR-PL TIES "EXAGGERATED"

Immediately after the arrest of Franco Piperno in Paris, Micaletto told me that Piperno had asked the organization, through channels that Micaletto did not specify, for a meeting with the exponents of the BR in Paris to clarify his and their positions following his arrest (and that of others) on April 7. The organization did not honor the request.

With reference to the fact that one of the participants in the Costa kidnapping reported a fractured foot, I state that I learned the news from Piancone who said that the accident happened to a Roman. I thought then that it must have been Morucci. Nothing excludes Moretti or any other Roman. It was an accident occurring during the descent of some steps.

Testimony closed at 12:00.

CIANFANELLI DEPOSITION

JUNE 2, 1981, 6 P.M.

I decided to dissociate from the organizations in which I fought, both because I became aware of the harm done to my family and to the innocent people that were targeted and because I fully realized the failure of any program of armed struggle. I intend to help the authorities and to that end, I will briefly expound on my political "journey." I completed my first experiences in the political field in the student movement of 1968. I attended Cavour High School from which I graduated in 1970. Then I enrolled in the engineering department in which I studied for a certain number of years, up to the third year of the program. Next I enrolled in physics, where I finished my courses without receiving my degree.

Last year I left this department and petitioned the faculty council for a transfer to the natural sciences. At Cavour I participated in the meetings of the "base committee." In that period--between 1968 and 1970--the base committees of the various schools were coordinated by bodies without a strict organizational structure and functioned only at demonstrations, assemblies for schools, and collectives, which had ties with the headmaster and which organized the demonstrations. I kept ties with the Cavour committee even after leaving my high school studies.

After the shrinkage (in membership) following the "hot autumn," various groups, which are called extraparlimentary, were formed: "Lotta Continua" (Continuous Struggle), "il Manifesto" (the Manifesto), "Potere Operaio" (Workers' Power) and "i Nuclei Comunisti Rivoluzionari" (the Revolutionary Communist Nuclei), which had their base principally in the schools of Rome--downtown, for example, at Cavour, Albertelli, Visconti, and others of the area.

The Nuclei lasted about from 1970 to 1972. They had headquarters in the neighborhood of S. Lorenzo, in Via dei Piceni, where, I recall, a police search occurred in 1972. The Nuclei did not have a stable structure. In recent times, besides the headquarters of S. Lorenzo, other headquarters were also opened; one near the railroad station, I

think in Via Principe Amedeo or one in Napoleone III, and another in the area of Tor Sapienza. There was a system of taxation for the expenses; I recall how I, as a student, gave three thousand lire per month. Those who worked contributed larger sums in proportion to their incomes. We held meetings, besides those in our headquarters, also near the Valdese Church in Via Pietro Cossa, in the PCI headquarters of Campo Marzio, in the section of PSIUP in Via Zanardelli. We did not have identification cards; we could not count with precision for that reason. However, the "die-hards" numbered from 50 to 70. With the sympathizers, who came on particular occasions, they equalled or surpassed 100.

The exponent of greatest prominence was Franco Russo. Others of note were Paolo Flores and his brother Marcello, Piero Bernotti, Sergio Petruccioli, Mirella Grieco and her husband. Regarding his ideology, many defined him as a "Trotsky-ite" because Russo had been expelled, or was alienated, from the I.C.L. for being a Trotsky-ite and later had adhered to the international quarter.

The organization had not posed the question of armed struggle. All of our activity was legal. I maintain that there were no clandestine structures. We distributed leaflets in front of schools and factories (at Tiburtino, at Pirelli, in the mines of Tivoli). The leaflets were signed by the Revolutionary Communist Nuclei. We have taken part in almost all the processions and public demonstrations of the unions. The little hand posters distributed in front of the schools about relevant problems were signed by individual nuclei.

I was involved principally with Cavour. I compiled and mimeographed leaflets. I used a mimeograph machine that was located in Via dei Piceni. When it was not working, I went to other organizations. I recall that the mimeograph machine of the PDUP headquarters in Via Cavour was used many times.

There was an attack in 1972 on the United States Embassy, which was suspected of being undertaken by elements of the Nuclei. This suspicion arose from the fact that two members of the nuclei were arrested. They were Pietro Caronia and Gioia Ferrucci, who were then or who were later married to each other.

I am not able to say if our taxation could cover costs.

I heard that there were persons, intellectuals and entertainment people, who, out of sympathy for the MCR, contributed large subsidies. I recall vaguely that the name Tonazzi was brought up.

The Nuclei published--I do not recall when the publication began--a periodical entitled "The Communist." It did not come out at regular intervals. It was edited near Piazza Mazzini. Once I helped to paginate it. I also did some photographic work for demonstrations and strikes.

In 1973 and also in 1974, the Nuclei, who for a time had assumed the name of "The Communist," merged with the organization "Long Live Communism." It was a strange merger in a sense, because "Long Live Communism" was a group of ML inspiration. The decision was perhaps a politically opportune one, since both the groups were very small in comparison with other groups of their type, such as "Lotta Continua," "Il Manifesto," and "Avanguardia Operaia." The resultant group was called "Avanguardia Comunista" (Communist Avantgarde). There was a sort of organizational or founders' meeting that was held at the CIVIS at the Italian Forum. I was there. There were 150 people. A sort of political directorate was created. The headquarters remained the same. I recall that the headquarters of "Long Live Communism" were in Via dei Piceni, near ours.

In the Communist Avantgarde the prominent person was also Franco Russo. Important persons from "Long Live Communism" were Francesco Montuori and Augusto Illuminati. Some members of "Long Live Communism" did not go along with the merger, and no one knows what became of them. Among others, I certainly recall Di Toro. For them, the Communist Avantgarde was an organization of the right, which aligned itself with the positions of Workers' Avantgarde and "Lotta Continua." Some of them, such as the Petrelli brothers, disappeared from the political scene. Only once and quite by accident, I met the lady friend (of one of them)--and then they reemerged later as members of the Red Brigades. I learned that the Petrelli brothers were in the Red Brigades from Piccioni, immediately after their arrest in the Moro investigation. I recall that I had met Piccioni at a routine appointment. He was with two others. He said that a crash had occurred; a logistic base had been

blown up. The next day or some days later I read in the papers that the two Petrelli brothers were arrested as well as the lady's husband, whom I had never met. I shall discuss this episode at greater length later. The Communist Avantgarde also had a newspaper by the same name (as the group). Now, recalling better, I am not sure if the editing office of Prati, near Via Luigi Settembrini, had been rented for the "Communist" or for the "Communist Avantgarde."

Other important exponents that I remember from the Communist Avantgarde were Fabrizio Grillenzoni and his wife, Silvia Calamandrei, I believe, the daughter of the noted jurist.

Also fighting in the Communist Avantgarde, that I recall, were Fabrizio Panzieri and Roberto Martelli. I had known Panzieri from the times of the Revolutionary Communist Nuclei. He lived near my home in Tuscolano. Panzieri's two sisters, Donatella and Daniela, also belonged to the Nuclei.

I again recall as members of the Nuclei and of the Communist Avantgarde Rosa Giolitti, daughter of the ex-Socialist Minister; Bettina Foa, daughter of Vittorio Foa; and a certain Lisa whose surname I do not recall, probably Giua; Giusi Mancini, daughter of the other ex-Socialist minister. All three came from the nuclei of downtown Rome, since Giolitti was from Visconti and the other two from Cavour.

In 1975 at the time of the trial for actions of Primavalle, that is, for the homicide of the brother of Mattei, there was a public appeal in the newspapers of the extraparlimentary left of the "Lotta Continua" type for a massive turnout at the trial. The majority of the comrades of "Communist Avantgarde" arrived at the Piazzale Clodio. I was among them. I recall that the trial took place in the large hall on the ground floor of the Palace of Justice. On the large square, I met, among others, Martelli, who said he was not able to enter and invited some of us to listen to the hearing. I tried to enter, but immediately incidents arose and the police blocked the entrances. I recall that I remained blockaded in the area. That happened on the first morning. At a certain point a rumor emerged that there were clashes with the fascists in Piazza Risorgimento. Then we decided to go in that direction. I arrived with others who were on the Piazzale, 50 or 60, on Piazza Risorgimento.

When I arrived, I noted the blood stains at the corner of Via Ottaviano and Piazza Risorgimento on the right-hand sidewalk. For whoever is watching from Piazza Risorgimento, it is the same sidewalk along which the sectional office of the Italian Social Movement [MSI] is located.

Martelli was in our same group. Having arrived there, we did not see fascists, nor did we see traces of clashes. However, the rumor spread that the fascists had taken a comrade and had held him in an entryway. The doorway was the one that opens to the same building where the MSI headquarters are located, but on Piazza Risorgimento. The doors of the portal were shut; from the overhead grilled lunette, some rockets were thrown down on the piazza. The portal was forced, and at that moment, I noticed that Martelli had made his way inside. I was in the little gardens in front where I had gone to avoid the rockets, together with those who had forced the door and had fired some gun shots in the direction of the door. At this point there was a stampede--a general stampede. I wish to add that, to force the entry, one of the movable signs with a cement base was used.

I had not noticed Panzieri. I cannot say whether Loiacono was there, because at that time I did not know him.

I recall vaguely that Panzieri was on the Piazzale Clodio. It seems to me that he had left in a car in the moment in which the news spread of the clashes in Piazza Risorgimento. Martelli had come to the demonstration on his bicycle, on the other hand.

I know Massimo Pieri. I met him in the physics department to which I belonged in that period. He belonged to the Physics Collective. I specify: I know him only by sight, as I know others of the collective. At the most, I exchanged a couple of words there (at the collective). I saw him at a demonstration for a trial. I cannot say at which, whether the Valpreda or the Primavalle trial. Perhaps I learned some news in the newspapers. I recall that he had his leg in a cast. That is all I recall of this incident. Right now, I do not know if I am speaking of something I saw (first-hand) or whether I read it or heard a rumor.

After some days I was called to a meeting, in Via dei Piceni or perhaps to Via Principe Amedeo. It was known that I had assisted in the actions of Via Ottaviano. There were about ten persons. Surely there was Franco Russo, one or both of the Panzieri sisters, the husband of the older sister of Cesare Liberatore or Imperatori. We attempted a reconstruction of the actions. I told what I had seen. I am not sure if Martelli was also there. We primarily discussed Panzieri. On that occasion we spoke of the fact that he had left Piazzale Clodia by car. It seems to me that we also spoke of Loiacono.

In my opinion, some knew that members of the Communist Avantgarde had come to the armed demonstration. Certainly Franco Russo knew. The meeting ended with the decision to entrust some lawyers with the defense of Panzieri. The lawyers were chosen by Franco Russo and by relatives of Panzieri. I do not recall the names of the pre-selected lawyers. The discussion verged principally on the experiences of Panzieri, on the circumstance of finding the pistol and on the modalities of the arrest of Panzieri himself. At this meeting many manifestations of protest occurred.

Then the rumor spread that Martelli and Panzieri were authorized to carry weapons to the procession for the purpose of protection from fascist attacks. The use that they had made of them was at their own personal initiative. The authorization came from the two responsible. As to their identification, it is somewhat difficult, because in the organization there is a kind of "Mafioso" style, in the sense that only a few, a limited group of militants, were apprised of what was happening and also made decisions. The others were kept in the dark and far from the significant decisions. Formally, democratic principles were respected, but in fact, those with greatest influence always imposed their decisions. Among them (of those that I have discussed previously) are Russo, Bernocchi, Grillenzoni, and Calamandrei.

In 1975 there were elections in which the PCI and the left in its entirety reported a substantial success. This caused a shift to the right of the formations of the left, the so-called extraparlamentarians. Such a phenomenon, confined to the small dimensions of the Communist Avantgarde, caused a crisis of the

organization. The "Communist Avantgarde" was not officially disbanded. Many of the adherents, for the most part coming from the NCR, abandoned the AC and flowed, more or less, into the the Workers Avantgarde. Among these there were Franco Russo, others who were well-known, and I. The ex-ML faction stayed in the Communist Avantgarde.

After my passage to the Workers Avantgarde, I began to participate in political activity in the unitary physics committee. This was between 1975 and 1976. In physics the structures were, other than "unitary," the physics collective, that of Pieri, and the student council, which was formed of boards by the PCI. The council had little power. Rather, people paid attention to the base committee. The autonomous collective of physics performed shows of strength, such as interruptions of classes. Besides Pieri, there was a certain Anna Borioni among the most representative figures in this collective.

In 1977 I became acquainted with Emilia Libera, whom I knew by sight, since she was in physics--for purposes of study. We were in the same course and in the same laboratory group. We did experiments at the same laboratory table. We had begun to talk and debate politics, and we had met at some political demonstration that was held after the summer. I recall that Libera upset me by her criticisms of the way in which I conducted myself at the demonstration. These were my first "discoveries" of Libera. She said, among other things, that I lacked the discretion, for example, to cover my face or to disguise myself. I recall that she said that I conducted myself as if I were at a concert and not at a demonstration. At an assembly, it seems, at the law department, in the corridors, rather in the atrium, she stopped me once and said: did you see what happened? or something similar. In those days Via dei Volsci was closed, and I immediately thought of that episode. I answered that it seemed a serious thing to me. She responded that it was as positive thing, specifying that she was talking about the Casalegno attack.

Sometime later she brought me a flier signed by the BR, that claimed the attack, and invited me to read it. She made no reference as to how she had procured it, and I did not ask.

The same thing occurred numerous times with other fliers, and we began to discuss them. I guessed that the lady was in contact with the organization, but from her attitude I understood also that I was to ask nothing. The meetings always occurred between us alone. During this period, which ends in April of 1978, the maximum degree of "discovery" of Libera occurred when she declared that she was in contact with members of the BR. The meetings, the lectures, and the discussions all occurred at the university.

At this point I wish to clarify to the Office that I know of a place where police could find weapons kept in a bin of plastic buried beneath the ground; the place is beyond Grottaferra. Such a place is hard to find. If, however, a search were conducted, I would be able to point it out.

Still in regard to the weapons, I wish to add that about fifteen days before being arrested, I got rid of two pistols by throwing them into the Tiber from the Sisto bridge.

At this point the Office, considering the urgency of the above-mentioned information, orders the suspension of the interrogation and prepares with separate provisions to go to the above-named spot itself.

JUNE 3 AT 10 A.M.

It is declared that the deposition suspended at 4:30 p.m. is reopened. In this period under discussion, which, as I said, goes to April of 1978, Libera, after having brought me several fliers, began to bring me more serious documents, such as the resolution and the document dedicated to the norms of comportment. I clarify: these documents were not given (to me), but they were returned to Libera, and I read and discussed them with her; she then took them with her except in the rarest of cases, as occurred in the case of the Resolution, which I insisted on having for a few days to read and to examine with care. I do not recall the number of the resolution; I think that it was number two. Anyway, it was the one that described the structure of the organization. The norms of conduct were those directed to irregular members.

Libera always came by herself. We saw each other, because we set appointments. If one missed an appointment, as often happened, it was she who renewed the contact by means of the telephone. I also had her telephone number. I even knew where she lived. One or two times I was at her house. Libera lived with her parents near Via Taranto in a large complex of working class housing, it seems to me, for railroad employees. The appointments were always at the university at the physics department and sometimes at Piazza Indipendenza at the autobus stop; and from there, we went together to the mathematics department which is located on Via Vicanza. At that time Libera was already linked emotionally to Savasta. I sometimes met him by accident.

During the Moro kidnapping, Libera, for the first time, asked me to collaborate with her in the distribution of fliers that pertained to the Moro case. I wish, however, to state that now I am not sure if the proposal of collaboration concerned the previous fliers on the homicide of Palma. However, I have read the fliers pertaining to Palma.

The first operation of distribution of fliers took place in the following manner. Libera set an appointment for me as usual at the university; it was in the morning around 10. She brought a package of fliers, which could have numbered from 100 to 200, and were hidden in an envelope of plastic (the kind distributed in boutiques). She told me to do what she did. The fliers were already divided into groups of 20-30. We began going to various departments, surely chemistry, political science, mathematics. Here we stopped in the vicinity where people passed, and, at the moment in which we were sure not to be noticed, we placed a bunch of fliers on the ground or on a bench, also attempting to scatter them.

During the Moro kidnapping I then undertook, always at the request of Libera, these operations of distribution of communiques many times. I always undertook these operations in the vicinity of the university center. I helped to distribute three or four of the new communiques. I do not recall the numbers of the communiques. I deny having brought the most recent, that in which the execution of the Honorable Moro was announced. That probably happened because in the period of the kidnapping, the intervals of distribution were notably lengthened

because of the commitment of the regulars, that is, of those who directly edited the communique.

Towards the end of April, Libera asked me to enter (the BR) and become part of a brigade, precisely the university brigade. I agreed, and she set an appointment, to which other members of the brigades came. Libera made me an appointment for some days later in Piazzale del Verano. We reached the department of chemistry by taking Via de Lollis. During the walk, she pointed out to me a girl who preceded us and said that she also belonged to the university brigade. She too, in fact, entered a little chemistry classroom where the appointment for all those belonging to the university brigade took place. Here we found Teodoro Spadaccini. Libera introduced me to Spadaccini and to the girl. I was introduced by my *nom de guerre*, which was given to me some days before by Libera. I was called Giorgio. I used that *nom de guerre* for the entire period of my militancy in the BR. Libera's *nom de guerre* was "Nadia." Spadaccini was called "Andrea." Before, however, he had used the name of "Mario." The other member of the university brigade, it seems to me, was called Cecilia. Habitually, we called her "cicciona" (chubby), despite the fact that she was very thin. I never knew her real name. I visited her for a brief period for reasons that I will name. She was a psychology student. She was born in and had a family from San Benedetto del Tronto. I specify that I cannot be sure of her place of birth. Certainly her family lived in San Benedetto del Tronto. I never knew where she lived in Rome. I later learned from Libera that she had married a person not belonging to the BR. She was, as I have said, very thin; she was a meter and 65 or 70 centimeters tall, with light brown hair; with blue or anyway light eyes. She struck me because she resembled a child actor that had played the role of Pinocchio on television. I saw this girl only for a brief time, since the university brigade lasted only a short time on account of the arrest of Teodoro Spadaccini. Immediately after his capture, the activity and the ties were interrupted; and the girl left Rome.

The brigade with this composition met three or four times before the arrest of Spadaccini. The girl missed one or two meetings, probably because of family problems.

The meeting of the university brigade occurred either within the university city or at the Cemetery of Varano.

The tasks of the brigade were above all the diffusion of propaganda material within the university area; then the political investigations of the composition of the university; finally the editing within a brief period of a document on the university situation.

Libera was the head of the brigade. At that time she was still an irregular. She had, however, direct contact with a regular. He was Seghetti, whose *nom de guerre* was "Claudio." One time, breaking the rules by mistake--we thought that we were at a brigade appointment (when it was not)--we met Seghetti, who instead was supposed to have a contact only with Libera. The meeting occurred at Via XX Settembre in front of the CIM, in the month of May of 1978, it seems to me after the shooting of Moro. Seghetti scolded Libera in rather harsh language, bringing up the rule according to which we were not supposed to have contacts with a regular--absolutely not.

The meeting was very brief, about ten minutes; we stood under the CIM for the duration of the meeting.

At this meeting Spadaccini was also present. The girl from San Benedetto, I think, was not there. If Spadaccini was arrested the 13th of May, the meeting must have occurred between the first and that date. At present I do not know, however, how to specify whether it was before or after the 9th.

On this occasion Libera fixed a later appointment for us at Porta Pia at the bar in the vicinity of a magazine shop. At this appointment Seghetti was also present. Spadaccini, however, did not come. The girl from San Benedetto also did not come; I am no longer sure of the reason.

Seghetti asserted that it was unconscionable that Spadaccini had not shown up. We learned the next day that Spadaccini had been arrested, exactly on the day on which we were supposed to see him in Porta Pia.

At this meeting Seghetti administered a kind of examination of my political past. Immediately after the meeting at Porta Pia he told us to move to Trastevere; I specify: probably he said it to Libera, because

I confined myself to following her lead. We split up: Seghetti took one autobus, and we took the next one of the same line. We met in a bar on Viale Trastevere. It was morning. We were seated in a bar outside. He asked me what political experiences I had had. I told him about my past, but he did not express any judgment. Regarding the degree to which I trusted him, I believe that we deferred to the judgment of Libera.

Following the arrest of Spadaccini, there was a total freeze of the brigade. The freeze lasted for twenty days to a month and, that is, until the 10th of June. I remained during this period at home, without having any contact with the organization.

This period having past, I was contacted again by Libera, who called me to an appointment at the university, at the department of physics, at which, as I have already said, we were enrolled together. There were only two of us. Libera told me that a new comrade would be entering the brigade to replace Spadaccini. He would probably be Savasta. I clarify that Libera did not tell me the name of the new member of the brigade. She told me only that we would meet him within a short time. After about 10 minutes, while we were on the terrace of the physics department, I saw Savasta, whom I knew as the fiance of Libera, approach us. Savasta was moving towards the chemistry building. We also moved towards that department. There we met him, and Libera officially told me that Savasta was the new member of the university brigade. On this same occasion Libera told me that his *nom de guerre* was "Diego."

From this meeting on, we saw each other somewhat regularly (about twice a week), and we began to formulate the document of which I have already spoken.

We saw each other usually at the university center. When we had to write, we went to those departments where there were empty rooms, such as bio-chemistry or the natural sciences.

I recall now, regarding the Moro kidnapping, a circumstance relating to a vehicle. On the occasion of the meeting of our brigade, a little before the day of the murder of the DC parliamentarian, I believe one or two days before, Libera told Spadaccini that she needed a car to which Spadaccini had the keys. I do not recall who of the two, probably Spadaccini, said that the car was a Renault. Spadaccini responded that all was in order, and Libera, for her part, concluded the talk saying,

"Then we'll talk about it again." Some time after talking with Piccioni after September of 1978, because I met Piccioni in that month-- he must have told me about the Renault in which the body of Moro was found. That same vehicle had also been used in the attack on the police barracks that probably are located on Via Salaria. But on all such circumstances I shall be clearer later.

I wish only to add that I talked about such circumstances to Martelli in a full manner. I told him, that is, that the red Renault used for the Honorable Moro was stolen by the university brigade, that it was always at our disposition, adding that it was also used for the attack on the police barracks (thus letting him know that I knew more details about the attack).

Martelli, to such discussion, asked me if I did not fear having left my fingerprints on the car, while driving the vehicle before its use at Via Caetani.

Nevertheless, returning now to the meetings of the university brigade, various meetings took place to formulate a document on the university situation. Towards the end, even the beginning of July, in a meeting at which we saw Seghetti, he told us that we would meet there a person of importance in the organization. At the appointment of Piazza Fiume all of us in the brigade were present, that is, Libera, Savasta, and I. Seghetti led us to the Fassi bar, which is located a few meters from Piazza Fiume on Corso D'Italia. Here a person in the outer garden awaited us; he seemed to be about 35, and he introduced himself as Giuseppe. In this first encounter, I did not figure out who he was. We had two or three other meetings with him in the course of which he related to us certain details and episodes of his political past.

From these narrations and from his markedly Emilian accent, I suspected that he was Gallinari. The certainty came when I saw his photos in the newspapers shortly after his arrest in the Porta Metronia area. Recalling better, I had an earlier confirmation from Morucci who spoke of Giuseppe and told us that he was Gallinari.

In the meeting at Fassi, I noted immediately that the person to whom we were introduced was a member of prominence in the organization both because he himself was introduced as such by Seghetti, because he (Seghetti) demonstrated an attitude of respect towards him (Giuseppe),

and because he (Giuseppe) asked us immediately about our activities. He scolded us for our inertia, and he asked us to undertake as soon as possible an investigation in the university area. In our brigade, Savasta was the one who principally kept up the discussion with Giuseppe. He added that it must be an investigation with specific objectives. We made it clear, always through the mouth of Savasta, that the center of actual power in the university area was the council of the administration. For that reason, a representative member of that council was chosen as the target, that is, the president or his secretary, or rather, the vice president. This choice was made by us with the help of the Monaci guide, in which we found the name and address of this individual. The investigation took from the beginning of July to the end of the month. I recall that this person lived in Piazza di Spagna at the last door of the piazza on the left going towards Via del Babuino. He also had a clinic--he was a doctor--in the African neighborhood--Salario. Libera took me to a lecture at the Higher Institute of Health at which our person was also present. I saw him for the first time. I kept surveillance (performed "sentinal duty") beneath his residence in Piazza di Spagna and one time at the clinic--here I only passed by, I never stopped--but I never ran into him. During the period of the investigation, there was an attack on a person who, according to the newspapers, had the responsibilities that our target was supposed to have. The attack was claimed by a smaller group, I do not know whether of the right or of the left. We then learned of our very serious mistake. For this gaffe, we were sharply criticized by Gallinari at a third meeting, which we had with him in the district of San Saba in a bar with a small inner garden. This bar is located along the Via di San Saba as the road ascends immediately after the Rubino cinema facing the piazza.

As a result of this mistake, the brigade would probably be disbanded. This meeting was the last before the summer holidays. Gallinari asked us if we needed money for the vacation. But about all these particulars, I shall try to be more precise after I speak about the second meeting with Gallinari.

This second meeting occurred around the middle of the month of July; it was held in Caffè "Du Parc," which is located at Porta San Paolo at the end of Viale Aventino. The three of us in the brigade, Seghetti, and Gallinari were present. We first discussed the progress of the investigation, and then Gallinari talked at length about the episodes of his life. I was given an appointment at the monument to Skanderberg in Piazza Albania, where I met Savasta and Libera; I clarify, we did not meet (there). They passed by; they headed toward some steps that are on the sidewalk in front; they noted that I was not followed; and then we met together at the bar but arrived separately. Gallinari was already there; a little later Seghetti joined us.

Regarding the third meeting, the one at the bar of San Saba, I must add that we spoke of not needing money for the summer. On this occasion nothing was said about the disbanding of the brigade. Such an act was surely a decision of the column management, and we did not know about it until the end of the summer. At the end of the meeting, Gallinari told Libera and me to leave, as he wished Savasta to remain. Seghetti also left with us, at least, so it seemed to me. We awaited Savasta in the neighborhood. After about half an hour, when he arrived alone, we decided to see each other again, Savasta, Libera, and I, the 24th of August, or perhaps the 23rd, in the neighborhood of Libera's apartment. We also specified the hour, which I now do not recall. The place was a courtyard of a building that is located at the corner between Via La Spazia and a cross street.

I spent the vacation making a tour of Umbria with my relatives and with a friend from my home town, that is, of Nemi--who has nothing to do with the organization.

At this point, since it was time, the interrogation was suspended--1:45--to be reopened at 2:30. The defense is informed.

JUNE 3, 3:15 PM

Regarding the weapons found last night, I must say that they were from the MCR organization--the one inspired by the Morucci and Faranda plan, when they left the BR. The MCR began to materialize around May of 1979 and, that is, a little before Morucci and Faranda were arrested. It was disbanded, in fact, with the robbery in which Pallone and Genoino lost their lives and, that is, in November of 1980. I shall fully discuss the circumstances in the course of the interrogation.

The weapons that the MCR used were stored in receptacles kept underground. There were three repositories for the weapons; knowing the origins of the weapons, I am sure there were no more. One was discovered in the neighborhood of the home of Pallone, at Tuscolo, some time before the robbery occurred in which Pallone himself was killed. The second is the one we found last night, at Tuscolo. The third, smaller, consisted of a plastic box and only two pistols that were later dismantled by me some months ago. This last deposit was found in the villa of Scipioni, to be precise, along the little staircase reached from the side of via Appia Antica on the left, rising on an embankment a short distance from a lattice. These two pistols I found completely damaged by rust. The deposit had been dubbed as temporary, but the weapons were left for about a year. I got rid of them by throwing them into the Tiber from Testuccio bridge.

The MCR has or had--some are dead--the following members: Luigi Rosati, whose *nom de guerre* was "Fabrizio"; Giuseppe Mitrani, who at one time had the *nom de guerre* "David," and now is called "Giordano," Claudio Pallone, called "Ernesto," killed in the robbery of the National Park of the Abruzzi; Arnaldo Genoino, called "Gaetano," who also died after cross fire in the above-named robbery; Claudio D'Aguanno, called "Giacomo;" Mario Guerra, called "Corrado," also implicated in the above-mentioned robbery; Ornello Turco, called "Federico"; Ruggiero Benedetto, called "Rocco"; a certain Enrico of whom I do not recall the surname, called "Enzo," who dwells in Via Greco Xovius, who works with his father in a stamp store, also in possession of a license to bear arms;

Giancarlo Davoli, called "Riccio," and in the early times "Renzo;" Alfredo Perifano, called "Mirco," who resides in a place whose exact location I do not know--the parents some time ago lived in the neighborhood of Circonvallazione Apa--and who lives, in fact, near Giuseppe Mitrani in Via Catone n. 10; a certain "Carlo," *nom de guerre*, whose true name I do not recall, rather, I have never known his true name, who dwells in the area of Cento Celle or Villa Giordani and is a university student; a certain Cesare, true baptismal name, called "Valentino," who lives or whose parents live in the zone of Alberone and who works in Parliament; a certain Badore (nickname) whose *nom de guerre* is "Silvio," who also lives in Via Catone N. 10 together with Pino Mitrani and Alfredo Perifano; Barbara Starita, called "Sara" as *nom de guerre*, presently engaged to Luigi Rosati; a certain Carlo whose *nom de guerre* is "Emilio" (I do not know where he lives; he is a university student. I know that he was stopped some time ago at Florence; a certain "Fabio," *nom de guerre*, whose true name I do not know and who seems to be between 20 and 22 years old; a certain "Marta," *nom de guerre* of the girl friend of Babio whose true name I do not know, nor her residence, nor her work; a certain "Fausto," also *nom de guerre* of whom I know only that he lives in the area of Cento Celle of Villa Goriani; Eurodia Vilsaggi, already engaged to Pino Mitrani--who like Badore, Pino Mitrani, Labio, Marta--all live in Rome North; a certain Laura, whose *nom de guerre* is Piera who lives along Via Appia Nuova quite far from [illegible] perhaps at the top of the Quarto Miglio; four outside [illegible] whose *noms de guerre* I do not know... [illegible] the robbery of Pallone and others at Alfedena.

For the moment I do not recall other adherents of the MCR. Returning to the discourse on my militancy in the BR, Libera, Savasta, and I saw each other at a meeting set before the vacation for the 23rd or 24th of August, in the courtyard that I described in the investigation.

The [other] two had been on vacation in a countryside town that was the birthplace of Libera's mother, it seems Val d'Aosta or Valcamonica. Before leaving, they had invited me to spend the vacations with them. But I had preferred to stay with my folks. They brought gifts for me, Seghetti and Gallinari; they were foods typical of the place where they passed the vacation (such as wines and salamis).

In the course of this meeting we finally completed the draft of the document of which I have spoken, consisting more than anything of a paper on the activity of the brigade and containing, besides other political assessments, information on the role played by universities.

The document was typed at Libera's home; at that period she was alone at home.

In the course of this meeting Savasta and Libera told me that in a little while we would meet Gallinari.

A few days later, in fact, we met with Gallinari, also this time at the Caffè du Parc, of Porta San Paolo. It was between the end of August and the first days of September. In the course of the meeting, Gallinari told us of the disbanding of the brigade and told us that each of us would have new tasks. He then took us aside; I add that Seghetti also came. Each of us was taken aside separately from the others by Gallinari and by Seghetti, and each one was given an appointment. I received the new appointment from Seghetti. In practice, with the dissolution of the brigade, each of us ex-members became compartmentalized with respect to the others.

Seghetti, besides scheduling me a new appointment, briefed me as to the new functions I would have to assume. He told me that, in consideration of my studies, the organization had assigned me to the logistic brigade, directly dependent on the logistic front of the column. To tell the truth, I learned only later of the rapport between the logistic brigade and the front, as it was in reality. Seghetti told me only that I was assigned to a new structure, and that was the logistic brigade.

The appointment given me was a few days later in the Aventino park a few meters from the Caffè du Parc where we had met.

Either he or Gallinari would probably come.

According to the information given me, after some days, I went to Aventino park and there met Gallinari. He had me cross the viale and introduced me to two people who were waiting. He told me that one was "Matteo," and the other was "Nicola." Immediately after the introduction of "Giuseppe," that is, Gallinari, he left us. I had already heard of Matteo. Libera had already spoken to me in the

course of a meeting of the La Milli university brigade. She told us about Matteo; he was a person with the look and the demeanor of a terrorist. She said this in an ironic tone and recounted also an episode that illustrated Matteo's obsession with various equipment and gadgets that he always carried with him in a bag.

He once decided to travel around with some self-lighting and self-extinguishing gadget inside his bag.

I identified (him) later, I will be more precise later about the particulars of this identification; however, the identification of Matteo occurred after our departure from the organization. Morucci was Matteo, and Mai was Nicola.

Giuseppe, as was usual, left on foot. Only once, at least up to this point, did I see any people leave the meeting by car. It happened in the course of a meeting of the university brigade. I was told at the previous meeting that I would have to come by car, since Seghetti wanted to show my capacities as driver, on a tour of the city, as my first operative job in the organization. It was, in fact, established that when I passed to the operative phase with the attack on the President of the Administrative Council of the University, I would function as driver of the command car. On this occasion Seghetti brought a car, in which he followed my car in my test drive from Trinita dei Monti to the African neighborhood.

The car brought by Seghetti was of French make, I do not recall if it was a Renault or a Diane, light blue or gray in color. (I recall that the Renault was an economy car.)

After Gallinari left us some minutes later, Matteo, Nicola, and I reached the Caffè du Parc. Here we were seated and, after a little while, two other persons came. It was morning. Matteo introduced us to two new friends as Andrea and Michele. I have now identified the latter [Michele] as Francesco Piccioni, about whose arrest the newspapers have reported.

To tell the truth, I [first] learned that he was nicknamed Francone, based on his true name Franco, when I left the BR.

I also learned, on the occasion of some meeting with him, that he had fought in "Viva il Comunismo." Once, in fact, he asked me if I recalled him, as a militant of the previous group. He asked me

if I recalled his name. I answered, joking, "It's your problem if I remember." I did this to keep him on the hook, but, in reality, I did not remember either his face or his name. Probably he was one of those that had not accepted the merger of "Viva il Comunismo" with "Avanguardia Comunista" and had consequently made a choice for the armed struggle.

One time he confided in me that he had stumbled into a road block set up in the vicinity of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and of being surprised by the explanation of the police force; he added that he did not have weapons, and so he passed through the blockade scot free. This made me presume that he, at the time of the Moro kidnapping, was not yet a regular of the organization.

Immediately after the arrival of Michele and Andrea, the discussion on the new structure began. Matteo, who spoke first, told us that the head of the new brigade would probably be Michele. He added that this brigade was part of the logistic front. I specify that he did not speak of the head of the brigade but rather of the "responsible person." He told us that he belonged to the national logistic front and that it had nothing to do with the existing structure that was composed only of us four and that is Michele, the head, Andrea, Matteo, and me. Of Andrea, I know only that he was the friend of Piccioni and that he came from "Viva il Comunismo."

I do not know whether he was arrested.

Matteo, having ended the discussion, gave us some specific business addresses.

He told me that I would to be involved in the "antenna" section, and that I would have to buy specialized publications regardless of the cost, and that I would be reimbursed by the organization.

He told me also to inspect, by passing through the city, the types of antennae connected to buildings, to find out which would characterize a military installation or be of particular interest.

Nicola was assigned to investigate compressed air weapons.

I do not recall which tasks were assigned to Andrea.

The following meeting occurred a week later. We continued to see each other with a certain regularity and to discuss technical problems.

It is noted that at this point the Investigating Judge Dr. Ferdinando Imposimato intervenes.

In the course of the month of September there was a weapons exercise that was held in the street on a construction site on the Cassia or the Flaminia. The exercise was organized by Michele who set an appointment for us in a piazza of Rome North where all four of us of the logistic brigade met. From there Michele, Andrea, and I took an autobus and reached the highway that we had followed. Nicola left in his car and preceded us to the bus stop. The weapons were in the car, at least I seem to recall. The car was a Diane of a light color.

We followed the road for some kilometers, certainly no more than ten. The weapons consisted of an automatic 81 pistol, a 38 revolver, and a 12-gauge shot gun. I had never fired before. "Michele" was our instructor. First off, he fired first with both pistols to test them.

In turns he then made us fire with the 12-gauge shot gun inside a large metal container about two and a half meters in diameter.

We were firing inside the tube toward the other end, lined up against an embankment. I recall that I was deaf for about two days. On the way back to the bus stop, "Michele" took me aside and told me that I would be the driver in the next operation, and he set an appointment for me with Giuseppe. For this reason, I would be excused from my duties in the logistic structure.

At this point, considering the hour, the investigating judge suspends the interrogation and schedules the next session for June 4 at 8:30 p.m.

[At this point the depositions are reopened, and the defendant declares:]

I spontaneously wish to make the following specifications:
Some months ago I participated, invited by Luigi Rosati, in a dinner at the home of Giuliano Del Bufalo who lives near the Piazza di Spagna (it seems to me in Via Frattina). The persons present were, besides Del Bufalo, Rosati and I, Barbara Starita, the fiancée of Rosati,

Alvaro Loiacono, and, later, the brother of Giuliano Del Bufalo who arrived with his wife. We spoke of the political situation, of the armed struggle, etc.

In relation to Alvaro Loiacono I recall that Rosati told me that Loiacono was emotionally involved with the daughter of Dr. Nobili: Loiacono was untroubled with respect to his appeal to the Court of Cassation [Supreme Court], because he was certain of knowing in advance through Dr. Nobili when the warrant for his arrest would be issued, the date of the proceedings at the Court, the outcome of the deliberations, etc.

The office states that in the last part of the interrogation the Public Prosecutor was also present in the person of Dr. Luciano Infelisi.

JUNE 4, 10 A.M.

It is noted that the interrogation closed yesterday is reopened. The weapons exercise, as I said, took place between the 10th and the 20th of September. Some days later I was introduced at the appointment that Michele (Piccioni) had made me with Giuseppe (Gallinari). The meeting took place near the Ministry of Public Instruction, on the Viale di Trastevere on the right hand sidewalk for someone coming from Piazza Sonnino, where the stone benches are located. Probably it was afternoon. There were only Gallinari and I. He made me move to the other side of the street, where the ATAC depot is located. Here two persons that I had never seen before awaited us. Giuseppe introduced them to me as Otello and Marzia. All four of us went to a bar, and we sat at a little table outside. Here Giuseppe began to speak of politics, dwelling in particular on the role of the judges in the counter-guerrilla sector. He hypothesized that those three were part of a structure that was concerned with the problem of the counter-guerrilla and of the judges who had special functions in that sector. He said that there had been a revolution in the state and in particular in the judiciary in the sense that the state was adjusting to the new phase of the class struggle, which, according to his interpretation, he saw as the "proletariat on the attack." The adjustment occurred in a special way through the creation of structures that specialized in the problem of the anti-guerrilla. The state groomed the judiciary, some police corps, and the army police for this purpose and introduced the system of differentiation in the prison sector. He also said that the structure of which he was part had concluded studies on the judges. He said therefore, turning to me, that I was chosen to participate in a prearranged operation against the judiciary. He drew the proposal out of a purse that he always carried with him. Gallinari always dressed elegantly in a jacket and tie. Only once did I see him in a shirt. It was the summer of 1979. I had run into him by accident in the neighborhood of Porta San Giovanni. Following the rules, I did not greet him. He, however, turned on his tracks and stopped me. He

reproached me for my departure from the BR and, in a certain sense, he threatened me. He said, referring to a noted journalist, whose name I do not recall, that his articles already deserved death for the damage they had done to the armed struggle. The publication of the document of Morucci and Faranda and, therefore, of the defectors of the BR, in *Lotta Continua* had caused damage one hundred times greater than those articles of the journalist. He took out, as I said, a large volume, about 5 or 6 centimeters (I did not see the color of the cover or the title, because it was covered with newspaper), from which he said he found the names of those holding various offices of the judiciary and their functions and the roles and the tasks that the individual judges were assigned.

Later in the investigative tasks and the data collection, he arrived, continued Gallinari, at the targeting of key persons. He stressed that in the investigative work, the reading of newspapers and of specialized magazines was indispensable. (He gave no names of magazines.)

He concluded, affirming that the work had brought him to singling out two judges as key persons, that is, De Vincentiis and Tartaglione.

We would probably choose De Vincentiis as target.

Before disbanding, Otello and I made an appointment for several days later near Cinecitta in a cross street of Via Tuscolana, because Otello would have to lead me to the judge's residence. We met as planned, and we inspected the street where the judge lived. This street was in the Don Bosco neighborhood. The dwelling was located in a huge complex with many stairs. I walked around in the courtyard, searching for the name of De Vincentiis on two house phone [panels]. I found it easily, also because Otello had already been there and had already given me directions.

Some days later we met again, Otello (Loiacono) and I, with Giuseppe, at the usual Caffè du Parc of Aventino. At this meeting Giuseppe said that De Vincentiis did nothing anymore to play down his key role--the one that caused him to be the target of this operation. Therefore, he told us, we would have to work on Tartaglione.

For this judge, the investigation--I was able to learn--had already been carried to near completion by the triple structure.

I must specify that at the meeting of the Caffè du Parc with Giuseppe, another person that I had never seen before was present. He was introduced as "Camillo."

At this point I wish to make some specifications about the particulars of our meetings. The appointments were always made by word of mouth from meeting to meeting. In the case of a missed meeting, the system of the makeup meeting went into effect. At the appointment one waited fifteen minutes; then one started to leave and returned at exactly one hour later than the first meeting. In the case of a missed meeting, you came the next day at the same time. If this makeup did not work either, you came a week later at the same place and on the same schedule as the first appointment. If this appointment was also missed, the system of make-up appointments ended, and the strategic appointment began. The strategic appointment was fixed for each structure; it was a fixed day in a fixed place. For those of us of the logistic brigade it was S. Pietro station on a weekday, I think Monday, at three in the afternoon.

I, in the period of the Tartaglione murder, while working for the triple, went to the strategic appointment for my brigade, the logistic brigade.

Returning to the appointments for the preparation of the homicide of Tartaglione, I recall that some days after the meeting at which Camillo was present, he or Otello had led me to Viale delle Milizie and had shown me the portal of the entrance to the home of Tartaglione. He then had me look at the windows of the dwelling, which faced across the street of the Viale. It seems to me that they were on the second or third floor. With regard to the windows, my companion told me that when they were open, it meant the judge was at home. The judge lived alone. The windows also remained open when he left for work. The schedule of the judge was also given to me. I was told that he left in the morning at 8 or 8:30 and returned home about 1:30 or 2 P.M.

We did not enter the portal. There was an inner courtyard and more stairs. At a later on-the-spot inspection I was shown the various streets in the neighborhood to study the possible avenues of escape.

At the last meeting before the homicide, which was held a few days earlier, we discussed the specific details of the action.

I recall that the judge, in the days before the operation, was absent for some days from Rome. This led to the suspension of the operation.

In those days, in addition, there were a large number of arrests of the BR in Milan. It seems to me that Azzolini and Bonisoli were captured. Gallinari, for this reason, was constrained to go immediately to the Lombard capital, and his place was taken by another person.

Camillo seemed to be about 25 or 26 years old; he is tall--about 65 or 70 meters; his build is slender; brown hair, cut very short at least at the time in which I saw him.

His family lived in Rome North. His political experience had been in this section of the city.

Marzia is a blond girl, with blue eyes, 1 meter and 65 centimeters or more, well-built. In 1978 she was 21 or 22 years old. Her political experience had been in Rome-North.

Both said that they had taken part in clashes with fascists in Rome-North.

Camillo was very good friends with Otello (Loiacono). They were, in fact, in the same structure, that is, in the triple, where they were principally concerned with the judiciary together with Gallinari, Faranda, and Marzia.

In the column management, there was also a certain Maria. If Balzarani, as she told me, has the *nom de guerre* of "Sara," it could be she, because Maria changed her name at a certain point to Sara.

Recalling now what occurred in the meeting to arrange for the defense of Panzieri immediately after the assassination of Mantakas, I specify that it was held one or two days after the actions of Piazza Risorgimento. Giusi Manzini was definitely present. Probably Rosa Giolitti was also there. The first part concerned the problem of selecting defense lawyers for Panzieri. It was the group's intention to choose prominent lawyers for him. For this reason they wished to gather the names of important people who could convince the lawyers to accept the case.

Some were charged with contacting the lawyers. They left the meeting. A few of us remained to reconstruct the facts.

It was ascertained that Panzieri and Martelli had gone to the armed demonstrations.

At this point, considering the lateness of the hour, the Office recesses the interrogation and sets 3 p.m. as the hour for resumption.

JUNE 4, 3:30 P.M.

In the year 1981, on the 4th day of June at 3:30 p.m. before Judge Dr. Rosario Priore and Dr. Ferdinando Imposimato, the accused Massimo Cianfanelli appears, at police headquarters of Rome, Digos.

[The recessed interrogation resumes.]

Some days before the 10th of October 1978, I had an appointment at Piazza Cola di Rienzo with Camillo, Gallinari, Loiacono, and Marzia. At the meeting Gallinari introduced me to a lady whose name was Alessandra and said that she would probably take his place in the action to be undertaken, since he was obligated to leave Rome. Later, I learned that Gallinari had left for Milan immediately after the arrests of Azzolini and Bonisoli, as I have already said. In the meeting with Gallinari and Alessandra, an analysis of the situation was made to ascertain the state of the investigation. In the course of a subsequent meeting at which the same persons, except for Gallinari, participated, the tasks of those who were to participate in the action were established. I was asked to drive a 128 during the escape. Camillo was entrusted with the task of firing on Tartaglione, Loiacono with providing cover to the inner courtyard, and finally Faranda with giving cover to the outside of the building.

I specify that in the course of a meeting with Gallinari and someone else, I was asked if I had a pistol to use in the action. I responded that I did not have one. Gallinari then decided that I must be given a weapon for the morning of the homicide.

I state that it is true that Gallinari had always spoken with me of the action against Tartaglione without specifying its nature. Gallinari told me, after learning that I had never fired, that I would have to practice with the weapon that he had entrusted to me. So, some days before the Tartaglione operation Loiacono, Camillo, and I went to an locality isolated from Via Portuense where we performed some exercises with weapons that we had brought along with us.

I fired at the tree 5 or 6 shots with a beretta model 81, Loiacono and Camillo shot some rounds with Morucci's Skorpion. Camillo also shot with the Glisenti that later was used against Tartaglione. The Glisenti was equipped with a silencer.

In the late morning of October 10, I drove to the intersection of Via Mompiani and Via Camorzi in a navy 128 [Fiat], which Camillo turned over to me some days earlier in Via Lanciani. Parking on Via Mompiani, I found the other companions: Faranda, Camillo, and Loiacono. Faranda gave me the Beretta 81 that I put in the holster and slipped into the belt of my pants. Awaiting the hour of the expected return of the judge, about 2 p.m., we remained in the area and walked around separately from each other. Towards 1:30 each of us took our predetermined positions. I went to Via Camozzi, and the other three went to Via Silvio Pellico at the corner of Viale delle Milizie. About ten minutes later, I saw Marzia pass on a Vespa motorcycle through Via Silvio Pellico. The others also saw Marzia pass. This was the signal that Judge Tartaglione was about to arrive.

At that point, I stopped the car, parking it on the right side of Via Mompiani with the front end facing Via Camozzi. I remained there in anticipation of the three who were assigned to participate in the ambush. After some minutes, I saw a navy car, with only the driver inside, pass by. I thought that it was Tartaglione's car.

After some more minutes, one after the other, Camillo, Loiacono, and Faranda, who took their places on the car, arrived. Camillo and Loiacono were quiet, while Faranda was upset.

Camillo wore a little goatee, Loiacono had on a false mustache. I also wore a false mustache. I quickly drove away from Via Mompiani in the direction of Viale Carso. I paused for some seconds in front of Piazza Bainzizza for Faranda's signal to start down [the street] with the weapons contained in the bag. I parked the car in a cross street of Viale Carso where all three of us got out. Each of us went separately on foot. I took my little motorcycle on which I later returned home.

The afternoon of the following day, Faranda, Loiacono, Camillo, and I met in front of the Ministry of Public Instruction, according to a preestablished appointment. We went to a bar where we reconstructed the details of the action.

Loiacono said that he had been stopped by the doorman and his wife immediately after the action.

The doorman told him that he had heard the shots. Loiacono responded that he did not think they were shots.

Faranda said that she was worried about the delay of Loiacono and, for that reason, she was late in reaching the 128.

Camillo said that he had arrived earlier than the judge who was climbing a staircase on the inside of the building.

When Tartaglione had climbed to the landing in front of the elevator, he (Camillo) approached the judge and fired two shots point-blank and at a close range. On the occasion he had used a Glisenti 1910 pistol with 9 caliber cartridges.

Loiacono had with him a Smith Wesson model 39 and the Skorpion but did not fire a shot. Faranda had an M12 submachine gun and her personal pistol. Camillo also had, besides the Glisenti, a Colt 45. At the time of the action, Loiacono was wearing a beret and a beige sari.

Camillo was wearing a light green rain coat.

In the meeting of the 11th of October, Camillo also said that he and Marzia had returned on the afternoon of the 10th to the navy 120 left unlocked by me on Viale Carso to take the purse removed from Tartaglione immediately after the homicide.

Adriana Faranda made the telephone call claiming the attack.

At the conclusion of the meeting of the 11th of October Faranda told me that after a few days, I would return to work in the logistic structure to which I belonged, together with Piccioni, Andrea (Cacciotti) and Nicola (Mai). The Office shows the accused an album containing the photographs of persons belonging to the BR and other groups.

The accused declares recognizing the so-called Andrea in the photo labelled number 4.

The Office takes note that it is Cacciotti, Giulio. I am drawing a design with the description of the homicide of Tartaglione, which is attached to this deposition. At this point the deposition is recessed and will be reopened at the hour [time not given]. (Map included)

JUNE 5, 11 A.M.

At 11 a.m. on June 5 1981 the interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli is reopened.

TARTAGLIONE

I recalled that before October 10, Gallinari returned to Rome and participated in a meeting with Faranda, Loiacono, Camillo, perhaps Marzia, and me, during which he said that the comrades arrested in Milan belonged to the organization [the BR].

VOLANTE IV (ALERT SQUAD IV)

Some days after the meeting of October 11, 1978, on information furnished to Faranda, I kept an appointment in Piazza Fiume, where I met Andrea (Cacciotti), who led me to a nearby bar, where I met Nicola (Mai), Piccioni, and Morucci. They said that the investigation on the police alert squad, begun long before the Tartaglione operation, was almost finished and that, therefore, it could pass to the action stage. Morucci told me that I would have to participate, together with him, Piccioni, Mai and Cacciotti. After some days, I tried, along with Mai, in Via della Batteria Momentana, to make an on-the-spot inspection. Mai showed me the established point for the ambush. Immediately afterwards, there was another meeting with the four, during which the details of the operation were spelled out, as well as the tasks for each one of us. The operation was to unfold in the following manner. We would have to move a car parked in Via della Batteria Momentana, in the vicinity of the local police barracks. We would then make a telephone call to the police to alert them of the presence of suspicious persons near the car itself and request that some alert squad cars be dispatched. At the arrival of the police squad, Andrea and I would throw an incendiary device on the top of the police car, thereby compelling the agents to escape from the vehicle itself. At that point Piccioni would shoot one or two shots at the motor of the car with his 23 caliber 12-gauge shot gun. Morucci would probably shoot with a 9 caliber

MP pistol against the empty sentry box, to prevent any policeman from climbing up there. Nicola would listen to the police radio, throw nails [on the pavement], and drive the car, a 1100 stolen by Piccioni and Cacciotti, during the escape. In fact, the operation unfolded essentially according to the established plan, with the exception of the unforeseen and unwanted injury of an agent. Andrea, Piccioni, and I stopped above the little wall situated in Via della Batteria Momentana to await the arrival of the squad car. Morucci and Mai remained in the 1100. At the end of the operation, Piccioni, Morucci, Mai and Cacciotti left in the 1100, while I left on foot and then [drove away] on a little motor scooter that was latched to a pole.

The same evening of the ambush I kept an appointment with Piccioni to whom I was supposed to return the 5 caliber 38 pistol that Nicola had given to me just before the ambush. But I did not carry the pistol with me, having hidden it in a flowerbed of a residence in the Momentano neighborhood. Later, I retrieved the pistol and gave it to Nicola at the meeting held the next day in a bar of Piazza Cola di Rienzo. Some time later I learned from Piccioni that the 12-gauge shot gun used against the Alert Squad IV had been employed and had been partially damaged by comrades of Turin from whom it was acquired. I thought that the weapon had been employed against the two surveillance policemen of the "New Prisons" of Turin.

In the attack on Alert Squad IV, the 12-gauge shot gun was used and Morucci's 9 caliber Browning.

A couple of days after the attack on the Galloni escort, an attack on the members of the Police Corps was supposed to be undertaken. The plan had been conceived thus: A telephone call would be made to ask for prompt police action regarding a suspicious individual, perhaps armed, who had gotten out of a car parked in Piazza dei Quattro Venti. (This story would be a complete lie.) If a senior official arrived, Morucci would kill him with an M1 gun, modified into an M2, with a sawed-off barrel. We hoped that Colonel Cornacchia would arrive, one of the choice targets of the BR.

Piccioni, armed with an M12, would be in charge of coverage. Cacciotti also would cover the action with a sawed-off hunting gun; Nicola (Mai) would be ready to launch a hand grenade. I would have

to wait inside the 504 Peugeot which had been stolen by Niccola (Mai). Maria, who was probably Barbara Balzarani, would make the telephone call to request the prompt action of the police concerning the suspicious suspect. The plan did not work, since police were not sent at the tip-off of Maria. Piccioni, Cacciotti, and I took our positions according to the pre-established plan.

THE GALLONI ESCORT

I did not participate in the attack on the policemen in the Galloni escort, which occurred in December of 1978. I learned of the action from the newspapers and the radio. Actually, Morucci and Piccioni told me generally that they were executing another operation against an important person. The following day (after the action) I met Piccioni, Morucci, Mai and Cacciotti in a bar in the area of Viale Trastevere. They said that the ambush of the Galloni escort had been necessary to complete the entire plan. They added that in the ambush the M12 had jammed. The charger was probably loaded with more shots than necessary. They said, for that reason, the 19 caliber pistol had been used. I was not told the names of the participants, among whom were Morucci and Piccioni. I thought that the group to which Loiacono belonged had participated.

VIA SALARIA

In the incendiary attack on the police cars at the little workshop in Via Salaria, Morucci, Cacciotti, Piccioni, Mai, and I participated. We were all armed. I had a P38 Waller automatic; Piccioni had a 9 caliber Browning. Mai had a model 81 Beretta; Cacciotti a 9 caliber Luger; Morucci had a 7.63 caliber Mauser. In the operation Mai was in a Peugeot, which was supposed to be used in the attack against the army police, while Morucci, Piccioni, Cacciotti, and I entered the garage and robbed two cars that were driven by Piccioni and Morucci to Piazza Fiume, where they were burnt. Mai, Cacciotti, and I left in the Peugeot driven by Mai. Cacciotti and I descended into the neighborhood of Via Momentana, while Mai followed in the Peugeot. The action occurred the 14th of February 1979, St. Valentine's Day.

SCHETTINI HOMICIDE

Immediately after the operation of Via Salaria, Morucci, Faranda, Mai, Andreani, Norma, "Giuliano" (*nom de guerre*) this latter a friend of Norma, "Lina" (*nom de guerre*), and I left the brigades after an ideological and political dissension, which was critical at the time and which erupted in that period.

I do not know who participated in the Schettini murder. I recall however, that in the course of a discussion that occurred inside my structure, Piccioni and Cacciotti spoke of the DC leader, Schettini, as a "qualified and fair" object of hatred by the proletariat of the Roman neighborhoods.

After the murder I recalled this detail. Seghetti spoke to me in general about Piazza Nicosia about a year after the action; he told me that it was supposed to have been be a demonstrative action (but was) downgraded because of the police intervention.

The following people in the column management of the Red Brigades in Rome participated in admitting me: Morucci, Faranda, Gallinari, Balzarani, Seghetti and others that I do not know. Later, I learned that Piccioni and Savasta took part in the management.

With reference to the Moro kidnapping, I recall that Libera, during the kidnapping of some days later, told me that while the university brigade (composed of her, Spadaccini, the girl from S. Benedetto and perhaps some others) was involved in an investigation of a university professor linked to the DC, Seghetti was also conducting an investigation of the same person, linking him to the Honorable Moro. Probably it was Professor Tritto. I say as this as a supposition.

With regard to the conduct of Moro during his imprisonment, Morucci said, counting actions told him by others, that Moro had maintained a or that was very courageous and very dignified, though realizing the danger of death that he faced. Morucci said that the Skorpion had been used to kill Moro; Gallinari probably pulled the trigger. Martelli told me that the weapon had been acquired from the FAC a long time ago. Morucci probably transformed it to a rapid-fire weapon.

Besides me, Spadaccini also distributed, during the Moro kidnapping, some communiques for propaganda purposes that were given to him by Emilia Libera.

I heard Dario mentioned by Morucci in January of 1979 as a comrade who was supposed to participate in an attack against an armoured police vehicle, in which a remote control device acquired by Nicola (Mai) would set off the explosives. The plan was never executed, probably because of Morucci's and Nicola's departure from the BR.

DISSENT WITHIN THE RED BRIGADES

With regard to their reasons for the departure from the BR, the first symptoms of the dissension surfaced before the Moro kidnapping, since Morucci told me that he was not in agreement with the idea of the Moro kidnapping. He added that his reason was that the operation had been premature politically and not for tactical reasons. In fact, according to Morucci the reaction of the police (and the state) would not be tolerated by the organization on the military level. Besides, the proletariat did not understand the meaning of the action. Morucci maintained the necessity of completing the operations most linked to the specific interests of the proletariat (residences, work, revenue, services).

With regard to the management of the kidnapping, Spadaccini boasted ties with friends at much higher levels in the organization. He said that very probably Moro would have been freed, because in Rome there was a move in this direction. Later, I understood that Morucci and Faranda were opposed to the murder of Moro. Morucci, in fact, told me this mostly after the dissension in order to explain how his rupture with the organization had come about. They had wanted to save Moro's life and had expressed this opinion when they were consulted by the heads of the organization. I recall that after his departure from the BR, I met Gallinari in a bar near Piazza di Spagna, at the request of Savasta and Libera, who were coming to visit me at home. Gallinari was clearly interested in my reinsertion in the organization and above all in the recovery of the weapons taken by Morucci. Gallinari told me that Morucci and Faranda were two bandits who were being manipulated by

shady persons, such as Piperno and Pace, even before and during the Moro kidnapping.

I responded to Gallinari that I knew nothing of the links between Morucci and Faranda and Piperno and Pace. Regarding the weapons, I told Gallinari that I did not agree with Morucci's decision to take away everything with him. I sought, in accord with Gallinari, to set an appointment between Faranda and a member of the Red Brigades. After some days, I again met Morucci whom I saw frequently, and I spoke of the problem of the weapons and of other questions linked to the concerns of the organization of MCR (that initially was supposed to stand for "Movimento Comunista Combattente," Combatting Communist Movement), and of his ties with Piperno and Pace. I recall that I asked him if it was true that he had maintained ties with Piperno and Pace even after his entrance in the Red Brigades. Morucci responded that he had met with them and that this accessibility did not mean anything since he was linked to them by an old friendship. On that same occasion or on another occasion, Rosati told me that Piperno and Pace were opposed to the departure of Morucci and Faranda from the Red Brigades, since they wanted to continue their battle for a new political direction from within the organization.

JUNE 5, 4 P.M.

At 4 p.m. of June 5, 1981, the interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli is reopened. Before us are Investigating Judges Doctor Ferdinando Imposimato and Doctor Rosario Priore. The presence of the lawyer Ennio Avvisati of Rome is noted.

Reflecting, I recall the fact that Piperno and Pace were opposed to the departure of Morucci and Faranda from the Red Brigades. I learned this, not from Rosati but from "Illari" (*nom de guerre*), whose true name is Andrea, who lives in Milan and who is sought by the police, because of the testimony of Barbone, who named him the person responsible for the distribution of the Kala(s) among the various combatting formations. They were weapons imported by sea from the Middle East through Armando. Scalzone was implicated in the traffic. To this discussion I note that the Kala, discovered through a tip two nights ago, had been consigned

by Illari to Morucci and Mitrani, called David, and then to Giordano. The Kala belonged to a shipment of arms purchased from the commandant Armando in Palestine through the Co.co.mi., the organization to which Mitrani previously belonged and of which Scalzone was an important member in Milan. In the autumn of 1977, at an assembly that was held at the university of Rome, after much time, I met with Martelli with whom I made acquaintance. We spoke of the armed struggle and of the combatting organizations operating in Italy. I told Martelli that I had procured a pistol, a Beretta 34 that was a leftover from the war. Martelli asked me to enter the Co.Co.Mi, which had a legal structure and a clandestine structure and operated in Rome and Milan. Rosati also belonged to the organization. Later I learned that the organization was linked to the Metropoli, which used the funds coming from the robberies staged in the Veneto and in the Friuli area. The Metropoli plan originated in a period before the publication of the first edition. In the organization of which, as I have said, the Co.Co.Ri constituted the legal branch, there existed an illegal branch divided into three sectors: logistic, informative, and operative and having a complete management. Scalzone and perhaps Rosati were members of this management. Martelli and Panzieri were exponents of significance in the illegal structure. Later I learned that Martelli had participated with other comrades of the North in a bank robbery, in the course of which one of the robbers was killed by a sworn patrolman. I learned this from Mitrani and from Illari.

Returning to Martelli's proposal that I enter the organization, I answered him that I was not interested, since I was sympathetic to the Red Brigades. Martelli was considerate of my decision and did not insist. From that moment, our ties became remote.

About fifteen days after the action of Via Salaria, February 14, 1979, or even sooner than that, at a meeting of the logistic structure that was held in Piazza Quadrata, in a bar, Michele (Piccioni) said that his comrade Matteo (Morucci) had been suspended from his duties and, therefore, he would not even be able to be present at the meeting. Matteo, nevertheless, was present and intended to give his version of the facts. In the first place, he launched an attack on the line of the management of the column, starting with the murder of Guido Rossa. This

action was judged a very grave mistake. The criticism was also directed against the line of the entire organization. This, according to Morucci, did not coincide anymore with the interests of the proletariat.

Immediately afterwards, Morucci left. At the meeting, besides Michele, Matteo, and me, there were Andrea (Cacciotti) and Nicola (Mai).

I wish to specify that between the action of Via Salaria and the meeting of Piazza Quadrata, Michele told us that a robbery of a business on Viale Trastevere near the station was supposed to have taken place. The robbery was supposed to have been staged by the logistic brigade. Giuseppe (Gallinari) was supposed to have been the cover person. The robbery was not undertaken. Later I learned that a certain Dario had charged that we, especially Nicola and I, had left the meeting in order not to take part in the robbery.

After Morucci left, Michele told us that the suspension regarded not only Morucci but also a female comrade, and that the group decided to permit those two comrades to write a document in which they would expound their criticisms of the organization. He did not tell us that, during the probation period, the two comrades would have to stay in an isolated house guarded by a member of the organization. This, according to Matteo, was a type of prison. The house was certainly outside Rome. Immediately after this announcement, Michele sought to bring the meeting to a level of routine technical work.

At the end of the meeting, Nicola took me aside and told me that the comrade Matteo and the companion Alessandra had written a letter to the column management and that if I were interested in reading that letter, I would have to meet him at an appointment at Piazza Verbano. The appointment was in the morning. I answered the invitation, and we read the letter. I told him that I was in agreement with the contents, and Nicola scheduled me an appointment within a few days with Matteo. This meeting occurred in a bar of Piazza Verdi. Present were Nicola, Matteo, and I.

At this point, since it was late, the Office recesses the interrogation. It will be reconvened tomorrow morning at 9 a.m.

JUNE 6, 9 A.M.

In the year 1981, on the sixth day of June at 9 a.m. the investigation is reopened in Rome. Before us are Investigating Judges Dr. Imposimato and Dr. Priore, representing the Investigating Advisor Dr. Cudillo, assisted by the Secretary De Monti.

Massimo Cianfanelli is present and states:

Towards the end of 1977, the ties with Martelli and Panzieri are reopened, since I was able to meet them for about two months. As I have already said, they were interested in my joining the organization of the Co.Co.Ri. of which they were already members. I already explained that the Co.Co.Ri. were linked to the *Metropoli* newspaper through some people, among them, Scalzone, Dony or Tony, and Illari. Dony wrote for the *Metropoli*, but Illari did not. I knew Illari between 1979 and 1980, in circumstances that I do not succeed in recalling, by means of Mitrani and others of the MCR group ex-CoCoRi. Illari, whose true name is Andrea, consigned to Mitrani and Morucci the AK47 Kala that was at the disposition of the MCR. While Martelli and Panzieri operated in Rome, Illari and Dony operated in Milan. With reference to Panzieri, I recall that in 1977, some time before the arrest of Rosati, he told me that he worked at CerPet, an institute involved in statistical research. Panzieri specified that, in reality, it was a light-load job which allowed him to earn the money. He said that he had been able to obtain that job through a recommendation of persons in the PSI. He did not give names.

(To a question he answers) I recognize Illari and Dony.

The Office shows to the accused a photo album of the following persons: Falcone, Gilpriano; Bergamini, Luigi; Costa, Maurizio; Palmero, Giorgio; Del Giudice, Pietro; Minervino, Claudio; De Feo, Domenico; Balducci, Ernesto; Pastori, Bruno; Bevilacqua, Rocco Ugo; Folini, Maurizio; Gardi, Eugenio; Achilli, Antonio; Lombino, Maurizio; Morelli, Andrea. The accused states: I recognize with absolute certainty in the photos, whose numbers are 67/81 and 35 SDF, Illari and Dony. The Office notes that the photos reproduce the faces of Andrea Morelli and Domenico De Feo.

Illari one day told me that he had made ties with Nicotri's wife.

The accused declares: The ties between Morucci and Illari (Morelli) certainly precede in time those between Illari and me. Morucci had contacts with Illari immediately after his departure from the BR and, that is, in February or March of 1979. Probably I sometimes talked with Illari about the reasons for the departure of Morucci and Faranda from the BR, I do not recall the terms of the discussion. I recall, instead, at this moment, that when I met Gallinari, after my departure from the BR, he told me not only that Morucci and Faranda had maintained ties with Piperno and Pace even after their entrance in the organization, but also that they had assumed responsibility for contacting Piperno and Pace, now that they were outside the organization, so that they could pressure some politicians to initiate negotiations between the BR and agencies of the state. Gallinari said that the organization was opposed to this until the State *de facto* recognized the BR by means of other methods, through contacts with political parties or symbols. The Red Brigades wanted the the State to recognize it as an organization simply as a result of power-ties between the terrorist group and the State.

MCR

Returning to the discussion on the formation of the MCR, after the meeting at the bar of Piazza Verdi--it is between the end of February and the beginning of March--we began to discuss the document that Morucci and Faranda were preparing. The discussion always occurred in the bar. The four of us met, Nicola (Mai), Matteo (Morucci), Alessandra (Faranda), and I. Morucci, abandoning the BR, had absconded with many weapons. Besides those hidden in Viale Giulio Cesare, there were also those common to the MCR that were kept in cars, and those that Nicola had.

Regarding the symbol (logo) in the first discussions we thought of the denomination Combatting Communist Party. The adjective chosen was Revolutionary, because this last term appeared more linked to the needs of the proletariat. It was Morucci who decided on this meaning. He told us also that he had worked on this plan for a long time; thus,

the embryo of the organization had already been established through a network of contacts. He told us that he and Alessandra were in precarious situations regarding lodging and that we also should take them in and find them a home. He never mentioned the apartment of Viale Giulio Cesare. He did not speak of the persons who had helped him. He did not trust anyone. Perhaps the only one who might know something about him and his whereabouts, his deposits of arms and documents, would be Davoli. He was an old CoCoRi. He was concerned with the Territorial Committees. I am not able to say whether he also took part in the so-called vertical structures. I never had direct ties with the CoCoRi. I do not know, therefore, what the internal organization of such committees was like.

At this point the Office, considering the lateness of the hour, suspends the interrogation until 8 a.m. Monday the 8th.

JUNE 8, 9:30 A.M.

Before us is Investigating Judge Doctor Ferdinando Imposimato and Dr. Rosario Priore at 9:30 of the 8th of June 1981; Massimo Cianfanelli is present for the continuation of the interrogation.

Cianfanelli states:

After the departure from the Red Brigades and before the arrest of Morucci and Faranda, I was able to meet Seghetti and at other times Piccioni and Cacciotti, regarding their attempt to reenter the organization. In these encounters Piccioni repeated the accusations against Morucci and Faranda already made by Gallinari. He said that Morucci and Faranda were bandits, that they were manipulated by Piperno and Pace and by others, and that they had entered the organization without ever sharing the political line, but for the sole purpose of imposing the political plan of Piperno, Pace, and Scalzone, who were for the *movimentista* line. Piccioni and Seghetti repeated the other accusation that Morucci and Faranda always maintained contacts with Piperno and Pace, who proposed to gain hegemony over the Red Brigades from the outside. This accusation was repeated later also by "Illari" (Morelli, Andrea), who knew Scalzone and Morucci, from whom he was able to deduce this plan. I, while accepting the criticisms made by Piccioni, Seghetti and Cacciotti, did not alter my decision to leave the Red Brigades.

At this point I recall an interesting episode to bring up. For years, I knew a certain Franco Messina, who participated in the assemblies, who hung around the physics department. After I entered the Red Brigades, I continued to meet Messina in the spring of 1978 and spoke with him of politics and of the armed struggle. He believed in the necessity of shifting to the armed struggle to "beat the system." Libera, Messina, and I met several times at the University of Rome in the period of May and June of 1978. For a certain period, I no longer saw Messina--whose *nom de guerre* at first was "Marcello"--and I thought that Libera had recruited him in the same manner she had recruited me. Later I saw him by accident. He behaved with extreme caution, and he told me to be on guard and not to be seen with him too much. He, in fact, knew that I belonged to the Red Brigades. My belief that he belonged to the Red Brigades was confirmed in a situation in which in 1980, in the first months, he put me in contact with Seghetti. The principal reason for the meeting was the fact that the comrades of the MPRO of the Appio-Tuscolano meant to establish political ties with the comrades of the MCR in our area for the purpose of organizing a coordinated effort with them. The other motive was to inform us that other comrades of the MCR had been photographed by the police at some points in Rome. I therefore asked Messina to put me in contact with someone of the Red Brigades with some responsibility. He set an appointment for me with Seghetti in front of the Appio cinema. After Seghetti missed some appointments that I kept, Messina told me that he was not able to locate him; finally I met Seghetti. I saw Seghetti two or three times. One time we went to eat in the restaurant "da Toto" and two other times in other restaurants in the area of San Giovanni Appio. In these meetings we spoke of ties between the nuclei of the MCR and of the MPRO. This latter is a revolutionary movement supervised by the Red Brigades through the irregulars and sometimes some regulars. Sometimes the Red Brigades, through Gallinari, made contacts with the representatives of the MPRO. This occurred in the period of the dispute between the BR and the Morucci followers, to prevent them from forming ties with the MPRO.

INTERNATIONAL TIES

I know nothing precise about ties between the BR and foreign organizations or states. I recall that during my militancy in the Red Brigades, Morucci (Matteo) told me that in France, probably in Paris, he had had contact with elements of Al Fatah who had a printing press in France. He added that they were not well furnished with arms. Another time Gallinari said that on the occasion of a trip made many years before to countries in the East, he had ties with some officials of the special police.

After my departure from the BR, I learned from Illari that a certain commandant Armando, who had contacts with their organization, of which Scalzone was a prominent member, had ties with minor agents of the KGB, who had furnished him (Scalzone) with a pass through Palestine and the countries of the Middle East (this for the purpose of allowing him to travel peacefully in the countries of the Middle East to buy weapons). The Kala comes from a shipment made in 1977 or 1978, through "Armando." Illari said vaguely that Armando had been stopped by the police of some foreign countries. I do not know if the ex-patriot-at-large came with the support of the foreign organizations. I know that Martelli succeeded in obtaining a passport that was given to him by someone who had falsely claimed to have lost it. The passport allowed Martelli to circulate freely abroad.

I know that Scalzone expatriated to France by train. The investigation will be continued at 9 A.M. on June 9, 1981.

JUNE 9, 9 A.M.

At 9 a.m. of the 9th day of June 1981, the deposition of the interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli is reopened.

Before us are Investigating Judge Dr. Ferdinando Imposimato and Dr. Rosario Priore.

Cianfanelli states:

Morucci, as I have already said, had built before March of 1979 a whole network of contacts and of ties in Rome principally with exponents of the ex-Communist Committees: first of all with Davoli, then Mitrani,

Turco, and some others. I learned this after committing myself to the Morucci plan. Concerning Davoli's contacts, I learned the following news. He was in "Potere Operaio" (Workers' Power); he was a friend of Seghetti; he had fought in the Revolutionary Communist Committee, involving himself in the work of the masses. I learned this news directly from him. I knew him after my departure from the Red Brigades in March of 1979, and, in recent times, I saw him frequently. He was nicknamed "Riccio;" he did not have a good reputation; he passed as a big talker, a meddler, whom one could not trust. These judgments came chiefly from Martelli, who, however, had left the CoCoRi; thus there might have been personal feelings of rancor. By means of his friendship with Seghetti, he had built a nucleus of the MPRO in the Appio. He had organized three or four of his friends of the Alberone and, that is, Ornello Turco, Stefano, and some others. The activities of this group were limited to periodic meetings with Seghetti and others for formulating some investigations against the police barracks, commissaries, and exponents of the DC of the neighborhood. Davoli was fence-sitting. He belonged, on one hand, to the orthodox wing of the Red Brigades through Seghetti and, on the other, to the *movimentisti* through Morucci. This was before his departure rather than after, and for a very brief time, since the orthodox Red Brigades, learning of his game, cut all ties.

After the meeting at Piazza Verdi, we met a few times in various bars in the area of Parioli to discuss the document of Morucci. Other persons came to these meetings besides those of Piazza Verdi. There were seven of us, who are always discussed in the newspapers and on the television and, that is, besides Morucci, Faranda, and me, Mai "Carla" that is, Norma Andreani; "Giuliano," whom I know very little, because I met him only two or three times--he could have been arrested at the border between Italy and Yugoslavia; and "Lina" whose true name I do not know, Florentine, ex-NAP member, perhaps a student.

Besides the seven of us, there were about twenty people, the results of contacts of Morucci. At the most, they coincide with the persons of whom I have already spoken, chiefly when I referred to persons who had weapons found at Tuscolo. Before listing these persons, it is well to specify some characteristics of the structure

of the movement. In the first place, Morucci and Faranda, above all, established a management. Members included Morucci, Faranda, Davoli, Mitrani and Turco. This management met often in the bars and definitely sometimes at the Turco's home. Turco lives alone with his mother and, therefore, can easily set up meetings at his house. Below this management there were two structures labelled generically as apparati. In one there were Morucci, Faranda, Davoli, Benedetti, and I. In the other there were the ex-FCA members, D'Aguanno, Pallone, Claudio, Genoio and a fourth named "Emilio," who is a different person from the other "Emilio" whose real name was Carlo. The structures did not have, at least at the time of which we are speaking (between March and May of 1979), any precise functions.

As one can observe, in the structures new names appear. Benedetti was a friend of Turco, coming from the area of the Combatting Communists. D'Aguanno came from the FCA experience, that is, from the same experience already completed by Morucci. The same thing, I think, one could say of Pallone, of Genoio and of Emilio. They had the same political experience. I know that some years earlier, they had claimed some operations with the logo "Vyborg Brigade." The structure or nucleus of the apparatus did not have the character of a territorial organ. In parallel fashion, along with the division by structure there was division according to territorial nuclei. There were the following nuclei: that of Appio, the Tiburtino and two of North Rome. The Appio was composed of Turco, Stefano (true name); Guerra, Mario; "Piera," whose true name was Laurama and is not Laura Serani (she belonged to the Communist Avantgarde and was the friend of Martelli--perhaps a student in the humanities and an inhabitant of IV Miglio); and the fiancée of Davoli, Kitty, whose mother has a clothing store in Via del Governo Vecchio.

The Tiburtine was composed of "Valentino," whose true name is Cesare, who works at the Camera. I have seen the others a couple times, but I do not know their *nom de guerre*.

I do not know how the two nuclei of Rome North are divided. I know that the following belong to these nuclei: "Fabio," Marta, the fiancée of "Fabio," "Emilio" (whose real name is Carlo), and others whom I do not remember.

Finally, there was a very strict rapport with the collective of Val Melaina, which was headed by "Emilio" of [the] Vyborg [Brigade].

This is the situation up to the capture of Morucci and Faranda.

The movement in this period, as later, never had bases. I did not know where the weapons were kept in this period (February-May 1979). Later they were kept in a house at Borgata Labaro, rented by a member of the MCR, a student finished with course work (or so it seems to me), whose *nom de guerre* was "Gino." For some time, then, they were kept in a car, a 132, provided by those of the Vyborg with false licenses, and moved from one parking spot to another. I recall that for some time it was kept in the neighborhood of the Trastevere Station, on Viale Trastevere, between Viale Trastevere and Via Portuense. Most recently, the weapons have been buried in bins. As I already said, there were two bins: that of Pallone and that of Tuscolo. There was then, as I have said, the small receptacle of Villa degli Scipioni. In this period a real file system had not yet been developed. The results of the "investigations" fell into the hands of Morucci and Faranda. Any of the papers taken in Viale Giulio Cesare were more or less of BR origin, however.

Just as [BR] weapons had first bolstered the MCR. There were, in fact, those that were confiscated in Viale Giulio Cesare. There was, however, also the support that came from the Revolutionary Communist Parties. Among those confiscated from Morucci, I do not think that there were weapons from ex-CoCoRi. I do not recall any taken from the Pallone deposit; perhaps the Sten, one was confiscated on that occasion. Among those of the Tuscolo deposit there were of ex-CoCoRi origin: the Kala, whose story is already told ("Armando," Mai, Morucci, MCR); the two hunting guns; the automatic; and the 12-gauge shot gun. But the Colt was of ex-BR origin. I do not recall the origin of the other weapons in the hands of the State.

In this period the MCR completed its only operation. I clarify: the operation has not been claimed. It was a house robbery. It was undertaken some time before the arrest of Matteo and Alessandro in an apartment of Viale del Vignola. It was a private residence. "Giuliano," Norma Andreani, and I were the operatives. We decided on it with Morucci and Faranda. I do not know if they spoke about it to the police. The residence was on the first floor. Only the owner was there. The

pretext came from Norma. She never told us from whom she got the information. We had arrived at the place on foot. Our weapons were: a Beretta 35 for me and a Beretta, it seems, a model 70, for Giuliano; Norma was without weapons. She did not enter the home. The owner was immobilized with some scotch. We took only paintings, ten or fifteen. Giuliano and I left the place by taxi. Andreani got away on foot, taking with her the paintings (only the canvases). I presume that she lived in that area. The action occurred in the late morning. I saw the two again the same evening or the next morning. They told me that they had sold some paintings. Later they disappeared, and I do not know what became of them.

With the arrest of Morucci and Faranda, occurring at the end of May, the organization entered into crisis--a crisis aggravated then by the complication some time later of the newspapers and the television, and of the photos of Davoli and of his later escape abroad.

At this point, considering the lateness of the hour, the Office suspends the interrogation, which will be reconvened at 4:30 in the afternoon.

JUNE 9 AT 4:30 PM

At 4:30 of June 9, 1981 the deposition of interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli reopens.

Before us are Investigating Judges Dr. Rosario Priore and Ferdinando Imposimato, in the presence of the Public Prosecutor in the person of Advocate Procurator General, Dr. Salvatore Vecchione. The accused, to a question, answers:

Between the capture of Morucci and Faranda and the escape of Davoli, there were only three meetings in which we primarily discussed the arrests, hypothesizing as to how...the police were able to find their hiding place.

At these meetings Davoli was present and, besides the two of us, there was Benedetti. He hypothesized that the source could have been the porter at the house of Miss Conforto. We spoke of other things as well. The investigations were suspended and all other activities.

After the appearance of the photos, Davoli fled immediately without contacting me. I know none of the details of the escape.

I learned later that Kitty was with him in France. The summer of 1979 passed without any activity. It picked up when Davoli returned to Rome. Immediately after Davoli's arrival, they also renewed contacts with the Vyborg Brigade. In this period also, a group of comrades joined the MCR--the comrades of Centocelle-Villa Gordiani. The group was formed of 17-18 persons. I know the *noms de guerre* of only two of them, "Fausto" and "Carlo."

It was a more than well-known fact in the organization that Davoli needed a flat and that it was found and registered to Mario Guerra.

The flat was supposed to be paid for by the organization. Not having liquid assets available, the rent was paid for in advance by Guerra.

He had also paid in advance other sums for the expenses of the organization, because in that period he did a rather profitable business, selling high fidelity equipment.

In this period, which lasts up to the release of Rosati from prison, the management of the organization was, in practice, collegial and in the hands of Davoli (at least up to his arrest), of Mitrani, of me, of D'Aguanno, of Genoino, of Turco and of some others, whom I now do not recall.

This management decided on a campaign focusing on the problem of housing to induce the builders to let flats. In the period of this campaign three operations were undertaken: the attack on Settimo Imperi, the raid on the headquarters of the UPPI, and the derisive treatment of Colombo Masi.

The arrest of Davoli and of Guerra did not bring modifications to the planned [party] line. The arrests were at the end of November.

The first of the operations was the incursion of the UPPI. This acronym stands for the Union of Small Furniture Proprietors. The headquarters is found in the area of Viale Aventino, in the neighborhood of Porta S. Paolo. The decision was made in December of 1979. Participating were "Fausto," Genoino, and I. The "investigation" was conducted by everyone. We went to the site in the 132, of which I spoke before and which served as an arms deposit. It was white and in that time it

had a license Rome R6....They told me that it had a real license, as though it had been an abandoned car. It had 2000 cylinders. Our weapons were: for me, a Beretta 70; for "Fausto," I think, a Sew. Chief Special 38 at five shots and two inches; for Genoino, who had a regular license to bear arms, a Swiss pistol, the Sieg, which he owned. He sometimes carried his father's pistol, a 38 revolver or 357. We took some card files. A dozen persons that I do not know were present, persons whom we led to a room from which they could not leave for at least fifteen minutes after our escape. Money was taken from some of them. I do not recall if we took personal documents. No shot was fired.

On the silenced victims, we wrote slogans, I think, using the MCR acronym.

We left the place, again in the 132.

The second action was the injury of Settimo Imperi. He was a builder, who had his offices on a cross street of Via Bocca, near piazza Irnerio. Also in this case the investigation was conducted a little by everyone; principally however, by those of Rome-North. It occurred around December 20. The decision was made as usual by the collegial management (except for Davoli who was in prison). The action was actually completed by four persons: "Valentino," D'Aguanno, Genoino, and I. Three of us entered the studio.

Valentino remained at the door. I do not recall if the car was the 132 or the red Ritmo, stolen some time earlier.

We entered the various rooms and found three or four persons, including the builder. Those present were bound. Genoino took Imperi, brought him to another room, made him sit on a chair, chained him, and shot him in the leg under the knee. He used a 22 caliber of the organization, that was presumably part of the cache found at Tuscolo. Besides this caliber 22, Genoino had the Swiss pistol.

I had brought a Beretta model 81 that would later be confiscated after the Abruzzo robbery, in which Pallone and Genoino died.

D'Aguanno had the P38, which Pallone was holding when he was killed at Alfedena.

I do not recall what weapon Valentino had.

We also carried the "Kala" of Tuscolo in a bag, that I kept during the "Valentino" breakin. Just as I was leaving, I took the bag. Pallone awaited us in the area of Via Gregorio VII at the top of Piazza Pio XI. The weapons were collected in the bag, a sort of gymnastic satchel, consigned to Pallone, who then was supposed to hide it in the trunk of the 132.

In January, before Epiphany, I think we executed the other operation, the injury of Masi Colombo, also a builder.

This operation was also decided on by the collegial management as part of the house campaign. As actual planners, there were I [sic], Genoino, Benedetti, Fabio, Ornello Turco, Pallone, Mitrani, and "Emilio," (Carlo).

The first four of us remained outside; the others entered the headquarters of the business.

The business was in the town-house of a builder, that is located in the Aventino, in a street that starts from Piazzale Romeo and Remo, in Via delle Terme Deciane, now that I recall better. It was near six in the evening.

As I said, Genoino, Benedetti, Fabio, and I remained on the street in the neighborhood. The other four, after having entered inside, immobilized Masi. They spoke to him for about ten minutes, expounding to him the reasons for the action--so they told me--and then they covered him with red paint and photographed him. I do not recall if they took anything.

I know that a small cord of an explosive was left in the garage and in the garden of the town-house. However, it did not explode. We left the place in two cars, that is, in the usual 132 and the red Ritmo.

On that occasion weapons were not used. On the inside of the town house. I believe there was only a secretary. I do not recall what weapons the group that entered the townhouse had in its possession. I recall that I had a P38, one of two, which I threw into the Tiber from Ponte Sisto. "Rocco," that is, Benedetti, had another P38, the one that Pallone held at Alfedena. Genoino had his Siley. We then hid, for convenience, gym bags (with the Kala and one of the guns, probably the 26 caliber shot

gun, found in Tuscolo) behind a hedge. I do not know if the "internal" group wrote slogans on the walls of the villa. There was a claim made by telephone; I do not recall by whom. It seems to me that there was a claim also for the Imperi attack, made probably by D'Aguanno.

Immediately after Luigi Rosati's release from prison, he returned to political activity, participating in the meeting of the MCR. He knew well the MCR plan that he had discussed at length with Morucci, imprisoned with him in the same cell at Rebibbia or anyway in the same wing. A lady who was with him then, Barbara Starita, always remained in contact. I am not able, however, to specify her degree of participation in the organization; I know, anyway that she took part in the meetings with the MCR.

Rosati left prison and began to frequent the meetings around the end of January 1980. He became a regular at the end of February.

In the first month he participated, in fact, only in two or three meetings. In this period the meetings occurred either in the bars or in the homes of the girl friend of Emilio (Carlo), who is called Masura. This girl living in Alessandrino only furnished us the house and did not participate in the meetings. At these meetings, eight at the most participated. Rosati, from February on, was almost always present, as were Mitrani, D'Aguanno, Genoino, Pallone and Turco, and I.

They were usually weekly.

At the end of the house campaign in January 1980, there was a period of reflection and debate. With the end of this campaign, the organization lost the Tiburtino group, which broke away because of disagreements and personal problems.

In March of 1980 the MCR, through D'Aguanno, entered into contact with some deserters of "Prima Linea." The first contact was made on the occasion of a trip north that D'Aguanno, Genoino, and I took. We arrived by train at Bergamo. Here we met two or three youths, whose names I do not recall, except that one was Alberto. And later I identified him as Marco Donat-Cattin; these were the youths with whom we went to Milan. They were known to D'Aguanno. We went first with them to Brescia. From Brescia we reached Milan by train and from there, we were taken in an autobus, to Piazza Castello, the Val d'Aosta, to the

Commune of Pre S. Didier. Here we were hosted in an apartment rented by a certain Cristina Scandolo. I learned this name later from the newspapers. In the girl's home, there were, besides the three of us from Rome and those whom we had met in Bergamo, a boy from Florence called "Piero," some from Brescia, of whom one was called "Ivan," and others from Turin. In all, there were ten persons. The girl did not participate. Concerning the date of this meeting, I am able to fix it at between the end of March and the beginning of April (because when we were in Brescia as guests of the fiancée of Donat-Cattin, we learned from the radio of the police breakin at Via Fracchia at Genoa).

The meeting lasted two days. Rosati was supposed to come, but in the end he decided not to participate, because he thought he was being followed. We discussed politics. We did not speak, however, of mergers. Except for us, almost all the others were ex-members of "Prima Linea." Now I remember that there was also a man from Padoa, whose name I do not recall. I recall only that he was older than the others; in fact, he seemed to be 35 years old.

We considered operations in common, and the Brescia people proposed to steal the paychecks of the city hospital employees.

No one spoke of a merger, both because we Romans had limited goals and opportunities in the city and because the ex-members of "Prima Linea" were all almost about ready to leave Italy.

Regarding that subject, someone spoke of establishing centers outside [Italy] to assist those at large, and themselves, that is, the comrades who expatriate.

After the discovery of Via Silvani, I was stupefied by the fact that the apartment had been rented by Enzo Bella, whose photo I recognized in the newspapers. I knew Bella, since he was a cousin by marriage--he was the husband of the cousin--of Franco Messina. I want to specify, with regard to the interrogation of yesterday, that I did not learn of the news regarding the activities of Morucci in France directly from him but probably through "Illari."

Between my departure from the BR and the discovery of Vescovio, I saw Martelli again, who asked me to participate in a kidnapping, but I did not accept. I knew Squadrani since the time of the Communist Avantgarde, an organization in which we both fought.

I know that Rino Proietti was a friend of D'Aguanno. Regarding Loiacono, I recall that one day he told me that the robbery at the Ministry of Transportation committed in February of 1980 by the BR should have been carried out a year earlier and that he [Loiacono] was supposed to participate. He added that on that occasion he had a purse with him. The robbery was not carried out because of an unforeseen circumstance. I do not know when Loiacono entered the BR. I certainly know that he was already a component of the triple, a structure operative at a high level, at the time of the murder of Tartaglione.

Martelli was convinced that he (Loiacono) had been in the BR a long time. Once he confided to me that Loiacono was probably involved in the action on Via Fani; Martelli met him in an apartment the 16th of March and noted that he was very tired. Loiacono was the protege of Morucci.

I recognize "Lina" who already belonged to NAP and to "Lotta Continua" and who then entered the BR in January 1978. She left the BR in order to belong to the structure of dissent, in February 1979, together with the Morucci followers. I knew that "Lina" was Florentine and that she had been victim of an auto theft.

It is stated that Cianfanelli is shown the identification photo of Marigo, Cristina.

Cianfanelli states that he is 80 percent sure that he recognizes in the photo of Marigo the "Lina" of whom he spoke.

At this point, considering the lateness of the hour, the Office suspends the interrogation, which will be reopened tomorrow the 10th of June at 9 a.m.

June 9, 1981, 9 A.M.

Today, June 10, 1981, at 9 a.m. the interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli reopens. Before the Investigating Judge, Dr. Rosario Priore, appears the accused, who, to a question, answers:

A little after the meeting of President Didier some of the participants, coming from the North, came to Rome for a new meeting with us of the MCR. Among them there were surely "Alberto" (Marco Donat Cattin), two from Turin (they were workers at the Fiat), "Ivan" of Brescia, a person from Padova and "Piero" of Florence.

This meeting was definitely held in April. I do not recall if it was before or after the arrest of Sandalo. Anyway even if it was afterwards, it was certainly before we knew that he was talking, since all appeared calm. It lasted two days, and it was held in the home of Maura, the fiancée of "Emilio" (Carlo) in Alessandrino.

The discussion begun in Val d'Aosta was continued, and principally elaborated on the theme of the constitution of the so-called centers of assistance from abroad.

For the MCR, D'Auanno, Mitrani, Rosati, I and for one day, Genoino, were present. I do not recall if "Emilio" was also present.

There were no real conclusions. It was established only that we would develop the investigation of the hospital bank of Brescia, and we decided on a new meeting, it seems to me to be held in Florence. Two commissions were created; one, political and other, logistic. The commissions never met. Genoino borrowed a pistol from the ex-Prima Linea member, consigning it to "Piero." It was a 44 magnum revolver. It was never returned.

The ties between the two groups were kept by Donat Cattin for the ex-PL members and by D'Aguanno for the MCR. The two groups did not meet anymore. I saw "Alberto" occasionally in Vila Carlo Felice at the beginning of May. I still did not know that "Alberto" was Donat Cattin. It was morning. He told me that a warrant for his arrest had been

issued and that he intended to go abroad. He added that he had, that day, an appointment with D'Aguanno. At the moment in which he told me of the warrant, the news was not public. The day after, it appeared in the newspapers. I saw his photo in the *Paese Sera* the next day. The news and the photo were on the first page.

Some time later we in the MCR learned through D'Aguanno, who learned it from Donat Cattin that Sandalo had begun to talk and, therefore, the ex-members of the PL were protecting themselves.

Donat Cattin and D'Aguanno were in contact by telephone. Donat Cattin did not tell me from whom he learned of the warrant for his arrest. D'Aguanno, some time later, told me that he had learned it from some warrant the family had.

I do not recall if the *Paese Sera* that I read was an evening or morning edition. Probably it was an evening edition of the previous evening and, therefore, of the day of the meeting in Via Carlo Felice. This meeting lasted very little time, because "Alberto" was in a big hurry.

I knew that almost all the ex-PLs were leaving for abroad, except for "Piero" and the fellow from Padoa (because he was seen again in Rome, right before summer).

They remembered the meeting place and, through Mauro, that is, "Emilio," they put themselves again in contact with us.

At the meeting, which occurred in the vicinity of Piazza Ungheria, there were Genoino, Pallone, Mitrani, and I. It lasted a very short time. We asked for the 44 magnum. They told us that it was in a secure place. We did not make any plans for the future.

We only made a new appointment in a city of the North: an appointment that we did not keep.

They showed much disagreement with the comrades who had expatriated.

Regarding the ties with the comrades of the groups that were not Roman, we had contacts with elements of Padua, Bologna, and Milan.

All the people were already in contact with the Communist Committees of Rome. We met several times in Rome, two or three times in Bologna and once in Padua. In the meetings of Rome and Bologna there

were representatives of all four of the cities mentioned. In the Padoa meeting the Bologna representatives were missing. These meetings took place during the period of the existence of the MCR or at least until the end of September 1980.

For Milan Illari and Doni (of whom I have already spoken and that is Andrea Morelli and Domenico De Feo) came. For Padoa two or three persons, among whom I recall only a certain "Armando" who certainly is not the "Armando"--ex-importer of weapons. I know this through "Illari." From Bologna three or four people, whose names I do not recall, except for the *nom de guerre* of a girl, a certain "Caterina." I know that one boy was a worker at Ducati. For Rome we all alternated a little. I personally was once in Padova, one or two times in Bologna and sometimes in Rome. I recall among the others, Mitrani, Turco, and Arbore. Rosati, however, never moved from Rome.

The comrades of Padoa and Bologna probably came from experiences of the Movement and of "Autonomia." Those of Milan instead came from experiences in the groups of Scalzone, such as "Senza Tregua" (Without Truce) and Co.Co.Ri.

In the course of the various meetings we principally discussed a plan of coordination between the various groups in the areas of exchange of political experiences, the assistance to comrades in prison, the construction of a logistic [plan] capable of taking care of escapees and those at large, possibly abroad. In reality, nothing was decided.

We also discussed an operative project proposed by the Padoa comrades, a bank robbery and damage to a bank inside a hospital, the hospital of Padoa. In this case also, no one ventured beyond the idea of the hospital and the bank. Genoino and I took part in the on-the-spot investigation with the Padoans and "Illari." The plan was, however, immediately shelved, because of the practical difficulties for realization. I read, however, some time ago that that bank was robbed. I learned also, through "Giordano" (Mitrani) that the comrades of Padoa were not involved.

In the period spanning the return of Rosati and the beginning part of the summer, the MCR completed four robberies. Before speaking of the robberies individually, I wish to clarify, however, how the decision was taken. For the apartment robberies and smaller ones, a

certain autonomy was left to the comrades of the individual nuclei. Their only obligation was to inform at least one member of the management (about the operation), that is, the collegial management of which I have already spoken, so that the management would be able to assess the danger of the operation itself.

For the bank robberies, or anyway larger robberies, the decision was taken by the organization of management, which debated and evaluated all the problems of the operation. The fundamental criterion was that of avoiding operations on targets defended by armed persons, so as not to get involved in cross fire. The weapons remained in the deposit and were withdrawn only on the day of the operation.

The booty, whether from the robberies of banks or of residences, was supposed to be invested in legal activities, such as the opening of stores, beer places, and bars, sales in the high fidelity sector, and import-export enterprises. (I recall that D'Aguanno had contacts in that sector and wanted to invest some money there.)

Regarding the individual robberies of the period considered, there were two in dwellings and two in banks. Now I do not recall the exact sequence of all four operations. I recall, of the robberies of dwellings, the first was in the vicinity of Piazza Igea and the second on Via Urbana. Regarding the bank robberies, the first was at the Bank of Cimino at Cura di Vetralla in the Viterbo area, and the second was also in the Viterbo area at the bank of Cimino, in Canepina.

The first robbery of a residence, near Piazza Igea, was done by members of the Appio nucleus, that is, by Benedetti, Turco, and "Enzo" (Enrico of Via Gregorio Pius) and me. The pretext came from Enrico. He sold stamps and knew the address of the collector. The robbery, however, yielded only two suitcases of stamps, from which we got only 200 thousand lire. We did not succeed in taking the most valuable stamps, because they were kept in a safe, whose keys were held by the owner, absent at the moment of our break-in. In the house (at the time of the robbery), there were: the wife of the owner, the maid, and one or two children.

Turco, Benedetti, and I went in; Enrico remained outside. We introduced ourselves as employees of a florist's shop. Our weapons were the "chief special," a Beretta 35 and a 70. Enrico probably had a 38,

carried legally, because he had a license. The robbery took place near the end of May--before June. We escaped in Enrico's car, a green Volvo, a familiar model.

The second robbery in an apartment, that of Via Urbana, was undertaken some days later by the same group. The pretext this time also came from Enrico, involving himself again with a stamp collector. Here we used the trick of the postal package. Once inside, we found the owner, a retired judge, his daughter, an aunt, and perhaps also his wife. The weapons, it seems to me, were the same. I perhaps had taken an 81 instead of the 35. On this occasion we stole several stamps. surely of value, as we learned from the papers. Immediately after the robbery, we were supposed to meet with Enrico, who was supposed to await us in the Volvo at the corner of Via Paolina and Via Cavour. He instead changed positions, because as he told us, he had seen some persons of the Regional Office (or something like that); and they were observing him. We waited a while with the purse and the suitcases, where we had placed the stamps. After a while we heard the police sirens, and we abandoned, for that reason, the purses and the bags behind a delivery van (parked) by a closed bar in Via dell'Olmata. We returned to the place after about an hour and a half, but we did not find anything. Some time later Enrico told us that a stamp collector whom he knew had had a "windfall" in his business, from which information he hypothesized that the stamp collector must have found the material stolen by us.

The Office, considering the lateness of the hour, suspends the interrogation, which will be reconvened at 5:30 PM today.

JUNE 10, 6 P.M.

It is June 10, 1981 at 6 p.m.; the interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli reopens. Before the Investigating Judge Dr. Rosario Priore appears the accused who to a question answers: In both the robberies the weapons were picked up and then redeposited in the 132, which in that time was in the area of Viale Trastevere. In this same period the two bank robberies were decided upon and undertaken. The first, as I said, is that of Cura di Vetralla, carried out towards the end of June. The proposal, it seems to me, came from Genoino. It had been selected

because there was no armed surveillance. There were six of us: Genoino, Pallone, Benedetti, "Emilio" (Carlo) and "Fabio," and I. We made a couple of on-the-spot investigations in the days immediately prior to the robbery, and on the day of the robbery, we arrived separately at the site; four of us by pullman, "Fabio," Pallone, Benedetti, and I--traveling down to Ronciglione; Genoino and "Emilio" (Carlo) with two guards that would be used for the robbery. We arrived at Cura di Vetralla in these cars.

I recall, as to the weapons, that I had a P38 and Genoino, his Sieg. I do not recall the others. We had in a car a bag with a 12-gauge shot gun, 16 caliber. The car was a gray 125, stolen by Pallone, and the red Ritmo, of which I have already spoken. The Ritmo had a real license, that is, Milan. Pallone, "Emilio" and "Fabio," were inside; Benedetti was at the wheel of the Ritmo; Genoino and I remained on the piazza in the vicinity of the 125. The robbery yielded about 15 million lire. It took place late in the morning. We escaped in two cars, of which I have spoken, and we reached Ronciglione. We abandoned the cars at Ronciglione, and Benedetti, Genoino, and I took a bus to return to Rome. The other three most probably had a private car. The second was completed about a month later, towards the end of July.

This time there were four of us: D'Aguzzano, Mitrani, "Emilio," and I. The target, as I have said, was another branch of the same bank, the Canepina branch. We reached the city in a 128, stolen some days earlier by comrades of Rome-North, I believe from their area.

The other three entered the bank; I remained in the street near the car. Our weapons were the usual Chief Special, a P38, the 16-gauge shot gun and two others that I do not recall. The robbery yielded around 25 million lire. We fled in a 128 that we abandoned later at Fabbrica di Roma. Mitrani and I returned by train. The others left in a car that had been left there.

The booty from these two robberies was supposed to, in the first place, cover the expenses of the organization and, in the second place, to give life to plans to finance legal activities, of which I have already spoken.

The first expense of the organization was to pay the stipends of some of the militants of the movement. The stipend was 350,000 lire per month. The recipients were, besides me, Rosati, Mitrani, Genoino, "Emilio," Pallone and for a certain period, also Benedetti and Turco. For these two the salary was suspended, because they found work. There were later some smaller contributions of 50 and 100 thousand lire per month for the comrades who found themselves in temporary financial difficulties. The money was kept by various comrades, by me, Mitrani, Genoino and Pallone.

The stipend was paid at the end of or at the beginning of the month. I kept the accounts and also handled the complete supervision of the financial situation of the organization. Each payee kept his own accounts. I never kept a written account.

Last November 13, which could be termed as the date when the organization entered into its crisis, there were about 9 million lire at Genoino's residence and 6 or 7 at Pallone's. Another five were invested by D'Aguanno in an import-export activity, and that money could be recovered at the end of January of this year. The other three were kept by Mitrani. The nine million of Genoino was deposited, according to him, in one personal account and in another titled to his father. Pallone's money was in two other accounts, one in his name and the other in the name of his girl friend, a certain Cristina. The three of Mitrani and the five of D'Aguanno (recovered by Mitrani) were used by Mitrani to pay the legal fees of the lawyer, Tommaso Mancini, and other lawyers in the trial of D'Aguanno, Paolo, and Daddo.

Paolo and Daddo were friends of all the ex-CoCo. of Rome-North members, in particular, of Rosati and of Mitrani.

I am looking at a sheet on which are reported names and sums of money, as of monthly payments, and I can say that Daddo must be the one noted by the actions of Piazza Indipendenza; Eurosia would be from Roma-North, already engaged to Mitrani; Piero would be Mitrani, who at that time had a friend who worked (at ATAC) and that circumstance justified the greater payment (he was later dismissed, because he said that the work was alienating and because he wished to open a pub, according to the plan that I have discussed); Barbara must be Starita, already linked to

Rosati. The Office takes note that the document is a sheet of paper taken from Fortuna, Leonardo immediately after his capture for an attempted homicide in Rome February 3, 1977.

Then there were, among the expenses, the help given to families of those arrested. Among these were the families of Tomassini, Fortuna, Proietti, Morucci, Faranda, the two survivors of Alfedena, and of Eugenio Gastaldi.

I do not know how the money arrived to the families, because I was never interested in this sector. The contribution was 100,000 lire per month. Mitrani took care of the payments to Tommasini and Fortuna and the others of Rome-North, who were linked with him in the Communist Committee. For the Proietto group, D'Aguanno, an old friend, was in charge. Morucci and Faranda (since she was from a well-off family, sometimes the contribution was omitted) through Rosati and, before him, perhaps through Starita, by means of Faranda's mother. For those of Alfedena, Mitrani took care of them, giving 1500,000 lire. For Astaldi, probably Rosati, whom he had known for many years.

Before separating for the holidays, in response to various requests by comrades for holiday bonuses, it was decided by the collegial management to pay to each member of the Movement a summer bonus of 300,000 lire each. Between 25 and 30 persons accepted the bonus. The total was between 8 and 9 million lire. Then there was an investment of two and one half million, consigned to Ornello Turco so he could buy in South America some objects of local artisans, which later were supposed to be sold in Italy. From this investment we expected to double our money. Turco instead did not acquire anything; he spent one million, 1900 thousand lire; he remained abroad a month and a half without doing anything. It seems to me that he was in Peru.

We separated for the summer holidays. I spent them at the National Park of the Abruzzi. At the end of July or the beginning of August, Benedetti was arrested in Umbria, because he was a suspect in a car theft. This vehicle was supposed to be used for a robbery by the Movement.

Before vacation, there was a sort of organizational conference; about twenty members of the MCR attended. This assembly was held on a Saturday and a Sunday in a locale, that is near Via della Pace, near the

church. In this locale there is a kind of spare restaurant. Pallone later succeeded in having it for two days. The locale was closed to the public. We discussed what later would be treated in a written document, which was kept in the bin at Tuscolo. First we discussed the purpose of politics (understood as a system of representation) and then someone launched an attack on the party line and on the concept of party itself. Second, someone proposed the theory of a proletariat community. Finally, we discussed problems of organization. Present were: Rosati, D'Aguanno, Turco, Benedetti, Laura Pacini, Genoino, Pallone, Emilio, Carlo, Fausto, Kitti, Eurosia, someone from Civis, Guerra, Mitrani, Batore, Barbara Starita, and I.

The persons who seemed to me most well-prepared were Rosati, D'Aguanno, and Mitrani.

We saw each other in September at the end of the holidays. There was no real general appointment. Around 10 to 11 p.m. there was a meeting of the management.

In that meeting we decided on the format of the document, which was entrusted to Rosati. A decision was taken to publish a book about Paolo and Daddo. This volume was compiled with the assistance of more members of the MCR. Rosati, Mitrani, Batore and other persons extraneous to the MCR were members of the "Committee for the Liberation of Paolo and Daddo." This book was then printed in a printing office in Florence. It was essentially concerned with the holding of ordinary jobs.

We also decided to keep our contacts with a Florentine group, the same one that was assigned the task of printing the book. They were persons in contact with Mitrani, Rosati and others, and they were close to the area of CoCoRi.

We decided between September and October to stage a robbery with these Tuscans in their region. Genoino and Perifano were sent. I do not know in which city it took place. I know only that it was committed in October and that it yielded for the Romans fourteen or fifteen million lire. Among the Tuscans there was Carlo Talini, who was arrested, it seems by the army police, some months ago, as a "Prima Linea" member. After the searches, the money from other robberies and additional weapons were found.

In a later meeting of the management, the robbery of Alfedena was decided upon at the suggestion of one of those living on the outskirts of Civis, natives of the zone. Pallone, Genoino, Guerra, and Ingrati left the thirteenth of last November. The weapons were those that could be hidden. Also on this occasion they were taken from the 132. It was probably the last time, because they were later placed in bins underground. Genoino, I know, went to the site in a Rover stolen some months earlier by Pallone. Other details I learned through the fiance of Ingrati, whose name I do not now recall. Genoino, Ingrati and Guerra did not offer resistance. Pallone, instead, contrary to what was decided prior to the robbery, opened fire and drew his well-known crossfire.

This operation signaled the beginning of the crisis and of the disintegration of the MCR. There were many meetings, in which we discussed the mistakes of the organization. Many members of the organization left, and there was a breakup; Mitrani, Perifano, Batore, those of Civis, "Emilio," "Fabio" and "Marco" left. "Emilio" was then arrested in Florence together with Carlo Talini. "Emilio" answers, now that I recall, to the name of Carlo Caravaglia. This group of Via Catone then began to frequenting the Florentines.

I remained in contact with Rosati and together with him, we began to attend the meetings of the Movement that were held in the locale of Continuous Struggle for Communists near Piazzale degli Eroi. In a personal capacity, I saw Davoli and some others again. All were merging into territorial groups.

Regarding the weapons, what remained in the 132 was carried to the bin at Tuscolo. Rosati and I provided transportation. There was first a transfer from the 132 to a stolen 128. This transfer was done by me, Benedetti, and "Emilio," Enrico, the one with the Volvo. The 128 was in the vicinity of Via Lanciani. The driving of the 128 to Tuscolo was done by me and by Rosati by public means; we placed the weapons in a gymnastics bag.

I must clarify that the bin of Tuscolo had already been buried the preceding May. The operation was completed by Benedetti and Turco. The bin was purchased and carried by them. At this point the Office, considering the lateness of the hour, suspends the interrogation, which will be taken up at 9 a.m. tomorrow morning June 11, 1981.

JUNE 11 9 AM

In the year 1981 on the 11th day of June at 9 a.m., the interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli reopens. Before the Investigating Judge Dr. Rosario Priore appears the accused who, to a question, answers:

Regarding the weapons confiscated at Tuscolo, I can tell what follows:

The Kalatchnikov AK 47, as I have already said, was given to the organization by "Illari" or Andrea Morelli. He got it from a certain commandant "Armando." I do not know actually who brought it to the MCR. It must have been someone trusted by Morucci and Mitrani. I saw this weapon for the first time in October of 1979 in the course of an exercise of which I still have not spoken, held in the vicinity of S. Polo dei Cavalieri. In that period the weapons were kept in a house in the borgata Laboro of a certain "Gino." I know that the Communist Committees of Rome had also contributed to the acquisition of the Kala. It has been carried in various operations as I have already specified, in two for precision, but it has not ever been used.

The Colt AR 15 caliber 223 is of BR origin. It was part of the weapons taken by Morucci. I do not know its previous origin. I saw it for the first time in the home of Labaro, but I do not recall when. It was never carried in any operation nor used in practice.

The sawed-off Breda 12 caliber automatic is of Communist Committee of Rome origin. I do not know who actually brought it to the MCR. I also saw it the first time in Labaro's house. It has never been carried in operations or used in practice. As with all the long weapons at Labaro's home, it went to the 132 and from this car it was deposited at Tuscolo. A similar weapon was employed for the operation of Alfedena and, on that occasion, after the cross fire, it was confiscated.

The Winchester model 1897 sawed-off shot gun 16 caliber is of Roman Communist Revolutionary Committee origin. This weapon was used in one of the practice sessions that were held in the vicinity of S. Polo dei Cavalieri. I participated in three training sessions in this locality. The first took place in October or November of 1979. Present were Mario Guerra, Ruggero Benedetti, and I; I do not recall the others. The localities are found at Monte Gennaro. We

fired a few shots with the Kala and a P38 pistol, the one which I later threw into the river. The second exercise also took place in S. Polo dei Cavalieri in the spring of 1980. There were Turco, Stefano, and "Alberto," that is, the one of Appio, and I. We fired with the 16 caliber Winchester and two pistols, the P38 mentioned above and a 7.65 caliber (I do not recall which). On this occasion we fired few shots. The shots, which were not war ammunition, were brought by Genoino and Enrico (who has the Volvo and who, as I have said, has a regular license to bear arms). The third exercise, occurring in the same place, that is, in S. Polo of Cavalieri, took place some months later. We participated: "Guasto," "Carlo," "Federico," or else Ornello Turco, and I. Also on this occasion as in the previous ones, we arrived at these localities by autobus. One of the members of the group, however, reached the end of the autobus line at S. Polo by car, and from there took us to the location of the exercises. The first time there was Guerra, the second "Alberto," and the third I do not recall.

The pistol discovered at Tuscolo was an ordinary 38, that was acquired [by] Pallone from a friend of his of the Garbatella [group], with the money of the organization. Eighty thousand lire were paid for it. As far as I know, it was never used. It was also placed in the 132. The second is a 22 caliber Arminius; I do not know from whom it was purchased. I do not even know whether it was of BR or Revolutionary Communist Committee origin. It was used in the attack on Settimo Imperi. I believe that it was also used in training.

Regarding the hand grenade, I do not know what type was used. I know only that there was one of those with the fine cord handle. It was a contribution of the group of Genoino. The organization possessed only this one.

Regarding the bullets of the Kala, these came from the same place as the rifles, and that is, from "Armando," "Illari," and Morucci, that is, the MCR.

There was then a fuse, of which I do not know the origin. There was a tin that I have always thought was smoke-producing. I do not know who had carried it.

Then there were four loaders for the Kala.

There were also some springs that that would be used to make the silencers.

I recall that there were also some cartridges for hunting acquired by Genoino for the 12 and 16 caliber guns.

I know that the MCR has held target practice, besides in the vicinity of S. Polo dei Cavalieri, in the periphery of a city to the south of Tivoli and at the Tolfa.

At this point the Office, considering the investigative commitments in other headquarters, suspends the interrogations, which will be reopened at 4:30 p.m. today.

JUNE 11 AT 4 P.M.

In the year 1981, today the 11 of June at 4 p.m., the interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli reopens. Before the investigating judges, Dr. Rosario Priore and Dr. Ferdinando Imposimato, appears the accused, who, to a question, answers.

I name, besides the lawyer Ennio Avvisati, the lawyer Giorgio Marcello Petrelli of Foro di Roma. It is stated that both lawyers are present.

I have been able to recall with regard to the Renault, which Libera and Spadaccini discussed a few days before the Moro murder, that after May 19 Libera said that Seghetti had been criticized for his delay in procuring the Renault for the organization. I thought that it was the car used to transport the body of Aldo Moro.

I learned from Rosati, but I do not remember exactly when, that Morucci said...[illegible]... of not knowing the prison of Moro, which was surely known to Gallinari.

With reference to the fliers relating to the communiques, and in particular, to the first communiques sent by the BR during the Moro kidnapping, Libera told me that they were distributed by Claudio (Seghetti), with whom he had periodic ties. Libera showed me, as I have already said, numerous fliers of the Red Brigades, among them those claiming the homicide of Casalegno, the Palma murder, and other actions committed by the Red Brigades.

Finally, I recall that a few days before Morucci's arrest (29th of May 1979), I met by chance in Viale Trastevere at the top of Piazza Mastai, Seghetti and a woman who seemed to be Barbara Balzarani. We pretended not to recognize each other, and we did not greet each other. A little later, I met Morucci, with whom I had an appointment, and I told him that a little earlier I had seen "Sorcio" and Maria (alias Sara).

I recall now a robbery that I forgot about in the list of the previous investigations. This robbery occurred in a little city in Umbria and was done by Claudio Pallone, Mario Guerra, and another whom I do not recall. The robbery yielded almost 900 thousand lire. The robbery was undertaken in October of 1980. I know nothing about the details, such as the weapons and the vehicles used.

I also recall that our organization broke into an insurance company in the spring of 1980. The business was located in Via Ostilense. There were I, [sic] "Carlo," Turco, and Benedetti. The latter two remained outside, while Carlo and I both went inside the business. We carried away insurance policies and a small sum of money (about 1500 thousand lire).

At this point the office, considering the lateness of the hour recesses the interrogation which will be reopened tomorrow, June 12 at 9 a.m. It is noted that the lawyer Marcello Petrelli has already left for prior professional engagements. The lawyer, Ennio Avvisati, takes cognizance of the other interrogator. Read, confirmed and undersigned.

JUNE 12 9 A.M.

In the year 1981, June 12, at 9 a.m., the interrogation of Massimo Cianfanelli reopens. Before the Investigating Judge Dr. Rosario Priore, appears the accused who responds to the question:

I am looking at the documentation taken from the bin of Tuscolo.

The flier entitled MCR is the one written and distributed at the end of the house campaign. For the text there was a collective assistance, but the actual laying out of the work was done by D'Aguzzo. I do not know with what machine it was typed, nor where it was mimeographed.

I do know that about 1,500 copies were made.

The fliers entitled BR and the periodical of the BR on the Alfa Romeo are all documents given to me by Seghetti, that I deposited in the bin at Tuscolo.

The other two documents with the BR signature, the one that begins with the words: "This document is a contribution etc.," and the other that begins with the words: "The situation now is characterized..." are, as one can see from the dates, old documents of the BR that probably come from the Morucci archive.

I do not know the origin of the document entitled "Contribution to the Debate." I have never read it.

The one entitled "Reflections on the 77 Phenomenon" is the first document of the MCR. It originates after the summer of 1979--anyway, before Davoli's arrest. It was compiled with the help of many persons. Davoli's hand is present. I do not know, however, who provided the final layout.

"The Political Contribution to the Organization of the Comrades of the South Zone," as the title itself says, is the work of one of the nuclei of Rome-South, probably of the nucleus of Centocelle-Villa Gordiani. I do not know other details about its editing.

The document entitled "Phase, past, present etc." is the noted document of the deserters from the BR, essentially written by Faranda with some help of Morucci.

The document entitled "The Colonel...etc." is the work of Arnaldo Genoino. He was a very precise type. He himself probably wrote in the margin the information about the edition, the copies and the number of pages.

The document that begins with the words, "Between quantitative needs and qualitative needs," was written by Davoli, according to him. He brought it after leaving prison and presented it as an external contribution, because at that time he had not been readmitted. Some said, considering the contents of the document, that probably he was influenced by his comrades in prison, among them, principally by Lanfranco Pace. Davoli and Pace were very good friends and often, when both were free, the latter enjoyed the company and the time of the former.

The document that begins with the words "Part One: Problem of Links etc." must be a draft that Seghetti gave me on the occasion of one of our meetings after my departure from the BR.

The document entitled "Introductory Note: Some premises etc." is the work of Mario Guerra. He expresses a certain line of criticism of the organization formulated by some comrades of the nucleus of Rome-Appio. It was written after Guerra's incarceration. I knew that during his detention he was in the company of Paolo Tomassini, and he had discussed much with him and had read about politics.

I do not know the origin of the remaining documents. Among them probably there are some consigned to me by Seghetti on the occasion of our meetings. I recall that he gave me a package of papers, which I put into the bin without reading.

The document that starts with the words "Following the same course as the ordinance to bring to trial, etc.," I have not ever seen before. I am not able, for that reason, to say who put it in the bin.

The remaining papers refer to investigations undertaken by the individual territorial nuclei. In fact, one sees names of Appio, of Rome-North and of credit agencies. There are then notes on ballistics coming certainly from the archive of Morucci. Even the books on weapons and explosives were the property of Morucci.

I heard people talk of a certain Condor, coming also from the Communist Avantgarde and ending up in the Co.Co. of Rome. He was a friend of Martelli. I do not know if it was Rosati.

The journalist of whom Gallinari spoke was Leo Valiani.

Rereading the MCR flier, I recalled that our organization also torched the car of a notary. The operation was undertaken by the Appio nucleus. Rereading the flier, I recall also the arson of the car of the builder Marcucci. For this operation I do not have any details, because it was undertaken exclusively by the nuclei of Rome-North.

I learned from Martelli and from Rosati some time ago (regarding Rosati, after he left prison) that in the villa of a comrade at Lanuvio important meetings of the Roman Communist Committees were held.

Regarding the attack on the judge, Tartaglione, I want to add that before the operation, it was never specified that he was to be killed. To me they said that I was only supposed to be the driver. I thought that, since it was my first time, the operation was restricted to a leg shooting. I had in mind principally the operations done against Traversi and Margheriti. Although Gallinari had so easily modified the target, he gave me the impression that it was not a matter of extreme importance and that, therefore, the attack did not involve the homicide of the judge.

Recapitulating the names of the persons belonging to the MCR and making a kind of flow-chart the organization, one can specify what follows.

Management

The first management, immediately after the desertion of Morucci and Faranda from the BR, was composed thus: 1) Morucci, Valerio; 2) Faranda, Adriana; 3) Turco, Ornello; 4) Mitrani, Giuseppe; 5) Davoli, Giancarlo. After the capture of Morucci and Faranda, there was a period of disbandment. And only after the return of Davoli from France and the renewal of contacts with the D'Aguanno-Genoino group was there a new management composed thus: 1) Davoli, Giancarlo; 2) Mitrani, Giuseppe; 3) Turco, Ornello; 4) Cianfanelli, Massimo; 5, D'Aguanno, Claudio.

After the capture of Davoli, elements of the management of the D'Aguanno group entered the management, which resulted in the following composition: 1) Mitrani, Giuseppe; 2) Cianfanelli, Massimo; 3) Turco, Ornello; 4) D'Aguanno, Claudio; 5) Genoino, Arnaldo; 6) Pallone, Claudio. After the release of Rosati, a month or two later, he also entered and at almost the same time, Caravaglia. This management will remain intact up to the crisis of the organization. It is composed thus of: 1) Cianfanelli, Massimo; 2) Pallone, Claudio; 3) Genoino, Arnaldo; 4) Mitrani, Giuseppe; 5) D'Aguanno, Claudio; 6) Turco, Ornello; 7) Rosati, Luigi; and 8) Caravaglia, Carlo. Structures or Nuclei of Apparati: There were two apparatus structures, as I have already said. The first was composed of: 1) Cianfanelli, Massimo; 2) Morucci, Valerio; 3) Benedetti, Ruggero; 4) Faranda, Adriana; and 5) Davoli,

Giancarlo. The second nucleus was composed of: 1) Genoino, Arnaldo; 2) D'Aguzzo, Claudio; 3) Pallone, Claudio; and 4) a certain "Emilio," *nom de guerre*. As I have already said, these structures have never functioned. They have also experienced some changes in members during the existence of the organization. Lately, they were unified into a single structure, composed thus: 1) Genoino, Arnaldo, 2) Pallone, Claudio, 3) Ingrati, Giuseppe, 4) Guerra, Mario. For a certain period of time I was also part of this structure, which I left to establish a commission of which I will speak later.

Territorial Nuclei

Initially, there were four territorial nuclei, composed of the following: 1) Appio, 2) Tiburtino, 3) Rome-Nord 1, and 4) Rome-Nord 2. In January of 1979 two other nuclei were formed: 5) Centocelle and 6) Villa Gordiani. After some time these two nuclei were unified.

Appio Nucleus

Taking part in the Appio nucleus were the following persons: 1) "Federico" or Turco, Ornello; 2) "Rocco," Benedetti, Ruggero; 3) "Piera," Pacini, Laura; 4) "Riccardo," Lanuti, Stefano; 5) "Corrado," Guerra, Mario; 6) "Alberto," of whom I recall only the baptismal name, Armandino; 7) "Enzo," of whom I know only the name, the address, and the work (i.e., Enrico living in Via Gregorovius, stamp salesman and owner of the green Volvo); and 8) "Cristina," of whom I only know that she has the nickname, Kitty, and is engaged to Davoli. Now I remember also that her true name is Giuliana Poletto.

Tiburtino Nucleus

This nucleus was composed of five or six persons, of whom I recall only "Valentino," *nom de guerre*, whose true name is Arbore, Cesare, who works in the Parliament.

This nucleus was disbanded before the others and has taken over a locale in the vicinity of piazza Trilussa, the "Corte di Miracoli," where they, along with others, were assigned to the alternative restaurant.

Rome-North 1 and 2

I cannot distinguish the members of each nucleus. I can only list the persons who certainly belonged: 1) "David," later "Giordano," that is, Mitrani, Giuseppe; 2) "Silvio," nicknamed Badore, about whom I know only that he lives in the Boccea area; 3) "Elena" Visaggi, Eurosia; 4) "Sara," Starita, Barbara; and 5) "Fabio," about whom I have no details.

Nucleus of Centocelle-Villa Gordiani

Six or seven people took part in this nucleus. Among them I only know two: 1) "Fausto," of whom I do not recall other details, 2) "Carlo," of whom I do not recall other details.

Territorial Management

For a certain period of time a territorial management functioned composed of one or two representatives of each territorial nucleus. Now I cannot specify the subsequent composition of this management.

Commissions

Some commissions were established after the conference of organization of July 1980, precisely: 1) Commission on Prisons, 2) Commission of Work of the Masses, and 3) Propaganda Commission.

I do not recall the composition of the individual commissions, except for the one of which I was a member, the first.

Prison Commission

This one is composed of: 1) Cianfanelli, Massimo, 2) Starita, Barbara, 3) Rosati, Luigi, and 4) Perifano, Alfredo. This commission met four or five times at the home of Alfredo near Circonvallazione Appia. Between September of 1979 and February of 1980, cooperative efforts were made between a group in Valmelaina and one in Garbatella. There were between ten and fifteen in Valmelaina; I do not know how many there were in Garbatella. I do not know other details about these groups, because I have not had contacts with them. I recall that Morucci and Rosati, speaking of Moretti, called him "the Old One," (*il Grande Vecchio*).

FENZI DEPOSITION

With this statement of mine I wish to summarize in a clear manner all the major transitions that have accompanied my militancy in the Red Brigades and to furnish the investigators with all the information that I possess in this regard, in order to give the widest and most complete testimony not only of my detachment from the organization, but also the most complete repudiation of that experience and of its contents, and of my willingness to collaborate with justice so that, to the best of my ability, new strifes and tragedies may be avoided.

In doing this, I will necessarily have to repeat here what I have already said in the deposition, during numerous interrogations before the judges of various Italian cities (Genoa, Rome, Turin, Florence, Milan, Venice, Naples), and to these depositions it is therefore opportune that I refer, inasmuch as they can complete and illuminate certain details better. On the other hand, this statement, because of its complete character, has an autonomous value and, if it does not add much to the depositions on the factual level, I hope it can add much to defining in a coherent manner (not in an equivocal or politically motivated one) my position at present. I do not think that, in the objective limits of time and space, one could exhaust here all that I could say about the facts, persons, reflections, discussions, which, in various ways, have filled almost five years of my life. I repeat for this reason that, on one hand, these pages supplement and are in their turn supplemented by the depositions already given, and that, on the other, their contents are fully open to confirmation, deepening, or enriching where it is appropriate, whether in trial headquarters, or at any request of judicial authority. In particular, it is a commitment that I have made, above all, to myself to continue to contribute until the political reasons for my repudiation of terrorism become ever more clear and penetrating; through collaboration with all the branches of law enforcement, on my part, in the struggle against terrorism, in the name of reason, of morality, and of politics. And in the name, I must add, of the personal humanity and the hope of whoever in these years has so atrociously had to suffer from it (terrorism).

1.

My first contact with the organization occurred through my colleague Professor Gianfranco Faina, with whom, in all the previous years, I had participated in various protest incidents within the university. With Faina, however, my relations up to that moment were of a purely personal nature, because I had not ever been part of the various groups that had gradually been organized around him, and for which he was particularly known in the Genoa left (the Club Rosa Luxemburg, Ludd, etc.). Moreover, I, as is known, had not even been part of any extra-parliamentary organization: not of "Lotta Continua" (Continuous Struggle), nor of the Avantgarde Workers, nor of Workers Power, nor of The Communist Struggle, nor of the various factions of the Chinese line, and so forth.

When, around the spring of 1976, Faina introduced me to a member of the organization, he (Faina) certainly was a member, and exploiting his numerous acquaintances, he was doing recruitment work. In my case, it was not a matter, however, of a real recruitment, and there were many precautions and reservations on both our parts. We spoke much about the Red Brigades, specifically about the Sossi kidnapping, and Faina asked me if I was interested in meetings and in exchanges of ideas. To my affirmative response, he took me to an appointment (at Rivarolo) with a person whom I knew later to be Rocco Micaletto. He was still totally unfamiliar with the "Genovese reality" but curious enough to know as much as possible about it. We talked, above all, about the university situation and about the "state of the movement": subsequently, I saw Micaletto again one or two times, and Bogliasco, always with Faina, who notified me and brought me with him. It was due certainly to the fact that my relationship was mediated through Faina that later, for a certain period, my contacts ceased. Faina in fact had entered into a serious dispute with the organization, as I learned in some more detail only later, and after a long period of bad ties, he was expelled. (I do not know, however, precisely when this happened, because his detachment passed through various phases, and in parallel fashion, my ties with him were relaxed; he was progressively neglecting the Genovese friendships in order to transfer his interest to contacts that he had in Milan.)

His mode of acting was in reality very incorrect. He recruited, if one could call it that, on his own, and on the basis of his ties. He tended to maintain an independent and privileged role with respect to the organization, with which, then, he was not at all in agreement on the political level, being firmly in opposition to any discussion of "party" "worker centrality," etc., and in brief, with all that was incompatible with his essentially anarchic vision of political action. These judgments I was not able to make then, and they are, mostly, the fruit of subsequent discussions and clarifications. Then, this brief phase was characterized, as far as I was concerned, by a superficial tie with the Red Brigades, limited to discussions of a general nature, and by an ambiguous rapport with Faina, who was probably interested in demonstrating to them simply that there were many people of various backgrounds who revolved in his orbit. And I was among them, or at least, it was supposed to appear that way. It was still in that period that, in a totally casual manner, I once met Faina with a young man who I learned later was Livio Baistrocchi. With this last person, I, however, had not ever had anything to do directly, except in some particular circumstances that I shall recount later. Then it seemed that he was linked essentially to Faina, and not to the Red Brigades, which turned out to be true only in part.

The momentary interruption of the tie with Micaletto, after the Faina affair, came after some months--anyway, before the Coco homicide to which Faina was certainly extraneous (and so I think that Baistrocchi was estranged, because of his then prevalent links with Faina.

Regarding the participation of Giuliano Naria, I continue to believe it to be rather improbable, as I have explained in a very detailed manner to the Turin judges, reconciling this with an opinion prevalent among the Genoa militants of the Red Brigades). Still concerning the Coco homicide, it took me by surprise, even if it was known to all that the Red Brigades considered him one of their principal enemies. What I know comes from listening to some discussions that occurred in the winter of 1979-80 in the superprison of Palmi, where I was then detained together with the so-called "historic nucleus" of the Red Brigades. In synthesis, mostly from the words of Franceschini, it emerged that at the time of the homicide, the Red Brigades were reduced drastically with six

or seven militants in all of Italy and a still fragile network of hackers and sympathizers. In this picture, that clamorous action, destined to imprint itself at once on all the activity of the Red Brigades, and perhaps on all the area of terrorism in Italy, was a decisive force, and was brought about on the national level, all outside the Genovese reality. It was something, in brief, analogous to the Sossi kidnapping, even if in contrast to it; the Red Brigades certainly now had gained access to a minimal but stable presence in the city. Micaletto, for example, was firmly in charge in Genoa, and it is the common opinion that Riccardo Dura, at that time, had already passed into clandestinity, continuing to act in Genoa, exploiting his knowledge of the "movement," which he gained from his past militancy in "Lotta Continua."

While Faina progressively disappeared from the scene of the Red Brigades, Micaletto resurfaced, inviting me to continue our ties. The method used for taking up contacts again, and then to confirm or call off appointments, was most simple. He called me at the Institute, asking for me like any student. I do not recall with precision when that happened, but from the autumn-winter of 1976-77, our meetings were regularly set even if there were always big intervals between them. The basis of the rapport was of a political, not operative, nature (since I did not consider myself then, nor was I considered, a real brigadist). Micaletto seemed particularly eager to discuss general themes, to confront an attentive and curious listener (such as I was to his ideas), and to ask my opinions also, always on a political level. The meetings, with intervals of twenty days, from one month to the next, occurred in local places along the eastern riviera, almost always at Recco, but sometimes at Camogli and at Sori. They lasted a long time, usually an entire afternoon, and they were always very relaxed and filled with a lot of discussion, without the urgency of commitments of another nature. I already, at Faina's urging and then on my own, began to read the local newspapers attentively, to follow the political activity of various groups that had gathered at the university, to participate, where I was able, in the citizen assemblies of the movement, and to bring whatever I gathered, even in terms of small details, of minimal information, to Micaletto. I recall that I also had begun to collect some newspaper

clippings on the political-economic situation in Genoa. But this activity turned out to be without effect, essentially useless; so it ended up by dying a slow, natural death. Even without this activity, there was, however, enough because those meetings were always full and interesting, both on the level of information that I furnished him, and on that of general discussion, which in some cases also touched the nature and structure of the Red Brigades. (It was Micaletto who explained to me little by little how the organization worked: the Executive, the Columns, the Brigades, the Fronts, etc., and who had me read what the Red Brigades wrote in fliers and in documents.) During the period of my rapport with Micaletto, from autumn of 1976 to spring-summer of 1977, notwithstanding the rigid compartmentalization in which I was kept, there were some episodes that I must report. Meanwhile, still on a general level, I learned that Micaletto was the head of the column or something like that and that he was responsible for making the Genoa column function and for keeping ties with other columns. With Faina I no longer had ties to speak of, except the sporadic meetings at the university. I learned of his break with the Red Brigades in part from him and in part from Micaletto himself, who had indicated to me its causes. Faina asked me if, notwithstanding everything, I continued to see the person with whom he had put me in contact, and I had no reason to hide from him how things stood. I think that it was exactly for this reason that I received, again at the Institute (winter 1976-77), a telephone call: it was Baistrocchi, who identified himself and who set an appointment near Zecco for an hour later. He explained to me that he had followed Faina in breaking away from the BR, but that he had later decided to reenter, and to that end he asked me to procure for him a appointment with Micaletto (whose *nom de guerre* was Lucio). I do not recall how much time it took me, but the matter was handled, more or less, within 20 to 30 days. To solicit this appointment, Baistrocchi told me, without, however, going into details, that he was supposed to tell the BR of an escape attempt that was in preparation, I think from the prison in Perugia, with the external support of the militants of the Genoa Autonomy. With his reentry into the BR he would also have to serve as a go-between, if I recall well, to persuade the BR to help

Autonomia. I never learned anything more about the undertaking. And for about a year I did not have any occasion to see him again.

I must take a step backwards. More or less in the same period in which I had been introduced to Micaletto, Faina resumed the same discussions with Professor Ortolani that he had made with me. Then one time all three of us discussed (some issues) altogether. And Ortolani, if with much uncertainty, stated that she was disposed to making a contact (with the BR), even if, in her case, it was still very evident that it was not a matter of being recruited, but rather of being consolidated into a group of sympathizers and of possible backers. A little later I recall that Faina arranged a meeting one evening, it seems to me at Nervi, with a brigadist who was not, however, Micaletto. (Faina himself underscored that it was someone else, but I must say that I am not totally sure of that.) I do not know how things later went, but I recall that at a certain point Micaletto, during one of our meetings, alluded to a colleague, without naming her, and told me in the clearest manner possible to forget about her and about what concerned her, to cut off any tie or discussion that was not strictly linked to our common work atmosphere. Thus it was done, and from that day the compartmentalization between me and Ortolani functioned in a perfect manner. I add that later, out of pure curiosity, I asked her some questions, but I did not ever get answers. In some cases, for example in June, 1980, when I left prison, speaking with her, I got the definite impression that she had been cut out of the life of the organization and that the old ties, whose strength I was not able to evaluate, had slackened by time. Moreover, Ortolani led an irreprehensible and impenetrable life from any point of view.

In that period I had become the friend of the lawyer Arnaldi, in connection with the activities of counter-information of the Genovese left. Together we had organized some assemblies at AMGA, on repression in Germany, in Italy, and on some particular cases, and invited lawyers with leftist sympathies from other cities. Arnaldi was extremely accessible to the defense of adherents of the armed organizations, even if, at the time, he was not identified with any of them. However, through the contacts with relatives of prisoners and his ties with Red Help of which he was a sort of "fiduciary" in Genoa (together

with Marchelli, who was the treasurer), he found himself, little by little, caught inexorably in the network of ties with the brigadists. I was never a go-between for him, for the simple fact that I had no need of it. I repeat, however, that at that time he was absolutely not a brigadist, nor did the brigadists consider him such. Rather, they felt diffident towards him, especially because of his open and generous accessibility towards everyone. As a demonstration of what I mean, I can cite an episode to which I was a witness. One day Arnaldi confided in me that he absolutely needed a certain figure, it seems to me, of two or three million, not more, to silence a client who had accused him of unfaithful legal representation and had appealed to the Bar Association. Through some relatives, he [Arnaldi] had asked for this figure (which, I add, was due to him, if for not anything else, for his [illegible, translator] professional services. I, who had told him of my ties with Micaletto and who knew that he (Arnaldi) was not able to make him (Micaletto) pay even for the trips that he (Arnaldi) made, in my turn, spoke of the matter with Micaletto. I received a very harsh response from him. In substance he answered that the lawyers of the left made their living without pretending anything, and that the money of the organization, which the militants procured at personal risk and danger, was supposed to be used only by the organization itself. I recall that I felt bad, and that there was also a small argument about it, in which [illegible] his words did not concern only the act but the attitude of the BR towards Arnaldi, but also towards all those who, in one way or another, helped without actually being insiders. I understood then, as I did later, that the brigadists were deeply convinced that whoever was "on the left" was supposed to help them without expecting anything in return in terms of consideration of political influence. The motto was: "The organization only takes; it gives nothing," as Micaletto repeated to me often. This attitude towards Arnaldi was, however, determined in part by the mentality of Micaletto himself, hostile in principle to involving backers in the life of the organization, and, moreover, a theorizer (who believed in) a rigid separation between the one group and the other. Probably it was also for his very rigid organizational principles that did not admit confusion of roles, that he succeeded in building a column that became

renowned in Italy for its impermeability. Later, however, things changed and, to end the discourse on Arnaldi, he became progressively more involved, and all his activity was reduced to links between the outside and the inside of the prison. That occurred after the departure of Micaletto from Genoa, from autumn to winter of 1977. And his participation became complete still later, I think at the beginning of 1979. Guagliardo told me later how he had to face a rough encounter with Micaletto to allow Arnaldi to be admitted into the circle of brigadists and how it was on account of him (Guagliardo) that Arnaldi got a reimbursement of a million (lire) a month. All this emerges in the first attempts to give organizational stability to something that later, with time and through other happenings, will become the Prison Front. Guagliardo was set free at the Turin trial, at the beginning of the summer of 1978, and he immediately established a contact with Arnaldi, who had been the defender of the "historic nucleus" during the trial, earning their trust. It was for this reason, natural enough that he was the one who stressed the need to exploit more effectively the services of the lawyer. This, then, consisted essentially in asking whoever was outside the brigades but involved in the situation in the prisons to support the public campaigns against the treatment reserved for brigadists, and the problem of Asinara was always top priority. Other things, more linked to the direct activities of the BR, for so many reasons, were still rare. No one spoke of escapes from the superprisons, for example, and the political and organizational split between those who were inside and those who were outside (prison) was in a phase deeper than anyone realized. At that point, for the brigadists of the "historic nucleus," it was easier, through definitely distant relatives of uncaptured brigadists, to form ties with small spontaneous and autonomous groups rather than with the organization itself. There was, for example, an escape plan that later failed, from the Nuove of Turin, planned by someone of the historic nucleus with a group, I think, of Lodigiano, unknown to the BR itself. The prisoners naturally complained of being forced to use this tactic and accused, with ever greater force, those on the outside of having, in fact, abandoned them. This, among other things, will lead to the split of the autumn of 1979, about which I will

speak more later. In short, if it is true that Arnaldi was fully involved, it is true that this happened precisely when the external-internal [BR] ties were very bad, so that, on top of his bad health conditions and the impracticality of involving himself in so general and deep a problem, his [Arnaldi's] work turned out to be greatly limited.

Concerning me, it has been said that my function, above all, was that of recruiter. This is not at all true, and it is enough to demonstrate it from what is already known about the happenings of the Genoa column, as they are particularly clear, beginning with the arrests and with the confessions of the autumn of 1980. I was said to have recruited the son of Arnaldi, Edgardo, that is, the very last person of Genoa who needed me in order to be recruited. This is true only in part, and, anyway, it does not at all correspond with the significance that I attribute to the word "recruitment." The story went simply like this: During one of our meetings, Micaletto told me that he needed to meet in a hurry with Edgardo Arnaldi, and he asked me if I could, the same evening, notify him and bring Arnaldi to him the following morning at an appointment at Bogliasco. The matter was done, and I then left the two together. It is true that Micaletto did not know Edgardo personally, but to me it seemed that he already had some tie, and that his request was justified by some particular necessity of the moment. I was, in brief, the person who was able to bring him to Micaletto in the fastest manner possible. I had never held "recruiter" discussions with Edgardo; moreover, I was somewhat perplexed about his participation in the organization with which it seemed he had a natural incompatibility, of a psychological as well as a political character. For this reason, later, I sometimes asked what became of him, and I was always told that his ties with the BR were problematic, and that they had actually been interrupted. In practice, from what I know about it, he was part of it for a small amount of time, more like a "candidate" than like an actual member; and then he detached himself.

An analogous case occurred with Francesco Lo Bianco. I had met him at some assemblies, at some demonstrations, and, in particular, he also attended the meetings of the Autonomous Collective, which also included

some port workers, who met in Via San Lorenzo, in what seemed to me was the seat of the Fourth International. I was not a frequent attendee, since they were mostly workers, but sometimes I went, to tell about it later to Micaletto. With Lo Bianco, however, I do not believe I ever spoke confidentially, using the familiar "you," and certainly not about the BR. However, I would still say, during the winter of 1976 and 1977, Micaletto spoke to me of it, and charged me with the responsibility of taking him (Lo Bianco) to an appointment (in Circonvallazione, this time). I recall that when, at that place, I approached Lo Bianco, few words were needed; nor was it necessary to mention the BR. Even if we barely knew one another, when I told him that there was a person who wanted to meet him, he seemed to understand immediately, and without any problem, he responded affirmatively to the invitation. Furthermore, I am convinced that he had already been notified by someone else, since my role was totally played there. Later, I very seldom met him--(only) by pure chance--and I have not had any more to do with him for a year now.

Regarding the participation in the BR of another person, whom I did not know, Bertolazzi, I knew about him from allusions by Arnaldi himself, after the accident in which Bertolazzi was a victim while on the beach of Vesima, or Pra--one evening when he tried new primers for incendiary devices. The surgeon, Sergio Adamoli, made me understand something of the kind as well. Concerning this latter person, I can say with certainty that he had ties with the BR, but that such links, as far as I know, were not ever good, both because of his very independent character and because, fundamentally, he was always linked politically and sentimentally to the PCl. He lent some help, for example, by furnishing a kind of first aid booklet, which the BR judged to be totally useless (as I learned later). For this reason he did not have continual ties, and on all occasions that we discussed the BR, I always found him to take very strong polemical positions. We never entered into the particulars, because he did not maintain his ties either with Micaletto or with Nicolotti, but with someone else; and because, I repeat, it seemed to me, these ties were very sporadic. One time he sought to be more clear with me (I do not recall when: it could have been in the autumn of 1978, and he exhorted me to leave the BR because,

he sustained, with people like me, they had kept only instrumental ties of pure exploitation). This, he said, had been his experience. Later, he comported himself in a manner consistent with his judgments. In fact, when, at the beginning of 1979, the rumor spread that he was about to be arrested, the BR, by means of Arnaldi, approached him again and offered their help, if not to become immediately a "regular," that is, a full-time clandestine militant, at least to assure him shelter from the law. They were moved to this action also by the political reverberations that such a case would have had, realizing that he was the son of Senator Adamoli, and of a known and esteemed person in the Genovese left. For an evening, I was a witness to these attempts of Arnaldi, but Adamoli refused to lift any blockade with the BR and chose to go abroad on his own, with a decision that, at that time had the precise significance of rupture. Then, some months later (I do not recall when: it could have been after my arrest--May 1979--and during one of the colloquies in prison) Arnaldi told me that, I do not know by what manner, Adamoli had put himself back in contact with him, and that the BR had sent him, Arnaldi, to Paris, to talk to him again. In reality, Arnaldi explained to me, the BR wished at that point to know who had helped Adamoli in his escape, who had provided him with documents, lodging, etc. But Arnaldi did not extract anything, and, according to what he told me, he returned from Paris without any useful information. Jumping ahead to an argument of which I shall speak later, the attack on Castellano, I must say that I did not find out that Adamoli was involved in any manner, nor do I know of elements that also hypothetically could be connected with this fact. I say this, to respond to a precise question in this direction, put to me by investigators.

In the autumn of 1977, the taking up of ties with Micaletto, after the summer hiatus, was slower. After a meeting or two of the interlocutory type, without definite contents, Micaletto came to the point. In substance, he explained to me that the type of contribution that I had given up to that point was becoming less and less valuable, for many reasons. For example, the university had quit being an interesting observatory, the various groups no longer counted, I did not have ties with the factory world or with other sectors in which the BR were interested (the press, the finance world, political parties). I

was, in brief, a person with whom there was always pleasant chatter, but whose utility had become dubious; and the nature of the tie linking me to the BR began to be even more unclear. He added that he would have to leave Genoa, for other responsibilities (I learned later that he had been called to become part of the Executive), and that, if I wished, I could meet with another comrade. He told me, however, that it was not possible for me to continue to be simply what I had been up to that moment, and that this new comrade would immediately confront this problem with me. I agreed to meet with the person who would take Micaletto's place, and Micaletto himself, after a while, introduced him to me, during an appointment arranged for this end on the *lungomare* of Recco. The new clandestine was called by the *nom de guerre*, "Valentino." (I knew later that it was really Luca Nicolotti), and I had the impression that he had already been active for some time in Genoa, because he seemed to know the city situation well, and in a special manner, the situation of the large factories of the west. In effect, as I understood later, Nicolotti was put in charge of the factory sector. During two or three subsequent meetings, Nicolotti occupied himself with getting from me all that he could about my past and my acquaintances, and he finally got to the principal problem. He announced to me that in the passage of a week or two, I would have to participate in an injury, for which he had already conducted the related investigation. (By the term investigation, one means the activity focused on gathering all the useful elements for the action, espionage, schedules, etc.). It was at the end of October, or at the beginning of November. He did not tell me, right off, who was the person to be hit, but he fixed an appointment to discuss the matter in depth. The meeting, some days later, took place at Nervi, at the little tables of the bar Marinella: I found there, besides Nicolotti, also Lo Bianco and Baistrocchi. The action would be done by us four.

As I learned later, Lo Bianco and Baistrocchi had already participated in numerous actions, and five persons were particularly expert. It is, however, certain that the choice had fallen on them also, because I already knew they belonged to the BR, and there was no risk, therefore, of any "de-compartmentalization." This observation presumes another, that in a certain sense I posed the main problem.

It was revealed to me later, in part by the investigators, in part by rumors gradually accumulating, that Micaletto was forced to face strong criticism, because he had allowed for so long someone like me to maintain that rapport with the BR without being compromised very much, in an almost privileged position. It was a matter, therefore, of making me take a further, irreversible step, to link me definitively with the organization. For this reason, it was very quickly decided that I participate in the action.

The reasons for this action were then explained to me, in particular by Lo Bianco, a worker in the Ansaldo Nuclear Mechanical building, the same one as that of the engineer, Carlo Castellano. In brief, Castellano was, on one hand, a rather influential member of the PCI, and on the other hand, he was judged to be "the brains" of the restructuring that then affected the whole Ansaldo group, and, in particular, all of the nuclear sector. To hit him meant to emphasize in a rather clamorous manner the contradiction that existed between the two roles, the one in the PCI and the other with the ownership tie, in a moment in which the workers were committed in the battle against those consequences of restructuring that fell on their shoulders. Naturally, the explanation was a little more articulate, but the substance was precisely to attack where contradiction was particularly evident. The arguments convinced me, and the problem was certainly real: if it is true what Nicolotti later told me, the action placed the PCI in difficulty within the factory. For many workers, it was a surprise to learn that the "owner" was of the same party and that he was the repository of "secrets" about the programs of restructuring about which they (who, with the party and by the party, were called to struggle) were kept in the dark.

There was another meeting with Nicolotti (not with the others) who, in the subsequent days, accompanied me on a brief inspection of the place, in front of the dwelling of the engineer Castellano in Via Corsica, and he explained to me what my role would be. The division of tasks was this: Nicolotti would be at the driver's wheel, Baistrocchi would be support, and I would be near Lo Bianco who had the task of firing (to give support; he meant to watch the shoulders of whoever did the action, to prevent surprises).

Regarding the action, I have furnished detailed explanations that I wish here to abbreviate, given that they concern facts that would lengthen the testimony by several pages. I will limit myself, for this reason, to the essentials, referring to the deposition already mentioned in this regard. On the established day, perhaps a Monday, I do not recall, I met with Lo Bianco, who took me to Via San Lorenzo to an apartment on the top floor of a building situated on the side of Piazza Benchi, more or less in the middle of the street. It was the habitation of Baistrocchi. There, it was about five in the afternoon, we disguised ourselves rather lightly in makeup with little fake beards, and I received there the pistol that I would carry with me, a Mauser 7.65, while Lo Bianco had two, one that seemed like mine and one equipped with a silencer, which, he told me, he feared would jam. Baistrocchi, who was there, left a little before us, to proceed to the place. We would see Nicolotti only at the moment of flight, when he would have reached us with the automobile stolen in the preceding days and left parked on the top of Via Ugo Foscolo. The car (I do not know from whom it was stolen) had also been furnished with a license (taken from another car) that, I believe was destined for demolition. The first day there was, however, a surprise: According to Baistrocchi, who ran down Via Corsica to warn Lo Bianco and me, who were awaiting the arrival of the engineer Castellano from work (he reentered usually at 6 o'clock), the police had positioned themselves around the stolen car. I do not know if it was true, but Nicolotti, arriving after Baistrocchi, was also of the same mind. He did not wish, however, to call off the action, and he made an appointment with Baistrocchi in the night to steal another automobile, this time without worrying about changing the license. And he decided to find us in the same manner the next day. Preceding our visit to Baistrocchi's home to apply the makeup and pick up the weapons (which had been retrieved, I believe, by Nicolotti) we designed a new plan for the ambush, while Nicolotti waited in a car that he had earlier parked in a certain place. But Castellano did not appear, and it seems to me that this also happened the following day. The third evening, it seemed, was like the two previous evenings. Lo Bianco and I were seated on a bench in Via Corsica on the side of the sea to watch

the engineer arrive in a white car that he was supposed to park in front of his house, in the piazza with the church whose doors face Via Ruffini. Baistrocchi paced around us, and Nicolotti waited, parked in the part of Via Corsica that leads to Ponte Monurentale, near the central headquarters of the Italsider establishment. At seven o'clock he still had not arrived; it was already dark; many cars had tried to park. Baistrocchi, I think, had decided to advance 100 meters from the point in which we were located. Lo Bianco and I were to notify Nicolotti, still in the car, if it was again necessary to call off the action. But after a little while, we heard him arrive running and yelling, "Giuseppe, run, run; he's over there." Against all odds, the engineer Castellano that evening had departed from the Italsider headquarters, which is almost directly in front of his house. (Italsider, I repeat, not Ansaldo: for that reason an absolutely unforeseeable circumstance.) Then he was seen by Baistrocchi and Nicolotti. (Another digression: Giuseppe was the *nom de guerre* of Lo Bianco). Immediately Lo Bianco left, running behind Baistrocchi who made headway driving him towards the point where he had seen the engineer, while I stayed slightly behind. And, farther ahead, among the cars, suddenly I heard the shots, I don't know how many, some lighter, others heavier, a sign that he had not fired only the pistol equipped with the silencer. (I was not, however, able to see the action, which ended in a few seconds, so that when I stopped hearing the shots from the piazza, I went there where Nicolotti was supposed to be found, and the car and the other two.) But I was alone, because, everything having happened exactly in reverse, at least with regard to the preestablished positions, Nicolotti was displaced and had gone directly to pick up Lo Bianco and Baistrocchi, while I, in the dark, I repeat, and in the confusion, among people who yelled and cars that moved, went where there was no one anymore to await me. After a moment of uncertainty, it seemed to me that I would not succeed in finding them, and I certainly did not wish to return to where I was; I decided, therefore, to go on foot along the same route that I would have taken by car, and I crossed Via Corsica. Thus, on the corner of LVia Bixio, I passed by Castellano, whom I saw on the ground, surrounded by people who sought to help him. Since he had been hit from the other side of the street, he had evidently succeeded

in crossing the street on his own strength. Even if I had passed very close to him, in the confusion, no one would have noticed. I refrained from running and thus allowed for climbing uphill on Via Bixio and keeping myself on course. When I was almost at the end of the way, a car came alongside me with an open door and took me. It was Nicolotti and the others, who first had awaited me and then went to search for me on both sides of Via Corsica. In the car we went as planned to Piazza Sarzano: and there I easily took off the little fake beard; I handed over the pistol to Nicolotti, and I returned home by the small streets, alone.

I saw Nicolotti again two days later. He did not make big explanations about the dynamics of the action, and he seemed embarrassed. I, on the other hand, also because of my inexperience, did not ask and I tended to put full faith in the others for any technical problem. I learned later, it seems from Guagliardo, that Nicolotti was greatly criticized for that action, conducted in such an automatic and unthought-out manner so as to risk leaving me on the scene, after having lost me. I recall now another detail. I should have, first of all, taken the purse of the engineer, Castellano, that he presumably carried on his person: this, specifically, was my task. Naturally, as things turned out, I was not able to do it. However, Castellano had a purse with him, as he told the newspapers, and added also that he kept it nearby and that at any moment, even with the escort, it was his first thought. Not even those who had gone behind him to shoot at him had taken it; therefore, the lament for the important documents that it contained, continually discussed in the newspapers, was more of a reason to criticize Nicolotti, responsible for the action.

After my having been thus directly involved in the activity of the BR, other episodes of this type did not occur. Despite my minor role in that action, the problem-situations emphasized by Nicolotti suddenly began to deteriorate. No one discussed things with me any longer, but it was certainly evident to everyone that I was not the most adept person, for a thousand reasons, to participate fully in the BR activity in Genoa: I was too well-known; I was beginning to be angry because rumors were going around about my participation in the BR; and I thus was not able to provide any guarantee of security for [my] potential support activity. I was external to the mover (which

gradually drifted further from the university and which was already reduced to Autonomy of *Sampierdarena*, and to potential peripheral grouplets, etc.). [I was not adept] because of my limited participation and my lack of experience, not to mention reasons of age and of lifestyle and [problems with] my clandestinity. I would say, in other words, that I was more an encumbrance than anything else. Nicolotti occupied himself with the factories, and he did not have many reasons for involving himself with me. When we saw each other, usually we turned to discussing general problems, and he, in particular, explained to me his point of view on restructuring, and dedicated himself to analyzing the strength and the strategies of the nuclear sector in Italy. On this topic, in the course of several months (winter 1977-78), he had compiled a very voluminous dossier.

I went ahead thus, with sporadic ties, without any news of note that regarded me, without meeting either Baistrocchi or Lo Bianco anymore, maintaining the usual ties of a more personal than political type with Arnaldi (who did not have any tie with Nicolotti nor did he know him, to the best of my knowledge) and with Adamoli. And it was through Arnaldi that, in late spring of 1978, the Berardi affair began. I do not know well how the thing began, because, initially, it was Arnaldi who received the confidence of Berardi whom I had not ever seen and about whom I never heard anything said. Arnaldi had been his defense attorney in a trial regarding some actions occurring on the Orient Express, to which the city press had given coverage. I imagine that on that occasion Arnaldi and Berardi had spoken of other things: the fact is that Arnaldi, who evidently in that moment did not have direct contacts with the BR or who had them but of a type incompatible with this initiative, spoke to me of an Italsider worker full of good will, available for a meeting with the BR, enthusiastic, with a past in Lotta Continua. He also had some reservations, relative to his unstable character and nervousness, but he concluded by asking me if I was able to put him rather rapidly in contact with some clandestine members of the BR, or, at least, if I could meet him. For this reason, I phoned Berardi (the number and the address Arnaldi furnished me), telling him that Arnaldi had spoken to me of him, and that I would be pleased to meet him. Berardi had spoken of him and was most happy, and immediately

he met us at Sestri Ponente. Naturally, before acting, I had asked the opinion of Nicolotti (and, therefore, the affair required a certain amount of time), and when Nicolotti heard that it concerned an Italsider worker he did not have doubts, and he ordered me to do what was possible to introduce him to Nicolotti in all haste. (It is necessary to know that then, I believe, the BR did not have any worker inside Italsider.)

Berardi seemed to me as Arnaldi had described him, ingenuous and enthusiastic, and very nice. He held to the myth of "comrade Arnaldi" and of the Resistance; he wanted to "do something" at all costs, and he revealed to me immediately that he already had completed various written responses for the BR in the factory, exploiting his mobility. In fact, his work was that of going around on a bicycle, to bring various forms to diverse departments. This job was the source for him of profound frustration; it was not clear, by the way, but I seemed to understand that because of his nervous disturbances he had distanced himself from his department, the rolling mill, and was relegated to the makeshift department. I also discovered that Berardi knew various things about me. In fact, after my telephone call, he was put in contact with Arnaldi, and he had asked him information about the person whom he was supposed to meet, and Arnaldi had given it to him, as he later confirmed to me. With Berardi one came rather rapidly to the point. I explained to him the risks to which he exposed himself in asking for a contact with the BR, and I wanted him to confirm to me his decision to meet a clandestine. After which, through another intermediate appointment, always at Sestri, we fixed the meeting with Nicolotti that occurred at Rivarolo, in the piazza in front of the Municipal building. Berardi, more emotional than usual, carried a small two-shot, double-barreled pistol, a toy, and a series of shots loaded by him, and he gave it to Nicolotti, who took it willingly, affirming it could be useful inside a prison. On that occasion I "passed" Berardi to Nicolotti, and I no longer had any more to do with him, except another meeting immediately following this one, still of the interlocutory type, one Saturday afternoon, in a restaurant in the country above Voltri.

During the entire summer I did not see either the one or the other anymore. In the beginning, and in the middle of September, Nicolotti reappeared in his usual manner (by means of a telephone call to the

Institute), for a chat, in which the problem posed by my anomalous position arose again with the impossibility of my being utilized better. On this occasion, I asked him what happened to the person I had introduced to him, and Nicolotti seemed to be satisfied enough, even if he told me he had quarreled with him harshly, for his inconsiderate and imprudent manner of dealing with him. He told me some episodes that I recall in a confused manner. For example, it seemed that Berardi had talked of being a brigadist to an exponent of the union; he exaggerated in his writings; perhaps he also boasted a little. But Nicolotti seemed secure of being able to succeed in imposing on him a minimum of discipline. But it was evidently too late, and at the end of September, if I recall well, Berardi was arrested in the manner that we know about.

From that moment on my meetings with Nicolotti disintegrated even more: I do not recall how many more of them there were, but certainly very few. The reason was always related to my low level of usefulness, on the "piazza" of Genoa. And of Berardi we did not speak anymore. With the passing of some months, in the winter, I noticed that my movements were under surveillance. I did not think at all that this was related to the arrest of Berardi, nor did Nicolotti think it (at least, he didn't tell me). Rather, this surveillance seemed to me the fruit of the rumors that constantly circulated about me. I was, therefore, already in a definite situation of "congealment," even if in my case, this word was never used, because, for some time, my rapport was anomalous, when the Rossa homicide occurred. The same evening and the subsequent day there were two very heavy-duty [police] searches in my dwelling in Vico Santa Fede, and the observation under which I was placed was visibly increased. Even the few contacts of the preceding months ceased, and when I was arrested, in the middle of May 1979, it had been a long time since I had cut ties with the BR. I add that in the second half of 1978, I was very involved in my work, with publications and participation in conferences, and that this fact also could be considered partial evidence of the phasing out of my political links.

Before speaking of my first experience in prison (May 1979 to June 1980), I must specify some things about the circumstances of my arrest. Rather, on the problem of the pistol and of the fliers found then in the Calvari's country home, rented a year or two before by me and by Isabella Ravazzi. I realize very well that at this point I could confess without too much damage the possession of a pistol, kept in an isolated country home but the point is and remains the same: Of the pistol and of the fliers I know nothing, and I assert, in a most absolute manner, my total extraneousness. I do not know how to give explanations of the fact, if not by pointing out that it was very easy to enter that house. Some hypotheses, already made in the trials when the pistol and fliers were discussed, have been advanced, and I am the first to admit that not one of them is satisfying. But the fact that I did not succeed in defending myself in a convincing manner and that, in general, it was not believed by anyone, not even by friends, does not make me accept responsibility for something that has nothing to do with me. And I also remain curious about clearing up this small mystery.

II.

I passed all the summer of 1979, up to the end of September, in the prison of Parma. I was the only "political," I had discreet ties with everyone, and I was thinking, above all, of defending myself. Today, I can imagine that if I had remained there for all of my incarceration, I would not then have had any more to do with the BR. But it was not that way. The first days of October I was transferred, without any apparent reason, to the superprison of Cuneo, and the first person I saw, entering into my section, was Berardi himself, who arrived there the previous day. There were then two other brigadists, "regulars," captured, that is, after their passage into clandestinity, Valerio De Ponti and Rino Cristofoli. After some time, Lintrami and Basone also arrived. The ties with Berardi were very good; he was always very extroverted, a friend of all and very well-liked. We did not talk of our meetings in the past, because there was not much to say. I do not recall when, probably at the beginning of November, Cinieri was murdered at Turin during the recess hour at the Nuove prison, by

the hand of Farre Figueras. It was said that the motive was the "cover-up" offered by Cinieri to Enrico Paghera, who in the Pianosa prison had revealed to the Management the existence of an escape plan, some months earlier. And Figueras, who then was at Pianosa, was among those who were supposed to escape. This death caused much discussion, even in Cuneo (seen today, it could be considered as a first sign of what would later happen within the special prisons), and the prevailing opinion justified it, in the name of the unwritten laws of prison. The problem, however, was not only this; in reality, since Cinieri was a "political," for his militancy in the Revolutionary Action, his death put before all the incarcerated politicians the problem of whether to kill or do less to the "traitors" in prison and whether to assume the responsibility for it and clearly claim this type of action. That the problem was ripe, to call it that, showed in all those months in the bad humor of many common prisoners who accused the politicians of keeping themselves outside similar regulations of accounts. The phrase that one heard was: "It is now time that they quit making only us do the dirty work." And the politicians began alone then to consider this aspect of the internal ties, that is, began to be fully accepted to depart from the murder of Viole in a cell of Nuove, always in Turin, several months later. The death of Cinieri and the discussions that followed, and, still more, the climate that it had created, hit Berardi very hard, who was visibly upset, even if, at the moment, the matter did not arouse comments. In this climate, the lawyer Arnaldi arrived at Cuneo for a colloquy; he was Barnardi's and my defense attorney. After the meeting, occurring separately, Berardi asked me what news the lawyer had given me, and I, not suspecting at all that Berardi was involved in my arrest, answered sincerely that in a few days, three or four, the court ruling to postpone sentencing would be delivered and that then I would finally know what charges existed against me. It seems to me that Arnaldi had come on Saturday. On Sunday Berardi was not there, and he reappeared with his wrists all slashed on Monday or Tuesday. He seemed very bad; he had cut his wrists, he had lost much blood, and he had been for a day, I think, in the hospital. After that he was sent to his section (in prison). To all of us who were around him he said that he had been through an upsetting crisis, and knowing how much he was attached to his family and

especially to a little nephew of whom he spoke always with a very moving tone, there was no motive not to believe him. Immediately afterwards, however, he took me aside, and crying, he confessed to me that he had been the one to give my name to the police, in the interrogation in the barracks of Sempierdarena, the day after his arrest. Having said this, he blurted out phrases like: "I am not worthy of the BR. You must bring me to justice. The partisans killed traitors," etc. I sought to calm him as I could, and to give him courage, saying that I was not mad at him, and that we ought to find a way to leave, get out of the situation. Before finishing the hour of fresh air, I pointed the matter out to Lintrami, and only to him, with the permission of Berardi himself. There was no time to speak beyond this. And thus, to understand better what was the situation and to avoid further dramas, the morning after--Wednesday--I went aside with Berardi in the refectory (there one could go instead of outside), to speak with calm. Berardi then explained to me how things had gone; but because of the agitation that dominated him, he was not very clear. I got out of it, in essence, that he had not given my name but that he had given a description that corresponded to me. Contradictorily, he had also sought to render this information in a confusing manner, that he had not spoken of Nicolotti, only because it seemed to him less serious to compromise, even if in a contorted manner, one like me rather than a clandestine, that is, to his eyes "a real" militant of the BR. (In effect, his tie was with Nicolotti: I had never given him fliers, because my function in his regard was limited to talk.) In addition, he continued to insist on the necessity for retracting in writing what he had confessed (providing he caused no violence to himself: that added to his sense of guilt). I did the most possible to calm him and to reassure him: I told him not to retract anything for the moment, not to make movements that could harm both him and me; I promised him that I would not tell anyone, and that we would return to talk of it with Lintrami, who was at that moment the person of the BR of greatest authority present in the prison; I assured him of my friendship. I was, however, also impelled to tell him that the newspaper, a few days earlier, had probably publicized his testimony, and that in prison an ugly situation would be created. In view of this, I counselled him to ask for a

transfer, right away, or else to remain in his cell, at least until a common line of conduct had been established. I did everything to convince him to be calm and to reduce the seriousness of the matter, which seemed, in effect, remediable. At the end he seemed much calmer, and we parted with the commitment to see each other the following morning, this time also with Lintrami. That evening, probably around 7, when all of us were behind bars, in the single cells, there was a cry: The two workers (prisoners who stay "free" and go up and down the corridor on small errands and cleaning chores) had seen Berardi hanged at the window of the bathroom of his cell. It took a little while, until this was opened (after the 4 o'clock count, the guards of the section no longer have the keys), and there was no longer anything that (we) could do (about it). The impression was enormous. The two prisoners who had seen him felt very ill. One fainted and began to fall, hurting himself, right in front of my cell; the other had a crisis during the night, with moments of violence and self-infliction. In a closed community like that, enclosed in a section of a maximum security prison, such occurrences could not but have a devastating effect, because, in an instant, it poses to everyone the reality of this condition, and the dramatic choices and the craziness that go with it, which one normally makes every effort to forget. I mean this, for the disdain that I still feel when I think again of the headlines of some newspapers, the subsequent days, that spoke of the prisoners who applauded the news of the death. No one, except me and Lintrami, knew of the admissions of Berardi (and many then, when the newspapers spoke of it, did not believe it). The day after, there was a recess outside against the prison management, for the treatment to which Berardi was subjected (for example for being put in his section after he had been wounded), and a communique was thus written in the section against the politics of the prison, which led to the psycho-physical destruction of individuals. Some days later I was called to a meeting in the office of the marshal with the Honorable Costa of the PLI, who occupied himself then with special prisons. On that occasion I was able to see fleetingly the papers of Berardi, and to note how many transfers he had been subjected to, at times even within a few days. I got the impression that, after his admissions about me, he no longer was (a potential) free man and that those transfers revealed

the attempt to make of him an infiltrator within the prisons. If such was the case, it would explain even better his sensation of not having any path of escape, his desperation.

At my arrival at Cuneo, there was no Committee of Struggle, but only some small groups, joined by political affinity: BR, PL, anarchists. And there were no particular reasons for tension. Things changed with the arrival of Lintrami and Basone. The first, especially, dedicated a lot of time to explaining what a Committee of Struggle was and to putting one in place. The models were those of Favignana and of Asinara. The committee would have been able to gather all those who intended to struggle to win better conditions of incarceration in the immediate future and to predispose and to bring about escape plans by exploiting these better conditions. The activity of the Committee would have, therefore, two aspects: one, in the light of day, consistent with the struggles and the demands on the Management, and the other, clandestine, consistent with the possibility of escape (to smuggle in weapons and explosives, to find where to hide them for long periods, etc.). Besides, it was considered fundamental that everyone participate in the Committee without distinction of political group, given that one presupposed that they shared common goals for the short or long term. The task of each brigadist was to participate in the Committee and to contribute to constructing it where it was not yet in place. The brigadist theory also contemplated, however, something else: that is, the Brigade of the Field, a clandestine structure (but not too clandestine, evidently, if for no other reason than that any prison management knows who are and who are not brigadists) formed exclusively of "official" brigadists declared, in the first place, as "regulars" captured during clandestinity. By the way, the possibility of recruitments in prison was contemplated, but then it was looked at with much reservation, and as a consequence, the brigade envisioned three levels of participation: the *effectives*, the *candidates*, and the *contacts*. The effectives were the declared brigadists, constituting the management of the Brigade; the candidates were, for the most part, according to my experience, those common prisoners politicized in prison and already stably associated with the brigadists; the contacts were those who on the outside would be called backers, that is, prisoners

willing to furnish single acts of assistance, to render some useful service. Everyone accepted the commitment to read and comment on the BR documents. The Committee of Struggle and the Brigade were supposed, therefore, to establish the two stable structures to conduct the struggle within the prison. But the reality was not so simple; to begin with, the BR presence was supposed to be minor, and the other components, the PL above all, did not intend to collaborate with structures over which the BR had, in fact, hegemony, from the moment that the Brigade, obviously very solid, was then *totally* within the Committee of Struggle. Besides, in theory and sometimes in practice, some suppositions were made. Both the Committee and the Brigade had, for example, to supply themselves with their own weapons and with their own hiding places, and to develop their own escape plans. It was to be arranged so that only the weapons and hiding places and the plans of the Committee were known and acted out by the brigadists, together with other components, while weapons and hiding places and plans of the Brigade were supposed to be and were rigidly secret and known only to the components of the Brigade itself. In sum, the theory was one thing, but the practice another, and in a section of twenty-three prisoners there was not the space necessary for so many bodies and for so many more-or-less secret responsibilities: and the non-brigadist components (PL, anarchists, autonomists) did not intend to participate in the committees that directed pure and simple emanations from the BR. I definitely believe that the Committees were born and have functioned where there have been very harsh common conditions of incarceration, of the kind experienced after the opening of the special prisons (the cases of Favignana and Asinara), and that these conditions have caused a spontaneous coalition of prisoners, existing for no other objective than that of immediate survival. Later, beyond the more or less hypocritical theorizations of the Committees, there was the definite effort of the BR to gain hegemony over the struggles within the prison, assuming always and everywhere a role of actual management, imposing one's own methods and one's own political vision. (The PL did not ever do anything similar and has preferred even to isolate itself, giving life to the so-called Community, amidst polemics and splits.) In the special prisons, through the interplay of many factors, the BR have today reached a position of monopoly of power

wherever they are present (not at Novara, for example, traditionally designated for prisoners of the right). (But of this I will say something more later, in connection with my second, and present, incarceration.) Lintrami returned from Cuneo; his effort had some immediate effect in provoking a series of small encounters for the enlargement of the internal socialization, and for sensitizing various prisoners to themes of their own Committees of Struggle. I entered into building the Committee, without any problem. More delicate was my position with regard to the Brigade (still in an embryonic form) from the moment that I officially proclaimed myself innocent. In fact, since a real Brigade did not yet exist, I kept personal ties of full trust with Lintrami and the other effective brigadists. So I knew that in the fourth section some pistols had arrived. (They were discovered some months after my departure.) In our section were hidden various knives, which a guard had furnished (I do not know to whom; perhaps it was the same guard who had carried the pistols, but I cannot be sure), a map of the prison, and some information about the security systems, the shifts, etc.

This activity, all "public" on my part, because I did not have sufficient experience and capacity to occupy myself with logistic problems, remained, however, as it did almost always at Cuneo, half-finished, because of the continual transfers that render problematic the construction of stable structures in that prison. I had arrived at the beginning of October; after two months, the first days of December, I was transferred to the superprison of Palmi, which was then just opening. Thus began a much more intense new phase of my participation in the Brigade. Still in regard to Cuneo, at that time, I can say that, besides the declared brigadists, the most active and alienated on the BR line were the prisoners Italo Pinto, Zoccola, Attimonelli, Sanna, Battini, all rather well-known for their commitment, and all quite experienced in prison life, leaders of various escape attempts, and therefore indispensable for any type of subversive activity in prison. From the point of view of the brigadist classifications, they and others in the other sections that now I do not recall were *candidate* members.

About the 10th of December, 1979, all the historic nucleus of the BR with few exceptions was gathered at Palmi and the old NAP, now having merged into the BR, with actual members in the BR. Moreover, there were Negri and some others of the so-called April 7, Faina for the Revolutionary Action (with Fantazzini), Alunni for the PL (at least he figured as such, even if he did not belong to the PL), and a series of particularly politicized and distinguished common prisoners, for example, in the revolt of the preceding October 2 in Asinara. Among these, the person of greatest importance was certainly Giorgio Panizzari, politicized in prison but included, for his capacities, among the "effectives" of the BR, with the duties of management of the Brigades of the Field. In brief, at that moment, before the waves of arrests of the subsequent years, the prison of Palmi enclosed almost all those persons of most importance in the armed struggle of Italy and those involved in the most clamorous investigations (for example, the Metropolis group). They were gathered from various prisons and brought there almost simultaneously, in a large combined action. I went into the cell with Curcio, Franceschini, and Bertolazzi, who were very curious to talk with me, to have news from the outside. To the problem of the ties with the outside, which constitute the central node, in fact the only link, of my experience at Palmi, I shall return a little later, because it will then be almost the continuous thread of my discourse. First, I will say something about the organization inside the prison.

The first problem was posed by the fact that the BR component was absolutely preponderant and that the prisoners defined as "common" were not so "common" at all, being all extremely politicized (with few exceptions). In these conditions the constitution of a Committee of Struggle was not feasible because of the particular composition of the field. For example, it was evident that the Brigade occupied almost all the available space and that the "masses" to be indoctrinated did not exist. It was then decided (when I say, "it was decided," one must understand that formally, the decisions were made in common, during the outdoor hours, but that, in fact, the basic decisions came almost always from Curcio and Franceschini) to construct the Brigade, and that was understood to mean the Unitary Committee of the Field, which was

supposed to be composed of representatives of the present groups to negotiate directly with the management about problems relating to life inside prison. This committee (which was not a model for other prisons to follow but was supposed to be relevant only in the particular situation of Palmi, even if this fact was perhaps not understood elsewhere), was composed of four prisoners, or five, I do not recall well. In substance, it consisted of a permanent delegation of no political importance that acted in the light of day, going to negotiate with the management about all those problems that the opening of a new prison, still in its break-in period, placed on the carpet (commissions for the kitchen, air, errands, etc.). Its importance became ultimately diminished by the fact that internal conditions were very good, and the entire management of the prison had a slant that was extremely reformist with regard to daily problems. I do not recall if there ever were occasions of conflict of any importance. More important instead was the establishment of the Brigade, managed, it seems to me, by Ognibene and Panizzari. In a rather compartmental manner, they and others, chosen according to their particular experience, were supposed to begin to study the prison and its weak points and to establish what was defined as the "logistic" of the field (in perspective, to construct hiding places for weapons, explosives, documents, etc: a not easy task because the prison was brand new, and everything had to start from scratch). All the others were divided, after summary consultations, into groups according to the traditional subjects of study. One group, with its head, Maurizio Ferrari, was, for example, assigned to follow the local newspapers to deepen their knowledge of the territory surrounding the prison, in all its economic and political aspects. Another, which was composed of the various "common" prisoners, would investigate the social problem of extra-legality (phenomena of social deviance, the Mafia, etc.). Still another, the study of the prison etc. I, with Bassi and Basone, began to study the theoretical problem posed by the Soviet Union, the nature of this country and of its economic and political structure. Since I knew nothing, much time went by in procuring material and in discussing some working hypotheses and the research. Later, I saw in a magazine,

Corrispondenze Internazionali, the actual draft of our research plan, published as a first contribution of the prisoners of Palmi in an analysis of the Soviet Union. Curcio and Franceschini reserved for themselves the study of things that interested them. Bertolazzi with Lintrami and the others studied the DC. In other words (at Palmi) the work in groups more or less continued. It was the same type of work that, at Asinara, had already led to the drafting of the so-called *Big Document*, which, with later corrections and additions, would become *The Bee and the Communist*. Since the people in particular study groups did not coincide with the people in the cells, there were groups during the recess hours, and one reserved a part of the day, usually the morning, for this type of activity. In the afternoon, was the "cell program," that is, a text to be studied by those in the same cell, and these works were of various kinds. In general, I think that we read and commented on fundamental texts of Marxism. In my cell, for example, for months, each day, we read and discussed a volume of the *Capital* by Rosdolski.

This gives an idea of the life in the field. It is fundamental, however, to understand that all this study activity was possible because no other type of activity was conceivable in those conditions. Revolt and escape were, in short, problems that would come up later. It was not possible to do anything else, and it was very worthwhile at that time to transform Palmi into a kind of university of the armed struggle. This imposition was then maintained; Palmi remained a very quiet prison, and, for this reason, in subsequent years, it attracted the fierce criticisms of those who were in other special prisons; "the prisoners in Palmi," one began to say, "prefer to study tranquility; they have renounced struggling." That is a too simplistic manner of judging, even if it has some grain of truth. In reality, together with this study activity, Palmi has become what Curcio and others wanted it to be: an active center of leadership of the armed struggle outside, with an enormous capacity of influence entrusted more to its political prestige than to the clamor of revolt or of escapes. As I shall seek to explain later, probably without this indirect but penetrating presence at Palmi, there would not have been the split of the Walter Alasia column, first, and the birth of the guerrilla-party of Senzani, later.

At that time, however, the most important point is that in discussion was the whole network of ties between the prisoners of the historic nucleus and the BR outside. I remained stupified, realizing how deep the division between the inside and the outside was: up to then, I did not even suspect anything of the kind. The brigadist prisoners felt isolated, betrayed; they were not recognized any longer even politically in the BR outside prison. The most hard-line was Franceschini, who paradoxically insisted on the historical necessity that all the leaders be captured, so that a work of renewal would be possible. The cell in which I stayed was the nerve center of the network of contacts. The political struggle emanated from there. I knew it immediately. Meanwhile, I was informed about all that the brigadists knew. On the occasion of the autumn trials in Florence and in Turin, the historical nucleus had politically attacked the management outside prison, and in a confidential document, it had explicitly requested that this management be at a distance, to permit the renewal of the organization. In a few words, it asked for the distancing of Moretti and of the other members of the Executive, of which Micaletto, Seghetti, and Dura were then members. (Later, Seghetti was captured in Naples and Dura in Via Fracchia; Guagliardo and Balzarani took their places.) In sum, the reasons for the alteration of the substance of the BR by this management were: the prevalence of a militaristic attitude, the prevalence of a bureaucratic mentality and of excessive management, which suffocated basic questions, its incapacity to be inside the struggle of the masses; the renunciation of the intervention at Fiat; the loosening of the Front of the Masses; its incomprehension of the character of the present political phase. Still more in particular: to kidnap and kill Moro without having a clear idea about what one wanted to achieve, which caused the subsequent crisis of the organization; to pretend to want to organize, the preceding summer, the escape from Asinara, for which the prisoners were working for months, but to consciously cause it to fail; to understand nothing of the prison problem; not to keep the prisoners abreast of the debate outside prison, which seemed, moreover, not even to exist, and things of this nature. Dominant instead [was]

political poverty into which the organization was falling, to the point where one could sense [an imminent] breakup in the air. An important point then was the lack of contacts. Despite what I often heard and what is believed about the influence of the directorate inside prison, I have learned in prison that in that period (not later!), contacts were very limited, and that, in effect, the brigadist prisoners knew almost nothing about what was occurring outside. As to how to influence the outside, no one even mentioned it. Proof came immediately after the opening of the Palmi prison. No response had yet arrived from the outside to the [written] attack composed by the insiders two months earlier. But more or less around Christmas the response arrived. The document was written with lemon juice in the interlining of a book sent by post, I do not know to whom, but certainly to no one in my cell. We knew, however, that the book was supposed to end up there, and [in that cell] it was deciphered and transcribed. I helped by holding the pages open over the little gas stove. It was a very harsh response--very insulting. In fact, it said: You of the historical nucleus are a bunch of exalted, impotent intellectuals. Be good, content yourselves with reading and writing, and leave the armed struggle to those who can really fight. It would be entertaining to describe what must have been the reaction of Franceschini, Curcio, and Ferrari to this response, which was made known to all the brigadists of the field. For some it was a real drama; for others, the definitive rupture already seemed inevitable. However, in the end, Curcio and Franceschini turned to a diplomatic solution. After many discussions, a document came out of Palmi signed by the Internal Center (Curcio, Franceschini, Bertolazzi, that is, my comrades in the cell), in which the breakup of the Center itself and of all the organisms in the field was announced, and it assigned to the external organization the task of defining a line and of taking adequate initiatives to conduct the struggle inside the prisons. It emphasized, besides, that the comrades inside would remain in the organization, in a minority position, to affirm the line that seemed right to them, without breaking the discipline of the party. The Brigade, that is, all the others, me included, signed another, longer document, in which the history of the attempted escape from Asinara and of the defects of the organization on this point was told, but it

confirmed in substance what the Internal Center had said. With regard to my signature, there were some polemics, since the document dealt with subjects of which I was totally unfamiliar. But the opinion prevailed then that even I must sign (or else dissociate myself rather publicly from the contents of the document itself, as had been done, for example by Delli Veneri); because the document involved not only incidents that had occurred but also points discussing the political line.

That was the moment of most serious explicit conflict between the inside and the outside; I say explicit, because in reality the contrasts, if less apparent, remained as the subsequent history of the BR demonstrates up to the current divisions. About a month after this response, a new communication arrived from outside, in a more conciliatory tone. The most important point was established by the news that the BR would entrust to three external militants the task of following faithfully the problem of the prisons, establishing a series of channels in every field, making documents come forth, formulating plans of various types in strict contact with the militant prisoners. It was the embryo of the future Prison Front. Naturally it was not indicated who these three were: Certainly as I understood later, there was Guagliardo. I do not think, however, that Senzani was included yet. On this note or promise of renewal my experience at Palmi ended, since in the first days of April I was transferred to Genoa for the trial from which I was excused at the beginning of June.

Naturally there are other things to say. Regarding the organizational aspects, the external-internal communications functioned well enough, in the sense that there were no particular difficulties in filtering documents. Conversations occurred without a dividing glass, and censorship of the press that arrived by post was almost nonexistent. I do not know who the go-between was for contacts of a personal nature. I am sure that they did not pass directly through my cell comrades. Given their notoriety, it would have been too unwise. It seems to me, but I am not sure, that the book with the message of which I have spoken arrived by post from the prison of Messina. In general, the practice outside was that of sending a packet, with the message written, as I have said, or else hidden in the cover of a book, to a prisoner who was absolutely trustworthy but, at the same time, not

particularly visible. As sender of the package, a close relative of the prisoner himself was chosen, without the relative's even knowing about it; in that way, the matter appeared normal to the prison supervision. If it was possible, the prisoner, during a colloquy, was informed of the arrival of the package, or else he was told about it by other means, through conversations with others, or post cards with *ad hoc* phrases. To give an example of which I am aware, the document entitled DS 80 was transcribed on cloth, and the pieces of material were sewn inside a jerkin, then sent to prison. For Palmi, the recipient was one of the De Laurentis brothers; for Nuoro, Pasquale Abatangelo. Micaletto, who was then alone in Novara, received it directly: but if he had been with someone less known than he, it would have been the other to receive the package. Naturally it was not possible to find out the true contents of the package: Pasquale Abatangelo wore the jerkin for a certain period without realizing that in the lining was hidden the text of the Strategic Directorate. He was then about to be transferred from one prison to another when he was informed (and, in a general way, the transfers really permit the most secure exchanges, whether from prison to prison or from the inside to the outside). In fact, the external-internal contacts are not ever organized in the same way in each single prison, but they are concentrated only where, for occasional motives, the contact exists, and the censure is greatest, etc. And it will then be the task of whoever is transferred from each privileged prison to carry on his person to other prisons what has to be known. The great majority of documents that I have been able to read in prison were always from other prisons (not from the outside). I add that in that very delicate phase of conflict between the outside and the inside I do not believe that there was mediation or collaboration of lawyers: It was not necessary, and I think also that there were no lawyers who knew about such secret details of the life and the line of the organization. Concerning Arnaldi, then, given his conditions of health, he did not ever come to find me at Palmi, and he was therefore in this phase completely outside the game. But, I repeat, the manner itself in which the communications arrived excluded this type of collaboration. In general, it is my opinion that the collaboration of the lawyer as intermediary could be useful when an arrested militant has his

first conversation. In this case, he can communicate with the lawyer the important elements that have caused, for example, his capture; he can send (a message) to warn the comrades outside to abandon a certain house, to avoid certain appointments. After that, the importance of the figure of the lawyer ceases. It is difficult for a professional to risk burning himself by carrying special documents or anything else within and outside of the prisons, considering also the difficulty of the matter. And there are a thousand other more secure channels for this (undertaking). It is probable that, in a circumstance of this nature, the role of Arnaldi would emerge: the first colloquy, after the arrest of Peci and Micaletto. I repeat that this is my opinion, supported by the experience that there has never been a case of a lawyer who was really important for the life of the organization. I do not know whether, in the period in which I was at Palmi, explosives or arms were smuggled in, but I doubt it, because of the state of internal-external rapports that I have described and because the prison was new, the composition (of prisoners) was new, and the eventual network of support still had to be constructed. This would provide that embryo of the Prison Front of which I have spoken and, according to what I have heard, it did provide (the embryo) in the sense that things of that nature at Palmi entered in, but later. Meanwhile Ognibene, with the help of Italo Pinto, was occupied with preparing some hiding places. So true is this that barely after he was transferred to Nuoro it became the general opinion that the Management had figured out this activity of his.

To strengthen the polemics of the historical nucleus against the outside BR, there was also the impression that the latter had become extremely sectarian, in the sense that they shied away from other groups and were impervious to the emergence of autonomous groups desirous of holding a debate and eventually of being enlisted. Probably there was much exaggeration, in the sense that any militant of Palmi tended to maintain that outside, from what he was told, the situation was potentially very rich with ferment and that the BR outside pointedly ignored it--if they were not suffocating it out of hand. And this is a typical misinterpretation in the optimistic sense of those who were in prison. However, some part of it was true. There was no doubt that

an Executive composed of Moretti (who, I later learned, was the most flexible of all), Micaletto, Dura, and Seghetti was not really the most adept for open and dynamic policy, just as there is no doubt that groups existed that, from the outside, pressed for a response without getting it. It may be that it was easier for these groups to develop a rapport with the brigadists in prison than with others outside. I have heard allusions to cases of the kind and have been witness to one.

With the usual device of the book it seems to me (I do not know to whom it was directed), a document of a group of Imperia arrived in our cell and was discussed. Its contents were interpreted as a severe criticism of the Genoa column. In other words, this group, not yet part of the BR, thought it possible to confront the historical nucleus directly and to acquire political information that it did not succeed in getting from the brigadists who were close to it. If this episode had a sequel, I do not know about it. Recalling it, I was not shocked when I learned lately that a BR group or a BR line of Imperia had not yet formed ties with the "old ones" of the BR. But it did ally with the guerrilla party of Senzani, that is, with the part of the BR that is polemically polarized from the Moretti management and from the very strong backing of nearly all of the historical nucleus, which pushed, aided, and followed the faction through all the phases of the rupture. I must, however, repeat at this point that the type of experience of those first months in the Palmi superprison was not of an organizational or technical nature. Concrete problems did not exist on the agenda that were not purely and exclusively political problems. This observation leads to the central nucleus of the activity that was developing there of a theoretical type, and to the activity, in particular, that was developing in the cell in which I was [kept]. It would be, in fact, an illusion to think that everyone was committed to the same degree; many of the activities of study were purely routine. Curcio and Franceschini, however, were committed to laying out a document that was then thought out by them and composed and discussed in the cell: that document was destined to have a very great importance outside the prisons, and in fact, it fully reopened the problem of the hegemony of the historical nucleus over the entire armed struggle in Italy. It is titled *Subjectivism and Militarism*, finished before April 1980. In fact, when

in the beginning of that month I was transferred to Genoa for the trial, I carried a copy with me; a little later it was published in the magazine *International Correspondence*, and in *Controinformazione*.

It is not appropriate to talk at this hearing of the contents of the document, which constituted an updated *summa* of the political line of the BR. I only specify here that Curcio wrote the theoretical parts and political parts, and Franceschini wrote the chapters with economic sections. Once written, it was discussed at length by the whole Brigade. But from the discussion, as was to be expected, it emerged unaltered.

I must say that those months at Palmi were absolutely decisive for my subsequent development. From a certain point of view I did more for the BR before than after that incarceration--for example, my only armed action. But with regard to my psychological as well as political involvement, there is no doubt that they reached their highest point then, and the very concentrated climate that one lived in and the type of problems in which one was involved had me, as one says, "charged up." From there, for so many related and also important reasons, I do not think that one could explain my subsequent choices without this "burden." In some ways I seemed to be at the center of the current that led to the development of the armed struggle in Italy, and to have a role, or other privileged function, for having been placed exactly there in that central and privileged observatory. This was useless, naturally, while I was at Palmi among the others, but it began to count when I left prison, the first days of June 1980.

III.

A week or two after my departure from prison I met Bertolazzi near the Albergo dei Poveri. He lived somewhere nearby, and I had already met him in passing. We had never spoken of the BR before, and our knowledge was very superficial. I knew that he was very friendly, from the times of the Armed Struggle, with Sergio Adamoli and with the lawyer, Arnaldi, who, as I have already said, told me something about his participation in the organization. He was very happy to see me, and he told me that, in any case, he would have looked for me; he had something to tell me. The organization desired to put him in contact with me, the quicker the better, since I would be able to contribute, on account of

my recent experience in the Palmi prison, to unraveling some political knots, to illustrating the position of prisoner comrades, and to defining better the problems of the political line affronted by Curcio and by Franceschini in the document *Subjectivism and Militarism* (which, as Bertolazzi confirmed to me and as I verified later, was having much success, but which also turned out to be obscure in some parts). Bertolazzi did not confine himself to being the go-between for the organization; he used the encounter to unburden himself, explaining to me that he did not get along with the managers of the Genoa column (I understood only later that he was referring, in particular, to Baistrocchi and Bozzo; but I did not then know anything of the latter), who, according to him, were precisely on the most obtusely militaristic line, what the historical nucleus considered the worst betrayal of the genuine inspiration of the BR. He added that he was given a marginal position of relative autonomy, in the sense that he held direct ties with the column, but that he developed his political activity in a small group that he had gathered autonomously around him, a little group that, through his connections, was in some way "federated" with the BR, but did not belong to it. From his entire discourse, the hope emerged that the debate that had begun would serve to modify the predominant attitude within the column, or at least to displace the internal equilibrium. To this end, it was understood that he was also counting on me, that after the story of Berardi, my incarceration at Palmi, my trial conduct, I had earned a greater stature. He set an appointment with me for a few days later, to let me know when and where I would be able to meet the BR; and he promised me that he would bring me a draft not yet in circulation of a document drafted by the Genoa column. He brought it, in fact, together with information about the appointment. I read it immediately and gave it back to him. It was very brief, and he maintained, I recall, that the only policy possible was that of targeting those in uniform, all those in uniform. It was not and did not attempt to be a "political" document but rather the clear and coherent declaration of a purely "terrorist" choice in its own right, that is, of something that the BR had always said: to combat with all their strength, in the name of the struggle of the masses and of the construction of a party. Was that document the proof that there really

existed, as the historical nucleus maintained, two antagonistic lines on the inside of the armed struggle? Then, in that climate, it seemed so. Today my judgment has changed, and I do not any longer think that there is a "good" armed struggle and a "bad" one. However, then, I repeat, I was imprisoned in this false counterposition, I moved within it, without succeeding in seeing anything else.

Following up on the information of Bertolazzi, I kept an appointment at Arezano. I waited, but no one came. No one spoke of a makeup appointment; however, I returned a day later, still in vain. I tried again a week later, and this time Lo Bianco and Guagliardo, whom I did not know, arrived. They were very angry, and only later did I understand the reason. It seems that the Genoa column, with the exception of Lo Bianco, did not wish to know about me and that the two previous appointments were missed on purpose. In particular, I was then made to understand that it was, above all, Baistrocchi who was opposed to forming with me, judging me useless for the BR (and, I think, imagining that I was [too] close to the positions of Palmi: but of this type of political discrimination I am not at all sure). The discourse was simple enough: Guagliardo asked me to depart the morning after with him, on a trip of some days. I would have to participate in a meeting that was called to discuss various political themes then on the agenda, and, if possible, to tell about the positions of Palmi. I accepted, and the morning after, we left from the Brignole station on the express train for Venice. Guagliardo bought the ticket and during the whole trip he did not ever tell me what the destination was. We got off at Vicenza, and from there we took a bus for Treviso. Arriving at the terminal he took me to an apartment in a building not far from the station, inhabited by Roberto Vezza (whose name, as always, I learned later) and frequented by a friend of his whom I have later recognized as Biliato, arrested after the Dozier kidnapping. That apartment was the base of Guagliardo and of Nadia Ponti whom I met on that occasion. I remained there two or three days. One afternoon another arrived, this one also an unknown, who I learned later was Savasta. (The *nom de guerre* of Guagliardo was "Tino"; that of Savasta, "Emilio." I do not recall Ponti's). Savasta, however, did not live there; he was only in transit, because he needed the plastic material for the falsification of official

stamps kept in that house. Savasta and Ponti directed the Veneto column. Guagliardo, as a member of the Executive, made his base in Treviso, but he occupied himself only indirectly with the situation in the Veneto. I learned then that the meeting in which I would participate was not in that area and that I had been brought to Treviso for security reasons. They carried on some discussions, especially with Guagliardo (Ponti left the house in the morning and returned late in the evening), who had me read a long document. It seems to me it was signed by the Prison Front (in which case it would have been the first), which analyzed the prison situation and traced a detailed program of intervention on this sector. With this document (which, they let me know, he had written himself) he (Guagliardo) had me read another. It was the response that Palmi had given. Both the document and the response bore the date of May. At that time, I was at Marassi for the trial and could not have known about either the one or the other. The response was fairly polemic and also very detailed, but on the whole, positive. From the point of greater friction between the outside and the inside, which seemed to be the problem of whoever was supposed to effectively direct the establishment of the Front--the prisoners and the external--it was evident that a large agreement was being developed on the subject. These two long documents would then be the basis of the pages of dedication to the prison sector in the pamphlet of the Strategic Direction of September 1980 (DS 80).

Two or three evenings after my arrival (during that period I did not ever leave the house, except for a brief tour of Venice for touristic reasons for half a day), Ponti arrived with two pieces of news. The first was that we would have to leave the next morning for the meeting; the second, that she had the impression the house was under surveillance. Savasta also arrived with her; they decided that it was opportune to leave and to sleep somewhere else. Thus, we departed from there and arrived at Jesolo by bus. I disembarked at the terminal; we continued on the local autobus and then walked a long way. It was already very late, perhaps midnight, when we arrived on a private street with vacation homes. In the shadow a person awaited Savasta. I did not see him clearly, but I understood that he was the person who was renting the apartment to which we were climbing.

The four of us slept there: Guagliardo, Ponti, Savasta and I. Rather early in the morning I left again for Venice and, from there, for Rome, on the express train. We traveled separately, and I accompanied Savasta. Arriving in Rome, Savasta took me on a long tour both on foot and on the public transportation for security reasons, and we finally arrived at the underground stop of the EUR. A little later (I would say, around four in the afternoon) Guagliardo and Ponti also arrived there and later a person who was supposed to accompany us to the meeting place. It was Barbara Balzarani, whom I first met on that occasion. We arrived all together by bus at Tor San Lorenzo, and from there, after a brief walk, we arrived at a little house that looked directly out on the sea. Gradually, within the next few hours, the others arrived, and the meeting lasted the whole next day and for half of the third day. This meeting, to all appearances, seemed like a meeting of the Strategic Directorate. However, I was never told what it was about or, for example, was Scozzafava told, as she testified. In reality, it was a large meeting of new persons, of an experimental character, not of a real Strategic Directorate. The participants were: Ponti, Guagliardo, Moretti, Balzarani, Iannelli, Savasta, De Maria, Betti, Alfieri, Chiocchi, Bolognesi, Lo Bianco, Scozzafava, Cocconi, and I. It is understood that, except for Moretti about whom no one could err, I did not know then and only learned later the names of the participants. From Genoa, with Lo Bianco, there were Scozzafava, whom I had met only superficially in passing and so did not realize that he was a brigadist, and Cocconi, whom I had never seen before. The Milanese were De Maria, Betti, and Alfieri; the Naples representatives were Chiocchi and Bolognesi; from Venice were Ponti, Savasta and Di Lenardo. (I forgot to name him above; although he comes from the Veneto, he arrived on his own.) Moretti and Guagliardo did not seem to be linked to any local situation, while Balzarani seemed to be linked to Milan. That was actually true, I learned later during the discussion.

There is not much to say about the discussion; it started off immediately with a fierce speech of the Milanese against Moretti and Balzarani (and implicitly against all the others, in particular Guagliardo), and it continued, always like that, from insult to

insult, for a day and a half, without any structure. In the end, it was clear that the Milanese of the Walter Alasia column wanted to break with the BR, and nothing else. The only decision taken was that of convoking a new meeting as soon as possible, in the autumn, to enlarge on all the problems about which they were not even able to speak there. (I have not specified the date of this meeting of Tor San Lorenzo. I do not recall it with precision, but it must have occurred around July 20-21.)

Before talking about the reasons for conflict with the Walter Alasia column, I specify that during that day and a half I did not see any other person. However, there was someone, I presume of the Roman column, who brought the food and took away the garbage. I do not know if there was watch-guard service around the vacation home; inside there were no arms other than those of the participants. The house, otherwise, could not have served as a depository. I was told that it had been rented for only a month and that this was the best system for escaping surveillance.

The conflict with the Milanese is important, both because it is a prelude to the subsequent breakup and because it gives a very good idea of what was then the "state of the organization." In brief, the Milanese maintained (not in such an explicit manner, in a certain sense, I interpret their attitude in a political key) that Moretti and Balzarani, who had directed the Milan column in the previous months, had completely failed as leaders and should resign (in truth, their language was more colored). They claimed that the BR were already external to any work place and had lost any link with the working class, especially in Milan. For this reason, in the name of the true nature of the working class that the BR champions, those of the Walter Alasia--and the Walter Alasia in its entirety, naturally--were the only true and authentic remaining BRs, and, as such, to them fell the task of entering into the leadership of the organization. To give better support to this pretext of theirs, they also carried a theoretical document, of about 15 pages. This document, however, appeared to me to be very rough and poor, full of contradictions and commonplaces; later I learned that the Milanese were also ashamed of it, and they had indirectly repudiated it. The tone of the discussion and the type of quarrel that was unleashed was such that it cut off the majority of the participants. I

recall that Balzarani did not open her mouth, and almost all the others interrupted very little, on discourses about methods, because of the impracticality of involving oneself in a problem that had all the ear marks of an internal matter of the management of the Milan column. But it was not thus. To begin with, it was evident that the arguments of the Milanese, contaminated with their extreme positions and with what we call local elements, retraced, in a surprising manner, the arguments with which the historical nucleus had attacked the BR leaders the previous autumn. And the consequences were also the same: a radical change at the top (even if then the Milanese were perhaps contented with much less, for example, a post in the Executive). However, that could not be the solution. I, like the Napoletani, interrupted near the end regarding a theoretical question, or rather criticized some passages of the document of the Milanese that seemed to me in error even from the theoretical point of view, let alone the political. And in the meantime I started to realize why I had been brought there with so much solicitude, and why by Guagliardo, who was the principal ally of Moretti and of the line of the Executive. Evidently, he had it in for the Milanese. It was not in virtue of my scarce merits as a brigadist, or for my finally recognized capacities. Nothing at all like that. I was simply a good card in the hand of Moretti, because somehow, coming from Palmi and, in fact, being part of it, even if no one had officially tapped me as the representative and the interpreter of Palmi, I took on, with my criticism of the Milanese, their principal argument or point of strength: that the historical nucleus was in accord with them. It is only a hypothesis that Moretti foresaw the conflict that would arise and decided, for that reason, to take me to Tor San Lorenzo in order to deprive the Milanese of the principal minor point of their discourse. But certainly this is what happened. In fact, when the document of the Milanese was discussed, I could do no less than observe that they had written it so badly that it did not remotely resemble what Palmi was preaching, from *Subjectivity and Militarism* on. To the contrary, without even knowing it, they committed mistakes like the ones they criticized in their work. Whether my view was actually true was not important. At the time, it seemed that it was, and I was in perfect good faith. But it is clear that the clash was political, or rather, a

power struggle within the BR, and not a theoretical confrontation. Except that in that particular case the theoretical argument was an important instrument of power.

The whole question for me was a new surprise, one of so many. I did not know anything about the situation in Milan, of the errors committed by Moretti or by Balzarani. I did not know the protagonists of the situation. However, I sympathized instinctively with Moretti, who always maintained a very calm and reasonable demeanor and who was the only one there, in my opinion, who had the qualities of a political leader. When the meeting ended, more because the Milanese had run out of insults than for any other reason, Moretti was still available for dialogue, and he was very realistically preoccupied with rupture at any cost. The rupture came, some months later, official and irreparable, without further open conflicts, at least, at that level. Leaving Tor San Lorenzo, the Milanese had probably already decided to isolate themselves within a short time from the rest of the BR. However, they did not wish to be known as fractionalists, and they tried to cut off their contacts a little at a time, avoiding other traumatic debates. The role of the historical nucleus was, in my opinion, ambiguous. In brief, I am convinced (and Moretti was too) that, the conflict having broken out, they were content with it; and that they had hoped for a certain time that the Walter Alasia column would be the force that finally would be able to sweep away the old directorate and renew the BR. In the months after the meetings of Tor San Lorenzo, I know that the historic nucleus was solicited to condemn the fractionalist attitude of the Milanese and to criticize the insufficiencies in their political and theoretical declarations. But they did not ever do it; they thereby avoided attacking the column and assumed the evasive stance of simply going along with both groups. Later, it must have been evident to them that the Milan column would not prevail in its attempt to ensnare Moretti, deprived as it was of national influence and very weak on the political level, even if very strong locally. But meanwhile, the new force was being born that could do what the Walter Alasia column was not able to do--the Prison Front of Senzani and, in hindsight, the guerrilla party. But that will happen later, in the spring and summer of 1981.

The meeting having come an end, I returned to Genoa alone. First, however, I had to give some assurances to the others about my conduct. And I set an appointment with Guagliardo for the end of August, in Rome, in order to resume our contact from the point at which it had been interrupted. It was not, however, at all decided that I should participate in the next meeting, whose date I still did not even know.

In Genoa I occupied myself with my own business, going to the University to settle some business. After a year of prison, I naturally had many things to put in order. At the end of July, Isabella Ravazzi and I left on our vacation. We camped a little in the south, and we spent most of August in Calabria, in a locality of the Ionio south of Catanzaro Marina, Marina di Davoli, or Badolato. (I do not remember the name well.) Here we were the guests of the family of the lawyer Mario Cavaliere of Bologna, who was there with his wife and two young sons. And sometimes a friend of the lawyer Cavaliere, the lawyer Tommaso Sorrentino of Cosenza, came to visit us. Sorrentino had been, or still was, the defense attorney for Ravazzi and me. Cavaliere had been introduced to us by him in Genoa, and we had immediately become friends, in the weeks following our release from prison. It was therefore an extremely recent acquaintanceship. This was a real vacation, without any political implication. Anyway, we really needed it. I will speak more later about Cavaliere.

At the end of August (I do not recall the exact day), I left Isabella Ravazzi in Calabria, and I went to the Roman appointment with Guagliardo. We met at the terminal of a bus whose number I do not recall. He arrived with my brother-in-law, Giovanni Senzani (*nom de guerre*, "Antonio"). I was surprised by it. I did not know very much about him; I knew that he concerned himself with the BR, from the time of his first stop in Florence on the occasion of the arrests of components of the Tuscan Committee (Cianci, Baschieri, Bombaci). But I did not know his current position. I supposed that he had left the country. In the month of May, in fact, while I was still in Marassi prison, I had received a gift from England from him (a complete catalogue of the paintings of Salvator Dali). From Rome, Senzani accompanied Guagliardo and me to Formia, to an apartment on the top floor of a new

building in the vicinity of the station. This apartment had been rented for Senzani by his old friend, Professor Iannetti, of the University of Salerno. (I have never seen him.) This Iannetti, according to Senzani, was a sympathizer, but it seemed that he had not yet understood well what the activity of Senzani himself was; Senzani, in fact, promised to talk to him again at length, to convert him definitively to the cause of the BR and to [thus] lessen the difficulties in the management of the house. A few days later, it seems, Iannetti, in fact, went to Formia, and I had to pass the day outside. (Guagliardo left again immediately, and I do not recall if he was still there.) I believe that he [Professor Iannetti] considered the favor he made to Senzani still a strictly personal one, and he was not disposed to or, not yet prepared for the idea that his apartment might become a brigadist base.

I repeat that Guagliardo departed almost immediately; subsequently, however, Moretti arrived. He used the house sporadically as a support base, since the houses of Rome were not secure. By the way, there was a discussion between Senzani and Moretti, and the conclusion was that it was necessary to decide to use them in the absence of better (safer) accommodations. With time, in fact, Moretti's visits to Formia diminished, and Senzani too began to stay at Rome. I, however, have never been in any Roman house, nor have I ever spent the night in Rome. Moretti, during the summer, had not been on vacation, but he had commuted throughout Italy, or rather, to all the columns of the BR, to reweave together the organization and to gather the facts necessary for the convocation of the Strategic Directorate. Part of the preparatory documents that I had seen already at Tor San Lorenzo remained unused, in view of the progress of that meeting. It was a matter now of getting new ones from the various columns, in order to prepare the general document that would state the line of the organization and to win the consensus of everyone. In theory, even of the Milanese. The best contributions came from the Venice column. I would say (but it is always difficult to document these things) that a great number of the pages of the DS 80 (the document that the DS would approve), the kind dedicated to the factory and to the strategies of the counter-guerrilla, were

directly the work of Guagliardo, while the most political chapters (the whole conclusion), for example, were written by Moretti. But even the Roman column had contributed, sending various drafts, and also the Naples column. The Genoa and Milan columns, however, did not contribute: the Milan column, because it was opposed to the rest of the organization, did not recognize the present directorate, and did not intend to participate any longer in the general meetings; [the Genoa column] because it was torn by internal contradictions, personal rancors and organizational difficulties, as emerged somewhat later with the arrests at the end of September. I saw some of the documents at Formia, during that stay; I saw another part at the meeting that was held around the middle of September.

Meanwhile, in those two first weeks of September, I stayed only at Formia. Senzani, I do not believe he had yet been officially designated, occupied himself with the prisons, and he had all his files. There were two voluminous suitcases with everything that, over several years, the BR had put together in terms of knowledge of the prisons (of the superprisons, above all). The material seemed to me already very well-ordered. (Only the part of the file devoted to the Walter Alasia was missing.) I did not examine it, and I do not have any particular recollection, besides that of some large photos of the prison of Fossombrone, taken from outside. The documentation on this prison seemed to be greater than on the others, and Senzani explained to me an escape plan was under study. It was based on the concrete possibility of blowing up a piece of the surrounding wall, near where the railroad tracks passed, with an external triggering device. With particular pleasure, in those days, Senzani showed me a little agenda book full of confidential names and addresses pertaining to the personnel who occupied the highest level of the prisons and worked at the Ministry of Amnesty and Justice. He told me that it also contained the secret telephone numbers in Rome of General Dalla Chiesa. This little address book belonged to a woman who worked in that sector (there were some private numbers), but Senzani did not tell me the name. Recently the investigating judges have shown me a xerox copy of the book, and I recognized it (it was the famous address book belonging to the present director of the superprison of Trani, Mrs. Ambra Barbieri). I asked

Senzani how he had procured it, and he told me evasively that it had been found by a Roman comrade in a telephone booth. It was clearly a lie, which also contained a reproof, since that was a question I was not supposed to ask.

In that same period, on the occasion of one of Moretti's visits, there was a heated conversation between him and Senzani. Senzani, in fact, insisted on carrying out, at any cost, an action that Moretti judged too risky. It was to kill the judge who supervised the activity of the corps of the Agents of Custody, Dr. Capriotti. Senzani revealed that, together with other components of the Roman column, he had developed a most accurate investigation and had come to know the (extremely confidential) schedules and habits of the judge and that someone pretending to be an office boy or office-cleaner had succeeded in entering his house. Moretti objected, saying that the escort was too powerful and that surveillance of the area during the hours of departure and return of the judge was too difficult and also that to enter his house seemed anything but easy. Senzani wanted to put a car with an explosive in front of the entrance of the house, even at the risk of injuring or killing some passerby. (But, in practice, it seemed almost certain that only the men in the escort would pass by there.)

Second, but this is a particular of which I am not certain, he proposed to lie in wait for a command in a school located in front of the habitation, and to strike from a distance. I repeat that the exchange was sharp, and Moretti provoked it, especially because, it seems to me, Senzani did not have, it seems to me, any authority on the operative level. I emphasize, however, that in my opinion, for the guerrilla party, which certainly acquired its knowledge of the Prison Front from Senzani, this target is of course always top priority, and [the action] can be repropounded any time that it is necessary to act according to the general directives that come from the inside of the prison, and on the occasion of revolts or other things that involve the prison world. From the entirety of those discussions and of those ties, I learned that Senzani, I do not know when, had had, as a brigadist, his place within the Roman column; he had known Gallinari well, and he occasionally mentioned Seghetti and Braghetto to me. At present, it was clear that he aspired to a managerial role and that he had thrown himself, with all his

forces, into the prison sector. He concerned himself, for that reason, with maintaining, on any occasion, that it was necessary to build a Front endowed with complete autonomy, something like another column (that is, with its own full-time militants, with its own budget, its logistic sector, etc.). This line then receded, but his preoccupation derived from the fact that, in the past, this Front had been nothing of the kind. It had never been, that is, a Front, but a simple "service" to which some comrades were sporadically assigned. It was always in the Executive and the column that one decided everything, and that, according to him, was supposed to change. In some way he had found a new terrain to exploit, up to then overlooked by the others, and he was getting hold of it with grit and an extraordinary activism.

After about two weeks, therefore, more or less at the middle of September, Moretti arrived with the news that the next day there would be a new meeting. All three of us left from Formia together--Moretti, Senzani and I, and we arrived in the early afternoon at Santa Marinella, in a little villa on the sea, similar to that of Tor San Lorenzo. Arriving also in the space of a few hours were Lo Bianco and Balzarani, Chiocchi, Bolognesi, Guagliardo, Ponti and Di Lenardo, Iannelli, Savasta, and Novelli, and from Milan, Alfieri, who maintained all the time the attitude of an external observer. We stayed there two days: here too I do not know about the outside house guards. The food was acquired directly, it seems to me, from Balzarani, in town. The little villa was rented, according to what I was told, for the month of September only.

Regarding the problem of the Prison Fronts, there were no polemics. It seemed to me that no one even talked about it, nor was the Executive to take care of it, designating Senzani as the person who was supposed to direct it. The meeting, which lasted two days, began with the reading, made individually or in small groups, of the numerous pieces of material at hand, part of which had already been known to those of the historical nucleus of Palmi. I do not know by what means. Moretti, by the way, brought out from Palmi a letter in which the prisoners approved most highly of what had been [given] to them to look over; and the letter proposed something new. Guagliardo brought, as I already mentioned, a substantial contribution from the Veneto. I seem to recall that to what

already was at the disposition of the group, they had to add only, on the request of all the columns, a paragraph on the *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. But it seems to me also that the Venice column had already seen to it, on its own, to fill this gap. On the whole, in brief, the linkage made by Moretti during the summer worked out, and things went ahead without difficulty, except for some polemics against the most "militarist" positions of Ponti and, in part, of Guagliardo. In the discussion Novelli distinguished himself (I did not know him; his *nom de guerre* was "Romolo"); he showed a profound knowledge of the problems of the Roman column. A little later, in fact, he was coopted by the Executive, together with Ponti. Lo Bianco noted the internal divisions of the Genoa columns, but in a superficial manner. That was not, in fact, the subject of the meeting, which was supposed, above all, to put together various written contributions in order to publish within a short time the little book (the DS 80) that consisted essentially, as I have already said, (1) of a part on the prisons, which was taken from the documents of May 1980; (2) of a very general part on the factories, the fruit of the work of Guagliardo revised by Moretti, who had modified its tone here and there; (3) of a part on the institutions of repression and the counter-guerrillas, I believe by Guagliardo, and (4) of a final part, the last chapters by Moretti. Some other connecting chapters (on the D.C. and on the P.C.I., it seems) were taken from the corresponding parts of the so-called Big Document, that is, the draft of the volume that would be published there shortly, *The Bee and the Communist*. After the reading, lasting more or less half a day, and another half day of discussion on the ordering of the subjects, everyone worked together mostly with scissors, cutting and combining the various chapters.

In those two days I did not see other persons besides those whom I have named. However, the second day someone (more than one person) came, and a separate meeting was held, made possible by the structure of the vacation house. At the time, I thought that it was a meeting that pertained to the Roman column.

At the end of two days, in the evening, Senzani and I left from Santa Marinella to return to Formia. But before the departure, the Executive met again separately and then, it seems to me, communicated to Senzani that the Prison Front had been entrusted to him. I was also

called separately and I was told that, for the moment, given my position, I was suspended. My destiny would be discussed later, with calm, naturally keeping my willingness also in mind. When Senzani and I left the little villa, the Executive was still meeting and was calling in all the others, one by one, to confront with each one the relevant problems and each individual situation, to plan each one's activity.

To Senzani was entrusted not only the responsibility of management of the Prison Front but also that of following the situation in Naples, helping Chiocchi and Bolognesi, as I only knew later. In fact, the two Neapolitani were, by their own admission, barely at the beginning of the work of building the Naples column and in addition they did not have any particular experience. By the way, in a pause of the freewheeling discussion, they had said that the capture of Nicolotti, Seghetti, and others, in the spring, had brought down the still fragile Naples column. But above all, they engaged in many polemics on the "colonial" manner in which that column was founded and maintained that it was necessary to begin again with greater caution and greater capacity to penetrate the Naples reality, trusting mostly the local internal forces in the popular movement, in which it was necessary to be more internally involved. Even they, therefore, in some way, polemicized with the old centralized management, and they claimed, in fact, a greater autonomy and a greater consideration for the local peculiarities. In that moment, and in the phase immediately following, therefore, was born the alliance between Senzani and the Neapolitani that would become the backbone of the guerrilla party. To sustain their affirmations, in the guise of a contribution to the discussion, Chiocchi and Bolognesi also read a long and detailed paper on the economic and social situation of Naples. Their intervention, together with that of the Romans, sensitive to these same themes, brought about the accentuation of certain discussions of the extralegal proletariat, and, in general, the opening of the organization to the "line of the masses," which one finds cited in the DS 80. Not by chance, later, Senzani himself and the Naples column set themselves up as the legitimate heirs to those positions, against an Executive that, in their opinion perpetrated the old management and the old politics.

After returning to Formia, in a provisional way and still without

knowing well what to do, we heard the news of the Genoa arrests; and at the same time, we knew that someone was "singing" (it seems to me that I arrived on the last week of September). Moretti, who brought the news, however, already had gone into hiding--he returned, in all, one or two times; I do not know on what basis anyone could affirm with so much certainty that there was a highly placed Genoa brigadist who was collaborating with the police. I imagine that he had deduced it from the discovery of some arms deposits. This fact made my situation more delicate in the sense that suddenly the possibility of my return to Genoa became unthinkable, and it became a little more so each day with the news of the progressive collapse of the whole column. For as little as I was known as a brigadist in Genoa (and in effect, as it turned out, it was really little), nevertheless, I was still able to be compromised. Already Guagliardo tended to put pressure on me, when he came to take me to Genoa, declaring himself sure that if I returned to a normal life, I would be inevitably arrested again. Now those predictions that I had not believed are coming true. I stayed, for this reason, at Formia, waiting, even if Moretti now no longer came, and even if Senzani began to distance himself from there, stopping more often in Rome.

In this phase, during the month of October, I sometimes accompanied Senzani on his work trips. For example, I accompanied him once to Naples, or rather to Ercolano, where he tried to keep an old appointment with an exponent of the PL (the place was the entrance of the Museum of the Scavi). It was a rather remote matter. It seemed that once a month, or else every two months, I do not recall, a militant of the PL passed by there, with a signal of recognition, for a possible contact with the BR. We went, but nothing happened, even though a young man passed and repassed in front of us, leading us to suspect that he could be the right person. But he did not give a signal (a newspaper and a yellow book, it seems to me), and we did not trust him.

I accompanied him even two or three times to Livorno, where, in the gardens of Lungomare he met with a person that he already knew, the railroad man Ciucci (as usual I learned the name later). He met him not to discuss problems linked to his work, but with the intention of constructing a network that permitted him to form ties with the prison of Pianosa,

since Ciucci knew a whole group of relatives of Tuscan prisoners. Plus, the tie with Ciucci seemed to me delicate and useful enough, and later I was shocked to learn that he had been surprise-attacked in the flat where General Dozier was sequestered. (He furnished me with material for reflection, which contributed in part to a new judgment that I was making of the BR, and it strengthened my reasons for dissociation.) During the second meeting Ciucci brought with him another person, whom I identified immediately. It was Cattabiani, of whom I had already heard something in prison. Senzani was very interested in forming a contact with Cattabiani, a person of quite another experience and turn of mind with respect to Ciucci. He had been out of prison for a little while, and he was willing to provide any useful information about prison to the BR. He did not yet speak of joining their ranks, because he was supposed to be recovering in the hospital from a delicate operation that would impede him for many months (as, in fact, occurred). Meanwhile, he was able to collaborate with the network that Senzani was weaving in Tuscany. In particular, he was capable of giving information about a series of goals. For example, he solicited an attack against the supervising judge of Livorno; an attack required--so he said--by all the prisoners who depended on him. He also said that he knew the location of the hotel or the pensione of Piombino in which the custody officers lodged after leaving work at Pianosa prison and, it seems to me, the location of the restaurant belonging to a sergeant stationed on the island of Elba. I am not sure that the last particulars are exactly correct. I think that, besides the references that he made during the meeting, he furnished Senzani with some file cards.

During the last of these trips, Senzani left me alone for a few hours. Later he reached me and told me that he had contacted some workers of the Livorno port (two, it seems to me), who had also placed their house at his disposition. The matter naturally made him very happy. I do not know who these workers were, nor by what means he made contact with them. I think that it was through some links that originated from the Montedison Company of Massa, and from there they led also to La Spezia. This was, anyway, a "territory" of competence of Balzarani, and it must have remained such, since Ciucci sided, during

the Dozier kidnapping, not with Senzani but with the others, as I think Cattabiani and the other Tuscans also did.

Senzani was content to have found those support points at Livorno not only for general political reasons, but also because it filled a clear work need. In fact, he moved around continually, and Formia was too uncomfortable as a departure base. So true is this that he gradually displaced himself to Rome. However, when I accompanied him to Livorno, I always departed from Formia, and I returned there, not having other places in which to be able to sleep. This was very tiresome. Meanwhile, given my situation and tired of being at Formia (lately I had been alone), I had made it known to Moretti that I wanted to go to Milan where I knew that I would be able to find temporary lodging. At the end of October, or at the beginning of November, Moretti himself asked me to go there, with the responsibility of helping Guagliardo to form ties with the Walter Alasia column, for the purpose of bringing it back to the BR. He also said that I would not be alone, but that probably at Milan I would also find the Genovese, Bertolazzi, already sought in Genoa; but some weeks later, Guagliardo told me that Bertolazzi did not wish to leave his family and did not feel like pursuing the brigadist adventure and had, for that reason, said good-bye to all and had left for abroad. Subsequently, I heard this fact repeated by Savasta.

At Milan I found lodging with a middle-aged couple, totally extraneous to the BR. I had known the lady years earlier, on the occasion of some assemblies of the Red Help, both at the Humanities and at the State [buildings], and she was a person willing to help comrades of the left. I retelephoned and was welcomed into their home. I never said who she was, nor do I intend to do so now, because this person has nothing to do with the armed struggle, as is shown in the fact that when it became public that I was implicated in the BR, I was immediately asked to leave, right away. Moreover, the husband had very bad nerves, and I am certain that their equilibrium in life would have been destroyed even if they were only partially involved in the history of terrorism. I am certain, therefore, of doing right and, at the same time, of not damaging justice minimally if I keep their names to myself. I was a professor hired at Genoa, but still, perhaps, pursued unjustly, in need of some months of tranquillity. Nor was I either a fugitive

from justice or clandestine, and I still carried my own documents. Officially, notwithstanding the arrests in Genoa, I was still a person perfectly at peace with the law.

In the last weeks at Formia I had continued to study and to write about Dante Alighieri. I also continued to stay in Milan, having always much time at my disposal. It was thus that I was able to publish at the publishing house UTET of Turin a work I composed in that period. And later, in November, it seems, I collected my compensation. I relate this particular to give an idea of how little I was committed to the BR. At Milan, up to the end of the year, I still frequented the Library of Brera regularly, but I signed the entry card with the name of Dino Chelli, brother of my ex-wife, resident of Milan, with whom I had no tie. I used this name simply to prevent some colleague or Milanese scholar from learning by chance of my presence in the library, and from deciding to come to find me: not out of scruple of clandestinity, since I repeat I still had my own documents, and only those. Later, I found it more comfortable to frequent the reading room of the Institute of Italian Literature at the state university. I went almost every day, and I think that the employees remember me very well: among so many studying youths, with my white beard, one would notice me easily, and since I stayed long hours, up to the closing time, I became known as "professore."

Guagliardo, as I have said, had the task of re-forming ties with the Walter Alasia column, who were separated from the rest of BR in fact, but were officially still united. He had already been to Milan previously, but I do not know when. He knew, for this reason, the persons with whom he was supposed to deal. Moretti, at Formia, had made me an appointment with Guagliardo at Milan. I saw him again, and the following day he took me with him to a meeting with members of the Walter Alasia. In the vicinity of the station he introduced me to a youth whom I later recognized in the photo that the judges of Milan have shown me. It was of Roberto Adamoli, *nom de guerre*, "Gianni" (I forgot to say it: meanwhile, my name had become "Marco"). He accompanied us, by train, up to Lecco, and from there, by bus, up to Primaluna, a little village in the valleys. Alfieri and Betti awaited us in a little two-room house on a hillside, perhaps a kilometer from the street. Naturally, I

did not know whose house it was; only later, from the investigators, I learned that it had been rented by a worker of the Alfa whom I had never met. We talked at length, but it was a dialogue among deaf people. In substance, they told Guagliardo and me that we were considered the servants of Moretti, that the Alasia column members had already decided to continue on their own, and that they were always of the opinion that the BR were already deprived of any effective link with the working class. (For their part, naturally, they boasted a capillary presence in the Milan factories instead.) Moreover, even if they did not say it clearly, they seemed to think that the BR was not even capable of undertaking any action. By the way, it is to be recalled that it was from the time of the arrest of Peci, that is, for about nine months, that in Italy, there were no actions claimed by the BR. In conclusion, they did not appear to want an official rupture, and they promised that they would talk with the others and that they would willingly see us again.

In the course of the month of November there were other meetings, but I do not recall perfectly in what order they took place, since there are so many facts. Certain meetings always took place in Milan, and the dates were fixed at the end of each session. Guagliardo arrived by train, and he left in the afternoon, because there was no home where he could lodge in Milan. The members of the Alasia column whom I met were always the same three (Adamoli, Betti, Alfieri), but we decided not to meet all three together anymore.

The new fact, after the first meeting, was the homicide of the engineer Briano (I do not recall now exactly the date). When Guagliardo returned to Milan, he met me before the others. (I took him to the vicinity of the station in order to go from there with him to the appointment with the Milanese, set in a bar at the end of Via Rinzamonti.) He told me that the organization, or rather, the Executive, judged the Briano action an out-and-out assassination, without any other political justification than that it was not the wish of the Alasia column to "depart" first from the BR and to show that they were stronger than the BR. They thus wished to form reciprocal ties and to win the hegemony that at Tor San Lorenzo they had not succeeded in acquiring. I was in agreement that it was a matter of a purely

instrumental assassination. What was not clear, however, was the attitude to take. Under his quite decisive and hard appearance, Guagliardo, in fact, was very uncertain (and for that reason also the Executive, I imagine), given that it shared the opinion of Moretti that, in any case, he needed to search to find an accord with the Alasia, since it was not acceptable that a column so strong and radical in the factories could be considered lost to the BR. At the appointment there was a clash: Guagliardo spoke, he threatened the expulsion from the BR of the directors of the Alasia, with a declaration made public, supported by the weight of all the other columns of the BR. The Alasia feared or seemed to fear this possibility, and it would have preferred that the BR and their directing organs at the national level leave Milan alone, according to a logic of decompartmentalization of the areas of competence. Besides, they very much feared that the BR did not recognize the Briano homicide as their own. Notwithstanding the hardness of respective attitudes, with even dramatic moments, the Alasia did not want an immediate rupture, even if it worked to procure it in a brief time, and the Executive wavered, because it still did not feel like expelling the entire column en masse. For this reason, Guagliardo proposed that the homicide not be claimed and that the Executive (that is, he) hold a series of meetings with other Milanese militants to enlarge the debate and possibly to succeed in putting the management in the minority. This was and remained one of his and Moretti's illusions. In reality, notwithstanding the promises of militants whom they had met, it was never possible, as one would see in the subsequent months, to go beyond them [the promises].

The homicide was claimed, and we were not permitted to talk with anyone else, even if, for this purpose (that is, that of organizing a larger meeting) between visits of Guagliardo, I had seen Adamoli, who did nothing else than drag things out. and he led us by the nose. And there was the second homicide, of the engineer Mazzanti, also absurd and also exploitative. At this point it was clear that any meeting with the Alasia was a pure farce, and the rupture became inevitable. Guagliardo arrived in Milan upset, and having barely seen me, he said that we would skip the appointment and that he did not want to see the Alasia members anymore. The

Executive had decided to denounce the two homicides as acts of pure adventurism undertaken by persons who had nothing to do with the BR. To give credibility to this lie, destined certainly to raise many arguments, he had been able to bring with him the first copies of the booklet, the DS 80. Thus, we did not go to the appointment, and I made two telephone calls, one to the newspaper *La Repubblica* and the other to *Corriere della Sera* (and this last one really did not turn out well because the switchboard delayed too long in making the connection) and read a very brief communique--two lines in all--that in rather harsh terms contained that lie. Moreover, I added that the authenticity of the message was guaranteed by the fact that the caller had left the packet with the DS 80 near a garbage can. While I telephoned, Guagliardo was beside me; but truthfully, it was not a very dangerous matter. The booklets were left downtown so that the journalists could find them immediately: one at the end of the Via sant'Andrea, another in the area of Via Garibaldi. We went immediately to make the telephone call to *La Repubblica* at Porta Ludovica; that of *Corriere della Sera* (was made) on the street of the Porta Romana.

On the advice of Guagliardo, I went again--it seems twice--to the makeup appointments with Adamoli (Alfieri and Betti no longer came), because there always existed the remote possibility that one could snag some other militants of the Alasia. It did not seem possible, in fact, that all the brigadists of Milan remained indifferent to that lie, and it seemed to us that someone would have disagreed with the local management. But, I repeat, this was an illusion, and this evidence of solidarity and impermeability that the Alasia column provided on that occasion is truly very extraordinary. The last meetings with Adamoli were for that reason rather tempestuous and totally inconclusive (we met in Viale Romagna, in front of the headquarters of the Institute of Peoples' Housing or something similar). The very last was particularly dramatic, because it happened the day after Iannelli's arrest in Rome. Adamoli that day was particularly overbearing, and I had the impression that that arrest confirmed, in the eyes of the Alasia, all their predictions: that is, that the BR was not any longer capable of doing anything and that only they were still capable of relaunching activity. For that reason, I reacted harshly to

that tone, and it seems that I called him a "jackal," at which he threatened to shoot me. Curiously, finally, as always during the meetings with the Alasia, he tried to keep the tie open and said that notwithstanding the rupture one could not take away the reciprocal aid. In particular, he asked me to tell Guagliardo that they needed a large quantity of explosives (it seems he said fifty or sixty kilograms) for an escape plan--all ready--in the prison of Brescia, where some brigadists in the historical nucleus were supposed to go for trial. To lend credibility to the matter, he alluded to the fact that the plan was placed in accord with those two brigadists, and that a local support group existed. I must say that I did not believe him, nor did it seem the time or place to make such a request: For that reason, I cut the discourse short, and saying that we no longer had anything to say, I said good-bye and left. Naturally, I told of that request to Guagliardo, who approved of my behavior. Of that escape I learned nothing more later.

Guagliardo came to Milan for the last time a little after this meeting with Adamoli; I think it was the beginning of December. It was already clear that I was completely alone in Milan. I no longer was able to see anyone from the Alasia column, since we had not fixed any new appointments. On that occasion, I don't know how, Guagliardo succeeded in making contact with two people and in introducing me to them. He told me that they were the "remains," that is, it was all that Milan could offer me in terms of contacts and of political work, for the moment. They were persons who, in the past, had refused to belong to the BR (I don't know to what past he was referring), but who, having decided to to meet someone, perhaps could be induced to collaborate, even if in the most minor way.

The meeting took place in front of a supermarket (the Rinascente) at the intersection of Via Martosa and Via Monteceneri, about noon; and we had lunch together. One was an employee of a firm that produced or sold adding machines and cash registers of a very advanced nature; his name was Biffarini; he lived in Via Washington. The other was a worker at Alfa or Arese. Now I don't recall his name nor the name of the street in which he lived, near the Ravizza park. (In any case, on the basis of my information, it was found by investigators.) They were

a little embarrassed, but also curious. I do not know under what guise they knew Guagliardo (for example, if they knew that they were actually dealing with Guagliardo). Certainly, they seemed interested in exchanging some political discussion of a general nature. Guagliardo left, as usual, and I arranged to see him again separately.

In short, contrary to the expectations of Guagliardo, only the worker at the Alfa plant seemed to be particularly persuadable. Probably he immediately repented of his initial curiosity, which had led him to me. Certainly he was not disposed to risk anything. He had a large motorcycle, an expensive stereophone set, and he probably passed the Christmas holidays, which were rather long (for him), in North Africa. I kept up with him for a while, and I visited his home two or three times. I eventually saw him no more, and the matter ended there. Naturally, he never told me explicitly that he didn't want to know (more about the BR); he would have been ashamed to do so. Instead, as always in these cases, he told me that he wasn't sure, that he was very confused, that he needed more time to clarify things, and so forth. In sum, there was nothing to do but let it drop. With the other one, Biffarini, the rapport was different, and better, even if it remained on a totally personal level. There was nothing that he wanted or could do for the BR, but we could chat together pleasantly. Since I was alone at Milan, with a lot of time at my disposition, I arranged to go with him to the movies sometimes. There was nothing else: But his usefulness became clear to me, in an indirect way, when I had to look for a new residence around the middle of January.

Meanwhile, the D'Urso kidnapping took place, and Guagliardo did not come to Milan any longer. I think that as a member of the Executive, he was committed to following this operation. Indeed, since he told me so himself during the last meetings, I learned that he had been transferred from the Veneto to Turin, to rebuild a column there. In that regard, he let me know about the enormous difficulties for example, in finding a safe house and in cutting off old, contaminated contacts. Regarding the house, he emphasized that the person who lodged him was not very satisfied with him, but that she had put a "good face" on an unpleasant task on account of compromises in her past, which were made to weigh on her. (These observations

fit into Guagliardo's complex about finding a house. He wanted, above all, a quiet place, even a pleasant, welcoming place, and instead, he was always traveling up and down (Italy) by train, camping out here and there. And this kind of life exasperated him.)

I heard from him for the last time by telephone. In fact, I had given him the number of the home in which I lived, and he had told Moretti. He told me that, for a period of time, we would not see each other, but he did not specify now whether it was because of his Turin commitments or, in the short term, for the D'Urso kidnapping. Probably, it had to do with both matters, since, around December 20, he was arrested in Turin while undertaking his local activity there. I must add that our previous appointments had been set each time (during our meetings) never by telephone. I did not want to do it (by phone) out of respect for our hosts, who naturally did not know anything about my activity and who viewed me as being dedicated to studies. That time, there was no problem, however, since I had told them that a dear friend might call me by telephone.

The publication of the interview in the *Espresso* changed things regarding my life style. (I do not recall the date; but it came out more or less the first week of January 1981.) With the arrest of Mario Sciloja of the *Espresso*, the name of Giovanni Senzani, my in-law, suddenly came out, in fact as the mediator for the BR and probably as the mole in the Ministry of Pardon and Justice. Together with Senzani, my name emerged again, and everything about me, and I was discussed on TV. At home the situation immediately became difficult. I continued to maintain that I was unconnected with any of it and that what was said about me could be credited to the fact that I was a victim of circumstances. But at this point, the persons who provided me lodging were not capable, not even psychologically, of assuming this responsibility. Some days after those revelations, the owner of the house, with tears in her eyes, told me that she had seen a police car below the home. I knew that it was not true, but I also knew why she had told me the lie. A day or two later, she asked me to leave. I still behaved in a harsh manner because I did not really know where to go. And, although they were willing to help me, I was not able to track down the Alasia column. In addition, I expected a telephone call from Moretti, or from

someone connected with him, since he was supposed to know that I was alone and without contacts in Milan after the arrest of Guagliardo. The call came, and we set the appointment for ten days later, downtown. We exchanged very few words, and I did not talk about my difficulties. It was on this occasion that the acquaintanceship with Bifferini proved useful. A little earlier, perhaps during the Christmas vacations, he had introduced me, in a totally casual manner, to his girlfriend Giovanna Esposito, a student in the humanities. I recall that he took me to her house, on Via Verga, in the area of S. Vittore, probably because he had something to tell her or because he wanted to go to the movies. He introduced me as Marco, a book salesman. We stayed an hour or two in the apartment, and it seems to me that he stayed there when I left. Giovanna Esposito lived alone, except for the occasional presence of a Swiss friend, a student of political science (I do not recall her name), and in that period she was preparing for an exam in Italian literature. It was easy for me to talk a little with her; she struck me immediately as being very studious and well-prepared, very far above average. When, in the middle of January, more or less, the problem of my lodging became acute (now it was certain that I was being sought by the law and very much sought!), I did not see any other possibilities but that one. While not having seen Giovanni Esposito anymore (our acquaintance with regard to Biffarini was supposed to begin and end that evening), I asked my friend the next time I saw him to accompany me to her house. And that same evening I asked her explicitly, with the greatest naturalness, if she would allow me to stay at her place for a few weeks. (The apartment was large enough.) Just as simply she consented willingly, in the presence of Biffarini, who was obviously against it and worried, a prisoner, in some sense, of the situation. And thus, some days afterwards, I went to live on Via Verga. To end the discourse regarding G. Esposito, I must say that she was not at all interested in politics, not only that, but she showed a certain aversion for the extreme left in general, as I gathered from some of her replies concerning the evenings spent uselessly, years earlier, in long and inconclusive assemblies of the movement. This I seemed to understand from Biffarini himself, then a sympathizer of I-don't-know-of-what Marxist-Leninist party. In the following days her attitude changed,

because Biffarini must have told her something, without clearly saying anything, but rather--I think--as he was, by nature, very ingenuous, he tried to play "the mysterious one." She remained, however, very discreet; she did not ask me embarrassing questions, and she adapted to the situation. Naturally, I was improvising, and I reminded her often that, as soon as possible, I would leave. I must say that I also sought, with caution, to detach myself from Biffarini, because I did not want him to convince her to throw me out of the house or to arrange some stupidity. For my part, I saw him less frequently, and, in brief, I quit our less than weekly appointment for the movies until I no longer met him at all. When I finally saw Moretti again, the arrangements had been made. I had a new home and a new telephone number, more usable than the previous one.

The meeting with Moretti lasted an entire afternoon. He told me something about the D'Urso kidnapping, above all to criticize the intrusion of Senzani. He made it clear to me that the kidnapping itself had always been his and the Executive's responsibility, although Senzani had wanted to claim a more important role for himself, as leader of the Prison Front. In regard to these considerations, he told me also that it was necessary to integrate the Executive, weakened by the arrest of Guagliardo and of Ponti and that it would probably be coopted by Savasta together with Novelli. The claims of Senzani, who aspired greatly to the role, seemed absurd and premature though. He was very satisfied with the interview in *Espresso*, which, he told me explicitly, he had written in a short time by correcting and modifying the list of questions of Scialoja.

These discussions, as interesting as they are, do not constitute, however, the principal purpose of the meeting. The problem, instead, was what to do about the Milan situation, which had remained "frozen" since the end of November already. In short, his thought was this. After the D'Urso kidnapping the BR had recovered credibility and political and military prestige (on this level, the assassination of General Galavigi was considered very important) both inside and outside of prison. All of the historical nucleus had praised the operation, and the old splits were beginning to heal. It was, for that reason, natural to deduce from this that the attitude of the Alasia column should

change, from the moment when its claim to build the leadership of the organization in every sense had been obscured. (And on this point I agreed with him.) It was, for this reason, the moment to try a rapprochement that would no longer involve the old leaders compromised in the breakup (leaders of the Alasia, that is, De Maria, Betti, Alfieri, while Adamoli was considered only a very good talker), but those militants who certainly must have wanted a rapprochement, and who could not fail to exist. In other terms, with the exclusion of the top leaders, the hypothesis of Guagliardo was proposed again: either to draw to himself everyone in the Alasia column, or to split it up. There was, however, a difficulty. Where were these militants eager to return to the BR? And, if there were any, how do we find them? I did not have any idea about it, naturally. Moretti was instead convinced he would succeed by going through the network of his Milan contacts. And I must say that, in my direct experience, this was the only major error of political judgment that I saw him commit in the exercise of his duties as head of the BR. Having once decided on this line of conduct, Moretti left me. But, in contrast to Guagliardo, he had a home in Milan in which to stay (if very cautiously), and never for more than one night. He spoke to me of it on the occasion of his second visit (like those of Guagliardo, his visits to Milan were rather sporadic), and later I knew where he was: in Via Civitali, in the district of San Siro. A worker of Alfa and his wife lived there; I think she was a teacher. This worker was fairly active in union affairs, although quite young, and I think that he kept his sympathies for the BR very hidden. As far as I could tell, the initial relationship was not with him, but with his wife, and it went back several years. The wife was at least ten years older (than the husband). I met both of them briefly, just in case the relationship should turn out to be necessary. I spoke with him of the situation at Alfa, about which, however, he knew something only in relation to his own department, in which he did not have at that time any clandestine tie with any other workers. In perspective, he could have become a very valuable militant of the BR. At the time, he was in a phase in which he would have to enlarge his contacts and make links through the growth of union activity. I do not recall his last name; his first name was Riki or Riccardo. The lady was called Gioia De

Carli, and she was not really his wife. She had been married and separated and had lived with him for a short time. She was not involved in any political activity, according to my information. Moretti, in view of the fact that they both had good covers, probably at his urging, could not possibly want to endanger his support point in Milan. They were very timid, especially regarding neighbors of the building, and obliged Moretti (as he told me himself) to enter and to leave in the hours in which the porter's lodge was closed. For this reason, they certainly have risked much by offering hospitality to Lo Bianco, arrested right next door to them some months ago. The link between them and Lo Bianco, after the arrest of Moretti, was certainly Balzarani who knew the couple; she was a guest toward the second half of March. Moretti sought, without success, to reach some militants of the Alasia column. All that he obtained was an appointment with a single person, which he succeeded in setting up during one of his visits to Milan. (On the average, 10 to 15 days elapsed between one and the other.) Since he was supposed to leave again immediately, he told me about the contact. I went, in Piazza Piemonte, and I met this person, whose name I do not know. (For recognition purposes he usually used the newspaper and book.) He had a common face, mustache and dark beard, and I do not believe that I would have been able to recognize him. The encounter was brief, even if it was my job to sound him out a little to develop a minimum of political discourse. He did not stay, and he did not seem to want ties with me, so that, in effect, I was not able to do anything except suggest to him most urgently to go, within a week, to an appointment with Moretti, at nine in the evening, in piazza Suso and to keep in mind the importance of the matter and that Moretti would be travelling through Italy just for him. Rather brusquely, he assured me that he would go, but that for good form he would inform his comrades of the Alasia, who certainly would not be thrilled by the initiative. Moretti returned to Milan, and I met him, according to plan, the day after this appointment. He told me that he had waited uselessly those two hours and that no one had come. He seemed embittered on a personal level as well, because the person who was supposed to meet him knew him well. Evidently, the vote of the Alasia column had also outweighed the tie of friendship. I could not

say exactly how old he was: as a rough guess, from 25 to 35. Almost certainly he was a worker. And this, I underline, was the only fruit of the attempts of Moretti to realign the Alasia (which did not mean that if he had had more time to stay in Milan he would not have succeeded more clearly).

During this period, I do not recall dates, I was taken for the first time to Moretti's place, and I then went alone the other two times to Treviso (February, March 1981), leaving from Milan each time. Robert Vezza, whom I already had met in those few days in July, when I had been to Treviso with Guagliardo, had acquired a new apartment outside town, within the boundaries of the commune of Lanzago, in a larger, new condominium. There I found Savasta, Francescutti (whom I met on that occasion), Massa, Lo Bianco, and Balzarani, and, from Naples, Chiocchi. The meeting, as Moretti explained, was to serve two principal purposes. The first was to give practical application to the directions contained in the DS 80 about the rebuilding of the Front of the Masses, subdivided into the factory front, services (railroads, hospitals, etc.), and the marginal and the extra-legal proletariat. (This sector was of interest to the Romans and the *Napoletani*.) In this sense, contrary to what some have said, this meeting was not at all a meeting of the Front, which still did not exist, but a preparation, still on the theoretical level, for the reconstruction. In fact, the second point did not have any operative meaning. It was a matter of executing an action [or word with similar meaning, illegible] more in line with the DS 80, writing a series of things possibly more precise on the "line of the masses" of the organization. The little book later came out with the number 13. In this period, however, I had already been arrested. The meetings (three as I said, at least so I recall) centered on the problem of putting this document together. During the first ones, there was a kind of division of labor. Since I had already intervened regarding the problem of worker salaries, I was assigned to write this section. When I returned to Treviso, after about 20 days, I carried those pages (six or seven, I don't know) about worker salary that were published in the booklet which I was able to see in its entirety in prison, where it circulated without problem. In reading it, one can find what I said.

It has an entirely ideological tone; some quotations of the works of Marx are the basis (of the discussion). Curiously, having overcome the problem of salary, they developed almost the whole discussion, centered on the notion of "fair" salary, or on the "real value" of the salary, which especially angered Francescutti, a discussion that had no real effect on the final version of the same booklet. Other parts were done by Moretti, who wrote willingly, after the success of DS 80, in which he had so much of a part. His, for example, I recall, was the part on the problem of the war industry and, again, all in the final part. Balzarani wrote the discussion of the factories; Chiocchi, or at least someone from Naples, wrote the part on Naples (a very pared down version of the voluminous document that he had carried around with him. I recall that I made [illegible]).

Even Chiocchi participated once; he told me that on the occasion of the two subsequent meetings he was not able to be present on account of other commitments that impeded him from making such a long trip as that one from Naples to Treviso. Then, after the breakup in the BR and the Naples column, united to the Prison Front, I thought that his absence already had political significance. In prison, in fact, along with the little book n.13 circulated a much longer document about the column of Naples, which criticized it point by point in the harshest manner possible (and it also criticized the cuts made in the original document that Chiocchi had carried, attributing to this editing particularly evil intentions that were not at all true, to the contrary). But this problem of the breakup cannot be explained or even illustrated through facts such as this one, as numerous as they are, and it needs to be confronted separately, on the basis of a complete political discussion.

I have said that Lo Bianco was also present, that he participated in the discussions. His presence there was, however, totally accidental. He was, as he said, on vacation, after having literally escaped from Genoa, after which, at an appointment, he had the impression he had fallen into a trap. He related (and I don't have reasons not to believe him) that the person that he was supposed to meet had been followed and had deliberately brought the police with him (or

the *carabinieri*). In view of the situation in Genoa, after the arrests of the previous autumn, he no longer trusted anyone and left immediately. He was at that time in Treviso to rest there.

Regarding my trips, I specify that I arrived in Treviso near evening: I slept (Savasta and Francescutti instead stayed elsewhere) at the lodging of Lo Bianco and Massa, where, from time to time, like me, Moretti and Balzarani and Chiocchi slept. The following day, towards evening, I left for Milan.

Concerning the ties between the editing of this booklet and the kidnappings of the following months, after I was arrested, I must clarify again, at the cost of repeating myself, that those meetings had as their only goal the booklet itself and that nothing linked them on the operative level to what would happen. Of Taliercio, Cirillo, Peci, I have learned only in prison about things done, only from the newspapers. The Executive and the individual columns (and, in the columns, above all, the logistic apparatus) probably already knew about some likely proposals and plans. But in the meeting in which I participated, any proposal or operative detail that dealt with the life of the columns was not only extraneous but prohibited. And I did not have any possibility of finding out about problems that I knew nothing about, that I was supposed to know nothing about. With that, it is clear that all that the BR does and says is in some manner connected, but that was and is valid for any brigadist, whatever his role, and in this consists his "participation." And it is true that somewhere, some project is always in course. It eventually either does or does not assume some practical expression.

Then, something more was in the air, undoubtedly from the moment that the intention of the BR was to make a series of linked actions or, in brigadist terms, a "campaign." But this is exactly what was not done, not so much for technical difficulties, as much as for political difficulties. In brief, we say the BR actually kidnapped and then assassinated Taliercio and no one else. The Alasia column, totally autonomously, kidnapped Sandrucci. Neither the one nor the other constituted, therefore, what is called a campaign, even if, from the outside, the thing could appear to be such. Naples and the Prison Front succeeded instead in doing it, kidnapping Cirillo, knee-capping two

Naples political exponents, and kidnapping and killing Roberto Peci. But they did all that on their own, in open collision with the rest of the BR. This is so true that these actions, praised by the historic nucleus [in prison] as the only true "campaign," caused the definitive break.

From what I could understand, the intention of the Executive, as I said, was to undertake a "campaign" that was not undertaken-- or rather, was not undertaken by the Executive, on the basis of a series of options. For example, it was evident that nothing existed in Turin or Milan, and that it was doubtful anything could be done in Genoa. By the way, I know that there was an investigation to attack a big-shot at Italsider, but I do not know who he was or if he were to be kidnapped or killed. Given the crisis situation, without a functioning column, I would say that an assassination was the more probable, undoubtedly the easier choice. Regarding Naples, it was clear that the local column would move along the lines of the problem of the post-earthquake problem. The time that Chiocchi was present, it seemed to me that the *Napoletani* would have considered as high priority a "campaign" with social contents in the broad sense, turned towards a broad strata of the proletariat and underproletariat of the city, without privileging the factory at all, as would be the natural tendency of the Executive. Regarding Venice, and in general, the Venice region, I knew that Francescutti was working on a huge document on the crisis in the chemical sector, with particular regard to Montedison, and that he gathered material concerning it. During one of my visits to Treviso, I caught a discussion between him and Lo Bianco that criticized the direction of the document. And later, occasionally, Lo Bianco himself told me of having read the uncompleted (document) and of not being in agreement. I do not know, however, whether the area of difference, regarding informational elements concerning the general problem of the restructuring of the chemical industry in Italy, was political or technical in nature. It concerned arguments that were totally beyond my experience or competence. What was clear was that the Venice column was interested in an action against Montedison of Porto Marghera, linked to the working conditions, to the plant exploitation, the contamination, and the intolerable levels

of toxicity, generally well-known to all. I knew, however, of another target to which previously Guagliardo had first alluded, and who was also valid now: the Honorable Bisaglia. I understood that the investigation had been done and that the action was judged feasible. And the target was the most ambitious, at that time, that the Veneto BR was able to carry out. It seemed to me--but they were fragments of discussion or allusions gathered in passing--that Savasta talked also of a particularly old person living in the historic center of Venice. He said it amidst a series of general observations about the systems of disengagement after an action, in a city like Venice. I must say, however, to this last proposal, that I am not sure I understood well.

During one of these visits to the home of Roberto Vezza, Savasta gave me the document (which I had when I was later arrested): an identity card registered to a certain Caner of Mestre. Up to about a month before my arrest, I always carried my true documents with me. I also procured the pistol later on in Milan from Moretti; it was his "summer" pistol. It was a Mauser 7.65, which I never fired. I learned at the trial concerning this pistol, which I had at Milan, from the Public Minister, that it had a functioning defect. Normally, I did not carry it with me, because I did not know what purpose it served. But I was obliged to carry it each time that I met a clandestine, that is, in practice, when I met Moretti and when I went to Treviso. It was a very serious rule of the organization that one was supposed to observe, even if in some sectors people began to think that it was not always useful to carry a weapon at all times. Curiously, Moretti himself leaned toward that opinion.

I forgot a detail pertaining to my brief trips to Treviso. Balzarani went sporadically to Genoa, with much caution, but she seemed to have ties especially in the La Spezia-Massa zone, with some worker. She herself talked about Otto Melara and Montedison di Massa, describing them as situations still in an embryo stage, to be developed in order to make them become true links to the organization. I am sure, as I think I have already said, that even Livorno fell, so to speak, under this area of influence. Still another thing. Chiocchi told all present, on the same occasion, that those of the Walter Alasia had a

direct contact with the Naples column, and that a Milanese (member) had gone to Naples in order to set up a meeting. They sought, more or less, to do what Moretti wanted to do to them, that is, to rotate the leaders. With the same negative result, according to Chiocchi. The emissary of the Alasia was taken to the door with the advice that, if he really wanted ties with the BR, he must seek the way that led to the Executive. Another sign of this activity of the Alasia, which broke the Milan cover, was the discovery reported in the newspapers of a collection of their documents in the public gardens of Treviso. The opinion of the Venice brigade was that they had a contact at Treviso, and they preferred to unload that material rather than to circulate it.

While this detail does not have great importance, the initiative of the Naples column explains well how, immediately after Moretti's arrest, Senzani, beginning in earnest, immediately succeeded in making contacts with the Milan column, as I heard it said many times during my imprisonment. Today I am perplexed by the rumor that the Alasia (or what remains of it) has joined the guerrilla party. With its traditional worker orientation and even "unionist" commitment, in the sense of seeking to act by countering the worker initiative and by always having an eye on the historical organizations do not know how this unnatural marriage will be able to last. But again this is a long discourse that presupposes an analysis of the capacity of today's guerrilla party to function on the terrain of the large factory: an analysis that up to now has not made.

I have left out, up to here, the problem of relations with the lawyer Cavaliere, which I shall explain now without interruption. As I said, I met him between June and July of 1980 in Genoa, through the lawyer Sorrentino, whose friend he was. In August, as his guest in Calabria, I was able to know him better and to appreciate especially his personal accessibility. When I left him towards the end of the month, there was still no political element in our relationship. Later, at Formia, I do not recall on what date, in discussing with Senzani the problem of the defense of the captured brigadists, I spoke to him of Cavaliere and posed the possibility of contacting him, taking all the precautions in the matter, treating him as an absolutely "non-political" person, in the most complete sense of the word. Senzani, who, in these matters, threw himself in immediately, exhorted me to do it, and also revealed his intention of meeting him. Thus, I telephoned Cavaliere, and I set an appointment in Pisa, near the station, on the occasion of a trip to Livorno in the company of Senzani. Naturally, by phone, I was limited to saying nothing more than that there would be another person with me. Cavaliere came, and I introduced Senzani to him as a friend, Antonio, interested in considering with him the problem of the defense of the declared brigadists. As always in these cases, it was clear that Cavaliere understood perfectly that this "Antonio" was a brigadist, and that in that moment I played the role of intermediary. But, as was otherwise obvious, he abstained from asking specific and embarrassing questions, and the discussion (we stayed about an hour in the bar) revolved around legal themes: the special laws, the function of the lawyer in political trials, and if it was possible for a brigadist to accept some type of legal defense, and under what terms and within what limits. Nothing was concluded because, at that moment, there was nothing to conclude. What was really important was the fact that Cavaliere had agreed to the meeting, and he was not averse to another one. However, after we left each other, Senzani told me that, for the moment, it was opportune to be cautious, and, seeing that the lawyer seemed to be very friendly towards me, he advised me to meet him once in a while, to keep the contact under control and also to exploit my condition as a person presumably wanted or, in any case,

under surveillance, but, at least, still officially "clean." For this reason I kept in touch sporadically with Cavaliere, with some telephone calls and also with a visit to Bologna on a particular occasion.

Senzani's problem was getting through to Micaletto, who was then in prison at Novara. I recalled that at Novara there was supposed to be a common criminal, a Renato Carlini, whom I had known when I was in prison at Parma, a year earlier. There was nothing in particular between me and Carlini, but by chance, during the talks, I also came to know his wife who lived in a village near Sarzana. Perhaps on the occasion of the same trip in which we met Cavaliere at Pisa, I made a brief visit to his wife. She remembered me, and I simply asked news of her husband, who was still at Novara, and I asked, if, by chance, she had seen or had had contact with Micaletto. The lady was totally ignorant of who Micaletto was, and of any problem even vaguely connected with the BR. She appreciated my brief visit, which I made because I was in her area, and she promised to answer me after she had had some talks with her husband. Since, in talking to me about him, she told me that he was supposed to go to the Tribunal of Parma within 10 days, and since, coming from Formia, it was more convenient for me to arrive in Parma than in the village of Sarzana, we decided to see each other there (in Parma), in front of the station. Thus it was, but the meeting helped me only to learn, besides about the personal troubles of the lady, that Micaletto had been transferred. It all ended in that way, but I left Parma in time to pass through Bologna and to greet Cavaliere with whom I passed several hours.

I continued, meanwhile, to telephone him during my stay in Milan, and at Milan I sometimes saw him when he came for his business. But the meetings were of a purely personal character. In about the middle of January I went to meet him in Bologna. I was in a difficult period. Guagliardo had been arrested; Moretti had not surfaced. I was supposed to find new lodging; from the radio and the newspapers I knew that I was sought (by the police). What I was doing in Milan was not clear from the end of November on. It was then that I agreed with Cavaliere to send that useless letter to the Tribunal of Genoa, asking what exactly were the charges (against me), and naming as my legal residence the study of the lawyer, Cavaliere. I repeat, it was a spontaneous

initiative, totally superfluous and without any follow-up, which betrayed my personal difficulties.

Cavaliere's general availability to the defense was, in any case, known in the sense that certainly Senzani had talked about it with someone. And I also had mentioned it to Guagliardo. After Senzani's arrest (which came at the end of December), he named Cavaliere himself. (I do not recall now if he also named Ponti, but I think so.) And he succeeded in meeting him about a month, or days later, on the occasion of the very speedy trial held in Turin--at the end of January or the beginning of February, anyway. Then Moretti came to Milan, as I said. And it was he who told me both that Guagliardo had named Cavaliere (I do not know how he knew), and that Senzani wanted to see me and the lawyer again. For that purpose, I was supposed to go to Bologna about ten days later and to be in front of the Johns Hopkins University at 1 P.M., and to tell Cavaliere of the appointment also. I got together with him over the telephone, and that day we saw each other--all three of us--Cavaliere, Senzani, and I. We went to lunch in a restaurant near the church of Santo Stefano, and we talked. The attitude of Cavaliere had changed. The somewhat ironic and unfocused curiosity that distinguished him had changed into real worry. Now he had really been appointed attorney, and the problems fell on his shoulders all at once. To begin with, he asserted that no lawyer could defend, or rather accept, a case from anyone who would immediately afterwards reject him just to renominate him again at a later time. That, he said, was untenable and also politically wrong. I do not know now whether he was in good or bad faith. Clearly stated, whether that discourse was simply the request for a possible legal "cover" or whether he touched a real and perfectly legitimate problem of a professional character. Probably, in that still ambiguous phase, both alternatives were the case, but the fact remains that he spoke solely of a legal defense. I was in agreement with Cavaliere, and I interrupted, repeatedly maintaining that the guerrilla trial had already had its day. The discussion was very lively, and Senzani concerned himself with--as I understood very well and I did not approve--not frightening Cavaliere, but rather of giving him rope, without admitting that he was right but, at the same time, of making him believe that the possibility could exist also that the BR had changed

its line and had accepted a legal defense. I was in good faith, and I was convinced by what I said. Senzani instead wanted only to trap Cavaliere, keeping quiet the fact that, in reality, on the question of refusal of the defense he was most rigid. Thus, he concluded by proposing to make a contribution to the lawyer on the problem, elaborating an acceptable proposal that reconciled the line of the BR with the needs of a technical defense. It was evidently a trap set only for Cavaliere, who, though, stated he was willing to consider it. The meeting ended that way and Senzani, from that moment, explicitly inherited that contact and took responsibility for "taking care of" Cavaliere. I remained then an hour or two with Senzani, who asked me how things were going in Milan. I could not answer him, except to say that they were going terribly. And that furnished him the occasion to make a violent attack on the past and present responsibilities of the management of Moretti, whom I, however, defended, thus greatly disappointing Senzani.

That was the only time that I saw Senzani after my departure from Formia. I saw Cavaliere another time in Milan, and I prodded him about his ties with Senzani. (For him, he was always "Antonio," but he made me understand that he clearly knew who he was in reality. Among other things, the newspapers already had widely published his picture.) But he was extremely evasive about it. I am convinced that it was not so much because of "compartmentalization," then probably not totally applicable in our case, as much as because of heavy conditioning by Senzani in this matter. Naturally, it is nothing but a hypothesis, based on what the behavior of Senzani was after his arrest, both towards me and towards Moretti.

During the month of March, Balzarani also came to Milan, together with Moretti, but had nothing to do with the local situation. She did not stop (to stay), but I believe she made a brief stop, to say it that way, between Genoa and the Veneto, where, in that period, houses were easily available. She returned later, towards the end of the month, coming again from Genoa, where she did not feel safe, and she slept in the home of Via Civitali. Some days later she went, however, to sleep in the lodging where I was staying, in Via Verga, so as not to "burden" the other (residence). I had not spoken with Esposito, who already,

while maintaining an extremely discreet attitude had understood who I was and what activities I undertook, and did not withdraw. Saturday, April 4, when Moretti and I were arrested, Balzarani was again in Milan--always just passing through as usual--and she probably slept again in Via Civitali, where Moretti would stay. On the occasion of the first trip to Milan (it seems to me that it was the day following his arrival, I do not recall well), she introduced Moretti and me to a person, whom I then learned later from the newspapers was named Renato Longo. During one of our appointments Moretti had told me of the matter, explaining that it concerned a companion who, for about two years, was trying to enter the BR. And in Milan he had organized a small group that had undertaken some small propaganda actions on its own. He did not tell me anything else, and I do not know by what means he reached Balzarani: I do not know why, but I had the impression that the contact had been "passed" through some worker at La Spezia. (It could be, however, that mine was an association of ideas, since I knew that Balzarani was working in that area.) The meeting was very brief, and it took place in Piazza Cinque Giornate, in the early afternoon. Moretti and I arrived together; Longo and Balzarani also arrived together; Balzarani immediately left, leaving us in the company of the newcomer.

We went to a bar, and we spoke for a while. Essentially, we dealt with arranging a larger meeting, with the friends of Longo, to illustrate to them the line of the BR and, in the long run, to enlist them. Since it was not even necessary to find Longo in Milan, and since a similar meeting would not take place in a bar, it was up to him (Longo) to find an adequate meeting place. At the time he had nothing available, and, for that reason, we agreed that, in the absence of Moretti, I would see him to be briefed on the development of the matter, and to then bring Moretti, on the occasion of his next visit to Milan, to the agreed-upon place. I saw Longo for this reason also on my own, once or twice, until he set the appointment for a Saturday at 2 P.M. in Piazza Calazzo, near the main station. I met Moretti a little beforehand; we went together to Piazza Calazzo; we met Longo who accompanied us to the foot of Via Cavalcanti, in a miniscule apartment in an old building. The owner was gone (he was a truck driver, I

think), and Longo succeeded in getting the key. Near the apartment three youths waited. I knew one was called Fadda; another was a girl, Tiziana Volpi, and a third, still younger than the others, remained unknown.

We all mounted the stairs, and we stayed two or three hours. Only Moretti and Longo spoke. After a while the unknown youth, scared by the direction that things were taking, stated openly that he did not feel like staying and left. In truth, there was nothing terrible said: Moretti, on one hand, sought to find out who they were and what experience and what political links they had, and, on the other hand, he scared them by exposing to them what risks and responsibilities they would meet and have by being attached to the BR. Longo asked many questions about the nature of organization, about the political line, about the reasons for the breakup with the Alasia, etc. On the whole, the discussions were very general, also because, to our disappointment, it came out that they did not have in fact much to say to us. They were not insiders to any interesting situation in their neighborhood. They did not work in the factory; they did not seem to have any special ties. It was a strange situation, and certainly unimaginable to the investigators: Moretti, elusive to capture, amidst strangers. And he pushed his imprudence to the point of allowing a boy about whom he knew nothing to open the door and walk out. (What if he had telephoned the police?) The explanation, naturally, must be found in the situation of total isolation in which we found ourselves in Milan, and in the desire to get out of it at any cost by trying to get to the bottom of things.

The only thing that emerged was that this Longo was wanted, sought for a kidnapping, and that, in the past, he had been in prison. He did not say for what reason, but he indirectly told us that it was also for robbery. However, thinking again now about his discussion, I must admit that he succeeded in being quite evasive about himself. He asked if the BR could give him a document, and he let us see that he had a photocopy of an identity card taken from the commune of Trezzano sul Naviglio. (I do not recall to whom it was registered.) When we left, we agreed that I would ask for his document (Moretti naturally gave his assent) and that we would meet once again to confirm a subsequent appointment of all

three of us together, in that same house. For the document, I would show the photocopy to Savasta, since, within a few days, I would return to Treviso and since Savasta had obtained my document for me a little earlier, and, finally, since it was only in the Veneto that there existed the opportunity to fabricate false ones, as I had been told many times.

At Treviso (and it was, I think, the last time I went there), I showed the photocopy to Savasta, who thought it was very unclear, because he could not see the stamp of the commune on the back. He told me, for that reason, to ask the interested party to make a fairly large design of the logo of the commune of Trezzano and to provide me with his own photo. When I saw Longo again, he confirmed the appointment to be held at a different spot from the previous time, because we now would see each other--all three of us--directly in Via Cavalcanti, at 2 or 3 on April 4. And I asked him both for the emblem, for which time was required, and for the photo. He had the photos taken immediately at the station of the metro at the end of Corso Buenos Aires (the appointment had been in Piazza Tricolore), and he gave them to me. I carried them home, to Via Verga, and they were there in a little case when I was arrested.

Some days later, I received a telephone call from Moretti. (He asked about Marco: the telephone of Via Verga, however, was used very little.) In short, I confirmed the appointment. I do not know where he was calling from. Saturday, April 4, in the early afternoon, I took a bus to the station, and from there I went on foot to Via Cavalcanti. From afar, I saw Moretti who awaited me, leaning against a little wall. Closer, however, there were a couple of youths (one was stopped on a motor bike) who made me suspicious. For that reason, having already seen Moretti, I took a cross street. Moretti, after a while, met me, asking me how I had not seen him, and I told him about my suspicions. He calmed me down, and we returned to the front of the home of Via Cavalcanti. They were there on time, Fadda and Volpi, not Longo who, among other things, had the key. We waited a while, and then, so as not to remain standing still, we decided that Moretti and I would go to drink a coffee for a while at a short distance, and the other two would take a walk to see if Longo were coming. We would meet again in front

of the home in twenty minutes. In the bar in which we went, Moretti briefly told me some very interesting things. He had come from Rome or from Naples and was returning from a meeting with Senzani and the Naples column. (He had with him two bags, one with clothes and the other with his personal file: identity cards, medicines, cigarettes, drafts of documents and money, as I learned later.) A fight followed--the first of its kind that had happened to him in his life, he said, since he had been a brigadist--because Senzani had tried to keep him from coming to the meeting, maintaining that Moretti was a "jolly" who could infiltrate anywhere regardless of the compartmentalization and, above all, regardless of the autonomy that the single columns were supposed to have. In other words, the political clash that would lead from there to an open break within a short time for Senzani had already started. Moretti was very critical of Senzani, and also quite worried. Another reason for worry was a letter that arrived for him from Palmi, in which the historical nucleus, for yet another time, avoided taking a position on the problem of the Alasia, and invited (the Alasia) absurdly (since for months there existed no rapport) to overcome the divisions and to rebuild unity. (He gave the letter to me, and I put it in my pocket.) For Moretti, it was a sign that the historical nucleus did not wish to take sides and that it kept all roads open. And that was what really worried him. Meanwhile, I again noticed that something was wrong outside the bar, and I recall that I said half joking, half serious, "It couldn't be that the latecomer has sold us out?" We left, and we took another cross street, to be cautious, since even Moretti was alarmed. But as soon as we reached the corner, we were blocked. As we learned later, Longo had called the police. Fadda and Volpi, isolated farther down, were arrested. I have nothing to say about them, having practically not heard them even open their mouths.

To finish up on Longo, I recall that during the meeting that I had with him, we spoke a little. And he told me that he had friends in Pavia disposed to make an investigation of the minister Rognoni and to undertake a plan to kidnap and kill him. He asked me, further, if I were aware of the escape plan from the Pianosa prison. Rather, there were two competing plans, which the brigadists saw as opposed to the other prisoners. But I did not know anything about them. (Later, in

prison, I learned that the plan actually, in fact, existed, and that the "repression" put in effect by the guards during the first days of April had caused the attempt to fail.) He emphasized also, in a light way, the possibility of making a lot of money by investing it in the drug traffic, but to my reaction of stupor, he turned the matter into a joke and changed the subject. Awaiting him, before my arrest, I told Moretti this disconcerting detail. For this and for other reasons, that afternoon we should have said of course to Longo and to his friends that for the time being it was not necessary to meet, at least for a long while.

A last thing. I recall that in Milan, in Piazza Cinque Giornate, I once met Moretti, who told me that he had to leave me after a while. He had barely finished speaking when, by pure chance, we ran into Francescutti, with whom Moretti was supposed to meet a little farther off, without me. All three of us went to eat together at this point, and then I left them. I do not know for what reason Francescutti was in Milan. I had the impression that he had acquired something, that probably he was useful to the logistic sector of the Veneto BR, which, as I said, functioned well then. I do not recall, however, what they talked about, nor what was the precise circumstance that had led me to meet with Moretti. Probably it was a normal appointment that we had each time that he came to Milan.

IV.

After my arrest, I remained in isolation, first at the police station in Milan, then at Cuneo. Around the 10th-15th of May there was, in Milan, the speedy trial for the weapons, and on this occasion I saw Moretti again. I recall perfectly one of the first things he said to me: "We hope that after my arrest the Executive has coopted Senzani." In other terms, he realized that there was a huge problem that did not consist so much in the obvious fact that Senzani wanted to belong to the Executive out of personal ambition and that he had barely tolerated being excluded from it up to that point, as in that what Senzani himself represented lay outside the Executive and, therefore, outside the perspective of the BR, both in terms of militants, situations, and concrete contacts and in terms of tensions and political contents.

The afternoon preceding the trial the lawyers Sorrentino and Cavaliere visited me and counselled me to accept a defense, since there was the probability of succeeding in delaying the trial and of joining it to the future trial for the armed band, so as to have one sentence instead of two. In general, I was, for my part, already in agreement about the defense; and we left after an hour of talk, having decided on that line. The following morning, when we were together in the cage, I informed Moretti of the matter, and he urged me not to do it, with arguments that convinced me. In essence, according to him, it would be politically disastrous if I was defended and not him (this point was not even part of the discussion), because the attention of the militants, who would not succeed in understanding behavior so anomalous with respect to the rules of the organization, would undoubtedly be focused on our trial--the first public meeting after the arrest. And no one could predict what they would conclude. He did not use any threat; on the contrary, he was very reasonable. And he added that in the future I would be able to defend myself, when I succeeded in doing it without generating equivocations. In the subsequent months he changed his attitude, after having learned about the realities of prison; and he was quite harsh with me. But in that first period he was undoubtedly uncertain and hopeful about a legal defense to the extent that he did not allude to the so-called guerrilla trial in which he was sentenced to life. I, for that reason, together with him, revoked the lawyers in the courtroom who resented it a little, especially Sorrentino. Moretti had named Di Giovanni, who not only did not show up but who never felt the need to send any communication about the matter. When the trial had finished, while we were returning to the cells, I reminded him to provide for his appeal, and it was I who told him to name Cavaliere, which he did immediately.

Later, in prison, Moretti and I (more him, really) were criticized for not having claimed the Cirillo kidnapping in the courtroom. I must say that we did not talk about it at all and that, as far as I am concerned, we simply forgot it. But it could also be that Moretti knew, from his meetings the days immediately preceding his arrest, that this kidnapping already fit into a picture of internal schism, and

he did not want, for that reason, to make statements in the dark. It must not be forgotten, besides, that we were in isolation, that is, deprived of any news from the outside.

Returning together (with Moretti) to Cuneo, I emerged from total isolation on June 10, and Moretti, whose case depended on a greater number of judges, left a week or so later. In that period, in my section, it did not seem that there were other declared brigadists, while there were some common politicized inmates, such as Sanna (candidate member of the BR), Soci, Agrippino Costa and others. On the floor above, there were Giannantonio Zanetti, Nicola Giglio and still others that I do not recall. (I would say, for this reason, that Zanetti was then the only actual brigadist.) I do not recall well, however, the rather close intervals of the arrivals and the departures, typical of the prison of Cuneo, which serves as a "base" for all the trials in the North. Anyway, there was no structure of the field brigade type.

In that waiting phase, we were eager to understand the new reality [circumstances] of the prison. (I noticed a climate very different from what I had experienced a year earlier.) We were informed of a rumor that circulated insistently and that almost certainly came from Nuoro. The matter was this: The orthodox Red Brigades (for simplicity, I shall call them from now on the Center, as they do in the documents) were complaining that Senzani and his Prison Front had monopolized all the internal-external ties, thereby excluding them [the orthodox Red Brigades]; and they criticized the "too negotiation-oriented" execution of the Cirillo kidnapping. It was too little [information] to really understand what was happening outside, but enough to concern Moretti very much and to provide a very new idea of the situation immediately. What bothered me was the realization that everyone, to a certain extent, even in a remote way, was part of this current of breakup, and that in the various prisons, according to what was said, they were forming opposing groups, on a basis that seemed very confused both to me and to Moretti. By the way, I must offer here an obvious explanation, which became clear to me gradually as new prisoners and new information arrived at Cuneo. One could not explain in any other way the lightning fast, instantaneous propagation of this "wind of breakup," if not by the fact that this

"wind" came not only from the outside of the prison, but also from inside, in perfect synchronization with the external origin--and just as strongly. (Had it only come from the outside, it would have taken much more time, and it would have spread with much more difficulty, regardless of all the networks that existed.) In other words: it was the historical nucleus from Palmi and Franceschini and others with him from Nuoro who were already departing at top speed, preceding in time, in my opinion, the external breakup, which they assisted and accompanied at each of its stages. And I also explain, in this way, the absolutely true fact, that Moretti and I remained, from the outset, a little out of place, almost as though even we were ignorant of what was occurring in the organization. (I again repeat that this was especially true for Moretti.) This was true in the sense that we were still ignorant of what was happening in the organization *inside* the prison, and that the external-internal symbiosis, on the slope of the prison front and the column of Naples, was producing its effects with the greatest rapidity. In that situation Moretti and I isolated ourselves often to discuss it. While towards the others we projected a reticent attitude of one who knows and can't talk about it, with each other we sought simply to understand things on the basis of the few uncertain elements at our disposition. The conclusion of Moretti--his hypothesis--at the end of these discussions was simple, and even today his clairvoyance astonishes me. The fragments of news that he had possessed only one political justification: that someone was starting an operation to break up (the Red Brigades), which would lead to the foundation of the party. The members of the Chinese line have always done things that way, said Moretti. One faction attacks another, accusing it of bourgeois deviations, and this attack is precisely the political operation that is the foundation and which legitimizes the new group that forms itself into a party. What contempt he had for this manner of acting and how stupid he judged it is not appropriate to discuss now. What, however, he did not yet understand, in my judgment, and that I, instead, began to understand, was the fact that this degenerative process did not constitute a deviation from the healthy stalk of the armed struggle, but it was actually its necessary fruit. This degeneration, in fact, did not affect only the new groupings, the

Prison Fronts and Naples, but it cut to the heart, to the Center, where the healthy part should remain. And what the Center was, from Taliercio to Dozier, has been seen very well. In short, it was not an experience in which it was easy to see what was to be salvaged. And to maintain that the greater good to safeguard was the unity of the various factions began to resemble the argument of someone who wanted to cure a cripple by replacing his head with that of a blind man. That the various factions rebelled against such unity is perfectly understandable, and the Center was right to want to expel the Prison Front and the Prison Front to want to detach itself from the Center. For each, the detachment served to advance the specific monstrosity of each faction. It is clear that here I am jumping to some conclusions that I made later. But it is also true that, from a certain point on, it was not easy to separate various moments, distinguishing the facts from thoughts and from the emotions that accompanied them. I leave, for that reason, the more or less ordered chronicle that is told up to here, to take it up later. Now on a less [significant] level, I prefer to tell some things that in their exemplariness, in their autonomous relief, I hope can give a better idea of the situation. The kidnapping and homicide of Roberto Peci, first of all. I was not the only one to be upset by the cruel and hypocritical manner in which the kidnapping was managed. I am convinced that it was the only kidnapping of the BR in which the fate of the prisoner was sealed in advance and everyone knew it. (I maintain it, even in the face of the Taliercio kidnapping.) And day by day one was supposed to, instead, help in the tragic fiction of an impossible negotiation with the Prison Front, which had the courage to ask the others--the workers, the proletarians, the prisoners--what should be done. It was all a shameful and untenable comedy, which caused many to say with disgust: "If he was really a spy, why not shoot him immediately?" But it was not at all clear even if he was a spy; and the objective, what was it? To terrorize other relatives? To terrorize other possible ex-brigadists? What was the political content of this? No one could understand it. When the picture that showed the moment of execution later came out in the newspaper, I recall that others like me were dismayed. In the courtyard, we spoke of it at length, and we arrived at a decision that perfectly renders, I think, the idea of our

state of mind. That photo was a false one concocted by the police or by the army police, because it *was not possible* that BR comrades had done such a thing. Instead, it was probable that some assassins, with a singular combination of stupidity and ferocity, had believed they were able to translate into practice discussions of "social communication," which emerged from Palmi. That photo, the exaltation of the pure fact, of the pure power to kill, was the true objective, the result. In terms of political evaluation, I felt a similar form of stupor in reading, more or less in that period of time, a document of the Prison Front reaching Cuneo, I believe it was n.16. It spoke of the actions undertaken in Naples, and it made an enthusiastic appraisal based on the sole criterion that such actions had [actually] taken place. The tone was: We have succeeded in doing this...we have succeeded in doing that...And that is it. Still more recently, I found again this simple and illuminating exaltation of the deed undertaken, detached from any relationship or political, moral and social significance, in the flyer that claims the assault on the Aeronautics barracks and on the other, against the enlisted soldiers at Salerno. Moreover, I repeat it is not that things got better: Not even the kidnapping of Taliercio was not well understood--except for the fact that there was no way to make any political meaning emerge [from the action]. In fact, with all that is known about the damage to the Porto Marghera establishment, I would say that the BR have been the only ones to succeed in the very difficult task of sanctifying the management of the company. Really a big help to the workers!

The problem relative to the internal breakup of the BR emerged ever more clearly as one came gradually to know more about the kidnappings: Milan on one hand, and the Veneto on the other, Naples on the other still. But I want to insist on the fact that this element that we call internal--in other words the interest and the participation that would arouse controversy among the various factions in the course of time--was, at least in my eyes, excessive in contents or, rather, one could better call it lacking in contents, and that the single acts, considered in themselves and for themselves, showed it. I found it difficult to side with the Executive or with Naples, when on one hand, I

saw Taliercio and on the other Peci, and I began to reject all the discussion about the existence of opposing lines [of thought] where the aberrations of one side were supposed to balance out those of the other.

I return to my judgment that Senzani (or whoever acted on his behalf) could not possibly have taken the photos of the murder of Roberto Peci. It was important because it clearly fixed a kind of wall, a barrier beyond which I could not go. (Certainly, how I got to this wall is still a problem.) I could not accept anything like this, which in turn, meant I could not accept the BR anymore, which even today, among other things, not only claims that murder, but also its significance and the manner in which it was executed. There was, almost at the end of my parabola, another fact that assumed great importance. The murder, in the prison of Cuneo, of Soldati, the militant of the PL captured in the central station of Milan. It was at the end of November or at the beginning of December. As I will explain later, I was already definitely suspended from the brigade, and therefore from the BR, but at the same time I was treated with some regard by the others, and people still told me things. Thus, I knew that Soldati was in that prison, in isolation, they said, but that clandestinely (perhaps through Alfieri, of the Walter Alasia, also in isolation, having arrived at the section some days prior to Soldati) had succeeded in causing to arrive two letters in which he admitted to having talked, immediately after capture, after the thrashing that he had received. In particular, in a letter, he wrote that he felt so guilty, but that he wished with all his power to return to being a combatting communist, who wished to extract himself from that moment of weakness which,, if not justifiable, was at least explicable, weakness and that the only justice that he would have been willing to accept was that of the comrades of battle to whom he wanted to return on the front line. In the second longer letter, he exposed instead in detail the contents of his confessions, which were much longer and more detailed. Thus, I repeat, so they told me, and for some days I didn't know anything else--up to the moment in which he was killed on the floor above, in section IV, where he had been taken. It happened that his "comrades" had taken him at his word. They had gone with him to the refectory; they had given him a

trial, they had argued, and they had condemned him to death. What he was able to say was only: "Do it quickly, and don't make me suffer." Then he was strangled, and it seems that his throat was cut with pieces of glass.

I was not in that section, and I am not able, for that reason, to say who actually strangled him; certainly an assassination was wanted and was put into action by the brigade. In my section in that moment Franceschini was present, in the little dormitory placed under that corresponding to section IV, occupied by Semeria and others (the little dormitories, placed at the end of the hall, have five sleeping accommodations and are the natural headquarters of various "commands" that communicate to each other through the window with a daily, fixed exchange of messages). I went then--it was possible to visit the little dormitory of Franceschini, who had me read the draft of a flyer that claimed the murder of Soldati, written by him. He concluded it with a phrase that said, to the letter, that for any communist "to strangle a traitor was a reason for partying and great joy." I kept my emotions to myself, except for some indications of doubt. To that little, which, in the situation, I thought I could permit myself--Franceschini reacted very harshly. With him in the little dormitory at the time was Domenico Giglio, also a brigadist of the field. It was then that he made me read the letter of Soldati of which I have spoken, it seems to me, the original. The first. Since it was a disturbing letter, full of contradictions, but certainly a letter that only added, if that was possible, to the repugnance for that homicide, I asked if he would let me read the second, the one that was supposed to contain the detailed list of the confessions made by Soldati to the police. Giglio responded immediately that it no longer existed; it had been destroyed because, he added, it would be compromising to hold onto it. The explanation was absurd, and there was no need to explain why. Everything was already "compromised," if that was the point. In that moment I was certain, and for me it was terrible. The second letter, the one that would have explained exactly why it was fair and inevitable to strangle Soldati, had never existed. It was an invention of whoever wanted to kill him. And he had therefore been killed not for what he had said. (Its importance, among other things, was never made clear because it was

supposed to be that way. It required the community ritual of the trial in the refectory, the rite of strangling, the weight of the death on everyone in the inside network, the demonstration that the deed was needed to prove that the BR were able to do inside prison what they had done outside prison, and what they had done to Roberto Peci.)

Among all these events, whether external (the kidnappings and killings) or internal, other things happened, which I tell not to give a little color to the pages, but because the real situation in which I and others were supposed to move will be a little more clear and concrete. In the fourth section was Claudio Gatti, of the Vallanzasca group. It was known that many had it in for him, because they attributed to a blow on the head (he had stopped a brigadist) the guilt of the reaction of the Management of the Prison of Pianosa, a reaction that had sent an escape plan up in smoke. It seemed, besides, that Gatti was the only one in these extemporaneous initiatives of an individual type. One Sunday, after a work of preparation that I knew was to be pretty long, he was stabbed at "recess" by Dorini and a very young Sicilian, Arnone. I barely knew this Arnone; I was assigned to go with him to the marshal about the usual internal prison problems (food, talks, etc.); Arnone wanted to show everyone that he was hard-nosed and looked for some way to prove it. He had pretended, for that reason, to be one of the two that had tried to kill Gatti. But Gatti was robust and agile, and he defended himself for a long time. Between the cries and the blood, Arnone could do it no longer. He threw down the knife, exclaiming: "No, no..." Dorini sought to end it alone, but Gatti, gravely injured all over his body, succeeded in leaving on foot from the passageway. (A month later he was carried to the Catapano Clinical Center.) Dorini was immediately transferred, I think to Trani; Arnone disappeared for a few days, and then he reappeared. He said that during the transfer south, he did not feel well, and they had thus preferred to bring him back to Cuneo. His life was in danger, because few things are worse than to abandon one's comrade in the moment of action, and probably even he knew it. He began to compensate by assuming attitudes of extreme polemics towards the militants of the BR present on the floor: Piccioni, Seghetti and others (they had arrived in the course of the summer), finally accusing them up to having taken some knives from the common prisoners. In reality these were

stupidities, and Arnone, at that time, was participating in a widespread intolerance towards the brigadists [fomented] by a large group of common prisoners, who looked in an unkindly way on the majority of the others, especially on floor IV, which traditionally had always been theirs. (In prison these things mean a lot.) He spoke of it: Piccioni made these things known to the floor below, to Franceschini and Ognibene and others, and they deduced that the possibility existed that Arnone was or was becoming a provocateur at the service of the (Prison) Management. After a while, during the free hour, he was strangled with a ping pong net in the courtyard near my cell. I know that the BR also discussed whether or not to claim that homicide. The conclusion was certainly negative, since they did not do it. After this death, four or five of the common prisoners asked to be isolated in their cells for fear of being killed in their turn. The fear began to grow also on our floor, and three others, it seems to me, called the guard evening and went into isolation. All this was celebrated as a great victory: the "flight of the mice," and the affirmation of BR power. It is in this climate that, two or three months afterwards, Soldati was killed.

There are also other important episodes (for example, Figueras' attempt to kill Moretti and me, in the first days of July), to which, if there is time, I am disposed to return with calm. If I have the opportunity, I wish to speak more at length of the prison, of its climate, of its problems, because I presume to be able to say something, after two rather intense years of special prisons under any conditions. But here it would be too long, and I wish, therefore, at least to conclude my chronicle, to return to Cuneo in those months. There were many arrivals in the course of the summer. In my section were Fasoli and Galati, and then Franceschini, Ognibene, Semeria (later transferred to the floor above), Guagliardo, Piccioni, Seghetti, many from Turin, Bersini, Volgarino, Fracasso, and then Alfieri, Ricciardi, Delfino, etc. At the beginning of winter there were also some departures: Franceschini, for Palmi, with Semeria, and Ognibene for Nuoro. Altogether, however, one could say that during the autumn there was at Cuneo a large number of particularly active brigadists, capable of making a brigade function. Moretti was at Pisa for a long

time, between August and September, to treat the wound inflicted on him by Figueras. He returned for about another month, and then he was also transferred to Nuoro prison. I was sent to Siena for twenty days between July and August [to speak with] the investigators. I returned for a week to Milan for the trial of appeal in the middle of January 1982, and I shared the cell with Moretti at S. Vittore, and I left Cuneo permanently for the trial in Genoa in the middle of February.

As I said, both Moretti and I (but also others, naturally) were extremely curious to hear news and to acquire documents relative to the development of the fight between the Executive and the Prison Front. These documents arrived especially from Nuoro, which had evidently a privileged channel through the Prison Front; while at Cuneo the outlooks of the Executive were channeled through talks that Michele Galati had with his brother, Paolo, but in a low-key way.

I, during the conversations that I had with him, sought to extract the most possible from the lawyer Cavaliere, but he knew nothing. I return thus to confirm what I have already emphasized: Senzani wanted to keep Moretti ignorant of news, outside the debate, from the moment that he correctly judged to have an adversary in him. And for this reason he no longer used the lawyer Cavaliere as a vehicle. Cavaliere would have been very capable, in my opinion, of making something definite known to us. So true was this that, when at a certain point more detailed news arrived again from Nuoro and from Palmi and a collection of documents that revealed the coming split in an indisputable manner (we were perhaps already into September), I got very mad, and I said to Cavaliere that if, by chance, he had occasion to see Senzani again to tell him on my behalf, that I considered him a "dirty politician" for having kept us in the dark about everything. Among other things, with what was going on inside of me then, I was avid for any news that could furnish material for my reflections and for my rethinking. I do not know if the message was passed, but I knew then that Senzani's judgments of me, from the time that my wish to defend myself emerged into about the light, were even worse.

This circulation of documents and of discussions is now very confusing in hindsight, and I believe that it was confusing even at the time, as always when something is about to happen. In substance, a break, of which all were sure outside of prison, and of which many were sure even in prison, especially at Palmi and at Nuoro, was emerging. There, in fact, the brigades associated with the Prison Fronts were already born, leaving in the minority the few linked to the Center. At Cuneo, instead, people deluded themselves into believing for some more time that the spirit of unity would prevail. When the Executive, I think in July, made it known that it wanted to establish its own front, we responded that they were supposed instead to find an accord with what already existed: the clear sign that we had not yet understood the situation. It was the arrivals from Nuovo and Palmi, alone, in the subsequent months, that made us understand. However, I don't think that I have to get my teeth into an examination of the documents here. Each faction exalted its own actions; it proclaimed itself as the true heir of the genuine spirit of the BR; it accused the other party of having betrayed it; and it left things to go on their own way, in the sense of avoiding an open break for the moment. The fractionalists, in brief, were always the others. Little by little, though, it became clear that Senzani and his people marched on with decision, multiplying their activity and exploiting all the channels that they had with the prison, while the Center took a defensive position and wrote stupidities upon stupidities, revealing themselves to be absolutely incapable of erecting an offensive against the others. In mid-summer, I know that there was supposed to be a meeting of the Strategic Management for a last attempt at unity but that this failed (each of the parties blamed the other). I got the information, however, from documents that circulated freely, and that the investigators recognize much better than I. But finally, with so many arrivals and so many documents, things continued to become clearer. Above all, the concrete occasion to clarify things was created. As in other fields, also at Cuneo, it was necessary to establish a Brigade, which still was lacking, and towards the end of the summer there were enough brigadists, and of great enough weight, to be able to do it. At this

point, a greater problem was posed concretely. Was the Brigade to be according to the model of Palmi and Nuoro, affiliated with the Prison Front on the positions of Senzani and of Naples, or was it supposed to be grouped behind the Center? Or was there the strength to form two brigades, one for each party, extraneous to each other? And the minor problem: Was I, for the positions I had assumed, still a brigadist or not? And therefore, was I supposed to belong to the brigade or not?

I speak immediately of myself, to remove myself from the center of discussion. As I said in Milan in May 1981, I intended to defend myself. Even if lawyers were present, I would renounce them, and I had confirmed this intention both to the magistrates who had come to interrogate me and to the comrades in prison, from whom, not to say more, I was not able to keep my comportment hidden. (Even materially, it is not possible in prison to accept an interrogation without its being known, but I wanted it to be known, because only in extreme clarity was there a possibility of extracting myself.) When I was taken to Siena for an interrogation by the judge Dr. Imposimato, the rumor spread fast throughout the prisons, as always in these cases. In assuming my willingness to defend myself from the fact that I had gone into a small decentralized prison, there could not but be great diffidence regarding me. Palmi echoed these ideas as I learned later and already assumed I was a dissocate.

In reality, I was still uncertain and I did not accept the invitation of Dr. Imposimato to stay in Siena, even if I immediately sought to assume an extremely "possibilist" attitude. My return to Cuneo quieted the others, but it did not resolve the fundamental problem. When August passed peacefully, Franceschini and the others posed the problem of the brigade. (I would say in September, perhaps after the first half of the month.) The matter would inevitably reemerge. A meeting was called with all the brigadists of the section (Franceschini, Ognibene, Moretti, Galati, Giglio, Semeria, Sanna, Felice: at the moment I do not remember if there were others), and Franceschini said clearly and loudly that if I did not change my decision to revoke the lawyers and to renounce my defense, I would be suspended by the BR. He himself, however, did not wish me to answer immediately, and he gave me all the time that I wanted to think about it. Naturally the guerrilla trial was discussed, the legal defense,

etc., and my point of view was the opposite of that of all the others, rigidly attached to the pure orthodox BR. I do not recall well if, then or subsequently, I participated in a meeting in which the merit of the split was discussed, along political lines of the organization (not directly along the Brigade's line, since the argument did not involve me, for the reason I gave above). Franceschini, Semeria, Giglio and others had no doubts; the old BRs were supposed to die, they were composed of "walking cadavers." The new were represented by the Prison Fronts and by Naples. The tone was very violent; it was the response to the most harsh accusations already launched against Moretti and all the management group linked to him, and the "condemnation without appeal" of all or almost all that the BR had done in the last years. Only Galati defended them and grouped himself with the Center, I think. Some time later, Guagliardo also, who initially had not yet arrived at Cuneo, also defended him. Strangely, Moretti avoided taking sides, thus also attracting the criticism of his allies who found it inconceivable and outright suicidal that Moretti did not defend himself, first of all, against what was a real attempt at destruction of his person and of his whole experience and political history. I also know that at Nuoro he persisted in this indefinite position (he sustained that he could not succeed anymore in agreeing either with the one or with the other), but that then he ended up by rejoining his own (people), that is, Guagliardo, Gallinari, la Point, etc. in the group improperly defined as "militarists" (improperly, in my view, because today the true militarists are those of the guerrilla party). I said something myself on the occasion, but without committing myself too much because, for reasons differing from those of Moretti, I did not feel like defending anyone, and I was in disagreement with everyone. I thought instead, as I was able, about resolving my situation with regard to the others, and about prison life in general, and that it would certainly not be rosy if I erred on some move. More or less 15 days after the intimation of Franceschini, another meeting was held to hear my response. I declared myself in disaccord with the positions of the others, but disposed to renounce the defense. Happy to hear me say that, everyone observed that, from that moment, I was able to be reintegrated into the brigade then in formation and in whose meetings I

had never participated. My position was not, however, complete. I let them say it, to point out that, this point having been clarified, and that is, that I was considered worthy and trustworthy to belong to the brigade, I was, however, not willing to belong, because, for a number of political and personal reasons, I did not want to. I asked, therefore, in exchange for my renunciation of a defense, to be left in peace. About the political reasons for my dissent no one spoke, since no one had any real wish to do so, and something else very interesting emerged instead. Franceschini (definitely, it was he who decided everything) unexpectedly defended me and almost eulogized me for my frankness, and showed that he very much liked the solution that I had proposed. The motive was clear: since I was not in agreement, it was worth a lot that I was thus under the cover, so to speak, under the wing of the BR, without giving scandal. In that precise moment, that was the most that Franceschini could obtain; and it was the most that I could obtain. I have described in brief above, through some episodes, what risks presented themselves in prison life. I do not say that I ran them, but the campaign against the penitents and the dissociates and the "compliant ones" filled the mouths of everyone, and I could not allow the least suspicion to arise on my account. However, I realized very clearly from that moment that the solution reached was provisional and fragile. Franceschini knew it too, I am sure, but by luck my reputation was very high in the prisons (by merit of the press, more than by me). And for the moment it sustained me well. Thus, in effect, in the subsequent months I was left in peace, if one could call peaceful the internal life of Cuneo. I did not participate in the Brigade, and I do not know, for that reason, what responsibilities were given within each one of them (who directed them, who took care of logistics, the rapports with other prisons, and with the outside, etc.). I know only that the real and true brigade was that of the Senzani line, and that Guagliardo and Galati, not being able to make one convergent brigade from two, were content to create a rapport of collaboration with the others. Moretti, meanwhile, had already been transferred to Nuoro. I have good reasons to think that the heart of the activity of the brigade--not of all, but of the management part--consisted in making contacts with common prisoners, and in intervening not so much through

Cuneo (the murders of Soldati and of Arnone anyway are good examples of this activity) as through the mechanism of transfers within the entire network of special prisons, to reenforce the internal power and the supervision of the BR. But still I repeat that this aspect of prison life, with its reflections on the external armed struggle, would merit a long chapter of its own.

More or less in the month of September, as I seem to recall, there were still two episodes that involved first Grazia Chelli and then Isabella Ravazzi. Grazia Chelli came to a talk, bringing her three sons. Briefly, given the conditions in which the talk took place, I noticed that one person, a lady, came up to her, making her understand indirectly that she had a link with the BR. She wanted to know about me, about my attitude, because people already feared that I wanted to dissociate myself. She offered her money also; it was not accepted. In the most decisive manner possible, I advised (her) to drop the matter and to refuse any similar encounter in the future. I feared, among other things, that that lady was Balzarani, whom I saw, at least in the months preceding my arrest, often in Genoa. The last thing that I wanted was that Grazia and, indirectly, the three sons, through no fault of theirs, get involved in some mess. Among other things, that initiative, besides being imprudent and insensitive, because she was capable of getting someone totally extraneous to the BR into trouble, was also perfectly useless, because in that period the Center was well informed about me. Michele Galati himself pointed out to me a sort of link, regulated by Guagliardo, for use by the Center through his (Galati's) brother, Paolo, who came regularly to talk with me. In that (Paolo-Guagliardo) rapport, among other things, they spoke of me, in truth, in such harsh terms that Galati toned down his report before transmitting it to the BR outside. I knew later that my ex-colleague, Prof. Ortolani, would admit to being the person to approach Grazia, giving a version of the facts that, to all appearances exonerated him.

Giovanni Senzani did the same thing on behalf of the Prison Front by approaching Isabella Ravazzi. In this case, however, I think that it was not so much a matter of reaching me as of using this argument to try to involve Isabella in something more. As far as I am concerned, Senzani solicited her because she had convinced me to write a document in

which I expressed my position, because I was the object of discussion outside. It was an invitation that I naturally thought was wise not to accept. Also in this case I was very scared, and I promised myself in a very clear manner that this tie would be cut. And Isabella herself then promised that the matter would have no sequel. Also here, this type of mediation was not absolutely necessary, because the Prison Front had other means of reaching me, if not directly, at least (of reaching) others grouped around it, who would have been able to inform them about everything (a matter that moreover I am certain happened anyway).

And then there was eventually the lawyer Cavaliere. By way of the latter, I must say, however, that beginning with the summer, I saw him much less, until his visits ceased altogether. At the trial of appeal in Milan, although he was my defense attorney, he did not appear. Our last encounters, in any case, had no particular substance. I had only noticed a much less trustworthy attitude in regard to my possibilities for a defense, and almost the implicit invitation to recant. He was very evasive about these reports with Senzani and, in general, I got nothing from them. After having spoken with me, he also met Moretti, but I have reason to believe that he even did not have much to say, since Senzani was really anti-Moretti.

As I said, in the middle of January 1982, I was in Milan for the trial of appeal for the pistol that I had when I was captured. Initially I wanted to renounce being introduced, and I had therefore already officially communicated this decision of mine to the Tribunal of Milan. Some days afterwards Punti passed in the section that distributed the food (it was on the floor above, the fourth section), and I was told that a communication had arrived from Nuoro, according to which Moretti wanted to meet me on the occasion of the trial. After various uncertainties (at that point, I felt definitely distant from the BR), I decided to go; and I was in time to correct that first decision of mine near the Matricola Office. In Milan, I stayed in the cell with Moretti three or four days, and we discussed things with the greatest serenity. I must recall that Senzani and a great part of his group had already been captured and that the Dozier kidnapping was already in course. Against this background, our considerations were broad and restrained only, on my part, by the necessary caution, whereby I

expressed what I thought only in the rather abstract terms of political analysis. My game was extremely dangerous, but I confess that I was irresistibly attracted by the possibility that was offered to talk things over with Moretti for hours, up to the wee hours in the silence and isolation of the cell, and to confront his reactions. I do not know; perhaps I wanted unconsciously to put them to the proof with the brigadist that I continued to admire the most. I could be wrong, and I apologize if I yield to some psychological considerations, but I have the impression that for Moretti the discussion was somewhat the same thing (as it was for me). We were treated poorly at Cuneo, and Moretti himself had severely insulted me when I was expelled from the brigade, in such terms that even the others reacted in my favor. And, as paradoxical as this situation could appear, he was in agreement with what I said. Certainly, I did not tell him everything either about my personal decisions or about what already was beginning to be the basis of my total refusal of the armed struggle. He would not have been able to accept such things. But he accepted the criticism, pushed to the point where I succeeded in pressing it without ruining myself. He did not see anything worth saving in the guerrilla party, and nothing outside of it. His judgment of the Dozier kidnapping, which had not yet failed, was very harsh and definite; his judgment of the plans of Senzani was ferocious. Moreover, the prison experience of Nuoro had removed, for him, any illusion of the possibility not only of being able to escape someday, but also of having any political life. He did not think about the BR structure in prison, and he saw around him only myths and illusions. Perhaps it was a matter of a particular period, already put in the past. But certainly it was a strange situation, in those days, and I was deeply convinced that he had seen clearly, perhaps more than I, into my future decisions. He did not have anything in particular to tell me, but only to exchange judgments and impressions. These things apart, I do not have, for this reason, concrete elements to narrate, except a phrase said in a very resentful tone, within a harsh condemnation of the activity of Senzani. According to Moretti, it was necessary to recognize, unfortunately, that Cirillo had been left alive to "please Cutolo." He didn't add anything more, but it seemed to me that he wanted me to understand that at Nuoro he learned more about that

kidnapping. At Cuneo, at the end of June, when he left isolation, he knew as little as everyone else. I still recall that once, in the presence of Franceschini (and, therefore, probably in September), speaking of this kidnapping, he emphasized a new criticism, relative to the payment of the blackmail, which constituted a novelty for the BR. Others also, in fact, were perplexed about this. And Franceschini got very angry, maintaining in a polemic tone that even the payment of that blackmail was perhaps politically the most relevant aspect of the whole operation.

On the specific problem of ties with organized crime, and in particular with the Camorra, no one talked very much, and, in any case, always in general terms, for two reasons strictly linked to each other. The first was that such ties in the prison, if they did not originate there, were very strong anyway, but that they had them through prisoners historically extraneous to the BR, such as the ex-Nappists who became brigadists in prison. They were completely unknown to Moretti, and they all followed Franceschini and banded with the dissident column of Naples and the Prison Front. (Not in those months, but I think later, the prison of Cuneo was a suitable "laboratory".) The second reason consists of the strong diffidence, not only of Moretti, but of all his group, the so-called militarists, towards tight ties between the common criminals, with whom Moretti and the others do not have nor want many ties. At Palmi the militarist minority (Gallinari, Seghetti, etc.) in the previous summer wrote a document in which they explicitly attacked the politics of the alliances with the underground, putting in discussion the whole orientation of the guerrilla party and of its theorists. And a fruit of this real hostility developed perhaps also at Cuneo in the winter, when Seghetti arrived in the fourth section. After a little while, no one less than Pasquale Barra, a man famous for his link with Cutolo, fled to the cells, fearing for his life, as had been said. Another brigadist linked to the Center, Guagliardo, is known for his rigid defense of his identity as a "political" and for the screen that he erects, with all the correctness and the diplomacy possible, between himself and the common criminals. And these, especially those most linked to Franceschini, repay him with attitudes of real hostility. So that in

prison the distinction between the two BR factions, the militarist and the "movementalist" (that is, the guerrilla party), is the clearest and the behavior is the most divergent on this issue. For example, the militarists tend to see themselves as a sort of army, separate from the rest, they almost seem to prefigure the conditions of a true "war prison," and they base their identity on precise political criteria. Conversely, the others tend to tone down these distinctions, accentuating the objective importance of the "transgressive" behavior, as is clearly evident, for example from the documents issued from Palmi in the course of 1981. As Franceschini and Ognibene told me, in the course of a sharp discussion on these points, they prefer by far the tag of "absolute criminals" to that of "politicals." Every now and then I find myself repeat. . . that "the discourses will be long, to elaborate the various arguments.' I apologize again, but this one too will be long. In any case, one very well understands how there could be not only a material base, rooted in the social dimension, especially in prison, but also an ideological one through the alliance (I use the word in the very generic sense) between the guerrilla party and the Camorra. This was the case, because the Camorra pretends explicitly to represent a social stratum, and it does a forceful job of representation. And it concerns the same social stratum that in Naples constitutes the reference point of that party. From this type of social legitimization the Camorra draws great prestige, and in prison it gains much admiration, as I have been able to find out directly. One must recall also that the Camorra, in contrast to the Mafia and the 'Ndrangheta, has not hesitated to attack men and prison structures directly. And Cutolo's faction established, much earlier than Senzani, a kind of very efficient Prison Front, both inside and outside prison. And also this explains as well the reciprocal, and above all strong attraction, at the grass roots. Regarding the discussions with Moretti, it was evident that he inclined towards the positions of the so-called "militarists"--in other words, towards his own group--but that the elements of a deep crisis that sapped at the foundation did not escape him, the very existence of the BR and the entire panorama of the armed struggle in Italy. Except that he stopped on this point. He did not wish to go further. For me, to the

contrary, it was absurd to limit oneself to judging the consequences, the poisoned fruits of the armed struggle, without putting into discussion and finally condemning the armed struggle itself, certainly not on an abstract metaphysical level but on the concrete level of history and of the Italian situation. It seemed to me, and it still seems absurd to me to confine oneself to condemning the "militaristic" residue in its pure state, who do not now have any other program than (1) to bear witness, with impotent furor, to its own identity, deprived of any substance and reduced to a mere existential casing against the entire world; and (2) to judge the vision destructive of any pressure of social blackmail in the true "criminal" and "subversive" sense of the guerrilla party, committed to a rapid liquidation for its political and organizational inconsistency. If in ten terrible years of history the armed struggle has amply demonstrated that it has no program, one cannot confine oneself today to observing the crisis of the BR and of other organizations. It is necessary to go to the root and to condemn the armed struggle in itself, for what it is, for what it has produced.

I repeat that, at the time of those discussions, the Dozier kidnapping had not yet failed. But it was already easy to see that it was a political disaster. Anyway, inside I was already definitely sure of the choices that I would have to make, a little later. And the discovery of the cache, the arrests, the collapse of the Veneto column did not do other than to bring new reasons to confirm an analysis already made and a decision already taken. A little later, in fact, I arrived in Genoa for the trial by appeal, and immediately I asked to be heard by the judge. The rest contains no secrets.

Having arrived at this point, I notice that much of what I have written (in a very hurried manner, in the imminence of a new trial) has really need of being integrated with the testimony rendered to various judges who have interrogated me, for the clarifications that they offer on various particular points. These pages contain, however, all the essentials, with respect to facts that regard me and of which I am aware. The initial promise has not, however, been kept, that is,

of explaining the explicitly political aspect of my experience in the Red Brigades. I do not consider here either the theory or the translation of this theory, on one hand, into an idea-force and, on the other, into precise structures of the organization. I believe I still have more things to say about both subjects. Besides, I have not spoken much about myself, that is, about my personal journey, about the motives that have nudged me, little by little, to come to this final choice. On this level, the debate will perhaps offer me occasion to be clearer and broader [in my discussion].

Regarding the theoretical-political discourse, I think that I must return to it again, above all for a reason that I maintain is central. It is my conviction (and in this naturally I could be wrong or else I could be too partial) that the prevalence of motivations of the ideological type was a characteristic peculiar to the BR--only of the BR, and not, for example, of the Prima Linea. More clearly, I would say that the brigadist has interpreted the course of history in a certain manner, and that he has made a bet with history. And all that the BR have written and said has been an attempt to substantiate the validity of their interpretive schemes of history and to force its course towards rigidly predetermined outcomes. This means, for example, that I do not believe that one can explain the BR as the sum of individual cases, interpreted in a psychological key with subjective criteria. (I think that that is, in good part, possible for the Prima Linea, perhaps also for Autonomia.) And I do not think that one can explain the BR with criteria and instruments of analysis of a sociological type as that it is the direct fruit of determined social conditions. (This notion can, however, function for today's guerrilla party, which explicitly accentuates its "sociological" nature and, in this aspect, detaches itself from the "old" BR.) One understands that every brigadist carries with his militancy a strictly personal subjective aspect, and also his experience and his social conditions. But the one and the other thing are rigidly placed inside a conviction of a general character, that is, in a nutshell, a pure theory, absolutely fundamental for understanding the nature of the group, its internal cohesion, its ends and its practice.

The presence of this element of theory has been perceived by everyone in a more or less confused way, and it has contributed not a little to creating around the BR the myth that they first of all have exploited and that they have always consciously cultivated. (It has also been a very intelligent political choice of Curcio and his comrades to create an image of Palmi as a kind of university of the armed struggle.) But when this key element goes, nothing remains of the BR. Or better, it becomes a band. But a band without any justification and without any trust, flawed on the organizational level, incapable of recruiting, condemned even as a pure and simple social phenomenon.

I have sought to say elsewhere, badly, what this "theory" is and how it has sought to cover the lack of any political plan or program. I will try later to do it better. What I want to emphasize, however, is that right now, it is an already dead theory, not only for me and for others who have abandoned the armed struggle, not only for the working class, which always rejected it, but even for the brigadists themselves who have experienced its falsity and do not know any longer what to say and what to do, except to get drunk with senseless slogans and with otherwise senseless deaths. It does not seem difficult to me to demonstrate it, and I believe that it is necessary to do it tirelessly, to separate from the BR all those who still are able to be removed from it (there are still many, within and outside the prisons), and to obstruct others who are attracted to it.

Alexandria 27.9.82

Appendix A GENERAL INDEX

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