


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
STRATEGIC DECEPTION: PLANNING AND A
CORRELATION WITH A HISTORICAL CASE

By LT COL RANDALL V. GRESSANG

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STRATEGIC DECEPTION: PLANNING AND A
CORRELATION WITH A HISTORICAL CASE

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Dr. Joseph L. Strange

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1986

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AIR WAR COLLEGE REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Strategic Deception: Planning and a Correlation
With a Historical Case

AUTHOR: ↓ Randall V. Gressang, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Examines the role of deception in war by reviewing how military writers from Sun Tzu to Liddell-Hart have discussed surprise and deception. Develops a process for planning strategic deception in consonance with the overall strategy being pursued, using results from recent psychological research and Barton Whaley's insight that deception and magic are closely related. Examines the applicability of this planning process by comparing it with what actually occurred in planning and implementing a successful World War II strategic deception, the Fortitude South Plan for the Normandy Invasion.

↑

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Randall M. Gressang (Ph.D., Aerospace Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology) has been interested in military history since the 1950s. Within the Air Force, he has served as a development engineer, with experience in flight testing, laboratory research, and system acquisition. He has also served in the Defense Intelligence Agency in the scientific and technical intelligence area, and as a planner in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, Class of 1979, and of the Air War College, Class of 1986.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 13(1:108)

This paper will examine fraud, the second cardinal virtue of war. Fraud as an aspect of war is usually overlooked in relation to force, but fraud has always been part of war. The role of fraud in war is discussed by some military writers, however no planning process for using fraud is outlined. This paper will attempt to synthesize a planning process for applying fraud in war by using research on deception, and will be based on the view that deception is applied psychology. It will also use contributions from magic, another branch of applied psychology.

The relevance of the planning process developed will be assessed by comparing it with a historical case drawn from World War II. Since expiration of the Official Secrets Act 30 year period, considerable material is now available on British and Allied deception activities. The case chosen is Plan Fortitude South, part of the Bodyguard Deception Plan for the Normandy Invasion. This case was chosen because deception was a key element of the Normandy Invasion. Accounts by planners (Masterman (2), Hesketh (3), and Montagu (4)) exist, and evidence of the impact of the deceptions on the victim's minds exists.(5)(6)(7)

CHAPTER II

DEFINITIONS

For clarity in thinking, this chapter will review definitions of deception, with emphasis on those definitions bearing upon strategic deception. The relevant JCS Publication 1 definitions are: (8)

DECEPTION: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

MILITARY DECEPTION: Actions executed to mislead foreign decision makers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originator's objectives.

STRATEGIC MILITARY DECEPTION: Military deception planned and executed to result in foreign national policies and actions which support the originator's national objectives, policies, and strategic military plans.

It is of interest that the Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms contains terms for similar activities, namely: (9)

DESINFORMATSIYA: Propagation of false information about one's forces and plans of action for the purpose of misleading the enemy. Means of disinformation may be: radio, press, simulated troop relocations, etc.

MASKIROVKA: A form of support for combat operations, its purpose being to conceal the activities and disposition of friendly troops, and to mislead the enemy with regard to the grouping and intentions of such troops. Camouflage measures are also implemented in the deep

near, within the framework of civil defense.

RADIODEZINFORMATSIYA: One of the elements of operational camouflage, carried on to mislead the enemy concerning the state, grouping, intentions, armament, and activities of our own troops; it is accomplished by broadcasting false messages by radio.

IMITATSIYA: (1) A decoy grouping of troops or dummy objects, false movements and disposition of troops, dummy defensive works, etc., for the purpose of misleading the enemy about the true disposition or activities of friendly troops, and of drawing his fire against the dummy objectives. Simulation is carried out with the aid of mock-ups of material, dummy works, and also signs of vital activity of the troops being simulated (firing, radio conversations, etc.). Simulation is also done by demonstrative activities, misinformation, etc. Simulation on an operational scale is carried out only on the instructions of a higher echelon of military command.

The key elements of all these definitions are summarized in Daniel and Herbig's view (10:3) "Deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage." This view will be that adopted in the remainder of this paper.

CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND: DECEPTION IN MILITARY WRITINGS

Deception is an integral part of warfare, as can be seen in some of the earliest accounts of warfare. Early examples are Joshua's taking of Ai, (Joshua 3) circa 1250 BC (11:278), and Gideon's rout of the Midianites (Judges 7) circa 1100 BC. (11:278)

Deception is also presented as an integral part of warfare in early military writings. Sun Tzu (4th century BC) stated "all warfare is based on deception" (12:66), and he discusses indirect approaches and providing bait to entrap the enemy. Commentators on Sun Tzu provide examples of successful strategems. Frontinus (1st century AD) provides a compilation of historical examples of strategems, "for in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds." (13:3) Vegetius (4th century AD) (14) and the Byzantines (15:56-58) continue to discuss ambushes, strategems and surprise as essential elements of war. Machiavelli's The Art of War (1521) is indebted to Frontinus for many of the strategems described (16), and "Machiavelli thought that a general's interest should not be restricted to purely military actions; he ought also to devise efficient methods of deceiving the

enemy and employing ruses--like the spreading of false rumors--to discourage him." (17:14)

Discussion of strategems as an integral part of war continued into the eighteenth century, as can be seen from the writings of the Marshal de Saxe (18) and Frederick the Great. (19:346-355) However, Napoleon's Military Maxims does not appear to have one mention of a ruse or strategem. (20) Jomini, one of the interpreters of the Napoleonic Era, does not mention ruses or strategems, and feels that opportunities for surprise have become limited due to the invention of firearms. His interest in surprise appears limited, and consists mainly in an exhortation to avoid being surprised and to take advantage of opportunities offered for surprise. (21:116-117)

Clausewitz feels that to achieve surprise in war is a nearly universal objective, and that secrecy and speed are essential. He defines surprise as "the desire to surprise the enemy by our plans and dispositions, especially those concerning the distribution of forces." (22:198) He also feels that "by its very nature surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful" (22:198) and its success will be greater the closer it is to being a tactical instead of strategic surprise. In addition he notes that surprise may depend on an enemy mistake, and that psychological aspects may be the most important. (22:200-201) Clausewitz feels

that some degree of deception (his term is "cunning") is involved in every surprise, but in general he feels that it has little value and entails too great a cost. He especially warns against demonstrations involving a large proportion of the available force. (22:202-203)

Later nineteenth century and early twentieth century military writers appear to neglect deception as an element of warfare (17), although certain commanders apparently were skillful practitioners of surprise and deception throughout this period. (23) The stalemate of World War I produced reappraisals of strategic concepts, and two of these reappraisals produced strategic concepts lending themselves to incorporating deception back into strategy.

The first writer was the German General Waldemar Erfurth, whose book on surprise in war emphasized the importance of surprise "as the primary objective of military planning." (24:195) "Secrecy, speed, movement, and surprise are thus the prerequisites of victory. Luck and art must combine to catch the enemy by surprise. In war, the unexpected is the most successful. Thus, surprise is the key to victory." (24:199) This doctrine readily leads to the comment by the Austrian General Alfred Krauss, "Real secrecy can only be achieved if, in addition to the correct information which the enemy receives, he is also provided

with incorrect information. Confusion is the only effective method of maintaining secrecy." (24:6)

The second writer was Liddell-Hart, who also emphasized that strategy should exploit maneuver and surprise. He (in common with Sun Tzu) recommends indirect approaches, and discusses the action of strategy being to cause a physical or psychological dislocation. This can be achieved physically by taking a line of least resistance, or psychologically by taking a line of least expectation. One of the bases for doing this, and to ensure reaching an objective, is to have alternative objectives. Liddell-Hart quotes Sherman's maxim about "putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma." (25:323-330) Deception can be a principal means for establishing a line of least expectation, and as will be seen later the concept of alternative objectives provides a natural area where deception supports an overall military plan.

Current Soviet operational art also highly values surprise, and by implication the use of deception to achieve surprise. Quoting from Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, Moscow, 1972:

Sometimes in a combat situation the enemy may commit a crude mistake or make an omission where, by taking advantage of it, our troops can deliver an attack against him. But the probability of employing surprise operations based on such a random occurrence is extremely low. Consequently, it is practically impossible to

count on attaining success through chance, surprise actions. The operation and battle began to be planned with consideration for achieving a preconceived, carefully planned and ensured surprise which will be the result of a purposeful, creative activity. Thus surprise began to appear as a fully natural phenomenon which, with observance of the necessary demands and assurance of the appropriate conditions, should occur with a high degree of probability. This means it is possible to count on the success of surprise actions only on condition of their prior planning, preparation, and timely implementation. (26:233)

Surprise is incompatible with stereotype. Stereotype contradicts the very essence of surprise. If one has succeeded in deceiving the enemy once, then he will not allow himself to be deceived a second time by the very same technique. (26:235)

The assurance of secrecy of operations has begun to be achieved as a result of an entire complex of interwoven measures having the purpose not only of depriving the enemy of information about friendly troops, but also of leading him astray with regard to their incapacibilities and planned actions (26:239)

It is therefore clear that Sun Tzu, Erfurth, Liddell-Hart, and Savkin discuss military strategy in a way that indicates what deception should contribute, and that they place a high value on deception. Their writings also show they expect deception to be more important in circumstances where pure force obviously is inadequate. In the world of nuclear weapons and consequent limited aims, this situation appears to prevail. There is a general feeling in these writings that surprise has become more difficult to achieve because of changed political and technical circumstances; however, quoting Col. G.F.R. Henderson, a British intelligence officer in the Boer war,

It is repeated ad nauseam that in consequence of the vastly improved means of transmitting information, surprise on a large scale is no longer to be feared. It should be remembered, however, that the means of concentrating troops and ships are far speedier than of old; that false information can be far more readily distributed; and also, that if there is one thing more certain than another, it is that the great strategist, surprise being still the most deadly of all weapons, will devote the whole force of his intellect to the problem of bringing it about. (27:747)

The fraudulent aspect of war is also frequently considered less honorable than other aspects of war; for those of this persuasion, the following quote from Milton is offered:

It is better therefore to say that strategems, though coupled with falsehood, are lawful for the cause above assigned, namely, that where we are not under an obligation to speak the truth, there can be no reason why we should not, when occasion requires it, utter even what is false; nor do I perceive why this should be more allowable in war than in peace, especially in cases where, by an honest and beneficial kind of falsehood, we may be enabled to avert injury or danger from ourselves or our neighbor. (28:302-303)

Sun Tzu, Erfurth, Liddell-Hart, and Savin all have contemporary relevance on the contribution of surprise and deception to military success; but Sun Tzu, while being the oldest, offers the broadest perspective in that he also considers the political and diplomatic context and the psychological effect desired in the mind of the opponent. None of these writers, however, indicates other than by examples how a deception operation can be planned and executed to support an overall military strategy. The

planning process for a deception operation will be the subject of the next section of this paper.

CHAPTER IV

A DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS

The relatively recent release of records and memoirs dealing with World War II deception operations (2)(3)(4)(29) has inspired academic research into deception (10)(30) using a wide variety of viewpoints (organizational, communications theory, psychology, etc.). Most of these views seem to have utility only for ex post facto explanation; however, the view that military deception is a branch of applied psychology, and is closely akin to magic, appears suitable for planning deception operations. This view apparently originated with, and has been developed by, Barton Whaley, author of Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War. (23)(30:178-192)(31) It is the principal influence in developing the proposed planning process which follows.

This deception planning process is presented as a method to be followed in developing actions, rather than as a set of principles. It is emphasized that deception is not a single act, but is a series of sequential acts designed to cause specific responses by the enemy which aid our strategy. Flexibility is important, and the planner must think through an action/response sequence for each plan. The deception plan itself is something like a play, involving both real and notional actions simultan-

eously. Reliance on principles or examples instead of thought process may possibly increase the danger of stereotyped thinking, the antithesis of deception.

Prerequisites for Deception

Before a deception plan can be developed three prerequisites have to be satisfied:

1. Accurate knowledge has to be developed about enemy decisionmakers, decision making processes, and intelligence organizations.
2. An effective security system has to be established for your own forces.
3. A secret organization, appropriately staffed, at a suitably high organizational level has to be established to plan and coordinate execution of the deception operations.

The validity of the first prerequisite can be seen by recognizing that deception is a special case of the psychological phenomenon of perception. In deception, signals which depict the false and hide the real are sent to the enemy intelligence collection system, with the intent that these signals be analyzed and from them a false perception of reality derived. This false picture must be presented to and believed by the enemy decision makers, forming the basis for enemy decisions and actions. To determine signals to which the enemy will pay attention and interpret in the desired manner, it is essential to

understand the enemy including his organization, the key personalities, and the cultural influences upon them.

Richards J. Heuer, Jr. has made a study of biases in human perception which appear to influence how humans are deceived. He notes that "perception is demonstrably an active rather than a passive process; it constructs rather than records "reality." Perception implies understanding as well as awareness." (33:33) Heuer's point is reinforced by the following quote from F.A. Geldard's Fundamentals of Psychology:

The list of noncorrespondences between what we infer to be going on in the physical world and how we perceive these events is a very long one. Indeed, it is not overstating the case to say that there never exists a one-to-one correspondence between the properties of objects in the physical world and our perceptions of them. (32:245)

Individual perceptual biases which appear to carry over to group behavior, and which indicate the nature of practicable deceptions, are:

1. "The extraordinary extent to which the information obtained by an observer depends upon the observer's own expectations, assumptions, and preconceptions." (33:34)
2. "One of the most important characteristics of perceptions is that they are quick to form but resistant to change." (33:36)
3. "Initial exposure to ambiguous or blurred stimuli interferes with accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available." (33:39)

4. People have difficulty estimating the probability of unlikely events. (33:44)
5. "Once an estimate is made, thinking becomes anchored and moves only within a narrowed range around that spot." (33:46)
6. In expressing subjective feelings as a probability estimate, people usually are overconfident. (33:46)
7. "People have more confidence in conclusions drawn from a small body of consistent data than from a larger body of less consistent information." (33:63)
8. "People have difficulty factoring the absence of evidence into their judgement." (33:63)
9. "Impressions tend to persist even after the evidence on which they are based has been fully discredited." (33:63)
10. "Events are seen as part of an orderly, causal pattern." (33:63) [even if they result from chance.]
11. Other's behavior is attributed to their nature, while our behavior is attributed to the situation. (33:57)

The effect of these individual biases can be significantly affected by culture and organization, and thus it is necessary to assess these impacts. Ewen Montagu wrote in Beyond Top Secret Ultra: "It was so important to deception work to be able to put oneself completely in the mind of the enemy, to think as they would think on their information and decide what they would do--ignoring what you yourself knew and what you could do." (4:140) R.V. Jones, author of The Wizard War, seconds Montagu:

Both for deception and unmasking, one of the personal qualities required is that of being able to imagine

yourself in the position of your adversary, and to look at reality down to the smallest detail from his point of view; this includes not only being able to sense the world through his eyes and ears,...but also to absorb the background of his experience and hopes, for it is against these that he will interpret the clues collected by his intelligence system. (35:21)

Sun Tzu articulated it even more succinctly: "Know the enemy and Know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." (12:84)

The second prerequisite for deception is effective security and security organization. Deception, like magic, involves showing the false and hiding the real. (34:183)

Frontinus wrote: "When Metellus Pius was in Spain and was asked what he was going to do the next day, he replied 'If my tunic could tell, I would burn it.'" (13:17)

The security organization is responsible for preventing the enemy from receiving unintended signals which would expose the false and permit the real to be exposed. Both a Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) planner writing a report on cover and deception in September 1944 and the German General Hans von Greiffenberg, reviewing allied and German cover and deception experience in World War II, emphasize the importance of denying the enemy knowledge that cover and deception are being employed. (10:16)

In the event that one is less than totally successful in this latter endeavor, however, the perceptual biases of the enemy (discussed above) may preclude him from

accurately interpreting the almost inevitable leaks.

(10:16-17)

The third prerequisite is that an organization, appropriately manned and located at high level, be established to plan and coordinate the execution of the deception operations. This organization must have the access to comply with Masterman's First Principle: "First and before all it is a cardinal principle that no traffic of any kind should ever be sent over without the written approval of some competent authority." (2:16) The organization should also be located high enough so as to ensure efficient execution of the details of the deception plan, and should not be distracted by other functions. Again quoting Masterman, "What must here be stressed is the overriding importance of having a section wholly and exclusively devoted to this special work, and not dependent upon any one specialized department." (2:14)

Deception Planning

Deception alone, however, is unlikely to provide any real benefit unless it is coordinated with the overall strategic plan. Moreover, even then the effectiveness of any deception scheme may be inversely proportional to the directness or obviousness of the strategy it is designed to protect. Strategies based upon achieving surprise and/or

having alternative objectives appear to conform well with the psychological bases of deception. Thus they offer extraordinary opportunities for effective deception.

This point is articulated well by Barton Whaley in

Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War:

The purpose of [a deceptive] strategem is to ensure that the victim be surprised...that he does indeed choose a false or unfavorable alternative. The technique of strategem achieves this by a two-step operation. First, it makes certain the victim is faced with an ambiguous situation...The technique of strategem next proceeds to present the victim with alternative solutions to his predicament. (23:139)

The best strategem is the one that generates a set of warning signals susceptible to alternative, or better yet, optional interpretations, where the intended solution is implausible in terms of the victim's prior experience and knowledge while the false solution (or solutions) is plausible. (23:142)

The deception planner should therefore begin by identifying enemy actions which would help achieve the objectives of the overall strategy. Having done this, the planner should utilize his knowledge of the enemy's beliefs and preconceptions to determine what various deception schemes might encourage him (the enemy) to take such actions. At this point, the deception planners and the commander and staff responsible for planning and executing the overall strategy must balance the difficulty and costs associated with each alternative deception scheme with its expected effectiveness and then choose the most desirable

course of action based upon both cost and probable effectiveness.

Two types of effects on enemy decisionmaker's beliefs appear possible. The first has been termed a misleading (M) type deception (10:6) and the object is "to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive, and wrong." (23:135) If the enemy's preconceptions must be changed, it will be extremely difficult and possibly not feasible. (33:42-44) The second is an ambiguity increasing (A) type deception (10:6), where the object is to create indecision on the part of the enemy as to which of several possible alternatives he should choose, so that his eventual decision is delayed until it is not timely. This appears to be easier to achieve. It is doubtful if pure A or M type deceptions exist; most actual cases probably being somewhat intermediate. Nevertheless, the deception planner should clearly decide if the principal objective of the plan is to "sell" one false alternative or to sow doubt and confusion.

Having decided upon the desired enemy action, belief, and the desired deception effect (decisively wrong or confused), the deception planner is now ready to design the required ruse and write its scenario. The planner must determine the time evolution of the actual planned strategy, and also develop a credible time evolution for the notional actions of the alternative or alternatives to be "sold" to

the watching enemy. The differences between these two time evolutions determine what is the false to be shown the enemy and what is the true to be hidden from him.

Knowing what is to be shown and when, and what is to be hidden and when, the planner can now decide how to show and how to hide. Barton Whaley's research into the connection between military deception and magic pointed out that there are basically only three ways of hiding and three ways of showing. (34:182-187) In relative order of effectiveness, most effective first, the false can be shown by:

1. "Mimicking shows the false by having one thing imitate another." (34:185) An example would be impersonating a senior officer to give the impression he was visiting another command.
2. "Inventing shows the false by displaying another reality. Unlike mimicking...inventing creates something entirely new." (34:185) An example would be a dummy airfield complete with dummy aircraft, lights, and radio traffic.
3. "Decoying shows the false by diverting attention." (34:185) An example would be a feint, such as Sherman used before Atlanta.

On the other hand, in relative order of effectiveness, most effective first, the real can be hidden by:

1. "Masking hides the real by making it invisible." (34:183) A diplomat continuing negotiations to conceal a decision to go to war is an example.

2. "Repackaging hides the real by disguising." (34:184) Disguising a warship as a peaceful merchant ship is an example.
3. "Dazzling hides the real by confusing." (34:184) A code or a cipher is an example.

Any way of showing can be combined with any way of hiding, giving a total of nine possibilities. A decision on the way of showing and the way of hiding, combined with the real and notional timelines of events, fixes the ruse to be employed.

The planner must now draw upon his intelligence system to determine the channels (diplomatic reporting, press monitoring, covert agents, communications intercept, photoreconnaissance, prisoner interrogations, etc.) used by the enemy to collect information. Signals that paint a picture of the false reality the enemy is to believe must then be designed to be sent through these channels. These signals should be consistent from channel to channel, but not too obvious. As R.V. Jones noted, "The analytical officer on the other side will be led to feel he is getting at the truth by eliminating errors introduced by faulty observation." (35:18) Jones has described this part of the process: "To deceive, you have first to find what channels of information your adversary has at his disposal, then to make sure that you provide appropriate clues in as many of these channels as possible, and either block or discredit

those channels where you cannot provide positive clues."

(35:19) The criticality of identifying channels and providing artistic, detailed signals is pointed up by a further comment of R.V. Jones: "To unmask a deception, your adversary must either open up new channels unknown to you, or work down to a greater depth in some of the existing channels than the depth to which you have provided clues (or detect an inconsistency in the clues with which you have provided him)." (35:19)

At this point, a detailed plan for the deception should be drawn up, and the means for implementing the plan prepared. The plan should not, however, ever be considered final or inflexible. If it is implemented, and the signals called for by it sent to the enemy, the deception planning organization should carefully monitor the execution of the plan through all possible feedback channels. Friction and chance upset the best laid plans, but flexibility and attention during implementation should always permit at least spreading confusion amongst your foes.

CHAPTER V

A HISTORICAL CASE STUDY: FORTITUDE SOUTH

The historical example of a deception operation chosen for analysis is Fortitude South, one of the cover and deception operations for the Normandy Invasion. Fortitude South was a subordinate plan of Plan Bodyguard, the overall cover and deception plan for Overlord. (6:94) The principal subordinate plans of Bodyguard were: (6:96-97)

1. Fortitude North - simulating a threat to Norway
2. Fortitude South - simulating a threat to the Pas de Calais
3. Zeppelin - threats in the Eastern Mediterranean
4. Ironside, Vendetta, and Ferdinand - threats in the Western Mediterranean
5. Graffham and Royal Flush - Diplomatic deceptions
6. Copperhead - a notional visit by General Montgomery
7. Quicksilver I to VI - subsidiary operations of Fortitude South
8. Titanic I to IV - dummy operations of Fortitude South
9. Taxable, Glimmer - simulated assaults during Overlord

Fortitude South was the key deception in this group of plans. Its importance and its objective were described by Masterman:

By the early spring of 1944 it was utterly impossible to disguise the fact that the major attack would come somewhere between the Cherbourg Peninsula and Dunkirk; the true preparations which could not be wholly disguised indicated this beyond all doubt, and the distance from the base at which fighter cover could be supplied helped to define the limits. The deception policy was dictated by these circumstances, and therefore of necessity it boiled down to a simple policy of three points: first to postpone the date of the attack, secondly to indicate that the attack would come in the east rather than in the west of the threatened area, and thirdly, after the real attack had taken place, to suggest that it was only a first blow and that a second and even weightier assault would follow in the Pas de Calais area, i.e. at the eastern end of the target." (2:145)

According to Charles Cruickshank, author of Deception in World War II, "Fortitude South, which simulated a massive attack on the Pas de Calais two hundred miles east of the chosen landing-places in Normandy, was the largest, most elaborate, most carefully planned, most vital, and most successful of all the allied deception operations." (6:170)

Considering the prerequisites first, it is clear that knowledge of the enemy and his intelligence system had been systematically acquired since at least 1940 with a view toward deception along with other possibilities. The principal means of acquiring this information appear to have been through double agents and through communications intercepts (ULTRA). Both Masterman (2) and Montagu (4) emphasize the continual growth of both the knowledge and the means required for deception starting as early as 1940, well before serious planning for a major cross channel invasion.

An effective security system was also established, with the term 'bigot' used to designate individuals who were cleared to know the date and place of the invasion. Any potential security leaks were vigorously pursued. (5:153) The British government was persuaded to take the unprecedented steps of restricting movement along a 10 mile strip of the English Coast and of censoring diplomatic communications and preventing the departure of foreign diplomats. (6:172-173) In addition to this security for the invasion, even tighter security was enforced with respect to ULTRA, the double agents, and deception, with significant information not being made public until the 1970s. (3) For example, Gilles Perrault, author of The Secret of D-Day, published in 1964, fails to uncover the entire story, indicating how well the secrets were hidden even twenty years after the war.

The third prerequisite--a suitable organization to orchestrate the deception--also existed. Quoting Haswell, "All the ramifications of Bodyguard were centralized in a secret office within Churchill's war headquarters. It was called the London Controlling Section (LCS),...and it was run by Col. John Bevan and LTC. Sir Ronald Wingate." (5:114) The LCS had begun significant activity in 1942 (6:34-35)(4:133), and had two years experience by 1944. In addition, the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was

obtained for Plan Jael (later rechristened Bodyguard) on 25 January 1944, fulfilling Masterman's cardinal principle of obtaining approval by a competent authority. (6:92)

Bodyguard and Fortitude South were well integrated into the Overlord strategy, in that there were two feasible landing sites: the Pas de Calais or Normandy. Landings could be made at either the Pas de Calais, or Normandy, or both. The commander of the German army in France, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, (5:107) believed that the Allies would assault the Pas de Calais, a preconception very carefully and effectively nurtured by the Fortitude planners. The action desired of the Germans was first to have them spread their forces across Europe, then to have the bulk of their garrison in France concentrated in the Pas de Calais and held there. The allied planners also knew from ULTRA of Hitler's constant interference in the Wehrmacht (5:106), and they hoped that he, too, would be fooled or confused long enough for him to freeze the 15th Army in the Pas de Calais while the Allies secured a bridgehead in Normandy. Overall, Bodyguard had aspects of an ambiguity increasing deception, but the key element, Fortitude South, was a misleading deception. The object was to make the German High Command feel certain that the main allied attack would come in the Pas de Calais.

The ruse used to mislead the Germans used inventing for showing the false, and repackaging for hiding the real. What was invented was the First US Army Group (FUSAG), which was poised to assault the Pas de Calais. (6:177-189) A key part of the invention of FUSAG was to provide a sufficiently padded order of battle for a landing at the Pas de Calais to be credible after a landing at Normandy. What was repackaged was the extent of the allied buildup in England at Portsmouth and to the west. (6:176)

The channels for gathering information available to the Germans were assessed to be agent reports, radio intercept, aerial reconnaissance, press monitoring, neutral diplomatic channels, allied bombing attack patterns, captured members of the resistance, and (subsequent to the landings) prisoners of war. In his history of Fortitude, Hesketh (3:233-242) implies that the main channels used for sending signals were the double agents of the XX committee, simulated wireless traffic designed for consistency with the double agent reports, bombing patterns and visual demonstrations for the benefit of aerial reconnaissance. Masterman's account of the doublecross system (2:144-162) and Montagu's memoir (4:15-156) give the same impression. Masterman also points out that double agent identifications of units were designed to be later confirmed by prisoners after the units were committed in Normandy, thus reinforcing

German belief in the false FUSAG order of battle. (2:157)

The deception planners apparently considered press leaks, leaks through diplomats, and leaks through the resistance in France as too diffuse channels for use by Fortitude South, and tried to minimize all signals in these channels by security.

Despite the relative sophistication and detail shown by the Fortitude South plan, Hesketh believes that even more detailed planning was required, especially for the double agent operations. (3:229) Finally, the need for flexibility in implementing a deception plan can be seen in how Fortitude South I (before the landing) was broadened out into Fortitude South II (after the landing) in such a manner as to preserve the credibility of the double agents. (3:35) This broadening out only took place after the original plan was in motion. (3:235) Without it, such influential signals as Garbo's message of 9 June 1944, which tipped Hitler against release of the 15th Army to Rommel at that time, would not have been credible. (2:155-156)(36:317-318)

The Fortitude deception scheme is a concrete example of the planning process outlined in Chapter IV of this paper. The process can work today as well as it worked then. But remember that stereotype is the deadly enemy of deception. Future planners of strategic deceptions should read the memoirs and histories of World War II deception

written by J.C. Masterman, E. Montagu, R.V. Jones, R.F.

Hesketh, etc., and in so doing they will discover the virtues of originality, individuality, and imagination stand out. There are no standard formulae or rigid principles prerequisite to planning and executing an effective deception scheme.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Fraud is as much a part of war as force, and a commander who realizes this and plans accordingly should reap significant benefits. Despite the growth of modern means of acquiring information, the potential for fraud and deception in war have not diminished. Deception is a psychological phenomenon, and the increase in information available may increase the utility of deception rather than diminish it. Deception can be rationally integrated with effective military strategies, and rational processes can be developed for planning the required deception operations. This paper has outlined a possible planning process based on viewing deception as a branch of applied psychology akin to magic, and demonstrated through the consideration of the Fortitude South plan for the Normandy Invasion that this planning process is relevant to actual experience. Reference 37 provides a fascinating starting point for those whose interest has been aroused by this paper.

The essentials of deception are to acquire knowledge of the enemy and his beliefs (as it is hard to reverse his preconceived ideas), to establish a security system, and to have an organization tied in to high headquarters. The planner must then analyze the strategy being supported to

find out how deception can best be used. If that strategy does not lend itself to strategic deception, the planner should remember Clausewitz's strictures on idle demonstrations, but if it does he should then "write a play" to be performed for the enemy audience.

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