Taking the Ultimate Risk: Commanding and Controlling Maneuver Forces in Tactical Deep Operations,
Abstract
This monograph examines the problems of commanding and controlling manuever forces conducting tactical deep operations, specifically at the corps and division levels. Inasmuch as AirLand doctrine calls for divisions and corps to fight deep with maneuver elements to influence the course of future engagements, this paper seeks answers to the question of how to command and control them effectively. The monograph first discusses the probable nature of the future battlefield, where multiple engagements will be fought in depth--a depth of time, space, and resources. The lack of U.S. Army doctrine for command and control of deep battle is addressed, along with the increasing emphasis our potential enemies are placing on disrupting our C2 technology. Next, the monograph examines six historical examples of tactical deep operations. The command and control processes that were successful, as well as those which were unsuccessful, are discussed in order to ascertain if lessons for future battle are evident. Finally, this monograph addresses the doctrinal implications that the findings suggest for command and control of tactical deep operations. The paper concludes that an institutional system of command and control should be implemented in the United States Army, in order to be able to fight in depth and win. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 05, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA179556
Entities
People
- Robert W. Mixon Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College