Meade and the Operational Level of War.
Abstract
Several writers, in the last few years, have written on the subject of 'operational art' and the operational level of war in an attempt to reemphasize the forgotten level of war in United States Army doctrine. We must study history and evaluate how operational level commanders conducted war. First, we must know their situation, terrain, weather experienced, resources available, political factors influencing their action, their personalities, strengths weaknesses and operational styles. The study of history allows the army professional to achieve this level of knowledge about former battle captains if studied in detail. This essay discusses the operational art of Major General George C. Meade from July 4, 1863 to December 2, 1863. Focuses on the Bristoe Station and Mine Run Campaigns and Meade's ability to maneuver large forces. Lessons learned from these two campaigns apply today at the operational level.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 23, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADA180728
Entities
People
- John W. Querfeld
Organizations
- United States Army War College