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
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
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STUDENT REPORT

SUCCESSFUL ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES

MAJOR DALE C. WATERS REPORT #87-2665
"insights into tomorrow"

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REPORT NUMBER 87-1665

TITLE SUCCESSFUL ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

A182311

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT STATEMENT "A" Approved for public release; <i>Distribution is unlimited.</i>		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 87-2665			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
5a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION ACSC/EDCC		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
5c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) SUCCESSFUL ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Waters, Dale C., Major, USAF					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1987 April	
15. PAGE COUNT 40					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Many anti-terrorism policies have been very successful in countering domestic and international terrorism. The success of such policies has been disguised by a false perception of the terrorist threat. The study evaluates trends in domestic and international terrorism to demonstrate problems with perceptions. Specific counter-terrorist policies are evaluated separately to determine their effectiveness. The study concludes with recommendations for a comprehensive anti-terrorism program based on policies with proven success.					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☐ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☒ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL ACSC/EDCC Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (205) 293-2483		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL

PREFACE

This study is intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of many policies and measures designed to combat terrorism. It looks at how false perceptions of the threat and regional patterns of terrorism have disguised the success of counter-terrorist programs. Individual policies and measures are evaluated based on the historical experience of the United States and our allies in the battle against terrorism. Some measures are shown to have had little or no effect on levels of political violence, while others have been extremely successful. The conclusion suggest a comprehensive program for combatting terrorism based on policies with a clear record of success.

I would like to thank Lt Col James E. Smith of the ACSC faculty and Ms. Jane Gibbish from the Air University Library for their assistance with this project. As my faculty advisor, Lt Col Smith's patience and advice helped immeasurably in putting together the final product. Ms. Gibbish gave her valueable time unselfishly, and her excellent bibliography on terrorism greatly aided my research efforts.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER

87-2665

AUTHOR(S)

MAJOR DALE C. WATERS, USAF

TITLE

SUCCESSFUL ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES

I. Purpose: To determine the effectiveness of various policies and measures implemented to deter and/or preempt terrorist actions.

II. Problem: The continuing rise in worldwide terrorism has obscured the success of many counter-terrorist measures. To build a comprehensive program to combat terrorism it is essential to cut through the mass of statistics to determine which policies have worked and which have clearly failed.

III. Discussion: To determine the effectiveness of counter-terrorist policies it is first necessary to show the degree to which a handful of trouble spots contribute to the perception of runaway terrorism worldwide. The anarchic situation in Lebanon, and on-going insurgent wars in Africa and South America are largely responsible for the increase in worldwide terrorist activity. In particular, these areas are the source of the most violent terrorist acts. This geographic influence on overall levels of terrorism obscures the high degree of success achieved elsewhere in combatting political violence.

Some anti-terrorist policies have been extremely effective. Passive security measures, such as airport screening, bomb detection, and protection of vulnerable installations have all had positive deterrent value. Such

CONTINUED

passive methods have worked best when coupled with aggressive intelligence and active intervention to complicate the terrorist's options and limit their freedom of action. Extreme interventionist options such as rescue attempts and reprisals have been of some value, but the risks of such measures indicate the need for maximum care in implementation.

Attempts to control terrorism through international agreements and the international legal system have been a dismal failure. Differences in perceptions of national interests and the degree of support for the political objectives of terrorists have made attempts to build an international counter-terrorist framework impossible. Similar differences have limited the effectiveness of political and economic sanctions. The US policy of absolutely rejecting concessions for hostage situations has proven to be less than effective because of inconsistency in application. All of these policy options need to be reviewed based on lack of proven success.

IV. Conclusions: A continuing rise in the overall level of worldwide terrorism has obscured the success of many countermeasures. An effective program for countering terrorism should expand on those measures that have been successful. Areas that have been of limited practical deterrent value, or that have had excessive political costs, must be dropped or modified.

V. Recommendations: International agreements on controlling terrorism should be continued for their political benefits, but with the realization that they have no value as a deterrent. Similarly, sanctions should not be considered as a deterrent but only as a political statement. Adopt a more flexible policy for hostage situations, and drop the no-concessions policy. Expand efforts in passive security. They have proven very effective and new technology offers hope for even better systems. Work for increased international intelligence cooperation. There is a proven link between counter-terrorist intelligence capability and levels of terrorism. Armed intervention and reprisal attacks are potent weapons against terrorism, but they must be used carefully with a full understanding of the potential risks.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

International terrorism has generated a sense of helplessness among many people and even governments in the Western democracies. Despite large expenditures on worldwide military forces and intelligence services, the United States often appears incapable of countering unpredictable attacks by a growing number of hostile organizations and governments. This sense of helplessness is a matter of false perception which ignores the success of many highly effective measures employed in the war against terrorism. Methods for combatting terrorism have ranged from passive security systems, such as those employed at air terminals, to dramatic military strokes and hostage rescues. What is missing is direct feedback on the positive results achieved by these measures.

This paper will attempt to answer the question, To what degree have various policies designed to combat terrorism been effective? The answer to this question will serve two purposes. First, it will refute the perception that governments are powerless to halt, or even slow, a rising tide of terrorist attacks. Second, it will provide a framework for developing a comprehensive program of proven counter-terrorist methods to deal with the future threat.

There are inherent difficulties in attempting to analyze any aspect of terrorism. It is a phenomenon that functions at many levels. The psychological, social, political, economic, and military aspects of terrorism are tied together in complex ways which inhibit clear understanding or simple answers. Attempts to evaluate the success of anti-terrorist measures must not be taken out of context. Still, some measures have been so demonstrably successful, and others so clearly useless, that they do not totally defy analysis. This evaluation will focus on specific counter-terrorist policies and attempt to demonstrate their overall effectiveness in the war against terrorism.

In keeping with the limitations discussed above, this paper will evaluate the effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures by a dual process. Some aspects of terrorism lend themselves to statistical analysis in the sense that the value of specific policies may be measured by changes in the level of

terrorist violence. Other cases defy such an evaluation, either because of obvious limitations on the access to information, as with clandestine intelligence operations, or because relevant data is disguised by shifting patterns of terrorist activity. In these cases, the deterrent value of the specific measures will be assessed subjectively. This dual scrutiny will allow a useful measurement of the long-term success or failure of counter-terrorist methods and policies.

OVERVIEW

The following overview provides more detailed information about the treatment of counter-terrorist methods in each chapter of this evaluation.

CHAPTER 2 - DEFINITIONS, DATA BASES, AND METHODOLOGY. This chapter will discuss sources and methods. It describes problems with basic definitions of terrorism and data collection methods and offers the operational definitions used for evaluation.

CHAPTER 3 - TRENDS IN TERRORISM: PERCEPTION AND REALITY. General trends in terrorism are provided as background for later evaluations of counter-terrorist methods. The emphasis is on problems with perception. International and domestic terrorism are discussed separately.

CHAPTER 4 - INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES. This chapter focuses on attempts to control terrorism through international agreements and cooperative measures. It discusses international legal measures, United Nations sanctions, and other more limited regional efforts.

CHAPTER 5 - SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND INTERVENTION. The success of passive security measures, international intelligence efforts, and armed intervention for hostage rescue is discussed in this chapter. Most demonstrably successful counter-terrorist measures fall into these categories.

CHAPTER 6 - REPRISALS. Israel has consistently used a policy of reprisal in attempts to counter terrorist aggression. This chapter discusses the legal aspects of reprisals and the apparent deterrent value of such a policy.

CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS. This chapter summarizes the effectiveness of the various counter-terrorist measures that were discussed and offers recommendations for a comprehensive program to combat terrorism in the future.

Chapter 2

DEFINITIONS, DATA BASES, AND METHODOLOGY

Attempts to analyze trends in terrorist activity are hampered by problems with definitions and inconsistencies in available data bases. Terrorists are patently uncooperative in allowing themselves to be measured, counted, or evaluated. Even individual terrorist acts are difficult to analyze since compilation of statistics varies widely based on differing definitions, uses, scope, and levels of analysis for existing data bases. The following sections discuss the definitions, data, and methods that are used in this paper to evaluate trends in terrorism and the effectiveness of anti-terrorist policies.

DEFINITIONS

The problem with definitions begins with the nature of terrorism. Whether or not an action is defined as terrorist depends very much on your point of view. The Israeli government, which was formed on the basis of a terrorist campaign against the British in Palestine, is quick to apply the label "terrorist" to actions taken by the Palestinians to regain their homeland. Similarly, Americans did not initially consider aircraft hijacking as terrorism when the primary offenders were East Europeans escaping from communism in the 1940s and 1950s. Similar definitional problems apply for almost all situations, depending on the degree to which you approve of the goals of the group carrying out the actions. The definitions listed below are generally consistent with those used by the RAND Corporation in compiling statistics of terrorism. "Terrorism, in the RAND Chronology, is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause." (1:14-16)

TERRORISM - "All terrorist acts are crimes - murder, kidnapping, arson. All involve violence or the threat of violence, often coupled with specific demands. The motives are political. The actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. And finally, the act is intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage." (1:16)

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - "Incidents that had clear international repercussions . . . incidents in which terrorists

went abroad to strike their targets, selected victims or targets that had connections with a foreign state, or created international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel, or equipment." (RAND Chronology Definition). This definition specifically excludes violence aimed at high officials or institutions within a country as part of internal rivalries or revolutions.

DATA BASES

Existing data bases on terrorist activity vary considerably in content and accuracy. They have been compiled by government agencies and private research groups with widely divergent purposes and goals. The predominant form of the data base is the chronology, although some attempts have been made to compile trends for different types of terrorist activities. (2:vi) The large variation between existing data bases creates a great danger in making "absolute quantitative statements" about terrorism. (9:52) To minimize potential inconsistencies, this study will generally use data from only a single source for each activity that is investigated.

METHODOLOGY

The primary purpose of this investigation is to evaluate the effectiveness of various policies and actions intended to combat terrorism. There are obvious limitations to attempting a strict, statistical, "before and after" type approach to this problem. The effectiveness of any particular counter-terrorist action may be obscured by many other significant social, economic, or political developments. For example, the value of special intervention units, such as Delta Force, in reducing the overall level of terrorism may be statistically irrelevant, but the value of such units as a policy alternative in certain hostage situations is beyond dispute. This paper will evaluate the effectiveness of counter-terrorist actions by a two-fold process: A) Where possible, the evaluation will be based on a statistical measurement of change in the level of terrorist activity. B) In situations where statistical data is meaningless, the evaluation will consist of a reasoned assessment of the value of the specific anti-terrorist measure or policy. Both methods will attempt to include major external factors which have a bearing on the problem.

Despite some problems with definitions and data bases, the existing information on terrorism can be of considerable value in assessing trends in terrorist activity. Using the definitions and methods discussed above, this paper will evaluate specific policies and methods designed to combat terrorism in light of available trend information.

Chapter 3

TRENDS IN TERRORISM: PERCEPTION AND REALITY

Many Americans are alarmed at what appears to be a rapidly expanding terrorist threat. Nameless masked assassins, kidnappers, and hijackers seem to operate with impunity throughout the world in defiance of established democratic governments. To a large degree these perceptions are invalid. This chapter is intended to close the gap between perception and reality. A realistic assessment of trends will place the terrorist threat in perspective and provide background for the evaluation of the success of anti-terrorist measures.

FALSE PERCEPTIONS

Cold statistics on the number of terrorist events or casualties often have little to do with how people perceive the terrorist threat. A few spectacular or newsworthy events can increase the threat in people's minds far beyond what is statistically relevant. An historical example occurred in 1972. The actual level of terrorism in 1972 was considerably lower than in the years immediately preceeding, but the impact of the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics increased the threat in the public consciousness. The result of this perception was the decision by many governments to get serious about combatting terrorism. (9:51)

Recently, a small number of terrorist events that turned into media spectacles have had a similar effect on perceptions of the terrorist threat. In many ways, the war of words (not to mention bombs) between President Reagan and Libya's Khadafi has increased the fear of terrorism in the United States beyond what the statistics indicate. This fear was reflected in the drastic decrease of US tourism to Europe in 1986. (20:59)

The fear of terrorism defies statistical evidence. Twenty-five Americans died at the hands of terrorists in 1985. This was the highest total in five years, excluding the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanon in 1983. During this same period, 40,000 Americans died every year in automobile accidents and 18,000 were murdered. (24:6) The general concern about the inability of the government to deal with terrorism seems misplaced when balanced against a lack of similar concern

for highway safety or more stringent crime prevention.

The discrepancy between the reality of the terrorist threat and the perception of our inability to deal with terrorism disguises the very real success of many of our policies. The remainder of this chapter investigates trends in terrorism to debunk some of the mistaken perceptions and to lay the groundwork for evaluating what anti-terrorist policies have really been effective.

TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Much of the current concern over terrorism is fueled by statistics that show increasing numbers of terrorist incidents throughout the world. After a level-off in the early 1980s, with around 500 incidents per year, there was a sharp increase to over 800 incidents in 1985. (See figure 1.) While there is certainly some room for concern over these figures, there is danger in using them to evaluate the status of our battle against world terrorism. There are important trends underlying this overall rise. Shifting patterns in geographic location, terrorist organizations, and targets reflect the success of many anti-terrorist programs and point up challenges for developing programs that will be successful in the future.

One particularly frightening aspect of international terrorism is the increase in fatalities and serious injury. There were 926 deaths attributed to terrorists in 1985 compared to only 20 in 1968. (24:4) But even this staggering increase tells only part of the story. For example, in 1984 about half of the fatalities were caused by only 10 attacks in Asia, southern Africa, and Latin America, six of them by insurgents. "Thus, although more than two-thirds of all international terrorist incidents recorded for 1984 took place in Western Europe or the Middle East, the most lethal ones occurred in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where there are active insurgencies." (23:47)

Another geographic pattern that tends to obscure the true nature of the increase in world terrorism is the situation in Lebanon. The weakness of the government, and outside interference by Syria, Iran, Israel, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, has resulted in what amounts to a continuing civil war. This war is often fought by terrorism. Since 1982 there have been more terrorist incidents in Lebanon than in any other country. The 82 terrorist attacks in Lebanon in 1984 made up almost one-sixth of the world total. Consistently, the most serious attacks against Americans, including bombings, murder, and kidnapping, have occurred in Lebanon. The situation in that country is also reflected in the number of incidents perpetrated elsewhere in the Middle

East and in Europe by Lebanese-supported organizations. (23:51)
Overall, the continuing cycle of genocide and terror in Lebanon has contributed heavily to the high level of world terrorism in the 1980s.




FIGURE 1

(24:4)

A widely held perception in the United States is that Americans are the group most at risk in Europe and the Middle East. Several recent incidents, such as the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the "Achille Lauro" cruise ship hijacking, have fed this idea. Americans are certainly a target of some terrorist groups along with citizens of other Western and moderate Arab nations, but this obvious fact obscures the relative risk factor reflected by the statistics. The 25 US citizens killed by terrorist in 1985 were only a small fraction of 926 total deaths worldwide. The geographic focus is also misplaced. Latin America remained the highest threat area for Americans in 1985 with 82 attacks, more than any other region. (24:3-4) Figure 2 graphically depicts the relationship of US

casualties vs. worldwide casualties for 1980 through 1984. The statistics for 1983 reflect the 312 fatalities in the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon.




FIGURE 2

(23:47)

DOMESTIC TERRORISM

The growth of international terrorism in recent years has disguised the general decline in terrorism within the United States. While the number of terrorist attacks against US citizens and property has increased to almost one-third of the world total, the rate of domestic terrorism has declined to almost negligible levels. At its peak in the 1970s, domestic terrorism resulted in over 100 incidents annually. In 1985, there were only seven total domestic attacks. (12:26)

Terrorist Incidents in the United States 1980-1985

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total Incidents</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Injured</u>
1980	29	1	19
1981	42	1	4
1982	51	7	26
1983	31	6	4
1984	13	0	0
1985	7	2	10

TABLE 1

(24:6)

The reasons for the low incidence of domestic terrorism are a combination of fortuitous societal safety valves and a very successful counter-terrorist campaign by law enforcement and government agencies. By some measurements the United States is extremely vulnerable. The emphasis on personal freedom that has made the countries of Western Europe a favorite target of terrorists also exists in this country. Yet, so far, the United States has escaped a similar campaign of terror. Some of the critical factors in the successful battle against domestic terrorism are listed below.

POLITICAL COHESION

The US political system provides many peaceful outlets for political grievances. The success of these systems over time has built an intolerance within the populace for the use of violence for domestic political purposes. Elements on the extreme political fringes that might be inclined to use violence are unable to find any base of popular support necessary for a sustained campaign of terror. (11:31)

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

In most other parts of the world, including Western Europe, long periods of autocratic rule generated violent groups in opposition. This process created a precedent for political violence as an acceptable form of dissent. Many of the active terrorist groups in Europe today are descended from

groups formed in more turbulent times. The United States does not share this legacy, and domestic terrorist groups are consequently much weaker and less well organized. (11:31)

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The recent decline in domestic terrorism has coincided with a strengthening of intelligence agencies combatting terrorism. As a reaction to President Nixon's perceived abuse of intelligence agencies against political enemies, President Carter placed severe limitations on domestic intelligence gathering. The Reagan Administration has steadily built an intelligence mechanism, with the FBI as the lead agency, which has successfully infiltrated and disrupted US terrorist organizations. (1:99) According to FBI statistics, 46 members from extremist groups were convicted in 1985. The majority of these were members of right-wing fringe elements. The drop in domestic terrorism has coincided with these arrests. (11:31) The success of US intelligence agencies has also had some effect on international terrorists anticipating operations within the United States. The following quote is from Oliver Revell, the FBI's assistant director for investigations. "The United States is a country that is nearly impossible to police. On the other hand, we're making the United States a very difficult target. We have penetrated and prosecuted virtually every terrorist group that has operated in the United States. That has given rise to (terrorist) concern that we're not such an easy target." (12:26) Mr. Revell's testimony is substantiated by the statistics for 1985, when not a single terrorist incident in the US had international connections. (12:26)

Although the current low level of activity within the United States reflects the health of our counter-terrorist mechanisms, it may only be a matter of time before the country is hit by international terrorists. In the mean time, it is critical that our government attempt to use the solid foundation of our domestic program to build a more formidable program for fighting terrorism worldwide.

This discussion of trends in international and domestic terrorism was provided to lay the groundwork for looking at the success of specific counter-terrorist policies. The information showing the effect of regional patterns and the discrepancy between perceptions and reality was in no way intended to trivialize the threat of international terrorism. In perspective, however, there has been substantial progress in fighting terrorism. The reduction of domestic incidents to a handful per year has been a major success. The challenge is to determine which counter-terrorist policies have been successful and to expand our efforts in these areas. The following chapters review the success of such policies.

Chapter 4

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The United States has sought to limit the spread of terrorism by a variety of political and economic means. Attempts to use the international legal system to control terrorism or to achieve united action by the world community have largely been unsuccessful. Official US policy has been to support international anti-terrorist legislation while maintaining a tough, no-concessions policy with individual terrorist groups. The following discussion investigates the limitations of working within the international system and the effectiveness of US policy.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Since World War II there have been many attempts to use the international legal system to counter the growing terrorist threat. The United Nations has proven to be of negligible value in this process. Even more limited efforts for regional agreements have failed to provide a useable framework for suppressing terrorism. Inherent weaknesses in the international political system leave little hope for useable anti-terrorist legislation in the future. A review of how the system has failed will demonstrate these weaknesses.

UNITED NATIONS

Attempts to use the United Nations to control terrorism were doomed from the outset by the deep political schisms between the member nations. In 1972, following the Munich massacre, and again in 1977, the United Nations attempted to draft legislation for the general control of terrorism. Each time they failed to reach agreement because of definitional problems. The United States and the Western democracies supported legislation that attempted to condemn and prosecute terrorist acts regardless of political motivation. Third World countries within the General Assembly consistently blocked such attempts, insisting instead that any resolution must address the causes and grievances of terrorists and attempt to solve them. The Soviet bloc would not support any agreement which did not legitimise the right of national liberation and anti-imperialist movements to use violence in their struggle.

No general agreement was possible. While the United Nations did ultimately approve watered-down resolutions to protect diplomatic personnel and to limit hostage taking, the wording was so vague as to preclude enforcement. (9:105-113)

REGIONAL AGREEMENTS

The failure of the United Nations led to more limited attempts at international agreements against terrorism. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and a similar agreement by the Organization of American States are noteworthy examples. While each of these conventions addresses a broad range of terrorist activity and provides for extradition and prosecution of terrorists, they are notably weak in enforcement mechanisms. In each case, the member nations are given the right to determine if the agreement applies for each incident. Such flimsy frameworks have been of negligible value as deterrents to terrorism. (9:113-115)


ANTI-HIJACKING AGREEMENTS

Several attempts to limit or control aircraft hijacking have also had limited success. The most important of these, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, stated that hijackers should be extradited or, in cases where no bilateral extradition treaty was applicable, the hijackers should be prosecuted in the country where captured. The major flaw in the Hague Convention is that the countries that routinely provide asylum to political terrorists never signed the agreement. (9:115-116)

The only international agreement that has worked in controlling hijacking was the bilateral accord between Cuba and the United States in 1973. Both nations had an interest in stopping what had become a disruptive and potentially dangerous series of hijackings. Although this agreement has lapsed, both nations continue to abide by its provisions. The drastic reduction in US hijackings can largely be attributed to this agreement. (5:158)

There appears to be no hope in the foreseeable future that international agreements will have any effect on terrorism. The nations of the world simply do not have enough common interests. Since terrorism is essentially a political act, there will always be some countries that support it. (5:158)

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft^{1/}



^{1/}Effective September 1981: Includes all certificate holders as defined in Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 100

^{2/}Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended/killed during hijacking or a result of "hot pursuit"

FIGURE 3

(4:39)

SANCTIONS

Attempts to use economic and political sanctions against countries openly supporting terrorism have largely been unsuccessful. The same political differences which prevent any concrete international agreements also prevent unified actions against nations such as Syria and Libya. For sanctions to be effective, they must seriously affect the economic base of the target country. Several attempts by the United States to organize effective boycotts, as against Iran during the hostage crisis and more recently against Libya, failed through lack of united action. (5:164) The dependence of these states on exporting oil makes them potentially vulnerable to such sanctions, but not without broad international support for the boycott. Unilateral sanctions have proven totally non-effective. (14:39) The value of sanctions, if any, is as a political statement of condemnation. They may not seriously harm the target nation, but there is comfort in not aiding them to support terrorism.

NO-CONCESSIONS POLICY

The United States has had an openly-declared policy of no concessions for terrorists holding hostages since the crisis at the Munich Olympics in 1972. This policy contrasts with most other countries who are willing to negotiate, or who have no stated policy. There are strong arguments for and against the hard-line the United States has taken. It is impossible to measure the deterrent value of the US policy, but a review of arguments for both sides will place it in perspective.

The reasoning behind the policy of no concessions is that potential terrorists will not take American hostages if they know before hand that the United States will not meet their demands. Individual hostages must be sacrificed to establish the government's credibility and prevent future incidents. On the surface this policy makes sense, although the reality of forfeiting lives is a drain on the public conscience. An additional benefit to the no-concessions policy is that it can be used to shape public opinion ahead of time for the hard decisions which must be made in a crisis. The national leadership is better able to deal with each situation since the policy has been stated ahead of time and public opinion is less likely to waver. (6:170)

While the strength of the no-concessions policy should not be underestimated, there are serious problems with the way it has been applied. By not applying the policy consistently in all situations, the US government has undermined its potential as a deterrent. The policy of no concessions has consistently been violated, either directly, as in Iran during the embassy hostage crisis, or through intermediaries, such as the release of kidnap victims in Lebanon. On other occasions, the no-concessions policy has resulted in the murder of the hostages. Ambassador Knox in the Sudan is one such example. (1:107) The US policy has resulted in a double standard. When US businessmen are kidnapped overseas, the government in no way discourages their companies from paying ransom. On the other hand, the United States insists that other countries do not concede to terrorist demands when American diplomatic personnel are held hostage. (1:63) The no-concessions policy has been broken so often that it is perceived as unrealistic and unworkable.

While the concept behind the no-concessions policy appears sound, it has been an impossible plan to follow consistently. In one sense, the United States has been following a flexible policy toward hostage situations and would be better served by stating so publicly. "There is no logical reason to assume that a clearly stated but sporadically observed policy is any better than an ambiguous or flexible one." (1:110)

Attempts to control terrorism through international agreements and legal means have been of little value in practical terms. The few existing conventions are plagued by lack of effective enforcement. Given the state of the international political system, there is little hope for improved measures in the future. Even more modest attempts at cooperative or unilateral measures such as sanctions or policies of no concessions have proven to be of little value. The passive nature of all these programs has left the initiative with the terrorists. The key to effective counter-terrorism lies in pursuing more aggressive measures to deter or preempt terrorist actions. The following chapter will discuss how security measures, effective intelligence, and armed intervention can shift some of the initiative to the government in the war on terrorism.

Chapter 5

SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND INTERVENTION

The failure to control terrorism through the international legal system has led to the development of more active counter-terrorist programs in many countries. Increased emphasis on security, intelligence, and active intervention has created a much more hostile environment for the potential terrorist. In addition to protecting obvious targets, these measures are designed to keep the enemy guessing and hinder his initiative. This chapter will investigate some of the more active counter-terrorist programs and evaluate the potential for expanding those that have been most effective.

SECURITY MEASURES

Passive security measures are inherently limited in their ability to prevent terrorism. It is impossible to adequately shield all potential targets. As long as US citizens travel freely throughout the world, they will remain vulnerable to attack. However, security measures have proven effective in limiting terrorism against some previously lucrative terrorist targets. Three such programs, airport security, bomb detection, and embassy security, are worth a closer look.

AIRPORT SECURITY

In many ways, airliners and airport facilities are the ultimate terrorist target. Air travel is a symbol of power, wealth, and progress, and the major carriers often represent national prestige. An aircraft in flight is extremely vulnerable, and even airports are lucrative targets. The transnational nature of air travel guarantees an international audience for hijackings, bombings, and armed attacks. Attempts to protect airports and aircraft from terrorism have met with varying degrees of success.

A rash of successful hijackings in the late 1960s led to government attempts to counter this dangerous trend. In the United States the Federal Aviation Administration was directed by Congress in 1969 to institute measures to prevent hijackings. Early countermeasures focused on using behavioral profiles to identify potential hijackers and on armed sky

marshalls for intervention in flight. These efforts were discontinued in the US because of limited utility and growing concern about the dangers of inflight gun battles. It should be noted, however, that both methods are still used by other countries including Israel with some success. In the United States the emphasis shifted to preflight screening with metal detection equipment. Today this method has been instituted at most major airports throughout the world and has been very successful in limiting aircraft hijackings. From January 1976 to June 1978, the FAA reported the detection of 6,905 firearms during preflight screening. At least 12 of these incidents were confirmed as hijacking attempts. (8:25-26) Since these measures were instituted worldwide, the number of aircraft hijackings has decreased significantly while the overall level of terrorism continued to rise. (See Figure 4.)




FIGURE 4

(4:40)

The success in combatting hijackings has unfortunately not been matched in preventing incidents involving explosives. The technology for detecting explosives, especially in baggage, has lagged behind. Most airports still use dogs for screening baggage, and this system has proven costly and cumbersome. The failure to institute effective explosive-detection methods has

resulted in a serious threat to civil aviation. (8:26) Since 1973, the most serious incidents involving aircraft have involved inflight bombs. (See Table 2.) Fortunately, technology in explosive detection is advancing at a rapid pace. Newer systems are able to detect explosives in luggage as they pass through an ion capture device. The first such commercial device was made available in Britain in June, 1986. (13:50) Widespread use of such equipment may prove as effective as weapons screening in the near future.

**SIGNIFICANT WORLDWIDE CRIMINAL ACTS
AGAINST AIRCRAFT 1973-PRESENT***

DATE	INCIDENT	CASUALTIES
4/24/73	AEROFLOT HIJACKING-EXPLOSION	2 DEAD
7/20/73	JAPAN AIRLINES HIJACKING-EXPLOSION	1 DEAD, 1 INJURED
12/17/73	PAN AM GROUND ATTACK	30 DEAD, 28 INJURED
2/20/74	AIR VIETNAM HIJACKING-EXPLOSION	3 DEAD, 8 INJURED
9/8/74	TWA EXPLOSION	88 DEAD
9/15/74	AIR VIETNAM EXPLOSION	70 DEAD
6/3/75	PHILIPPINES AIRLINES EXPLOSION	1 DEAD, 45 INJURED
9/30/75	MALEY HUNGARIAN AIRLINES EXPLOSION	84 DEAD
1/1/76	MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES EXPLOSION	82 DEAD
5/21/76	PHILIPPINES AIRLINES HIJACKING-EXPLOSION	13 DEAD, 14 INJURED
6/27/76	MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES GROUND ATTACK ROCKET	1 DEAD, 2 INJURED
7/2/76	EASTERN AIRLINES EXPLOSION	1 INJURED
10/6/76	CUBANA AIRLINES EXPLOSION	73 DEAD
10/16/77	AIR QHIBOUTI GROUND ATTACK	2 DEAD, 2 INJURED
12/4/77	MALAYSIAN AIRLINES HIJACKING-CRASHED	93 DEAD
8/18/78	PHILIPPINES AIRLINES EXPLOSION	1 DEAD, 3 INJURED
9/3/78	AIR RHODESIA GROUND/AIR MISSILE ATTACK	48 DEAD
2/12/79	AIR RHODESIA GROUND/AIR MISSILE ATTACK	59 DEAD
4-26-79	INDIAN AIRLINES EXPLOSION	8 INJURED
11-15-79	AMERICAN AIRLINES EXPLOSION	0 INJURED
9-9-80	UNITED AIRLINES EXPLOSION	2 INJURED
10-13-81	AIR MALTA EXPLOSION	2 DEAD, 8 INJURED
12-12-81	AERONCA EXPLOSION	5 INJURED
8-11-82	PAN AM EXPLOSION	1 DEAD, 20 INJURED
9-11-83	KOREAN AIRLINE SHOT DOWN	280 DEAD
9-23-83	GULF AIR EXPLOSION	112 DEAD
1-16-84	AIR FRANCE EXPLOSION	0 INJURED
3/10/84	UNION DES TRANSPORT (UTA) EXPLOSION	24 INJURED
CASUALTY SUMMARY		
	INCIDENTS	DEAD INJURED
U.S.	6	110 51
WORLDWIDE	28	1015 168

*AS OF 1/1/85

TABLE 2

(4:41)

BOMB DETECTION

Explosives are the terrorist's favorite weapon. Bombs have been used in the majority of terrorist incidents and have caused the most casualties. They have the potential for devastating effect with little risk to the terrorist. (18:15)

Considering the elusive nature of the crime, there is no way to eradicate it entirely, but there have been some successes in limiting its effect. Education on the bomb threat has had some positive results. Letter bombing reached its peak with over 300 incidents in 1972 largely due to an Irish Republican Army campaign in Britain. The British government countered with an effective education program on how to recognize letter bombs and actions to diffuse them. (10:30) By 1974 the incidence of letter bombing had fallen to current levels of a few dozen per year worldwide.

The development of new explosives detection technology may have some positive effects in the long term, as discussed above in relation to airport security measures. These technologies will be particularly helpful in protecting high-risk areas such as airports and government buildings. The threat of terrorist bombings, however, will remain high despite education efforts and technological developments. Such passive measures must be coupled with aggressive intelligence efforts and active pressure on terrorists groups to have any appreciable effect.

EMBASSY SECURITY

The number one US target for international terrorists has been embassy property and diplomatic personnel. In the wake of the Iranian hostage crisis, the United States moved to increase the security at diplomatic missions worldwide. Since 1981 Congress has spent 1.4 billion dollars to make the missions more secure. (22:3) During this time attacks against embassy property have continued unabated. Although some progress has been achieved in protecting against the major threat of suicide bombings, a substantial threat still exists. Recognizing this situation, Congress allocated 4.4 billion dollars for enhanced security in 1986. (19:21-25) While the need to protect our diplomatic personnel is unquestioned, the utility of such large-scale expenditures is of marginal value in deterring terrorism. Embassy officials must operate outside their compounds to effectively carry out US policy and will continue to be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

On the whole, passive security measures have substantially contributed to controlling terrorism. When employed correctly, these measures can act as a deterrent and force even the most determined terrorist to consider less lucrative targets or methods. Still, all security systems are by nature passive and leave the initiative with the terrorist. A successful counter-terrorist program must include active measures that place direct pressure on the terrorist organization. A prerequisite for all such active programs is effective intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE

A sound intelligence program provides necessary information to actively combat terrorism. The biggest advantage of the terrorist is that he chooses the time and place of his attack. Only effective intelligence can limit his initiative and place him on the defensive. It is impossible to assess the true value of counter-terrorist intelligence since there is little information on successful operations, but a general discussion of the development and future of such intelligence is necessary.

In a free society there is always a conflict between the need for intelligence gathering and the rights of the individual. The United States has had some problems with striking the proper balance in these conflicting needs. The danger of over-restricting intelligence gathering was amply demonstrated by the high levels of domestic terrorism which corresponded to the limitations placed on US intelligence agencies in the late 1970s. It can be argued that the Reagan Administration has reestablished the proper balance, and the result has been an effective curb on domestic terrorist organizations. (See "Domestic Terrorism," Chapter 3.)

Several other countries have made great strides in developing intelligence networks to combat terrorism. West Germany has had great success in controlling their substantial internal threat by the development of a national police force that cooperates with regional authorities to apprehend and infiltrate terrorist organizations. The extensive German intelligence network, and especially their computerized data system, "is now regarded as Western Europe's primary defense against international terrorism." (1:100) The Israelis have established an even more aggressive role for their counter-terrorist intelligence organization, the Mossad. Since the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics, the Mossad has successfully tracked down and killed the leaders of that terrorist operation. While recognizing the deterrent value of such a program, it has inherent risks which limit its utility for the United States. In one case, the Mossad misidentified their target and killed the wrong man. Five Mossad agents are jailed in Norway for that incident, and it is doubtful American public opinion would make such a program practical for the United States. (5:162-163)

Given the increasingly international nature of terrorism, the need for an effective exchange of intelligence information is paramount. Unfortunately, there has been little progress in this area. No existing mechanism is capable of dealing with this need. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) is specifically forbidden from actively collecting intelligence on terrorist groups. Although the countries of

Western Europe and the United States have made some progress in sharing counter-terrorist intelligence, most of these channels are still informal. (7:80-81) Timely intelligence will remain the first line of defense against terrorism, and a permanent structure for the dissemination of information would help bolster this defense.

INTERVENTION

One of the most successful measures in the war against terrorism has been the development of special police and military units trained to forcefully intervene in hostage situations. Many governments formed such units as part of the get-tough policy adopted after the Munich Olympics incident in 1972. The employment of specially-trained forces to release hostages has resulted in several spectacular successes and a few dismal failures. The following review of armed intervention will demonstrate its value as a potent counter-terrorist weapon.

Hostage taking is a potentially lucrative enterprise for terrorist organizations. They are almost guaranteed extensive media coverage. In the short term, hostage incidents have proven valuable in releasing jailed comrades and obtaining funds for terrorist enterprises. Many governments, including the United States, have refused to make concessions to terrorists holding hostages in the belief that giving in to their demands will encourage even more such incidents in the future. The only alternative to sacrificing hostages in these situations is to attempt their rescue. The risks are high, but a number of successful operations have proven the value of intervention in some situations.

The most celebrated hostage rescue operations have been carried out by the Israelis and the West Germans. In 1976 the Israeli General Intelligence and Reconnaissance Unit 269 successfully released 103 hostages from Palestinian terrorists at Entebbe, Uganda. One Israeli soldier was killed along with several civilians, but seven of ten terrorists and several dozen Ugandan soldiers also died. More importantly, this raid demonstrated to terrorists that taking hostages carries risks. (5:177-178) The West Germans carried out a similarly successful operation in 1977. Following their bungling of the operation in Munich in 1972, West Germany developed Border Protection Group Nine (GSG 9) to handle hostage situations. This was the unit employed in Somalia in 1977. With the permission of the Somalian government, GSG 9 rescued the passengers and crew of a Lufthansa 727 aircraft that had been hijacked to Somalia. In a lightning attack they killed or wounded all of the terrorists without a single other casualty. (5:179-181) The success of these commando units spawned a host of imitators, including the

United States Delta Force. Altogether, 14 different countries maintain forces for armed intervention, forming a potent deterrent to potential hostage takers. (8:34)

All hostage rescue attempts have not been successful, and the cost of failure is often very high. In 1978 an Egyptian unit attempted to assault an airliner at Larnaca, Cyprus. The aircraft was carrying two Palestinian terrorists attempting to fly to safety after murdering an Egyptian newspaper editor. The Egyptians carried out the attack without the permission of the Cypriot government, resulting in a gunbattle with Cypriot forces surrounding the aircraft. Fifteen Egyptian commandos died and their C-130 assault aircraft was totally destroyed. (5:182-183) The failure of the US attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran is an additional example of the difficulty and risks of such an operation. The mechanical failure of several helicopters and an unanticipated dust storm essentially doomed the rescue attempt before the US forces even approached their objective. The loss of American lives and the political costs inherent in such a failure indicate the need for care in deciding to attempt intervention. (5:187-195)

Well-trained, professional units designed to militarily intervene in hostage situations have considerably complicated the terrorist's problem. Hostage taking, while lucrative to the terrorist cause, is not a simple operation, and counter-terrorist units have made it even more difficult. Even when they are not employed, they place doubt in the mind of the terrorist, and that is a large part of their deterrent value. Such units are not the answer to all hostage situations, but they are a potent weapon in the free world's arsenal.

The coordinated efforts of improved security measures, timely intelligence, and the proven ability of special counter-terrorist units have made great strides in combatting international terrorism. Improved technology, better intelligence cooperation, and the maturing of special operations units should make the terrorist's job more difficult in the future. The employment of passive security measures and aggressive offensive counter-terrorist efforts have proven far more effective than international agreements or treaties in the war against terrorism. The following chapter investigates an extreme form of intervention, military reprisals against groups supporting or harboring terrorists.

Chapter 6

REPRISALS

The deterrent value of reprisal attacks against countries or populations harboring terrorists is difficult to assess. Israel has practiced a policy of reprisal for terrorist attacks for many years, and the 1986 attack by US warplanes on Libya threatens to widen the trend. The use of reprisals as a weapon against terrorism hinges on two questions: Are reprisals legal? And are they an effective deterrent?

LEGALITY

The right of reprisal is accepted within international law to redress illegal acts by one state against another. The legality of the act is dependent on three factors. "Reprisals, in order to be legitimate, must have been (1) precipitated by an illegal act on the part of the offending state, (2) preceded by an unsatisfied demand for peaceful redress of the injury, and (3) in proportion to the initial action." (5:172) According to this interpretation, a state actively supporting illegal terrorist acts or openly harboring terrorists could be subject to reprisals. Reprisals may be a legally-accepted means of countering terrorism, but only within strict guidelines which insure that they are not used indiscriminately or in a manner which is out of proportion to the grievance.

DETERRENT VALUE

There is no body of evidence to prove that reprisals have been effective in deterring terrorism. Some studies of the use of collective punishments against populations supporting terrorists indicate that reprisals do reduce violence, but only the first time they are used. Subsequent measures reverse this trend and increase support for terrorism. (3:59) The Israeli experience has largely reinforced this evaluation. Israeli reprisals have generally led to a reduction in terrorist activity for periods of up to a month, followed by a resumption of violence at pre-reprisal levels. (1:88) The long-term deterrent value of reprisals, particularly indiscriminate attacks, appears to be minimal.

The US attack on Libya in April 1986 may have demonstrated an effective use of reprisals despite the evidence provided above. Although all the effects have not been tallied, it appears that this attack has had several positive results. While it certainly did not eliminate the terrorist threat, there has been no evidence of the predicted backlash. In fact, through August of 1986, terrorist attacks against Americans, and Middle East terrorism in general, were lower than for recent years. (15:1) While voicing concern over the escalation of violence, the countries of Western Europe have finally taken some positive measures against Libya. Over 100 Libyan diplomats were expelled from Europe, and countries such as Italy have taken steps to shift their oil purchases to Nigeria, lessening their ties to Libya. (17:6) The equation has changed. No longer can countries openly support terrorism without fear of reprisal. According to CIA director, William Casey, the American raid demonstrated that deterrence can operate at all levels of conflict. Libya's President Khadaffi had been defiant in his support of terrorism as a low-cost/low-risk policy. By making such a policy high-cost/high risk, the Libyan raid passed a clear message to Khadaffi and resulted in at least a temporary reduction in his active support of terrorist atrocities. (16:75)

Overall, a policy of reprisal is of questionable value in countering terrorism. The non-discriminating nature of such attacks make them far less desirable than measures which hit directly at the terrorist. In limited cases, as with the Libya raid, where state-sponsored terrorism is blatant, and where care is taken to use force only against the mechanisms of state support, there may be some beneficial results. Reprisals should not be ruled out altogether, because the deterrent value lies with the perception that they might be used against states supporting terrorism. However, such attacks must be made only in special circumstances and within very stringent guidelines.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSIONS

The battle against terrorism is not hopeless. Many counter-terrorist policies have been highly successful, and a comprehensive program to expand and improve these measures will help control terrorism in the future. This final chapter will review the effectiveness of various counter-terrorist policies and offer recommendations for how they should be employed.

Clearly, perceptions of the threat from terrorism are greatly exaggerated. Trend information indicating increased terrorism and levels of violence disguises some important geographic and cultural patterns. The anarchic situation in Lebanon and continuing insurgent wars in Africa and Latin America are responsible for a disproportionate number of the most violent incidents and tend to hide the success of programs in other parts of the world. It is critical to keep this perspective so that responses can be kept in line with the real importance of the threat.

International agreements and the international legal system have limited value in combating terrorism. Still, it is important to keep working for such agreements because of their political utility in marshalling cooperation in other, more concrete areas. The United Nations has not been a useful forum for developing effective and enforceable agreements against terrorism. Future efforts should concentrate on more limited contracts with countries who share our determination to combat terrorist violence.

The greatest successes in the war against terrorism have been in security, intelligence, and intervention. Effective security measures have considerably reduced the risk to formerly lucrative terrorist targets like air travel and embassies. Aggressive intelligence efforts have enhanced the ability of security forces to prevent or preempt terrorist attacks and to place severe limitations on the freedom of action of terrorist organizations. The threat of intervention by highly-trained commando forces is a last resort which can guarantee that terrorist demands are not met. A comprehensive national program involving all of these measures continues to form our most effective deterrent against political violence.

There is no hard evidence that a policy of reprisal is effective in combatting terrorism. The deterrent effects appear to be short-term, and repeated reprisals appear to exacerbate political differences. Still, the US raid against Libya demonstrated that reprisals are at least partially effective if used within narrow constraints and to counter well-documented grievances.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Continue political efforts to develop comprehensive international agreements on the control of terrorism. Such efforts have proven to be of little value as a deterrent but are valuable in demonstrating national commitment. Wherever possible, encourage even limited agreements with countries that share a desire to stop terrorist violence to lay the foundation for more concrete cooperative efforts.

Limit the use of economic and political sanctions against countries supporting terrorism. Unilateral sanctions simply do not work as a deterrent, and gaining the level of cooperation required for international sanctions is politically unfeasible. Sanctions may be of limited political value to show that we will not aid our enemies, but their deterrent value is negligible.

Adopt a more flexible national policy for dealing with hostage situations. The "no-concessions" policy has proven to be unworkable in practice and leads to considerable confusion and loss of face. Maintain a hard line against routinely giving in to concessions, but leave all options open.

Work for even more effective passive security measures. There is a desperate need for advanced technology explosives detectors to counter the rising tide of terrorist bombings. Enhance security by intensive education efforts for personnel working in high threat areas. Passive security measures have been among the most successful counter-terrorist weapons, but there is still room for improvement.

Strengthen cooperation with friendly intelligence agencies. The value of timely intelligence cannot be overestimated. Several countries have developed excellent domestic intelligence networks, but the lack of cooperation between these agencies limits their effectiveness. Work toward the establishment of a formal mechanism for collecting and disseminating intelligence data on terrorist organizations.

Maintain special intervention units, and let terrorists know we have them. Even if they are not used, they pose a substantial threat that limits the terrorist's options and

makes him more predictable. In situations where the threat to hostages is imminent, do not hesitate to intervene. To quote the motto of the British special counter-terrorist unit, the SAS, "Who Dares Wins."

Openly declare the right of reprisal against states that support terrorism. The threat of reprisal at least raises the stakes for nations that use political terrorism as a cheap form of warfare. Actual reprisal attacks must be conducted with the utmost constraint, taking care not to spread violence to innocents who have no political influence. Do not use reprisals in the Israeli fashion. The long-term deterrent value has been minimal, and the political costs are high.

Terrorism will continue to be a problem for the foreseeable future. There is little hope for curing all of the underlying political and cultural factors, and the only reasonable response is to develop a comprehensive program to aggressively counter terrorist violence. Ultimately, terrorism is an act of political desperation which calls for a strong, but measured, response. The recommendations listed can form the basis for such a program.

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