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CAMPAIGN OF THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS AUGUST 1862

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
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
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STUDY PROJECT

CAMPAIGN OF THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS
AUGUST 1862

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL A. HOUGH

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20. study focuses on the linkage between the tactical and operational art in the support of the strategic objectives of the Union and the Confederacy.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

CAMPAIGN OF THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS

AUGUST 1862

A STUDY PROJECT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL A. HOUGH USMC

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013-5050

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Abstract

Author: Michael A. Hough LTC USMC

Title: Campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas

Format: Study Project

Date: March 16, 1987

The campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas was one of many campaigns during the Civil War that was waged in the valley between Washington D.C. and Roanoke, Virginia between 1862-1864. But none embodied the excitement and boldness in the execution of the operational art of war as it did. This study is based on the historical accounts and data obtained from Official Records and Regimental Histories, letters, and other recordings of first hand accounts of the events and personalities involved in that campaign. In addition to providing strategic and operational overviews of the Campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas, the study focuses on the linkage between the tactical and operational art in the support of the strategic objectives of the Union and the Confederacy.

Preface

This study project was produced under the direction of Professor Jay Luvaas, Professor of Military History, U.S. Army War College. The scope and general design of the study was outlined by Professor Jay Luvaas. In addition to providing a historical and analytical account of the events that occurred in the Campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas in August of 1862, this study project was designed to serve as an automobile tour of that campaign. The author elected to undertake this project due to both his interest and ignorance of the operational art of war in hopes, when completed, to have a better grasp of the subject's meaning and role in war making. This campaign served the author's purpose exceptionally well, for it is replete with graphic and splendid examples of the operational art as so ably demonstrated and exercised by General Robert E. Lee and his "lieutenants".

A special word of thanks must be given to Mr. and Mrs. Moore of Clark Mountain and a heavy debt of gratitude paid to Mr. John Eden of Jeffersonton and Jim Burgess of the National Park Service, who, amongst others, have given so graciously of their time, energy, and expertise in helping unravel the many unknowns that the author encountered in the researching of this project.

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Campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas

August 1862

Introduction

On 11 July, 1862, Lincoln appointed an able Commander in Chief of the Federal Ground Forces, William Henry Halleck, after dissapointingly trying to direct the operations of the war from Washington, D.C. without a centralized command. In late May, 1862, Robert E. Lee, the personal advisor to the Confederate President Jefferson Davis, was appointed as the Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Both men developed realistic national strategies to defend their respective capitols and at the same time, to threaten each other's capitols in an effort to bring the Civil War to an end. Interestingly, the strategies of both sides contained similar problems in achieving their objectives. The Army of the Potomac under McClellan was in position around the Confederate capitol, Richmond, with 90,000 men to threaten it's downfall. However Halleck correctly believed McClellan was incapable of prosecuting the campaign to victory because of his lack of bold leadership. Halleck pondered the course of reinforcing McClellan with forces in the theater or replacing him with a more capable commander. Lee had an equally perplexing dilemma in the summer of 1862. He realized if Pope's army in the Valley reinforced McClellan, the superior numbers of the Army of the Potomac could crush Richmond. Lee sensed that remaining on the "defensive" would be fatal to the Confederacy: his strategy would be to "pull" or draw the Union force away from Richmond away to the North rather than to risk annihilation in "pushing" them away in an all out defensive war that the Confederacy could not afford to wage with its limited resources. Therefore, the key to a victorious Southern strategy was to threaten the Federal capitol in a offensive campaign which Jackson had so ably demonstrated earlier in the year to be the Union's achilles heel. Lee would conduct in August of 1862, his first of many successful Valley campaigns in an effort to meet the objectives of his national strategy of preserving the Confederacy.

The theater of operations for this study is in the valley

between Washington D.C. and Culpeper, Virginia, where the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers and a number of small streams flow. Although all these rivers and streams were fordable in the dry season, they were liable to be made impassable due to rapidly rising water caused by sudden violent thunderstorms that occurred frequently in the summer months. North and south of Gordonsville is mountain country; the mountains run parallel northeast and southwest creating valleys in which the passage of troops could be screened by the ridges. The mountains, however, could only be safely traversed East and West through key gaps or passes, which are Thoroughfare, Aldie, and Hopewell Gaps west of Manassas. The entire country was covered with hardwood timber broken with intervals of clearings and farm fields. The highways were really dirt roads of red clay that were hard packed and easily traversed in dry weather but became extremely difficult during wet weather. The Manassas Gap, the Orange & Alexandria, and the the Virginia Central Railroads were the primary routes of communication and were vital to North and South operations alike. The Manassas Gap and the Orange & Alexandria Railroad joined at Manassas Gap and the Orange & Alexandria Railroad joined at Manassas where the Federals had their major logistics base that served their Valley campaigns. The Virginia Central, which joined the Orange & Alexandria at Gordonsville, was the artery that linked the Valley and the Army of Northern Virginia with Richmond. Gordonsville through Charlottesville, the Orange & Alexandria Railroad connected Lee with Confederate forces operating in the Southeast and the Shenandoah Valley. Gordonsville and Charlottesville were Confederate bases.

This study analyzes the first campaign of Lee's command of the Army of Northern Virginia which he conducted in the valley between Culpeper and Manassas, from the strategic, operational, and the tactical level. This analysis is designed to enable the reader to understand not only the events as they occurred, but why they occurred in relation to the national and operational strategies of both the North and the South. Maps of the theater of operation are used throughout the study to gain a greater perspective from which decisions were made utilizing factors of terrain, location of forces, distance, lines of retreat, lines of communication, etc. Reproductions of the original maps drawn by Confederate and Union engineers are referred to where appropriate as are modern topographical survey maps. Also, this study is designed to aid the reader to conduct an automobile tour of the campaign. The tour traces as exact as possible the original route of Jackson from Clark Mountain on the 13th of August to the "unfinished railroad" near Manassas on the 29th of August, 1862. Only in those cases where a road or ford is no longer passable or a road has been rerouted does the tour deviate from the original trampings of Jackson and is so notated in the narrative where appropriate. At each stop, an eye-witness account plus a narrative from the author will be provided to help the reader deduce the role that terrain, weather, and other factors played in dictating the soundness of leadership, operations, and tactics employed. The tour will require approximately five hours to complete if all stops are visited.

Order of Battle

Campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas

August 1862

Confederacy

Army of Northern Virginia

General Robert E. Lee

Right Wing

Major General James Longstreet

Anderson's Division

Major General R. H. Anderson

Armistead's Brigade

Brig. Gen. L. A. Armistead

5th Virginia
7th Virginia
8th Virginia
14th Virginia
38th Virginia

Mahone's Brigade

Brig. Gen. W. Mahone

6th Virginia
12th Virginia
16th Virginia
41st Virginia
49th Virginia

Wright's Brigade

Brig. Gen. A.R. Wright

3rd Georgia
22nd Georgia
44th Georgia
48th Georgia

Jones' Division
Brig. Gen. D.R. Jones

Toombs' Brigade
Brig. Gen R. Toombs

2nd Georgia
15th Georgia
17th Georgia
20th Georgia

Drayton's Brigade
Brig. Gen. T.F. Drayton

50th Georgia
51st Georgia
15th South Carolina
Phillip's Legion

Jones' Brigade
Col. George T. Anderson

1st Georgia
7th Georgia
8th Georgia
9th Georgia
11th Georgia

Wilcox's Division
Brig. Gen. C.M. Wilcox

Wilcox's Brigade
Brig. Gen. C.M. Wilcox

8th Alabama
9th Alabama
10th Alabama
11th Alabama
Anderson's Battery

Pryor's Brigade
Brig. Gen. R.A. Pryor

14th Alabama
5th Florida
8th Florida
3rd Virginia

Featherston's Brigade
Brig. Gen. W.S. Featherstone
Col. Carnot Posey

12th Mississippi
16th Mississippi
19th Mississippi
2nd Mississippi Battalion

Hood's Division
Brig. Gen. John B. Hood

Hood's Brigade
Brig. Gen. J.B. Hood

18th Georgia
Hampton Legion
1st Texas
4th Texas
5th Texas

Whiting's Brigade
Col. E.M. Law

44th Alabama
2nd Mississippi
11th Mississippi
6th North Carolina

Artillery
Maj. B.W. Frobel

Bachman's Battery
Garden's Battery
Reilly's Battery

Kemper's Division
Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper

Kemper's Brigade
Col. M.D. Course

1st Virginia
7th Virginia
11th Virginia
17th Virginia
24th Virginia

Jenkins' Brigade
Brig. Gen. M. Jenkins

1st South Carolina
2nd South Carolina
4th South Carolina
5th South Carolina
6th South Carolina

Pickett's Brigade
Col. Eppa Hunton

8th Virginia
18th Virginia
19th Virginia
28th Virginia
56th Virginia

Evans' Brigade
Brig. Gen. N.G. Evans

17th South Carolina
18th South Carolina
22nd South Carolina
23rd South Carolina
Holcombe Legion
Boyce's Battery

Artillery of the Right Wing

Washington Artillery

Col J.B. Watson

Eshleman's Company
Miller's Company
Richardson's Company
Squires' Company

Lee's Battalion

Col. S.D. Lee

Eubank's Battery
Grime's Battery
Jordan's Battery
Parker's Battery
Rhett's Battery
Taylor's Battery

Miscellaneous Batteries

Huger's Battery
Leake's Battery
Maurin's Battery
Moorman's Battery
Rogers' Battery
Stribling's Battery

LEFT WING

Major General Thomas J. Jackson

Jackson's Division

Brig. Gen William B. Taliaferro

First Brigade

Col. W. S. Baylor

2nd Virginia
4th Virginia
5th Virginia
27th Virginia
33rd Virginia

Third Brigade

Col. A. Taliaferro

47th Alabama
48th Alabama
10th Virginia
23rd Virginia
37th Virginia

Second Brigade

Col. Bradley T. Johnson

21st Virginia
42nd Virginia
48th Virginia
1st Virginia Battalion

Fourth Brigade

Brig. Gen. Starke

1st Louisiana
2nd Louisiana
9th Louisiana
10th Louisiana
15th Louisiana
Coppen's Battalion

Artillery

Maj. L. M. Shumaker

Brockenbrough's Battery

Wooding's Battery
Caskie's Battery
Cutshaw's Battery

Carpenter's Battery

Poague's Battery
Raine's Battery
Rice's Battery

Hill's Light Division

Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill

Branch's Brigade

Brig. Gen. L. Branch

7th North Carolina
18th North Carolina
28th North Carolina
33rd North Carolina
37th North Carolina

Archer's Brigade

Brig. Gen. J. Archer

5th Alabama Battalion
19th Georgia
1st Tennessee
7th Tennessee
14th Tennessee

Pender's Brigade

Brig. Gen. W. D. Pender

16th North Carolina
22nd North Carolina
34th North Carolina
38th North Carolina

Field's Brigade

Brig. Gen. C. W. Field

40th Virginia
47th Virginia
55th Virginia
22nd Vir. Battalion

Gregg's Brigade

Brig. Gen. M. Gregg

1st South Carolina
1st South Carolina Rifles
12th South Carolina
13th South Carolina
14th South Carolina

Thomas' Brigade

Brig. Gen. E. L. Thomas

14th Georgia
35th Georgia
45th Georgia
49th Georgia

Artillery

Lieutenant Col. R. L. Walker

Braxton's Battery
Crenshaw's Battery
Davidson's Battery
Pegram's Battery

Fleet's Battery
Latham's Battery
McIntosh's Battery

Ewell's Division
Maj. Gen. R. S. Ewell

Lawton's Brigade
Brig. Gen. A. Lawton

13th Georgia
26th Georgia
31st Georgia
38th Georgia
60th Georgia
61st Georgia

Early's Brigade
Brig. Gen. J. A. Early

13th Virginia
25th Virginia
31st Virginia
44th Virginia
49th Virginia
52nd Virginia
58th Virginia

Trimble's Brigade
Brig. Gen. I. Trimble

15th Alabama
12th Georgia
21st Georgia
21st North Carolina
21st North Carolina Battalion

Hays' Brigade
Brig. Gen. Harry Hays

5th Louisiana
6th Louisiana
7th Louisiana
8th Louisiana
14th Louisiana

Artillery

Balthis' Battery
D'Aquin's Battery
Johnson's Battery

Brown's Battery
Dement's Battery
Latimer's Battery

Cavalry
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart

Hampton's Brigade
Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton

1st North Carolina
2nd South Carolina
10th Virginia
Cobb Legion
Jeff Davis Legion

Lee's Brigade
Brig. Gen. F. Lee

1st Virginia
3rd Virginia
4th Virginia
5th Virginia
9th Virginia

Robertson's Brigade
Brig. Gen. B. H. Robertson

2nd Virginia
6th Virginia
7th Virginia
12th Virginia
17th Virginia

Artillery

Hart's Battery
Pelham's Battery

Artillery

First Virginia Regiment

Col. J. T. Brown

Cooke's Battery
Dance's Battery
Hupp's Battery
Macon's Battery
Smith's Battery
Watson's Battery

Sumter Battalion

Lieutenant Col. A. Cutts

Blackshear's Battery
Lane's Battery
Patterson's Battery
Ross' Battery

Miscellaneous Batteries

Ancell's Battery
Milledge's Battery
Peyton's Battery

Huckstep's Battery
Page's Battery
Turner's Battery

Union

Army of Virginia
Major General John Pope

First Army Corps
Major General Franz Sigel

First Division
Brig. Gen. R.C. Schenck

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. J. Stahel

8th New York
41st New York
45th New York
27th Pennsylvania
N.Y. Arty, 2nd Bat.

Second Brigade
Col. N. McLean

25th Ohio
55th Ohio
73rd Ohio
75th Ohio
1st Ohio Arty, Bat E.

Second Division
Brig. Gen. A.Von Steinwehr

First Brigade
Col. John Koltes

29th New York
68th New York
73rd Pennsylvania

Second Brigade
Brien. H. Bohlen

61st Ohio
74th Pennsylvania
8th West Virginia
Pa. Arty, Bat. F.

Artillery
Col. W. Kryzanowski

54th New York
58th New York
75th Pennsylvania
2nd N.Y. Arty, Bat L

Independent Brigade
Brig. Gen. R. Milroy

82nd Ohio
2nd West Virginia
3rd West Virginia
5th West Virginia
Ohio Arty, 12th Bat.

Cavalry Brigade
Col. J. Beardsley

1st Conn.
1st Maryland
4th New York
9th New York
6th Ohio

Second Army Corps
Major General Nathaniel Banks

First Division
Brig. Gen. A. Williams

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. S. Crawford

5th Conn
10th Maine
28th New York
46th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. G. Gordon

27th Indiana
2nd Mass
3rd Wisconsin

Second Division
Brig. Gen. G. Greene

First Brigade
Col. C. Candy

5th Ohio
7th Ohio
29th Ohio
66th Ohio
28th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade
Col. M. Schlaudecker

3rd Maryland
102nd New York
109th Pennsylvania
111th Pennsylvania
8th & 12th U.S.

Third Brigade
Col. James Tait

3rd Delaware
1st D.C.
60th New York
78th New York
Purnell Legion

Cavalry Brigade
Brig. Gen. J. Buford

1st Michigan
5th New York
1st Vermont
1st West Virginia

Artillery
Capt. C. Best

Maine Arty, 4th Bat
Maine Arty, 6th Bat
1st New York Arty, Bat M
New York Arty, 10th Bat
Pennsylvania Arty, Bat E
4th U.S. Arty, Bat F

Third Army Corps
Major General Irvin McDowell

First Division
Brig. Gen. R. King

First Brigade
Brig Gen. J. Hatch

22nd New York
24th New York
30th New York
84th New York
2nd U.S. Sharpshooters

Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. M. Patrick

21st New York
23rd New York
35th New York
80th New York

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. A. Doubleday

76th New York
95th New York
56th Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade
Brig. Gen. J. Gibbon

19th Indiana
2nd Wisconsin
6th Wisconsin
7th Wisconsin

Artillery

Capt. J. Campbell

New Hampshire Arty, 1st Bat.
1st New York Arty, Bat. L
1st Rhode Island Arty, Bat D
4th U.S. Arty, Bat B

Second Division

Brig. Gen. J. Ricketts

First Brigade

Brig. Gen. A. Durtea

97th New York
104th New York
105th New York
107th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade

Brig. Gen. G. Hartsuff

12th Mass
13th Mass
83rd New York
11th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade

Brig. Gen. Z. Tower

26th New York
94th New York
88th Pennsylvania
90th Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade

Col. J. Thoburn

7th Indiana
84th Pennsylvania
110th Pennsylvania
1st West Virginia

Artillery

Maine Arty, 2nd Bat
Maine Arty, 5th Bat
1st Penn Arty, Bat C

Cavalry Brigade

Brig. Gen. G. Baynard

1st Maine
1st New Jersey
2nd New York
1st Rhode Island

Reynold's Division

Brig. Gen. J. Reynolds

First Brigade

Brig. Gen. G. Meade

3rd Penn Reserves
4th Penn Reserves
7th Penn Reserves
8th Penn Reserves
13th Penn Reserves

Third Brigade

Brig. Gen. C. Jackson

9th Penn Reserves
10th Penn Reserves
11th Penn Reserves
12th Penn Reserves

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. T Seymour

1st Penn Reserves
2nd Penn Reserves
5th Penn Reserves
6th Penn Reserves

Artillery
Capt. D. Ransom

1st Penn Arty, Bat A
1st Penn Arty, Bat B
1st Penn Arty, Bat G
5th U.S. Arty, Bat C

Army of the Potomac
Major General Sam P. Heintzelman

First Division
Major General P. Kearney

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. J. Robinson

20th Indiana
63rd Pennsylvania
105th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade
Col. O. Poe

2nd Michigan
3rd Michigan
5th Michigan
37th New York
99th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. D. Birney

3rd Maine
4th Maine
1st New York
38th New York
40th New York
101st New York
57th Pennsylvania

Artillery

1st Rhode Island Arty, Bat E
1st US. Arty, Bat K

Second Division
Major General J. Hooker

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. C. Grover

1st Mass
11th Mass
16th Mass
2nd New Hampshire
26th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade
Col. N. Taylor

70th New York
71st New York
72nd New York
73rd New York
74th New York

Third Brigade

Col. J. Carr

5th New Jersey
6th New Jersey
7th New Jersey
8th New Jersey
2nd New York
115th Pennsylvania

Fifth Army Corps

Major General Fitz J. Porter

First Division

Major General G. Morell

First Brigade

Col. C. Roberts

2nd Maine
18th Mass
22nd Mass
1st Michigan
13th New York
25th New York

Third Brigade

Brig. Gen. D. Butterfield

16th Michigan
12th New York
17th New York
44th New York
83rd Pennsylvania

Second Brigade

Brig. Gen. C. Griffin

9th Mass
32nd Mass
4th Michigan
14th New York
62nd Pennsylvania

Artillery

Mass Arty, 3rd Bat
1st Rhode Island, Bat C
5th U.S., Bat D

Second Division
Brig. Gen. G. Sykes

First Brigade
Lt. Col. R. Buchanan

3rd U.S.
4th U.S.
12th U.S.
14th U.S., 1st Batt.
14th U.S., 2nd Batt.

Third Brigade
Col. G. Warren

5th New York
10th New York

Second Brigade
Lt. Col. W. Chapman

1st U.S.
2nd U.S.
6th U.S.
10th U.S.
11th U.S.
17th U.S.

Artillery
Capt. S. Weed

1st U.S., Bat E,G
5th U.S., Bat I,K

Sixth Army Corps

First Division

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. G. Taylor

1st New Jersey
2nd New Jersey
3rd New Jersey
4th New Jersey

Ninth Army Corps

First Division
Brig. Gen. I. Stevens

First Brigade
Col. B. Christ

8th Michigan
50th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade
Col. A. Farnsworth

28th Mass
79th New York

Second Brigade
Col. D. Leasure

46th New York
100th Pennsylvania

Artillery

Mass Arty, 8th Bat
2nd U.S. Arty, Bat E

Second Division
Major General J. Reno

First Brigade
Col. J. Nagle

2nd Maryland
6th New Hampshire
48th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade
Col. E. Ferrero

21st Mass
51st New York
51st Pennsylvania

Kanawha Division

11th Ohio
12th Ohio
30th Ohio
36th Ohio

Troop Strengths of Opposing Armies

Union

August 14, 1862		
Sigel's Corps	13,228	
Banks' Corps	11,526	
McDowell's Corps	21,479	
Reno's Division	8,000	Total 55,233
August 23, 1862		
Reynold's Division	4,500	Total 59,733
August 24, 1862		
Heintzelman's Corps	14,000	Total 73,733
August 26, 1862		
Porter's Corps	10,056	Total 83,789
August 28, 1862	(minus troops missing, wounded, or unavailable for duty)	Total 77,289

Confederacy

August 14-28, 1862		
<u>Longstreet's</u> Wing	30,768	
<u>Jackson's</u> Wing	22,450	
<u>Stuart's</u> Cavalry	1,531	
		Total 54,749

Strategic Overview

The Spring of 1862 had trumpeted a year of promise for the Union in possibly bringing the war to a close by year's end. Missouri, Kentucky, and West Virginia had been overrun by Union armies, Tennessee was falling, and the entire Atlantic Coast in the South was weakening. President Lincoln and his Secretary of War were jubilant and confident; the Union recruiting offices would be closing by the end of April. However, just as the Northern war wagon seemed to be rolling smartly, its wheels came off. Confederate Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Commander of the Valley Army, was dispatched by General Johnston to the Shenandoah Valley with approximately 12,000 men to accomplish three missions. First, he was tasked to watch enemy forces in the Valley; second, he was to be ready at all times to be able to reinforce Johnston; and third, he was to direct operations against Federal forces in the Valley. Jackson met those objectives and more by soundly defeating Union Major General John C. Fremont in the mountains west of the Shenandoah Valley and Major General Nathaniel Banks at Winchester, sending bluecoats fleeing across the upper Potomac River towards Washington. Jackson's deliberate provocation of the Union forces in and around the Valley played directly on the fears of Lincoln and other officials in Washington for the safety of the Union Capitol. Jackson's actions directly influenced the immediate course of events upon which long-term Union strategy would ultimately rest.

The Union immediately reopened its recruiting offices looking for 300,000 new soldiers; national reply reflected a dismal national interest. McClellan, whose grand strategy to take the Confederate center of gravity, Richmond, in a Peninsular campaign, became bogged down as he waited in futile for reinforcements of fresh troops. The fear of Jackson invading Washington prevented any diversion of troops from the Valley to the Peninsula. President Lincoln realized the gravity of the situation and reacted decisively. Through the failures of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell in the Shenandoah against Jackson, it became readily apparent to the War Department that the policy of having three separate armies acting independently in the same theater of war was a bad one. On the 26th of June, 1862, McDowell's army in the Department of the Rappahannock, Bank's army in the Department of the Shenandoah, and Fremont's army in the Department of the Mountains were united into one Army of Virginia under Major General John Pope.

The Army of Virginia consisted of three independent corps and two cavalry brigades. The First Corps Commander, Major

General Fremont had a strength of 11,500 soldiers. Major General Banks' Second Corps had a reported strength of 8,000, and the Third Corps under Major General McDowell consisted of approximately 19,000 men. However, Fremont resigned in disgust very shortly thereafter, because Pope as Commander of the Army was junior to his subordinate commanders; Fremont was replaced immediately by Major General Franz Sigel. With the addition of two cavalry brigades under Brigadier Generals George D. Bray and John Buford, Pope's Army of Virginia fleshed out at approximately 38,000 men.

Pope's mission was threefold: first, to cover the city of Washington from any attack from the Shenandoah, namely Jackson; second, to conduct operations to ensure the safety of Union communications and supply lines in the Valley; and third, to operate in the Confederate lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville to draw off considerable forces from the defenses of Richmond. The accomplishment of the last mission would allow McClellan's Army of the Potomac to resume the offensive against Richmond. On 11 July, 1862, the reorganization of the Union forces was complete with Lincoln's appointment of Major General Henry Wager Halleck of the Western theater to be the General-in-Chief of all Federal ground forces. Even though the Union seemed to repair it's war wagon and began to slowly roll Southward, doom and gloom hung over the Nothern reaches of the land; despair and pessimism of the war's end hung in the capitol. The Confederacy, on the other hand, was upbeat; optimism was threaded through a rejuvenated South in the Summer of 1862.

It was 26 June, 1862, the very day the Army of Virginia was born, that General Robert E. Lee, the recently appointed Commander of the Confederate Army of Nothern Virginia, began to earn the reputation as the South's finest general and tactician by initiating and winning battles in seven short days at Mechanicsville, Gaines Mill, Savage Station, and Frayser's Farm. Lee understood exactly the grave state of the Confederacy when he took command of his army. He understood that the South's center of gravity and prestige was Richmond and was symbolically the "Heart of the South". The basis of his strategy would rest on that fact. Lee's strategy was deliberate and soundly grounded in three pillars of hard facts. First, the defense of Richmond was paramount. He immediately set to digging earthenworks and trenches and strengthening existing defensive fortifications that immediately earned him the uncomplimentary nickname of "King of Spades". These defensive enhancements would prove to be force multipliers so as to be able to relieve the large defensive force around Richmond to fulfill operations elsewhere, namely the theater in which the campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas would be conducted. Secondly, Lee understood that he had to guard his communications and the railroad in the theater at all costs. The Shenandoah produced much of the food upon which the Confederacy and its armies subsisted. Thirdly, Lee understood McClellan and knew that his timidity would prevent him from attacking Richmond with knowledge from "planted false intelligence" in the Richmond newspaper that the Rebels had in

excess of 200,000 soldiers around Richmond. This allowed Lee to develop a campaign plan to divert enough men from the defenses of Richmond to Jackson in the area of operations to defeat Pope and return to Richmond to engage and defeat McClellan.

Jackson was dispatched in early July to the theater with two divisions under Major General Charles S. Winder, who was killed at Cedar Mountain and replaced by Brig. General William B. Taliaferro, and Major General Richard S. Ewell, with a threefold mission: to meet the Union advance of the newly formed Union Army of Virginia, to secure the approaches to Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Richmond, and finally, to attack if the opportunity presented itself. On 19 July, 1862, Jackson's wing was reinforced by a Light Division under Major General Ambrose P. Hill and a brigade of cavalry under Brigadier General Beverly Robertson who would later be replaced by Major General J.E.B. Stuart. The total strength of Jackson's wing now numbered 18,000 men, nearly 5,000 from Ewell's division, 7,000 under Hill, and over 5,000 in Winder's, and approximately 1,200 cavalry. As soon as Jackson's reinforcements arrived, he had orders to engage Pope and dispose of his forces before he could be reinforced by McClellan. Shortly before noon on 9 August, 1862, eight miles south of Culpeper, Jackson engaged and routed a major portion of Pope's fragmented and disorganized army in the Battle of Cedar Mountain. Although Pope's army was soundly defeated and the army had retreated into a defensive position between the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers, strategically, nothing had changed.

Lee now felt confident, however, that his strategy was sound. He had rested, refitted, reorganized, and reinforced his Army of Northern Virginia since he took command. His improved defenses of Richmond with reinforced earthenworks and trenches coupled with Jackson's latest tactical success at Cedar Mountain allowed him to put into motion the third pillar of his campaign strategy. Lee concluded from scanty but accurate intelligence that McClellan's army was departing the Peninsula. Lee correctly divined that McClellan was ordered to join Pope to strike a knock-out blow to Jackson. The race was on; if Lee could move quickly enough by railroad, he might be able to join Jackson and defeat Pope before McClellan could reach the valley where the Rapidan and the Rappahannock Rivers join. Lee knew that Jackson's army was not strong enough to finish off Pope; on 13 August, 1862, Lee shipped by train three divisions under Major General James Longstreet from Richmond to Gordonsville. On 14 August, 1862, the Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia joined his lieutenants and legions in the start of one of the most bold and daring campaigns of the war. It was a campaign which, interestingly enough, started not at a geographic point on the map but rather at a point in time and culminated at the Second Battle of Manassas. It was a campaign that fit into Lee's strategy exactly, for neither the Army of Virginia nor the Army of the Potomac would threaten Richmond again for the next twenty-one months.

Operational Overview

On 14 August, Lee rode the train towards Culpeper to join his lieutenants in a war council; based on intelligence of the enemy's position received before he left Richmond, he already had a plan to dispose of Pope before the Army of the Potomac could join him from the Peninsula. With Longstreet arriving in the theater just two days before, on the 13th, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was in excellent shape. Because corps organization had not been introduced into the Confederate Army yet, Lee improved his command and control by grouping his divisions into right and left wings. Similarly, his artillery was improved by grouping his batteries into battalions under brigade and battalion field artillery commanders. Improvements also appeared in the weapons and equipment of the artillery and infantry as captured weapons from the Seven Days' Battles were issued to the Confederate Army. His fit, enthusiastic Army of Northern Virginia numbered nearly 55,000 soldiers: his left wing under "Stonewall" Jackson with A.P. Hill's corps contained over 23,000 troops and his right wing commanded by Longstreet had nearly 32,000 men.

By August 15, 1862, the addition of Burnside's IX Corps of 8,000 veterans under Major General Reno gave Pope about 52,000 soldiers including his cavalry. Although it was about the same number as Lee's army, Pope's army was a loose aggregation of corps and divisions that had never been united, had never shared the same experiences, and had little in common. Although Lee gauged erroneously that Pope's full strength to be 65-70,000 men, Lee accurately and more importantly determined from his observation station on Clark Mountain, about four miles south of Culpeper, that Pope had bivouacked into a most undefensible and vulnerable position. He had nestled his army into the "V" formed by the meeting of the Rapidan and the Rappahannock Rivers, about nine miles west of Fredricksburg. If Lee could concentrate his army utilizing the element of surprise (Pope did not realize Jackson had been joined by Longstreet), then Pope could be caught in the pincers of the river's channels and possibly be destroyed. Time was critical. Confederate Major General French telegraphed Lee from Richmond that on the morning of the 16th of August, 108 ships containing McClellan's Army of the Potomac were sailing down the James River enroute to Pope's position via Aquia and Fredericksburg. Lee reacted decisively: on the 18th, he ordered Longstreet to attack Pope's left flank only if J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry could assail and destroy Pope's communications in his rear area. However, on the 18th, Lee's army was not prepared. Anderson's division was not in position, the whereabouts

of Stuart was unknown, the Confederate left flank did not suit Lee, and adequate commissary and logistic goods were not staged to sustain the battle and after. The attack was subsequently delayed until the 19th of August, and again to the 20th, due to staff, logistic, and other organizational problems.

However, on the afternoon of the 17th of August, J.E.B. Stuart, a victim of a curious misadventure, was nearly captured in Verdiersville. Although he made good his escape, the Federal forces captured his famed and recognizable plumed hat and his map case containing Lee's planned attack on Pope. Lee, not finding out this information until the morning of the 18th, did not fear so much that his position was compromised, but rather that Pope would withdraw North across the Rappahannock River into a more defensible position. General Lee, on Clark Mountain at 1:30 in the afternoon, observed the telltale dust and activity of the beginning of the withdrawal of Pope's forces. The element of surprise was lost; the advantage was now with the defending Federals.

Pope withdrew to the higher Rappahannock north bank about seven or eight miles above Kelly's Ford. Pope had to merely set in defensively and hold off Lee until McClellan's Army arrived. As each day passed, Lee's opportunity to crush Pope greatly diminished. Stuart, with his cavalry, rode East and West, up and down the river in advance of Longstreet and Jackson's flank poking and probing each crossing for an opportunity to puncture the Union lines. However, Stuart found bluecoat infantry and artillery massed at every bridge and every river lowpoint. Jackson, meanwhile, marched seven miles up the Rappahannock opposite White Sulphur Springs; finding the crossing unopposed, he ordered Ewell's division across with Early's brigade and eight cannons. While the passage of Jackson's men was slow, J.E.B. Stuart crossed the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge with 1500 cavalry and two cannons on a mission to raid Pope's rear and disrupt his communications on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad near Catlett Station. Arriving undiscovered in Catlett Station at dusk during a violent thunderstorm, Stuart's raiders found not only a tremendous cache of supplies in wagons and trains, but had stumbled into Pope's headquarters. Although the rebels were unable to fire the supply trains or the bridge at Cedar Creek in the driving rain on the blackest of nights, they escaped with a treasure much more valuable to Lee. Stuart had captured the Army of Virginia's headquarters dispatch book and many valuable messages that gave Lee the plans and strengths of his opponent. However, the same hard driving rain that made Stuart's escape good isolated Jackson's forces on the Union side of the river due to rising swift water which prevented Jackson from reinforcing or retrieving his trapped forces to the safety of the South bank. At dawn on the 23rd, in the mist of the river, Longstreet created a furious artillery diversion far down the river to give Jackson's engineers time to build a makeshift bridge for his men to reach safety. Subsequent to Jackson's successful recrossing, Longstreet marched up the river and concentrated his forces with Jackson at White Sulphur Springs because Pope reinforced his right, correctly surmising that high water down river would

prevent a Confederate flanking attack on his left.

Lee received Stuart's prize booty early on the 24th of August. He learned that Pope would be reinforced with 45,000 more men by the 26th, exclusive of the reinforcements from Burnside, and he had not dispatched any of these forces Eastward toward Fredericksburg, as he had thought. Pope was instructed to hold the line on the Rappahannock until McClellan could join him with his main force in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. The race to reach Pope first was becoming dangerously close. The situation was now extremely grave; Pope's numbers of soldiers and artillery would be vastly superior. Even if an engagement favorable to the South afforded itself, it should be avoided, for the expected heavy losses would be irreplaceable. It was crucial, then, to stay with the initial strategy, that is, to continue maneuvering North, drawing Pope away from McClellan and continue to feed the Confederacy in territory that the enemy would otherwise strip. It was vital to maneuver towards Washington looking for an opportunity to cut the Federal railroad and supply lines of communication. However, Lee's efforts to dislodge Pope's army from the North bank of the Rappahannock had all been repulsed. All the major fords on the swollen river were well covered. The majority of Pope's army was concentrated between Fauquier Springs and Warrenton, therefore the Orange & Alexandria Railroad still remained as Pope's link to Washington. However, Stuart proved it to be vulnerable. A turning point of the campaign was at hand.

In a secretive meeting in Jackson's headquarters in Jeffersonton in the afternoon on the 24th, Lee unveiled his most daring and boldest stroke of the campaign. Lee directed Jackson to take his 24,000 men and march North and around through Thoroughfare Gap to the rear of Pope's army and cut his communications with Washington; a move that if successful, would hopefully continue to draw Pope away from his defensive position toward Washington and at the same time isolate him from reinforcements. Jackson would be moving on the morning of the 25th; Longstreet would be moving quietly into Jackson's defensive positions so as not to bring attention to the plan and to deceive the Federals to give Jackson a good start. Lee would be following in trace with Longstreet in a day. Speed and surprise would be vital; the risk was enormous. Lee and his commanders knew that if Pope discovered that the Confederates split their forces, he had the superior numbers to selectively destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, one wing at a time.

At dawn on the 25th of August, with Stuart's cavalry shielding the way, Ewell's division led A.P. Hill's Light Division, followed by Jackson's under Taliaferro. With no reserve ordnance, ambulances, baggage, or knapsacks, the men in ranks were prepared for a long, quick routed march to a destination known only to Jackson and his immediate subordinates. Out of Jeffersonton to Amissville, with the Bull Run Mountains screening their movements, they turned toward the Northeast over the Hedgeman River at Hinson's Mill at Orlean and another dozen miles to Salem for the night. Early on the 26th of August, the column eagerly pushed East to White Plains, over the Bull Run

Mountains through Thoroughfare Gap and on to Haymarket. J.E.B. Stewart, with the remainder of his cavalry division, joined Jackson as the column passed through Gainsville. At sunset, after two days and fifty-four miles of nothing to eat but green corn, the column arrived at Bristoe Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, twenty miles behind Pope's lines. The telegraph lines were cut and two Federal trains were derailed with a third train enroute to Manassas escaping back to Pope with knowledge of a "raiding party" in the rear. Trimble's Brigade of Ewell's Division, supported by Stuart's cavalry, advanced along the railroad and captured Pope's sprawling supply depot at Manassas Junction during the night. Over three hundred prisoners and massive amounts of supplies to include shoes for the barefooted, blue uniforms for the ragged, medical supplies for the doctors, saddles, blankets, and massive amounts of food were taken or destroyed.

Pope, meanwhile, after a stumbling start, had handled his army well along the Rappahannock. He stalled Lee into a lethal stalemate with his vigilant infantrymen and artillerymen at every ford along with his weary, saddle worn cavalrymen. For seven days, he had held the Rappahannock line and would continue to hold as Hallack ordered until the expected reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac arrived. It was nineteen days since McClellan was ordered to evacuate the Peninsula and divert his troops to the Valley that the first of these troops started arriving in Pope's camp. His army was growing rapidly; between the 19th and the 26th of August, Pope's ranks had swelled to over 90,000 men with two additional corps awaiting to be moved down from Alexandria. Pope had to reorganize; 4,700 men under Brigadier General John F. Reynolds, with McDowell's Corps and Sigel's Corps, were formed into an informal wing under McDowell to guard the northern flank near Warrenton. Pope, from his headquarters in Warrenton Junction on the railroad directed the rest of the army which consisted of Bank's V Army Corps of 10,000 men under Major General Fitz John Porter, and the III Army Corps of 15,000 troops under Major General Sam P. Heintzelman. To be expected, with corps size reinforcements came corps size problems. Heintzelman and Porter reported aboard with no wagon trains or ambulances, Heintzelman's artillery had not arrived, Porter had no reserve artillery rounds and one of Reynold's Brigades almost revolted because of irregular feedings.

On the 25th of August, Pope's knowledge of Jackson's departure and his forced march of twenty-six miles was masked by the lack of dust kicked up on the wet to soggy roads and by the lack of intelligence gathering due to the inactivity of his worn out cavalry. However, on the 26th of August, he was made well aware of not only Jackson's movements and position but also that of Lee and Longstreet's departure from Jeffersonton. The fact that the Confederate forces were split by a day's march presented a unique opportunity for Pope to strike and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. However, not withstanding the fact that Pope's cavalry was well-worn and was not under his direct control that only added to their ineffectiveness, Pope still had severe command and control problems which fatally diluted his capability

to visualize and execute in a timely manner. His capability to process confusing and sometime conflicting intelligence was limited; consequently if his orders were not lost or delayed, his orders were often untimely, confusing, ineffective, and at times questionably suicidal. His problems were further aggravated by the lack of a well coordinated and collective working relationship between himself and his subordinates that was caused by his superior and bombastic attitude, and the fact that he was junior to his subordinates did not help. Consequently, the quickly changing tactical situation offered ample opportunities for a Northern victory if Pope could react, instead the opportunities became seeds of a Union disaster.

On the evening of the 26th of August, Pope believed that Jackson's march to the Shenandoah was a covering force for the right flank of Lee who Pope knew was in trail of Jackson. When sure of the Confederate's movements, Pope shifted his lines off the Rappahannock to a line extending northwest to east. Early on the morning of the 27th of August, he ordered McDowell's Corps to march to Gainesville before evening to be followed by Reno's division and Kearney's division to Greenwich. Hooker's Division was dispatched from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station to check what Pope thought was a raiding party of Stuart's cavalry. Hooker instead encountered the full force of Ewell's division at at Bristoe Station at about 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Ewell, thinking that he was outnumbered because of Hooker's maneuvering, tactically retreated across the Bull Run towards Manassas to minimize losses and to join up with Jackson. Taliaferro, meanwhile, had evacuated Manassas Junction during the night after putting the torch to all supplies that could not be carried off. Jackson, to protect his command from Pope's superior numbers, marched throughout the night with his divisions, retreating by three different routes that served only to further confuse Pope. Jackson retreated to a long, partly wooded ridge about a mile northwest of the year-old Manassas battleground that overlooked the Warrenton to Alexandria turnpike near Groveton. From this concealed position, Jackson could exit through Aldie Gap to the North if pressed, defend until Lee joined them, or strike Pope, if necessary, to prevent him retreating any further towards Washington. The first objective of Jackson's mission was successfully completed. Federal supplies and lines of communication were interrupted and Pope was rapidly being drawn North away from the Rappahannock.

On the evening of the 27th, Pope rode to Bristoe to observe the situation first-hand: he was stunned! He now fully realized the gravity of the situation and understood for the first time that he was facing the full brunt of Jackson's command rather than a small raiding party in his rear area. However, problems of coordination and lack of cavalry still plagued Pope; he had absolutely no idea where Jackson was.

However, with knowledge of his enemy in his rear area, Pope reacted immediately by issuing an order to mass his army in Manassas by morning. However, the dark of the morning of the 28th found still more problems of execution within Pope's ranks. Porter was to march at 1:00 AM to aid Hooker, and Reno, Kearney,

and McDowell were to start marching at the crack of dawn, however, Sigel, Porter, and McDowell failed to get started before 10:00 AM. Jackson's Confederates, alerted to Pope's intentions by way of a captured courier carrying Pope's order, continued to improve upon their defensive positions in the wooded ridge throughout the day.

Without the assistance of cavalry to determine Jackson's whereabouts coupled with Pope's consuming obsession to "bag Jackson", Pope jumped to the fatal conclusion that Jackson was retreating through Centerville to join Lee on the other side of the Bull Run mountains enroute to the Shenandoah Valley. Therefore, Pope in the midmorning countermanded his order to mass at Manassas and redirected his army to concentrate at Centerville to cut Jackson off. However, because of continuing confusion with lost orders, couriers getting captured, delays and continued poor execution, the bulk of the Union forces would bivouac no further than Groveton in the evening of the 28th.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the 28th, McDowell's very capable cavalry under Buford discovered Lee's march through White Plains towards the Bull Run Mountains. McDowell correctly ascertained Lee's intentions but could not locate Pope to brief him of his suspicions; therefore, he ordered Brig. Gen. J.B. Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap to block Lee's passage. Lee, sensing opposition in the Thoroughfare Gap as he neared the Bull Run Mountains, dispatched an enveloping force through Hopewell Gap, three miles to the North. Ricketts, an unusually reliable soldier, sensing a flanking movement on his right, made a fatal blunder by abandoning his blocking position and withdrawing to Gainesville. In late afternoon, Lee marched through Thoroughfare Gap virtually unopposed. Jackson, made aware in late afternoon of Lee's passage through the Gap, took advantage of the Confederate's concealed position and attacked the exposed flank of King's division marching East down Warrenton Pike to Centerville. In fading light, Jackson and King's "Black Hats" Brigade under Gibbon fought valiantly toe-to-toe in a bloody, smokey fight. Casualties mounted at a frightening rate; Taliaferro fell with multiple wounds, Ewell lost a leg, and every field grade officer in the 7th Wisconsin was shot. Still they fought through the night until artillery in direct fire on both sides blasted the lines apart about 9:00 PM. In the still of the night, bodies were left strewn where they fell; more than one third of the Federals engaged were shot and the Confederates suffered about the same rate. Sometime after midnight, the Union retreated down the Pike towards Manassas and Jackson withdrew to the "unfinished railroad."

Although Centerville was the place of bivouac in Pope's order, unknowingly to Pope, Gibbon and his subordinates trudged to the safety of Manassas. In the wake of this bloody midnight march, the Warrenton Pike was left completely undefended and clear for Lee's arrival the next morning. Pope, however, still persisted in the belief that not only was Jackson retreating to the West, but that McDowell had stopped his retreat west of Jackson's line of march on the Warrenton Pike. Pope, who was positioned East of Jackson, ordered Reno, Hooker, and Porter

to attack Jackson at dawn on the 29th. This would prove to be a costly error; not only was Pope not in control of his forces, he was not even sure where they were or Jackson was.

Meanwhile, Jackson was far from fleeing as Pope continued to believe; rather he was busily entrenching himself in the "unfinished railroad", an independent line of the Manassas Gap Railroad connecting Gainsville to Alexandria. In a series of two miles of cuts, embankments, and ready-made brestworks, the Confederates occupied a line from Catharpin Run near Sudley Church on the left along Stoney Ridge southeastward to a point north of Brawner's farm. Jackson's command, which had been reduced to 20,000 men, faced an opposing force of over 70,000 soldiers and artillery. However, Jackson's forty cannon converged on every avenue of approach and his position was strategically located for Longstreet to unite on his right on the morning of the 29th. The stage was set for Lee's arrival and predictably Pope's defeat in the Battle of Second Manassas.

AUTOMOBILE TOUR

STOP 1

Clark Mountain

Proceed East from Culpeper or West from Fredricksburg on Route 3 until you intercept Route 522 South. Turn right or left, depending your origin, on Route 522 and proceed for 10.6 miles. Turn right on Route 617 for 1 mile to Route 627. Turn right on Route 627 and drive 3.3 miles to Route 697. Turn right on Route 697 and drive the 0.8 miles to the top of Clark Mountain. Park where convenient. Use Map 1 to orient yourself. The large brick home directly behind you which faces almost due North, is the home of Mr. and Mrs. Moore, the owners of the mountain. Mr. Moore is quite knowledgeable in the history that surrounds the mountain and is very helpful in identifying the landmarks and battlefields over the same panorama that Lee and his "lieutenants" studied prior the campaign.

Wednesday, 13 August 1862

Situation

Jackson on south side of Clark Mountain
Longstreet enroute by railroad to Orange

Army of Virginia between Rapidan and
Rappahannock Rivers

"Major General Longstreet, with his divisions and the brigade under General Hood, were directed to proceed to Gordonsville. At the same time General Stuart was directed to move with his main body of his cavalry to that point, leaving a sufficient force to observe the enemy still remaining in Fredericksburg to guard the railroad. General R. H. Anderson was also directed to leave his position in James River and follow Longstreet". (1)

Thursday, 14 August, 1862

Situation

Jackson no change
Longstreet on south side of Clark Mountain
Lee arrived in Gordonsville Headquarters

Pope no change

Lee, in Richmond, was apprised in a letter from Longstreet of the enemy's position and estimated strength north of Clark Mountain. Lee's thoughts on the disposition of the enemy to Longstreet were immediate:

"I incline...to the right flank movement, the easiest way of accomplishing that I should prefer...you being on the spot...must use your own judgement and deliberate. I have directed to send...Stuart by the right to sweep around by the enemy's rear and cut his communications when we get ready to move; keeping Jackson's cavalry on our left and in the enemy's front to disguise the movement....It is important that our movement, in whatever direction it is determined, should be quick as possible. I fear General Pope can be reinforced quicker than ourselves; prepare accordingly."(2)

This plan was not hastily conceived, for as early as the 7th of August, Lee wired Stuart in New Market:

"If they(Pope) could reach a position which Jackson could interpose between them and Fredricksburg, they(Pope) would be annihilated....The greatest benefit you can do...is doing what you are doing, cutting up their communications, trains, etc...."(3)

Lee recognized immediately that the situation he described to Stuart earlier(Pope located between the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers) was exactly what Longstreet conveyed to him in his letter. Lee knew that Pope was vulnerable and time was critical. It was time to act. Although he was scheduled to leave at 4 o'clock the next morning to Gordonsville on the train, he made a hasty rescheduled departure late in the day.

As Lee rode the train west to Gordonsville, he prepared himself mentally to execute the strategy he devised for his first campaign more than sixty days ago when he was appointed General of the Army of Northern Virginia. His generalship was already legendary in the South and was recognizably well respected in the North by military and politicians alike. Seward, Secretary of State of the Union, reviewed correspondence on 6 August on General Lee's ability and strategy:

"I am afraid...that it is the plan of the rebels, relying on the weakness and slowness of McClellan's army, to outnumber

and outgeneral Pope...I am convinced this is part of their present policy" (4)

Seward was exactly right on his assessment of the Confederate strategy; the "rebel" was Lee and he had the advantage, for he knew his enemy. Although he respected McClellan, Lee knew he was too cautious. Pope however, he detested and would certainly outgeneral him. Pope incensed Lee and insulted his noble profession of arms when, upon assuming his command as General of the Army of Virginia, he issued his General Orders 7 and 11 on July 10th and 23rd respectively. These orders, directed personally to the citizens of Lee's Virginia, stated:

"Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States...will be permitted to remain in their homes.... Those who refuse shall be conducted South...and if found within our picket lines will be considered spies. If any person, having taken the oath...and found to have violated it...shall be shot and his property seized."(5)

Lee, upon learning of these orders issued by Pope, immediately dispatched a wire to Jackson in the theater on 27 July:

"I want Pope to be suppressed. The course indicated in his orders, if the newspapers report them correctly, cannot be permitted and will lead to retaliation on our part."(6)

Robert E. Lee arrived two and a half miles from Gordonsville on the Madison Turnpike late in the evening; Jackson went to see him.

Friday, 15 August, 1862

Situation

Jackson moved to the southeast side of
Clark Mountain(Mt. Pisgah Church)
Longstreet no change

Pope no change

Near Gordonsville, more Confederate troops were arriving all the time. They speculated that they were heading for Maryland. Longstreet's troops were busy bivouacking on the southeastern slope of Clark Mountain. Jackson's troops, after two days rest, moved from Gordonsville to Mt. Pisgah Church on the southeast side of Clark Mountain to wait. Robert E. Lee changed his headquarters in the evening to the plantation of Barton Hexall, with plans to move to the Taylor farm near Orange Courthouse on the 16th. Jackson had earlier established a signal and observation station on top of Clark Mountain. In the evening, from this observation station, Lee and his "lieutenants" conferred as they looked down upon the Union forces and their lines to the North and observed exactly what Pope described in his correspondence.(Map 2)

"...the cavalry...occupied the Rapidan from Raccoon Ford to the base of the Blue Ridge. On the 14th...Gen. Reno, with 8000 men...joined me. I immediately pushed forward my whole force in the direction of the Rapidan and occupied a strong position, with my right, under Major General Sigel, resting on Robertson's River, where the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court House crosses that stream; my center under Gen. McDowell, occupying both flanks of Cedar Mountain, and my left under General Reno, a position near Raccoon Ford, and covering the road from that ford to Stevensburg and Culpeper."(7)

As it was readily apparent to Jackson on the 13th of August (Official Records, Volume XII, part 2, page 648) so also it was to Lee that the Union was occupying a very vulnerable and most indefensible position between the two rivers, the Rapidan and the Rappahannock. Atop Clark Mountain, Lee drew up the plan to attack Pope's position on the morning of the 18th.

"I. General Longstreet's command, constituting the right wing of the army, will cross the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford and move in the direction of Culpeper Court House. General Jackson's command, constituting the left wing, will cross at Somerville Ford and move in the same direction....General Anderson's division will cross at Somerville Ford, follow the route of General Jackson, and set in reserve....The cavalry...will cross at Morton's Ford, pursue the route by Stevensburg to Rappahannock Station(Remington), destroy the railroad bridge, cut the enemy's communication, telegraph line, and...take position on General Longstreet's right.

II. ...commanders will designate their reserve....Medical and ammunition wagons alone will follow the troops across the Rapidan. The baggage and supply trains will be...parked in secure positions on the south side so as not to embarrass the different roads..."(8)

Saturday, 16 August, 1862

Situation

Longstreet no change

Jackson moved his headquarters to southern slope
of mountain (Crenshaw Farm)

Pope no change

Skirmishes between the Union cavalry under Generals Buford and Bayard and Confederate pickets continue on the northwest side of Clark Mountain to the village of Rapidan. Although no major clash occurred to give away the Confederate position, Pope was aware of a major Confederate movement. He writes:

"...reports were constantly reaching me of large forces of the enemy reinforcing Jackson from the direction of Richmond." (9)

Although Pope's cavalry was still effective in its role of intelligence gathering at this time, the cavalry was rapidly breaking down. Fresh horses and cavalry equipment were not being replenished and available horses were either dying for lack of feed or were being ridden to exhaustion. Pope, to maximize his cavalry's efficiency and to render his corps's commanders more flexibility over their use of the dwindling assets, issued Special Order 45 late in the day. It stated:

"V. Hereafter the cavalry of each army corps of this army will be massed and placed under command of the chief of cavalry of that corps.

Commanders of army corps will be allowed to detach for duty at their own headquarters such cavalry as may be necessary for their personal escorts....

When divisions or brigades are temporarily detached, the cavalry required for service with them will be furnished for that

temporary purpose only by the commander of the army corps."(10)

The execution of this order by his corps, virtually eliminated all of Pope's control over any cavalry in support of his headquarters. This lack of support would serve to severely cripple his already poorly demonstrated capability to collect accurate intelligence in a timely and efficient manner. This burden, coupled to Pope's inability to digest and process information in a fast-paced tactical operation, would prove amongst other problems to be his achilles heel in the prevention of his prosecution of this campaign successfully.

Sunday, August 17, 1862

Situation

Jackson no change
Longstreet no change

Pope no change

Preparations to attack Pope on the morning of the 18th continued in Longstreet and Jackson's camps. Troops went to Church in both camps followed by the cooking of three day's rations which was a standard operational procedure before a long march or battle. Meanwhile, at the same time, an incredible action was ongoing in Verdiersville with J.E.B. Stuart. He writes:

"....On Aug.16,1862, in pursuance of (R.E.Lee's) secret instructions, I put this brigade on the march for the vicinity of Raccoon Ford, near which point the army(Federal)...was rapidly concentrating. General Fitzhugh Lee was directed by me to proceed the next day from Davenport's Bridge, opposite Beaver

Dam, across the vicinity of Raccoon Ford, where I promised to join him on the 17th. My command was now augmented by the addition of another brigade (Robertson's) and it was intended to concentrate the bulk of this force near Raccoon Ford, cross, and attack the enemy's communications in rear of Culpeper Court House simultaneously with a blow by the main body in front. I rode down from Verdiersville, a point in the plank road opposite Raccoon Ford....I found no one there except the inhabitants....It was night....I sent...Major (N.R.) Fitzhugh on the road which Gen. F. Lee was to have marched to look for him, remaining myself at Verdiersville.

At early dawn next morning I was aroused from the porch where I lay by the noise of horsemen and wagons, and walking out bareheaded to the fence near by, found that they were coming from the very direction indicated for General F. Lee. I was not left long in this delusion, however, for two officers, Captain Moseby and Lieutenant Gibson whom I sent to ascertain the truth were fired upon and rapidly pursued. I had barely enough time to leap upon my horse just as I was, and, with...Lieutenant Dabney...escaped by leaping a high fence. Having stopped at the nearest woods, I observed the party approach and leave in great haste, but not without my hat and cloak which formed my bed...."(11)

Even more interesting than the occurrence is the lack of a statement by Stuart indicating that besides his famed and recognizable plumed hat and cloak lost to the Federals was his mapcase containing Lee's general order to attack Pope on the 18th. Stuart's loss of his hat and cloak bruised his ego; Stuart would insure later that Pope would dearly pay a similar price of embarrassment.

Lee, apprised of the situation late in the evening mulled

over the occurrence. Calmly, he modified his order to attack from the 18th to the 19th; not because of Stuart's folly, but because Anderson would not be in place as ordered and the logistic wagons were not positioned and in place to sustain the attack if needed. Lee had a problem and he knew it: his staff was new and they needed more time to work out their coordination problems in the execution of an order in a timely fashion.

Pope, meanwhile, wired early in the morning to Halleck an assessment of his position between the two rivers:

"The main body of the enemy has fallen back to Mechanicsburg and lies between Louisa Court House and Charlottesville. Reports from various sources represent a large force to be moving from Richmond to join Jackson. I think it very likely to be true. Our position is strong and will be difficult to drive us from it...I need cavalry (1500)horses immediately. Our cavalry is much broken down and not having been fit for anything from the beginning."(12)

Pope was already experiencing a problem of poor intelligence-gathering partly because of the poor physical shape of the horses, but mainly because of his reorganization of the cavalry. He compounded the problem with his demonstration of poor military judgement by not recognizing the vulnerability of his tenuous position between the rivers.

Monday, 18 August, 1862

Situation

Lee's Order to attack Pope: modified to the 20th
Jackson's troops moved to Mountain Run
Longstreet no change

Pope: made aware of Lee's plan of attack
starts to fall back of the Rappahannock

Halleck, in receipt of Pope's assessment, recognized the vulnerability of Pope's position and immediately ordered him to pull back behind the Rappahannock and guard his communications in his rear area until reinforcements from McClellan arrived.

Pope, now aware of trouble, wrote:

"...by the morning of the 18th, I became satisfied that nearly the whole force of the enemy from Richmond was assembling in my front, along the south side of the Rapidan, and extending from Raccoon Ford to Liberty Mills....The cavalry captured papers...which made manifest to me the position and force of the enemy and their determination to overwhelm me before it could be reinforced by any portion of the army of the Potomac....it became apparent to me that this advanced position...was no longer tenable....I determined...to withdraw behind the Rappahannock with all speed as I have been instructed(by Halleck)."(13)

Pope, in the evening, commenced his withdrawal across the Rappahannock, crossing at the railroad crossing at Barnett's Ford below, and at Sulphur Springs Ford, ten miles above, hoping to complete the movement by noon the next day. This movement was observed by Lee from Clark Mountain and was just the action that he was afraid the Federals would take. Lee did not so much fear that the Union would discover his position behind Clark Mountain, but rather that they would recognize their own untenable situation and would withdraw across the Rappahannock to a more defensible position before he could attack.

Tuesday, 19 August, 1862

Situation

Lee observes Pope withdrawing
Confederate army concentrated behind Clark's
Mountain

Pope continues to fall back:
Sigel(Pope's right) to Sulphur Springs
Banks(Pope's middle) followed by McDowell
to Rappahannock Bridge
Reno(Pope's left) to Kelly's Ford

At 4:45 p.m., Lee wrote Stuart:

"I have just returned from Clark Mountain. The enemy as far as I can discover is retreating on the road to Fredericksburg. His route is certainly north of Stevensburg and is thought to be through Brandy Station over the Rappahannock by Kelly's Ford".(14)

Lee instructed Stuart to continue around Pope's left and try to cut him off before Kelly's Ford. With this order, Special Order 185, which was a modification of the original attack order for the 18th, Lee further slipped the Confederate attack to the 20th to allow Stuart to execute his mission and his staff to fully finish the coordination of his order which was further modified ordering Jackson to Beverly Ford and Longstreet to Kelly Ford, both on the Rappahannock River.

Meanwhile, as Pope finished the withdrawal of his army safely to the north bank of the Rappahannock.(Map 3)

"...the whole army, with its trains, had safely crossed the Rappahannock, and was posted behind that stream, with its left(Reno) at Kelly's Ford and its right(Sigel) above 3 miles above Rappahannock Station(Remington), General Sigel...to march down until he connected closely with General McDowell's right".(15)

Wednesday, 20 August, 1862

Situation

Longstreet crosses at Raccoon Ford and heads for
Kelly's Ford

Jackson crosses at Somerville Ford for Stevensburg

Reno at Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock Bridge

McDowell astride Rappahannock Bridge

Sigel at White Sulphur Springs extending south to
McDowell

Pope's movement to the north bank of the Rappahannock completed, he wrote the following dispatch to General Halleck at 8:30 a.m. which laid out his defensive strategy until reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac arrived.

"I shall mass my whole force along what is known as Mask Run about two and a half to three miles northeast of Rappahannock Ford with an advance guard from the center and picketing strongly with cavalry the fords above me as far as the road from Sperryville to Warrenton. If the enemy attempts to turn my right by way of Sulphur Springs they will probably march direct on Warrenton from which place a good turnpike conducts to Washington. Such a movement, however, will expose their flank and rear and you may be sure that I will not lose the opportunity....The enemy so far has made no movement in advance. I think they are not ready, for want of transportation for supplies, to cross the Rappahannock."(16)

Pope was correct in his assumption that the Confederate strategy was to now turn his right at White Sulphur Springs, but was wrong in his assumption that that Lee would not cross the

Rappahannock for awhile; Pope committed a critical error in not exercising his cavalry to determine whether or not Lee had started his crossing of the Rapidan at dawn. Captain Boswell, Jackson's capable engineer recorded the moment.

"At dawn on the (20th), the corps moved forward(from Crenshaw's farm) in the following order: Generals A.P. Hill, Ewell, and Taliaferro....I was ordered to remain at Somerville Ford, where the Corps crossed the Rapidan....I rejoined General Jackson about two miles beyond Stevensburg, on the Brandy Station Road where the corps bivouacked for the night."(17) (Map 4)

Longstreet also moved at dawn in accordance with Lee's order, crossing the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, towards Kelly's Ford where he set in for the night.

Thursday, 21 August, 1862

Situation

Taliaferro at Beverly's Ford
Ewell at Brandy Station, Hill behind him
Longstreet moving towards Taliaferro

Sigel still edging south with Milroy near
Freeman's and Beverly's Fords
Banks and McDowell the same
Beardsley and Buford on flanks of army
Porter arriving at Aquia Landing
Reynolds at Falmouth

The Army of Virginia continued to improve its defensive positions on the North Bank of the Rappahannock River covering every possible ford and low river crossing point that the northwesterly passage of Lee's army may encounter. Poking and probing with Stuart's cavalry, the Confederates were met with

skirmisher, sharpshooter, and artillery fire at every point possible. That evening, Longstreet replaced Jackson at Beverly Ford as Jackson continued to ascend the river in execution of General Lee's plan which he(Lee) explained in his report:

"As our positions on the south bank of the Rappahannock were commanded by those of the enemy, who guarded all the fords, it was determined to seek a more favorable place to cross higher up the river, and thus gain the enemy's right."(18)

STOP 2

White Sulphur Springs

Drive back down the mountain(Route 697) At the bottom, turn left onto Route 627 and drive for 1.1 miles to Hawfield Stables sign which is located on the right side of the road. STOP At your 1 o'clock position, you should notice some dark green tall overgrown American boxwoods in a cluster in the woodline in front of the brick structure 800 yards across the horse pasture. Within those boxwoods is the foundation to the old homeplace of the Crenshaw family who owned the farm during the Civil War. Jackson located his headquarters here from 18-20 August with his troops and Lee's headquarters nearby on the Mountain Run Creek. From this location in the very early dark of the morning of 20 August, 1862, Jackson started on his famous march in one of the most celebrated campaigns of The Civil War. CONTINUE

Jackson stopped by Ewell's camp before shoving off about 3:00 a.m. and continued East on Route 627 for 2.6 miles to Route 626 intersecting on his left. He turned left onto Route 626 and hiked the 3.6 miles on the winding guarded passage between Clark Mountain on his left and Brushy Mountain on his right. Jackson, arriving at the intersection of Route 636, turned left onto Route 636 and marched .5 miles to Somerville Ford on the Rapidan River as ordered. STOP

The bridge used by Jackson was rebuilt at the turn of the century and was subsequently destroyed during the flood of 1942. All that remains of the location is the bridge abutments. The road leading from the river which is now pasture and farm land, passed to the left of the Somervilla farm that is visible directly across the river. The Somer clan, a wealthy family from North Carolina, has owned the land since before the Civil

War. To resume Jackson's march across the river, turn around where convenient, retrace your route on Route 636 from the ford, continuing past Route 626 for .6 miles to Route 522. Turn left onto Route 522 and drive 1.1 miles to and across the Rapidan River Bridge to where Route 647 cuts East and West across your road. STOP Jackson marched to the left of the farm, bearing for .5 miles on Route 655 to Route 647. He turned right onto Route 647 and marched the .6 miles East to the spot you occupy. This part of Route 522 and the bridge you just crossed was constructed in 1942; Old Mineral Road(Route 522) led directly to Somerville Ford and on to Culpeper in 1862. Turn right onto Route 647 to continue Jackson's march to Stevensburg. CONTINUE

Jackson uncharacteristically continued East at an easy pace for approximately 1.7 miles. STOP To your right less than 1 mile is Raccoon Ford, where Longstreet crossed the Rapidan River enroute to Kelly's Ford. Jackson, in turn, marched left onto a road that is no longer visible and the roadbed of which the author could not accurately identify. Therefore, the ride will continue to that point where the Jackson's troops exited this now defunct road. CONTINUE Drive straight ahead on Route 647 for 2.4 miles and turn left onto Route 661 and continue .6 miles on Route 661. STOP This is the approximate spot from which Jackson left the old roadbed onto Route 661. CONTINUE Jackson continued North on Route 661 for 4.7 miles to Route 663. He turned left and marched for .2 miles to Germanna Plank Road(Route 3). Crossing Germanna Plank Road(Route 3), he now marched his men quickly through the village of Stevensburg and continued for 1.7 miles out of town on Route 663 where he halted for the night on Jonas Run. His men bivouacked for the night in the tree line on the Run. That afternoon, Robertson's cavalry had a fight with Union cavalry just up the road in Brandy Station. Early the next morning on the 21st, Jackson continued North on Route 663 for 2.4 miles to Brandy Station. Pressing quickly through Brandy Station on Route 663, crossing the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, he continued .4 miles out of town where Route 685 intersects Route 663 on the right. STOP

At this point, Jackson turned right and marched to Beverly Ford as directed by Lee. Map 5 shows the line of march and other points of interest. Jackson spent the night on the Thompson farm which was across the road from St. James Church. Although the church which was located on the wooded knoll has long been gone, parts of the foundation can still be located. On the 22nd of August, part of Jackson's troops moved up river to Freeman's Ford and the others crossed the Hazel River at Wellford Ford enroute to White Sulphur Springs; Jackson moved his headquarters to Lee's Springs. On the 23rd, except for Longstreet,

Confederate movement was minimal. Since the roads to Beverly, Freeman, and Wellford Fords as the fords themselves are no longer passable across the Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, the tour will continue from this point on Route 663 to that point on Route 621 where Jackson's troops picked up their trek to White Sulphur Springs on the 22nd. CONTINUE Drive North on Route 663 for 3.5 miles to Route 625. Turn right on Route 625 and continue for 2.2 miles to the T where Route 640 is on your left and Route 625 turns right. Continue right on Route 625 for 3.5 miles to Route 621. STOP About here, Jackson's troops tramped onto the road heading North after crossing Wellford Ford about 3 miles to their rear. Ahead about 400 yards on the right is a dirt road (Old Myer's Mill Road) leading to the Northeast. It is the actual path that Jubal Early's troops tramped enroute to the Springs; this dirt road is part of the old highway out of Washington D.C. that the likes of Congressman Daniel Boone used on his way back west when Congress recessed. Today, however, it is not a through road and will be bypassed; its exit will be identified when passed. CONTINUE Drive on for .8 miles to Route 623. Turn right and proceed for .8 miles; the dirt road (Old Myer's Mill Road) to your right is where the Confederate troops exited onto Route 623.

In the afternoon of the 22nd, Early's troops hiked North up Route 623 enroute to White Sulphur Springs. They continued where they intercepted Route 623, turned right onto Route 623 and proceeded quickly the 2.1 miles to Route 802 (Seven Hills Road); to the right a couple hundred yards, the timbers of the burned out bridge over Rappahannock rested in the low water at the Springs. (The original bridge and Route 802, which was known as The Springs Road, were actually 300-400 yards further to the North. Foundations of the old bridge leading to the mid-1800's resort town of Sulphur Springs are still visible). A Confederate reconnaissance team investigated the integrity of Sandy Ford, about a mile south of White Sulphur Springs on the river and defenses were assigned just out of Union artillery range on the ridge line to the immediate West, starting about .5 miles south of the bridge to North across Route 802. (Map 6) STOP

Friday, 22 August, 1862

Situation

Jackson moving towards White Sulphur Springs-
crosses Hazel Run at Wellford Mill
Longstreet between Rapahannock Bridge and Freeman's
Ford

Stuart crossing Waterloo Bridge and Hart's Mill
Ford for raid on Catlett Station

Banks moving north to support Sigel
Bohlen crosses Freeman Ford: runs into Hood/Trimble
Reno in support of McDowell at Rappahannock Bridge
Reynold's at Kelly's Ford
Porter completes disembarking at Aquia Landing

Another day of frustration for the Confederate Army as they were continually repulsed by Union fire from the north bank of the river as they continued to wind their way north up river looking for a break in the Blue lines. Jackson set up defensive positions at White Sulphur Springs where they found the bridge destroyed and the crossing "warmly" guarded by Union artillery and rifle fire. Jackson established his headquarters two miles east of Jeffersonton in Lee's Springs across the river from White Sulphur Springs. Longstreet, meanwhile, downriver between the Rappahannock Bridge and Freeman's Ford, intercepted the Union cavalry crossing the river on his lead elements of his left flank. Setting up an ambush, Longstreet's troops devastated them in a murderous rifle cross-fire and artillery fire. The survivors were taken prisoner and rendered valuable information concerning the Federal positions on the river. Jackson and Longstreet conferred and agreed that a crossing of the river at White Sulphur Springs would be advantageous in turning Pope's right flank. Jackson's actions, in turn, would confirm Pope's suspicions of the Confederate aim to turn his right in order to gain access to the turnpike to Washington. Jackson, late in the afternoon, ordered:

"...that the Thirteenth Georgia, Brown's, and Dement's
batteries of four guns each, and Early's brigade, crossing over,
took possession of the Springs and adjacent heights, and taking

some prisoners and incurring some risk "(19)

The force actually crossed about a mile down river where the Confederates found a weak point in the Union defenses on an old dilapidated dam at Sandy Ford (bridge abutment on north bank of Rappahannock River still visible) that conveniently afforded the passage. While this action was being conducted with some minor Union resistance, Stuart was actively preparing for his own operation near the White Sulphur Springs crossing as ordered by Lee.

"I received a note from the commanding General (Lee) that my proposition to strike with cavalry the enemy's rear was approved, and at 10 a.m., I started the execution of the plan (Map 7) with the main portion of Robertson's Brigade, say about 1500 men and two pieces of artillery. Proceeding through the village of Jeffersonton, part of the command crossed the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and the remainder at Hart's Mill, a few miles below, and took the direct road to Warrenton. Reaching that place in the afternoon, I halted to close up and obtain information. No force of the enemy had been here for days. From this point I directed my march to the rear of Cedar Creek with the view to destroy the railroad bridge over it near Catlett Station, the telegraph line, and thus cut the enemy's line of communication. I had not proceeded far before a terrific storm set in, which gave indication of continuing for a sufficient time to render the streams on my return impassable." (20)

Stuart executed his mission and more; although he could not fire the bridge and supplies in Catlett on his departure because of the rain, unknowingly, he blundered into Pope's headquarters during the raid.. He made off into the rainy, black night with Pope's dispatch book and in retaliation for Pope capturing his hat and cloak, took Pope's finest dress uniform coat. As predicted by Stuart, the way back to Jeffersonton would be slowed by the swollen streams. Picking his way back over his original route, he arrived at Jackson's headquarters late the following evening covering sixty miles in twenty-six hours.

Meanwhile, Early, because of the rains, found himself

trapped on the Union side of the river because of the dangerous swelling and swift current of the river. With pickets guarding his flanks, he moved up to White Sulphur Springs and part of his force moved down river from the point where they crossed an undetermined short distance, collecting a few prisoners and controlling about a mile of the river bank. The evening closed in on the Union and Confederate forces in a continuing driving rain that dictated minimal movement on either side.

Saturday, 23 August 1862

Situation

Day	<u>Longstreet</u> unchanged <u>Jackson</u> repairing bridge at White Sulphur Springs <u>Early</u> , Milroy exchanging artillery fire across Great Run Bayard skirmishing with <u>Early</u> Kearney at Warrenton Junction (Calverton) Hooker arriving on the Orange & Alexandria
Evening	<u>Robertson</u> in support of <u>Early</u> <u>Longstreet</u> , <u>Jackson</u> unchanged Porter advances through Hartwood

Stuart's troops were still slogging their way back through the flooded back country and Jubal Early was fending off Union artillery and close-in skirmishing while Jackson's pioneers were trying to finish constructing a makeshift bridge across the river at White Sulphur Springs. Robertson, on his swing back from Catlett Station was ordered by Stuart to divert from Warrenton to Early's position with two to three regiments of cavalry and two artillery pieces. However, as Early writes in the afternoon:

"...it was evident, from the noises heard, and the reports of one or two persons who had seen the columns of the enemy

passing below, that a heavy force was near at hand and that preparations were being made to surround my force."(21)

Early's assessment of his predicament relative to a Union attack at dawn was absolutely correct. Pope dispatched a note to Halleck at 10 p.m.:

"They(Early) fell back towards Hedgeman's River and Sulphur Springs. At the latter place my left was engaged about sunset and now awaits daylight. I shall move rapidly at daylight upon Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge. If the enemy is really in large force on this side of the Rappahannock, he will be trapped, as the river is very high below."(22)

At 10 p.m., the temporary bridge was finished; orders were issued by Jackson to reinforce Early during the night with Ewell's division. However Early, upon hearing of Jackson's order, quickly dispatched the following:

"I immediately dispatched a messenger to Gen. Ewell to inform him that there was no doubt of the enemy's being in high force and if I was to be recrossed it had better be done at once without waiting for daylight, as the enemy by moving to the left could command the bridge....In response to this, a little before 3 o'clock in the morning,...gave me the order for recrossing, the whole being accomplished shortly before daylight. My command was rescued from almost certain capture, as it since appeared from General Pope's report that he had brought up his entire force to attack what he supposed to be General Jackson's whole force."(23)

In coordination with Jackson, Longstreet would create a diversion down river at Rappahannock Station(Remington) about three miles above Beverly Ford to effect Ewell's safe passage across the river. Jackson ordered Colonel John Walton, Washington(Louisiana) Artillery, to coordinate the effort. He reported:

"I made a reconnaissance of the position of the enemy in

the vicinity of Beverly Ford and Rappahannock Station...to place the long range guns under my command in position to open upon the enemy's batteries early the following morning....The heavy fog prevailing obscured the opposite bank of the river and the enemy's position entirely from view until 6 a.m. at which hour I opened fire from Captain Miller's batttery of long range guns of the enemy directly in front at a range of aboout 1000 yards. By previous arrangements, the batteries on the right and left of Captain Miller's position immediately opened fire and the fire became general along the line....The enemy having our exact range fired with terrible precision and effect. For sometime we maintained this unequal conflict...the cannonade continued for several hours....In about two hours, however, the enemy abandoned his tete de pont. The object sought to be attained by this agreement, I am happy to say, was fully accomplished....The command withdrew...continuing to march up the Rappahannock, crossed the Hazel River and bivouacked at Jeffersonton(on the 24th)." (24)

STOP 3

Jeffersonton

Jackson moved his headquarters from Lee's Springs to Jeffersonton. He marched his staff west on Route 802 the 2.4 miles to the front of the village Baptist Church and located his camp on the small ridge across the street to the left from the front of the church. As he marched his staff west, he passed Hood's batteries and troops located below the ridgelines of the seven hills between the bridge at White Sulphur Springs and Jeffersonton. The field upon which the secretive meeting took place with Lee and his lieutenants is alleged by a local historian, who is well versed and researched in the local history, to be in the rear of the Baptist Church along the woodline to the right rear where a horse path once led to the Springs. (Map 6)

Sunday, 24 August, 1862

Situation

Morning Early recrosses the Rappahannock at White Sulphur Springs
Longstreet moves toward Jackson at White Sulphur Springs

Sigel, Banks, Reno moving to support Milroy at White Sulphur Springs
McDowell moving towards Rappahannock, Ricketts via Alexandria, King via Old Culpeper Road
Hooker moving by rail to Warrenton Junction (Calverton)
Sykes passing Falmouth; parts of Morrell at Kelly's Ford

Noon Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, Stuart meet at Jeffersonton
Longstreet takes up Jackson's positions at White Sulphur Springs

Evening Jackson pulls back to Jeffersonton
Mumford at Waterloo Ford
Stuart at Amissville

Buford at Waterloo Bridge, Sigel enroute
Banks and Reno at White Sulphur Springs, Reynolds enroute
McDowell unchanged
Hooker at Bealton, Kearney at Warrenton Junction
Porter camped near Morrisville

Throughout the night, Stuart and his men minus Robertson straggled back into camp at Jeffersonton, wet, tired, and hungry. They had not eaten since they left on their raid. However, despite his fatigue, Stuart was in a "jolly" mood returning from his wet raid with something more than the dispatch book to show his superiors. Least important of his booty, but one which greatly amused Jackson, who was fond of Stuart, was Pope's dress coat. Stuart, it is alleged by Henderson, wrote the following note to Pope:

"General:

You have my hat and plume. I have your best coat.

I have the honor to propose a cartel for a fair exchange of the prisoners.

Very Respectfully,"(25)

The note, signed by Stuart was sent up through the Union lines with no knowledge of its results. Although this incident struck a humorous note in the midst of a cruel war, Pope's captured dispatch book quickly brought back the Confederate focus of the situation into grim reality.

Pope's dispatch book contained the most detailed information as to his strength, disposition, and disclosing his belief that the line of the Rappahannock was no longer tenable. Also, most interestingly, Pope believed that Stuart's advance on Catlett's Station had been made in connection with Jackson's attempt to cross at White Sulphur Springs and that the retreat of his cavalry, combined with that of Early's recrossing of the Rappahannock River seemed to indicate that the movement to turn his right flank had definitely been abandoned by Lee.

Without the judicious and efficient use of his cavalry, but rather by artillery and skirmishing contact with the Confederates, Pope had so far guessed the Confederate positions correctly and had moved and countermoved his whole force with Lee's army keeping Jackson's forces basically at his center.

"On the afternoon, the whole force of the enemy was stretched along the line of the river from Rappahanock Station to Waterloo Bridge with his center, and I think, his main body in the vicinity of White Sulphur Springs".(26)

Pope's whole force, in turn, was concentrated on the road which runs from Sulphur Springs through Warrenton and Gainsville to Alexandria to Washington. Pope and Lee both knew that the Army of Northern Virginia was in a most precarious situation. Lee had tried crossing the river at various points on the offensive several times and was repulsed at each occasion. Time was running out; the Union soon would mass its forces that would not only prevent an attack on the Union line, but could force a Confederate tactical retreat that would preempt the Confederate strategy. Lee realized from Pope's papers that he had twenty-four to forty-eight hours to turn the tide in his favor, if the tide could be turned. The enemy held the river line tightly with the Bull Run Mountains and the forests beyond shielding Washington to the northeast and McClellans's Army of the Potomac guarding the passage to the East. The situation was desperate;

it would take a Napoleonic solution to avert a Confederate disaster. In the afternoon, Lee held a historic war council with his "lieutenants" in a field to the rear of the Jeffersonton Baptist Church that was being used as a field hospital. Henry Kyd Douglas, Jackson's aide described the meeting in this way.

"It was a curious scene. A table was placed in the middle of a field, with not even a tree within hearing. General Lee sat at a table on which was spread a map. General Longstreet sat at his right, General Stuart on his left, and General Jackson stood opposite him; these four and no more...The consultation was very brief. As it closed, I was called by Gen. Jackson and I heard the only sentence of that consultation ever reported. It was uttered by the secretive Jackson and it was-'I will be moving within the hour'".(27)

Lee's plan was to split the Confederate forces--a direct violation of the most basic and strategic war maxim; however, what was he to lose? It was a bold and brilliant stroke. Although the risk was enormous, the risk of sitting in the defense was greater. Jackson's wing was to circle northward and around through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains to Manassas, twenty miles to the rear of Pope's army. Jackson could cut his communications and thus draw Pope further north away from Richmond and the Army of the Potomac. Here Lee sensed that he had an opportunity to dispose of Pope with a concentration of his forces at Manassas. Longstreet, therefore, would occupy Jackson's positions on the high ground overlooking the Rappahannock River adjacent the White Sulphur Springs Bridge and Waterloo Bridge and follow in Jackson's trace in a day's time.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Jackson summoned his reliable engineer, Captain Boswell:

"About 3 p.m. I received an order from General Jackson to report immediately to him at Jeffersonton....He directed me to select the most direct and covered route to Manassas. I recommended that by Amissville, Hinson's Mill, Orleans, Salem, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainsville which he approved and directed me to select guards which I did from Captain Adams' company,

Sixth Virginia Cavalry and to direct the front division in person at dawn the following morning."(28) (Map 8)

Boswell chose the "Wise Dragoons", Company K, Sixth Virginia Cavalry for a very good reason. Company K had been recruited in Fauquier County at Salem(Marshall), the same area to be marched over. Though not a native of Fauquier County, Boswell had relatives living just southeast of Thoroughfare Gap and was also familiar with the country. Evening was spent with Longstreet quietly assuming Jackson's defensive positions so as not to alert the Federals across the river; Jackson would need the element of surprise for his march. Jackson, in turn, secretive of the destination, gave the order to his enthusiastic, eager troops to prepare for a long march that was to begin before dawn with no baggage or haversacks. Unfortunately, most of his troops failed to get the word in time to prepare any rations for the arduous march before them.

STOP 4

Jackson's March

Route directions are contained within the narrative
(The route of Jackson's march has been verified
from the Official Records with clarifying
statements and explanations lifted from regimental
histories, letters, or other germane papers.)

Monday, 25 August, 1862

Situation

Morning Jackson's march begins being led by Sixth Va.
Cavalry followed by Ewell, Hill, and
Taliaferro
Longstreet between White Sulphur Springs and
Waterloo Bridge

Sigel ordered to Fayetteville, Banks to Bealton,
Reno to Kelly's Ford
McDowell, Heintzelman unchanged; Porter passing
Morrisville

Evening

Jackson at Salem; Longstreet unchanged; Anderson in reserve

Reno mistakenly heads toward Warrenton Junction
Ricketts near Waterloo; King, Reynolds outside Warrenton

Heintzelman, Porter little change; Banks near White Sulphur Springs

At the blush of first light, Boswell and Company K, Sixth Virginia Cavalry led in order, Ewell, A.P. Hill, and Taliaferro's divisions on the selected route. Stuart's cavalry started at

"2 a.m., and upon arriving at the brigade that night at 1 a.m., I had reveille sounded and preparations made for the march at 2 o'clock. In this way, I got no sleep, but continued in the saddle all night. I followed by direction the route of General Jackson through Amissville..."(29)

Stuart's cavalry shielded the way from Federal skirmishers and sharpshooters and more importantly, prevented detection and interception by a major Union formation.

From Jeffersonton, Jackson marched west out route 621(Colvin Road) to Route 211(Amissville Road) crossing Route 229 (This portion of Route 229 was not constructed until the 1930's) 1.5 miles away. At Route 211(3.7 miles), he turned left and continued passing through Amissville to Route 643 about 3.1 miles out of town. At Route 643(Hinson's Ford Road), the pathfinder Boswell turned right and headed to the Hedgeman River(Rappahannock), as it is called in these parts after the parson who started the Jeffersonton Baptist Church, about 2 miles away. (Hinson's Mill and the narrow, forty-five foot adjacent bridge affording Jackson's passage was burned out shortly after the Civil War and was never replaced; therefore, although a road,

of sorts, leads to and away from the river where Jackson crossed, passage by automobile is no longer possible. Therefore, the route will circle around and intercept the road that Jackson followed from the river, cutting no more than six miles out of his original path to Manassas. Turn around where convenient, and drive back to Route 211 and turn left proceeding back through Amissville to Route 622 about 5.4 miles. Turn left on Route 622 and continue 1.3 miles until you reach the historic Waterloo Bridge where Stuart originated his raid on Catlett. (This area was the scene of three button factories that were supplied with materials ferried in barges drawn by mules in a canal that extended from Fredricksburg to this point. One can only find small traces of evidence of the canal along the river today.) Cross the bridge and turn left onto Route 688 at .1 mile; proceed 3.5 miles to where Route 743 intersects Route 688 on your left.

Route 743 is a twisting, curving dirt road of four miles on which that Jackson exited the river after crossing at Hinson's Mill. It was about here that Jackson ordered Boswell to take the "Albemarle Light Horse"(Company K, 2nd Virginia Cavalry) and "Black Horse Cavalry"(Company H, 4th Virginia Cavalry) and scout the advance to Salem. The Confederate infantry continued to follow the route described.

Jackson exited the river via Route 743, tramping the four miles to Route 688. Turning left, he proceeded along Route 688 1.3 miles to the village of Orlean. Passing the Orlean Post Office on his left in the middle of the village, Jackson continued to bear right onto Route 732(Thumb Run Church Road) for

3.3 miles to Route 733. Turning right on Route 733 he proceeded .7 miles to the intersection of Route 733 and Route 738. He continued bearing left on Route 733 and continued to march for another 1 mile until he intercepted Route 765(dirt road) on his right. Jackson turned right on Route 765 and marched just a short distance(.5 mile) at which point he ordered his men to march across the path and field guarded by the woods directly to your front and pick up Route 724 on the other side. (At this point, turn left at the T on Route 765 and continue another 1.1 miles on the dirt road to Route 647(Marshall Grade Road); turn right and proceed .8 miles to Route 635. Again turn right on Route 635 and drive .3 miles to Route 724; turn right on Route 724 and move .4 miles down to the edge of the woodline. At approximately this spot, Jackson's men emerged from the field and continued their trek straight ahead down Route 724.) Jackson continued on Route 724(Stuart Carter Road) for 1.7 miles where it intercepted Route 721(Morgantown Road). He continued to bear left on Route 721 until he intercepted Route 55 about 3.4 miles down the road, turned right and proceeded through Salem(Marshall).

(As you proceed through Marshall, you will see a historical marker noting the passage and bivouacking of Jackson in the town of Salem on this date. The records indicate that Jackson's headquarters and his troops actually rested for the evening about a mile south of town. Later in the evening, however, Colonel Mumford came up with the 2nd Virginia Cavalry and actually spent the night in town.)

The troops were tired after covering twenty-six miles, many with no shoes and almost all eating nothing but roasted corn picked from nearby farms for lunch and supper. Nevertheless, Jackson's crew was a disciplined lot and their spirits were high. Jackson's men revered him as their leader; his genius and self discipline inspired them to perform extraordinarily out of blind allegiance and loyalty. Henderson, in his autobiography of

Jackson, recorded that Jackson stood on a large rock near Salem reviewing his men as they passed. As they started to cheer with their usual greeting, he raised his hands to stop them and the word was passed down the column, "Don't shout boys, the Yankees will hear us". The soldiers contented themselves with swinging their caps in much jubilation. Jackson, swelled with pride, turned to his staff and asked an unanswered question, "Who could fail to win battles with such men as these?"

Although Boswell and Stuart did a superb job of guiding and shielding Jackson's main body from major contact with the Federal forces, Pope, by evening, was very much aware of the Confederate movement from White Sulphur Springs area to the North. Sigel, from his blocking position from Waterloo Bridge to White Sulphur Springs Bridge, wired Pope:

"I received intelligence that a large force of the enemy's cavalry had crossed my right and was moving towards Orlean, and that another force had crossed my left, at Sulphur Springs and had taken possession of that place".(30)

Sigel had not only gained critical and timely intelligence of the early morning march, but had witnessed the exchange of Confederates in their positions. It was a vitally important piece of information, which, when pieced together with the rest of the incoming information of Confederate movements of that day from other Federal observations, could provide Pope with the key to Lee's operations. However, it was not to be.

Almost simultaneously, McDowell from his position received word from a Federal signal station of Jackson's movements and immediately sent Pope a message.

"What is the enemy's purpose is not easy to discover. Some have thought he means to march around our right through Rectortown to Washington. Others think that he intends going to the Shenandoah, either through Thorton's or Chester Gap. Either of these operations seems to me too hazardous for him to undertake with us in his rear and flank."(31)

Pope answer to McDowell's message at 9:30 p.m. manifested his pernicious mindset:

"I believe that the whole force of the enemy has marched to the Shenandoah Valley by way of Luray and Front Royal....I desire

you as early in the morning, holding Reynolds in reserve at Warrenton...to make a reconnaissance...and ascertain what is beyond Sulphur Springs."(32)

Again, Pope's inefficient use of his cavalry to gain timely and first hand intelligence was evident. Also, his erroneous assumption, based on the earlier exploits of Stuart in Catlett and Jackson's crossing of the river at White Sulphur Springs, that the Confederate movement would wheel West would prove to be fatal. In addition, Pope lost valuable time when he assigned McDowell to make a reconnaissance of the area that Sigel was guarding. Pope ordered Sigel back to Warrenton simply because he had no confidence in his capability and personally did not like him. In a note to Halleck on the 25th, Pope revealed:

"McDowell's is the only corps that is at all reliable that I have. Sigel, as you know, is perfectly unreliable, and I suggest that some officer of superior rank be sent to command his army corps. His conduct has occasioned me great dissatisfaction. Banks' corps is very weak...and demoralized."(33)

Pope's poor relationships with his subordinate generals stemming from his superior, bombastic attitude and manifested incompetence as a General Of the Army was fatally influencing his decisions; Pope drew Sigel back from the river line and subsequently assigned McDowell the mission.

The Second Day Of March

Tuesday, 26 August, 1862

Situation

Morning	<u>Jackson</u> continues his march to Bristoe <u>Longstreet</u> starts his march from White Sulphur Springs in trace of <u>Jackson</u> <u>Anderson</u> relieves <u>Longstreet</u> at Waterloo Bridge
Afternoon	<u>Stuart</u> overtakes <u>Jackson</u> at Gainsville <u>Jackson</u> captures Bristoe, <u>Trimble/Stuart</u> advances to Manassas
Evening	<u>Longstreet</u> camps at Orlean Sigel falls back to Warrenton Banks at Fayetteville, Porter approaches Bealton Station Heintzelman unchanged McDowell sent to Sulphur Springs to cover Sigel's withdrawl Reno halts at Warrenton Junction(Calverton) Reynolds near Warrenton
Night	Milroy(82nd Ohio) destroys Waterloo Bridge

Jackson's march continued early in the dark of the next morning with the column marching from Salem(Marshall) to White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, Haymarket and ultimately Bristoe. Longstreet's troops were also up early pushing off from the White Sulphur Spring/Waterloo area with Anderson relieving him of his defensive position. Longstreet marched in almost the exact footsteps of Jackson, but without the aid and safety provided by

the cavalry as Jackson had it all assigned to him.

Jackson picked up Route 55 out of Salem(Marshall) proceeding 4.5 miles past the village cemetery, through the burg of Bunker Hills to White Plains(The Plains) enroute to the Bull Run Mountains further to the East. Meeting some Union sharpshooters and skirmishers rifle fire that he quickly disposed of, Jackson proceeded through Thoroughfare Gap(4.4 miles from The Plains) virtually unopposed. Quickly transiting the Gap, Jackson continued on Route 55 for about 3.6 miles to Haymarket and Gainsville another 2.1 miles away. At Gainsville, Jackson's men continued to turn right onto Route 292 for .5 miles, turning left on Route 619. Jackson continued on to Bristoe another 6 miles, crossing the Broad Run .5 miles down the road.

J.E.B. Stuart, seeing the main roads were blocked by wagon trains, crossed at Free State Hills in the Pond Mountains south of Thoroughfare Gap. With the remainder of his cavalry division, he joined and screened Jackson's flank as the column passed through Gainsville. At sunset, the column arrived at Bristoe Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. The telegraph wires were cut and two supply trains were derailed. A third train approaching Bristoe from Pope's area enroute to Manassas sensed danger, reversed it's engines and escaped back to Warrenton to warn Pope of the situation. Captain H. Bliss, the officer in charge on board the retreating train, was originally ordered to Manassas to investigate the trouble and repair the telegraph. He wired immediately the following dispatch to Pope in Warrenton Junction:

"Having proceeded to near Bristoe Station. Found a train of cars burning and telegraph wires broken, and enemy in very heavy force. Do not deem it prudent to go on without further orders. Have conductor of burned train with me who reports there being a large force of the enemy...."(34)

Meanwhile, back in Bristoe, with the Confederates firmly in charge of the area, Jackson was made aware, subsequent to his arrival, of great stores of Union supplies that were staged at

Manassas Junction about six miles away. He believed that, although his men had just tramped fifty-four miles in forty hours, no time should be lost in capturing those stores. Although Trimble eagerly took the challenge and volunteered to move out without delay, Stuart was appointed the overall commander of the raid upon Manassas Junction. Trimble reported:

"Your order(to march on Manassas) was received about 9 o'clock that night after a long and fatiguing march of the army from Salem to Bristoe Station. I immediately put two regiments in motion-the Twenty First North Carolina and the Twenty First Georgia...in all about 500 men. (My third regiment was left at Bristoe) and proceeded with them to within one and a half miles of Manassas. (Stuart's horsemen moved along a parallel road while Trimble's men hiked the railroad tracks.) ...by 1:00 a.m., over 300 prisoners were taken, an immense quantity of commissary and quartermasters stores{50,000lbs. of bacon, 1000 barrels of corned beef, 2000 barrels of salt pork, 2000 barrels of flour(35)}; and a large train loaded with promiscuous army supplies...and about 200 horses independent of those belonging to the artillery were also captured."(36)

Jackson added to the list of captured supplies:

"...8 guns, with 72 horses,...upward of 210 new tents.... besides recovering 200 Negroes."(37)

Wednesday, 26 August, 1862

Situation

Morning

Trimble in Manassas

Hill, Taliaferro marching to Manassas

Ewell remains in Bristoe

Sigel in Warrenton

McDowell, Porter, Reno, Heintzelman, Morrell
marching to Manassas

Banks at Fayetteville

The first part of Jackson's mission was successfully completed. His forces had marched around to Pope's rear area, cut his vital communications, and was drawing Pope rapidly north away from the Rappahannock River towards the Federal capitol. The pace of the operation on both sides was accelerating to a tempo optimum for the Confederate generals and their operational plans; it would prove to be beyond Pope or his subordinates' capability to cope tactically or operationally. It was Jackson who, by his operational defensive actions, would now dictate the operational offensive actions of Pope and his Army of Virginia until the two wings of the Army of Northern Virginia would again unite in two days.

Word had filtered back to Pope and Washington(Halleck) that there was a "problem" in Bristoe and Manassas caused by a Rebel cavalry raiding party. However, nothing more than feeble and ineffective action was initiated by Pope to investigate and confirm his suspicions. In early morning, to safeguard his position in Bristoe, Jackson directed Stuart's cavalry to guard every road and avenue of approach; Ewell was ordered to conduct a strong defensive operation in Bristoe, barring a direct approach from Warrenton Junction by Pope. Jubal Early, one of his subordinates described Ewell's defenses:

"...next morning(25th), Lawton's brigade was posted on the left of the railroad(at Bristoe), Hays' brigade on the right of it, and my own brigade to the right of Hays', in a pine woods, our line of battle being fronted toward Warrenton Junction and occupying a ridge a short distance from Bristoe in the direction

of that Junction....brigades were placed so as to prevent surprise and an approach on the railroad."(38)

STOP 5

Manassas

Although many of Jackson's forces marched up the railroad early in the morning on their way to Manassas on the 26th, Jackson and his trains marched the .5 miles West on Route 619 to Route 28. Turning right on Route 28, he marched North, crossing the Broad Run at .8 miles. STOP (The Broad Run bridge and railroad bridge .8 miles to your immediate right on Route 660 were destroyed later in the day by Ewell in his retreat from Bristoe to Manassas. If time and interest permit, you can visit the scene.) CONTINUE Jackson continued to march up Route 28 for 3.1 miles to the Union supply depot in the railroad yard where the Orange & Alexandria and the Manassas Gap Railroads joined. At this point turn right into the Confederate Cemetery which is adjacent to the railroad yard where the supply depot was located immediately to the East. The cemetery is the permanent home for Colonel Bowen of the "Black Horse Cavalry."

Wednesday, 26 August, 1862

Situation

Noon Trimble, Hill, Taliaferro in Manassas
 Ewell in Bristoe

McDowell, Sigel, Reynolds countermarched to
 Gainsville
Kearney, Reno countermarched to Greenwich
Hooker, Porter to Bristoe

Evening Ewell's forces retreat to Manassas
 Pope's forces march to Manassas

After the defenses were set to Jackson's satisfaction in Bristoe, he moved with the rest of his troops up to Trimble's position at the Union supply depot in Manassas. Jackson recalled best the actions of the day in his after action report:

"The next morning the divisions under the command of General Hill and Taliaferro moved to Manassas Junction, the division of General Ewell remaining at Bristoe Station. About a mile before reaching the Junction Colonel W.S.H. Baylor encountered and disposed of a regiment of Federal cavalry. Soon after the advance of the troops from Bristoe Station reached the Junction they were fired upon a distant battery of the enemy posted in the direction of the battlefield of Manassas. (This battery was the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery called "Heavies", who had advanced from Centerville earlier that morning. Subsequent to accurate return fire from Hill's artillery on the "Heavies'" position, the Federal artillery unit beat a hasty retreat towards Centerville from what they originally thought was a Confederate raiding party.) Soon after, a Confederate body of Federal infantry, under Brigadier General Taylor of New Jersey,

came in sight, having, it is believed, that morning left Alexandria in the cars(railroad), and boldly pushed forward to discover the position and stores which had been lost the previous night. The advance was made with great spirit and determination under a leader worthy of a better cause...it(Taylor's brigade) soon commenced retreating and was routed....In this conflict, the Federal Commander, General Taylor, was mortally wounded."(39)

Jackson, out of respect for Taylor, actually offered him an opportunity to surrender before engaging in a fight that Jackson knew could only end in the decimation of the inferior Union force. The Confederate offering was acknowledged with a rifle shot.

As this action was over by noon, the remainder of the day was spent by Jackson's men, save Ewell's troops in Bristoe, plundering the Union supplies in Manassas. It was a feast that few of the ill clad, barefooted "boys of the South" had ever experienced. There were new shoes for the barefooted, blue uniforms for the tattered and ragged, saddles and bridle gear for the well worn cavalry, medicines, toothbrushes and soap. The most appreciated, however, was the food. Although the staples such as hardtack and coffee were plentiful, the green corn and apple fed troops passed them up and gorged themselves on a cornucopia of exotic foods such as lobster salad, sardines, smoked oysters, canned meats, fresh fruits, white wines, beer, and cigars. Jackson was liberal in his allowances with his men until late afternoon when his defenses were perked: word reached Manassas that Ewell was having trouble in Bristoe.

Late in the afternoon, Ewell noted enemy activity advancing from the south towards his position. Jubal Early accounts for what happened:

"...in the afternoon, indications were seen of the approach of heavy columns of the enemy from the direction of Warrenton Junction. In a short time the enemy was seen approaching on the right of the railroad and in front of Hays' brigade....The enemy's force consisted of heavy columns of infantry and artillery....Fresh columns of the enemy were seen advancing, and it became apparent that his force was much larger than ours, and the nature of the ground was such that a movement to our right,

which he was evidently making, he could obtain a position which commanded the rear of our line and the crossings of Broad Run. General Ewell then informed me that he had received orders from General Jackson to retire towards Manassas Junction if the enemy came in a large force and he gave the orders for withdrawal of our forces across Broad Run...directing me to move one or two regiments by flank with colors elevated, so as to present the appearance of the arrival of reinforcements. This was done and the enemy did not advance any further."(39)

Ewell, with a superior force, had met Hooker head on and did not realize that he had the advantage. It was a rare case of where Hooker would out-maneuver anyone on a battlefield in the war. At dusk, following Hooker's advance to Bristoe, Pope rode in with his headquarters. Subsequent to his arrival in Bristoe, he was briefed of the confrontation with Ewell. (Map 9) He immediately instructed Porter to remain in Warrenton Junction(Calverton) and Banks to march to Gainesville to cut off what he thought was a large Confederate cavalry unit retreating west to the mountains. Shortly thereafter, however, he received intelligence that quickly changed his mind and recinded the order. Pope later reported, that by dark:

"...I had by that time become conscious that the whole force under Jackson...was south of the Warrenton Turnpike and in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction. McDowell reached his position(Gainesville)...as did Kearney and Reno(Greenwich), and it was clear that we had we had interposed completely between Jackson and the main body of the enemy, which was still west of the Bull Run range and the neighborhood of White Plains(The Plains)....There were but two courses left open to Jackson....he could not retrace his steps through Gainesville, as it was occupied by McDowell...and(Jackson) was obliged, therefore, to retreat through Centerville, or to mass his force

and assault us at Bristoe Station, and to our right. He pursued the former course and retired through Centerville."(41)

Pope's assessment of the situation could not have been any more wrong. Subsequent to his burning of the Bristoe railroad bridge over the Broad Run on Nokesville Road(Route 28), Ewell successfully retreated north to join Jackson at Manassas Junction with minimum casualties. Jackson, apprised of the situation at Bristoe, realized that although he had accomplished his mission as ordered by Lee, could not afford to wage a major engagement with Pope. Although he was the aggressor, it was imperative that he retreat to a superior defensive position that would facilitate a tactical link up of Lee upon his arrival in the area in the next twenty-four hours. Lee was but a day's march behind Jackson, but as Freeman in his autobiography of Lee wrote:

"Reinforcements were coming, Jackson between Pope and Washington, the railroad out, the enemy's advance base destroyed, it was enough to strengthen men...there was a definite lessening of tension, and the pace was slower. Lee did not have the heart to push his men when there was nothing in Jackson's dispatch to indicate his situation demanded a forced march. Headquarters were established late in the evening...near White Plains. The Army of Northern Virginia was just 22 miles from Jackson."(42)

Jackson, once made aware of Lee's position, acted decisively in Manassas:

"Having appropriated all that we could use(stores and supplies), and unwilling that the remainder should fall into the hands of the enemy, who took possession of the place the next day, orders were given to destroy all that remained after supplying the immediate wants of the army."(43)

The usually reticent Jackson manifested his tactical and operational genius in his retreat from the area before the forces of Pope arrived early the next morning. As the flames of the torched remaining Union supplies lit the night air, the words of his commanders describe their courses of action:

Taliaferro commented: "I moved my division, with the entire

trains, across to the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike, passing the old military road to Sudley Mill and at daybreak halted on the old battlefield of July 21, 1861."(44) Early continued, "...when my men had their fill(of supplies), they moved in the direction of Centerville toward Bull Run and the several brigades bivouacked separately between Manassas and Bull Run."(45) A.P. Hill added "At 1:00 o'clock(in the morning), I moved my division to Centerville."(46)

Jackson's retreat(Map 10) in three different directions was a brilliant maneuver that served his operational and tactical purposes exactly. First, it greatly confused Pope into thinking that Jackson had retreated with his forces towards Centerville causing Pope to order his army to countermarch north towards Centerville. Secondly, it bought the usually offense minded Jackson the precious time to hold defensively until the arrival of Lee. His place of retreat was a carefully selected piece of terrain known as Stoney Ridge. It was a two mile prominent but irregular line of wooded high ground that was south of Sudley Springs and north of the Centerville Turnpike(also known as the Warrenton Turnpike). Located about twelve miles from Thoroughfare Gap, it offered a protected avenue of retreat through Aldie Gap to the North if needed. The shady ridge was sufficiently off the Warrenton Turnpike to afford the concealment of Jackson's weary forces, contained the necessary dominate terrain features from which to conduct a strong defence, and yet close enough to execute a surprise flank attack on any unwary unit traveling on the primary avenue of approach(Warrenton Turnpike). The wooded ridge met all of Jackson's requirements; it was a place to vigilantly rest while he waited on his General.

STOP 6

Stoney Ridge

In the evening of the 26th, Taliaferro left the supply depot and railroad junction area via Sudley Road. Sudley Road was Route 674 in 1862. Taliaferro turned left from the area (Confederate Cemetery) and marched his men back west on Route 28 for .7 miles, to the intersection of Route 28 and Wellington Road, crossing the Manassas Gap railroad enroute. Turning right on Wellington Road (Route 674), they continued for .9 miles to Rixlew Lane (Route 668). Turning right on Rixlew Lane (Route 668), the Confederates quickly covered the 1 mile to Sudley Road (Route 234). They turned left on Route 234 and marched for 3.4 miles to Route 29 (Centerville Pike). Taliaferro and his troops turned left and marched 1.7 miles to where they exited the road to the right moving through the woods to their assigned defensive positions on Stoney Ridge. Turn right into the Battery Heights Park exhibit. Stoney Ridge (Map 11) is the wooded high ground to the left of the exhibit.

Thursday, 28 August, 1862

Situation

Morning Lee at White Plains
 Jackson's forces continue to retreat

 Pope's forces massing on Manassas
 Hooker, Kearney at Bristoe
 Reno marching to Centerville
 McDowell marching to Manassas
 Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap
 Banks at Warrenton Junction

Noon Lee at Thoroughfare Gap
 Jackson set in the defensive at Stoney Ridge

 Pope's forces marching to Centerville
 Banks at Warrenton Junction

Evening Lee passes through Thoroughfare Gap
 Jackson engaged in Battle of Groveton

 Pope's army massing in Centerville

As dawn broke, Jackson's forces continued in their execution of a brilliant and most effective ruse over Pope of retreating by way of three different paths. Pope was convinced that Jackson was retreating to Centerville. Taliaferro was in place on the right of the ridge by dawn, as Jackson ordered. Ewell, who retreated Manassas in trace of A.P. Hill towards Bull Run, rose at dawn and moved up to Blackburn's Ford, crossing Bull Run, through the fields on the north bank of the run, over the Stone Bridge on Warrenton Pike in a westerly direction to occupy the middle of Stoney Ridge no later than 10 o'clock in the morning. A.P. Hill broke camp in Centerville also at first light and marched down Warrenton Pike to the same ridge to command Jackson's left flank by noon. Incredibly, most of Jackson's force was maneuvering with troops and wagons during the morning daylight no more than two to three miles from the main elements of Pope's army and was not detected. Jackson now rested his tired men, watched Pope's troops from his guarded position, and waited defensively for Lee's arrival.

Meanwhile, Pope's intelligence of Jackson's lines of retreat from Manassas led him to be seriously deceived and characteristically in this campaign, skewed his anticipation of

Jackson's subsequent actions. His cavalry was ridden worthless and his weak military judgement was further diluted by his complete disregard of the little intelligence at his disposal. He completely lost his head knowing the enemy(Jackson) was in his rear area and substituted intuition for facts. Although he had completely lost track of Jackson, his anticipation of Jackson's unpredictable moves overwhelmed him to execute a flawed plan in his chase of Jackson. In the evening of the night before, from his headquarters in Bristoe, he ordered his entire army, save Banks, to mass in Manassas by morning. At 9 p.m. on the 27th, he dispatched to Reno:

"...advance upon Manassas Junction from Gainesville at the same hour; Kearney in Bristoe. As you value success, be off by the earliest blush of dawn".(47)

Pope's order to his army to mass in Manassas was not executed "by dawn". Not only had Pope lost track of Jackson, his corps were not where he thought they were to execute the order on time. McDowell was not in Gainesville, as Pope thought, but west of Gainesville. However, as Pope was writing his order to his army in the evening of the 27th, McDowell was aware of vital intelligence, that if acted upon correctly, could have operationally altered the events of the campaign in favor of the North. McDowell, in his after action report to Pope, explained:

"Buford...sent word(on the 27th) that he had cut the enemy's column and forced Longstreet to deploy between Salem and White Plains(The Plains)....The night of the 27th, I saw General Sigel...and informed him that Longstreet would be coming through the Gap next morning...and that I would give him one of my divisions(Ricketts) and charge him...of watching the Gap and engaging the forces when they came through, whilst I would go against those(Jackson) who had already passed. I sent word to you(Pope) at Bristoe, but whilst preparations were being made to carry out it out, I received your order dated 27 August, 9 o'clock, at 2:30 in the morning on the 28th. I showed your order to General Sigel and sent him a copy of my general order. My order required all the forces to march immediately(to Manassas).

I...endeavored to get the forces forward there early as you indicated. General Sigel, instead of complying fully...that all wagons go by way of Catlett's, had brought with them nearly 200 which encumbered the road and embarrassed our movement seriously,....Knowing that Longstreet would be coming through Thoroughfare, I sent cavalry(Buford & Bayard)...and I detached Ricketts in check."(48)

McDowell's order to Ricketts to guard Thoroughfare Gap was executed at the time without Pope's knowledge. This fact is of little consequence, however, when the question is asked why McDowell, who armed with vital intelligence that had operational and strategic importance relative to the success of this campaign, executed an order that he(McDowell) knew not only enhanced the success of the Confederate strategy but was absolutely fatalistic to the successful prosecution of the Union objectives. McDowell alone uncovered and understood Lee's plan and was in a physical position to reverse the campaign's predictable conclusion: his actions in this situation remain a mystery. Nevertheless, that Pope's army would mass in Manassas six hours late relative to his order is irrelevant in light of the fact that the order itself was a operational blunder. It was a gross mistake that would later prove to have grave consequences. It was, in retrospect, symptomatic of the problems that would continue to plague the Army of Virginia's leadership and coordination that were vitally necessary to execute a successful campaign. Pope and his generals had squandered the first major opportunity offered that day to defeat the Army of Northern Virginia by blocking Lee at Thoroughfare Gap with McDowell's Corps.

Shortly after noon, Halleck and McClellan were aware of Pope's assessment of the situation in Manassas and both showed signs of panic. McClellan, with an erroneous intelligence report indicating a grossly overinflated enemy strength(120,000), proposed to Washington that Pope pull back between the Occoquan and Potomac Rivers to bolster the defenses of the capitol. Halleck responded by ordering McClellan to immediately mass the remaining troops of his Army of the Potomac in Manassas to support and reinforce Pope.

Pope, arriving at his headquarters between Manassas and Centerville shortly after noon while troops steadily piled into Manassas, suddenly realized that Jackson was not between Gainesville and his position, as he thought. Pope now accepted the fact that he had completely lost track of Jackson and fully realized that his order to concentrate his army in Manassas was a mistake and he must countermand his order, but where? At first, he was inclined to think Jackson was retreating through Centerville to cross the Bull Run Mountains through Aldie Gap,

fifteen miles to the North, to reunite with Lee in his march to the Shenandoah Valley. Pope's intuition and emotion was now guiding his actions; he ordered McDowell from his present position to head north and cut Jackson's retreat.

At 3 o'clock, shortly after Pope assigned McDowell's mission, Pope received word from Halleck that McClellan

"...was satisfied that the enemy, in large force, is between us and Pope."(49)

...meaning that Jackson was again in Pope's rear area near Washington. Panic was spreading. Pope was thoroughly puzzled; although this fact would certainly explain away Jackson's conspicuous absence around Manassas, he really did not believe the report. He had no cavalry to confirm or deny the report and he could not take a chance on the possibility of it not being a hoax. His capabilities completely strained, Pope now lost all situational and battlefield awareness. He cancelled McDowell's order to tramp north and ordered the entire Army of Virginia, save Banks, on the chase after Jackson who was supposedly somewhere to the Northeast. Pope's order at 3 o'clock to McDowell read:

"The enemy is reported in force on the other side of Bull Run, on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, as also near Centerville. I have ordered Sigel to march on Centerville immediately, as also Kearney and Reno. I will advance Hooker as reserve. Please march immediately with your command directly upon Centerville from where you are."(50)

Pope's order to converge his army on Centerville was another gross error in judgement; it was his second serious mistake of the day and the Union's third major blunder. There would be more before the day was out.

About the same time that Pope's army was marching off to Centerville in the forenoon, Longstreet was approaching Thoroughfare Gap. General Lee reported the action:

"...he(Longstreet) found the enemy(Ricketts) to dispute his progress. General D.R. Jones' division, being ordered to force the passage of the mountains, quickly dislodged the enemy's sharpshooters from the trees and rocks and advanced to the gorge. The enemy held the eastern extremity of the pass in large

force....The ground occupied by Jones afforded no opportunity for the employment of artillery. Hood...was ordered to turn the enemy's right...moving over the mountain by a narrow path to the left of the pass and (Wilcox) further to the North by Hopewell Gap(three miles north). Being vigorously repulsed, he(Ricketts) withdrew to the eastern end of the Gap until dark...and then retreated...."(51)

Rickett's retreat to Gainsville would prove to be the fourth major Union mistake of the day. Lee was now assured of passage through the Gap virtually unopposed. Only twelve miles from Jackson's position, Lee knew from the sounds of rapid sustained cannon fire to the East that no time could be lost in uniting with his left wing tomorrow.

The violent noise of sustained cannonfire that Lee heard at dusk was Jackson hotly engaged in the Battle of Groveton. King and Doubleday's divisions, bringing up the rear of McDowell's Corps, were approaching the Sudley Springs Road(Highway 234) on the Centerville Pike enroute to Centerville as Pope had ordered earlier. Throughout the morning, Jackson from his commanding vantage point on Stoney Ridge, witnessed the Federals massing Eastward; he was puzzled in thinking that they were retreating. However, Colonel B. Johnson, Second Virginia Brigade, delivered a captured Union courier bearing a dispatch from General McDowell to Major General Sigel:

"I immediately sent the courier and dispatch...to Major General Jackson. The intercepted dispatch was an order issued the night before from Major General McDowell to...Sigel and...Reynolds conveying the order of attack on Manassas Junction..."(52)

Throughout the rest of the day, Jackson confirmed the order of march in McDowell's order with the column marching down Centerville Pike not six-hundred yards away. Although his pickets and cavalry had periphery contact with Sigel's Corps earlier in the day, his concentration of troops remained hidden and unmolested, resting in the shaded woods while Stuart guarded his flanks. At precisely the correct time, at dusk(Map 12), Jackson executed a surprise attack on the flanks of King and Doubleday. Jackson remembered:

"Dispositions were promptly made to attack the enemy, based

upon the idea that he would continue to press forward upon the turnpike toward Alexandria, but as he did not appear to advance in force and there was no reason to believe that his main body was leaving the road and inclining toward Manassas Junction, my command was advanced through the woods, leaving Groveton on the left until it reached a commanding position near Brawner's house. By this time, it was sunset...his column appeared to be moving by, with its flank exposed, I determined to attack it at once...with the divisions of Taliaferro and Ewell...our line was less than 100 yards from a large force of the enemy...the Federals did not advance, but maintained their advance with obstinate determination. Both lines stood exposed...until about 9 o'clock when the enemy slowly fell back....The losses on both sides were heavy,...our wounded included Major General Ewell and Brigadier General Taliaferro."(53)

The determined troops colliding with Jackson were Doubleday's two regiments and Gibbon's "Black Hat Brigade" so named because the Indiana and Wisconsin natives wore the U.S. Army's dress uniforms-knee length frock coats topped by black, high-crowned hats. They won the admiration of Jackson's troops for being stubborn foes and ferocious fighters. For over an hour and a half, the two battle lines stood a stone's throw apart in deadly combat. Union soldiers stood upright loading and firing without cover of any sort, the Confederates partially protected by the Brawner House and nearby orchard. The Civil War rifle at 100 yards could fire a pattern within a 12 inch circle. The only hindering factors affecting the soldiers' accuracy this night was the rapidly fading light and the haze created by the gunsmoke lingering in the hot humid night air. The casualty rate on both sides challenges one's imagination. Due to the wooded terrain, only a few Confederate cannons were brought to bear upon the few Union cannons that were available for the fight. However, the cannons on both sides were being used in a murderous direct fire mode, registering fire on each other's muzzle flashes, some as close as sixty yards from each other, exchanging cannonball for cannonball. Slowly, the two lines blasted each other off the field about 9 o'clock, leaving the ranks of their dead where they fell. More than one third of the Federals and Confederates engaged had been shot to include every field-grade officer of the

7th Wisconsin.

The Union retired quietly to safety, leaving the field to the Confederates. Gibbon took charge of the remaining Union forces and marched to Manassas, rather than to Centerville as ordered by Pope. Gibbon explained why:

"The battle took place on the very ground where an hour before Hatch's brigade was deployed making his reconnaissance. We...were completely surprised...whilst marching in flank along Warrenton Turnpike....Our position was now a critical one. To oppose the large force of the enemy we had but four small brigades, one...much cut up...and nothing but the determined front(Union) prevented the enemy from forcing his way back to the pike that night, thus opening his communications with Longstreet, approaching through Thoroughfare Gap. No superior general officer was in the vicinity with the knowledge and authority to order up troops to our support and the enemy held the high ground, from which he would no doubt open fire upon us in the morning. It was therefore decided to withdraw towards Manassas Junction that night."(54)

Although Gibbon seemed to understand the gravity of his actions in retreating to Manassas and certainly did so nobly in the interest of the preservation of his men, it was the fifth major error to be committed by the Union this day. In Gibbon's retreat to Manassas, the Warrenton Turnpike was now left unopposed for Lee's march to Jackson's right the next day.

Pope, notified of the violent clash with Jackson by a messenger from Gibbon at 9:20 p.m., was elated with the news, but still remained fatally ignorant of the true operational situation of the battlefield. Now believing that McDowell's Corps with 25,000 men had run headlong into Jackson's retreat, and was subsequently blocking his exit through Thoroughfare Gap, ordered McDowell to hold his position as an anvil at all cost. He then sent orders to Kearney, Heintzelman, and Porter to march immediately from their position near Bull Run to act as the hammers to crush Jackson at dawn. The order to Heintzelman, issued at 10 p.m., read:

"General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy.

Sigel is immediately on his right, and I see no possibility of his escape. I have instructed Kearney to push forward....Hooker shall march at 3 o'clock tonight. Advance cautiously and at early dawn attack him vigorously".(55)

Pope's final order of the day was in consonance with his others of the day: it too would prove to be fatal to his chances of success in this campaign. His last order not only scattered his forces further out of control, but gave Jackson another day to rest and wait for Lee without fear of attack from a concentration of Union forces. Jackson, subsequent to the clash with Gibbon, retreated to an abandoned "unfinished railroad" a little west from his position on Stoney Ridge. Although the fight with Gibbon would cost Jackson irreplaceable leadership(Ewell and Taliaferro) and loyal fighters, his attack served as a brilliant fait accompli to his mission as ordered by Lee. As Jackson retreated throughout the night to assume a superior defensive position, his offensive tactical actions initiated from an operational defensive posture at dusk insured that Pope would be in the area tomorrow. The Confederates would end their campaign on the next day's battlefield, fulfilling all of Lee's strategic and operational objectives with superbly executed tactics and maneuvers.

STOP 7

The Unfinished Railroad

Turn right out of the Battery Heights park exhibit and proceed .5 miles west on the Centerville Pike (Route 29). Off to your right about 600 yards is the Brawner House. It was rebuilt at the turn of the century and abandoned mid-century. The Park Service has recently purchased the area of Stoney Ridge to include the Brawner House, however because of a lack of park funds, renovation of the house has not been started. Turn around where convenient and proceed back to the Battery Heights exhibit and continue for .5 miles past that point to Featherbed Lane intersecting on your left. Turn left onto Featherbed Lane and drive .8 miles to the "unfinished railroad" exhibit.

Friday, 29 August, 1862

Situation

Longstreet on the eastern slope of Thoroughfare Gap
Jackson occupying the "unfinished railroad"

Pope marching west on the Centerville Pike

Jackson retreated to the "unfinished railroad", taking most of the night to set his troops in their assigned defensive positions. The "unfinished railroad" was an abandoned railroad bed that was to be an independent line on the Manassas Gap Railroad connecting Gainesville to Alexandria. Running out of money in 1853, the series of cuts and banks were left without tracks or trestles; it was, in effect, a perfect ready-made two mile line of breastworks from which Jackson could conduct a delaying operation from a superior defensive position, if necessary. Jackson's grey lines ran from the Catharpin Run near Sudley Church on his left to the base of Stoney Ridge southeasterly to a point just north of Brawner's farm on his right. On the left was A.P. Hill's division with the first and second echelons occupied by three brigades (Field, Thomas, Gregg) and the third echelon also by three brigades (Branch, Pender, Archer). The middle was commanded by two brigades of Ewell's division now commanded by Lawton (Turnbull, Lawton). Jackson's right was commanded by Taliaferro's division under Starke. The first and second echelons had two brigades as did the third echelon. The flanks were guarded by Stuart's cavalry with a portion of the cavalry positioned at Haymarket to intercept Longstreet's march and guide him to Jackson's right. Jackson positioned his forty remaining cannons so as to cover every critical avenue of approach to his position from an easterly direction. Positioning them five hundred yards to the rear of his lines, he had sixteen cannons on his left and twenty-four overlooking right center. Here Jackson would wait with his 18,000 men and 1500 cavalry; although Jackson was poised for a fight, his intention was remain in the defensive until the Army of Northern Virginia could reunite with his force, hopefully, sometime today. (Map 13) His mission had been executed superbly; all assigned objectives had been accomplished.

The first campaign of Lee as General of the Army of Northern Virginia was rapidly drawing to a close; the major moves of the Grey and Blue lines in the struggle had been completed. Unpredictable and innovative, Lee and his "lieutenants" had executed the Confederate campaign plan brilliantly and had capitalized on Pope's weaknesses and errors masterfully and totally. The ending of this campaign was a foregone conclusion if it was to end on the battlefield. As Lee sensed in Jeffersonton, "an opportunity may present itself in Manassas to dispose of Pope." History, predictably, would record the defeat of the Army of Virginia at the hands of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Second Battle of Manassas in but a day and a half.

Reflections

"Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in the theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. A campaign is a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater. The operational art sets the objectives and pattern of military activity. The tactical level of war is the art by which commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. As with the distinction between the strategic and operational levels of war, the distinction between the tactical and operational levels of war is not a clear, distinct line." (56)

Strategically, the campaign served both the North and South by successfully meeting the defensive objectives of each side. Although neither capital (centers of gravity) fell, the North failed offensively in their strategy to destroy the Confederacy by taking Richmond in the Peninsular campaign. Pope was an integral part of that strategy. The reorganized Army of Virginia under Pope was ordered to Gordonsville and Charlottesville to prevent a concentration of Confederate forces around Richmond, to cut Confederate communications, and ultimately to attack Richmond from the West in support of McClellan's Army of the Potomac in the peninsula. Conversely, Lee felt that the occupation of the capital (Richmond), despite all attacks to capture it, became so much of a matter of prestige that it formed the basis of his strategy without any formal declaration of military policy. He understood the North's strategy completely and countered it totally, but not without risk. His operational plan was to protect the "Verdun of the South" by accommodating the Union in taking the war to them in Pope's theater in an offensive campaign that would ultimately threaten Washington. He would, in effect, "pull" the enemy from Richmond rather than "push" the enemy away in a defensive engagement that would bleed the Confederacy to death in a war of attrition. Lee's campaign plan was simple. "My desire has been to avoid a general engagement, being the weaker force, and by menacing to relieve the portion of the country referred to". (57) Lee also understood that because of a wavering political environment in the North, that a crushing defeat of the Federal army could drive the Union populace towards a conclusion of peace.

Operationally and tactically, Lee and his "lieutenants" conducted the campaign masterfully by adhering to the time-tested

axioms and corollaries of war when appropriate and by unpredictably breaking these rules when vitally necessary. Pope, on the other hand, was not well versed in the basic do's and don'ts of war; therefore, he was not only handicapped in the tactical execution of his plan to meet the campaign objectives, but more importantly, he or his superiors did not fully recognize Lee's objectives or the seriousness of Lee's actions relative to his position in the theater. The first major blunder was committed by Washington in not ordering Pope to march East and join McClellan in the taking of the South's center of gravity when Lee and his army was drawn into the theater west of Richmond. The Union was so preoccupied with the defense of Washington that they deviated from their original plan to destroy Richmond; Pope was ordered on the Rappahannock to hold until reinforcements arrived from McClellan. The North did, essentially, exactly what Lee had hoped they would do.

Pope's handicaps were recognized by Lee early in the campaign and capitalized upon totally by his army. The Confederate General and his "lieutenants" fully understood and judged the man(Pope), before embarking on their maneuvers. Lee's ability to outwit and outmaneuver his enemy, therefore, was no accident but rather due to a carefully construed plan. Lee recognized, promoted, and surrounded himself with "lieutenants" who, like himself, had a deep insight into war and were capable of translating strategy into "operational art" that met with the definition and was tactically executable. Comparatively, Pope suffered from a weak organizational and professional base of military knowledge from which to draw an operational plan based on national policy. His demonstration of "operational art" was poorly devised and executed because of pitifully poor inherent use of sound military judgement. As an example, Pope failed to meet his original campaign objectives and subsequently, when confronted with a necessary change of orders from Washington, failed to recognize his tenuous position between the rivers, failed to recognize the vulnerability of his rear communications, did not underscore the seriousness of Jackson's movements, and did not comprehend the overall objective of Lee's plans until the 29th of August. His misunderstanding of the total military situation and mishandling of troops were faulty to an extreme. In consonance with his deficiencies, Pope's "lieutenants" and troops were a hodgepodge of corps and divisions who were united in name only. Pope's ability to command and control his disjointed legions was systematically eroded by his lack of credibility within his subordinates' ranks stemming from his poor to non existent personal or professional relationships with his generals. Conversely, in the Army of Virginia, strong professional and respectful personal relationships were inbred within the senior leadership. The "profession of arms" in the South was held in the highest respect by it's populace. The resulting trust and confidence at the "top" translated into a force multiplier in the lower ranks. The resultant was a loyal, enthusiastic, esprit that strengthened and insured a cohesive and coordinated army capable of executing orders in the face of very often overwhelming odds.

It was, however, more than a sound campaign plan, strong leadership, astute military judgement, strong personal relationships and an infectious cause for which loyal "Confederates" willingly shed their blood or arguably, more than the lack of these very factors in the Union army that allowed the smaller Army of Northern Virginia to run roughshod over the larger, better equipped Army of Virginia. It was much more. Pope, like many generals, was a victim in believing that all war is a matter of precedent; he consequently found himself fatally deceived throughout the campaign. He initially distinguished himself for his inefficient utilization of cavalry in intelligence gathering of the enemy, and what intelligence he had at his disposal was either ignored or poorly processed in an untimely manner. Therefore, his anticipation of the Confederate's movements and subsequent orders to counter the Confederates in the fast paced tactical arena were based on an already acknowledged poor military judgement and was further flawed by his lack of emotional control under the strain and stress of the battlefield. He was, in effect, his own worst enemy. His reaction to Jackson's rearward march exacerbated the problem of Jackson's presence by scattering the Union forces with marches and countermarches throughout the theater instead of preserving his tactically superior position between Lee's two split wings. His orders to his army on the 28th of August resulted in five lost major opportunities, independent of each other, to selectively destroy Lee's army, one wing at a time. The baneful effects of dispersion have never been more strikingly illustrated on the field of battle. On the evening of the 28th of August, Pope had 20,000 men at Bull Run, 20,000 at Manassas, 18,000 at Centerville, 11,000 at Bristoe Station, and 9000 at Greenwich. Not withstanding that the "fog of war" will cause confusion in the total comprehension of the tactical situation on any battlefield, Jackson, located within the heart of Pope's army with a mere 20,000 weary men, should have been destroyed by Pope the following morning.

In the Southern camp, Lee and his cohorts, however, not only understand the precedents of war, but more importantly, understood when the risk was worth breaking with precedent. Jackson's march around Pope was a stroke of unpredictable imagination and boldness. The plan to split the army, march around to Pope's rear area to cut his vital communications, and then hold him by the throat until the Army of Northern Virginia could reunite and concentrate to deal the "coup de grace" was insanity when the risk is reviewed purely in the light of the maxims of war. However, when reviewed over Lee's shoulder at the moment of decision, what were his options? The risk was clearly worth the gains when a general such as Jackson stood in your midst. Although the plan was clearly above Pope's intellectual or military capacity to comprehend even when confronted with accurate and timely intelligence, Jackson's execution was demonstrably beyond Pope or his subordinate's ability to effectively counter militarily. It was readily apparent that the Union had not within their ranks the leadership of the caliber of a Jackson. His reputation to be in two places at the

same time was legendary, respected, and feared. A strict disciplinarian, Jackson fervently adhered to the regimen of briskly marching his men for fifty minutes with a ten minute break; his path was guided by men who were recruited from the area that he was tramping. As there were no wasted steps in his fast paced marches, neither did the deliberate, decisive leader waste time in striking furiously and effectively when the opportunity presented itself tactically. The usually offensive-minded Jackson, when contrasted with the conservative, defensive-minded Longstreet, seemed reckless. However, the melding of these two "lieutenant's" personalities and capabilities under the watchful eye of their gentle, genius general proved to be a formidable force that could confound even competent Union leadership.

At the close of the campaign at the end of August, except for the troops at Norfolk and Fort Monroe, the only Federals closer than 100 miles to Richmond were prisoners of war and men who were busily preparing to retreat from the base at Aquia Harbor. Washington was seriously threatened. Despairing Union officials in Washington had given orders to ship all moveable government property to New York; city locals were being mobilized to help in the defense of the capitol. Lee had met his operational objectives and in doing so, fulfilled national policy in preserving the Confederacy for a time.

The Campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas is replete with examples of the right and wrong ways to conduct a campaign. To study Pope is to analyse "operational art" from the negative aspect. His record speaks plainly; he failed to pass the test of those skills which are taught in the most basic military schools. Pope was not outgeneraled; he plainly was not a competent leader whose best was demonstrated to be woefully inadequate when, relative to the situation, an average performance may have netted the Union a possible victory, or at the very least, a draw.

Lee's understanding of national strategy and the execution of "operational art" as a means of carrying out policy was obvious. His use of cunning, stealth, speed, intelligence, and deception to fight the enemy on ground favorable to his army, with economy of force and concentration was a model of excellence in the conduct of war. It is a simple task to construct an effective model from which one may construct the framework of "operational art" using the lessons that are still very valid today. Interestingly, Lee's "lieutenants'" understanding of war paralleled the classic dictum On War, although none of them had ever studied the model, for it had not been translated from original German to English at the time of the Campaign of the Second Battle of Manassas. The military genius of Lee and his subordinates, and their understanding of the "operational art" of the conduct of war.

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CAMPAIGN OF THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS AUGUST 1862
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
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
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


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
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MAP 1






MAP 3



MAP 4





MAP 6

JACKSON'S
HEADQUARTERS
AUG 23

AUG 23
AUG 24

Lees Springs

JACKSON'S
MARCH

Beaverdam

Jefferson

JACKSON'S
HEADQUARTERS
24 AUGUST

Cem Field

CULPEPER CO
FAUQUIER CO


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
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
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


MAP 7






MAP 9



Map 9, report of Maj Gen John Pope, Aug 27, 1862
SES 1 VOL 10 PART 2 PAGE 12



MAP 11

Sudley Springs

Run

Ridge

Stony

Bull

BRAWDER'S
HOUSE

Stonewall
Memory
Gardens
(Cem)

Groveton
Confederate Cem

HOW
ARE
WE
Batter
Heights

Dogan House

Groveton

Cem CENTERVILLE AVE
(WARRENTON PIKE)
CENTERVILLE

Stuarts Hill


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Youngs

Chinn

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MAP 12



Situation 5:30 PM., 28 Aug., and
Movements Since Midnight, 27-28 Aug. 1862

0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles
SCALE

Situation at Dawn, 29 Aug, and Movements During Night of 28-29 Aug 1862

Scale: 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles

0 1 2 3 4 5

SCALE

Endnotes

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