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
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
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THE US MILITARY AND FUTURE WAR: READY OR NOT?

BY

COLONEL DAVID A. BOUTON

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THE US MILITARY AND FUTURE WAR: READY OR NOT?

An Individual Study Project

by

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Prior to arrival at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), my military experience had been focused at the tactical level. Top priority had always been proper juggling of the two "glass balls", training and maintenance. The units with which I served earnestly worked to keep both 'in the air', within resource constraints and the usual menu of peacetime distractors. Personnel turnover, alone, dictated that basic individual and unit skills be emphasized. If Soldier Qualification Test (SQT), Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP), physical fitness, marksmanship, and equipment serviceability standards were met, I felt confident about our readiness to fight. The team was doing its job. My main concerns were the myriad activities which caused significant differences between "present for duty" and "present for training" strengths from day to day, and other factors, such as accidents and competing demands that took me away from direct supervision of my troops. On the whole, training facilities and resources were adequate, the soldiers were good, my bosses were supportive and competent, and daily priorities were focused on the mission. There was a sense of purpose and accomplishment. The American taxpayer was getting his money's worth. Or so I thought.

Since arriving at Carlisle, I've been exposed to a whole new world. New terms, such as operational art, military reform, and jointness, have entered my vocabulary and consciousness. The

three levels of war - strategic, operational, and tactical - and the linkages between them, are frequently discussed and debated. National and theater level issues, organizations, relationships, and decision-making processes are daily fare. Perhaps most important, I've learned how the defense establishment is supposed to fit into the fabric of our society. National interests should flow from analysis of American values, goals, and objectives. These interests should then be prioritized based on existing threats and our willingness to fight for them. Strategies are then supposed to be formulated to see that our interests are served. A strategy consists of ends, ways, and means. Ends, or objectives, should drive the ways, or concepts, which should drive the means, or resources. The tools for implementing national strategy include political, economic, psycho-social, and military power. Once a strategy is developed, requirements with which to accomplish it are identified. Resources are then applied to requirements, giving us certain capabilities to implement our strategy. This is supposed to be a very dynamic process since the world is constantly changing.

I have learned that the above process is very different in practice than it is in theory. There is a gap between our military capabilities and what we have defined as vital interests (where an issue has reached the intolerable point).¹ Since World War II, national strategy has differed in substance,

clarity, and emphasis, with each administration. Only the Nixon Administration published anything resembling a national strategy,² until January 1987 when a Presidential White Paper articulated a national security strategy. Throughout the post-war period, there have been constants in national military strategy, such as deterrence, collective security, and forward defense. However, each attempt to articulate a strategy has been cloaked in convoluted terminology, conflicting priorities, and incoherence between ends, ways and means. National level decision makers appear so preoccupied with the defense budget process, that inputs drive outputs, the opposite of how it should work. Although many of our key political officials remain in power for years, all are elected or appointed for relatively short terms. Therefore they, like the electorate they serve, have short-term concerns. These concerns are linked to our political system, not the electorate. The unified commanders are oriented to readiness because they are responsible for conducting war in the short term. The services, by virtue of their control over Congressionally authorized resources, are oriented to the longer term, modernization, and future war. In a world of finite resources, complex acquisition practices, an ever-growing Federal bureaucracy, and costly new systems, it appears readiness is being mortgaged for investment. Despite recent legislation, the defense establishment remains functionally oriented (management by line number, such as, by weapon system, under research and development, or by installation), rather than mission oriented.³ While effort is important, results are all that

matters in war. The mixed results of American use of force during the past 40 years reinforces the need for peacetime readiness, particularly if we accept the probability of 'come as you are' wars in the future.

This new knowledge has shaken the confidence and sense of accomplishment that I brought with me to Carlisle. In viewing the world from the top down, and considering the various places and levels of war into which we could conceivably be drawn, I am gravely concerned about our ability to defend strategic objectives in support of US interests - tomorrow, next month, even next year. It alarms me to think of our nation, supposedly the world's role model for democracy and individual liberties, mired in bureaucratic quicksand; with mismatched interests, capabilities, and strategies; resulting in what I intend to argue as unacceptable risks in readiness. Logic dictates that the defense budget proposal have prioritized packages, oriented to probable contingencies, within the context of a national military strategy. Incredibly, however, the Department of Defense (DoD) does not present a joint military budget to Congress.

Gloomy thoughts such as these have led me go back and review how a former democracy behaved and how our forefathers envisioned defending ours. The Roman Empire lasted a little over seven centuries. Rome believed that the only foundation for law and order was the overpowering force of government.⁴ Through force, Rome attempted to move men's wills more than their minds.

(This thrust reminds me of a similar mentality practiced almost 2,000 years later, in Vietnam..."grab them by the balls, and their hearts and minds will follow".) Although she did not wish to rule the world, Rome constantly strove for world order, demanding unconditional surrender by those on her frontiers. Through this process, Rome made herself policeman of the whole civilized world, perceiving an obligation to make it better. Her weakness became apparent by the time of Augustus. Rome had grown arrogant, myopic, and insensitive to criticism from within and without. She focused not on ends, but on means - the sword, manpower, and money. Means eventually became an end in themselves and disorder ensued. The Empire fell from within, destroying itself. The United States tends to use force similarly, as a practical means to restore order. We have viewed force with a moral purity under the guise of making the world free for democracy and containing communism. During the past 40 years, however, the distinction between means and ends in our use of force has been blurred. We have occasionally used force when interests or strategic objectives did not warrant it, i.e. Vietnam, or we did not correctly apply force, even when strategic ends were legitimate, i.e. Cuba (1961, or earlier). The US, like Rome, also has a history of cultural arrogance, myopia, and insensitivity to criticism. We tend also to forget lessons learned from previous wars. If ever there was a time when we should be mindful of the lessons of history, particularly of the Romans, it is now.

The framers of the Federalist Papers, particularly Alexander Hamilton, went to great length to explain why a new nation needed a standing army and what its purpose was. Most of the states thought militias would be adequate for national defense. Many Americans had come from suppressive governments and were fearful that standing armies in time of peace would threaten the liberties for which they had just fought. Hamilton explained that initial dependence on militia almost cost the nation its independence.⁵ He continued,

The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind...War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.

As security for newly won popular rights, Hamilton made clear that the power to raise armies was lodged with the Legislature, not the Executive. He assured the people that their elected officials were chartered to protect their liberties and ensure that proper precautions were taken during peace, in event of war. Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and the other founding fathers were men of vision who had been through a war the nation was not ready to fight, and they were determined not to be caught short again.

There is little evidence that we, as a nation, have studied the lessons of our last war, much less those that led to the fall of Rome. Conversely, the Soviet's have studied the lessons of World War II in great detail. Their current force structure and commitment of resources to defense reflects their determination to preclude similar failures in the future. The greatest warriors

of this millennium have been ardent students of military history. Yet, our nation has traditionally shared neither the interest nor rigor of the great captains or our adversaries in learning from history. Part of the explanation may be that America is living out Toffler's 'Future Shock', where the rate of change is exceeding our capacity to adapt. Culturally, we are a youth-oriented society that has always tended to look ahead. Perhaps our perception of future war is so different, given the proliferation of nuclear weapons, highly lethal and sophisticated conventional arsenals, and the emergence of over 100 Third World states, that the lessons of previous wars are largely irrelevant. A final portion of the explanation may be that we have more in common with the Romans than we realize.

The gathering momentum and visibility of the reform movement suggest that our current defense focus and energies do not reflect the simplicity and clarity envisioned by our forefathers. Our Federal government has become a morass of bureaucracies, with redundant, layered staffs. Coordination of a single Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract normally requires input from myriad Federal agencies, and takes from weeks to months to complete. Although still a bloody affair, warfare has changed a great deal since the Federalist Papers were written. Weapons are more deadly, reach greater ranges, are more difficult to maintain, and are much more expensive and complex. Ammunition travels farther and faster, is more accurate, is fired at much faster rates, and is more complex and expensive. We are also a

nation with global obligations. Some are legitimized by alliance, others are based on something we or friendly nations need, such as raw materials and energy resources. Last, our nation is obsessed with stopping the spread of communism, in general, and Soviet influence, in particular. Potential battlefields span the globe, in almost every climate and terrain, against adversaries with widely varied capabilities and political ideologies.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to register my concern over our nation's failure to adequately learn the lessons of our recent military history, and apply them against contemporary interests, threats, and strategy, to produce General Purpose Forces that represent an acceptable balance between readiness to fight now and investment in longer-term defense needs. The nuclear dimension of war is outside the scope of this paper. My basic thesis is that, given a less than perfect world, we have accepted too much risk in our ability to meet 'come as you are' crises or wars, particularly if they become prolonged and resource intensive. As a result of spending the past 20 months listening, reading, and thinking about these broader perspectives, I wanted to do something relevant, with potential impact on the future. The next generation, including my children, will be doing the fighting in our next war, so I have a strong interest as a citizen, soldier, and father, in seeing that every possible resource is in their hands or supporting them. The following three chapters will address strategic, operational, and tactical level issues that detract from our will, or capability,

to fight effectively. Conclusions will be reached regarding the impact of these factors on combat effectiveness, followed by recommendations for change.

ENDNOTES

1. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s, p. 12.

2. Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace, p. 232.

3. AFJ Extra, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," Armed Forces Journal International, October 1985, p. 25.

4. Stringfellow Barr, Consulting the Romans: An Analogy Between Ancient Rome and Present-day America, p. 8.

5. Alexander Hamilton, "The Federalist Papers" in Great Books of the Western World, ed by R. M. Hutchins, vol 43, p. 91.

Chapter 2 - Strategic Level Concerns

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss issues that affect one or more of the components of our national security strategy - ends, ways, and means - and our readiness to use force as an instrument of that strategy. Discussion will focus on the Presidency, Congress, DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military departments, and the unified and specified commands.

During the past two years, three key actions were taken that indicate a high level of concern over defense management practices and organization. In mid-1985, President Reagan appointed a blue ribbon panel, headed by David Packard. The Commission's charter was to recommend how to improve the effectiveness and stability of resource allocation for DoD, including legislative process. It recognized collaborative requirements between the President and Congress, even though national security planning is executive responsibility. Three major problems were identified: a need to relate plans to resources, an unstable budget process, and Congressional inefficiency in review of the DoD budget. The Panel proposed several ways to improve and stabilize strategic planning and budgeting, to include a recommendation for DoD issuance of provisional five-year budget levels. These procedures would reflect competing demands on the Federal budget and gross national product (GNP), and revenue projections. In the area of

military organization and command, recommendations included providing broader authority to unified commanders and establishment of a unified transportation command (TRANSCOM). Finally, there were several recommendations designed to streamline the acquisition system to include establishing an Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, service acquisition executives, and program executive officers (PEO).¹

As a result of the Packard Commission's interim report in February 1986, the President signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 on 1 April 1986, implementing virtually all of the Commission's recommendations. The NSDD also provided a framework for Executive and Congressional agreement on national military strategy, the forces to carry it out, and necessary funding. It provided for better long-range planning based on military advice that is fiscally constrained, forward looking, and fully integrated. Finally, it simplified procurement statutes and strengthened oversight responsibilities of the Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRMB).²

The third key action, the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act, passed on 12 September 1986, was the first major attempt at reorganizing DoD since 1958. This bill strengthened civilian authority in DoD, improved military advice given to the National Command Authority (NCA), provided authority to combatant commanders commensurate with their

responsibility, improved joint officer management practices, and improved management and administration within DoD.³ In sum, these initiatives were needed and long overdue. Some DoD observers contend, however, that they only scratch the surface. Others have noted that some elements of the directives are not being adequately executed. For example, the personnel system has yet to establish acquisition career fields for participating civil servants and military officers, or prerequisites for promotion. Tours in acquisition and procurement billets have not been stabilized. Some program managers report that they still report to several bosses instead of to a PEO, as mandated by the new, three-tiered acquisition reporting chain, discussed above.

An essential player at the strategic level - and one not adequately addressed by the above initiatives or the reformers - is the NCA. American vital interests have been determined when the NCA decided that the issue at stake was so basic to the well-being of the nation that it should not be compromised, even if it resulted in the use of force.⁴ Some post-war examples have been aligned with national strategy, and some have not. In either case, there is an obvious need to have a flexible force that is ready to fight on short notice. Clearly defined, attainable strategic objectives must come from the NCA. These became confused in Korea and in Vietnam. Recent attempts to prevent Nicaragua from becoming the second Soviet client state in this hemisphere have failed, in part, because the NCA has not

convinced Congress or the public of consistent, coherent, sensible ways and means for doing so.

The President, as Commander-in-Chief, ensures that civilian control over the military is maintained. Since most presidents are not experts in military affairs, sound advice must be provided from those who are. The Secretary of Defense, Chairman and Vice Chairman of the JCS, and Service Chiefs serve that purpose. These people, appointed by the President, must serve as his honestbrokers before decisions to use force are made. If we have learned one lesson in the post World War II period, it is that force must be applied as part of a strategy to achieve political ends.⁵ The NCA, in general, and the Commander-in-Chief, in particular, are responsible for ensuring that US forces are adequately resourced and integrated into a strategy with clearly defined ends, before they are committed.

The NCA is also charged to coordinate the four elements of power in prosecuting national strategy. This is a difficult task for any form of government, but particularly in a democracy where there are many inputs by divergent players. The military element has historically been the most visible of the four, and easiest to use, although not always the most appropriate to use. However, this reinforces the importance of having a military that is ready to fight, within a strategic context. It also suggests that the NCA of a global power in today's world understand the consequences of using force. Super power decisions to use force

can profoundly influence peoples and governments in many different lands. The NCA can minimize the risk of committing force by maintaining a military that is strong enough, and ready enough, to deter potential enemies from threatening our vital interests. But deterrence will only be effective if we have also established ends, ways, and means, that are relatively balanced, and clearly understood by potential adversaries and ourselves. Deterrence has worked in precluding direct confrontation with the Soviets for the past 40 years, but it has not worked against others because of shortfalls in balancing ends, ways, and means, and ensuring that our capabilities and intent were clearly understood. From wars in Korea and Vietnam, to crises, such as the Pueblo, Mayaguez, and Lebanon, our failures resulted from a combination of faulty, vague, or neglected strategy, and military forces that were not ready for the task at hand. The NCA bears ultimate responsibility for both. These shortcomings also explain why our national strategy must not only be clear and attainable, but incorporate all of the elements of power as means to strategic ends. Had Secretary of State Dean Acheson included Korea in the US Pacific defense line, in his widely publicized speech of 12 January 1950, the North Korean's may not have risked attacking south.⁶ The NCA, in coordination with Congress, can further reduce the probabilities of resorting to force by developing and bringing one or more of the other three elements of power to bear as viable alternatives in executing national strategy.

Presidential perceptions and judgement, rather than objective reality, largely determine vital interests.⁷ With National Security Council (NSC) assistance, he provides vision and direction through policy and strategy formulation. Presidential insight and guidance is needed to keep national security within the context of strategic goals and political ends. Events that trigger war happen fast and often unexpectedly. A full range of response options will be available if each of the elements of power are operative and ready. Only the President, with NCA and Congressional support, has the power, perspective, and, hopefully the will to establish a framework and bring the resources together that are needed to orchestrate the elements of power at his disposal. This is not an easy task, but certainly one which deserves increased emphasis if our nation is going to serve effectively as the standard bearer for the free world.

Another essential player at the strategic level, and one that has received increased attention in the reform debate, is Congress. Congress occupies a unique place in our system of checks and balances. It has demonstrated its capacity to check the Presidency, DoD, and the military. The people, through the electoral process, are charged as the check for Congress. Based on research done in preparation for this paper, events of the past decade bring the effectiveness of the latter part of that system into question. The Packard Commission, numerous reformers, and several influential Congressmen, have observed its inveterate tendency to legislate management practices and organizational

details for DoD.⁸ These same individuals agree that Congress must reprioritize its energies by concentrating on overall defense posture and military performance.⁹ The budget process now occupies over half of the legislative year. Many Congressmen function as program managers rather than in a board of directors role. Last year, Congress changed over 1800 DoD programs.¹⁰ Because of their overinvolvement in details, they have repeatedly had to resort to continuing resolutions in recent years, disrupting long-term DoD planning. Congress is suffocating itself and DoD through its own micromanagement. Its 535 members, and over 10,000 staffers, requested 458 studies and reports in 1985 (36 in 1970) and passed 213 legislative provisions into law (64 in 1970).¹¹ Since 1980, the length of time devoted to floor debate has tripled and the number of amendments has increased fivefold. Less and less time has been spent on major policy issues or matters of national priority. New committees and subcommittees have proliferated, duplicating effort and overlapping responsibilities. Various pieces of the budgetary pie are handled by different committees, with varied procedures that create "stovepiping". A typical example, is that one committee reduces spare parts for equipment at Diego Garcia with no knowledge of the impact it has on our basic commitment to Southwest Asia (SWA), being handled by another committee!¹² The outcome of all this is that Congress has lost sight of the major questions of policy, strategy, and priorities. Shifting the focus away from inputs toward outputs, from trivia to basics, from micromanagement to oversight, will require active collaboration

between Congress and DoD. The biennial budget for DoD appears widely supported as a first step to bring about the above changes.

There are other Congressional practices that impact more directly on military readiness. Some estimate that the Congressional "pork barrel" now costs the taxpayer 10 percent of the annual military budget, or \$30 billion.¹³ Parochial interests that create or sustain jobs and income for home districts, and lead to questionable budgeting practices, result in quantities and types of equipment or bases that DoD neither wants nor needs. In the FY85 budget alone, Congress added over \$6 billion to programs requested by the administration.¹⁴ For example, a strong constituency from Florida, coupled with pressure from the Navy, kept the Naval Air Station at Pensacola open despite recommendations by the Grace Commission and DoD to consolidate all basic helicopter training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Although Congress is supposed to be watchdog of the public treasury, ignoring vested interests in home districts will lose votes and, possibly, seats.

The Administration has been trying to buy more major systems through multiyear procurement. This would facilitate manufacturer planning, stabilize overhead costs, and increase production efficiency. The 1984 appropriations bill approved only seven of 14 multiyear proposals, denying the taxpayer a potential

savings of over \$1 billion.¹⁵ Some Congressmen torpedo this, and other money saving techniques, such as large batch arms buys, because they lose political leverage with the Pentagon or fellow Congressmen, in return for their support for other actions. All of these factors undermine the effectiveness of our military forces.

Perhaps the greatest impediment to having a combat ready force is the budget process and energy that is devoted to it. About one-third of the annual Federal budget is spent for defense. Most people would agree that overall defense posture is better today than it was in 1980. Over \$1.5 trillion has been spent toward that end.¹⁶ Disagreement centers around whether the money was spent most effectively. The process begins with translation of national interests into a strategic context and alliance commitments. JCS converts this into missions for the CINCs, who then identify requirements to accomplish these missions. The services aggregate these requirements and incorporate them into budget planning. Each service updates their part of the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) based on threat analysis, CINC input, and prioritization based on perceived likelihood of various contingencies. DoD consolidates this input into the defense budget and submits it to Congress. Because DoD does not integrate service proposals, there are duplicated missions, different weapons to do similar jobs, and excessive costs. This exemplifies the functional vice mission-integration approach to business as, discussed above.

We also start more programs than we can afford because of unrealistic long-term inflation and growth estimates. In the early 1980's, this was done deliberately, at least by the Army, to take advantage of a monetary "bowwave" from Congress.¹⁷ Unfortunately, most of the money was placed in new or ongoing programs, at the expense of expansion of an atrophied industrial base. Of the new strategic programs, little analysis was done to determine how affordable they would be over time. This process has resulted in programs being stretched out over time. In FY 1985, 22 "stretched" programs drove acquisition costs up by more than \$3 billion.¹⁸ Congressmen exacerbate this problem, intending to protect jobs and income back home, even though new systems are manufactured at inefficient rates. Multi-year procurement provides stability to the process, by reducing the expense and tendency to "stretch" programs. The idea is to commit to a program over time. It can be modified as threats and interests change. Successions of one year programs are inefficient, expensive, and detract from combat readiness.

This process affects readiness in two ways. New systems are not fielded as quickly and the average age of outgoing systems increases because we cannot afford one-for-one replacements. Congress, DoD, and the military departments are partners on this resource treadmill. Investment is favored over readiness because new systems have lobbies and readiness does not. In FY 1985, Congress directed the services to buy \$560 million worth of

aircraft they had not requested while cutting \$655 million from requested aircraft spare parts and support equipment essential to readiness.¹⁹ Two important initiatives have been taken to alleviate these problems. The Goldwater-Nichols bill prescribes a new system and new positions to streamline acquisition, and a budget ceiling has been in effect since FY 1985. This will preclude "end runs" favoring home district constituencies.

Within Congress, there are at least six committees that review the DoD budget (budget, armed services, and appropriations, both houses). In the FY85 Pentagon request, 1,848 line item changes were made during the appropriation stage alone.²⁰ Each change requires discussion and vote at committee and floor levels. Differences in changes between houses require conference committees which shape compromises and then return them for vote by appropriate committees and both floors. It should be no surprise that, in using such a process, Congress has had to resort to "continuing resolutions" in recent years.

A final, key factor in defense spending is the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings plan). In an effort to balance the budget by 1991, Congress has imposed automatic spending cuts, known as sequestering. This amounts to equal percentage reductions in all budget accounts for fiscal reasons. No provisions for strategic needs, military judgement, or prioritization exist. Moreover, 50 percent of the cuts must come from defense appropriations

although defense is less than 30 percent of the budget.²¹ Many observers think that sequestering will impact most significantly on DoD in the form of reduced personnel strength. As of this writing, however, there appears to be some vacillation within Congress as to whether this bill is the most effective way to reduce the Federal deficit.

Several peacetime diseases have permeated our Federal government - large, unwieldy bureaucracies; budget myopia; micromanagement; and preoccupation with means. That is not to say disputes between Congress and the White House or DoD are not healthy. Disputes are inherent in the separation of powers, which is rooted in the foundation of our political system. Congressional overcontrol of DoD has been a two-way street. DoDs problems have been compounded by Congress, but many of them have been self-inflicted over a 40 year period. It is DoD, to which the Packard Commission recommendations and Goldwater-Nichols law are aimed, that this paper now turns.

DoD consists of over 86,000 people, who work in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 15 Defense agencies, and various field activities. Over 40 different officials report directly to the Secretary. The Secretary and his deputy are the only officials responsible for integrating departmental functions.²² Congress has created several positions, which must report directly to the Secretary, so they share responsibility

for the bureaucratic monster that has been created. (Of note is the fact that the service chiefs have comparable spans of control.) It is difficult to conceive how any mortal could realistically take charge of so sprawling a structure, effectively supervise, and integrate the energies of over 40 talented people, most of whom will tend to do things their way unless directed otherwise. It is easy to conceive of confusion, lack of focus and coordination, and under-supervision of parts of such a huge organization.

DoD and the service departments are also functionally, rather than mission-oriented.²³ Peter Drucker maintains that this tends to direct vision away from results and toward efforts. By focusing on areas such as procurement, research and development, and installations and logistics, instead of specified worldwide and regional missions, DoD is hindered from achieving its primary task of bringing the warfighting capabilities of the separate services together effectively.²⁴ Preoccupation with inputs, such as the purchase of new weapons, detracts from consideration of outputs, such as analysis of what our defense missions should be. Organizing for effective mission integration addresses ends or strategic objectives first, ways or concepts for achieving them second, and means last. The logic of a functional approach is the reverse of that. Our nation has agreed to provide 10 divisions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) within 10 days of mobilization. Although the chain of command has been working since 1978 to make that

possible, we're still not close to achieving our goal. The commander-in-chief (CINC) in Europe, the services, and others, all have inputs, but no one has responsibility for the overall output.²⁵ Someone at OSD should logically do it, but no one below the Secretary or Deputy Secretary has that level of responsibility. The Goldwater-Nichols bill has taken a positive step by directing that unified commands be established for all US special operations forces and strategic transportation resources. Disasters such as the Iran hostage rescue prompted Congress to demand a coordinated, responsive, special operations mission focus, since crises requiring low intensity responses were more likely to occur in the future, than other crises, higher up the spectrum, requiring more conventional responses. Despite Congressional admonitions about the inefficiency of each service maintaining its own special operations forces, and the low funding priority given to those forces, no one in DoD took charge. Hence, Congress took charge. On the other hand, the initiative for the new transportation command came from within DoD. Military Airlift Command (MAC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), will be combined into a unified command so that strategic lift capabilities and spending are better aligned with requirements.

Another recurring allegation is lack of unified direction and command within DoD. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower used terms such as "strategic direction" and "unified control" as imperatives of modern warfare when they reorganized DoD in 1947

and 1958, respectively. Yet there are several recent historical examples where weak civilian control and conflicting interests and procedures among the services affected their performance on the battlefield. Vietnam is the most tragic example of different services having responsibility for different parts of the war. There was no CINC with overall responsibility for US operations in Southeast Asia. Even in Grenada, a success in relative terms, US Marine and Army conventional units were not under a single land component commander. They both reported to the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander who was offshore.²⁶ Army and Navy commanders could not talk because their communications gear was not compatible. The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), organized for time-sensitive contingency planning, was excluded because of tight security measures and apprehension over whether such a new agency could contribute in a very rapid, intense planning window. The Air Force and Army have made great strides in learning how to fight together, but the Navy, with its own army and air force, has been reluctant to participate. Reorganization initiatives in OJCS include a focal point for interoperability issues, such as joint doctrine, and another for force, resource, and warfighting analysis. Unfortunately, legislation and reorganization provide only part of the answer to the issue of unified command and having a combat ready, joint warfighting team. The most important ingredient must come from within the military establishment itself. Our civilian and uniformed leaders in DoD must provide vision and focus their energies on integrating service interests and programs, and satisfying the requirements generated by our

national security strategy. As it is now, Congress tries to "divide and conquer" between disparate OSD, JCS, and service programs.²⁷

Various JCS, unified command, and military department actions and inactions have also adversely impacted on readiness at the strategic level. The Joint Chiefs are not in the chain of command, they have almost no role in resource allocation as a corporate body, and they must represent their service's viewpoint, while occasionally sacrificing that view for the common good. An impossible task. Service interests have dominated. The Joint Chiefs tend not to override individual allegiances or expose professional differences in public. Hence, accusations of logrolling, and worse, repeated failure to provide a critical, joint position or options as to what the nation needs to meet defense commitments.²⁸ Interservice rivalry can be positive as long as dissent and alternatives are rendered in the nation's interest, not service interests. This may not be a realistic expectation, given the two hats the Joint Chiefs wear. Despite the Goldwater-Nichols bill, unified commanders have minor impact on how they are resourced. The services train, equip, organize, and station their personnel. All classes of supply are also under their control. Unified commanders are largely dependent on component commanders to compete for sustainment resources, and to balance and distribute stocks in locations and ways that support theatre strategy. Campaign planning and warfighting considerations are therefore largely dependent on

service chief support, even though both are CINC responsibilities.

Strategy formulation, and ultimately readiness, is also shaped by our alliances and mutual security agreements. The complexity of most joint issues is exacerbated by US bilateral and multilateral security commitments with 43 nations around the globe. NATO members differ on the meaning of forward defense and when and where nuclear weapons should be used. Any Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiating move by our side requires concurrence by 200-300 officials from 12 NATO governments.²⁹ NATO is fertile ground for several other coalition and political issues that impact on the Alliance's readiness to fight. There is no certainty that authority for ground forces to engage key targets across the Inter-German Boundary (IGB) would be given in a timely manner. The Belgian corps has a long way to go to reach forward positions and 50 percent of their troops are reserves. Our capability to project power in the Pacific will be significantly effected if we have to give up Subic and Clark Field. If war breaks out in SWA, will we receive timely approval from Egypt, the Saudis, and others for overflight rights and access to key bases and facilities? The US has to ask itself this question in the face of denying a \$4 billion F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia.³⁰ Most prospective battlefields for US forces will involve combined command. This, coupled with high technology communications, will make overcontrol, caution, and political interference inevitable.

Harry Summers has captured the thesis that probably best underpins all of the previous discussion. The United States has not effectively linked the means of systems analysis with the ends of political science. Summers made this observation regarding our commitment in Vietnam. Based on the foregoing, it appears we have not learned that lesson. Clausewitz ascribed this dilemma to the differences between peace and wartime situations. He maintained that during peace, nations train and equip fighting forces in preparation for war. The means tends to become an end in itself. During war, military force tends to be viewed as one of several means applied against the purposes of the war. We confused these two activities during the Vietnam War³¹ and are still confusing them. We have not maintained a balance among Clausewitz's trinity of war - the people, the government, and the military. Adversary relationships are implicit to the separation of powers in democracies, but not antagonism, distrust, parochialism, logrolling, and bureaucratic inertia. Recent history implies that future war will probably be "come as you are". Victory will be defined as achievement of the political ends for which the war was waged. Political considerations will probably demand limited objectives.

Holistic, Gestalt thinking is needed during peace and war. First, the ends, ways, and means, of our national security strategy should follow that order, in theory and practice. Differences between objectives and capabilities must result from

consciously determined acceptable risk, or objectives (interests) must be refined, or capabilities increased. The proper blending of these elements - always a difficult task - is even harder during a modern era of limited wars and dysfunction between power and objectives. Our alternative, however, is to repeat mistakes of the past 40 years the next time we commit US forces. If we are to turn that trend around, the above institutions have to extract themselves from a "preparation for war" mentality and address strategic-level needs for war tomorrow. Fixes will demonstrate the interdependence between strategic and the operational level, which the next chapter will address.

ENDNOTES

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2. US Government, National Security Decision Directive 219, White House Summary, pp. 2-5.

3. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Report 99-824, p. 90.

4. Nuechterlein, p. 18.

5. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, p. 438.

6. Nuechterlein, p. 134.

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9. AFJ Extra, p. 5.

10. Ibid., p. 6.

11. Ibid., p. 7.

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13. Richard Halloran, To Arm A Nation, p. 244.
14. Ibid., p. 257.
15. Ibid.
16. John M. Collins, "View From the Fourth Estate: What Have We Got For \$1 Trillion?", Parameters, p. 84.
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20. Gary Hart, America Can Win: The Case For Military Reform, p. 228.
21. AUSA, The FY 1987 Defense Budget, An Analysis, Fact Sheet, p. 7.
22. AFJ Extra, p. 24.
23. Philip Gold, "Reagan's Military: Billions, Billions Everywhere, But Not That Much To Show", Insight, March 1987, p. 12.
24. AFJ Extra, p. 25.
25. Ibid., p. 26.
26. Ibid., p. 14.
27. Lecture at USAWC, April 1987, by ranking DoD consultants. (Note: several endnotes, from this point forward, will reference distinguished speakers at USAWC and Air University (AU), both of which have non-attribution policies.)
28. AFJ Extra, p. 17.
29. M. Scott Davis, "Negotiating With Ourselves", Foreign Service Journal, November 1985, p. 32.
30. Lecture at AU, March 1987, by a ranking, retired flag officer.
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Chapter 3 - Operational Level Concerns

The operational level of war is easier to describe than define. It consists of military conditions and plans necessary to achieve strategic objectives. It is linked to the tactical level through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns, which are phased to include a series of simultaneous or sequential battles and engagements. The operational level normally implies joint and combined forces, from field army through theater of war. However, the key to understanding operational level considerations is not force size, but in the relationship between military means and specific political aims.¹ The US seizure of Grenada in 1983 was an operational level use of force because it sought strategic objectives, even though the size of ground forces employed approximated only about a division. Important dimensions to this level are the capacity to sustain forces once they are committed, political restrictions as to what they can do, gaining positional advantage (causing the enemy to 'resign', or accepting the inevitable, before yielding to a 'check mate'), culminating point (that point in the attack or defense when energy and resource expenditures begin to exceed that needed to succeed), and center of gravity (that element of combat power, the loss of which, will cause the enemy to stop fighting, such as political will, freedom of action, or physical strength). The remainder of this chapter will address various issues that fall within the operational level framework, which compound those of

the previous chapter in adversely affecting our readiness for war.

It is important to understand at the outset that our primary adversary, the Soviet's, are building a worldwide sphere of influence. Their system and strategy keeps chipping away, making small gains at a time, most recently in our own back yard, undermining our will and cohesion with allies. They depend on one instrument of power to impose their will on other nations - the threat or application of military power. They use it directly, through surrogates, arms sales, schooling, and training assistance. While most of their writing, and virtually all of their training, is oriented at the tactical level, the Soviets have devoted more and more attention in recent years to the operational level. For the Soviets, quantity is quality. They are concerned with the long-term and warstoppers. The Soviet value system permits total focus on mission accomplishment, with little concern over force survival. Their approach is direct - isolate and eliminate opponents. There are no political constraints because the 'Party' is infallible and the military is nothing more than an extension of the party. In fact, it is the only instrument of power that has proven successful under their system. All plans and other military programs are approved by the 'Party'. War is very predictable, a science. Plans do not fail, only individuals fail. Plans are simple, yet planned to minute detail. Afghanistan has shown them to be prone to stereotypical behavior. The Soviets see the United States as their only real

competition in the world. They therefore watch us carefully, and are very reactive to US policy and initiatives. Yet, by their standards, we are very unpredictable and therefore an enigma to them. They have proven to be great copiers of our weapon systems, but bad innovators. The Soviets tend to react to many of our proposals for new weapon systems by building counters for them, even though we may eventually decide not to build some systems.²

The United States has correctly perceived that its interests and position as a global power are threatened by Soviet capabilities and intentions to isolate us from the rest of the world. However, for reasons cited in the previous chapter, our capacity to transition to war and fight on short notice have some pronounced weaknesses. One of our most basic requirements in preparation for war is to have plans based on analysis of the Soviet Empire and other perceived threats. This includes plans for mobilization, deployment to prospective theaters, and employment and sustainment of forces (campaign plans) once we get there. These plans should be politically acceptable and militarily executable, within allocated means. Unfortunately, most unified and specified commands have no campaign plans for missions assigned through the Defense Guidance (DG) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). There are several reasons for this, including vague strategic guidance, coalition peacetime sensitivities and the fact that operational level warfighting considerations have only returned to U.S. military thinking

within the past five years. The point is, without warfighting plans, how do we coherently prepare to fight in a joint, much less combined, arena? It is true that plans are often only useful until the first shots are fired, but their presence and utility are essential to the start of any campaign, as evidenced by Operation Overlord in Europe and the Inchon landings in Korea. Combined Forces Command (CFC) has a campaign plan for defense of the Korean peninsula and US Central Command (CENTCOM) is developing one for SWA. There are no others. We had a contingency plan prepared at the time we attacked Grenada, but didn't use it because of the typical ad hoc manner in which we react to crises. This issue will be discussed in more detail later.

Although an inexact science, planning is key to expressing the commander's intent or visualization of how he sees the various phases of a campaign unfolding. It provides the conceptual backdrop that subordinate commanders must have to continue operating after the fog and confusion of battle interfere with command, control, and communications. Campaign planning prompts analysis of the capabilities of the enemy, viewing the battlefield from his perspective, and assessing how he would fight. It demands comparison with JCS-driven deployment plans so that forces arrive in-theater where, when, and in configurations that support the CINC's warfighting plan. The importance of all this is self-evident, but we are not there today and will not be until preparation for war receives the

priority it deserves from the chain of command, Congress, and the entire defense establishment.

The operational level commander, whether a CINC or joint task force (JTF) commander, must have authority commensurate with his responsibility. If we went to war tomorrow in a theater with a non-Navy CINC, assigned US Naval forces probably would not be under his operational command (OPCOM). They would be 'in support of', meaning that they would continue to take orders from their parent or supporting Naval CINC. Were war to start tomorrow in SWA, supporting US Navy forces in the Indian Ocean would answer to CINCPACOM, not CINCCENTCOM! Although this issue is discussed in JCS Publication 2, 'Unified Action Armed Forces', and is being worked by the new J-7 Directorate at JCS, it is a 'sacred cow' that has existed since World War II, and a clear violation of the unity of command. Admiral Halsey's untimely and uncoordinated departure from the Leyte Gulf - based on an 'in support of' command relationship - nearly turned one of our most important victories in the Pacific into a debacle.

A somewhat related issue pertains to the use of US Marine Corps air. The Marine Corps is designed to fight as an integrated air-ground team. This makes sense at the tactical level. But at the operational level, this air does not belong to the air component commander, even though JCS Publication 26 gives the joint force commander doctrinal authority to employ all theater assets as they see fit. Every Marine air-ground task force

(MAGTF) has organic air assets. As it stands today, if an operational level commander, with a MAGTF in his task organization, wanted to weight air support in another sector, he has the authority to redirect the Marine air. Sensible commanders in this situation can and would work this out. But this type of roles and missions anomaly would have political implications on any joint battlefield, despite what JCS Publications prescribe. The operational commander requires sufficient flexibility to allocate combat power based on the threat and mission without being constrained by service doctrine. Span of control, command relationships, and unity of command all must serve the warfighting needs of the operational commander, over and above service traditions and parochialism. Future wars will undoubtedly be fought by coalitions, involving different languages, cultures, and religions. Preparing for those is challenge enough without internal struggles among participating American services.

Warfighting consists of four sequential parts: mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment. The first two impact at the strategic and operational levels, the third impacts at the operational and tactical levels, and the fourth impacts at all three levels. For purposes of continuity, most of the discussion pertaining to those four parts will now follow.

Mobilization, which the US has not done in significant terms since World War II, is very important to the start of any major war. First, it rallies our population and focuses the

nation to a commitment that will require their unqualified support. Second, it signals to the enemy that we are sufficiently serious about some interest that we are willing to fight for it. The sad truth is, however, that if war started tomorrow and mobilized resources were needed, the current US industrial base is not able to adequately respond to defense mobilization requirements.³

There are several reasons for this. First, our "smoke stack" economy is rapidly being replaced by a service-oriented economy. With the erosion of our industrial base, we are increasingly dependent on foreign sources of supply for end items, components, parts, and raw materials. American industry essentially does no mobilization planning.⁴ Part of the explanation is that weapon systems technology seems to have grown faster than associated manufacturing technology. Second, there is a trend away from defense business by the sub-tier manufacturing base. The claim is that DoD is a high risk business partner. Regulations and paperwork are cumbersome and expensive. Contracts are awarded annually, while production decisions wait. Companies understandably do not commit funds to prestock materials until they have a contract. This leads to small orders, lengthened lead times, and delays in getting systems into the hands of the troops. Last, and perhaps most important, DoD requirements are sometimes unclear and frequently change. DoD's own industrial facilities, such as shipyards and arsenals, are aging. Within the industrial base itself, there are limitations on production

space; requirements for special tooling, castings, and forging; and, a dearth of semiconductors.⁵ The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has done a lot of work in this area, but the fact remains that we, as a nation, are not prepared to adequately respond to surge and mobilization requirements. Industry, particularly sub-tier vendors and suppliers, must receive a clear statement of military requirements and contractual streamlining from the government, in return for increased productivity.⁶ Finally, US concepts of stockpiling - historically done at the raw materials level and driven by domestic politics - need to be modernized. Components and structures that can make a difference early in a crisis should be stockpiled, not just ores that require a year or more to move through the economy. Also, expansion of the industrial base (long term impact) can, and must, be done while continuing to stockpile war reserve items (short term impact).⁷ Mobilizing industry in response to a war is a constraint in time, not money. This problem, coupled with increased dependence on foreign resources, has serious consequences for our technology base and the next generation of weapons and equipment.

The manpower dimension of mobilization is also a critical issue. The Army's Active Component (AC) cap of 780,900 meets only 88 percent of documented manning requirements.⁸ Almost 50 percent of the uniformed Total Army is in the Reserve Components (RC). One-third of our combat divisions are in the National Guard and two-thirds of our combat service support (CSS) is in the Army

Reserve. In event of full mobilization, the mobilized training base is supposed to have a planned surge capability for acceptance of 133,000 trainees between M-day and M+30. However, our training bases have only about two-thirds the facilities needed to handle that number of people. There is also insufficient equipment, such as tanks, clothing, and personal equipment, for that number of people.⁹ Current programming actions are aimed at this issue. This presents another problem, however, in that the two-thirds is still more soldiers than our depleted industrial base can equip.¹⁰ With expected high attrition on potential battlefields demanding full mobilization, first priority for replacement end items would be to committed forces in-theater. The number of people that are trained, when, and in what skills, may well be determined by the capacity of our surging industrial base to arm and equip them. Actions are ongoing in the Army to develop a methodology to that end.

One final note on manpower mobilization. It is anticipated that the level of intensity of a war meriting full, or even a partial mobilization, would result in a trained military manpower shortfall - particularly infantrymen, tankers, and medics -within the first 120 days.¹¹ Our Selected Service System, by its own admission, cannot expeditiously support contingency plans. It would take two weeks before the first recruits reported, and another 100 days to train and deploy each increment.¹² Pretrained manpower would have to fill the gaps during this period. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) has grown

significantly over the past five years, but it consists largely of specialists who are poorly suited to replace riflemen or tank crews. Personnel from RC units (primarily National Guard) could serve as fillers, but to use them in this role would destroy the integrity of units that are scheduled to support the war or another contingency. In short, the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) cannot cover critical US commitments. Neither the Army, Air Force, nor the Navy is able to fully man existing force structure.¹³ There are three alternative solutions. First, the nation accepts the risks involved. Second, invite more volunteers through increased incentives. The expense of doing this in peacetime would probably not be politically acceptable. Third, reinstate some form of the draft. Unless future war is fought at the lower end of the spectrum, against an unsophisticated enemy, and ends in three or four months, conscription will be needed to provide critical warfighting skills in the numbers necessary to sustain our effort.

Let us now turn from mobilization issues to deployment issues. Even if this system produced sufficient men and equipment, we do not have enough strategic mobility to get them there. There is a substantial shortfall between our strategic mobility requirements and capabilities. The current fiscally constrained goal of 66 million ton miles per day (MTM/D) for airlift alone is nowhere near our requirement in event of a major war in Europe or SWA.¹⁴ Strategic lift consists of airlift (organized under MAC), sealift (organized under MSC, US Navy),

and CONUS-based rail and road long-haul assets (organized under MTMC). Together, they are known as the transportation operating agencies (TOA), but there has been no integrating agency to organize these disparate agencies for mobilization or to direct expansion to meet mobilization requirements. As stated earlier, a unified transportation command will be organized this year, consisting of MAC, MSC, and MTMC. JDA, which has up to now served only as a coordinating activity, with no power, will also belong to USTRANSCOM. This initiative should provide needed organizational direction to accomplish the above objectives.

Currently, we can meet about two-thirds of the strategic airlift requirement noted above. Despite projected improvements, this shortfall will continue at about the same level unless Congress authorizes production of more airlift aircraft. This problem is compounded by a severe decline in the US merchant marine, heretofore the backbone of a sealift capacity that is programed to provide 95 percent of all supplies and equipment to future warzones.¹⁵ Not only is the number of available ships declining, but those remaining are not necessarily the most suitable for military purposes. Although the Navy has initiated an ambitious program to increase its strategic sealift capability, no one is expanding oceanborne transportation assets needed to meet national economic sustainment requirements - the flow of raw materials into the US - in wartime. During 1986, the merchant marine carried only three percent of America's oceanborne foreign trade.¹⁶ The rest was carried by foreign

flag carriers, many of which may not be available to support the US during wartime. Based on planning assumptions for a full-scale war with the Soviets, current US owned or controlled shipping is capable of transporting only about one-quarter of the total requirement. NATO and other allied shipping would make up the difference. Yet, the NATO shipping pool is also declining. A major portion of surge shipping is comprised of active US flag ships plus those in the Navy's Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The RRF consisted of 82 ships at the end of 1986.¹⁷ Its task, in event of mobilization, is to lift the bulk of continental US (CONUS) based equipment and sustaining supplies. Most of these ships are procured from commercial sources, sometimes foreign. The average age of these ships is about 22 years. Most are not active and therefore are unmanned. The reliability of this force for a war five years from now, not to mention tomorrow, is questionable. In event of mobilization for a go-it-alone war, such as SWA, we would be almost totally dependent on foreign flag shipping to sustain our wartime economy.¹⁸ Since there are no options either on the drawing boards or on the horizon, the implications of the above to our deployability are sobering.

All of this is not to say that the services are unaware of the urgency of correcting these problems. In fact, a great deal is being done. The RC are better equipped than they have ever been and are an integral part of all warplanning. Planning for their mobilization is being done with more scrutiny. One of four major sections of the Packard Commission Report was devoted to

government-industry accountability. The JCS is taking an active lead in joint industrial mobilization planning. FEMA and industry are working together to develop an action plan for emergency-level production. The Air Force is actively pursuing various options to help alleviate strategic airlift shortfalls. The Army has restructured five divisions and is prepositioning equipment on a large scale to relieve the strategic lift problem. The Navy has dramatically increased sealift funding. Eight fast sealift ships (FSS), which can move a mechanized division, have already been delivered.¹⁹ The fact remains, however, that most of our mobilization and deployment problems have been longstanding, and will significantly affect our ability, and ultimately our will, to fight a mid-to-high intensity war in the near future.

The high cost of reducing mobilization and deployability shortfalls, plus recent emphasis on procuring new weapons, has affected readiness and our capacity to sustain battle.²⁰ Despite marked improvement, war reserve stocks of ammunition, fuel and major end items are not sufficient to meet the needs of sustained combat. The need to integrate old and new families of equipment compounds the basic problem of balancing the need for warfighting tools with the price of sustaining the force that is using those tools. To achieve our total war reserve stockage (WRS) objective would require about 15 times the funding in the current budget. One additional day of all categories of WRS costs about \$1 billion.²¹ Shortages are most pronounced in high technology munitions. Our chemical warfare capability remains

woefully inadequate. In NATO, there is enough equipment to protect individual combatants, but not enough to keep key facilities, such as airfields, operational, or to protect non-combatants. Moreover, NATO does not have adequate chemical munitions to counter Soviet first use. The Army does not have enough truck companies to line-haul ammunition to front line users and move the new light infantry divisions around a theater of operations. Dr. William Mayer, DoD's chief medical officer, told Congress in 1985 that we have sufficient medical capability to care for only 30 percent of estimated casualties in a fullscale conventional war in Europe. The remaining 70 percent of those casualties would have to be left on the battlefield.²² Shortages exist in medical treatment facilities and equipment, professional medical personnel, and in medical evacuation assets. DoD is taking action in each of these areas, such as funding for 45 more hospitals during FY 1986 and 1987, but this is still not sufficient to solve the problem. In sum, readiness is determined by numbers and kinds of weapons and bullets, but also by numbers and kinds of beans, butter, and bandaids. Although many sustainment problems are being addressed and improvements being made, we are paying the price today because sustainment needs have not received equal priority with strategic and tactical level weapons acquisition.²³

Sustainment shortfalls are no less critical in the personnel arena than in materiel. In a recent effort to increase combat effectiveness through enhanced cohesion in combat units,

the Army instituted the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) concept. This has received rave reviews at company and battalion level. Yet, COHORT is being modified because the Army can only fill about 70 percent of its combat units with COHORT-trained soldiers because of training facility constraints.²⁴ This is a blow to readiness and sustainment since the COHORT concept envisioned ultimately replacing an individual replacement system with a unit replacement system. World War II proved that the German unit replacement system was superior to individual replacement systems in terms of saving lives and preserving combat effectiveness in the most heavily attrited units.

Alliances and coalition considerations only complicate sustainment issues and our readiness to fight as part of a combined force. The US is allocating more and more defense dollars to WRS, while NATO allies are calling for only limited improvement in their stocks. If those stocks run out two weeks into a war, the conventional part of that war is, in effect, over unless we transfer some of our WRS to them (assuming the calibers are compatible). Related to this is that there is no common procurement of ammunition. Hence, various allies pay widely different prices for the same round of ammunition. The US and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are fielding the same radio system manufactured by the same corporation, but the armies will not be able to talk with each other because of special limitations built into each system. To compensate, liaison teams,

which neither army can afford, will relay messages. Resources are squandered when 11 firms in seven countries build anti-tank weapons.²⁵ Similar situations exist regarding ground-to-air and air-to-ground systems. Vague US technology transfer policy fosters internal European armaments cooperation to the exclusion of the US.²⁶ Several interoperability problems, air defense being the most notable example, currently undermine our effectiveness as a combined team. Identification, friend or foe (IFF) has not worked for NATO, or any other alliance, between air-to-ground and ground-to-air systems. As a result, airspace management in every prospective theater is largely nonexistent. The proliferation of aircraft will cause significant levels of fratricide in any coalition war fought in the near future.²⁷ In NATO alone, there are almost 1,300 allied tactical aircraft that have to be controlled. Passive listening technology is probably the best near-term solution, in that it can differentiate enemy aircraft models from friendly counterparts. However, money and coalition politics will delay integration of such a system into the force. There are a plethora of intelligence systems available from various nations. But with many variations on security clearance requirements between services and nations, determining who needs to know, and downlinking intelligence to the right place at the right time, it is questionable whether operational commanders will have all the information that is available to make critical warfighting decisions.²⁸ US special operations forces (SOF), upon employment, are under operational control (OPCON) of the commander who owns the area of operations to which

they are assigned. But, because of incompatible communications equipment between allies, the SOF commander would have to report to the most accessible US commander within the operational level of command.²⁹ There is also a shortfall in standing ground and air forces in most theaters where we might directly confront the Soviets. Nowhere is this disparity greater than in artillery pieces in Europe. The Warsaw Pact (WP) has 2.33 times that of NATO, with longer ranges.³⁰ We do not have enough firepower to neutralize their long preparations with counterbattery fires. NATO's option is to divert tactical aircraft currently projected to conduct a counter-air campaign, to kill this artillery at the start of a war. Another option is to use aircraft designated as close air support (CAS) for the task. The point is that NATO is at a marked disadvantage with the WP in artillery.

The net effect of these mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and coalition shortfalls is potential Soviet isolation of Europe, increasing the likelihood that in-place defenses could be overwhelmed. Although not likely, the Soviets could attack Europe in the near future and force a pace of attrition that NATO could not match, thus denying variations of flexible response short of escalation to nuclear warfare.³¹ This is possible before US mobilization and reinforcement are fully effective. In other words, as General Rogers has said, the Soviets have more flexibility than we do. In the wake of recent US-Soviet discussions, new nuclear arms control initiatives are likely. As this occurs, the conventional force disparity will

become more visible, as will the need to eliminate major vulnerabilities, such as those discussed above.

Discussion thus far has focused on fullscale war. Based on recent history, our most likely future war will be at the lower end of the spectrum. Even then, it depends on perceptions as to how intense a war is. What may be low intensity conflict (LIC) for us is high intensity war for the people in whose nation the war is being fought. We still tend to define conflicts, cultures, expectations, and geo-political factors in terms familiar to us, without first studying these factors as perceived by the people whom we are trying to support. We tend to view counter insurgency (CI), SOF, unconventional warfare (UW), and LIC, synonymously.³² In fact, each has uniquely different meaning. UW applies across the spectrum of warfare. SOF deals with uniquely trained forces and has joint connotations. Another detractor to readiness at the lower end of the conflict spectrum is misreading the causes of insurgency. We tend to develop prescriptions for symptoms rather than causes.

Insurgencies occur when a disenfranchized segment of a nation, with rising expectations, is exploited by another group, seeking to seize power in that nation. The group that drives the insurgency may have a left or right political orientation, may or may not be communist, and may be operating from within the political infrastructure of the nation or outside of it. Their success is determined by the degree to which they draw popular

support away from the incumbent government. If the existing regime is corrupt, self-serving, and fails to address the rising expectations of its people, insurgent fires are fueled. As the insurgents convince the disenfranchized group that they are a credible alternative, and expand their power base, they gain legitimacy and become a threat to the incumbent. We then have to decide which side best serves our interests. This is a key decision. In Vietnam, we invested billions of dollars in resources and over 55,000 American lives in a Thieu-Ky government that had effectively lost the support of most of its people by 1965.³³ That government was rotten to the core, yet our choice was to contain communism. There are times when, given that kind of choice - no credible, alternative power structure in which to place our support - that risks outweigh gains. We fold our hand and get out, embarrassed, but not decisively beaten, as President Kennedy did following the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

Nicaragua is the most recent example of our misunderstanding of the lower spectrum of warfare. A coherent, consistent strategy has never been evident. CINCSOUTH had little input into the planning. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruited Contras from poorly educated, powerless Camposinos in the north, and then moved them around to different provinces where they did not know the land. Ten percent of Nicaragua's most influential, best educated people are exiled in Costa Rica.³⁴ Because of the recruiting base that was chosen, a viable political front was never formed - no political alternative from

which to draw support away from the Sandanistas; no catalyst to which the rising expectations of the people could be wedded.³⁵ The Contras have been a means to the end, but never a credible political alternative. As a result, numerous opposition elements in-country that could have provided political counterpressure in the world of public opinion have not been mobilized. This could have been generated by a DoD-managed UW campaign. Instead, we've defaulted in our commitment, permitting the Soviet empire to establish a foothold in Central America.³⁶ Another step in the isolation of America. It may still not be too late to turn the fight for Nicaragua around, but introducing regular US troops could have the unanticipated consequence of uniting the Contras and Sandanistas together to defeat a common enemy - us!

There are also better ways of achieving US objectives in nations attempting to fight off insurgency. First, the CINC should be put in charge. He would need a responsive, theater-level intelligence apparatus, with an imagery capability. The CINC needs to know what the allies and enemy are doing. Guerrillas normally exercise poor communications security, giving much information away over the radio. Satellite communications can capture messages within 30 seconds of transmission. RC personnel could monitor these communications, plus other important functions to this level of war, such as construction engineering and field medical support. This kind of soldier gets close to the people and finds out what is really going on in the barrios and villages. These efforts must be up-front and visible,

with a story, to sell the media and Congress on the commitment. Security assistance can also perform an effective role in defeating an insurgency. But our attention and resources must be relevant to the people we're trying to support, not necessarily to ourselves. Because of complex, layered budget and funding procedures, and diverse Congressional involvement, this process has become an end in itself rather than a means for implementing strategy.³⁷ Mobility support needed by Salvadorian soldiers is boot soles to counter the volcanic abrasiveness of the ground over which they have to walk, not helicopters.³⁸ The helicopter logistical tail is expensive and the peasants it is supposed to be supporting cannot maintain it (the mission capable (MC) rate of the aircraft is less than 10 percent). In short, we have overlayed on a Third World people and army our interpretation of what is needed to stop the spread of communism and expand democracy in the region.

The final subject to be addressed in this chapter deals with how we respond to operational level crises. The US has traditionally had an East-West orientation regarding threats to its security. Yet, in today's world most of the strains to peace consist of over 100 Third World states that are oriented primarily North-South.³⁹ Because of global mismanagement and self-inflicted wounds, most of these nations suffer from hunger, overpopulation, pollution and waste, energy shortages, terrorism, and fragile western economies. A crisis consists of an event, perceived as threatening to our national security interests, to

which a response is considered. As a crisis emerges, several things usually happen in our government. Top-level decision maker agendas are cleared. Ad hoc crisis action teams are formed. Forces are alerted. Around-the-clock shifts begin. Press queries are made. The latter alone sometimes prompt actions or reactions. Invariably, the right people are not brought in early, particularly communications and intelligence personnel. Ironically, mass communications and high technology produce a strong tendency for over-control by senior officials.

Our experience in responding to various crises over the past 25 years discloses several recurring deficiencies. No crisis response doctrine has been developed. An absence of SOP's has led to ad hoc responses to crises.⁴⁰ The Sontay raid was rehearsed 70 times. The plan for evacuation of our hostages from Tehran was never rehearsed. 'What if' analysis is not adequate. There is a tendency to reach decisions too quickly and respond prematurely, before thinking the options through or accessing sufficient information. Different agencies or key individuals try to compete or upstage each other, as is frequently true between operations and intelligence experts. Existing contingency plans will be overlooked, as was done before the Grenada operation. Because the players change, past lessons are forgotten; previous mistakes repeated. The entire decision making process is accelerated, with higher probability of mistakes. Fatigue impairs judgement. The impact of time zone differences is not considered. A crisis is like a chess game. The situation has to be continually assessed

and alternative responses gamed. Intelligence platforms have to perform. Monitoring, sensing and aiming continue until a decision is reached. If and when future crises occur at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, we will probably need specially trained forces, at least initially.

Congress has legislated the new SOF command (SOFCOM), over the objections of at least two of the services, for several reasons. Service SOF were averaging less than three percent of their budgets, no proven anti-terrorist capability had been demonstrated, and recent joint SOF participation in Iran and Grenada left a lot to be desired. Moreover, SOF can not operate in a vacuum. They have to be integrated into a continuum of responses once force is used. SOFCOM appears to be a sound first step for integrating the unique capabilities of existing SOF into joint and combined campaign planning.

There are definite linkages between strategic level and operational level facets of warfighting. The national goals-interests-threat-strategy-requirements-capabilities sequence is a series of interdependent links, each succeeding step dependent on the previous one. Based on the number of operational level issues cited above, it is evident that this arena of warfighting has been neglected over the past 25 years. We are trying to catch up. Unfortunately, unforeseen clashes of interest can precipitate a crisis or war on very short notice. We have to be ready for any eventuality along the continuum of conflict, short term or

protracted. Our nation has to be able to mobilize, deploy, and sustain a full scale war on one end of the spectrum, through successful elimination of a 24 hour hostage crisis at some far-flung US embassy, on the other.

Just as strategic and operational level warfighting considerations are linked, so are operational and tactical level factors. The operational level consists of a series of tactical level battles or engagements, the success or failure of which, will decisively affect the outcome of theatre campaigning. The next chapter will address our readiness to fight at that level.

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Chapter 4 - Tactical Level Concerns

Tactics is the way in which the components of combat power - maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership - are applied at the decisive time and place to win battles and engagements.¹ Combat power is situational in that it changes constantly, based on mission, enemy, time, terrain, and troops available (METT-T). It is also relative; combat power has meaning only as compared to the enemies. Lastly, combat power is reversible, in that the objective of using it is to reduce the enemy's capabilities. Tactics, like the operational level, is both a science and an art. On the one hand, it consists of techniques and procedures, or various actions needed to fight effectively. On the other hand, it is creativity or the thought process by which techniques and procedures are tailored to METT-T and a constantly changing, confusing, uncertain sequence of battlefield situations. Tactical level warfare generally applies to corps and smaller units. It is linked to the operational level by a series of battles and engagements which determine the course of campaigns.

With this as background, tactics is a combination of doctrine, equipment, training, and organization or force structure. Doctrine codifies principles or guidelines for how to think and how to fight.² Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgement in its application. One of our major shortcomings at the tactical level, is that each of the services view doctrine

differently. The Air Force has basic, operational, and tactical level doctrine, which is functionally oriented to its primary components - bombers, fighters, and airlift. Air Force doctrine generally takes a theater-level or operational perspective. In the Navy, major subordinate commands develop techniques and procedures unique to respective theaters of operations. AirLand Battle (ALB) is the Army's doctrine for fighting mid- to high-intensity warfare. ALB is the only US doctrine which represents inter-service coordination - the Army and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC). The Army and Marines emphasize how to fight and support or sustain the fight at the tactical level, independent of theater. We have no joint doctrine, although there are several initiatives under way, and joint doctrine formulation is one of the responsibilities of the new J-7 directorate at JCS. NATO has published its doctrine and terminology in Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-35, to include follow-on forces, attack (FOFA). FOFA extends ALB deep operations beyond the tactical and operational realms.³ The 1986 iteration of ALB (FM 100-5) was written to be compatible with ATP-35 and FOFA.

Historically, the US has depended on firepower to fight its wars. Although superior firepower is only one ingredient of combat power, it worked well for us when resources were relatively unconstrained, when we had allies who could buy us time and do much of the dying for us, and when we had a safe industrial base. But it is not 1944 anymore; we need service and

joint doctrine that is simple, consensually accepted, and understood by most.⁴ It must be flexible, fast-reacting, and balanced between firepower and maneuver.

In sum, the role of doctrine, and the level from which it is approached, varies among the services. Each of the services has organized differently in accordance with their doctrine. With the exception of ALB, our service doctrines are unilaterally oriented, with little regard for joint or combined implications. In other words, we have not codified joint and coalition considerations into how we think about future war. Moreover, existing doctrine is not widely read in our military, much less understood or influential in how we think about war. Without a shared way of thinking about how to fight, boldness and aggressiveness are inhibited. Commanders will not have the confidence that those above, below, and beside them will understand what they are doing and why, without the foundation of trust that follows a common base on how to fight. After the Grenada operation, Army Major General Jack B. Farris, made the following comments regarding Army-Navy operations in an interview with the Navy Times:

It's too late in exercises and actual operations to have misunderstandings and disagreements over doctrine. It's too late in these situations not to be able to effectively employ all your resources, which are always scarce, because you don't have joint procedures and techniques to employ all those systems along functional lines.⁵

A final point on doctrine. Sometimes requirements drive doctrine, and sometimes doctrine drives requirements. Both ways can be

effective. It would have been difficult to develop doctrine for nuclear weapons before they were developed. On the other hand, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) would probably be less controversial had a doctrine for its employment been developed before the BFV itself. With a technology lead, more innovation is likely, although it is less likely that it would be harnessed to a preconceived operational concept. In any case, this process has to be done in a joint environment, since the CINCs are charged to put this synergism of doctrine and technology to the ultimate test.

Force structure, and how we arm and equip, should flow from doctrine. Although the Army has adopted a concept based requirements system (CBRS), force structure has tended to drive doctrine.⁶ We currently have seven different divisional designs, six of which entered the structure before ALB. Most of the new family of weapons were conceived before ALB. Only the light infantry division (LID) organization and Army of Excellence (AOE) force structure model post-date ALB doctrine. The proliferation of force designs is primarily a product of integrating new means of transport rather than advances in how to fight or matching force structure with strategy or doctrine.⁷ The LID enhances the speed by which the Army-Air Force team can deploy by air to meet a crisis in another theater. What is not clear is why it was decided to field five of them before the first was validated. There is no evidence that any sort of threat

assessment or strategic appraisal preceded the decision. The LID is basically a foot-mobile force except for a battalion of utility helicopters. In a high or mid-intensity environment, it would have to be moved frequently for survival. Since future war at those levels is projected to be several times as intense as World War II, sufficient aircraft or trucks may not be available to move LID's as freely as in peacetime. The question then becomes, do we need that many LIDs for anticipated low intensity threats, given the newly organized SOFCOM?

AOE is intended to redress a 200,000 man, Congressionally imposed shortfall in spaces needed to field 16 full active army divisions under the Division 86 structure.⁸ AOE also seeks to align force design and end-strength mismatches with ALB doctrine. There are now 18 active divisions and 10 in the National Guard. Since much of the divisional CSS base has been moved to corps, the initial savings in strategic airlift needed to deploy a LID will be offset by the additional sorties needed to bring in the 'tail' for sustainment beyond the first 72 hours. We now have seven different types of smaller divisions, two more division flags, the ability to move a division-level force into a theater faster, with little savings in strategic airlift for an infantry division when non-divisional CSS is added. If the intent was to increase our capability to rapidly establish a ground force presence or show of force in another theater, with little

capability to sustain battle, then AOE has been a worthwhile initiative.

The force can be modified to meet new threats or strategy through changes in hardware, organization, doctrine, or training. As mentioned above, the Army has adopted CBRS to determine which areas need fixing as it modernizes itself. But it is oriented mainly to process, not ends. Acquiring new equipment is the most expensive option and it takes the longest to execute. Over \$1.5 trillion has been spent since 1980 to modernize the force. Although our military has grown undeniably stronger, there is concern over the effectiveness of how the money was spent.⁹

One of the most frequently debated examples is the applicability of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) to a modern battlefield. There is certainly a need to transport infantrymen that can fight with tanks on mobile battlefields. They must be able to keep up with the tanks and they need sufficient cover to provide survivability comparable to the tanks. Mobile infantry will normally have to dismount to close with the enemy in the objective area. The Bradley, unlike the M-113 before it, is a closed IFV. Its occupants are, therefore, more vulnerable to mines and anti-tank missiles than if the vehicle had an opening on top. In the former case, the troops are thrown against the roof, compounding the probability of injury. In the latter case, the confined space makes the warhead more deadly.¹⁰ The aluminum skin vaporizes when hit by a shaped charge, increasing

the antipersonnel effect of the warhead. The effectiveness of rifle fire from an enclosed vehicle moving rapidly over rough terrain is questionable. The Soviet BMP, with very similar characteristics to the BFV, suffered heavy losses during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and reports from Afghanistan are equally as unfavorable.¹¹ Another factor is that only six infantrymen dismount the BFV, reducing by one-third the number of soldiers who actually close on the objective. Finally, this 25 ton, \$1.5 million vehicle has a history of swimming failures. It was originally envisioned as a complement to the M-1 tank, which does not swim. The BFV was built to satisfy a perceived need to thicken the European battlefield by arming every mechanized infantry squad with the means to fight tanks at 3,000 meters.¹² We have not learned from our own experience and that of others that infantry do not need a fighting vehicle; they need a vehicle that can maneuver with tanks, protect them from mines, artillery, and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), and get them close enough to objectives for dismounted assault. The BFV is an example of our military's questionable performance in developing weapon systems that are part of an integrated whole, with capabilities that optimize the combined arms element they were designed to support. BFVs reflect the dubious thesis that infantry will be most effective if they stay mounted in combat and fight from inside a vehicle.¹³ The requirement to move infantry rapidly around a mobile battlefield is valid; but for the infantryman to influence fighting, he must dismount and maneuver over the ground, just as he has always done.

Since World War II, we have failed to develop an adequate light antitank (AT) weapon.¹⁴ The German Panzerfaust of World War II, and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet RPG-7, currently in every infantry squad, have been reliable light anti-tank weapons. The Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW), like the Bazooka before it, was incapable of killing most tanks, and has been outrun by the pace of modernization of Soviet armor. The error is not in the original mistake, but in the fact that it has been perpetuated for so long. To our credit, the Viper was canceled because it didn't work. We have now ordered the Swedish AT-4, which is supposed to be an effective weapon, but we don't know yet because in the competition no firing was directed at real tanks. Meanwhile, we still have no light AT weapon in rifle squads.

The organic air defense capability within our divisions has been set back by the cancellation of the division air defense (DIVAD) self-propelled, radar directed, antiaircraft gun. The DIVAD's major flaw, after a 10 year attempt to improve on a similar Soviet gun, is that it relies on advanced radar technology. This radar works fine as long as the target aircraft flies straight. But in combat, pilots "jink" - twist and turn -their aircraft to keep air defenders from accurately tracking them. Some experts claim that computers are incapable of adapting to jinking targets; that the human eye is actually more efficient in guiding anti-aircraft guns than high-technology, automatic

guidance systems.¹⁵ Another factor is that the \$6.8 million unit cost of the DIVAD is so prohibitive, that even if it had proven effective, we would not be able to afford enough of them to make a great impact on our overall air defense capabilities.

The BFV, DIVAD, and light anti-tank weapon issue are examples or symptoms of pervasive trends in the development of weapons for our soldiers. Our services seem reluctant to pursue weapon technologies which challenge existing doctrine or fail to conform to established roles and missions, or to design and build functional, uncomplicated, affordable weapons critical to mission performance.¹⁶ Technology is a useful means to the end of attaining battlefield objectives. It can compensate for human weaknesses and reduce the amount of uncertainty in battle. But we cannot allow it to dictate the structure and functioning of our warfighting systems. We cannot become enslaved by technology. Success in battle has less often resulted from technological superiority than from awareness of its limitations and discovering ways - through training, equipping, reorganizing, and revising doctrine - of circumventing them.¹⁷ Whereas technology deals with the science of war, working around its limitations is the art of war. Our recent tendency has been for technology to virtually take on a life of its own. Technology is only useful if it is affordable, and is understood and accepted by its users.

Our interests in future battle will be better served if we overcome roles and mission biases, and organize and equip to

fight smarter. For example, if enemy air is overwhelming the maneuver force and ground-based air defenses, army aviation assets should be diverted from other missions to a defensive counterair (DCA) role.¹⁸ The degree to which this would occur will depend on the importance of ongoing antitank and cavalry missions. In a fast moving situation, with limited counterair assets, the ground commander may place aviation assets OPCON to the air defense commander as an aerial extension of ground-based ADA systems.¹⁹

Between the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and line of sight, we should use ground-to-ground systems. Close air support (CAS) assets should operate between the line of sight and the fire support coordination line (FSCL). This would be a more efficient way of optimizing available weapon systems to kill, not just delay and disrupt, targets.²⁰ Another initiative would be for the armor and ADA communities to consolidate efforts so that the new FOG-M antitank system, and the follow-on to the DIVAD can be used interchangeably in a ground-to-ground or ground-to-air role, as dictated by METT-T, similar to the shared ADA and aviation roles described above.²¹

Training detractors are another major impediment to readiness at the tactical level. Our single greatest peacetime challenge in all the services is personnel turnover. With a substantial portion of the force stationed overseas and on remote tours and an individual replacement system, many of our units

replace 25 percent of their strength every quarter.²² In other words, many units completely change personnel every 12 to 15 months. This impels units to concentrate on such individual and crew-level skills as weapons marksmanship, military occupational specialty (MOS) proficiency, and maintaining prescribed mission capable (MC) rates with organic equipment. Although multi-echelon training is routinely practiced in most units, time does not exist to sustain proficiency in higher level skills, such as corps and division-level maneuver, and practicing warfighting tasks with allies.

The expense of new technology in weapons and ammunition means that less and less live firing will be done during training. Antitank crews for TOW and Dragon systems may fire one live round a year if they are lucky. A Phoenix missile, valued at over \$900,000, means that some fighter pilots may never fire a single missile while assigned to their squadron.²³ Pressure from business interests and environmental protection groups will continue to limit, and even reduce, space and time available to train. For example, live firing is now prohibited after midnight in many areas, particularly in Europe, in the interest of noise abatement.

Myriad games and simulations have been developed to compensate for many of the above realities, most of which are here to stay. These devices are excellent for refining procedures and reactions in teamwork, marksmanship, and decision-making.

They can be effective if they are used to supplement, not substitute for, realistic training. Units will always have to work at replicating the fog and confusion, the fatigue and stress of around-the-clock operations, and a live opposing force who is trying to win just as badly as they are. In order to be combat ready, military units must train frequently under the latter conditions. No amount of technology will substitute for it.

The final area affecting readiness and future war at the tactical level deals with people. Mentioned earlier is the fact that the Army has decided against keeping COHORT, the only serious recent attempt to substitute individual replacement with unit replacement. Although new fixes will reduce turnover by about 15 percent, the steady flow of individual members in and out of units will perpetuate the lack of cohesion in those units. The major reason that men are willing to fight and die is because they do not want to let down their buddies.²⁴ That ethos only happens over time after men have shared the rigors and stress of tough training and have completed various rites of passage which certify that they belong, that they can 'hang'. Cohesion is the combination of morale, discipline, and sense of mission that emerges after men get to know one another, and develop trust, pride, and identity with their team. It is the essence of any force's killing power. Cohesion has characterized the Germans during two world wars, and more recently, the Israelis -both highly successful at the tactical level against numerically superior enemies. Conversely, successful application of force

by our country has been attributed to the overwhelming output of the industrial and manpower bases. For reasons stated in previous chapters, neither of these is likely to characterize American involvement in future wars.

Bureaucracy exacerbates readiness shortcomings at the tactical level. Since World War II, our military has become stultified by tiers of staffs oriented on management, logistics, and weapons engineering. Of 1.1 million DoD civilians, only 9 percent work in direct support of combat forces.²⁵ The bureaucracy is fueled by an enlisted to officer ratio of 5.9:1. This compares with a 10:1 ratio at the end of World War II. Since 1980, 30 percent of the net increase of 100,000 military personnel have been officers.²⁶ Recently, a 4-star speaker at the Army War College attempted to justify this trend by arguing that these officers would be needed as cadre in event of mobilization. A good thought, but not very believable as the reason for its occurrence. At the same time we have had difficulty retaining NCOs. Neither officers nor NCOs remain in tactical units much longer than the privates, which compounds the lack of cohesion. The 'up or out' policy for officers precludes those who thrive on duty with troops to develop their expertise and help stabilize leaders. Some 258,000, or 14 percent of our military's enlisted strength, is in a combat skill - 32,000 less than those listed in administrative or clerical positions.²⁷

Bureaucracy seeks to standardize procedures, establish staffing requirements, and manage systems. The idea to is stay within the system, follow some plan, and make it work. Many of our officers by virtue of assignment to one or more of our military bureaucracies have become imbued with the idea that making these systems work is the most important task in our profession. Some of this is necessary during peace, even during war. The problem is that the battlefield is a very uncertain place. It demands innovation - departure from the routine, where the unexpected becomes the norm. War does not deal with suspenses and milestones to solve known problems. It demands quick solutions to unanticipated problems. Just as legalisms have cut into morality in our legal profession, it appears the military profession has let bureaucratic rules substitute for innovation.²⁸ Combat readiness depends on a balance between management of things and leadership of people. If we do not give more attention to the latter and less to the former, peacetime preoccupations will continue to interfere with our readiness to fight.

The final issue in this chapter deals with women in the military and implications for combat. Women comprise about 10 percent of our military.²⁹ Inculcating that many women into a traditionally male institution has been a traumatic experience. Issues surrounding high pregnancy rates among single servicewomen, fraternization, sexual harassment, single parenthood, and assignment of married service members have been

widely debated. The judiciary has ruled that pregnant single females must be allowed to stay in the military if they so choose. This edict includes remaining on duty until the final month of pregnancy, a three month maternity leave, and return to duty as a single parent, each of which detracts from readiness.

There are other implications unique to combat, such as the specter of rape and torture in prisoner-of-war (PW) camps. Western civilization has generally accorded women protection and privilege, laying open the questions of whether they would be able to handle the psychological and emotional stresses of war and whether the public will could endure the sight of female casualties arrayed on their television screens.³⁰ There are numerous examples testifying to the morale, commitment, and effectiveness of military men and women working together during rigorous field training exercises and in support of our efforts in Central America. Yet, if the next war is fought at the middle of the spectrum or higher, we will have more female casualties than during our last three wars combined.³¹ Non-combatant ships, air defense sites, communications nodes and CSS facilities, all weighted with servicewomen, will be early, high priority targets for the enemy. Our challenge in the US military is whether we are willing to accept the psychological impact of female casualties on the American public, based on peacetime decisions made for their employment.

In summary, the US military establishment operates on the margins of what is required doctrinally; organizationally; and in equipping, manning, and training for warfare tomorrow. A shroud of peacetime naivete seems to hang over us, blocking out the lessons of recent combat experience, endeavors to improve and innovate being absorbed and lost in business-as-usual bureaucracy, and preoccupation with technology as the panacea for future war. In the tactical arena, as in the operational arena, readiness for battle tomorrow, despite all the rhetoric, sometimes gets buried beneath energy spent on resource allocation, force modernization, and the array of peacetime distractors to readiness. The final chapter will attempt to synergize the major themes presented thusfar and crosswalk them into a series of recommendations intended to better balance the need to be ready to fight tomorrow and investment into future defense needs.

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26. Ibid., p. 244.
27. Ibid., p. 243.
28. Lecture at USAWC, April 1987, by a renowned observer of military affairs.
29. Halloran, p. 60.
30. Ibid., p. 93.
31. Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant, p. 258.

Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Recommendations

Churchill once said, "democracy is the worst form of government, except all others." The American Republic is a testimonial to Churchill's statement. The separation of power has not worked as envisioned by the Founding Fathers. Whereas Congress has exerted great leverage over the Executive Branch, the only check over Congress is the ballot. Continuity is lost with the biennial turnover of elected and appointed officials. Our government was structured to preserve liberty at home. It was not intended to orient externally, as is a monarchy, much less with the responsibilities and commitments of a global power. In a sense, our system of checks and balances precludes us from playing the ruthless games of great power politics.¹ de Tocqueville warned that this nation needed a foreign policy that fit its domestic institutions or it needed to change its domestic institutions. We have opted to retain the principles under which the nation was founded and its institutions.

With only 40 years of experience, this nation is still learning how to fulfill its responsibilities as the leader of the free world. It took 11 years from the Declaration of Independence to ratify the Constitution. We took another 177 years to pass a civil rights bill. We continue to experience growing pains in an era of unprecedented change in magnitude and pace. The nation is urbanizing. Our pluralistic system has weaned diverse interest

groups, all of which seek to impose various levels of influence on that system. Recent advances in technology have created a worldwide information explosion and rising expectations by over 100 Third World nations. Increasingly, world events are being driven by forces within those nations, rather than by the Soviets and ourselves. Strategic terrorism, the population explosion, trade imbalances, and drugs present new threats, with which we are trying to cope. The Soviet Empire also grows ever stronger, while power has become more diffused throughout the globe. Another factor, which should not be taken lightly, is that America is geo-strategically isolated. We are physically separated from most of the world by two huge expanses of water. This reality must be considered at a point in history when interdependence among nations has never been stronger, and will probably remain so.

Understanding of this backdrop is necessary to place the issues of the previous chapters in context, and to underline the importance of having a ready defense. The Soviets only have to win once. We have to avoid defeat daily. Our nation and its friends must have the capability and will to ensure that at the moment of truth we can hold him off long enough for the strengths of democracy (which are longer term) to win over the strengths of totalitarianism (which are better suited for warfighting in the shorter term).²

At the same time, we have to be prepared for crises at the lower end of the spectrum, to include terrorism and drug trafficking. The magnitude of the drug problem is staggering. Since 1984, the drug traffic entering our borders has doubled. Presently, the figures are 25 tons of marijuana per day and 2-3 tons of cocaine per week.³ The NCA, in coordination with key Congressional leaders, the JCS, and our strategic intelligence apparatus must prioritize these threats to reaffirmed vital interests in terms of likelihood of occurrence and impact on our national security. Assumptions must be developed based on worst case planning. We have to be ready for sustained combat with at least a partial mobilization.

Irrespective of the specific threat, we have to recognize that raw power is not necessarily capability. We also have to more closely scrutinize intentions. The most dangerous capability is not necessarily the most dangerous threat, once intent is considered. One example would be the Soviet capability to destroy the US with existing nuclear weapons. The estimate of the situation serves as an effective tool for the military to weigh possible enemy courses of action. The NCA needs to unify the effort of our strategic intelligence apparatus, to include ongoing strategic estimates of the situation. In short, the 'who-what-when-where-why' of probable conflicts must be articulated and maintained at a high level of consciousness within the NCA.

Only then will we be able to develop a national military strategy that makes sense and provides a practical guide for resource requirements. OSD, with JCS input, should have ownership for this strategy. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) must pull the service chiefs and CINCs together by providing an overarching strategy to which each of their interests are subordinated, but to which their energies are focused. Service budget proposals should be replaced by a single, integrated DoD budget proposal before Congress. This budget would reflect the SecDef's national military strategy, which would reflect the NCA assessment of probable threats to our vital interests. An integrated, mission-oriented DoD budget request would also facilitate resolution of mismatches between strategic objectives and capabilities. By pooling all of DoDs resources into a single operational pot, (JCS would prepare a single five year defense program (FYDP)) DoD could more efficiently argue budget requirements before Congress. If after having done that, and shortfalls still exist, the Executive must change strategic objectives or the Legislative must provide the means to increase capabilities. In either case, our political system will be operating more responsibly in providing for the Nation's defense.

Some examples are necessary to clarify this discussion. The Navy's 'maritime strategy' is largely unilateral. A national military strategy would emphasize the importance of maintaining open sea lines of communication (SLOC) for the strategic movement of Army and Air Force units to the theater of interest. This

would require the Navy to coordinate more closely with the other services. The services would see that in most threat situations the Navy cannot win the war, but by losing the battle for control of the SLOCs, they can lose it. A national military strategy, coupled against finite resources, would require more debate within the defense establishment on basic issues. For example, rather than arguing over the relative merits of the B-1 Bomber versus Stealth technology, the more fundamental issue to be debated is the future of the manned bomber. The Navy and Air Force are organized functionally to fight different parts of the war, such as anti-submarine warfare and strategic airlift. A mission-integrated strategy should cause the Army to rethink whether having seven different kinds of divisions is necessary for fighting across the spectrum of conflict in several prospective and uniquely different theaters.

A clearly articulated, well understood strategy is necessary to drive requirements. Meeting those requirements does not imply spending more money or adding more people to our already swollen bureaucracy. How the money is spent is key. Identifying requirements involves a trade-off between quality (or capability) and quantity (or costs). These negotiations, including the services, the combatant commands, JCS, and DoD, and risk assessments would occur prior to development decisions. However, once those decisions are made, debate stops and centralized execution begins. Over half of the DoD budget is for operations. The Federal government can no longer

afford to virtually subsidize defense contractors. Our system of free enterprise and competition should be allowed to work. Performance would be driven up, and costs down. Systems would be selected based on fly-offs or shoot-offs. Having more options would drive up prototype costs, but production costs would remain constant.⁴ Equipment should be measured by its usefulness, not the level of technology embodied. We have to adopt a more cost effective philosophy where 'good enough' is better than 'best'. Expanding defense markets beyond the current 'one supplier, one buyer' stage, would also invigorate our sadly depleted industrial base.

We should not start programs unless we can afford to keep them. Baselineing and multi-year procurement are essential to stabilize the acquisition process and minimize the risks of 'stretching' and Congressional 'pork barrels'. Greater use of commercial products will also contribute to higher reliability and lower costs. The cap on defense spending should be continued. It forces the system, to include DoD and Congress, to correct itself.⁵ Congress needs to adopt a mission-oriented, multi-year budget just as DoD has. A retired, ranking military officer recently remarked at the USAWC that during his watch Congressional authorization committees did not even review two Army procurement categories (both pertaining to key readiness areas such as ammunition, trucks, and communications equipment). All of these initiatives will permit a more intelligent tradeoff between quantity and quality of new systems and will contribute

to a force that is better organized and equipped to implement the deterrence and warfighting components of our national military strategy.

One of the basic problems at the strategic level is that rational solutions are being proposed for problems that exist in a bureaucratic system. Bureaucracies reward people who accept the organization as is and who try to make its systems work. Overall goals and purposes are reduced to individual tasks which are usually well defined. This system is resistant to change. Loyalties are widely diffused within different services and specialty areas within the services. Ironically, the dominant characteristics of combat are uncertainty and rapid change. Our Federal government in general, and DoD in particular, need to adopt a corporate organizational model. Individuals would adopt the institution's external goals and purposes as their personal goals and values (the ends of a national military strategy). Innovation, initiative, and questioning day-to-day procedures are expected and rewarded. This model promotes unity of effort in figuring out how to achieve the goals.

A national military strategy, drawn up by OSD, would provide the necessary goals and direction which DoD now lacks. Strong civilian and military leadership will be needed to work toward these goals in a corporate environment. Congressional laws won't change the system. It has to come from within. Incentives are needed to encourage officers to become strategists or program

managers, and to attract qualified civilians to work in such critical areas as acquisition. In short, DoD has to take the lead - with articulation of a national military strategy, integrated ways and means for implementing that strategy, and a new, corporate approach for overseeing the nation's defense. None of this is to imply that readiness for the next war will follow, but they are prerequisites for being ready.

The first step in being ready to fight at the operational level is a viable mobilization apparatus. As stated above, competition will accomplish much to restore the Nation's industrial base. FEMA is working on surge planning. But there are several other initiatives that must be taken. The services must consolidate existing CONUS facilities to provide sufficient mobilization and training bases, in event of mobilization. Consolidation of helicopter pilot training facilities is one example mentioned in an earlier chapter. Next, a return to some form of conscription is necessary if the next war takes longer than six months and requires mobilization to sustain. The AVF plus pretrained military manpower are insufficient to meet projected mission requirements.⁶ Loopholes encountered during the Vietnam-era draft would be precluded by a lottery, and the advantages of having a more representative cross-section of our youth serving their country is self evident. Although the quality of service members in the AVF is higher than we would field under a draft, the issue is one of quantity of personnel. If we don't have a mechanism for rapidly expanding our manpower base to

perceived force level requirements, readiness is obviously affected. Draft calls could be done annually or biennially, allowing the recruits to choose their time of entry. This would reduce manpower turnover and add to the stability and combat readiness of the force. The absence of a peacetime draft does place a check on the power of the NCA to embroil us in another Vietnam without Congressional approval. Nevertheless, prudence dictates that we place the machinery into operation now.

Strategic deployability was noted in Chapter 3 as a significant weakness in our current readiness to commit US forces from CONUS to another theater. If North Korea attacked South Korea tomorrow, all available strategic airlift and sealift would be needed to move US Army and Air Force units not already committed to another theater. The deterrence part of our strategy would suddenly be depleted for the rest of the world.⁷ All flexibility at the strategic level would be gone. Strategic mobility assets would be needed to sustain our forces on the Korean peninsula, the AVF would soon be depleted, and any uncertainty in the minds of other prospective enemies around the world regarding the credibility of our conventional deterrence for their region would be gone. In light of the continued erosion of our merchant marine fleet, and increased dependence on foreign-flag shipping (much of which will not be available in event of war), we have to increase US Navy responsibilities, regenerate a merchant marine industry that is competitive in the commercial world, vastly expand the civil reserve air fleet

(CRAF), or some combination of the three. None of the options are easy, and each would be expensive and time-consuming. Yet if we don't act, and fast, the credibility of CONUS reinforcements to any OCONUS combat scenario remains more bluff than reality. We simply do not have the means to get sufficient men or materiel to worldwide battlefields in time or in quantities needed to sustain battle. This situation is compounded by failures to consider such factors as potential target area port facilities before we build MSC shipping. For example, none of the new fast sealift ships (FSS) will fit into existing harbors in SWA because they are too big (about the same size as carriers).⁸

Most issues in the employment or warfighting area of the operational level have been addressed and progress is being made. However, some of those issues bear repeating. Campaign planning, the CINC's or JTF commander's visualization of how operational level fighting will unfold, is essential in every unified command. Decisionmaking must be centralized during planning, but decentralized during execution. A clear statement of overall intent by the operational level commander and mission-type orders in execution will be necessary to provide adequate flexibility by subordinate commanders. This process must be inculcated into all joint and combined level commanders with which US forces are associated. Wargaming can serve as an effective tool to practice operational level commanders and their staffs. However, these officers must first practice thinking conceptually, then develop realistic scenarios. The sophisticated gaming facility at the US

Navy War College sacrifices realism if carriers are never lost. Compatible, interoperable equipment is another detractor to our readiness to fight. The new DoD acquisition chain must ensure that weapon systems and other equipment can be used interchangeably among the services wherever practicable - particularly communications systems. This area also has obvious implications with coalition partners. Vested interests by services and nations must give way to independent operational testing. Winners get the contracts. Again, the military must be able to convince their political masters that they have the best interests of the existing strategy, warfighting missions, and the taxpayers at heart when they ask for money.

The following coalition concerns warrant particular attention if we are to optimize the combined forces involved. Operational level commanders must get strategic intelligence in real time. Those commanders must have direct access to strategic assets operating in his theater. Security clearance limitations within and between nations must be sensible. The best way to avoid compromises is to have several plans for the same campaign or contingency. Progress must continue in coalition logistics so that operational commanders have more flexibility in moving forces around the battlefield. Combined training is essential to overcome differences in language, fighting doctrine, and capabilities. Operational commanders must maintain open communications with their civilian leaders and agree to reporting procedures and rules of engagement that will preclude overcontrol

during hostilitie Combined exercises should be as realistic as possible. There has been a growing tendency for over-controlled, scripted exercises in recent years. We must train as we will fight.

Several steps are needed if we are to respond to national crises more effectively. Predesignated task forces should be designated, SOPs established, and rehearsals conducted. Specific individuals should be placed in charge, by name or by position. Plans for handling the media should be prepared. Access should be controlled until the problem becomes well defined. Undue haste causes undue mistakes and should be avoided. Crisis action teams must be sensitive to time zone differences, and have the first team on duty during prime time in the crisis area. Low intensity conflict is very different from larger scale operations involving conventional forces. The CINC should be placed in charge, but he must work closely with appropriate ambassadors and country teams. Before we commit ourselves to support one side or the other in a Third World state, the CINC in coordination with the NCA, Department of State, and JCS must determine if the side we wish to support has a sufficiently stable political infrastructure, a power base, and interests of the people at heart. Those factors must be working before we commit military forces, much less enjoy reasonable probability of success.

There are several 'warstopper' issues at the operational level that must be resolved before we are ready to fight any war

beyond a Grenada-type crisis. Much attention and resources have been focused on employment, the most scenario-dependent phase of warfighting. But mobilization, deployment, and sustainment are also critical components of the whole. There is another facet of operational level warfare that has received almost no attention -the occupation phase, or what we do after our strategic objectives are met. None of these phases has received the attention or resources they deserve if we are serious about readiness. Shortfalls in any one can undermine any strategy or force structure that is developed in support of that strategy. DoD, as the maker of national military strategy, and Congress, as holder of the money, must work in concert to provide some badly needed fixes or the 'hollowness' that General Meyer spoke of seven years ago with respect to the Army will come back to haunt us at a higher level.

My proposals at the tactical level are intended to facilitate cohesive, coordinated operations that would reduce service rivalry and improve combat readiness. First and foremost, a basic realignment of service roles and missions is needed. The lethality of ground-to-air weapon systems and continued IFF problems (the potential for fratricide) dictate that the Army assume the CAS mission. Assignment of medium and high altitude air defense weapons to the Air Force will facilitate unity of effort in air defense. All strategic nuclear forces, to include the Air Force's bombers and tankers, Navy nuclear submarines (SSBN), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) should be

consolidated into a single, specified command. This would facilitate planning, procedures, and organization of forces with a common mission. Current initiatives to consolidate all strategic mobility forces and special operations forces are sensible outgrowths of the same logic. All remaining forces should be allocated to one the warfighting CINC's based on threats to our national military strategy. Force allocations would change as the threat changed.

The above initiatives would require the following complementary actions. In writing joint doctrine JCS must take the lead in challenging fighting doctrines from previous wars which may not be applicable to future war. The future role of aircraft carriers should be debated and realistically wargamed. How vulnerable are they to submarines and standoff air-to-ground missiles fired from Backfire bombers? Is the risk of strategic bombers penetrating state-of-the-art ground-to-air missile arrays still acceptable? What is the most effective mix of divisional structures to counter conventional ground threats? All of these questions must also be considered in light of alliances of which we are a member. Basic joint and coalition principles must be identified as operational and tactical guides, and constantly refined based on collective inputs from the services and our allies.

The joint specialty officer (JSO) initiative should be a plus for joint planning. JCS should prescribe prerequisites for

the specialty, assignment guidelines, and incentives for joining it. If the JSO program is not strong enough to overcome service biases, a General Staff should be formed along the lines of the German model. These officers would be identified as junior majors/lieutenant commanders and schooled to become experts on the art of joint and combined war and institutional memories on the lessons of military history. Prior to selection, these officers must have proven themselves technically competent in their parent service specialty. Operational planning within JCS should be confined to mobilization and deployment planning. Employment planning, to include crisis-action planning, should be done by the appropriate warfighting CINC. Each CINC must have a campaign plan based on tasks assigned by the DG and JSCP. Each war plan should be complemented by a supporting deployment plan prepared by JCS.

The importance of interoperable, dual sourced equipment has been addressed. Above all it has to be usable and available in sufficient quantities to those who need it. Before procuring new systems, the new acquisition framework must conduct a joint analysis of systems needed to fight, based on METT-T and fiscal constraints, followed by joint prioritization of those systems. All new equipment must receive increased and tougher testing before it is introduced into the force. Warfighting systems must be interchangeable, or at least compatible, among our services, and with allies whenever possible. Where foreign systems win competitions, we can still negotiate to have some of them built

in the US to ease Congressional constituent pressures. Readiness shortfalls such as the relative inability of NATO to defend itself against a known chemical threat must be corrected.

Underlying much of my thesis is that we need a code of ethics within the officer corps in our military. Every officer cadet and candidate needs to understand, and every officer needs to be periodically reminded that they are sworn to defend the Constitution, to serve the Republic. These are weighty responsibilities that transcend individual, unit, or service interests or loyalties. Until our entire officer corps is inculcated with that mindset, we will continue to 'shoot ourselves in the foot', perpetuate an adversary relationship with Congress, waste money, and worse, detract from the very purpose for which we exist (readiness to defend National interests). As a corollary, the military school systems, particularly the staff and war colleges, need to more thoroughly cover each of the phases of warfighting (from mobilization through occupation), and convey a fuller understanding and appreciation of the importance of military strategy.

The next underlying point is that reform is needed, but reorganization and legislation are only part of the answer. We need to change the way we think about defense. Strategy, and political ends, must underpin everything we do regarding national security. Strategy is only a guide, but it expresses how the policies and vision of our Commander-in-Chief will be

implemented. In this sense, reform applies to the NCA. It applies to Congress as well. Congressional oversight must be restored to a proper level, with less preoccupation on the budget, so that it can more responsibly attend to its Constitutional charter. This will be facilitated if OSD takes control of its department and the services, and integrates their activities in terms of a national military strategy that it must prescribe. In order for this strategy to be credible, each of the above institutions must 'buy into' it; all actions taken and resources committed to preserve our national security must be within the parameters of that strategy. These linkages are essential if we are serious about being ready to defend our interests. Reform is needed - of the entire system.

War is the greatest potential disruption to our ability to predict the future. Once war is introduced, the life of everyone affected - not just those who fight in it - changes fundamentally, regardless of the outcome. With that sobering thought, the institutions mentioned in this paper - and all of us as professional people and responsible citizens - have not only a Constitutional obligation, but a moral obligation to adjust our azimuth, sift out the inanities and irrelevancies of peacetime bureaucracy, and rededicate ourselves to the art and science of warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is also crucial to understand and appreciate the fact that key institutions such as the Congress, NSC, DoD, OMB, and the Politburo, have different ways of viewing the world based on

perceived responsibilities. Internal communications will tend to break down because some institutions, such as DoD, are oriented to the future, while others, such as Congress, are reactive to current issues. External communications will break down for the same reasons. The Politburo is predictive (future oriented) while the NSC is reactive. Our collective task is to balance the realities of the present with the uncertainties of the future and field the most ready force that our strategy and available resources can provide. If we apply wisdom in learning from the Romans, we will realize that our greatest enemy is ourselves. Our future security, therefore, lies largely in our own hands.

ENDNOTES

1. Lecture at USAWC, April 1987, by a renowned observer of military affairs.
2. Lecture at AU, March 1987, by a renowned observer of military affairs.
3. Lecture at USAWC, April 1987, by a ranking military officer.
4. Lecture at USAWC, April 1987, by ranking DoD consultants.
5. Lecture at USAWC, April 1987, by a renowned observer of military affairs.
6. Hadley, p. 282-284.
7. Lecture at USAWC, May 1987, by a renowned observer of military affairs.
8. Lecture at AU, March 1987, by a ranking military officer.

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
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