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THE MILITARY RAILROADS OF THE CIVIL WAR AND THEIR GREAT LEADERS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILBUR H. BOUTIN, JR.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM
PAPER

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CIVIL WAR

AND THEIR GREAT

LEADERS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY

PROJECT

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23 March 1987

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ABSTRACT

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Our history is replete with great leadership which has been demonstrated by men in battle. The United States Army War College has subsequently used these leadership styles as part of its curriculum to expose others to those traits which have proven to be successful. In the majority of instances, leadership examples have tended to be directed toward the combat commander. Little effort has been given, to provide in this curriculum, a wider exposure of leadership styles in the combat service and combat service support specialties. It is therefore a major contention that our curriculum does not offer our students the broadest exposure to leadership styles. This study is intended to do that. Using the Military Railroads as the support function, this project will investigate the leadership associated with this organization. The final outcome will be to demonstrate the need to incorporate leadership styles of support functions into the curriculum of this college. ✓

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER I THE REPORTER	1
CHAPTER II THE MEN	6
CHAPTER III THE FIRST INTERVIEW	16
CHAPTER IV MAY 2, 1865	75
CHAPTER V A VISIT WITH GRANT.135
BIBLIOGRAPHY188

THE REPORTER

The surrender of General Robert R. Lee at Appomattox on April 9, 1865 will be viewed by many as the conclusion of the great War of the Rebellion that has divided this nation for over four long years. During the weeks that follow, the remainder of the Confederacy will return to the folds of the Union and we can commence a period of reconstruction, which will again unite our regions. While this will not be an easy task, I firmly believe that our Government is dedicated to this proposition.

I cannot help though to feel less secure about other aspects of this Rebellion which I and my fellow colleagues have failed to capture for our posterity. As I reflect over the past few years, I am clearly aware of the many historical accounts that have been written concerning the genius of such eminent leaders as Grant, Lee, Sherman and Longstreet; not to mention the gallant manner in which they led their armies into battle. To some degree, I am completely satisfied knowing that historically we have captured their heroic deeds. Such a heritage will serve this great nation well in the future, but yet I cannot help to feel a void about this War, which we as journalists and reporters have neglected.

"Mr. Luvaas!, Mr. Luvaas!, Mr. Luvaas!"

"Whoever that is out there, I'm in the editorial room."

"Mr. Luvaas"

"Yes Jimmy, what is it?" I sure wish that I was young again and had the degree of energy that young reporters such as Jimmy have. On second

thought, being fifty-nine, mature, distinguished looking, and modestly competent isn't bad either.

"Well Mr. Luvaas, the editor of our paper, Mr. Nelson said that he wanted to see you right away. He told his secretary to fetch you immediately as he has a new assignment for you. Please hurry as it sounded quite urgent."

"Thank you Jimmy. Please tell Mr. Nelson's secretary that I will be along shortly." I suppose I should hurry but after spending all these years on the road reporting on the war, I just don't have that kind of energy left in me. Perhaps I should take up a new vocation. I wonder how I would be as a historian. Having tramped the battlefield at Gettysburg, Corinth, Decatur, Vicksburg and Savannah to name just a few, I could probably provide significant insight in the history of this period. Enough of this mind wondering, I had better get on up and see what Hal Nelson has on his mind. After all, one does not keep the editor of the Baltimore Sun waiting. I just wish that his office were on the first floor of this building instead of the fourth. These darn stairs always seem to get the better of me.

"Good afternoon, Ms. Thomas."

"Well, I declare, if it ain't Mr. Jay Luvaas himself. It's good to have you back. How was your trip?"

"It's good to be home again. My trip to Appomattox was an exhausting one. I just can't describe the emotion I felt as I viewed Lee's surrender. Is the boss in?"

"He's expecting you, so please go right on in."

"Is that you out there Jay? Come on in and make yourself comfortable. I cannot tell you how glad I am that you are back."

"It's good to be back Hal. I would have stopped by earlier today but I wanted to finish my article on Lee's surrender in time for tomorrow's edition of the paper. I think you'll find the article quite good but I'm afraid that I've included the emotionalism which I felt while witnessing this historic event."

"To be honest with you, I've already had an opportunity to see an advance copy. The boys in the type set room provided me a copy. If not to sound somewhat bias, it's truly one of the best articles you've written. That isn't why I asked to see you though. I've got an important assignment that I need you to undertake."

"What exactly do you have in mind?"

"Well, I would like you to go to Washington on a special assignment that I have been working on for over three months."

"hal, I've been on the road for the past six months and I really feel as though I need sometime off. Surely the paper has another journalist that you could send on this assignment."

"It's not a matter of having a journalist to handle this assignment. It's a matter of having the most capable journalist to cover this story and that my friend is you. I realize the hardships that you have had to endure but I need your help. Before you say anything, please hear me out. I think then you'll agree that you are the best man for this assignment."

"I'll listen to what you have to say, but it will take a lot to convince me that I should take on a new assignment right now."

"Let me start then by saying that I realized several months ago that the War would soon be drawing to a conclusion. I also realized that today's journalists have extensively covered most of the important conflicts and from a historical viewpoint we will leave future generations considerable insight into this war and its leaders. Unfortunately, most of what history has recorded involves great leaders, important battles and heroic deeds. Little; however, has been written about those behind the scenes who provided yeoman assistance in keeping the armies of both sides equipped and sustained. Anyway, I feel that we as journalists have a story that needs to be told about this aspect of the War. If for any reason, history demands that it be recorded."

"I certainly agree with what you have said but I still don't understand why it is so important for me to take this assignment."

"That's easy. You are one of the few reporters in this country who has covered this War so extensively. Whether you realize it or not, you have become an expert in your own right. Furthermore, you have some familiarity with many of those individuals behind the scene who provided immeasurable support to the maintenance of the Union army. Your experience, knowledge, and familiarity with those involved demand that you take this assignment."

"I hear what you are saying but it appears on the surface that perhaps you have something more specific in mind. Before I decide whether or not to take this assignment, I'd like to hear exactly what thoughts you have."

"That won't be hard, as I've already begun to set this entire assignment in motion. By this, I mean that I have requested several interviews with key political and military figures which I believe will give us the extent of information that we need to develop a truly dynamic article of major historical significance; which will address some of the unsung heroes who equipped and sustained our army during the War. Today I received a response from the War Department indicating that Secretary, Edwin M. Stanton would be available for such an interview in his office on Tuesday, April 25, 1865 at 1PM. The telegram further states that Mr. Stanton has also requested that Generals Grant and Halleck be in attendance for this interview. Without doubt, these three men can provide the degree of insight necessary for a first rate story on the nature and extent of logistical support to Union army."

"I must admit that the prospect of interviewing Secretary Stanton and Generals Grant and Halleck would be an opportunity in a lifetime. I'm not sure though that I'm the one for this assignment. Sure, I've written extensively about the War but my focus has been on the great captains of this Rebellion. I am not confident that I will be able to adequately do justice to those behind the scenes who made these great captains the heroes that they are."

"Jay, you could not be more wrong. If there is one journalist alive today who can best develop and present this story it is you. Think about it for a few days and then we will discuss it. Until then, take a couple of days off."

THE MEN

The last time I was in the War Department offices, the urgency of the day was absolutely overwhelming. That was about two years ago but there just doesn't seem to have been any change in the routine affairs of this department. You would think that with Lee's surrender, the hectic atmosphere in the War Department would begin to slow down to a manageable level. Looking at the hundreds of citizens, politicians, and military figures waiting for the opportunity to speak with the Secretary would suggest that little has changed. Perhaps the demands placed on the Secretary in regard to reconstruction are the cause. Regardless, I just hope that my appointment with Mr. Stanton will not be delayed. If I miss the last train to Baltimore, I'll have to seek accommodations for the night.

Having a few minutes before the scheduled interview, I'll just grab one of the remaining chairs in the reception area and rest these weary bones. On second thought, I won't. This chair is almost as bad as the hard seat that I had to endure on the train this morning. I hope I don't sound as grumpy as I feel. Letting Nelson convince me that I was the one for the assignment has made me a little irritable. The amount of research that I had to do, in such a short period of time, was nerve-racking. My knowledge of those behind the scenes which equipped and sustained the Union army was somewhat limited. After discussing my research with Nelson and looking at the personalities I will interview today, I think I may have just touched upon the right story to cover. Selecting those responsible for the operation of our country's military railroad system was a stroke of genius if I do say so myself. It is also logical from the fact that each of those I will interview today, have an intimacy with this par-

organization. Most important though is the significant contribution that the men of the railroad organization made toward keeping this great nation of ours united.

"Mr. Luvaas!"

"Yes"

"Mr. Luvaas, I am Mr. Anderson, private secretary to Mr. Stanton. The Secretary of War has just sent a messenger to inform me that he has been detained by the President but expects to be back in his office shortly. If you will please accompany me, I will show you to his office where you can await his return."

"Thank you, I appreciate your kindness. I must admit that the activity here is most straining. Surely all these people don't expect to see Mr. Stanton today."

"To be honest with you, they do. It is like this every day. Mr. Stanton is partly to blame as he allows these visitors an opportunity to present their concerns each day at certain established hours. I would just hope that one day they will learn that brevity is the only way to get his attention. Lengthy and incoherent presentations do not result in decisions but it does cause the Secretary to lose his patience. Here's Mr. Stanton's office, please go in and make yourself comfortable."

"Thank you again. Your thoughtfulness is genuinely appreciated." Although this office is somewhat austere, it does provide a sense of

calmness which is lacking elsewhere in this building. Those overstuffed chairs near the fireplace will be ideal for this interview. They look comfortable. I had better clear my mind and get back to the realities of exactly why I am here. A mental review of the personalities I will be interviewing today will be most helpful in preparing for the dialog which I hope to have with them. I want to make sure that I approach my questions in a positive manner and to direct each question to the most appropriate person.

I realize that I have had but few occasions to interact with the Secretary of War, Mr. Edwin McMasters Stanton. Had Washington been my beat, rather than those often unheard of battlefields, I would know much more about this man than I can say I do. There is one thing for sure that I do know and that is the reputation that Mr. Stanton enjoys throughout the nation. Regretably, this reputation is not the most favorable.

I know, in talking with my colleagues, that Mr. Stanton is certainly an individual of unique character for such an important cabinet position. In fact, many do not understand why President Lincoln selected him over other talented people as his Secretary of War. Although a lawyer by profession, many found him to be a very contradicting individual in most things he said and did. He was noted as being a very able administrator; yet he tended to become deeply involved in many of the routine affairs of his subordinates. As a major governmental figure, he surrounded himself with with the most talented people available but followed his own course of action over their more detailed recommendations. He considered himself somewhat of a military tactician and was constantly interfering in

military matters. Many viewed him as power hungry, rude, arrogant, domineering, rash, very discriminating and oftentimes prone to violent reactions. He was also considered to have excessive confidence in his own judgment and did not think twice about using the power of his office to achieve his goals.

On the few occasions which I have had to observe him, my personal experiences have been somewhat different. While I did detect a slight indifference on his part in dealing with subordinates, private citizens, and politicians, I think he projected this image for a reason that few truly understand. I found him to be the type of individual who needed few relationships and has never pretended otherwise. Perhaps this was by design as he has thrown his entire energy into one overriding purpose; the preservation of this nation. He may have an unfavorable reputation because of his style and manner of leadership but one must ask oneself why Lincoln selected him. Was it his tough, aggressive, no nonsense approach to his job or was it his effective organizational abilities. History will record much about this man, as well as his qualities. I can only surmise that his survival during this crucial period can be associated with the dedication and determination that he had. The country has much to be thankful to him for.

The one person in this interview who I truly know is General Hiram Ulysses Grant. Having accompanied his headquarters for the past two years during the War, there isn't one aspect about this man that I do not know. At forty-three years old, he is the highest ranking military officer, holding the rank of Lieutenant General. Now that the rebellion is almost over, I

understand that Congress is seriously considering the passage of a measure to appoint him to the rank of General. That hasn't been done since the days of George Washington but it would be a fitting tribute to an outstanding soldier and leader.

I remember the first time we sat down and I had the opportunity to interview him. We spent a lot of time talking about his early years. Who would ever expect that a farm boy from Ohio would ever reach the level of achievement he has obtained. In 1839, at the young age of seventeen, he entered the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where due to an administrative error he acquired a new name. Somehow his real name of Hiram Simpson was changed to Ulysses Simpson but that is another story in itself. "Sam" as he was called, was immediately singled out for his lack of military bearing and was placed in the awkward squad where he remained for several months. He received many demerits for his careless habits in dress, dirty uniforms, inability to keep in step, not wearing his uniforms properly, and his general lackadaisical attitude. This type of performance did not give promise for a successful military career. He did show some promise in mathematics but his only area of excellence was in his horsemanship. He did manage to graduate from West Point in 1843; although his ranking was only twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine.

During our subsequent talks, I learned that his first assignment after West Point was in Missouri as a quartermaster officer. He then saw duty in the Mexican War with follow on assignments in New York, Michigan, Panama, California and Oregon. I gather from his comments that in this latter assignment, he was taken to additional drinking and became disenchanted

with the army. He resigned from military service in 1854 and it was not until some seven years later that he again volunteered his military services as a Colonel in the 21st Illinois Regiment. It was at this juncture in his life that he began to make his greatest contributions to this country. Since then, I have seen him characterized as a bulldog of great tenacity, stubborn, and thoroughly determined. I would say that in my association with him, I would tend to differ in this assessment. I found him to be a quiet and reserved leader who was highly respected by both subordinates and superiors alike. He demonstrated a methodical approach in his campaigns but was on occasion extremely stubborn. I truly believe though that the one characteristic which set him apart from his peers was his ability to seize the initiative regardless of the risk involved. This moreso, than anything, was probably what caused Lincoln to assign him as the General-in Chief of the Union armies. That's my opinion and all reporters are entitled to such.

My acquaintance with General Henry Wager Halleck is also somewhat limited but his reputation is extensive in many sectors of this country. Like Grant, he grew up in his early years in a farming community in New York. He ran away from home at an early age and went to live with his grandfather. In 1853 at the age of twenty, he entered West Point and graduated four years later third in his class of thirty-nine. He was further commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. His proficiency in this technical area and his ability to publish engineering articles gained him a considerable reputation in his early years as an officer. His publication of "Elements of Military Art and Science" enhanced his reputation as a professional soldier before he had the opportunity to demonstrate his leadership on the battlefield.

My research indicates that his first assignment at the opening of the Mexican War was in California where he discharged important military duties including those of Secretary of State, Chief of Staff in lower California and Lieutenant Governor of the Mexican City of Mazatlan. It is interesting to note that in route to California he managed to translate Henri Jomini's *Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon* during the seven months at sea. This was later published in four volumes in 1864. After serving in those key positions, he resigned from the army and remained in California to establish a highly successful law practice. He subsequently refused a state justiceship as well as a seat in the U.S. Senate, but quickly offered his services to his country at the outbreak of the war and was appointed to the rank of Major General in August 1861. In this position, he commanded departments in both Missouri and Mississippi. In June 1862, President Lincoln appointed him as General-in-Chief of the Union army, replacing Winfield Scott. He served in that position until little over a year ago when Grant assumed these duties. He did, however, stay on in Washington as the Chief of Staff discharging many of the same duties he had before.

The accounts of General Halleck's leadership have been mixed. As a general officer he appeared to be an able administrator who ensured that he had the most capable of subordinates around him. During this early career he was characterized as an individual of iron will, who was energetic as well as technically and tactically proficient. He did have the habit of being slow in aggressively taking advantage of military successes on the battlefield and was often criticized for this deficiency. His reputation as General-in-Chief was not as favorable. The Secretary of War considered him to be a scoundrel, a fellow colleague, General McClellan

called him stupid, and the Secretary of the Navy suggested that he was incapable of planning or taking on responsibility. In his command of the Department of Missouri, he was known as "Old Brains". Today at fifty, he is now affectively know as "Old Wooden head" because he oftentimes finds faults in his subordinates for his own mistakes and frequently offers useless advice. Of late, his greatest attribute appears to be an effort to shift responsibility to the shoulders of others.

So much for those who I will interview today. I had better review my notes about the two men that I am most interested in for my story about the United States Military Railroads. My preliminary research suggests that the driving forces behind the success of this organization were a Herman Haupt and a Daniel Craig McCallum. Little has been recorded about their contributions but there appears to be universal appreciation for the contributions that each made to this nation.

I understand that Haupt was born in Pennsylvania in 1817 and that at the age of fourteen entered the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. In 1835 he graduated from that institution along with General George Meade. He resigned his commission shortly after graduation and began a career in railroad construction which culminated in his becoming the Chief Engineer of the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1853. His reputation as an engineer during this period was well known. His publication of his book "The General Theory of Bridge Construction" was a significant advancement in the engineering field. In 1856, he resigned from the Pennsylvania Railroad and began his greatest engineering challenge; the construction of the Hoosac Tunnel on the Troy and Greenfield Railroad in Massachusetts. Newspaper

accounts suggest that this project has become embroiled in the state's politics at a great financial loss to Haupt. It appears that Governor John A. Anderson was against the project and refused to reimburse Haupt for the costs he incurred. Upon Secretary Stanton's summoning of Haupt to Washington in early 1862 and since then, this issue has remained unresolved.

Hopefully, this interview today will provide me more insight in exactly what contributions this man has made in the U.S. Military Railroads. I understand that he is an industrious, hardworking individual who is an expert in his field and a first rate organizer. He is most noted for his unique ability to get the best out of his subordinates and to adapt to most changing situations. This is not to presume that he does not have any faults. Many of his colleagues would suggest that he is pigheaded, impatient, very opinionated and somewhat disrespectful toward superiors. Perhaps his greatest liabilities though, are his distaste to work with military officers and his insatiable desire to give others military advice. On one occasion I met him, he appeared to be a man of religious convictions who prided himself on his reputation. This interview will hopefully clarify this man and his story.

General Daniel Craig McCallum in many respects is similar in character to Haupt yet decidedly different in others. He was an immigrant from Scotland who spent his early years in New York State. After some elementary schooling, he entered the employment of the New York and Erie Railroad where his engineering and administrative capabilities were readily evident. As a result of his talents, he rose quickly to positions of increased responsibility; culminating in his assignment as Superin-

tendent of this railroad line. An able engineer in his profession, he designed and patented a railroad bridge which was called the "Inflexible Arched Truss Bridge." Just prior to the War, he was the president of his own bridge company, until his country called him. In February 1862 at the age of forty-seven, he was appointed the Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in the United States. Originally commissioned as a Colonel in this position, he now holds the rank of Major General fulfilling the same duties and responsibilities.

Little can be said about this man as he tended to remain distant from others. A large and powerfully looking man, he is noted as a strict disciplinarian who supervised his organization with an iron fist. A thoroughly competent railroad man, he demonstrated his capabilities time and time again as an administrator. Throughout the War he managed to operate the railroad lines under government control with minimal friction. His ability to coordinate with civilian railroad officials was particularly noteworthy. A no nonsense person, he approached his work with a vengeance that is not often found in someone of this position and responsibility. He worked well with political figures and his thoughts were highly respected throughout the government. Perhaps the only trait he had which could detract from his professionalism is the relationship he lacked with Haupt. There was an animosity between the two, but it was difficult to assess. A different aspect of this character, is a rumor I recently overheard about his publishing a book of his own verse under the title "The Water Mill".

THE INTERVIEW

I do wish that Mr. Stanton would come so that we could get started. I cannot afford to miss my train. I also hope that the Secretary received Nelson's telegram. I asked that one be sent requesting that all War Department documents concerning the United States Military Railroads be made available to me to assist in the preparation of this story. Along with this interview, these documents will be crucial in adding factual information to my story.

"Right this way gentlemen. Mr. Luvaas, I have the pleasure to introduce you to our General-in-Chief and our Chief of Staff. Gentlemen, this is Mr. Luvaas of the Baltimore Sun. If you will excuse me, I must go and await the arrival of the Secretary. He is expected momentarily."

"Thank you Mr. Anderson. Mr. Luvaas, General Halleck and I will make ourselves comfortable. Jay, its good to see you. I think you have met General Halleck before, haven't you?"

"Yes, I have General Grant, but it has been sometime since General Halleck and I have last seen each other. How are you doing sir?"

"I am well Mr. Luvaas."

"I was glad to hear that both of you would be attending this session with the Secretary. You have each been intimately involved with our Military Railroads and I look forward to your candid comments and thoughts. I know that they will add much depth to my effort for the paper.

"Excuse me for snickering, but I can not help but chuckle a little over your request for all this department's documents on our railroads."

"Sir, I do not consider this request in the some light manner that you do."

"I did not mean to project that attitude Jay, but I'm afraid that General Halleck doesn't share the same humor as I do about the request."

"What do you mean General Grant?"

"Call me Sam. We have been friends, off and on, for several years now and I think we can dispense with some of the formalities. What I meant about your request is that General Halleck has had his staff hard at work for the Secretary gathering up all reports, letters, messages, and telegrams which apply to our Military Railroads during the War. It is absolutely amazing just how much documentation that there is. I sure hope that you have several days to spend reading it all."

"That is correct, the available information is quite extensive. What you will not be able to obtain from this interview, you'll be able to extract from these documents. There was alot of effort to gather up these documents so I do not share the same humor as that of General Grant. We are very busy these days."

"I think it was time well spent, if I may be so bold as to say so. Having used the Military Railroads in all my campaigns, it certainly is a story that must be told. The men responsible for organizing and leading that organization deserve special recognition and tribute for a truly outstanding performance. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the fact that many of the successes of the Union army were largely dependent on the ability of our Military Railroads to keep us sustained on the battlefield."

"Your comments are right on mark General Grant. Having been on the ground floor when our Military Railroad was organized, I can appreciate your remarks."

"General Halleck."

"Yes."

"Can I assume that you know both Herman Haupt and Daniel McCallum."

"Yes, but it is General McCallum, now. Herman Haupt is no longer affiliated with the War Department."

"How about you, General Grant, are you familiar with both of these men?"

"Well, I had the distinct pleasure to be able to work quite closely with General McCallum, but I am only familiar with Haupt. I'm sure that the Secretary will have some thoughts about Haupt. I understand that they had their differences before Haupt left the service of the Military Railroads."

"Could you expand your comments on that?"

"Perhaps we should wait on that and see if the Secretary has any comments that he would like to offer."

"What is all that commotion in there?"

"I see you haven't been to the War Department lately Mr. Luvaas."

"What do you mean General Halleck?"

"Well, if you had, you would realize that our Secretary has just arrived and the daily onslaught of visitors is about to occur. I just hope that he doesn't decide to stop and offer them all his thoughts. He really enjoys being in charge."

"Gentlemen, the Secretary has just returned from his meeting. He will be here shortly."

"Thank you Mr. Anderson."

"Shall we be seated. As soon as the Secretary arrives, we should get started. He isn't one for a lot of formalities nor exchanges of pleasantries. General Grant, if you will be seated in the chair to the right of the Secretary's chair that would be fine. Mr. Luvaas, please be seated in the chair closest to the fireplace and directly opposite the Secretary's chair. I think that position will provide you with the best location in which to interview us all."

"It is a glamorous day indeed. How are you all doing gentlemen?"

"We are fine, sir."

"Good! I just had the most enjoyable meeting with the President on the direction of our government's reconstruction efforts in the South now that General Johnston has finally surrendered the last remnants of the Confederate army. I think that the President finally understands and appreciates our department's position. That isn't why we are here though is it?"

"Mr. Secretary."

"Yes, General Halleck."

"Sir, I would like to introduce you to Mr. Luvaas of the Baltimore Sun. As you are aware, he is interested in your insights into our Military Railroads as part of a story that he is doing on that organization."

"It's nice to meet you Mr. Luvaas, but you do look familiar. Haven't we met before?"

"We have Mr. Secretary, but it was some time ago."

"Well, time is a precious commodity for this department so let us get started. Please take your seats and tell me where we should begin."

"Sir, I was hoping that this interview would lead into the story I am doing on Herman Haupt and General McCallum. I am immensely interested in the contributions that these men made to the United States Military Railroads and this nation. I understand that their leadership was the driving force behind the success of that organization. Before discussing them though, I was hoping that perhaps you could provide some insight into how the Military Railroads organization came into being."

"To be perfectly honest with you, there were numerous reasons associated with the formulation of the United States Military Railroads. The driving force, however, in forming this organization was to establish the necessary military control essential for the movement of units and their supplies to critical areas of conflict."

"Perhaps you could give me some idea as to what some of the other reasons were in determining the need for this organization."

"As I reflect back before the formulation of this organization, I would assess railroad operations, in general, to be somewhat disorganized. By this I mean that movement of military units and their supplies did not enjoy a favorable priority."

"Why was that Mr. Secretary?"

"The primary reason for this being that the railroad lines are in the business of making a profit for their stockholders. Therefore, they tended to schedule passenger and freight traffic accordingly. Unfortunately, military movements on railroad lines did not provide the margin of profit that caused their priority to be favorable. This can be attributed to the reduced charges that the government was required to pay."

"How would you assess the conditions of the railroads at the start of the war?"

"That is a question I will defer to General Halleck. As a railroad man, I'm confident that he could best assess them."

"General Halleck."

"Perhaps it would be appropriate to say that each railroad, both in the North and South at the start of the War, had its own personality. By that I mean their differences readily created problems which prevented any degree of coordination. Fortunately, our railroads were in some respect

better off than those in the South. The major problems with our railroads were insufficient rolling stock, poor maintenance of the lines, inadequate sidings, limited double track lines, and differences in gages. In sum, these railroads were just not able to support the increased traffic which arose at the start of the war. These factors as well as the hesitancy on the part of railroad lines to cooperate with each other and the lack of rail connections between lines did not facilitate the needs of our government and its military institutions."

"Before the formulation of the Military Railroads did our government seek to encourage these lines to improve their operating efficiency? Mr. Secretary, would you please respond to that question?"

"I would say unequivocally that all railroad lines that remained loyal to the Union tried earnestly to cooperate with the government in providing the best support that they could within the constraints that they had to operate. Many railroads just did not have the financial resources necessary to improve their operating efficiency. The conscription did not help the railroads either as many of the engineers, conductors, and maintenance personnel saw service in the military. At one point, the lack of railway personnel caused so much consternation that I authorized railroad companies to substitute their engineers with equally qualified personnel for military duty. Had I not consented to this, many railroad lines would have discontinued service and the government would have had to take on even greater controls of railway operations than it did."

"Mr. Secretary, how exactly did the Military Railroads get its beginning?"

"Well, I must state that I have to take some credit in its formulation. Shortly after I took over this cabinet position from Mr. Cameron, I became intimately aware of the fact that the governmental demands placed upon our railroads for transportation were significant. I therefore asked my Assistant Secretary at that time, Mr. Thomas A. Scott to provide me with some specific recommendations on how we could improve operating efficiency to accommodate increased governmental usage. Mr. Scott subsequently submitted six distinct recommendations. First, he suggested the creation of a transportation and telegraph bureau to take charge of rail and water transportation and to operate out of the War Department. Secondly, recommended that provisions should be made for the construction and extension of railroads and telegraph lines. Thirdly, he recommended that an officer should take charge of transportation of troops and supplies in each state. His fourth recommendation proposed that transportation should be by contract, with bids being asked. The fifth recommendation dealt with the establishment of a transportation officer position on the staff of each military department. Finally it was suggested that this bureau should have its own appropriations and act as a separate identity apart from the Quartermaster."⁽⁴⁶⁻¹⁰²⁾

"Were all recommendations submitted by Mr. Scott implemented?"

"For the most part they were. The bureau was created but it did remain, at least nominally, under the control of the Quartermaster. Water transportation was separated from this bureau because of the magnitude of the transportation workload."

"What can you tell me about the bill that Congress passed which authorized the President to take possession of the railroads?"

"Again, I have to take a good deal of credit for that. I worked some long hours with my good friend Senator Ben Wade of Ohio in drawing up the guidance for that bill. If my recollection serves me right, it passed the Senate by a vote of 23 to 12 and in the house it passed by a margin of 113 to 28.⁽⁴⁶⁻¹⁰⁵⁾ The President was pleased with the content of the bill and signed it into law on January 31, 1862."

"General Halleck."

"Yes sir."

"Do you have a copy of the general order that we published a few days later advising our commanders of the context of the bill?"

"I have it here sir, it was General Order No. 10, dated February 4, 1862. Mr. Luvaas, would you like to read this order?"

"I would."

"The important aspects we identified in the first two sections. Take a moment to read them."

"Let me read this quickly to see exactly what this order states."

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States, when in his judgment the public safety may require it, is hereby, authorized to take possession of any or all,..... the railroad lines in the United States, their rolling stock, their offices, shops, buildings, and all their appendages and appurtenances; to prescribe rules and regulations for the holding, using, and maintaining of the aforesaid railroad lines, and to extend, repair, and complete the same; to place under military control all the officers, agents, and employe's belonging to the railraod lines thus taken possession of by the President, so that they shall be considered as a post road and a part of the military establishment of the United States

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That any attempt by party or parties whomever in any State or District in which the laws of the United States are opposed, , to resist or interfere with the unrestrained use by the Government of the property described in the preceeding section, or any attempt to injure or destroy the property aforesaid, shall be punished as a military offense, by death, or such other penalty as a court martial may impose. (67-N.F.)

It appears from reading this Mr. Secretary, that the War Department was given complete authority, through our President, to assume absolute control over any railroad line in which a military necessity existed.

"That is true Mr. Luvaas, but as we continue with this interview, I suspect that you will find that in most instances this authority was only exercised on those railroad lines belonging to the Confederacy, which eventually come under our control. The fact that the authority existed and the northern lines cooperated with us precluded the need to actually, take over of these lines. There were some exceptions but that is the case in most situations."

"After this law was enacted Mr. Secretary, did you also implement Mr. Scott's recommendations?"

"Mr. Scott's recommendations were implemented over a period of time. I did, however, take action to create the Military Railroads organization as a separate identity. That was about a week after the general order on railroads was distributed to our leaders in the field."

"Is that when you appointed Herman Haupt to that organization?"

"No, I'm afraid that was a little latter in the life of that organization. General McCallum was my first appointment to that organization. Do you have a copy of that order which I signed General Halleck?"

"Yes sir, I do."

"Please allow Mr. Luvaas to review that order. It is truly nice to have such an able administrator as General Halleck. He is a wizard when it comes to paperwork."

It appears that this order was signed exactly one week after General Order 10 was published.

War Department
Washington City, D.C., February 11, 1862

Ordered: That L.C. McCallum be, and he is hereby appointed Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in the United States, with authority to enter upon, take possession of, hold, and use all railroads, engines, cars, locomotives, equipments, appendages and appurtenances that may be required for the transport of troops, arms, ammunitions and military supplies of the United States, and to do and perform all acts and things that may be necessary and proper to be done for the safe and speedy transport aforesaid.

By order of the President

Edwin M. Stanton (67-N.P.)
Secretary of War

"Might I inquire Mr. Secretary as to the basis for selecting D.C. McCallum for this position."

"To be honest with you, I selected him because of his reputation as a railroad man and the credentials he possessed. he was a hard worker who made his way up through the ranks of New York and Erie Railroad Company. When I selected him for this position, he had left that line and had formed a reputable bridge construction company. With his engineering and railroad background, he was the type of individual I needed to keep this new organization on an even keel. He didn't let me down either and on many occasions, he exceeded all expectations. He is a superb officer of unquestionable talents."

"I noticed earlier when I mentioned his name to General Halleck, I was corrected in that he holds a military rank. When you first assigned him to that position, did he have a commission?"

"He did in fact. When I appointed him as the Director for that organization, he was commissioned a Colonel. At present time he is a Major General. Sam, weren't you the one who recommended his last promotion?"

"I was, and it was well earned."

"Excuse me for interrupting gentleman, but when did Sherman Haupt enter the service of the Military Railroads?"

"I believe he came to the War Department at my request in the latter part of April 1862."

"Could you expand alittle further on that for me Mr. Secretary?"

"If memory serves me right, I sent him a telegram requesting his presence in Washington. I needed a man who could put the Fredericksburg Railroad in order so that General McDowell could move his forces and cooperate with General McClellan in a campaign against Richmond. If it had succeeded, I was hopeful that the War would be over."

"How was it that you came to call upon Haupt for this service? Couldn't then Colonel McCollum have handled the assignment?"

"To be honest with you, the operation of any railroad line requires more than one capable man. McCollum is an able engineer and administrator and at that time, I needed him in Washington. So I decided to call upon another capable engineer to assist me for a short duration. Having knowledge of Haupt from a previous interview I had with him for a position as an Assistant Secretary, I was confident that I could count on him. He was known as a technically qualified engineer, hard working and aggressive. He didn't mind telling you what was on his mind either."

"Mr. Secretary, in my research on Haupt, there are reports which suggest that perhaps the reason you called upon his services is to bail Governor Andrew out of a sticky political situation. I think it had something to do about the Hoosac Tunnel controversy and Governor Andrew's refusal to reimburse Haupt for his expenses in undertaking this project as well as it's completion. Rumor has it that Andrews talked you into summoning Haupt to Washington, to ease the publicity of that entire affair. Would you care to comment on that?"

"That is absolutely untrue! It's total nonsense! The reason I selected Haupt was for his credentials and his qualifications. I'm aware of these rumors and while I am indebted to Governor Anderson for Massachusetts's untiring support to the War, I would never, and I repeat never, allow myself to be tricked into doing anything that is less than honorable. In fact, when I discussed this assignment with Haupt, we agreed that his services would not be required for more than three or four weeks. I'm sure that we must have something in our records to reflect this. Do you have anything General Halleck?"

"I believe I have two documents here which will verify what you suggest. First is a note signed by you sir. Shall I read it?"

"Yes, go ahead."

"The note is dated Washington City, D.C., April 24, 1862. It states:
Herman Haupt Esq.

DEAR SIR:

I desire you to proceed directly to the Headquarters of Major-General McDowell on the Rappahannock and receive his instructions respecting the engineering work which he desires to have executed for his advance. If, upon inspecting the operations, you can devote your time and abilities to the service of the Government in their completion, you will be regarded as rendering important and positive assistance to the country which will be cordially acknowledged by the Department.

Your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON (16-44)
Secretary of War

The second communique I have is dated Washington, April 25, 1862. It reads as follows:

Hon. E.M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

I have considered your request and will go immediately to General McDowell, ascertain the position of affairs and the precise character of the duties to be performed. If they shall appear to be such as imperatively to require my personal attention, it will be given, although the sacrifices in other important interests will be great. If I can suggest arrangements to dispense with my personal services, this may be done. In any event, I would expect to continue only so long as public exigencies demanded it.

I have no military or political aspirations, and am particularly averse to wearing the uniform; would prefer to perform the duties required without military rank, if possible, but if rank is essential as a means to aid in the performance of duty, I must acquiesce.

Pay I do not require or care about. If I take the position you have so kindly offered, it will be with the understanding that I can retire whenever, in my opinion, my services can be dispensed with, and that I will perform no duties on the Sabbath, unless necessity imperatively requires it, and of necessity I must be the judge, so far as may be consistent with military subordination.

Yours, with much respect,

H. HAUPT (16-44)

From that which I just read, it certainly appears that Haupt did not intend to commit himself to this assignment for any extended period."

"I would agree General in what you have just said but I also find some interesting qualities in this man as they relate to these letters. It would appear that he is extremely confident in himself, dedicated, and somewhat religious; yet he lacked some degree of respect for the military. Would you say that was an accurate assessment of this man General Halleck?"

"Knowing Haupt as I do, you have described him quite well. I would point out though that his belief in himself, his pride, and his immense concern for his reputation were his dominant characteristics."

"Mr. Secretary, if we could get back to Haupt's assignment with General McDowell. Could you tell me what support he rendered?"

"I would say that Haupt's support to McDowell was as complete as any commander in the field could expect. Being that both men were classmates at West Point, McDowell did not hesitate to let Haupt take complete charge of the reconstruction of the Fredericksburg railroad."

"What exactly did Haupt accomplish?"

"Well, in about a month's time, he was able to rebuild the wharf at Acquia Creek that was previously destroyed by fire, relay about three miles of track which the Confederates had torn up, and constructed several bridges on the Potomac Creek and Rappahannock that had been destroyed. The Potomac bridge is one that I am intimately familiar with as I remember it from the time I accompanied the President on a visit to McDowell's headquarters. When President Lincoln saw this bridge, he was indeed impressed. In fact, when he returned to Washington he told everyone that he had "seen the most remarkable structure that human eyes ever rested upon". (21-280) he further recollected to the journalists in Washington "that man Haupt has built a bridge across the Potomac Creek, about 400 feet long and nearly 100 feet high, over which loaded trains are running every hour, and upon my word, gentlemen. There is nothing in it but beanpoles and cornstalks." (21-280) I would say that Haupt did his job well."

"Would you say that his contributions were exceptional or singularly outstanding?"

"Mr. Secretary, I would appreciate the opportunity to comment on that."

"Please do General Halleck."

"Haupt's efforts were without reservation remarkable in all respects. I say this for two reasons. First is the fact that at this point in time, the U.S. Military Railroads were an infant organization that was ill equipped and staffed in the field. When Haupt arrived at McDowell's headquarters, he was the only asset available to accomplish the work that needed to be done. He was therefore forced to use unskilled soldiers from Wisconsin and Indiana to perform the necessary railroad work. The second factor that compounded his problems was the adverse weather conditions that this unskilled labor force had to work in. Although he accomplished the work in record time, his efforts were to no avail as McDowell was directed to move to Front Royal to intercept General Jackson."

"What did Haupt do at that point?"

"Perhaps I had better leave that question for our Secretary to address."

"Mr. Secretary?"

"I think what General Halleck is referring to is the fact that a conflict arose during this period as to who was in charge of construction and transportation on the railroads to be used by our army. You see, after

almost completing his work on the Fredericksburg Railroad, Haupt coordinated with McDowell to go to work on the Manassas Gap Railroad. As he was departing for there, he learned that a Mr. Daniel Stone had been given authority over all construction on the Fredericksturg Line. This coupled with the authority given previously to Colonel McCallum left Haupt with the impression that his role would be minimal. He therefore tendered his resignation. Do you have a copy of Haupt's letter to McDowell?"

"I have it here sir."

"Please allow Mr. Luvaas to read it."

"This is somewhat of a lengthy letter but I had better read it."

FREDERICKSBURG, May 26, 1862

To: Major-General McDowell

SIR: After receiving your instructions this morning to advance for the purpose of constructing the bridge across the Massaponix,, but found that the opinions of Mr. Stone and myself did not precisely coincide and that considerable confusion existed Mr. Stone handed me his letter of instruction from the Secretary of War which is in the following words:

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C., April 26, 1862

This is to certify that Daniel Stone is authorized to do anything he may deem expedient to open for use the Richmond and Aquia Creek railroad

EDWIN M. STANTON
Secretary of War(41-156)

This letter gives Mr. Stone absolute and exclusive control, not only over the bridges, but over the construction of the road, leaving me absolutely nothing to do but play the part of superintendent of transportation By not showing me his instructions, Mr. Stone left me under wrong impressions.....

The Honorable Secretary of War stated to me verbally that I was placed in general charge of all matters in your Division of Rappahannock

In the Department of Transportation there is also a conflict of authority in the general instructions given to Col. McCallum..... Mr. McCallum is a personal friend but there is serious defect in organization which interferes with successful operation.

I find no fault with the Secretary of War It seems to me my mission is ended, or will be as soon

Very respectfully submitted, h. HAUFF⁽¹⁶⁻⁵³⁾

"Would you care to comment as to how this conflict in instructions came about Mr. Secretary?"

"I would not except to state that much was underfoot during this period and occasionally mistakes were made. The important thing to note is that the conflict was resolved in short time."

"How as that Mr. Secretary?"

"General Halleck, do you have a copy of that communique I sent Haupt."

"I have it sir."

"Mr. Luvaas, please look this over."

WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., May 28, 1862

Colonel Haupt.

Sir: You are hereby appointed Chief of Construction and Transportation in the Department of the Rappahannock, with the rank of Colonel and attached to the staff of Major-General McDowell.

You are authorized to do whatever you may deem expedient to open for use all Military Railroads now or hereafter required in said Department to appoint such assistants and employes; to make requisitions upon military authorities to purchase all such machinery, rolling stock and supplies

You are authorized to form a permanent corps of _____, organized, officered, and equipped to supply said corps with rations, transportation, tools; to employ civilians and foremen

You are authorized to take possession of and use all railroads, engines, cars, machinery, and appurtenances within the geographical limits of the Department

By order of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

EDWIN M. STANTON
Secretary of War⁽¹⁶⁻⁵⁴⁾

"It appears that you gave Haupt unlimited authority within the Department of the Rappahannock, but did not this not take away some of the authority of McCallum?"

"One could perhaps interpret that to be so but in actuality the basis for my signing that letter as it was prepared was much different. By granting Haupt this latitude, I was really giving the Commander, General McDowell, the freedom he needed to operate. Had I elected to retain this control in Washington City, everything would have been in chaos in short order."

"Did your decision have an impact on the authority of McCallum?"

"It did not. As I see it, Haupt was responsible for field operations in the Department of the Rappahannock and McCallum was the chief administrator of the Military Railroads in Washington City. I guess what matters most is that this accommodation did not seem to be objectionable to either of these men."

"I can appreciate your view Mr. Secretary, but I have yet to truly see where Haupt has made his contributions."

"We are getting to that now. The important thing to realize up to this point is that the Military Railroads was still in its infant stage until the latter part of May 1862. Besides the achievements at Acquia Creek, the U.S. Military Railroads had little impact on the War up to that time."

"When then did Haupt's achievements become evident?"

"I suppose his abilities were first realized shortly after his arrival for work on the Manassas Gap Railroad. In short order he was able to put this railroad into operation up to Rectortown. His first exposure to actual operations of the railroad during wartime conditions served as a basis to establish regulations pertaining to military railroad operations."

"Can you be more specific in to your comments?"

"What I mean is that once Haupt assumed control of the Manassas Gap Railroad, he quickly learned of the difficulties he was to face. The lack of adequate equipment in which to operate this line, interference of line operations by various military authorities, lack of adequate procedures to unload cars, and dependency on the telegraph to regulate the movement of

trains caused considerable confusion and resulted in less than adequate service in supplying General McDowell's army. Actually, you could say that this was his first real baptism under fire; with more to come."

"What specifically were the equipment problems that Haupt had to face?"

"It is my understanding from reports he wrote me at the time, that there were only five locomotives available between the Fredericksburg Railroad and the Manassas Gap Railroad to move General McDowell's supplies. Of those five, one was inoperable, one had limited haul capability, and one was needed to move the supplies to Washington City for further transportation to Front Royal. That left two locomotives to do all the hauling of supplies on the last leg of this journey."

"Although this was a problem, it appears that Haupt was able to overcome this dilemma. Did the other factors you mentioned also serve as a part of the confusion which existed?"

"They did indeed. I can't recount the number of times that Haupt expressed his displeasure over military interference on the railroad."

"Can you provide some insight into the degree of interference you are referring to?"

"Well, if my recollection serves me right and it usually does, while getting the Manassas Gap line into operation Haupt had a problem with a paymaster. It seems that this paymaster had decided to set-up his office in a box-car on the main line of the railroad at Rectortown, preventing the

movement of trains in either direction. According to the story, as Haupt describes it, this paymaster felt that the payment of the soldiers was more important than anything else, to include supplying them with food. Therefore, when Haupt asked him to vacate from the car, he refused."

"What did Haupt do about that?"

"I can only say that he aggressively handled the situation in his normal undiplomatic fashion. He gathered up a detail of soldiers and directed them to remove the paymasters money box, his table, and his chair from the box-car. Haupt was obviously in charge as no protests were made by the paymaster. The point to be made here though is that this interference was one of many which slowed down or even stopped our Military Railroads operations. I suppose if it were me, my temper would have gotten the best of me, and I would have thrown the paymaster out of the box-car myself."

"Could you perhaps address the problem of unloading cars?"

"Yes I can. This was a significant military problem which faced Haupt on a daily basis once he arrived on the Manassas Gap line. The Commissary and Quartermaster Departments of our army were the cause. The procedures used by these two departments were such that they used railroad cars to carry commissary or quartermaster items and these items were never unloaded except when issued. This meant that no one was ever sure when critically needed cars would be returned for subsequent use. It also caused railroad operations to cease if these cars were on a single line track with no sidings. This was the case for Haupt on the Manassas Gap line and at Piedmont a blockade as such developed."

"How did Haupt resolve this problem?"

"Well, you have to excuse my sense of humor but Haupt resolved this situation much to the displeasure of others. It seems that he took the matter to McDowell that evening for resolution. The weather was really bad that night and it was raining heavily. After being appraised of the situation McDowell sent both his commissary and quartermaster officers out in the rain to personally supervise the unloading of that train so that railroad traffic could resume. I'm sure that this action made the necessary point."

"What about the telegraph operation? How did that cause a problem to the Military Railroads in this area?"

"The problem with the telegraph was one of priority. You see, it was a practice of our military to regulate the movement of our trains via telegraph. The concern with this procedure was that every military authority also used the telegraph to transmit their business. The movement of trains via telegraph did not enjoy the same level of importance that this other business enjoyed. Therefore trains waited for hours and on occasion for days, at sidings, for instructions to move. The loss of this valuable time delayed movement of troops and their supplies. Haupt was so upset about these unnecessary delays that he advised me in a letter that the railroad would no longer depend upon the telegraph and that he had issued General Order 2 which directs the manner as to how his trains would be run."

"Do you have a copy of that order?"

"I'll have to yield on that to General Halleck."

"Sir, I am unable to locate any General Order 2 in our files but I do have a document which I believe you have referred to. Mr. Luvaas, here it is."

"Thank you. Please give me a moment to review this document."

Military Railroads

DIVISION OF THE RAPPENAHANNOCK

Department of Construction and Transportation

June 2, 1862

GENERAL ORDERS

To Whom It May Concern:

1. All orders and instructions in regard to the movements of trains must be given by the superintendent or his local representatives, the dispatchers at stations.
2. No orders from any other source shall be obeyed if in conflict with instructions, unless they shall proceed from the Commanding General in writing
3. If written instructions shall be received which are in conflict with orders of the superintendent, the fact, be reported to the party giving the order with the request, that he indorse upon it the words "I assume responsibility" and sign his name to it.
4. No officer, no surgeon, or assistant, no paymaster, quartermaster, or commissary, no person, civil or military, shall have the right to detain a train, or order it to run in advance of schedule time. If cars are not unloaded or trains made up when the hour of starting arrives, engines must proceed with parts of trains, or without trains
5. No extra trains or engines will be run upon the road except by orders of the superintendent, the chief of transportation, or the General in command of the department When an extra is to be run the fact

and the time of starting as well as the time of departure from each telegraphic station, must be communicated to each station in advance,

6. If schedule trains from any cause are behind time, great caution must be exercised.....

7. Trains running at night must be supplied with headlights and two red lights in rear.

8. These lights must be kept upon the engine..... and the engineer will be held responsible for them and for having them at all times in condition for service.

9. Conductors and agents must report time of arrival and departure at each station.....

H. HAUPT, A.D.C.
Colonel of Staff, Chief of Construction and Transportation
Department of the Rappahannock (67-N.P.)

"This General Order is the first indication that some degree of order was being established within the Department of the Rappahannock in regards to the railroads. Would you agree Mr. Secretary?"

"I would, and it is at this very point that Haupt began to make significant contributions which would establish the foundation for our Military Railroads system. In the next few weeks that followed, Haupt established an efficient railroad operation on the Manassas Gap line but was later directed to establish operations on the Orange and Alexandria line. This was due to the fact that McDowell was unsuccessful in intercepting General Jackson and ordered out of the Shenandoah Valley. He therefore moved his headquarters from Front Royal to Manassas."

"What did Haupt do then?"

"I can answer that Mr. Secretary."

"General Halleck."

"Sir, I believe it was at this point where Haupt first formalized the internal organizational structure of the Military Railroads in the Department of the Rappahannock. I have here a regulation that he proposed which is rather comprehensive. Please take a look at this Mr. Luvaas."

"This document is dated June 11, 1862 so it must have been prepared during the relocation of McDowell's army."

1. The Construction Corps of the Department of the Rappahannock will consist of such commissioned and non-commissioned officers, privates and civilians as may be detailed from the force under the orders, or especially enlisted or employed for the service of the Corps.

2. The duties of the Corps will consist in the construction and reconstruction of roads and bridges, the erection of buildings required for transportation purposes, the preparation of materials for structures

3. The Corps will be organized into squads of ten men each. Each squad will be under the command of a non-commissioned officer, each two squads under command of a lieutenant.

4. The Adjutant of the Corps will keep a register, in which shall be entered the names of men, their residence, the companies from which they have been detailed, their former occupations, the kind of work in which they are most expert

5. The Adjutant of the Corps will also act as Commissary and Quartermaster his duty to see that the Corps is,, provided with rations, suitable in quality and sufficient in quantity; also, that the cooks and cooking utensils, tents, and transportation have been provided

6. It shall be the duty of a clerk,, to keep a correct record of all tools, implements, and public property of every kind belonging to or used by the Construction Corps. Each tool will be marked..... "Construction Corps Rappahannock Each individual will be charged with the tool furnished him..... To one squad shall be assigned the duty of taking care of ropes, pulleys, blocks, tackling, and hoisting apparatus generally. Another shall take care of all materials used in construction To another taking care of and collecting together tools used in common and not chargeable to individuals..... At regular periods the tools will be inspected by the officer in command.

7. When on active duty, Men who are not willing to work, even for 16 hours continuously, when required, are not wanted in the Construction Corps, and are requested to leave it and return to their regiments at once.

8. Extra pay will be given for all time actually engaged in construction or other work

9. Officers are to make constant observation, and report..... skill, industry, habits and general deportment of the members All who habitually use profane or obscene language; who are immoral, vicious, indolent or insubordinate..... will be otherwise punished as circumstances may require.....

10. Each squad will occupy its own tent, and will be responsible for the care of it, as also, for the tool-box, cooking utensils, and other property

11. No member shall discharge fire-arms without orders except where imperative necessity requires it.

12. Civilians, employed as superintendents in charge of construction, will be considered as having

must conform to the rules, regulations, and discipline of the Corps in every particular

14. A diary shall be kept, and a quarterly report compiled, in which shall be given the names of all who have been distinguished by efficient services, and also the names of those who have been sent to their regiments of misconduct or inefficiency.

15. It is expected that all will show themselves to be gentlemen, as well as soldiers

H. HAUPT, A.L.C.

Colonel of Staff, Chief of Construction
and Transportation

Department of the Kappanhannock (15-64)

"The content of this regulation is indeed quite specific. It is obvious to a reporter such as I that Haupt clearly had a vision for the military railroads. At this point though it is difficult to actually assess his organization in regard to the composition of its workforce. It would

appear to be both military and civilian in structure. Would you comment on that General Halleck?"

"I believe I can, at least from July 1862, when I assumed those duties of General-in-Chief. At that time, Haupt's workforce was predominately military but he did have a few civilians working for him in the higher managerial positions which he created. You must keep in mind that he was of the opinion that a civilian workforce was much more efficient. Perhaps this can be attributed to his apparent dislike in wearing a military uniform, although he was commissioned a Colonel on McDowell's staff."

"After establishing the organization of the Military Railroads, what did Haupt do next?"

"I can answer that questions best."

"Mr. Secretary."

"At this point in time, Haupt submitted his resignation. Here it is, please look it over."

ALEXANDRIA, June 20, 1862

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

DEAR SIR: It is now two months since I was summoned to Washington by your telegram, and was informed that the service required of me was the prompt reconstruction of the railroad from Acquia Creek to Fredericksburg, to facilitate a movement against Richmond. I consented in the belief that the time required would not exceed two or three weeks,; but when the Fredericksburg line was opened, it became an urgent military necessity that the injured portion of the line to Front Royal should be reconstructed.

This was promptly done by the Construction Corps and under my direction. I then found that the transportation was in a state of great confusion, and required reorganization;, but now I am able to announce that the communications are all open, the roads in good condition, the trains running regularly on schedule, abundant supplies of stores for a week or more in advance already transported, and no probability of any new work, under these circumstances I purpose to return to Massachusetts

In the way of compensation, I desire nothing. I cannot draw pay as Colonel, because I have not complied with the forms and cannot subscribe to the certificates. If acceptable to the Department, I will continue for a time to give my services in the same way; that is, by the repayment of actual expenditures, but my business engagements are such as to prevent me from accepting any permanent position in connection with the army

I find that my pay as Colonel would amount,, to over \$500, while my expenditures, do not much exceed \$500, This is all I ask to be repaid.

With many thanks for your kindness,, I remain

Yours very respectfully,

H. HAUPT (15-65)

"I am sure that it must have been extremely difficult for you to accept Haupt's resignation after the effort he applied toward the railroad operations for McDowell."

"To be honest with you Mr. Luvaas, I never acted on his resignation."

"Why was that Mr. Secretary?"

"I didn't acknowledge his resignation because this was around the same period in which decisions were being made to replace McDowell with Pope as the Commander of the Army of the Rappahannock. Realizing the importance of the role that the railroads would play in supplying this army and in future campaigns, I could not afford to let Haupt go while changing commands."

"What about Haupt's business situation in Massachusetts? Didn't that demand his attention also?"

"I'm sure that Haupt felt that way, but his presence there could not have changed the situation. Besides, I knew that his sense of duty would not allow him to leave without my approval. So you might say I gambled somewhat that he would stay."

"Did he stay?"

"Well, yes and no. By that I mean he resolved himself in staying on and commenced further refinements with the Military Railroads. He personally wrote General Order No. 7 dated June 25, 1862 in order to prevent abuses by officers in dealing with the railroad. This was approved by McDowell's headquarters and circulated amongst his army."

"What specifically did this regulation deal with? May I review a copy of it?"

"General Halleck, do we have a copy?"

"I do not see one in my file. I will go and see if I can have my staff locate a copy."

"You mentioned that Haupt did and did not stay Mr. Secretary. Could you explain what you meant by that?"

"As I said before, I did not respond to his letter of resignation so he stayed for about a week more at McDowell's headquarters. On the

occasion that General Pope assumed command of this army, I believe that was around June 26, 1862, he decided that a military railroad organization was not needed so he released Haupt."

"Who ran the railroad operations then?"

"General Pope placed that responsibility on his quartermaster department."

"Was that a wise decision?"

"As far as I was concerned it was not and when I learned of Haupt's departure back to Massachusetts, I really got mad. Fortunately for Pope, he wasn't nearly or we would have met under unfavorable circumstances. General Halleck calmed me down over this based upon our policy not to interfere with the commander in the field. He did learn his lesson though."

"How was that?"

"Excuse me sir but our staff was able to find a copy of Haupt's general order. Would you like to read it Mr. Luvaas?"

"Perhaps you could just give me a quick summary of its content General Halleck."

"Well, according to the general order both quartermasters and commissaries were prohibited from transporting freight not included in their stores. Sutlers could only transport freight by permit and if illegal contraband was discovered it would be confiscated and sutlers would forfeit their right of transportation. Officers could be punished if they

allowed their name to be used or sutlers and others to transport items other than their personal property. Finally, freight of those residing along the railroad could be carried provided these persons were known to be loyal to the Union. (15-67)

"Thank you for obtaining that order General, it will certainly add to my story of what Haupt did to bring the railroads out from under a state of confusion. Getting back to your comments Mr. Secretary, how did Pope learn his lesson by firing, so to speak, Haupt?"

"Well, after determining his services were no longer required, Haupt returned to Massachusetts to again participate in his claims for reimbursement of expenses on the Hoosac Tunnel project. While working on that business affair, he was called back to Washington to testify in behalf of McDowell on the conduct of the war at Front Royal. When in Washington City, we again met and Haupt offered up his services. Since Pope had refused to accept any thought of a separate Military Railroads organization in his army, I declined Haupt's offer and he returned to Boston."

"Do I detect a degree of anguish in your comments over Pope's decision?"

"I suppose you do. When you have an operation such as Haupt's performing at peak proficiency, one does not normally discontinue it. That decision did come back to haunt him though and I'm sure he felt like eating crow when he telegraphed General Halleck."

"What did the telegram say General?"

"His message was short and if my memory serves me right, it went along the lines of:

"The management of the railroad from Washington to Culpeper is most wretched and inefficient I request that Colonel Herman Haupt may be telegraphed to come home at once to take charge of all railroad matters in this department."⁽²⁰⁻⁷⁵⁾

It must have bothered him to send that telegram but I am glad he did."

"What did you do after you received that request?"

"I discussed the matter with an Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Watson and it was decided that he would ask Haupt to return. His telegraph message was likewise short. It said: "Come back immediately; cannot get along without you; not a wheel moving on any of the roads."⁽³¹⁻⁴³⁾ There was a reason for sending this message that way as it was decided that we could best appeal to Haupt by being somewhat apologetic."

"To be forced to eat some humble pie isn't that bad when you consider the importance of the railroads to a Union army. How long before Haupt returned?"

"Suprising enough, he was back in Wasington City within a few days and then went on to meet with General Pope."

"Do you have any knowledge General as to how the first meeting went between Haupt and Pope?"

"I was not at this meeting as my presence was required here. I was told though that the meeting was cordial. In fact, I am told that

Pope advised his chief of staff to issue any orders that Haupt thought necessary to bring the transportation problems to a timely resolution. I have a copy of the order that was prepared. It reads as follows:

CLDAR MOUNTAIN, August 18, 1862

GENERAL ORDERS

No. 23

All railroads, and especially the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, within the limits of the Army of Virginia, are placed under the exclusive charge of Colonel Herman Haupt.

No other officer, whatever be his rank, shall give any orders to any employe of the road, whether conductor, engineer, or other agent. No orders respecting the running of troops, construction or repair of the roads, transportation of supplies or troops, shall be given, except by authority of these Headquarters through Colonel Haupt.

All persons now employed in any way on these railroads will immediately report to him, and will hereafter receive instructions from him only.

All requisitions for transportation, and all applications for construction or repair of roads, will be made directly to him at Alexandria, Va.

All passes given by him to employes will be respected as if issued from these Headquarters.

By command of Major General Pope.

GEO. D. RUGGLES
Colonel and Chief of Staff (15-70)

I understand that Haupt actually dictated this order himself, right on the spot."

"The power he was given by Pope was extensive. Was it normal policy for commanders to delegate such wide authority to their subordinates, Mr. Secretary?"

"That would depend upon the situation. In this case Pope had 50,000 men in the Army of Virginia and he was totally dependent on the railroad to support him. In fact, I also complimented his order with one of my own. In order for Haupt to perform his duties, I extended his authority to include the areas of the Army of the Rappahannock and the Army of Virginia."

"I do not want to appear negative, but isn't this conversation directing alot of attention on Haupt and the authority given him. Is it that important?"

"To be honest with you Mr. Luvaas, the degree of Haupt's authority is actually the central theme of this conversation at this moment and rightfully so."

"Why do you say that?"

"Because there were many things happening at this time in the armies of he Union for which you are probably unaware. I realize that you are quite knowledgeable of the campaign fought by Pope during this period but it is what happened behind the scenes which you are not aware. I would hope also that if we discuss that which I intend to present, I will earnestly hope that you will use proper judgement in writing your story."

"Please go on Mr. Secretary."

"At this point in the rebellion, I think you must realize that our senior leadership in the field was composed of a great many different

personalities and their views were quite different in regard to each other. Their different personalities and views caused Haupt much consternation in trying to fulfill his duties and responsibilities. I am confident of the fact that you are aware of the pressures placed on Pope by the Confederate forces near Culpepper so there is no need to retrace familiar ground. What you are not aware of; however, is the degree of interference that Haupt had to deal with in moving men and supplies to the front to support Pope."

"Do you have some specific examples in mind when you say this?"

"As a matter of fact, I do. The first one that comes to mind is the incident involving General Sturgis which I did not hear about until much later. Had I been told when it happened, I would have court martialed him for sure. General Halleck can best tell of this incident as he was involved."

"The incident with Sturgis occurred on August 23, 1862 according to our files and I remember it well. General Sturgis had been directed to move forward in support of Pope and that evening while south of Alexandria, he began stopping trains on the main track until there were about five trains backed up. This naturally curtailed all traffic on this line and no men or supplies were moving to assist Pope. Halleck then telegraphed Haupt to move his men on these trains. Haupt refused unless he received orders from either myself or Pope and included a copy of my letter concerning non-interference in the operation of the line. I gather that Sturgis, story has it he was under the influence, exploded and threatened

to shoot Haupt. He even sent a detail of soldiers to find him and place him under arrest."

"What happened then?"

"Haupt and Sturgis met latter that night after Haupt finally found his headquarters. Haupt advised Sturgis that his demands on the use of these trains were holding up the evacuation of wounded soldiers and the eventual use of these trains to carry more units forward to help Pope. At this point, Sturgis said, "I don't care for John Pope a pinch of owl dung!"⁽⁴⁴⁻¹²⁷⁾ Fortunately, Haupt had the sense to wire me about the problem prior to seeing Sturgis. My subsequent telegram reached Haupt while they were together. I have a copy of the message I sent and it reads as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D.C., August 24, 1862

Colonel H. Haupt:

No military officer has any authority to interfere with your control over railroads. Show this to General Sturgis, and if he attempts to interfere I will arrest him.

H. W. HALLECK
General-in-Chief^(67-N.P.)

Once Sturgis received this telegram, the issue was resolved but his interference probably kept 10,000 or so soldiers out of the battle and that alone might have made the difference of the outcome."

"It would seem that personalities did play some degree in the outcome of this battle and there were obviously personal differences among the generals in regard to each other. Could you give me one more example

where our leadership caused Haupt significant difficulties during Pope's campaign Mr. Secretary?"

"I can, but I will keep my comments general so as to relate them to much of our senior leadership at this time. In this case, I would judge from the reports I have received that perhaps many of our senior leaders were not in a hurry to assist Pope."

"That is rather a strong indictment, isn't it?"

"I would think so but you must consider the fact that Pope wasn't much liked by his colleagues. It took considerable time for others to go to his aid, and you would have to question their motives."

"What exactly are you saying?"

"Although I could never prove it, I would suggest that these leaders placed an overly dependent attitude on the use of the railroad in going to Pope's aid. In some instances, these senior leaders waited at railroad stations for days in order to get transportation. Likewise, a normal force march by their units would have placed them in the battle where their difference might have resulted in a more favorable outcome."

"That probably contributed significantly to the burden placed on Haupt at this time."

"I would suggest it did, but let us not forget the other burdens that he also had to operate under. If we add the evacuation of wounded soldiers, interference of the line by military officers, movement of supplies, and

evacuation of equipment that occurred also, Haupt had a significant task to deal with."

"What lessons did Haupt learn from this experience which were later applied to the operation of the Military Railroads?"

"Haupt was a very astute individual when it came to learning from previous mistakes. I believe it was after this campaign that he established a priority system as to that which would be transported on the Military Railroads. To the best of my knowledge, that priority system changed little during the War. Do we have anything in our files on that General Halleck?"

"According to my records Haupt published a notice on this which read as follows."

NOTICE

Alexandria, August 26, 1862

Transportation on the Military Railroads of Virginia will be furnished in the following order:

1. Subsistence for men in the field.
2. Food for horses.
3. Ammunition.
4. Hospital stores.
5. Infantry regiments that have seen service, with staff horses.
6. Infantry regiments composed of raw troops.
7. Batteries, except in cases of great urgent necessity, will march.

8. Cavalry will march.
9. Mules and wagon-horses will be driven.
10. Wagons, ambulances and other vehicles will be hauled over the common roads.

It must be understood distinctly, that nothing required for the use of the Army will ever be refused transportation when it can be afforded without excluding other transportation entitled to priority.

The proper duty of the railroad is to forward supplies. It cannot, in addition thereto, transport large armies on short notice, but it can, with present facilities, remove ten thousand men per day if accident occurs, and if there is no delay in loading and unloading.

No car will hereafter be loaded on the main track south of Alexandria. The proper place of shipment is on the Washington track west of Alexandria.

H. HAUPI
Colonel and Chief of Construction and Transportation
Army of Virginia (15-95)

I believe you are correct on this point Mr. Secretary. This was the first system established which gave priority of movement on our military railroads."

"In the days which followed this publication, to include the second battle of Bull Run, what was haupt specifically involved in?"

"Both Secretary Stanton and I can answer that question because we were monitoring the changes in the situation as they occurred. Who would you prefer to answer that question?"

"Mr. Secretary, could you please start and if General Hellack could add his comments as you talk, I would appreciate both your views."

"Very well, but you must realize that this was a period of rapid change so I hope that we do not miss anything of importance. I guess

I should state that at this time, Haupt's role expanded beyond that which was expected of his normal duties. I am aware of the fact that he personally visited General McClellan's headquarters in Alexandria and requested his assistance in obtaining a strong force to protect his trains so that the much needed supplies for Pope's army could be sent through. McClellan's response was that "it would be attended with risk."⁽¹⁵⁻⁹⁸⁾ and then Haupt reminded him that "military operations were normally attended with risk."⁽¹⁵⁻⁹⁸⁾ Unfortunately, McClellan was more concerned about the protection of Washington than he was of Pope's perilous position. Had McClellan supported Pope, the outcome at Bull Run might have been substantially different."

"What else was Haupt involved in at this time."

"Sir, if I might say a very words."

"Yes, please add your thoughts General Halleck."

"Our records indicate here that Haupt spend some time up until the Battle of Bull Run providing the War Department and the President whatever intelligence he could acquire on the military situation."

"Please give me an example of what you mean?"

"Well, here is a telegram from Haupt to President Lincoln dated August 27, 1862. It reads as follows.

Intelligence received within twenty minutes informs me that the enemy are advancing and have crossed Bull Run bridge; if it is not destroyed, it probably will be. The forces sent by us last night held it until that time.
(15-100)

I also note in another communique that Haupt used the railroad to acquire intelligence. In a letter to me dated August 28, 1862 he states:

The result of our railway reconnoissance today was extremely gratifying. The Construction Corps reconstructed the bridge across Pohick, the operators repaired telegraph lines, and wounded at Fairfax were all brought off safely.

Important intelligence was obtained from a soldier who came from Warrenton Junction. He confirms burning of Bull Run bridge he says General Sigel and Hooker occupy.....

From a chaplain captured.....our Superintendent Devereux elicited he saw General Lee today at Fairfax.....

I have arranged with General McClellan.....reconnoissance by rail to Bull Run,, with a wrecking and construction party, to clear away and open communications,, I will endeavor to pour supplies without delay; will reconstruct Bull Run bridge in shortest time possible."⁽¹⁵⁻¹⁰⁹⁾

His messages to us helped to clarify the military situation as communications with our senior commanders were often cut off."

"It was evident that Haupt, from that last message you read, actively involved himself in repairing the railroad. Can I presume that the Confederate forces had damaged the line?"

"I'm sure the Secretary would agree with me when I say that the Confederate army took every opportunity they could in destroying the tracks and bridges on our lines. Bull Run was no exception and Haupt was busy throughout this period repairing the Manassas Gap and Orange and Alexandria lines."

"Haupt was also bothered by another problem which I'm afraid I caused."

"What was that Mr. Secretary?"

"Well, in my zeal to help, I invited the medical profession in both Washington and Baltimore to travel by train to Alexandria to help with the wounded returning from the field. I soon learned that this was a mistake because when the train arrived there, almost half the men were drunk. General Halleck, do you have a copy of Haupt's message on that?"

"Yes sir, it was addressed to our Assistant Secretary P. H. Watson on August 30, 1862. It states.

A large portion of the nurses who came on last night were drunk and very disorderly. I sent them off with written directions to the officer in command at Fairfax, to arrest every one who was drunk and return him by the next train. I understand that a large number are on their way back. They are much in the way. Can you not place a guard on Long Bridge? We are now using care to bring back nurses who are satisfied with the experience of one night and are skedaddling back again. (15-118)

"It would certainly appear that Haupt had his hands full during this timeframe. Were there any other difficulties he encountered?"

"I can tell you there were. As the Secretary of this Department, Haupt never let me forget this period of his service. He would always take the opportunity to let me know what he accomplished in moving men, equipment, and their supplies on this single track line. What is interesting though, I don't think he realized the number of sleepless hours he spent doing what was needed nor did he realize the responsibility and authority he took upon himself in deciding which reinforcements or supplies would be sent where. Without doubt, the Battle of Bull Run was a disaster but it satisfied me that I had an extremely capable man in Haupt to operate my railroads."

"May I say something gentlemen?"

"Yes General Grant, please do."

"While I do not profess to have ever met Haupt, I would, from listening to this conversation, state that his principles of non-interference, timely unloading of trains, and need for a rigid schedule of movements were again impacted upon. Is that not true Mr. Secretary?"

"An astute observation General Grant but Haupt did resolve these issues to the degree that their impact was negligible in future operations. I should also note that because of his untiring support and efficiency, the President commissioned him a Brigadier General on September 5, 1862.

"I noted in your previous comments about his commissioning, as a Colonel, that he refused to sign the appropriate certificates for that grade. Did he sign this commission?"

"He did not and I must tell you it was beginning to get me aggravated. His refusal, as usual, was based upon the fact that he needed to return to Massachusetts, when required, to handle his affairs regarding the Hoosac Tunnel. That whole political issue there was his overall driving sense of urgency. I guess I would also feel that way if someone was attempting to ruin my reputation as a professional engineer and businessman. Getting back to your point though, he was still a General but this was based upon my acceptance of an informal agreement."

"After Bull Run, did the Military Railroads encounter much difficulty in their operations under McClellan, Burnside or Hooker?"

"I think it would be safe to say that Haupt achieved firm control of the railroad operations in Virginia. Throughout the year that remained in which we had Haupt's services, efficiency was achieved at all times. Most of the major military conflicts did not involve significant support by our military railroad system to any great degree. Of course, Confederate efforts to damage our rail lines were always a factor and the necessity for upgrading existing lines to support transportation needs were ever present. Haupt managed to accomplish this work through the able assistance of several civilian subordinates. He also managed to increase the strength of his Corps to the point that he was no longer dependent upon the use of soldiers to accomplish his mission. Perhaps General Halleck would care to comment further."

"I would agree with your assessment Mr. Secretary, but I think that perhaps Mr. Luvaas is interested in other facets of this man which directly impacted on the organization of our Military Railroads. Is that not correct sir?"

"It is General, and anything which you would care to offer would be welcomed."

"The one thing that I noted about Haupt is that he was always attempting to find a better way to do something more efficiently. The first thing that comes to mind is a letter which was sent to me concerning the reorganization of the Military Railroads. Let me see if I have it here in my files. Ah, yes I do. It is addressed to me and is dated Washington, September 16, 1862. It reads as follows:

SIR: Since my interview with you this morning, I have given some thought to the subject of our conversation, and have concluded to venture some suggestions.

As at present informed, the Department of Military Railroads, excepting perhaps for the immediate vicinity of the capitol, is without a head.

If you or the Secretary of War, should desire to be informed as to what roads are in the possession of the United States; how far they are in operation; by whom operated; what their condition; what the amount of rolling stock; what prices are paid for materials and supplies; whether a judicious economy or a lavish expenditure characterizes their operation, it would be impossible to procure any direct information on any of these subjects, and abuses of great magnitude may exist without the power of discovering them.

To procure information, put it in shape to be readily accessible; secure system and uniformity in administration, correct abuses and promote efficiency, the following arrangements appear to be proper.

Yours respectfully,

L. HAUPT (15-136)

In the detailed plan that he submitted with this letter he proposed that a single department be created rather than having an administrative office in Washington and a field operating element with each army. He further proposed that this department be headed by a Brigadier General with a uniformed system of organization to be applied to all railroads. Incorporated into this system would be the requirement for regular reports on the conditions and needs of each railroad. Finally, he suggested that McCallum should be appointed as director to work under the Chief of this department to fulfill his current administrative duties. (15-136)

"Did you act on this proposal General?"

"I did not!"

"Why is that sir?"

"This proposal was obviously submitted with the view of placing Haupt himself in charge of this organization. McCallum was originally hired to run the department but Haupt's promotion to General Officer status caused conflict because a junior officer was really directing a more senior one. I would think that Haupt's proposal was submitted to improve efficiency but it was also aimed toward resolving this dilemma. Although I did not make the change as proposed then, I later incorporated these changes as the Military Railroads developed. By this time, McCallum was the only one of the two still in the War Department so the decision was not complicated."

"Are there any other initiatives which Haupt was responsible for which were aimed at improving operations or efficiency?"

"There are two more initiatives which readily come to mind. One involves procedures to be followed to prevent irregularities on any military railroad line and the other includes support rendered to the Military Railroad by our army units. Give me a second to find them in my files..... Yes, here they are. First is a circular published by the Quartermaster General's Office. I'm sure you remember that the Military Railroads were at least nominally under their supervision. The circular is dated October 1, 1862. It reads as follows:

In order to remove the cause of many of the irregularities, delays, and blockades that occur on the military railroads of the United States, the following general instructions are published, and will be observed by all officers and agents of the Quartermaster's Department.

1st Supplies will not be forwarded to the advanced terminus of military railroads until they are really needed.

2nd All cars will be unloaded and returned immediately. They must not be detained for use as storehouses.

3rd Trains should not on any account be detained beyond their regular time of starting

M.C. MEIGS
Quartermaster General (67-N.P.)

This initiative I believed resulted from Haupt's determination that the Cumberland Valley Railroad was not operating efficiently for the above reason. This was not an isolated problem and the circular was intended to address applicability throughout the army.

The second initiative from Haupt involved the protection of the Military Railroads against our own soldiers and the need to improve efficiency. I have a Special Order No. 337 from the War Department. It is dated Washington, November 10, 1862. That portion pertaining to the Military Railroads is found in Paragraph 16. It reads as follows:

Commanding Officers of troops along the United States military railroads will give all facilities to the officers of the roads and the Quartermasters for unloading cars, so as to prevent delays. On arrival at depots, whether in the day or night, the cars will be instantly unloaded; and working parties will always be in readiness for that duty, and sufficient to unload the whole train at once. Commanding Officers will be charged with guarding the track sidings, wood, water tanks, etc., within their general commands, and will be held responsible for the result. Any military officer who shall neglect his duty in this respect will be reported by the Quartermasters and officers of the railroad, and his name will be stricken from the rolls of the Army.

Depots will be established at suitable points, under the direction of the Commanding General, and properly guarded.

No officer, whatever may be his rank, will interfere with the running of the cars, as directed by the superintendent of the road. Anyone who so interferes will be dismissed from the service for disobedience of orders. (31-49)

I believe this order was issued by our Secretary to assist Haupt in supporting the army under General Burnside. Is that not correct sir?"

"It is General. I was amazed to hear of the degradation that was occurring on the Orange and Alexandria Railroads as a result of our troops guarding this line. It was bad enough that we had to contend with the destruction of our lines by the Confederates. Likewise, we did not need our own army to support further deterioration of these lines. I understand that our soldiers used the critically short water tanks we had at our stations to bathe in. The soap in turn accumulated in the engines of our locomotives and that caused them to become non-operational. Our soldiers even tore up our rails in order to use the ties for their evening fires. This order put a stop to all that."

"I once heard somewhere that Haupt had initiated a request for some type of protection measures for the operators of his locomotives. Can you give me some insight into that development Mr. Secretary?"

"I recall a recommendation by Haupt on this. He submitted, I believe, a proposal to provide iron cabs for his locomotives that were bullet proof. He was concerned over the protection of his locomotive engineers who were the frequent target of the Rebels and sympathizers in the area. I believe that we investigated his proposal but we had limited success. Is that not right General Halleck?"

"It is sir. I would add though that Haupt did provide us with some methods on how to destroy locomotives as well as bridges. Would you care to hear about these aspects Mr. Luvaas?"

"I would, please go on."

"I have a report which Haupt prepared back on November 1, 1862 in Washington, D.C. From the content, it was obvious that he had been experimenting on ways to destroy locomotives and bridges. The accepted procedure at that time for destroying both was by burning. Bridges were set on fire but depending on the condition of the wood or the weather, it often took considerable time to destroy. Likewise it was a customary policy to destroy a locomotive by letting the water out of the flues and making a fire in the fire box, but this was generally ineffective and the engines were rapidly brought back to running condition."

"What were Haupt's proposals?"

"In regard to the destruction of bridges his organization developed a mechanism called the torpedo. It was essentially a small explosive device that could be inserted into the substructure of a bridge. When detonated the explosive charge weakened the bridge and it collapsed. The time associated with this procedure was significantly less than waiting for a bridge to burn. The proposal for the destruction of locomotives was even simpler. The most expeditious mode to disable a locomotive was to fire a cannon ball through the boiler. It would then have to be taken back to the shops and a new boiler installed."

"Did these proposals get implemented?"

"They did indeed. After demonstrating their effectiveness, torpedos were produced in quantity and provided to our units. They were particularly useful during retrograde operations or when calvary were sent out on raids into enemy territory. The destruction of locomotives by firing

cannon balls through their boilers was practiced by our units but that was subject to the availability of a field artillery piece. By disabling our locomotives before their capture by the Rebels, they could not be taken or used against us."

"It seems to me that I also recall something about other experiments that Haupt participated in during the period just before and after General Hooker assumed command of the Army of the Potomac. Could you or General Halleck comment on this effort?"

"That is hard to say. I'm not sure exactly which initiatives you are referring to. Haupt was involved with so many operations to improve both his own organization as well as those of the army as a whole."

"Sir, I think I can respond to Mr. Luvaas' question. I believe he is referring to Haupt's effort to enhance the capabilities and efficiency of his organization. Should I continue Mr. Secretary?"

"Yes."

"Well, during the period I know that Haupt undertook extensive work on methods to erect railroad bridges in shorter periods. He approached his work by developing standardized bridge sections sixty feet in length as well as interchangeable bridge parts. His explorations into bridge construction enabled his organization to be capable of replacing destroyed railroad bridges in hours instead of days, weeks or even months. In fact, the proficiency of Haupt's Construction Corps was such as to be acknowledged by the Rebels who opposed the Union forces in the Army of the Potomac.

Another initiative by Haupt was the development of an apparatus to straighten out rails which were damaged by rebel forces. As you know, it was a common practice of the Confederates to tear up railroad tracks and then to bend them through heating. Once this was done, it was extremely difficult to straighten the rail without sending it back to a rolling mill. In most instances, it was cheaper just to replace the rail with new iron. The development of a device called the jack-screw to straighten bent rail reduced the need for replacement rail and enabled the Construction Corps to repair damaged lines in a much more expeditious manner.

Haupt also worked on developing railroad bridges, floating docks, and river depots so as to connect water terminals without break of bulk or any lapses in time. This reduced considerable time in resupplying units as they carried their campaigns across major waterways. The work by Haupt and his Construction Corps at Acquia Creek is an excellent example of the efficiency which was achieved with careful planning."

"I really am being left with the impression that Haupt was all encompassing in his organization, gentlemen."

"That would be an accurate assessment of this man but he could be equally destructive."

"How is that Mr. Secretary?"

"I remember that he prepared a report and forwarded it to the War Department about another device his organization developed which was entirely destructive in nature. I think he referred to it as a portable

track-wrecking apparatus. Do we have anything in our files on that General?"

"Let me look sir."

"While General Halleck looks for this report, I can tell you that it was a major breakthrough toward enabling our army to tear up and destroy tracks so that the railroad lines future use would be questionable. This apparatus was a U shaped device which when affixed to a section of rail, could be used to twist the rail to such an extent to make it unservicable. It eliminated the need to use fire to heat the rail so it could be bent, thus negating reliance on extensive time to accomplish the destruction. Have you found that report yet?"

"I have it here."

"Please hand it to me. Thank you General."

"Let me see, there was one specific part of this report I want to refer too. Yes, here it is. The report states that. "A working force of 2,200 men can destroy five miles of track in one hour."⁽¹⁵⁻²⁰⁰⁾ If you consider the hours of time spent in accomplishing this similar work, the use of this apparatus indeed possessed a military significance. Would you not agree Mr. Luvaas?"

"I would Mr. Secretary. It certainly is evident that Haupt played a major role in the war effort as he did in enhancing the capabilities of the Military Railroads. I also see by my watch, that I have exhausted most of

the time allotted for this interview. Do you gentlemen have any other thoughts you would like to make about Haupt?"

"I have a few additional comments I would like to make to perhaps tie up our previous remarks about this man."

"Please, General Halleck, your thoughts are most appreciated."

"The first comment I would like to make is that we really did not cover Haupt's specific contributions to Generals Burnside, Hooker, or Meade whom he served under in the Army of the Potomac. He perhaps encountered many of the same problems as those cited earlier but through his constant regulation of operations, effective repair of the railroad lines under his authority, and his refinements and improvements to the management of those lines, few of these commanders had occasion to express concern over his organization. The point being that when rail support was needed, it was available. The soldiers on the battlefield never were in want for supplies if a railroad was in close proximity.

The next point I would like to make is that during the latter part of 1862 and early part of 1863, Haupt began to integrate civilians into his organization and at the same time its organizational structure changed from its initial Construction Corps. I have two documents here which I would like to read to you in part. The first is a letter from Haupt to General Burnside dated Washington, December 14, 1862. This letter states in part:

General Halleck does not much favor my idea of forming a Construction Corps and Transportation Corps of, say 500 civilians, for our work. (15-178)

Subsequently, in a document from the Office of Construction and Transportation, United States Military Railroads dated Washington, January 1, 1863 we see that.

The construction and operation of military railroads in Virginia will be separated, and each placed in charge of an officer as engineer or superintendent. (67-N.P.)

So you can see up to this point that there was a gradual development of this organization into a civilian operation versus mainly a military one. We also see at this point a separation of responsibilities into construction and transportation functions."

"Would you care to comment on Haupt's remark about you not favoring the use of civilians?"

"At the time the comment was made, the idea of a predominately civilian organization participating in a military function was new to me. I always felt that our engineers could be called on to perform yeoman support in this area. I guess I wasn't prepared for the change then but look at what happened."

"Would you care to make any final comments Mr. Secretary?"

"Yes I would. It is my sincere hope that you do Haupt justice in your story. He is said to be many things to many people and has been appropriately characterized by them all. To judge him best and to adequately state his worth, there are three important things I would like to point out. First, Haupt was a man who felt a sense of responsibility in

advising his commander on how best to use his services. As a matter of policy, he visited each new commander to discuss his organization's operation and the type of support he could provide. He also normally followed this up with a similar discussion in writing. In other words, each commander knew exactly what Haupt could provide for them and what Haupt needed from them to fulfill his mission.

The second comment I would like to make is that Haupt offered up his services to his country during a period in which he was experiencing a personal crisis in his business ventures. He accepted no salary but expected only to be reimbursed for his actual expenses. His departure from the service of his country was regrettable. My order on his relief from this duty reads as follows."

Washington, D.C., September 14, 1863

SIR: You are hereby relieved from further duty in the War Department.

You will turn over your office, books, papers and all other property under your control belonging to the United States, to Colonel D. C. McCallum, Superintendent of Military Railroads.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON (15-264)
Secretary of War

The third point I would like to make is that Haupt was the type of individual that a senior leader looks for in a subordinate. By this I

mean that he had a unique ability to anticipate requirements. Perhaps this ability can be associated with his belief that he could analyze military movements. After all, he did consider himself to be something of a strategist. Whatever the cause, he did anticipate requirements for transportation and supplies. In doing so, he saved valuable time for his commanders."

"Would you care to comment on why you dismissed Haupt after all the favorable comments made today? Did it have anything to do with Governor Andrew?"

"I do not intend to justify my actions in regard to Haupt, Governor Andrew of Massachusetts had nothing to do with it. During the time I was associated with Haupt, we only had two disagreements. One involved his employes signing for supplies that they were entrusted with for transportation. I eventually yielded to that requirement. The second was the issue of Haupt signing his commission. I put his refusal to sign this certificate off hoping that he would eventually change his mind. His failure to agree, left me no other alternative."

"Gentlemen, the hour is late and I want to thank you for your time and your frank comments to my questions. You have given me much to digest in writing my story on General Haupt, and I am very comfortable with the information you have provided. It is unfortunate that we were not able to discuss General McCallum's contributions."

"If you like Mr. Luvaas, we can finish that up next week at the same time. We owe each a great deal and I want to insure that their story is told."

"I appreciate that offer Mr. Secretary and I will make it a point to be here as scheduled. I must also apologize to General Grant as we took up the majority of his afternoon and never got to discuss McCallum, which is the reason why he is here. My apologies sir. Will you also be in attendance next week?"

"I will and there is no need to apologize. I have found this interview to be most informative. It always makes me feel good to see some of our unsung heroes finally get their just recognition."

MAY 2, 1865

I was indeed fortunate to have the opportunity to speak with General Halleck after my interview last week with Secretary Stanton. He must be an able administrator being that he has a great deal of information at his disposal in the War Department. When he told me that I could borrow his files on the Military Railroads to review prior to our next meeting, I did not hesitate to accept his offer. Upon beginning my research into the story on his organization, I found a wealth of information available on Haupt but rather little on General McCallum. With Halleck's help, I was able to obtain sufficient information on him in order that I might ask the type of questions I need for this story. As I think about Haupt and McCallum, I can't but feel that perhaps the significance of McCallum's contributions have been overlooked; based upon the initial shadow that was cast by Haupt. In reviewing the many reports of McCallum and his subordinates, after Haupt's departure, it is clearly evident that the leadership provided in his direction of the Military Railroads was immeasurable. hopefully when I interview Secretary Stanton and Generals Grant and Halleck today, I will continue to have that same impression.

Before I make my appointment with our Secretary of War, I should stop by and thank General Halleck for the documents he provided me for review. I believe his office is right around the corner here. You would think that someone of his stature would be afforded better accommodations. I realize that his actual office is not in this building but the temporary space they provide him while on business here is really austere. The furnishings in this office are extremely limited and consist of a rather old and worn desk with one chair for a visitor. Secretary Stanton certainly doesn't

believe in creating a favorable working atmosphere. The whole Department, if you think about it, is rather bland in appearance.

"Colonel, I'm Mr. Luvaas of the Baltimore Sun."

"Mr. Luvaas, what can I do for you?"

"I'm on my way to meet with Secretary Stanton and thought I would stop by to see General Halleck for a moment. Is he in his office?"

"He is sir, but he is also getting ready to meet with Secretary Stanton."

"I believe we are both going to the same meeting. Would you just tell him I am here."

"Yes sir, I will."

"Mr. Luvaas, how are you today?"

"Very well General and yourself?"

"I feel fine today. Come on into my office. We still have a few minutes before the interview. Please remove your coat and have a seat."

"Thank you General. I stopped by to thank you for the use of your file on the Military Railroads and to return it to you. It was most informative and will contribute to my story."

"I'm glad it was of some help. How was your trip from Baltimore?"

"The usual. I can never get comfortable on those trains."

"I know exactly what you mean. Well, I suppose we had better be off. We don't want to keep our Secretary waiting."

"General Halleck, the Secretary is waiting for you and Mr. Luvaas. I was about to send someone out to find you both. Please go right in."

"Thank you Mr. Anderson. Mr. Luvaas and I are on our way."

"Ah, there he is now. It was good of you to come back again Mr. Luvaas. I hope that your journey from Baltimore was a pleasant one."

"It was satisfactory sir but it is indeed a pleasure for me to meet with you again Mr. Secretary. I am also quite glad to see you General Grant. I was really looking forward to having your comments on our Military Railroads."

"To be honest with you Jay, I too have been waiting for just this opportunity." Are we ready to begin General Halleck?"

"Yes sir, may I suggest that we make ourselves comfortable. If we stay with the same seating arrangement as before, it should support our efforts in concluding this interview."

"An excellent idea General, let us be seated."

"Where would you like to begin this time Mr. Luvaas?"

"Mr. Secretary, I think that I have more than enough information concerning Haupt and the contribution that he has made. If it is acceptable with you, I would like to concentrate our discussions today on General McCallum."

"That would be fine with me. Where would you suggest we start?"

"We sir, I note in my research that you appointed McCallum to his position on February 11, 1862. Your appointment, if I may be so bold reads as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington City, D.C., February 11, 1862

ORDERED: That D.C. McCallum be, and he is hereby appointed Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in the United States, with authority to enter upon, take possession of, hold, and use all railroads, engines, cars, locomotives, equipments, appendages, and appurtenances that may be required for the transport of troops, arms, ammunition, and military supplies of the United States, and to do and perform all acts and things that may be necessary and proper to be done for the safe and speedy transport aforesaid.

By order of the President, commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

ELWIN M. STANTON
Secretary of War (70-1)

In reviewing this order, I cannot help but be struck by the rather wide authority which you bestowed upon McCallum. Was there a particular reason Mr. Secretary as to why you gave him the magnitude of such power in this assignment?"

"There was indeed a specific reason behind this order being worded as it was. The President signed a bill which we discussed during the last interview which allowed this government to take possession of any railroad when military necessity existed. Although he signed the bill, he was somewhat reluctant to do so because he did not want to appear to be ready

to interfere with the business affairs of the private sector. After all, that is not the intended purpose of our central government. The publication of that order as intended to do two things. First, it identified the fact that the War Department would be the implementing arm of this bill should it become necessary. The second intent was to put all railroad companies on notice that McCallum had the authority to take possession of their lines if their cooperation was not freely given."

"Should I assure that each railroad line was provided a copy of this order?"

"You can, and in fact, it was the normal policy of this department to notify all railroad company presidents, in writing, of any action contemplated or taken that could or would impact on them."

"What would be your estimate of the impact that this order had on McCallum's coordination with these lines?"

"My estimate is that this order instilled a sense of urgency in their support to McCallum and their overall cooperation with him was excellent in all respects. In fact, with the exception of railroad support to the Army of the Potomac, it was unnecessary for this department to take any railroad line over in the Northern states."

"If we could change direction for a moment, I would once again like to explore the relationship that existed between Haupt and McCallum. I know that you indicated that there did not appear to be any friction between them. Yet in reviewing the yearly reports on the operations of the

Military Railroads submitted by McCallum, I can find no mention whatsoever of Haupt."

"I'm not sure exactly what you mean Mr. Luvaas. Could you be more specific?"

"Yes I can. What I am asking is whether or not these gentlemen were able to work together? The reason for asking this question is that McCallum, in all his reports, acknowledges the contributions made by the many civilians who worked for this organization but there is no mention made of Haupt in his report of September 20, 1863, and November 27, 1864. (67-N.P.) This would lead me to opine that perhaps these men did not get along. Was that the case?"

"I can answer your question but I don't think my response will achieve the information you are seeking. Let me say that their relationship was one of a professional nature and I never observed any indication of friction or animosity between them. You must remember that they did not work together. Haupt was my man in the field and McCallum was my administrator in Washington. If there were friction, I would expect that their professionalism would be such so as not to make it evident. I do know though that Haupt did not perceive a problem."

"Did you notice any problem develop when Haupt was given a commission as a Brigadier General and McCallum was a Colonel?"

"I did not. Frankly, I think you are barking up the wrong trail."

"Please don't get me wrong Mr. Secretary, I am not trying to infer anything at all. I'm just trying to understand these men so that I can best present their story."

"I would suggest then we get back to the relevant aspects of what they accomplished."

"Very well Mr. Secretary. The next question I have pertains to the title of McCallum, I note that when he was first appointed to his position, his title was that of Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in the United States. In later communiques signed by him, his title changed to that of Director and General Manager of Military Railroads in the United States. Is there a significance to this title change?"

"Shall I comment on that Mr. Secretary?"

"Please do General Halleck."

"I believe the significance of this title change occurred as a result of our taking control of Confederate railroad lines. When first appointed as Military Director and Superintendent of Military Railroads, McCallum's role was primarily one of coordinating governmental and military needs with those railroads which remained loyal to the Union. For the most part, we did not operate or supervise these lines; the railroad companies did that for us. On the other hand, when we assumed control of Confederate railroad lines, we also inherited an operational and general management responsibility; hence the change to Military Director and General Manager."

"Thank you General, that helps to clarify the confusion which existed as I read many of his communiques."I note earlier on in his career as Military Director that McCallum's first opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Military Railroads was in the Peninsular Campaign of 1862. Could you please comment on that Secretary Stanton?"

"Yes, I remember exactly what you are referring to. It was perhaps the first challenge that McCallum was ever given and he demonstrated his value immediately in meeting the needs of the army. I believe it was General McClellan who asked McCallum to provide four locomotives and some rolling stock for the Richmond and York River Railroad. He needed this railway equipment to supply his units in the field. I must admit that McCallum rose to the occasion and immediately set to work to acquire these assets. He purchased four locomotives and some eighty cars from various railroads throughout New England and had them shipped to McClellan by May 1862.⁽⁴⁶⁻¹³⁷⁾ About a month later, he acquired a fifth locomotive to expand the capability of this line to supply the army."

"I would think that this initial success would have created significant confidence in him."

"That it did, but I must tell you that I lost an equal amount in General McClellan."

"What do you mean by that?"

"I was naturally pleased with the quick response that McCallum achieved but I was down right mad over the fact that this equipment was

shortly thereafter lost. When the army withdrew from that area in the latter part of June 1862, all this equipment had to be abandoned, so it was destroyed."

"That was unfortunate Mr. Secretary, but wasn't it the practice of destroying equipment rather than leaving it behind to be used by the enemy against us?"

"It was but I failed to see any effort applied toward removing it before the Confederates arrived on the scene."

"General Halleck."

"Yes."

"I would appreciate your thoughts on McCallum in the early days of the Military Railroads. It would appear from my research that he seldom left Washington. From the files which I reviewed, it would also appear that he more or less functioned, during this period, as a central coordinator. I made the following notations for your files: In a letter from J. H. Levereux, a subordinate of Haupt, he states in part of June 3, 1862:"

Col. McCallum seized from the Baltimore and Chic road three heavy coal burners for the special purpose of aiding me Col. McCallum telegraphed me this A.M.: "I ordered a car load of soft coal for you on Friday from Georgetown, and the party agreed to deliver....." (15-57)

In a letter to McCallum dated August 31, 1862 Haupt asks:

Can you not get an order from the Secretary of War to prevent any more people from coming over? (15-127)

A letter from Haupt dated November 17, 1862 to one of his superintendents, W. W. Wright, states in part:

Requisitions for material or supplies to be made through the Quartermaster, unless the amount is small or the necessities urgent. Such (15-167) requisitions should be submitted to Colonel L.C. McCallum for approval.

In a short telegram dated July 14, 1863 Haupt asked McCallum:

Construction Corps, tools, and materials ordered to repair to Alexandria. Assist in providing transportation by special train. Order back oxen if they have been forwarded. (15-244)

Finally, I note in Haupt's Final Report of September 9, 1863 he states in part:

Information in regard to disbursements and accounts has been furnished by Colonel L.C. McCallum, Military Director and General Superintendent of United States Railroads. (15-268)

From these quotes and my initial comment would you agree General?"

"I would say that your assessment of McCallum's initial tenure was right on the mark. He seldom left his office in Washington to visit his organization in the field. I suppose the reason for the way that he operated in the beginning had much to do with his personality. He was not one to mix with others. I also think that he was comfortable with himself in that he knew he could handle any problem small or great that came his way. He kept a close watch on the organization though and there wasn't much going on that he wasn't aware of."

"I did note in my research that shortly after the departure of Haupt, that McCallum faced his first major challenge. Would you care to comment on that Mr. Secretary?"

"Are you referring to the defeat of General Rosecrans of Chickamauga in September 1863 and the movement of Hooker's Corps to reinforce him?"

"I am."

"I'm sure that history will record the movement of so many soldiers in such a short period of time as a truly remarkable accomplishment."

"Could you tell me more about what happened and the role that McCallum played in the transportation of these reinforcements for General Rosecrans?"

"Before I do that, let me ask General Halleck to please find that message that Mr. Dana sent to me from Chattanooga during this period. I think it will establish the beginning dates of the subsequent actions that were taken. While waiting, I should point out that after his defeat at Chickamauga, Rosecrans withdrew his units to Chattanooga, Tennessee where he became cut off from his main supply lines which were located at Bridgeport, Alabama, a distance of some sixty miles away. If reinforcements had not been sent, Rosecrans and his army would have been forced to surrender or to starve to death.

"Sir, I have found that message from Mr. Dana."

"Please let me have it. Thank you sir....Now where was I? Oh yes, Rosecrans was cut off at Chattanooga. At this point, I was fortunate to have Mr. Dana, one of my Assistant Secretaries of War, at Chattanooga. On September 25, 1863 he wired me the following message:

No time should be lost in rushing twenty to twenty-five thousand efficient troops to Bridgeport. If such reinforcements can get there in

season everything is safe and this place indispensable alike to the defense of Tennessee and as a base for future operations in Georgia will remain ours." (41-287)

This message as well as others I received, of a similar alarming nature, caused me to realize that drastic action was needed."

"What exactly did you do next Mr. Secretary?"

"I guess I realized that the only solution to this dilemma was to send reinforcements to help Rosecrans. The major problem though was to decide which units they would be. Those closest to Rosecrans were fulfilling vital roles and I could not jeopardize the loss of control of other vital regions. My only choice therefore were units from the Army of the Potomac. I discussed this matter in depth with President Lincoln and Secretaries Seward and Chase. General Halleck was also in attendance at this meeting and he argued against such an undertaking."

"Sir, as your General-in-Chief at the time I was obligated to render you my best judgment based upon the situation. We must remember that there was a substantial risk of sending a significant number of men and equipment there only to find that General Rosecrans might have already capitulated to the Confederates. Had that been the case, then those arriving units might then have faced a totally superior enemy force. I am grateful though that my decision was overruled later."

"Can you explain what you mean General about being overruled later?"

"I will yield to our Secretary on that."

"What General Halleck is referring to is the fact that President Lincoln agreed with his views but I was able to persuade the President to hold off on his final decision until I had time to fully develop the feasibility of my proposal."

"What did you do then?"

"I called McCallum into my office, explained the situation to him and presented him with the following question:"

Assume that you had the entire control of rail and telegraph, what is the shortest time in which you can transfer the required number of ⁽¹⁵⁻²⁸⁵⁾ ~~(11-285)~~ with artillery, ammunition and supplies, to the objective point?

I naturally provided McCallum with my best figures as to the number of officers, men, horses, artillery and pieces of baggage that would be required within the move."

"What was McCallum's response to this sir?"

"He made a few calculations, several notes, and then provided me with the time it would take to move these soldiers to Bridgeport. As it was within the timeframe that General Halleck indicated was acceptable, I told him to proceed at all speed to set whatever was needed in motion. That evening, he briefed the President and got both him and General Halleck to agree to the movement. Is that not correct General?"

"It is sir."

"I should add too that I was so delighted with his positive attitude and professional approach to his job, that I inferred him I would pro-

mote him to Brigadier General if the last train was loaded within the established timeframe."

"Was it?"

"It was and I did in fact have him promoted. Justly deserved I might add."

"How exactly was the move accomplished Mr. Secretary?"

"At noon the following day, I believe that was September 24, McCallum met with Assistant Secretary Scott and representatives of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Mr. John W. Garrett and Mr. William P. Smith."

"Isn't Mr. Garrett the President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad?"

"Yes he is and Mr. Smith is his Master of Transportation."

"Were there others also involved?"

"There were a great many people involved in this operation but these were the principle ones. Anyway, as I was saying these men under the supervision of McCallum, finalized the plan to move General Hooker's two Corps, the Eleventh and Twelfth, to Bridgeport, Alabama some twelve hundred miles from here."

"How many soldiers did that involve?"

"It was over 22,000 officers and men but you must realize that this move involved much more than men. Added to this were the Corps' horses, their

artillery, ammunition, and the baggage that is normally found in a force of this size. What really made this a significant feat, however, was the fact that this movement was accomplished over three different railroads, each with a different gauge, as well as two separate river crossings, one by ferry and the other by ponton bridge. The coordination on this effort was spectacular and McCallum is directly credited with planning this 1200 mile move."

"I'm sure the coordination for this movement was monumental. How was it orchestrated?"

"If I recall correctly, McCallum himself personally took charge of the loading and transportation as far as Washington. Mr. Carrett was placed in charge from Washington to Jeffersonville, Indiana. Across the river at Louisville, Kentucky, Mr. Scott took charge until the units arrived at Bridgeport, Alabama. I can only tell you that this was an operation of the grandest scale and was accomplished in a most remarkable fashion. It was the first time that our Military Railroad played a part in the grand strategy of our effort and it was an example of what they would accomplish in the future."

"How long did this movement of units take Mr. Secretary?"

"The actual loading of soldiers and their equipment started on September 25 and by noon of September 28 the entire two Corps were enroute to reinforce Rosecrans. The first unit arrived at Bridgeport on September 30 and by October 8 all units were in place. From the date of the initial planning to completion of the mission, it took only fourteen days to

perform. I believe it was General Halleck who first said that such an undertaking would not be accomplished in less than three months. (46-181)..

"That is true sir. I did say that. I can only say that one learns from experience."

"Mr. Secretary."

"Yes."

"After McCallum completed this assignment and helped to secure East Tennessee for the Union, what was the next major role in which he participated?"

"I would say that his next major contribution was made in formulating and implementing an efficient and effective organizational structure for the Military Railroads."

"What do you mean by that sir?"

"I think you should realize that up to the end of 1863, no actual organizational structure for the Military Railroads had actually evolved. Haupt formed a Construction Corps, as you are well aware, but it was predominately military in composition. It was not until the end of his service that we saw signs of the Corps becoming partially filled with civilians. We also did not have at this point an element within the organization to handle the actual transportation functions. In truth, both the maintenance and operation missions were performed by one person who usually could not afford the luxury to devote his attention full

time to both responsibilities. McCallum tackled this problem head on when he went on an inspection of the railroads in the Military Division of Mississippi."

"Before you continue sir, please give me a little background on why McCallum went to this division to inspect the railroads?"

"Actually, it wasn't on an inspection per se. It was more of having a reason to make the trip."

"What do you mean?"

"I guess in order to explain this, I would have to go back to Haupt's time in the organization. In the Spring of 1863, I directed Haupt to inspect the railroad lines of this theater of military operations based upon rather sensitive reports I was receiving concerning the unsatisfactory nature of the rail operations out there. You must appreciate the fact also that this operation was still under the exclusive control of the Quartermaster Department. Anyway, Haupt was busy preparing to support General Hooker's upcoming campaign so he asked an associate of his, Mr. Forbes, to perform this inspection for him."

"Sir, is that F. H. Forbes, the newspaper reporter from Massachusetts?"

"The very same..... Mr. Forbes' report, when it arrived in December 1863, pointed out a great deal of waste and inefficiency which was hampering railroad operations there.⁽¹⁻³⁴⁾ After reading this report, I directed that McCallum proceed there to straighten out these operations."

"I believe I saw an order in your files on that. May I look for it General Halleck."

"Please do."

"Here it is. The order is dated December 19, 1863. It is part of Special Order No. 562 and reads in part:

33. Colonel D. C. McClallum, additional A.D.C., superintendent of military railroads, will immediately proceed to Chattanooga, Tennessee, with such ^(67-N.P.)parties of his constructing forces as can be spared from the front....

May I ask Mr. Secretary, why McCallum also took a portion of his constructing force?"

"I guess there were two reasons for that. First was the fact that McCallum was really sent there to investigate matters. Had he been sent alone, it would have been obvious but moreso difficult to obtain information about what in fact was happening. The sending of the construction forces was meant to defuse any thoughts that this was actually on investigation. The second reason was based upon the fact that Mr. Forbes' report left strong indications that help was needed. By sending this force with McCallum subsequent delays in transporting them there if needed would be avoided. As it turned out, they were required and valuable time was therefore saved."

"Not to divert from you comments sir, but I note in the order that I just read that McCallum was still a Colonel at this time. I thought you said that he was promoted to Brigadier General."

"Perhaps, I should have properly responded to your question by saying that I recommended him for promotion to Brigadier General. As you know Congress approves these recommendations at their leisure and it naturally took some time before it was officially approved. In fact, if my memory serves me right, almost a year passed before it was official. The point though is that he was promoted and it was in recognition of his untiring and professional support rendered in reinforcing Rosecrans."

"Getting back to my original question Mr. Secretary. What did McCallum find when he arrived in Chattanooga?"

"Sir, if I might comment on this, I think it would be more appropriate as I was in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi at that time."

"Please do General Grant. Your comments are indeed welcomed."

"After his investigation, McCallum determined that several of the allegations pointed out by Mr. Forbes were in fact true. Perhaps more noteworthy though was the fact that McCallum related the rather non-cooperative attitude of the general manager of our rail lines, Mr. John B. Anderson in accepting his offer to help repair the Nashville-Chattanooga line. Mr. Anderson was also described as lacking managerial skills in performing his duties. The final decision to relieve him came when suspicions developed over this loyalty.

"Whom did you select in his stead?"

"There was only one obvious choice for this job. I needed the best man I could secure."

"Who was that sir?"

"I selected Dan McCallum and there was no better choice that I could have made."

"Did that not conflict with his regular duties as Military Director of Military Railroads in the United States?"

"I suppose it did but you must remember that the greatest need for railroad support at that time was in my division. Once he got things organized, I released him and the operations reverted to his capable subordinates."

"Sir, might I ask that you expand upon your comment about his getting things organized. What exactly did he do?"

"Although I must admit that I am not totally familiar with the Military Railroad organization prior to that time, I think that McCallum first established an organizational structure for his field units in my division. As noted in earlier discussions, the Military Railroads up to this point were predominately composed of military personnel borrowed to fulfill a mission requirement. When McCallum assumed the duties as my general manager, he departed from this practice and commenced to formalize a civilian structure within the organization. Would that be a correct assessment Mr. Secretary?"

"It would be General. Please go on with your comments."

"I have had in my possession, two orders which I feel established the grounds on which McCallum decided to form his operating elements in the

field. I would like to read them both, if I may. They are long, but I think you'll appreciate their significance Mr. Luvaas. The first reads:

OFFICE OF GENERAL MANAGER
Military Railroads U.S.
Nashville, Tenn., February 11, 1864

A. ANDERSON, Esq.

SIR: You are hereby appointed general superintendent of transportation on the United States military railroads in the Military Division of the Mississippi.

Your duties will be confined to the management of transportation on all railroads in use in this military division, together with all necessary repairs of the same.

You will have, with the approval of the general manager, full authority to engage the services of all persons for whose acts you are held responsible, and will have full power to dismiss any subordinate when in your judgement the interests of the service will be permitted thereby.

You will also, with the approval of the general manager, have authority to establish rates of compensation of all persons serving under you.

You will at an early date present to the general manager, for his approval, a plan of the organization of your department.

You have the authority to make requisitions for supplies upon the A.Q.M. detailed to service on military railroads in the Military Division of the Mississippi.

You have the power to make requisitions for men or materials, or both, upon the chief engineer in charge of construction in this division, when in your opinion the emergency calls for such assistance.

As the duties of the general manager will occasionally cause his absence from this military division, you will at such times, and in order to insure prompt action, obey any order emanating from the General-in-Chief of this military division, or the Generals in command of the Departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee, in all matters pertaining to the branch of duties in your charge.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. McCALLUM
Col. U.S.A., Mil. Div. and Gen'l Manager Railroads U.S. (67-N.P.)

The second order is somewhat the same but I will also read it in its entirety. It states:

OFFICE OF GENERAL MANAGER
MILITARY RAILROADS U.S.
Nashville, Tenn., February 11, 1864

W.W. WRIGHT, Esq.

SIR: You are hereby appointed chief engineer of the United States Military Railroads in the Military Division of the Mississippi.

Your duties will be confined more especially to the reconstruction and opening of new lines of railroad. For this purpose you will have the entire charge of the Construction Corps. You will have authority with the approval of the general manager, to engage all persons for whose acts you are held responsible, and will have full power to dismiss any person employed under you when in your judgment the interest of the service will be promoted thereby. You will, with the authority of the general manager, have the power to establish rates of compensation of your subordinates, and will at an early day report to the general manager, for his approval, a plan of organization of all forces in your charge. You will have the authority to make requisitions for supplies, tools, etc. upon the assistant quartermaster detailed to special duty in the Military Division of the Mississippi, and located at Nashville. It will also be your duty to honor requisitions made upon your men and material by the general superintendent of the United States Military Railroads in the Military Division of the Mississippi for the purpose of repairs of lines in use; but you will in no case withdraw your forces for said repairs without the consent and approval of the General in command of the department where your forces may be located, or the General-in-Chief of this military division.

In order to insure prompt action you will, in the absence of the general manager, obey the orders of the General-in-Chief of this military division, or the Generals in command of the departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee.

Very respectfully, your obed't servant,

D. C. McCALLUM
Col. U.S.A., Mil. Dir. and Gen. Manager Railroads, U.S."(67-I.P.)

There appears to be several factors in these orders which had not been previously addressed in the military railroads organization. The

first and perhaps the most important is the separation of functions. Here we see two separate departments created; a transportation department and a construction department. The transportation department was charged to manage train movements and to do general maintenance on the railway line and its equipment. The construction department was charged to do major repair work and to build new rail lines whenever needed."

"I would also think that the establishment of civilian positions and the fixing of their salaries was a major new initiative."

"It was Mr. Luvaas but the importance to me as the commander of the division in Mississippi was to free up my soldiers for other important duties that needed to be accomplished. This was particularly true in regard to my engineer elements which I needed for fortification work."

"General, what other aspects do you see in these orders which had not been addressed before in the Military Railroads?"

"I see a closer relationship being developed with the Quartermaster Department. Although the Military Railroads were a part of that department, at least nominally, this was the first occasion that we see a working relationship being established between them."

"I agree with both of your comments gentlemen but let us not forget what else came out of these orders."

"What do you mean Mr. Secretary?"


"Well Mr. Luvaas, I am referring to the fact that Mr. Anderson and Mr. Wright were charged with the task to prepare an organizational plan for their respective departments."

"It seems to me that I remember seeing an organizational structure in these departments as I was travelling around covering the war. Would you care to comment on these organizations General Grant?"

"I thought you would ask me about these organizations and how they were structured. It would be difficult to attempt such a discussion without being able to visualize the configuration that was established for each. Before coming here today, I took the liberty of preparing several diagrams on how the Military Railroads organization was generally operated in my Military Division of the Mississippi. I must remind you though that this is based upon my best recollection, which is primarily derived from prior conversations with both Wright and Anderson. If you will please look at my first organizational drawing, this establishes the primary lines of authority.


Note that the Military Director of Railroads, in this case McCallum, is the focal point for most of the direction given to either the Transportation or Construction Divisions. Recognizing his periodic absence, McCallum designed the system to enable directives to be given to these divisions in his absence. As you can see, the Secretary of War could deal directly with either or both divisions. Also note that the Quartermaster General or the appropriate military chain of command could also provide direction to these divisions through separate channels. This flexibility was indeed important to me as a commander."

The next diagram I have prepared is that of the actual structure of the Transportation Division as I saw it but modified in general terms of what could be expected on any line they operated, not just mine. As you



(63-435)

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION




(63-435)

can see by this diagram, the Transportation Division was structured to support both the overall operations of a railroad line as well as its general maintenance.

There are several factors about this division which should be mentioned. First, is the fact that the superintendent of this division has a rather significant number of subordinates reporting to him. This diagram reflects twelve but it could in fact be more depending on the number of rail lines and central maintenance facilities that were in your area. This brings me to my second point. What you see here is essentially the structure that was in effect for a division for one railroad line. As additional lines were added to the division's responsibility, the number of line superintendents, with their respective structure, increased proportionately. Furthermore, this in turn impacted significantly on the size of the personnel requirements in maintenance and repair of the line, its equipment and the number of specialized agents needed. I guess it would be fair to say that the size of this division was extremely fluid but intensely manpower driven by operational necessities. I would point out in my Military Division of the Mississippi, Mr. Anderson had seven line superintendents reporting to him and his general mechanist had master mechanists in Nashville, Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Memphis reporting to him. These latter locations were centralized railroad facilities.

The Construction Division is perhaps the easiest of the two to discuss as this type of organization was fixed in size. If you'll refer to my diagram on this division you will see exactly what I mean.

CONSTRUCTION DIVISION



(66-437)

As you can see from this diagram, the division was seven hundred and seventy-seven men strong and their mission was one of reconstructing lines in a deteriorated or damaged state as well as the opening of new lines. This division was broken down into specialized areas, the major ones being bridge building and track laying. Each of these had three hundred and fifty-six men. The remaining subdivisions provided support functions or minor facility construction to a railroad line.

In listening to the conversation of the first interview, it would appear that this division used extensively the perfections developed by Haupt in standardized bridge parts, and prefabrication. The track laying subdivision also seems to have benefited from Haupt's experiments in straightening out damaged rails. The speed with which this division was able to accomplish this work clearly demonstrates the importance that their operations had in supporting the field commander.

The final point I would like to make about this division is that its standard structure served as a means to provide similar organizations as the workload increased. As a matter of fact, there were up to seven of these divisions in my area of operations. McCallum's direction of both types of divisions were superb in all respects."

"General, I really appreciate the explanation which you have provided on these two organizations as well as how they were formed. This will certainly help my story as I develop it. There are a few questions I would like to ask based upon that which you have addressed."

"I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have Mr. Luvaas."

"There are several I have in mind but I think I would first like to know just how effective you personally viewed this organization?"

"That is easy. I can sum it up best by a quote which I saw published recently by a railroad man of a well known line. He noted that the efficiency of these two divisions gave the soldiers of our armies a sense of confidence in the fact that they would never lose contact with home for long. He wrote."

The moral effect is marvelous. The Union troops were led to believe that their communications with home could never be interrupted, save for a few hours at a time; while the enemy was fully convinced that Sherman and his men were all but omnipotent, and that destructive measures were of little avail to arrest their progress. Indeed there was a story in these days to the effect that Johnston had determined to blow up an important railroad tunnel in order to stop the invaders, whereupon one of his men remarked, "There isn't no use in that cause Sherman carries long duplicates of all tunnels."(64-518)

It is really obvious to me that this quote says it all. Even the Confederates appreciated the fact that our Military Railroads could undertake the most remarkable challenges and succeed in the most expeditious manner possible. A finder tribute could not be paid to that organization. It operated most efficiently and one could not ask for more."

"I wholeheartedly agree with your comments General. I would appreciate your answering a few questions that I have which will help to clarify several of your remarks about this organization."

"I will be happy to respond to any of your questions as long as it is within the scope of my involvement with the Military Railroads. Beyond that I must yield to our Secretary or General Kalleck who may possess a more intimate knowledge than I on this subject."

"My first question deals with the actual lines of authority which you mentioned during this interview and which were commented on previously. Specifically, your diagram on lines of authority suggest that the Military Railroads was not necessarily part of the Quartermaster Department. I am of the opinion that they were. Could you please comment on that relationship?"

"The Military Railroads was and is still a subordinate element of the Quartermaster Department. Based upon my experience with them, I would suggest that initially they enjoyed a rather wide latitude in the manner in which they operated. The point I was trying to make was the fact that the Military Director was the focal point for the majority of guidance and direction that these two divisions received. He in turn responded to three different lines of authority, which, in his absence, enabled the two divisions a continuous flow of guidance and direction. Should you require more about this structure, I'm afraid I will have to yield to others who are perhaps more knowledgeable in this regard."

"Sir, if I may perhaps interrupt, I think I can help to clarify this point."

"By all means General Halleck, please do."

"When the Military Railroads were first formed, they were in fact part of the Quartermaster Department and this relationship has continued to exist. In their infant stage, the Military Railroads were nominally under the control of the Quartermaster but were allowed to operate in an independent manner. As the Quartermaster Department and the Military Railroads grew in size and responsibility, Congress perceived a need to better organize the former. In July of last year, they enacted a bill to improve the organization of the Quartermaster Department. This bill, which I believe was Public Law 212, functionalized the responsibilities of this department into nine divisions. The Military Railroads then became part of the fourth division which had responsibility for all modes of transportation. This is the way it is today."

"That was most informative General. Thank you for your comments..... General Grant, I would like to ask you another question now if I may?"

"Proceed sir."

"I note in the preceding interview and this one, that this organization grew from a predominately military one to one composed primarily of civilians. I also recall that comment was made about the difficulty in procuring the right kind of manpower based upon the conscription practices. Furthermore, I remember hearing that the railroads in the north

paid rather high wages for talented railroad personnel. My question is whether or not McCallum and his two subordinates in the Military Division of the Mississippi had problems in acquiring the right type and quantity of manpower?"

"I would say that there was always some degree of difficulty acquiring the right type of talented men to work in the Transportation or Construction Divisions. You must remember though that McCallum gave his two subordinates the right to hire and establish appropriate wages. They could therefore be somewhat competitive with private industry and were in fact that way. Perhaps General Halleck might have some specific remarks to make on this."

"Sir, the only additional comment I could offer is to say that our railroad personnel were paid salaries based upon their technical capabilities. I think that our wages for these people were competitive with what you would have found in private industry at the time. The only exception being the more senior personnel which were hired. McCallum needed the best men he could find in these positions so he paid them the type of wages that were somewhat above the industry's average."

"Could you give me a few examples of what you mean?"

"Certainly, I think I have a few records in my file which will help. Yes, here they are. I see that Mr. Anderson as the Superintendent of the Transportation Division was paid \$5,000 annually and he was also allowed to draw traveling expenses. (64-524) Such an arrangement of salary was slightly better than one would find in the civilian sector. The line

superintendents working under him were paid between \$2,000 and \$3,000 annually. Again this was slightly better than the average." (64-524)

"Would you say then sir that McCallum and his principle subordinates had a policy of paying more for the services of individuals in critical positions?"

"I would and based upon the situation at that time, I see no problem with the policy as McCallum established it. I would hate to think that we could have lost the war because money was the governing factor. Cost never bothered me and under those circumstances never would."

"General Halleck, could you also give me some idea as to the salaries paid to other employees of the Military Railroads?"

"I have a few more here. I see that the masters of transportation were paid \$175 per month, roadmasters between \$120 and \$200 per month, train dispatchers \$125 per month and engineers and conductors \$90 per month." (64-524)

"What did the normal laborer on the line receive for wages?"

"My records suggest that there was a rather wide scale of pay for these men which ranged from \$.50 per day to \$2.75 per day depending on the difficulty of work and the scarcity of labor." (64-524)

"One final question before we move along into other areas impacted on by McCallum."

"Yes, what is it?"

"Well, General Grant, I note that in both organizational diagrams which you provided, provisions were made for a surgeon. Could you please elaborate on that?"

"I can. First, I think you must realize that the Military Railroads by this time had involved into a predominantly civilian structure and were not considered part of the military establishment when it came to support of this nature. Another consideration is the fact that railroad work was, by its very nature, hazardous and required readily available medical support when emergencies arose. Finally, we must realize that our surgeons in the military had more to handle in tending to our soldiers than time permitted and had such time been available, regulations would have precluded this type of coverage, except in the most life threatening situations. In view of these factors, McCallum and his principle subordinates recognized the importance of having a surgeon available and incorporated this into their organizational structure. I do not mean to imply however that the government paid the salary of this surgeon. Rather, the employees within their respective division contributed a portion of their salary to have a surgeon available to them to provide medical support when required."

"Before we move on to other aspects of the Military Railroads and in particularly McCallum, I do have one more question regarding the Construction Division. In your comments I think you inferred something which I want to make sure I'm correct in assuming. My question is "Was the Construction Division organized as they were to be able to disperse in all directions on a rail line and accomplish their specialized roles independently?"

"That is a good point and an excellent question. I should have been more specific in my remarks. You are precisely correct in what you say. If you look again at my diagram on the Construction Division, you will see that there is redundant supervisory staffing in both the bridge building and track laying subdivisions which allowed the division engineer the flexibility to spread these operations out simultaneously in different directions. With this capability, major reconstruction of damaged, destroyed, or deteriorated lines could commence over a larger segment of any railroad line, if necessity dictated this need. Likewise, the support services of the other subdivisions could be equally divided to accommodate multiple operations in support of the major functions."

"That was most helpful in clarifying that point General Grant.... I would now like to move on with my questions pertaining to McCallum's other contributions. Before leaving this area though, I will ask if there are any other organizational initiatives instituted by McCallum."

"There is just one more that I would like to point out."

"Mr Secretary?"

"I feel it important to note that McCallum realized that the future would require the Military Railroads to account for the costs and expenses associated with their operation. He therefore established procedures for an audit trail of his operations. This was done about the same time

as the two divisions were established in the Military Division of the Mississippi. He also established a requirement for these two divisions to submit reports on their operations. This subsequently became the norm throughout the Military Railroads organization."

"While we are on the subject of procedures, I noted in our last interview that Haupt established some fundamental procedures in regard to the operation of railroads under military control. Did McCallum follow these same procedures?"

"From my perspective he did, but I think that this question could be more appropriately responded to by either General Grant or General Halleck. Would either of you care to comment on this?"

"I would Mr. Secretary!"

"General Grant."

"After listening to the first interview and this one, I can clearly see the impact that McCallum had on regulating the operation of the Military Railroads. As the Commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi and in my capacity as General in Chief, it is obvious that McCallum did in fact continue with the basic principles established by Haupt. I would also suggest, that he established his own regulations which were equally enforced in all the divisions of our army. I would think that General Halleck should have some examples of orders issued in behalf of or by McCallum which would verify my comments."

"I do sir and with your concurrence I would like to read in part several orders, which I have, which will substantiate your remarks."

"Please continue."

"The first on order approved by General Thomas when he commanded the Department of the Cumberland. It reads

"SENIOR AND SUPERVISING Q.M.'s OFFICE
Department of the Cumberland
Nashville, Tenn., February 20, 1864

GENERAL ORDER
No. 8

The plundering of cars and theft of property along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga, and Chattanooga and Knoxville railroads, though largely diminished, still continues. To correct these flagrant evil still further, and for the information and guidance of all concerned, it is therefore ordered:

I. All officers of the Quartermaster's Department along the line of these roads..... are directed to call on the commanding officers of the posts for ample details to guard all public property at their stations.....

II. Officers are forbidden to take forage, clothing, quartermaster's stores, or other property from cars which are not consigned to them.....

III. Post quartermasters are especially charged with the prompt unloading and loading of all cars arriving at their stations. They must keep constantly on hand,, a sufficient force to discharge and receive stores

IV. By special orders of Major General Grant, and of the Secretary of War, the general manager and local superintendents of railroads and conductors of trains must not be interfered with in the management of the roads,

V. No guards or any persons will be allowed in freight-cars without special permits from the Quartermaster's Department.....

VI. Route agents in charge of mail are prohibited from allowing any one to enter the room in which the mails are stored while in transit,

VII. Officers of the guard and conductors of the train are reminded that they are held individually responsible for all damage done and losses sustained by robbery and plundering on their respective trains

VIII. All officers, especially post commanders, on the line of the military railroads, who shall learn of thefts are requested to take instant steps to arrest offenders and send them in irons to Nashville,

XI. On return

By command of Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Thomas:

J.S. DONALDSON
Senior and Supervising Quartermaster D. of C. (67-N.P.)

The second order which I have is also one from the Military Division of the Mississippi. It is dated Nashville, Tenn., April 6, 1984 and it reads in part:

"GENERAL ORDER
No. 6

To enable the Military Railroads running from Nashville to supply more fully the armies in the field, the following regulations will hereafter be observed.

I. No citizen nor any private freight whatever will be transported by the Railroads, save as hereinafter provided.

II. Officers traveling under orders, or on leave of absence, sick or furloughed soldiers, departing from or returning to their Regiments will be transported Bodies of troops will not be transported by Railroad when it is possible for them to march

III. No citizen will be allowed to travel on the Railroads at all, except on the permit of the Commanding General.....

IV. Express Companies will be allowed one car per day each way, on each Military Road, to carry small parcels for soldiers and officers. One car per day more on each road for sutlers goods and officer's stores, may be allowed

V. Stores exclusively for officer's messes in very limited quantities, after due inspection....., will be passed free on the several roads,

VI. Horses, Cattle, or other live stock, will not be transported by Railroad, except on the written order.....

VII. Trains on their return trips, will be allowed to bring up private freight, when the shipment..... does not interfere with the full workings of the Roads,

VIII. Provost Marshals have nothing to do with transportation by Railroads.....

IX. When the Rolling Stock of the Railroads is increased,, increased facilities may be extended to passengers and private freight,

X. Until the Railroad is relieved, all Military Posts within thirty-five miles of Nashville and twenty miles of Stevenson, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, Huntsville, and Loudon, must haul their stores by wagons.

XI. The General Manager and his duly appointed agents and conductors, will control the trains,

XII. Until other arrangements are perfected, Commanding Officers, will furnish details for providing wood or water at such points as may be necessary to supply the trains.

By command of Major General W.T. Sherman.

R.M. SAWYER
Assistant Adjutant General (67-N.P.)

I have several other orders which are more recent but the contents are basically the same. General Grant's comments were definitely on target. McCallum did apply the principles first implemented by Haupt, but I also see McCallum as having added his own initiatives to further improve the operating efficiency of the Military Railroads. Haupt concerned himself with prevention of military interference, timely unloading of cars, proper scheduling of trains, and the establishment of a priority system for the use of the limited train assets at that time. The above orders clearly indicate that McCallum's organization continued to enforce these regulations but it also reflects the fact that he identified other aspects in

railroad operations which required regulation. His implementation of these additional requirements served to enhance the overall effectiveness of his organization."

"It would seem from this reporter's viewpoint that both Haupt and McCallum tended to compliment each other. Would you agree Mr. Secretary?"

"I would to some extent, but I think you need to recognize that each provided his own touch to that organization in his own special way."

"Sir, would you care to comment on any other initiatives implemented by McCallum."

"There is one which I as the Secretary of War felt to be a major consideration in our eventual defeat of the Confederate armies."

"Please continue sir, you certainly have my undivided attention."

"I'm referring to the fact that up to this time no one ever raised a question over the need for more locomotives and rolling stock to support my armies. While McCallum was busy straightening out the railway mess in the Military Division of the Mississippi, and forming a organization that would support that operation, and maintaining and repairing the railroads there, he was also busy investigating railroad capability."

"What did he determine in this investigation?"

"To be honest with you, I get mad every time I think about it. You would think that Mr. John Anderson, the one General Grant finally relieved, would have brought the problem of inadequate or insufficient equipment to

our attention. I would think too that the telegraph lines to my office would have been ringing with the problem. Such was not the case. It's hard to keep my composure over this matter.

Anyway, McCallum ascertained that our main army in Chattanooga was forced to rely on over two hundred and ninety-two miles of rail to supply its needs. You can imagine the quantity of supplies that were constantly on the rail system to support them. McCallum determined that the total available locomotive stock on the four lines which comprised this distance of rail were fifty. This was totally inadequate and to make matters worse only thirty-nine of them were in satisfactory condition to render their intended use. On top of that, he also learned that of the five hundred and thirty-seven freight cars on these lines only four hundred were in working order."

"Excuse me Mr. Secretary, but I'm having a difficult time relating to the problem as you see it. The number of locomotives and the quantity of rolling stock appear to me to be rather significant."

"I guess to a reporter it would but certainly not to a military commander if you didn't get your supplies when they were needed. Let me put it another way. Consider the fact that on the seventy miles of track between this city and Culpeper, Virginia there are sixty locomotives and eight hundred cars to handle the normal business of that line. This should give you a better impression for what is needed on a line four times its size with a heavy military demand placed upon it. Obviously with one half as much equipment as on this smaller line, it is a miracle that any supplies

were even reaching the army. It was truly a logistical nightmare for those involved in the management of the rail lines. Had someone identified this problem to me sooner, appropriate action could have been taken to order an adequate amount of locomotives and rolling stock."

"When did McCallum address this problem to your sir?"

"It was toward the middle of January 1864 while he was still involved in organizing the Transportation and Construction Divisions. He sent me a letter outlining the problem and estimated that it would take 200 locomotives and three thousand cars to rectify the problem."

"What was your reaction to this letter?"

"I was naturally upset and very much frustrated over the fact that such a large deficit existed. In the next two months, I had several occasions to discuss this problem with both McCallum and my Quartermaster, General Meigs. I finally concluded that we only had two courses of action that could be followed. The first being to direct all manufacturers of this equipment to turn over to the government all such items as were in the process of being built and to increase the production capability to expedite further demands of the military. The second course of action was to take possession of this equipment from other lines which had these assets."

"What did you decide to do sir?"

"Do you have my letter on that General Halleck?"

"Yes, sir. Here it is."

"I sent the following letter out to all manufacturers of locomotives and rolling stock. It reads:

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington City, March 23, 1864

GENTLEMEN: Colonel Daniel C. McCallum, general manager of Government railways in the Departments of the Cumberland, of the Ohio and of the Tennessee, has been authorized by this Department to procure locomotives without delay for the railways under his charge.

In order to meet the wants of the military departments of the Government, you will deliver to his order such engines as he may direct, whether building under orders for other parties, or otherwise the Government being accountable to you for the same.

The urgent necessity of the Government for the immediate supply of our armies operating in Tennessee renders the engines indispensable for the equipment of the lines of communication, and it is hoped that this necessity will be recognized by you as a military necessity, paramount to all other considerations.

By order of the President

EDWIN M. STANTON
Secretary of War (67-N.P.)

I should also state that the presidents of the northern railroad lines were likewise advised of this decision."

"I note in your previous comments and those you just read a slight variance. It appears that your letter to manufacturers only covered locomotives and did not address the needs for rolling stock such as freight cars. Is there some reason for that?"

"I would say that was an oversight on my part. The greatest need was locomotives so that is the reason for it being specifically addressed. As to the rolling stock, McCallum coordinated that matter when he dealt directly with the manufacturers."

"Mr. Secretary, how was this letter received by these manufacturers and the presidents of the railroads which were effected?"

"I would state without doubt that they were greatly concerned over this government action but I think there was a spirit of patriotism which prevented any outcries of anguish. It was not something that I really wanted to do, but it was the only quick fix I had to an immediate problem."

"Did you find it necessary to take possession of any equipment on other railroad lines? I believe you stated that this was also another option."

"Yes we did. McCallum secured some twenty-one locomotives and almost two hundred cars from three lines in Kentucky. The reason for this being the acute shortage of haul capability. Kentucky railroads were tasked for this support primarily due to the fact that their equipment was of the same gauge as that in Tennessee. Our government bought fifteen of these locomotives latter on and some sixty of the cars. The rest were returned to each respective railrod company."

"Sir, can you give me an indication of the extent of support you were able to achieve in these courses of action?"

"I can indeed. In fact, the spirit in which our manufacturers dealt with McCallum was much more responsive than I anticipated. By the end of 1864, these manufacturers had built and delivered one hundred and forty locomotives to the government representatives in Nashville. Likewise the

production of rolling stock was significant. As late as last month, a total of some two thousand five hundred and seven cars have been built and delivered to the Military Division of the Mississippi. The manner in which McCallum monitored and coordinated this mission essential equipment is remarkable. It truly deserves special recognition."

"Sir, would you comment on McCallum's initial assessment as to the magnitude of this need for equipment?"

"There is not much which can be said except to say that this equipment was always in constant use. That would suggest to me that his initial projections were rather accurate."

"If I could change direction for a moment gentlemen, I would very much like to explore McCallum's strategy in regard to the use of his organization. It seems to me that in order to render such valuable support, he must have had a strategy for the Military Railroads. Would anyone of you care to comment on this aspect of McCallum?"

"I think that both General Grant and I can contribute to that question."

"Mr. Secretary."

"If you think for a moment about how McCallum operated, it is rather obvious that he had two principle strategies. The first dealt with provisions for centralized support for critical servies and the second dealt with responsiveness to our field units. I'm sure that General Grant could comment on this letter aspect."

"I would be happy to discuss that aspect Mr. Secretary."

"Good, I will ask that you make your comments momentarily. First, I would like to point out that McCallum had a strategy in which he visualized centralized support type functions at major railroad terminals. I strongly believe that he intended his operations to converge upon these centers for supplies and manpower in the event that the railroads behind them were cut off by the Confederates. He also looked toward these centers as a focal point from where future operations could begin and where repairs of any kind could be accomplished."

"I think I've visited these centers while reporting on the War. To insure that I do not forget to mention each in my story, would you be so kind as to review them with me?"

"That is easy. I would suggest that these centers included Alexandria, Virginia and Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis and Knoxville all in Tennessee."

"Perhaps you could spend a few moments to discuss the importance that each of these centers played in McCallum's overall strategy."

"I can do that and no better place to start than with Alexandria, Virginia. This was the very first center of railroad activity for McCallum and the Military Railroads. This city was used as a major supply depot for this organization in the very beginning and it was retained for that purpose throughout the War. Whether you can believe it or not, it was a key factor in McCallum's strategy in Tennessee. I say this because the supply depot in Alexandria stocked the two most important railroad supplies

there: lumber and iron rails. Each was worth their weight in gold. The lumber shortage in the Division of the Mississippi created a need for a source of supply outside of Tennessee. Alexandria fit the bill for this due to its close proximity to rail lines leading into Tennessee. Lumber from this depot was shipped to other railroad centers for car repairs, railroad ties, bridging material and facility construction. McCallum recently told me that since 1862 his organization had constructed over 137,000 linear feet of bridges. A significant portion of this material was provided from our depot in Alexandria. Iron rails were of a similar supply shortage and the Military Railroads always maintained an adequate supply on hand there. The bulk of the iron rails shipped from here went to support operations in the Military Division of the Mississippi. Had these stockpiles of lumber and iron rail not been available, many of our major military operations would have been delayed pending the timely repair of our railroad lines as a result of Confederate action."

"I see what you mean about the importance that this supply depot played in supporting the operations in Tennessee. What support functions did McCallum establish in Tennessee?"

"He located his major support facilities in Nashville and Chattanooga. I would say that McCallum selected these two centers based upon the fact that the Quartermaster Department set up their commissaries and storehouses at these locales. His use of these centers were much different. It was his intention to develop large scale repair shops to handle the everyday maintenance anticipated with an increase in the locomotives and rolling stock which we previously discussed. In addition, he envisioned the

establishment of railroad supply points in which necessary material would be available to repair track, build bridges, construct support facilities and to rebuild engines and cars. The facilities at Nashville were the largest of the two and was capable of handling one hundred engines and more than one thousand cars at a time. During my one visit there, I was really impressed with the extent of facilities I saw. I remember seeing a series of machine shops; carpenter, tin, and copper shops; storehouses; blacksmith facilities; mess houses; administrative offices and even a hospital. I understand that approximately 20,000 cars were repaired, rebuilt, or refitted last year in this facility.

The Chattanooga railroad center had a repair shop capability but McCallum also set up some specialized operations at that location. He established five saw mills there as well as a stone quarry. Perhaps his greatest achievement there was the establishment of a rolling mill. In February 1864 he recommended to General Grant that his organization take over a rolling mill at that location that had been started by the Confederates. The basis for this being that the cost for rail had risen from \$40 a ton in July 1862 to almost \$130 by June of last year. McCallum felt that by rerolling the worn out rails, it would be more economical than purchasing new rails at a cost of two-thirds more."

"General Grant."

"Yes."

"Do you have any thoughts on the rolling mill proposed by McCallum?"

"I really am not in a position to discuss this proposal in depth at this time. The rolling mill has only been in operation for about a month

now and it is too early to comment on its success. I do know that McCallum initially stated that he could produce rail by rerolling it at a cost of \$50 per ton. Based upon that, I approved his initiative in this area. Mr. Secretary, do you have any information available on this?"

"I was just getting to that when Mr. Luvaas asked for your comments."

"Sir, I must apologize for the interruption."

"That is alright. I realize the fact that reporters have the tendency to seek out as much information as they can when covering a story. Getting back to the rolling mill, McCallum did underestimate the cost of completing it but that was due to the need to relocate it from its present site to a safer location. I have heard unofficially that the mill is doing well after being in operation for only a month. Rumor has it that the mill is currently producing rails at the cost of a little over \$35 per ton. That is almost fifteen dollars a ton less than projected. We may just save some money with this operation. Once things get back to normal we should be able to sell this mill and recover that which we put into it."

"Sir, what about the facilities at Memphis and Knoxville?"

"They were similar to Chattanooga and Nashville in regard to repair facilities and stockage of supplies such as railroad iron, bridge material and ties, but not at the same level. The point which needs to be made is that McCallum's strategy was to provide railroad centers which were capable of operating for extended periods should their lines be cut by the Confederates. The only exception to this was the Alexandria depot where

critically short materials were controlled and distributed. It was all a very sound plan. At this point, I'm sure that General Grant would find it appropriate to discuss McCallum's strategy of responsiveness to our field units."

"That I would sir and no better topic to discuss at this juncture of the interview. Before getting into his strategy, it is important to note the fact that the railroads in the Military Division of the Mississippi were prone to constant disruption by both Confederate units and local sympathizers. We must remember that our army was, for the most part, operating in hostile territory. To give you an appreciation of the extent of this problem, I've been told that as late as January of this year, the Military Railroads in Nashville had recovered, with their wrecking train, sixteen wrecked locomotives, some five hundred plus cars and almost three hundred carloads of bridge iron, car wheels, and other equipment destroyed the rebel raids.

With that background to help visualize the situation, McCallum developed a strategy of railroad responsiveness that was not only timely but effective. By this, I mean that he provided key railroad services involving operations, maintenance and repair of equipment, and related administrative services at his major railroad terminals. The Transportation Division had everything they needed to fulfill their missions in the geographical areas of Nashville, Chattanooga, Knoxville and Memphis. In fact they had sufficient stores and materials readily available in the event that their supply lines were cut by the Rebels. In a similar fashion, the Construction Division had their supplies of ballast, iron rail, bridge

material and ties stockpiled at these same locations. I should note also that these Construction Divisions were strategically located in these cities. Therefore, when an act of destruction was accomplished against the railroad line by the Confederates or their sympathizers, a force was readily available to handle the emergency. From these cities one or more of these Construction Divisions could radiate outwards from their supply base and work expeditiously toward each other to repair damaged railroad lines."

"Sir, if I may interrupt for one minute and ask a question."

"Yes, Mr. Luvaas, what is it?"

"I note in your comments you said Construction Divisions. Just how many were there?"

"In the Military Division of the Mississippi there at one time up to seven of these divisions. This is not to say that they always remained under the control of one military leader. They were self contained divisions capable of supporting any construction requirement that would be found on any railroad. For example, McCallum pulled one such division out of Nashville and sent it to North Carolina to assist General Sherman on his campaigns there. So you see there was a good deal of flexibility in this type of organizational structure.

I should point out too that not all these divisions were located in major terminal cities. You see, the Construction Division was such that it could be broken down in smaller elements with the same general capabili-

ties. McCallum had these detachments stationed at various points along railway lines to repair damaged track or bridges quickly. With these detachments, were stockpiled quantities of supplies. In this configuration, there was no section of track which could not be reached in a short period of time, and repaired quickly."

"Just how effective would you say that McCallum's strategy was?"

"It was completely effective if you ask me. The comment made previously about the duplicate tunnel could not reflect more the army's opinion of the Military Railroads. The efficiency and responsiveness of this organization was always depended on. Never did they fail us and more often than not they exceeded our expectations."

"Sir, I have one more question concerning strategy and I'm not sure whether or not this is applicable to McCallum and his organization but I feel compelled to ask it. My question involves the use of fortifications that one sees along most railroad lines. Were they the result of McCallum's efforts?"

"That would not be an easy question to answer. I think I would have to give you both a yes and a no response."

"Why is that sir?"

"Well, McCallum had an unofficial policy on fortifying critical railway points but whether or not that originally came from him or haupt would be difficult to ascertain. I note that his Construction Divisions built fortifications around many of the large bridges in my area of oper-

ations in the Military Division of the Mississippi. Detachments of military personnel, sometimes as many as one hundred men, would be located within these fortifications to protect the railroad line there. A small force in a well fortified position was capable of holding off a much larger force until reinforcements arrived. I know that on several occasions these facilities enabled our troops to prevent the destruction of key bridges by a numerically superior force.

I would point out though that many of the fortifications you would see these days along any railroad line were not constructed by the Construction Divisions. The troops along these lines, placed there to protect the railroads, as well as our engineer regiments built many of these fortifications. So your question would be most difficult to answer. I would not consider this part of McCallum's overall strategy based upon that which I have just said."

"Thank you for your comments. I think that the time allotted for this interview is almost over. As a final question on my part, I would hope that one of you could give me an overall appreciation for the magnitude of the operations involved in the Military Railroads up to this point in time."

"General Halleck, you can probably best do that as I know you have been recently discussing this with McCallum."

"I have Mr. Secretary. Now that the War is over, we need to reduce the size of our support services as many of our soldiers are discharged and headed home. McCallum is formulating his plans to reduce the size of the

Military Railroads through a reduction in his manpower and the return of railroads under his control to loyal civilian authorities. This will be a difficult task for him but as we work together on the staff to make these reductions, I have gained a much broader and indepth appreciation for what he has accomplished.

In my discussions with McCallum, I was immediately struck by the size of the workforce he has directed at any one given time. His records reflect the fact that there were at period of time 24,964 men employed under his supervision. This included members of his organization in Virginia, North Carolina, and the Military Division of the Mississippi. The latter alone had the largest workforce, exceeding 17,000 men strong. With this force, he directed transportation services and maintained railroad lines over a distance of 2,100 miles.⁽⁴²⁻¹⁷⁾ His Transportation Division operated some four hundred and nineteen locomotives pulling over 6,330 cars carrying troops, supplies and equipment to meet the army's needs. His Construction Divisions have built more than twenty-six miles of bridges and have laid or relaid some 641 miles of track, over a third of that which he had responsibility.⁽⁵¹⁻⁷⁷⁾ When you consider the magnitude of the figures I've just given you, one cannot be but impressed over the leadership which McCallum has provided."

"Sir."

"Yes."

"Do you have any idea what the total cost of the Military Railroads operations will be now that the War is over?"

"That will be difficult to say based upon the fact that McCallum is just now working on his plan to reduce the size of his organization. I've seen preliminary figures which would suggest that the cost will be around thirty million dollars. I must stress the fact though that these are preliminary figures which include the cost of doing business and expected revenues generated from transportation sources as well as the projected sales of railroad supplies and equipment."

"If I may interrupt."

"Yes, Mr. Secretary."

"I think you should realize that the anticipated cost from the Military Railroads operation is actually immaterial to me. Winning the War was what counted, not how much it cost. I would find it difficult to associate a cost of thirty million to maintaining a country united. If you feel compelled to use cost figures in your story, be so kind as not to associate them to McCallum. I say this because my initial instructions to him after his appointment were to the effect that.

I shall expect you to have on hand at all times the necessary men and material to enable you to comply with this order, and there must be no failure under any circumstances. (63-435)

McCallum in my mind fulfilled this verbal order beyond my expectations. The cost may seem high but what would the cost have been if his organization was not ready at all times to support the army. I shutter at the thought of it."

"Gentlemen, that just about concludes my questions but I would be more than happy to hear any thoughts which you might like to make at this time."

"I think that perhaps I have one which we somewhat touched upon."

"What is that General Grant?"

"I think that your story should probably address the accomplishments of both Haupt and McCallum from the viewpoint that this War was the first one in which the railroad played a significant role in the strategy of this country's military leaders. It was the first occasion that I am aware of where such large numbers of military units were moved great distances to determine the final outcome of a campaign. It was also the first time that a military commander depended on a railroad as his primary means of re-supply. Finally, the use of railroads were actually responsible for the development of technical improvements in bridging, the advancement of expedients to counter local guerilla activities, and the identification of rules and regulations that would improve railroad operations in time of war. I see both Haupt and McCallum as having given us much."

"Thank you General Grant. Do you have any final thoughts General Halleck?"

"That would be difficult to say being that this interview and the previous one only touched upon two men in the Military Railroads organization. I'm sure that we only skimmed the surface of their contributions. There are just so many things that could be said that I'm not sure where to

begin. I guess that I would like to make two final points. The first is that McCallum was one of the most competent man I've ever had the pleasure to work with and I found him to be quite versatile. I remember one time last year, I think it was in July, that the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad went on strike. This tied up critically needed shipments of coal for the Navy. McCallum's reaction to this was to send his own train crews from Alexandria to operate this road so that the Navy would be supplied. As a result of his actions, the railroad strike only lasted two weeks before operations were back to normal again. (1-75)

The second point I would like to make is that the men who worked for McCallum in the Military Railroads deserve special recognition for their contributions to the War effort. I say this because they normally worked in excess of sixteen hours each day, seven days a week. They were exposed to enemy fire on a frequent basis, spent days with little or no sleep, and frequently were cut off from their own lines of communications. They sacrificed much for their country and represented themselves and the Military Railroads with the highest tradition. Their recognition in your story would be most appropriate."

"I appreciate your views General and I'm sure that I will not forget the contributions of these men in my story."

"My final comment will be a short one."

"Mr. Secretary."

"In reviewing our discussions today and those of our first interview, I can only feel that perhaps we are missing an important ingredient in your story."

"What is that Mr. Secretary?"

"We have covered much about Haupt and McCallum as well as what they accomplished in the War. I think to make this story complete, one would need to incorporate a view of the military leader and the role that the railroads actually played in his strategy. Perhaps General Grant could help in this regard."

"I would be more than happy to assist Mr. Secretary. I'm sure that Mr. Luvaas and I can discuss some arrangements to meet at a later date for this purpose on our way out."

"Good idea. I guess that concludes the interview."

"Gentlemen, on behalf of my paper and myself, I thank you for your time. I will truly attempt to do justice to my story on the Military Railroads and its leaders. I am sure you will all be satisfied with the results."

A VISIT WITH GRANT

Here I am once more on another train. I've already made two trips in the past month from Baltimore to Washington on these darn contraptions. At least, this time, I'm on one headed in another direction. For the life of me, I still don't know why it is Richmond, Virginia. All I have to go on is that vague telegram which Nelson received from General Grant last week. The more I read it, the more my curiosity has me. Heck, maybe if I read it one more time.

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington City, May 8, 1965

EDITOR
BALTIMORE SUN

SIR: Have Luvaas meet me at railroad depot in Richmond, Virginia at 10:00 A.M., May 16, 1965.

I just don't understand this telegram. When I last saw General Grant, we were leaving the office of the Secretary of War together. At that time we spoke of meeting again to obtain his views on the strategy of a field commander who used the Military Railroads. He said that a message would be sent when next we would meet. This telegram establishes the date, time and location, but the real question is why there. I suppose I could let my mind cover all the possibilities but that would serve no purpose. I'll just wait and see what happens.

"Conductor."

"Yes, Sir."

"Would you be so kind to let me know when we arrive at Richmond? I think I'll afford myself the opportunity to rest my eyes for a bit."

"I will be happy to alert you sir on our arrival."

"Thank you."

Here I am in such a big hurry to get there and yet I still have a day to wait. Had Grant made this appointment for the afternoon, I would have left tomorrow morning instead of today. The paper wired ahead for my accommodations, so I should be taken care of until I see Grant at the railroad depot. That's a strange place to meet the General-in-Chief of our army.

"Sir!"

"Yes conductor, what is it?"

"Sir, you said that you would like to be awakened once we arrived at Richmond. We are entering the city limits now."

From the looks of this town, as we pass through it, there really appears to be quite a bit of devastation. I guess when Jeff Davis decided to evacuate the city, there was not much left for the Confederates to do but to destroy everything they had to leave behind. Our army would have done the same, had we been in a similar situation. Since I last passed through here, just after Lee's surrender, it would appear that much of the reconstruction effort has begun. The quicker this process, the faster will be the reunification we seek.

The train is stopping now. I had better gather up my things and get ready to get off. I need to find a carriage to take me over to the hotel where I will be staying.

Today's the date that this reporter will end his suspense as to why I'm here. I'll have one more cup of coffee and then I'll be off to the railroad depot. Supplies must be difficult to come by still. The hotel doesn't seem to have any sugar for my coffee. It is a rough way to start the day off but I guess I will make it. Rationing is still a difficult situation to have to endure. Hopefully, it won't last for long.

"Waiter."

"Sir."

"Please bring me my bill?"

"Right away sir."

"Also be so kind to ask the porter to arrange for a carriage for me. I will be leaving for the railroad depot in about ten minutes."

"Yes sir."

I didn't know whether I should plan to stay here again tonight or not. I checked out, so if I need accommodations, I may end up sleeping in the depot tonight. The hotel is booked solid. I wish that I knew what Grant was up to.

"Sir, the porter tells me that your carriage is ready. I took the liberty of asking the porter to carry your bags and place them in the carriage."

"Thank you very much. I appreciate your sincere help."

It is about a fifteen minute carriage ride to the railroad depot. My watch shows that it is now 9:40 A.M., so I should arrive there with a few minutes to spare. I really hate all this secrecy, especially when I'm the one who doesn't know what is going on.

"Sir, we are coming near the depot. Where would you like your bags placed?"

"I would appreciate it if you would place them in the telegraph office for me. Oh driver!"

"Yes sir."

"What time do you have?"

"It is about five minutes before the hour sir."

"Thank you."

I have better go into the telegraph office and check to see if I have any messages. There is always that possibility.

"Excuse me sir, are you the operator on duty?"

"I am sir."

"Would you please be so kind as to check and see if you have any messages for me. The name is Mr. Jay Luvaas. I'm a reporter for the Baltimore Sun."

"I do not even have to look sir."

"What do you mean?"

"I mean that I know you have a message. It just came in over the wire about one hour or so ago. I remembered it because it is not everyday that one takes down a message from General Ulysses S. Grant."

"May I have the message sir?"

"Here it is."

According to this message, Grant indicated that he would be arriving at Richmond on an unannounced special train from Petersburg. He says that he will be here at ten o'clock in the morning.

"Operator."

"Yes."

"Could you please give me the time?"

"It is ten o'clock sir."

"Thank you. Is that a train whistle that I hear in the distance?"

"It is. Must be that unannounced special train referred to in your message. The regularly scheduled train from Petersburg will not be here for another hour."

"I guess I had better go outside then and wait on the platform."

It is still a little chilly but I think we are in for good day. Here is the train now. That's interesting. A locomotive, one passenger car, and a caboose. The plot thickens, but I should find out what this is all about.

"Conductor."

"Yes."

"Can you tell me whether or not I might find General Grant on this train?"

"Are you Mr. Jay Luvaas?"

"I am."

"Then I would ask that you follow me on to the train sir. Is that your baggage there?"

"It is."

"Please proceed into the passenger car and I will take care of your baggage."

"Is General Grant aboard?"

"Please go right in sir."

"The only way I am ever going to find out anything is to locate Grant. He had better be in that car."

"Is that you Jay?"

"General Grant?"

"In the person. I hope you were not inconvenienced in meeting me here. I had a very special reason. I think you'll be quite surprised too. There is someone in the next room of this car which I would like you to talk to."

"Who would that be sir?"

"Please let me have a few minutes to keep you in suspense. When we last saw each other in Secretary Stanton's office, I agreed to see you again to talk about the Military Railroads and the part that organization played in my overall strategy. The more I thought about it, the more I decided that there was someone much more qualified to talk about that than I. As this individual was planning a short stop in Washington before assuming his new post, I thought I could arrange a meeting between you and him. That is why you are here today. You can conduct the interview while we head toward Washington."

"General, my curiosity will not take much more. Who is it?"

"I will take you in to meet him now. I will only say that you are very familiar to him and he is one of the best generals that the Union army ever had. He is a brilliant tactical commander whose strategy is equalled to none. I see a smile beginning to appear Jay. Could it be that you know whom I'm referring to?"

"I think I do."

"This way please, we'll see if you are correct..... Here we are Mr. Luvaas, I would like you to greet an acquaintance of yours, General William Teamsch Sherman."

"Mr. Luvaas, it is a great to see you again. It's been about two months since we have last spoken. I can't tell you how happy I was when General Grant asked me to talk to you about the Military Railroads. I understand you are doing a story on them. General Grant says that he has already participated in two interviews with you, in which both Haupt and McCallum were discussed. Both are fine railroad men and officers."

"It is a great pleasure for me to see you again General Sherman. We have covered much ground all over the South. You with your military campaigns and I with my stories following many of your successes. To be honest with you, I did not expect to see you so soon again. I am glad that we will have this opportunity because I know your comments will add to the dimension of my story on the Military Railroads that I might otherwise not have obtained. Before getting into that, I must ask about all this secrecy."

"I'm afraid that I am at fault on that."

"General Grant."

"I was concerned over the fact that General Sherman does not seem to have any privacy these days. Everywhere he goes, there are reporters. I don't mean to sound derogatory in this comment as they are all doing their jobs. They want a story and tend to follow him wherever he goes. I therefore suggested that he take leave for a few weeks of quiet time. He needs to do this prior to moving his headquarters."

"Moving his headquarters?"

Yes, General Sherman will be relocating his headquarters for the Military Division of the Mississippi to St. Louis, Missouri. Of course that is confidential information which we do not expect to see in print prior to the first of next month."

"I appreciate your interest in General Sherman's welfare. Reporters have a tough job too but we do tend to limit our perspective on others feelings. You have my word that I will not disclose the whereabouts of General Sherman or the fact that he is moving his headquarters. That is, until the first of June. After all, I deserve a news breaking story once in a while..... That isn't why we are here though and if possible, I would like to get down to my story. My deadline with the editor is fast approaching."

"In that case, I will ask you both to be seated and we can get started."

"Thank you General Grant."

"General Sherman."

"Yes."

"As General Grant has already informed you, I am doing my story on the Military Railroads and its leaders. To make my story complete, I need the view of the railroads from the perspective of the tactical commander. As the Commanding General of the Military Division of the Mississippi, following General Grant's selection as General-in-Chief, your thoughts would be particularly valuable to me in this story, That is not to infer that you are off the hook General Grant. I still expect to hear of your wisdom in how you used the railroads."

"That you will sir. I hope though that we can concentrate on General Sherman's Atlantic campaign. His use of the railroads in that campaign was brilliant.

"Sir, I intend to address that aspect in considerable detail. Before doing that, I feel that it would be beneficial to solicit some additional background information which I failed to explore at our last interview."

"What specifically are you referring to Jay?"

"Well sir, I would really like your views on the importance you placed on the railroad terminal facilities at Nashville in regard to your strategy. I know we touched upon this at our last meeting but I think you intended these facilities to be an integral part of future campaigns. Is that not correct General Grant?"

"I would say that your assessment is right on the mark. Long before I assumed the duties as General in Chief, I realized the importance of not allowing the Confederate forces to mass against us from various points in the South in any military campaign we might undertake. There are many reasons for this rationale but that is not appropriate discussion for the story which you are working on now. Rather it should be sufficient to say that I felt it important for the Union army to be able to pressure the Confederacy at different geographical locations, if we were to be successful. By concentrating large standing forces at different strategic locations, I could force the Confederate forces to divide their strength to counter separate threats. I might add, that they did just that.

I saw the Military Division of the Mississippi as one of these standing forces in this strategy. I also realized that to accomplish this grand plan, an enormous strain would be placed upon the logistical support system for the Union army. Fortunately for me, I recognized the new role of railroads in this War and the contribution that they could make. As Nashville was a central railroad terminus, its importance was obvious. From Nashville, military operations directed toward the Confederacy could be supported either partially or totally by our Military Railroads."

"Is that the reason why the Military Railroads under McCallum set up their principle operations out of Nashville?"

"I would say that the Military Railroads established themselves in Nashville due to the fact that the Quartermaster Department used this city as a major supply depot for our military division. It would also be accurate to say that the Military Railroad organization maintained a policy of establishing itself as close to the front lines as was possible. In this respect, they could project responsive and timely support as needed. If the railroads were not maintained at peak efficiency, logistical support to our field units would be less than adequate."

"Why is that sir?"

"Well, without operational railroads, our army would be totally dependent on its wagons to carry subsistence, forage, ordnance, and ammunitions. Our limited lift capability in this regard, significantly reduced our flow of these supplies and resulted in a slow down of our military operations. With our railroads operational, our units were re-

supplied in greater quantities and with much less wear and tear on our wagons and animals which pulled them."

"Is there anything about the Nashville operations or the Military Railroads there which you think appropriate for my story?"

"I know you are very interested in hearing from General Sherman but there are several factors which I would like to discuss."

"Please continue General Grant."

"I think that you should realize the fact that Nashville was the first of many bases for logistical and railroad support that were envisioned in our strategy. As additional territory was liberated from the Confederates, new supply bases and railroad support operations were established. Such was the case with Chattanooga and the similar role that city played in the Atlanta Campaign.


The second point I would like to make is the extent of work which the Military Railroads performed prior to General Sherman's campaign. Your story should certainly address the fact that McCallum and his organization were responsible for a significant amount of trackage in this geographical area."

"Could you be a little more specific on the magnitude of responsibility that the Military Railroads had in this area?"

"I think I can but let me see if I might possibly have a map on this train which I can use to visually demonstrate exactly what I mean..... I

guess that this small map which I have will give you some idea of what I'm referring to. As you can see, there are numerous lines which converge on Nashville. When McCallum took charge of the Military Railroads in this military division, railroad operations were in a state of turmoil. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, as shown on this map, was the main line for logistical support to Chattanooga and eventually or to Atlanta. If my memory serves me right, the length of this line was about 151 miles. The Military Railroads spent over a year from February 1864 to repair over 115 miles of this track with new iron, cross-ties and ballast. They also erected new water tanks as well as sidings at intervals of eight miles. Had the Military Railroads not undertaken this tremendous effort, the demand for transportation would have caused the eventual deterioration of the line to the point of being totally useless. This would have subsequently caused significant delays in supplying General Sherman in Chattanooga and later in Georgia.

A further review of this map will enable you to identify another major railroad line which supplied Chattanooga. This was the Nashville, Decatur and Stevenson line which covered some 200 miles. Actually, this line was comprised of a portion of a Central Alabama Railroad and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which were under Union control. Although longer than the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, this line was used extensively until June 1864, while the latter was being repaired by the Military Railroads. In actuality, this line was used for return trains from Chattanooga so that the Nashville and Chattanooga line could concentrate exclusively on resupply. For the Military Railroads, this 200 miles of rail-



road posed equally challenging problems in operation and maintenance. This line was particularly vulnerable to enemy activity and on occasion was damaged by Wheeler, Forrest and Hood in their raids behind our lines. To give you an idea of the work performed by the Military Railroads, in Hood's campaign against Nashville in December 1864, all railroad bridges were destroyed between Nashville and Decatur. The Military Railroads undertake their repair and within two months this road was in operation once again. The fact that the Construction Division was located in Nashville, lumber could be obtained from their saw mills and stockage of bridge parts had been previously placed along this line, assisted immeasurably in the efficient and timely repair of this line."

"Sir, I would also like to make a comment about the Nashville, Decatur and Stevenson line if I may."

"Please do General Sherman."

"The one point I would like to make is in regard to the comment made by General Grant concerning the flow of traffic on the lines supplying Chattanooga. I recall writing a note to one of my officers about this and if you will bear with me, I would like to read it to you."

"Take your time General Sherman..... If you are wondering Jay why General Sherman has all these files, its because he intends to write his memoirs about the War and has gathered up all that he could find concerning his orders, letters, and private correspondence on the Rebellion."

"That is true General Grant but for a very good reason."

"Why is that if I may ask."

"Well, Mr. Luvaas, I have oftentimes been portrayed as a mad man, terrorist, ruthless leader, and inhuman soldier. I think that these perceptions are directly related to my actions to help win this War. Perhaps if I tell my story from my perspective, others will understand why I acted as I did. Don't misunderstand what I'm saying. My goal as a soldier was to preserve the Union and in my eyes anything which I did to further that cause was justifiable. At any rate, my notes, orders, and letters will help to clarify why I did things as I did..... here is that letter I was looking for. I should like to read it in part.

STEVENSON, March 28, 1864 - 3 a.m.

Major K.M. Sawyer:

I have your dispatch. Your orders to General Brayman and Veatch all right. Write a note to superintendent of railroad in Nashville that I have been over all the road and am of the opinion that all loaded trains should make a continuous circuit from Nashville by way of Decatur to Stevenson, and back to Nashville over the old road with empty cars.....

W.T. SHERMAN
Major General (23-18)

I think that the point I am trying to make here is that I was personally concerned over the condition of the railroad lines which supported me and so I inspected them myself. Being that the Nashville and Chattanooga line was under repair, I felt that my proposal to use the Nashville, Decatur, and Stevenson line to be sound, especially in return of the empty

cars to Nashville. While my proposal was not acted on in full by the Military Railroads because they could still use the Nashville and Chattanooga line, they did accept my proposal to send empty cars over the longer return route to avoid heavy taxing of the main line."

"Thank you for your comment General Sherman."

"Your welcome Mr. Luvaas."

"Is there anything else which you would care to offer at this point General Grant?"

"I think not Jay. I know that you are very interested in the views of General Sherman and how he used the Military Railroads so I won't delay this interview any longer. I just felt that I needed to address the strategy of that time and explain how the railroads and the organization of Military Railroads fit into the overall scheme of things."

"Your comments are much appreciated sir and will add to my story..... If I may now, I would like to address a few specific questions to General Sherman."

"Please do. I will offer additional thoughts as the occasion should arise."

"My first question for you General Sherman pertains to your command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Could you please tell me exactly when you assumed these duties? This will help me to relate your comments with those of General Grant."

"I assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi on March 18, 1864. I must admit that it did come as a surprise to me being

that I was not the senior commander of the four departments within the division."

"By departments, are you referring to the Military Departments of the Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, and Arkansas?"

"I am Mr. Luvaas."

"May I add something on this?"

"General Grant."

"The selection of General Sherman as my replacement as the Commander, Military Division of the Mississippi was based upon his demonstrated leadership, tactical competency, and generalship. We needed a bold, aggressive leader in this position who was not afraid to take risks. General Sherman was the only logical choice based upon our needs regardless of seniority."

"From strictly a reporters viewpoint, the choice of General Sherman for this assignment was indeed the correct one..... The next question I have can really be answered by either of you gentlemen. It involves a long standing rumor about a secret meeting that the two of you had sometime prior to the Atlanta campaign. Would either of you care to comment on that?"

"I suppose that General Sherman and I can now address that rumor. First let me say that it is true that we met secretly in March 1864 just prior to assuming the positions which we currently hold. Our meeting occurred at the Eurnet Hotel in Cincinnati and lasted for two days. The purpose of this meeting was to advise General Sherman of my strategy to end

this War and to coordinate our actions to achieve maximum effort; preventing the Confederates the freedom to shift their forces. My strategy essentially called for General Sherman to throw the forces of his division against General Joe Johnston while I took charge of those forces against Lee. By striking at the same time, neither force could come to the aid of the other and their defeat would be realized."(49-20)

"Sir, how often did you meet secretly thereafter to coordinate your plans?"

"That is funny you should ask that question. Since that two day session in Cincinnati, General Sherman and I have not met since yesterday. I think we both appreciated what needed to be done and we both understood the strategy that was to be applied."

"Would you care to add anything to that which General Grant has given me?"

"Well Mr. Luvaas, I would suggest that both General Grant and I fully understood what was expected from each other and we know our own strengths and weaknesses. I do not want you to think that we did not coordinate at all though because that was not the case. Our coordination; however, was limited to the telegraph. That is how we simultaneously commenced our military operations and that is how we kept each other posted on our progress."

"Sir, could you please expand your comments concerning strengths and weaknesses by addressing which category you would place the railroads in?"

"That would be difficult to do as I think that our railroads, within the Military Division of the Mississippi, could easily fall in both of these categories. I say this for several reasons. First, our division was dependent on a 473 mile single track line from Louisville to Atlanta. The ease in which a disruption could impede our logistical flow made it extremely vulnerable. Another factor involved the territory in which these railroad lines were located. Almost half of this line was located in areas where sympathy toward the South was prevalent. On the more positive side, I saw major strengths in our railroads. The dominant strength was the potential capability of the Military Railroads organization. Their extremely able leadership, capability of assuming control over private railroad operations, technical capability, and ability to improve operational efficiency have made the Military Railroads an immeasurable asset to the Union army and my division. Finally, I saw in this organization a strength which involves experience."

"Would you please expand on that last comment sir?"

"I would be happy to Mr. Luvaas. What I am referring to is the fact that the Military Railroads gained much experience from railroad operations in other military departments and brought the knowledge of lessons learned from them to my division. As a result, the effectiveness of the Military Railroads was much more beneficial in the Mississippi Division as we did not need to learn through trial, error, or experimentations."

"It would seem that perhaps you are referring to the work of both Haupt and McCallum during the Military Railroads initial support to the Department of the Rappahannock and the Army of the Potomac."

"I am sir. In fact most of that which was developed and implemented by these two men became a matter of policy in the Military Division of the Mississippi. I am most indebted though to the superb leadership of McCallum and the myraid of operational improvements he was personally responsible for."

"If I might note General Sherman, in the last interview we held with Mr. Luvaas, we discussed in depth the contributions of McCallum. I think Jay would like to limit this interview to your use of the railroads and how it functioned under your command."

"That is correct General Grant..... Perhaps I could ask General Sherman to assess the contribution of the Military Railroads in preparing his command for the Atlanta campaign. Sir, could you comment on that?"

"From what General Grant has already indicated to me before your arrival, I think you are already aware of the efforts taken by McCallum to prepare the Military Division of the Mississippi for the Atlanta campaign. My involvement, at least initially, was in inspect my entire command to assess it's overall condition. General Grant had already focused on the problems within this division and I continued to pursue his efforts in many respects. We were both naturally concerned about our logistical support and the railroads were a key to that. The inspection I made of the Division only served to reinforce my transportation and supply needs. The one aspect of this whole situation was that many of the key players in both the Military Railroads, Quartermaster and Commissary Departments did not work directly for me but rather reported directly to Washington. More often

than I would like to remember, I ended up performing these staff functions locally. I do not want to leave the impression that I received no cooperation because that was not the case. Rather I would suggest that the responsiveness would have been more timely, if I did not have to wait for approval from Washington."

"To be honest with you General Sherman, as a reporter, that relationship was not obvious. You always seemed to be in charge."

"I am glad it appeared that way and I suppose I was. It was just the idea of the type of relationship that bothered me."

"Sir, could you discuss the importance of Chattanooga as a railroad center and the importance it played in your campaign."

"That will be easy. General Grant has already pointed out the vital role that Nashville played so I need not go into that any further. I will say though, that I looked at Nashville as my main base of supply and at Chattanooga initially as my advance base for supplies. As such the Military Railroads was charged to provide the transportation services necessary to accumulate two months of supplies at Nashville. Working under adverse conditions of manpower and equipment shortages and a vastly deteriorated single track line, they accomplished this mission prior to my Atlanta campaign. At Chattanooga, the mission of the Military Railroads was similar. They faced the same problems and were tasked to move a one months supply of subsistence, forage, ordnance and ammunition to that local prior to my campaign. With a three months stockage of supplies, I was more confident that I could sustain my army in the field in the event my long

logistical supply line was disrupted for any great period of time. As my Division moved forward, Nashville and Chattanooga both became main supply bases and I established other advance supply bases."

"Were these advance bases along railroad lines?"

"They were and if you reflect back on my campaign, you will see that my strategy involved using the Western and Atlantic Railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta for all my supplies. In fact my campaign against Johnston followed this line all the way to Atlanta."

"I would like to explore that further in a moment sir. Before doing that, I would like you to review the Military Railroads organization in Chattanooga. Was it similar to the organizational set-up faced in Nashville?"

"I would say that both locations were almost identical. McCallum established like support at each of these locations. In specific, Chattanooga had equipment repair facilities, several saw mills, a supply point for stocks of iron, ties, and standard bridge parts and sufficient manpower to provide transportation services and maintenance and repair of all railroad lines emerging on that city. McCallum also set up a rolling mill there which allowed us to re-roll old rails for subsequent use as needed."

"Can you give me an idea of the magnitude of support that you required from the Military Railroads as you began your campaign?"

"I certainly can. That was on my mind all the time. As a matter of fact, I was writing my memoirs and included some comments which you can quote if you would like..... Let me see what I have written. It should be

here somewhere..... Ah, here it is. The particular paragraph I would like to quote reads in part:

"That single stem of railroad 473 miles long, supplied on army of 100,000 men and 35,000 animals for the period of 196 days, viz; from May 1 to Nov. 12, 1864. To have delivered regularly that amount of forage and food by ordinary wagons would have required 36,000 wagons, of 6 mules each, allowing each wagon to have hauled two ton 20 miles a day, a simple impossibility in roads such as existed in that region of the country."⁽⁵¹²⁸⁹⁾

What I was saying in this passage is that our Military Railroads would face the supreme test of logistically supporting one of the largest armies of its time. Our railroads in fact were the only mechanism available to meet this demand as our wagons were incapable of supporting this requirement."

"Sir, what exactly were your expectations of the Military Railroads in regard to supplying your force?"

"Are you referring to the quantity of supplies I needed to sustain my Army in the field?"

"Yes, I am sir."

"I believe that my initial calculations at that time was that I need 130-160 cars daily in order to support the Atlanta Campaign. That would equate to a daily demand of between 1300-1600 tons of supplies each day. This of course included food, clothing, equipment, forage, ordnance, and ammunition. Unfortunately, the capacity of the single line which supported us was well below that capacity. This was due in part because of poor management practices and an inadequate amount of locomotives and cars. The other major factors included military interference, civilian utilization, and raids by Confederates and their sympathizers."

"How did you solve these problems?"

"In regard to the poor management practices and inadequate railroad equipment, I placed these matters in McCallum's capable hand and as you are no doubtedly aware, he did not fail me. If you would like, I can go into the specific measures which I became personally involved in to resolve the remaining issues."

"Please continue General Sherman."

"I guess my first action was taken shortly after inspection of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Realizing the role that the railroads would play in my pending campaign, I needed to institute a policy to regulate usage of the railroads which were to supply me. My primary concern was that supplies were not being shipped to needed points because of inappropriate military regulation or priority consideration being given to private enterprise or civilians. While I could not quantify the magnitude of this problem, it was obvious that significant amounts of military supplies were delayed in shipment at the expense of private freight or unnecessary passenger requirements. Take for example the space and weight that a passenger would occupy at the expense of an equivalent amount of military freight. Multiply that amount by the number of passengers who used the railroads and we see an enormous amount of military supplies that could have been transported but instead remained idle. I therefore published an order on April 6, 1864 which regulated what the railroads could transport. This was General Order 6 from my headquarters."

"Sir, I do not mean to interrupt but is that the order which prohibited transportation of military or civilian passengers except by permit."

"It is Mr. Luvaas."

"I also believe it included provisions limiting freight by private concerns as well as what stores and livestock could or could not be transported. Is that correct sir?"

"It is indeed. I would say that you have certainly been doing your homework on this subject Mr. Luvaas."

"I wish I could say that this was the case General Sherman. Rather, I must admit that we touched upon this particular aspect during my last interview with Secretary Stanton and General Grant. It would appear though that this order served its purpose."

"I would say it did but that is not to infer that it did not pose significant problems for me in having to tell civilians, politicians, and even officials in our Government no to their requests for exceptions."

"Did you ever grant any exceptions?"

"There were occasions but they were far and few between. The most memorable one I can think of involves Mother Mary Ann Binkerdyke. She was a middle aged widow who attached herself to my Army as a nurse. I have never met a more spirited woman in my lifetime. She was always after me to use the railroads to carry medical supplies. I guess I gave her a

rather hard time in granting her request but I did not want to leave the impression that everyone could be granted an exception. In her case, I remember her barging into my headquarters with fire in her eyes, demanding rail transportation for her medical supplies. There was a heated exchange of words and I finally consented to her request but I needed to leave the appropriate impression on the difficulty in acquiring such an exception."(48-18)

"I can understand your approach on that regard sir. You also mentioned raids by the Confederates and their sympathizers on your railroads. How did you handle this problem?"

"I could address that issue now but I think it would be more appropriate for later on in this interview."

"Very well, perhaps we could then focus our attention on your actual campaign to Atlanta. To start with, could you tell me exactly when this campaign commenced, what your strategy was, and how the Military Railroads fit into your scheme of operations?"

"That is a rather tall order but I will try and answer each question as best I can. To begin with, the Atlanta campaign actually started on May 4, 1864 from Chatanooga. My strategy for this campaign was based upon the two objectives which I felt were given to me by General Grant in our March meeting. The first objective I saw for my army was the eventual defeat of General Johnston's Confederate Army of Tennessee. By constantly placing pressure on his army and engaging him when it was to my advantage, I was confident I could wear his forces down while at the same time preventing these forces from linking up with General Lee's forces in Virginia. This


would enable General Grant to marshall his forces against General Lee without worry of Lee being reinforced. The second objective I saw for my military division was the capture of Atlanta. A successful campaign in this regard would split the South in two, and eventually lead to the conclusion of the War. To accomplish both objectives, I planned to use three military departments under my control. These included the Departments of Tennessee, Ohio, and Cumberland."

"I understand now sir what your objectives were but what exactly was your strategy to accomplish this?"

"To be honest with you Mr. Luvaas, my strategy was largely determined by General Johnston and the pressure that I exerted on his forces."

"I'm afraid that I don't follow what you are saying. Could you be more specific?"

"I can but I will ask that you look at the map I have which outlines the direction of the battles that we fought with General Johnston. A close look will reveal that General Johnston consistently withdraw his forces, from the pressure I exerted, along the railroad from the Georgia Sate Line all the way back to Atlanta. He was obviously dependent on Western and Atlantic railroad for his supplies and reinforcements. had Johnston not been so dependent upon this railroad line, then perhaps both his and my strategy would have been different. My strategy simply put, involved maintaining pressure on his forces, at all times, while attempting to maneuver behind him with a portion of my force to cut off his resupply by rail. As the rail behind him became threatened, he was forced to withdraw



or have his supply lines cut. By repeatedly undertaking such a strategy, I could choose the ground on which to fight and on more than one engagement could determine the degree of contact that I was willing to accept."

"Sir, if I may interrupt for one moment. Why do you think that General Johnston chose to withdraw specifically toward Atlanta instead of other areas in the South where perhaps he could also be resupplied?"

"I would think that there are two specific reasons for this. First, resupply was the least difficult from Atlanta as the Western and Atlantic Railroad was the one railroad line in any condition to meet this resupply requirement. Secondly, I think that General Johnston recognized that our objective was Atlanta. It's capture would certainly have a demoralizing impact on the South and its cause."

"Your strategy of out maneuvering Johnston was obviously a well thought out plan but could you expand your comments about choosing the ground on which to fight and the degree of contact that you accepted?"

"I can. Essentially what I am referring to is that everytime that Johnston withdraw, he usually fell back to a point where he had time to prepare effective defensive positions. Attempting to overwhelm these positions would have been extremely costly in the loss of forces. By getting in his rear, these defensive positions were not effective and he would be forced to withdraw. It was during these withdrawals that I could select the terrain that was most advantageous to my forces in which to engage him."

"If we can move along now to the importance of the Military Railroads in your campaign. Could you address how they fit into your scheme of operations?"

"I needed the Military Railroad organization to provide me with a capability to operate and maintain my resupply lines for my division. General Johnston's withdrawal along the Western and Atlantic Railroad provided me with a means of resupply that was critical to my military operations over an extended front. Had I not been able to use the railroads to resupply, equip and reinforce my units in a timely manner, the outcome of the War might have been different or at best prolonged. I've already given you an idea of the magnitude of my resupply needs and the inability of our wagon trains to meet this need."

"What exactly did the Military Railroads provide you?"

"To answer that I think you must put things in a perspective of what their mission was initially as compared to what it was as the campaign continued. As General Johnston withdrew along the Western and Atlantic Railroad, he took every advantage he could to destroy the rails, bridges and facilities of that line. He was well aware that my resupply was dependent on this line and by destroying it, he not only slowed my movements but also reduced my resupply. I therefore looked toward the Military Railroads organization to repair the Western and Atlantic Railroad as we progressed with our campaign toward Atlanta. I can only say that the Military Railroad organization within my division consistently exceeded my expectations. In fact they were so proficient in repairing damaged sections

of the Western and Atlantic Railroad that I never doubted for one moment that my supply lines would ever be out for more than a few days at any given time. If I think about it, there was seldom a day in this campaign when the work of the Military Railroads did not keep pace with our military operations. Before an engagement with Johnston was finished, we could hear the whistles of our locomotives directly to the rear of our army. It was indeed a comfortable feeling to have."

"I would think so sir. Maybe you could give me a few examples of exactly what you mean?"

"Well, if my recollection serves me right the Military Railroads constructed some eleven major bridges on the Western and Atlantic Railroad that had been destroyed by General Johnston's units. The largest of these were the one over the Chattanooga River which took four and one half days to build. I believe that bridge was 780 feet in length and over 90 feet in height. It actually took two of my construction divisions in the Military Railroads organization to build it."(46-200)

"It seems that you have an excellent memory for that construction effort. Is there a reason for that?"

"There is. The reason for my remembering such detail over this bridge's reconstruction is that it was the last obstacle to my supply line running from Chattanooga all the way to the outskirts of Atlanta."

"Do you have any other examples?"

"In fact, I have several. The first involves one occasion while my forces were in Resaca. The Confederates had torched a railroad bridge there and I instructed the Chief Engineer of the Military Railroads, Mr. William W. Wright to reconstruct the bridge in 48 hours. His reply was that it would take some 96 hours to construct."

"What was your response to that sir?"

"Well, I believe I said something to the effect 'Sir, I will give you 48 hours or a position in the front ranks.'⁽⁴⁶⁻²⁰¹⁾ I said it more to urge him on than anything else."

"Did it work?"

"I would think to some degree it did. He put almost 2,000 men to work on it but the work did not get completed until 72 hours later. Wright excused himself for the delay by stating that the hot irons in the destroyed bridge could not be removed right away because of the heat from the burning. Naturally, I accepted his excuse as the delay was acceptable to my timetable. On another occasion, the Military Railroads had to construct a 600 foot bridge over the Etowah River near Kingston. That effort took five and one half days to complete. The important point is that the Military Railroads were so proficient, little time delays were realized, in resupplying my forces via the railroad. In fact, the Military Railroads had fully equipped construction trains kept ready at Chattanooga and selected forward points to move up the line and make repairs when necessary.⁽⁴⁶⁻²⁰³⁾ Besides bridge repair, the Military Railroads also relaid about 75 miles of track out of the 136 miles of the Western and Atlantic

Railroad between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The rest of the line was repaired at one time or another during my campaign..(67-N.P.)

"What else did the Military Railroads organization do to improve rail transportation operations or to ensure continuous railroad support for your logistical needs?"

"I would suggest that perhaps their greatest initiative in this regard was to station what they referred to as railway detachments of the construction division along the Western and Atlantic Railroad at various key locations. These detachments were primarily composed of bridge builders and track layers who responded to unsafe conditions on the line or damaged caused by the Confederates and/or their sympathizers. The Military Railroads also stockpiled iron rails, spikes, and timber for ties and bridge parts at depots along this line to expedite repair should the need arise. Such organizational planning and execution resulted in responsive support and extremely limited interruption to my resupply needs via the railroad. I can only reiterate the comfortable and confident feeling I had about this organization."

"Sir, could you give me some idea of the responsiveness of this organization to damages resulting from Confederate raids? I understand that General Hood was particularly effective in getting into the rear of lines and doing some devastating work against the railroad lines that supported your forces."

"I would say that General Hood was somewhat effective in destroying my supply lines but this was quickly offset by the excellent support of the

Military Railroads. I remember that Hood attacked the Western and Atlantic Railroad on two occasions doing substantial damage each time. He destroyed eight miles of railroad between Allatoona and Big Shanty and some thirty five miles of track north of Resaca. If you look at this map I have showing the movement of my forces in this campaign, you will be able to appreciate the locations of these strategic points in regard to Atlanta. The later destruction was at the beginning of the Western and Atlantic Railroad, just south of Chattanooga. The former was on the same line just north of Atlanta. In the case of the damage to the section of line between Allatoona and Big Shanty, the Military Railroads replaced some six miles of track to include 35,000 new ties. The work was completed in a week. Likewise, the Military Railroads organization was working on the repair of the thirty five miles of destroyed track north of Resaca before hood left the railroad at the opposite end. In this case the work took thirteen days to complete..(46-203)

"How then were you able to supply your Army while this line was done?"

"As I noted earlier in this interview, we established advance supply depots along the line which stocked our front lines as the need arised. I believe that I have several orders with me which establish my strategy of using advance bases. If I could read in part the following orders:

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Special Field Orders
No. 7

In the Field, Resaca, May 15, 1864

I. Dalton is announced as the present depot of supplies, but the railroad superintendent may bring forward trains of cars with ammunition or special articles up to the rear of the army.....

II. Commanders of armies will aim to keep on hand ten days' supply of meat and bread, and as much forage as they can.....

By order of Major General W.T. Sherman.

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-Camp (66-243)

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Special Field Orders
No. 11

In the Field, Kingston, Ga, May 22, 1864

I. General McPherson will..... Resaca will be held strong, and will be the depot of supplies until further notice. Such stores and provisions will be kept forward at Kingston and Rome as can be moved by wagons.....

II. The several armies.....

III. Marietta is the objective point,

IV.

V.

By order of the Major General W.T. Sherman.

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-Camp (66-247)

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE
MISSISSIPPI

In the Field on Little Allatoona Creek, June 4, 1864

Special Field Orders
No. 18

I. Tomorrow.....

II. Major General Thomas will.....

III. Major General Schofield will.....

IV. Allatoona will be the point of supply as soon as the railroad bridge can be completed, and, in the meantime, all trains and detachments at Kingston or Burnt Hickory will be directed.....

By order of Major General W.T. Sherman.

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-Camp (23-90)

By using these supply bases, I established sufficient stockage levels of supplies to enable my army to sustain itself should the railroad line be disrupted for a short period of up to two weeks."

"I would say that your strategy worked well General Sherman. I do not recall one occasion during your Atlanta campaign in which your soldiers were in want of anything."

"That is true. If anything, I would suggest to you that they had more. Of course that might not have been the case had I not had the Military Railroads."

"Sir, if I might at this point change the direction of this interview, I would like to explore your initiatives in regard to supplementing the

efforts of the Military Railroads, particularly in light of the raids on your supply lines. Would you please address some of your actions in this regard."

"As the Commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, I felt that I had several responsibilities which related to the protection of the railways under my control. I would say that my initiatives in this regard were directed at protecting key railroad terminals and points, supporting orders to protect against raids, and providing for guards to accompany trains and protect them in route. If you would like Mr. Luvaas, I can go into more depth on each of these aspects."

"I would certainly appreciate your comments in these areas. Your thoughts will be most helpful for this story."

"In that case, I will address those measures which I took to protect the Western and Atlantic Railroad first and we can then proceed from there. I suppose the two major efforts in this regard were the stationing of units along this railroad line to physically protect it and the construction of defensive facilities at key terminals or points to enable small units to defend the railroad against much larger forces."

"When you say that units were stationed along the Western and Atlantic Railroad, are you speaking of substantial numbers of soldiers?"

"I would say so. During the Atlanta campaign, units were stationed at Ringgold, Dalton, Resaca, Kingston, Etowah Bridge, Allatoona, Kenesaw, and Marietta to name just a few. Their mission was simply to protect the

railroad and the supplies maintained there for my army. I believe I have several orders which reflect my position on railroad security. If you give me a moment I'm sure I can find these orders."

"Take your time sir. Any information which you can provide will be beneficial."

"Ah, here they are. Shall I read those applicable parts to you?"

"Yes sir."

"The first one which I have reads in its entirety as follows:

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Special Field Orders In the Field, near Resacea, May 14, 1864
No. 5

I. Major General Scheffield is charged with guarding Knoxville and the railroad from Tyners to Knoxville, and from Cleveland to Dalton, relieving, as soon as possible, General Thomas' troop on that line.

II. Major General Thomas will guard the railroad from Chattanooga to Dalton, and forward as the army advances.

By order of Major General W.T. Sherman:

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-Camp (66-242)

In the next order you will get on appreciation for the magnitude of troops required to guard one key strategic point along this railroad. It reads in part:

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Special Field Orders In the Field, Kingston, Ga, May 22, 1864
No. 11

I. General McPherson will cause the 17th Army Corps, Major General Blair commanding, to march from Decatur to Rome and Kingston, and will garrison Rome with a force of about 2,000 men until further orders. General Thomas will garrison Kingston with a small force, say 1,000 men, well covered by earthworks or stone buildings.....

II.

III.

By order of Major General W.T. Sherman.

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-camp (23-79)

Another order reads in part:

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Special Field Orders In the Field, Acwarth, Ga, June 6, 1864
No. 20

I.

II. Major General McPherson will cause one (1) regiment to guard the railroad bridge now under construction near Allatoona, and the balance of a brigade to hold the mountain pass at Allatoona. Two or more good strong earth redoubts will be located at the eastern extremity of this pass, and must be constructed by the troops, but the commanding officers at Kingston, at the railroad bridge and at Alatoona.....

III.

IV.

By order of Major General W.T. Sherman.

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-Camp (23-94)

And finally my last example reads in part:

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Special Field Orders
No. 52

In the Field, near Atlanta
August 5, 1864

I. Brigadier General John McArthur is hereby assigned to the command of the district of country embracing Kenesaw, Marietta, Koswell, and the west bank of the Chattahoochee River and the Sweetwater.

1. He is charged with guarding the railroad from Big Shanty to the Chattahoochee, and protecting our stores at Marietta and Vining's.

2. He will personally visit the points of interest and distribute the troops embraced in his command according to his judgement, and cause redoubts and block houses to be at once made, to give additional security to the railroad and places of deposit.

3.

4.

II.

III.

By order of Major General W.T. Sherman.

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-Camp (66-277)

As you can see, I did not hesitate to ensure adequate protection of the Western and Atlantic Railroad. It was my life line and required maximum protection."

"From the examples of the orders which you provided, it is evident that you did not hesitate to task organizations as large as Corps or Divisions for such security measures. That certainly was a strain on your manpower resources, wasn't it?"

"That is an accurate assessment but I cannot overemphasize the importance that the railroad played in sustaining my army in the field. Rather I expend the manpower to protect it then to disengage from the Confederate forces because I could not maintain my supply lines."

"You also spoke of defensive facilities for strategic points along the railroad where a small force could defend itself against a superior enemy force. In the last order you referred to redoubts and blockhouses. Could you address your policy on these?"

"I would suggest that the redoubts and blockhouses were on integral part of my strategy in protecting the Western and Atlantic Railroad. At each critical or key point along this line, my troops created these facilities. They were particularly evident at major terminal facilities or bridge works. The blockhouses offered protection from rifle fire while the redoubts provided protection from shelling."

"Were these initiatives strictly yours General Sherman?"

"I wish I could say they were but that was not the case. In fact, my direction of their construction was a result of lessons learned by General McDowell when he commanded the Department of the Rappahannock. I would not be surprised if Sherman Haupt did not have something to do with their use either. Anyway, McDowell used them effectively and I saw their benefit in my campaign to Atlanta. While I could not afford to place twelve sentinels per each mile of track as McDowell did, the use of redoubts and blockhouses did allow me to position soldiers in small numbers to defend critical points on the railroad. With the added protection, they could

defend themselves with some degree of confidence until reinforcements arrived."

"In my travels, I noted that these structures varied in size. Can you give me an idea of what size force we are talking about?"

"I would estimate that most blockhouses and redoubts were configured to protect between 10-15 soldiers. It was not uncommon to find some at more critical points which could accomodate up to 100 soldiers."

"Who constructed these facilities?"

"In the majority of instances, these facilities were erected by regiments of engineers and mechanics. On occasion, the Military Railroads also was responsible for their construction when not actually employed on more critical tasks."

"General Sherman, you also spoke of regulations which were established to protect the railroads. Could you discuss this aspect for me?"

"I can do that easily but I think that there is one major order which I fully supported which will address your concern in this area. It was published by Major General Steedman of my command in Chattanooga. Because of its major implications, I would like to read it to you in its entirety. It states in full:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE ETOWAH
Chattanooga, Tenn., June 28, 1864

General Order
No. 2

I. The frequent depredations committed upon the communications between Bridgeport and the army in front as well as the barbarities practiced by placing torpedoes under the track to blow up trains containing sick and wounded soldiers and citizens demand the adoption of the most stringent measures to suppress these crimes and atrocities. To this end, all citizens except Government employes found within three miles of the railroad from Bridgeport to the Federal army in Georgia, outside of the picket line of any post or station or troops after the 7th day of July 1864, will be arrested and forwarded to these headquarters to be tried before a military commission as spies "found lurking" within the lines of the armies of the United States. All officers commanding troops within the district are charged with the execution of this order. Exceptions to this order will be made only by the general commanding the district or by superior authority upon the most conclusive evidence that the party applying to be excepted is of undoubted loyalty, and that is for the interest of the Federal arms that the exception be made.

II. Commanding officers of posts and stations on the line of road mentioned in the foregoing paragraph will keep constant patrols on the road between their respective stations, who will carefully examine the track and all the bridges and culverts, and if any part of the road be found dangerous for the passing of trains. They will signal and stop approaching trains and report the condition of the track to the person in charge of such train. Daily patrols will also be made over the territory from which citizens are excluded by the foregoing paragraph. Guards stationed at bridges will inspect them after the passage of each train, and see that all fire that may be dropped from the engine is extinguished, and that the track and bridge are unimpaired by the passing train. In like manner all tunnels will be inspected by the guards stationed to protect them.

III. When all trains, either railroad or wagon, or any battery, herd of cattle, mules or horses arrive at any station, (if the commanding officer at that station) shall deem the guard accompanying such property insufficient for its protection he shall add to such guard a force sufficient, in his opinion, to protect it to the next station, where it will be relieved, if necessary, by a detail made in accordance with this paragraph, in each case reporting by telegraph to these headquarters the strength of such additional guard.

By command of Major General Steedman:

S.B. MOE,
Captain and Assistant Adjutant General (23-101)

I think you will agree with me that this order established significant procedures to protect our supply lines. As the District of the Etowah covered almost all of the Western and Atlantic Railroad there was little left for me to personally add to this order. General Steedman did have my total support. I might add also that this order was similar to one issued by Major General Meade when in command of the Army of the Potomac. I would suggest that we can all benefit from the past experiences of others."

"Sir, you also made note of the fact that you used railroad guards on the trains traveling through Georgia. General Steedman's order also reflected this position. Is there anything else that you think appropriate to mention on this subject?"

"Well, I did use train guards to protect my supplies as well as the civilians within the Military Railroads who operated our railroad equipment. The Western and Atlantic Railroad was subject to frequent Confederate raids and guerilla activity and so train guards served a useful purpose. I believe I have a copy of an order which I issued which established what I considered a representative strength for such a guard force. Here it is. It reads in part:

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Special Field Orders
No. 27

In the Field, June 20, 1864

I.

II. General Thomas will furnish General Steedman a detail of one thousand (1,000) men to be organized as train guard, and as soon as General John E. Smith reaches Kingston, he may relieve the detachments now there.

III.

By order of the Major General W.T. Sherman:

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-Camp (66-259)

Some may think that this was an excessive guard force but when you consider the daily transportation movements back and forth along the Western and Atlantic Railroad, it wasn't really that much."

"How would you assess the effectiveness of all these measures in protecting the railroads during your campaign to Atlanta?"

"I would say that these measures were most successful in that few major raids were attempted by the Confederates on this line. I'm not sure whether or not one could quantify our success with these measures against guerillas and sympathizers. They operated at night and disappeared into the surrounding area amongst the general population. I would suggest though that our protective measures were effective in most instances as this type of activity gradually declined to an insignificant measurement."

"I note in many of the articles I have read on the war, you developed a rather wide ranging reputation for destroying railroads whenever you want. Could you comment on the techniques which you applied to this destruction and the means by which these techniques were developed?"

"If you don't mind my saying this, I feel that I was much maligned by reporters in this regard and that is probably the reason why I have had a rather distasteful attitude toward newspaper reporters, present company excepted. Nothing which I did during my Atlanta campaign regarding rail-

road destruction, was new to military operations. In fact, I would feel comfortable in saying that all I did was practiced at one time or another by both sides to this conflict. I guess I was just the unfortunate one to have my undertakings sensationalized by the press. Let us not forget that as a military commander in the field I had but one objective; that being the defeat of the enemy at all costs. Without such an approach, this War could have continued in an endless manner.

I suppose that I've strayed somewhat away from your question but appreciate the fact that I did not enjoy the manner in which I was oftentimes portrayed..... As too your question on techniques which I applied in destroying railroads my approach was not a bit different from other field commanders. I will tell you that I used different groups to accomplish this work."

"Please continue General Sherman."

"When it came to the destruction of a railroad line, I was fortunate to be able to draw upon three different groups. When available, I would use the Military Railroads organization based upon their extensive experimentation in this area. If they were not available, I could then call upon the services of my engineers and mechanics. As a last resort, I would just task my infantry units to perform this work of railroad destruction. The latter, I might add, was more often than not the group which I used."

"I seem to remember you soldiers talking about "Sherman's Neckties" when talking about their efforts to destroy the railroads. What exactly were they referring to?"

"All soldiers like to be able to refer back to their commander in unique ways and heavens knows that I had my share of these references. The expression "Sherman's Neckties" developed during The Atlantic campaign. It related to a common practice we had to destroy rails on the lines that were directed for destruction. Essentially, the soldiers would pull up the spikes holding the rails, remove the iron rail and then stack the ties under them in piles for burning. Once this was accomplished, the ties were set on fire. After a period of time, the iron rails were laid across the burning ties so that the middle section of the rail could be heated sufficiently for bending. When the iron was red hot, the soldiers would remove the rail from the fire and carry it over to the nearest tree with a large trunk. The soldiers would then take the cold ends of the rail and pull the iron in such a way as to twist the rail around the tree trunk. The heated middle of the rail would bend very easy. I guess the troops thought this to be my idea hence the name "Sherman's Neckties". In reality it was a common practice on both sides of the Rebellion. The important point to make about this procedure is that you had to cut the tree down to remove the rail and the twist in it was difficult if not impossible to straighten thereby making it difficult to repair trackage in a timely fashion."⁽¹⁻⁷⁶⁾

"Did you you utilize any other techniques to destroy railroads during your campaigns?"

"There were several others which I must admit came from the Military Railroads. We used the torpedoes which they developed to destroy railroad bridging and let me tell you that it was certainly much easier to destroy a bridge that way, then to burn it down. If anything, it was much quicker.

The other technique which we borrowed from the Military Railroads was a device known as a rail twister. This was a mechanism which enabled one to twist iron rails to the extent that only a rolling mill could be used to repair the damage done. What was most important about this device is that it was portable and could be carried by one soldier. This device was ideal for use by our soldiers when riding behind enemy lines."⁽¹⁻⁵⁶⁾

"General Grant."

"Yes conductor."

"Sir, we will be arriving in Washington in approximately 15 minutes. You had indicated that you would like to be advised accordingly."

"That is correct. Thank you for notifying me."

"It is my pleasure General Grant. Wait until I tell the family that both General Grant and General Sherman rode on my train today. I can only tell you how proud I am to have this opportunity to see you both. Our country is indebted to you both for what you have done to preserve the Union."

"We appreciate your comments sir..... Mr. Luvaas, I suggest that perhaps it would be appropriate to ask General Sherman one more question and then allow him to prepare himself to disembark the train."

"I understand sir, but I do want to ensure that I use this last opportunity to ask a most worthwhile question. We have covered much ground today so it is difficult to say what we have not touched upon. I suppose

we should conclude with a question concerning your activities with the railroad between Chattanooga and Atlanta as you commenced your campaign toward Savannah. I understand that it would have been impossible for you to protect your supply lines beyond Atlanta. You certainly could not have afforded the luxury of providing more soliders to protect additional lines and your vulnerability to raids and guerilla activity would have been substantially greater. I also recognize that you could not afford to leave the Western and Atlantic Railroad intact as it could be used by the Confederates against you. If this rationale is all correct, what was your plan to negate any benefit that could be derived from this line?"

"Your assessment Mr. Luvaas is correct in every aspect. I did give a great deal of thought on how to neutralize this railroad and I think it can be summed up by an order which I issued just prior to abandoning Atlanta. I have it and would like to read it in part to you.

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Special Field Orders In the Field, Kingston, Ga, Nov. 4, 1864
No. 115

I. In view of the contemplated movement.....

II. The general plan of movement will be as follows: As much notice as possible will be given in advance to General Easton at Atlanta and General Steedman at Chattanooga, who are charged with the responsibility of causing all the rolling stock of the railroad to be removed to and north of Resaca, from which point General Steedman will cover its removal into Chattanooga. The railroad lying between Resaca and the iron north of it will be removed by cars into Chattanooga and stored for future use. The railroad from Etowah bridge into Atlanta will be destroyed. The 14th Corps will be charged with the destruction of that road from Etowah to Big Shanty; the 15th and 17th Corps with that from Kenesaw to Chattahoochee bridge, and the 20th Corps from the Chattahoochee into and including Atlanta.

III. On receiving the order to march.....

By order of Major General W.T. Sherman:

L.M. DAYTON
Aide-de-Camp (66-312)

As you can see, my plan involved the destruction of the Western and Atlantic railroad near the terminus in Atlanta but essentially left the remainder of this line untouched except for the removal of bridging at key points. By removing all rolling stock, key bridges, and destroying that section leading into Atlanta as well as the railroad facilities there, this line could not be used and repaired in time to be used against me. Perhaps some of your newspaper colleagues over dramatized what I did in fact do. History is my only witness and hopefully it will correct some of the exaggerations made of my campaign to Atlanta."

"Sir, I want to thank you for this interview. I am indeed honored at the opportunity you have given me. I am aware of your opinion of newspaper reporters but I can assure you that I will do your story and that of the Military Railroads justice in all respects. After hearing both stories, I cannot adequately describe the inner feeling of respect that I have developed for each."

"In that case sir, I am glad that General Grant convinced me to participate in this interview."

"I would also like to thank you General Grant. Your contributions in our previous interview will assist me immeasurably in developing my story on the Military Railroads. I also appreciate the unexpected interview with General Sherman that you have arranged."

"You are quite welcome Jay. It is important for me as General-in-Chief that the credit of our victory for this country be shared by all those involved. I think you have the basic story and I am confident that you will do it justice. I look forward to an advance copy of your story."

"Thank you again sir, and I hope to see you soon. My paper is always looking for a good story."

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As this study has been developed in the form of conversation, I did not feel it would be appropriate to footnote all quotes and references least I should destroy the style of this writing. I recognize though that others must be given credit for my sources of information. I have therefore compiled a bibliography of all references used in this study. Where specific quotes have been given, I have departed from the traditional footnote procedures and referenced the appropriate source with the corresponding number of the bibliography as well as the page where the reference could be found. In these instances where the bibliography did not contain page numbers, the reference was cited, followed by n.p. to reflect no page number.