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
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
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


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
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Report No. AU-ARI-CP-87-4

THE CHANGING WESTERN ALLIANCE
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

by

Brian L. Kavanagh
Wing Commander
Royal Australian Air Force

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ABSTRACT

The Western alliance in the South Pacific has experienced three decades of success based on a cooperative spirit established through its keystone, the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty. Over the last few years, some events have occurred that are now challenging this spirit.

The author examines the alliance, its history and objectives, and the issues confronting it. He also analyzes current policies of ANZUS nations and their perceptions of the treaty. He concludes that the traditional ANZUS Treaty can no longer meet the security objectives of its members and that it requires major revision. A blueprint for change is suggested.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Our commitment to the security of our allies and friends is a commitment to our own security as well.

Caspar W. Weinberger

There is a consensus today among the world's trading nations that a new strategic interest is emerging in the Pacific region. While the East-West political struggles in Indochina, the two Koreas, and the Philippines have no doubt contributed to this state of affairs, the economic emergence of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the ASEAN nations appears to be the main driving force. This new international focus is not contained solely around the economic giants within Northeast Asia, however; because of superpower moves into the Indian Ocean and the increasing importance of sea lines of communication (SLOC) from the Middle East to northern Pacific regions through Southeast Asian "chokepoints," the whole Pacific Ocean now plays a more important part in the communications network of trading nations.

A number of events have occurred in the Southwest Pacific over the last few years that have caused serious concern for the nations of the free world and that have upset the area's traditional stability. The most significant development has been the unraveling of the very foundation on which the Western alliance depends in the

region: the Australia, New Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) Treaty.

For the past 34 years, ANZUS has welded its three member nations together and ensured peace and regional stability by maintaining a dominant Western power presence throughout the South Pacific.* Dislocation of the treaty occurred in February 1985, when the New Zealand Labour Party, newly elected on a popular mandate to establish a nuclear-free New Zealand, refused port entry to the US Navy ship, USS Buchanan. This was done in response to a US refusal, in accordance with Defense Department policy, to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear arms or power on board any US ships. The New Zealand government asserted that denial of port access to nuclear-armed or -powered vessels was its sovereign right and within the confines of ANZUS; the United States avowed that unrestricted port access was a contiguous part of any alliance. Both parties stood on positions of fundamental principle that, according to each, were irreconcilable. The treaty itself was open to either interpretation. The ANZUS Treaty remains in existence, but "in a state of suspense," as was noted ambiguously by Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden.¹

*For the purposes of this paper, the South Pacific region encompasses the area of Pacific Ocean between Australia, Papua New Guinea, and New Zealand in the west and the coastline of South America in the east. It includes the countries of Australia, Papua New Guinea, and New Zealand as well as the island chains of Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia. The Southwest Pacific denotes the western half of this region.

Australia and the United States have reaffirmed their bilateral defense interests; New Zealand has been struck from the US list of bona fide allies.

Among other threats to security arrangements and regional harmony is the gradual and systematic encroachment of the Soviet Union into the Southwest Pacific, a region which has held no special interest for it in the past. Also, the spirit of ANZUS has been further taxed by the continuing nuclear debate beyond New Zealand's unilateral action; that is, Australia and New Zealand are becoming more independent in foreign policy, more critical of superpowers' inability to reach consensus on nuclear arms and testing agreements, and less susceptible to the policies of other powers.

The latest and possibly most damaging threat to the alliance after the New Zealand split is the US Congress' decision to subsidize overseas grain and sugar sales in support of an ailing US agricultural industry and at the expense of traditional Australian markets. In the words of the Australian foreign minister, "genuine outrage" was felt among the Australian people, many of whom questioned for the first time the true value of the alliance.

The increasing number of disputes presently challenging the ANZUS Treaty is in many respects indicative of the state of flux in the entire Pacific. As world strategic interests change, traditional allied interests and objectives within regions may need to be reviewed. Certainly the policies

that are currently employed by the United States and its allies within the South Pacific are susceptible to the changing environment; and they should be constantly reevaluated.

A reassessment of those policies is the essence of this study. It poses this question: in the changing environment of the Pacific, do present policies of the Western alliance in the South Pacific fully support alliance security objectives today, and will they continue to do so into the future? The study's specific aim is to review current policies against security objectives in a changing Western alliance, to identify policies that are inadequate, and to suggest adjustments necessary to protect alliance interests in the years ahead. The analysis will first look at ANZUS in general, including its history, current status, and objectives. Policies will then be reviewed, and alternative policies will be recommended.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. Bill Hayden, Australian foreign minister, quoted in The Australian, 30 September 1985, 5.

CHAPTER 2

THE ANZUS ALLIANCE

In short, diminish us and you diminish all of us.

Sir Wallace Rowling

From the beginnings of their European settlements, both Australia and New Zealand suffered a sense of remoteness and vulnerability which encouraged them to seek alliances with more powerful nations. Bound by a tight, enduring bond formed from the ANZAC (Australia-New Zealand Army Corps) spirit of World War I, they fought in two world wars to support "Mother England." The United States' influence on the war in the Pacific and the British withdrawal east of Suez after World War II caused a subsequent shift of allegiance to the United States by the trans-Tasman twins.

With the onset of the cold war after 1945, widespread disillusionment with the United Nations' collective security system, the Korean War, and fears of a US-supported Japanese defense independence, Australia and New Zealand vied for a formal alliance treaty with their newfound, powerful, wartime ally. On 1 September 1951 the ANZUS Security Treaty was signed in San Francisco, and it came into force when ratified by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States on 29 April 1952. Since that time, ANZUS has been the mainstay of the Western alliance in the South Pacific. It became more than a security treaty; it was a total relationship among the three members. It encompassed historical,

cultural, personal, political, and commercial links, as well as close defense cooperation designed to ensure that ANZUS forces could operate together quickly and effectively should the need arise.¹

ANZUS has had unprecedented success over the past 34 years, exemplified by continuing peace in the area and a general underlying consensus that is not evident in most other Western alliances. Since the treaty was loosely worded, and the alliance had no formal organizational support structure or military command, its success was due in part to the spirit of cooperation, consultation, and mutual consent that underlay it.

The turning point in this hitherto ideal relationship came with the declaration of the Nixon administration's 1969-70 Guam Doctrine of US withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and the dictum to its allies that America would in the future "look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."² Total reliance on strong, powerful allies for defense was now a thing of the past for Australia and New Zealand. This also marked the beginning of the end to the forward defense policies that had prevailed in both countries until that time. Both would now look to greater defense self-reliance; and both would seek greater cooperation with regional neighbors while reevaluating their unswerving loyalty to the worldwide policies of the United States. On this point Dr Ramesh Thakur, chairman of the

Dunedin Branch of the Institute of International Affairs, in his treatise on New Zealand's foreign policy choices in the nuclear age, explains that "the Vietnam war was most probably the critical catalyst in leading New Zealand away from the role of faithful and unthinking ally."³ In Australia also, the "All the way with LBJ" thinking of the people in the sixties was soon diverted by a conscious nationwide reassessment of Australia's capability to support a more independent, self-reliant, and even "continental" defense strategy.⁴

It was at this time that the seeds of doubt were sown as to exactly how far the United States would commit itself to the security of Southeast Asian and Pacific allies in a post-Vietnam era. From this point onwards, the significance and expectations of the treaty became less clear to each member, and differing perceptions of the meaning of ANZUS evolved. The extent of the divergence of allies' perceptions was only fully realized when the current crisis between the United States and New Zealand began to unfold. To illustrate the point, consider that the United States was totally nonplused at New Zealand's determination to proceed with its "irresponsible action" while New Zealand completely underestimated the US reaction to this "one rather narrow issue," as New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange termed the denial of port access. The fact that the situation has not been resolved after two years of careful negotiation is further evidence of these irreconcilable differences. Since

coming to grips with the different perceptions of the meaning of ANZUS is crucial to understanding the whole complex of the alliance as it exists today, those perceptions are examined more closely in a later chapter.

At present, the ANZUS Treaty is, in the words of Australia's Prime Minister Bob Hawke, "a treaty in name only." And at a recent bipartite ANZUS council, US Secretary of State George Shultz declared the ANZUS Treaty "inoperative" and announced that the United States was "suspending its security obligations to New Zealand."⁵ The door was left open to New Zealand, however, to permit a return to trilateral cooperation should she see fit. Unfortunately, New Zealand seems unwilling or unable to relent as the government is proceeding with action to legislate its nuclear arms policy. Secretary Shultz further warned that the status of ANZUS would be "reviewed" if New Zealand proceeded with the proposed legislation. Many speculate this would mean the formal abolition of ANZUS.⁶ At the time of this writing, the proposed bill had not been passed by both houses of New Zealand's Parliament.

In the meantime, the Australian foreign minister, Bill Hayden, and the New Zealand prime minister, in an attempt to expand bilateral cooperation between the two countries, have held talks in Wellington. They publicly agreed, however, that the defense relationship between the two countries could not be expanded significantly. An Australian expectation of greater spending by New Zealand to improve

defense links was dampened by Wellington's declaration that New Zealand had no plans to increase its defense budget.⁷ Conversely, Wellington's expectations that Australia might take up defense responsibilities to New Zealand where the United States left off was abruptly dispelled by Bill Hayden.

The question that many are now asking is where will it all go from here? All agree that ANZUS is in a crisis; the treaty is weakened by the New Zealand split, and the alliance is threatened by other political and commercial issues. As Washington and Wellington continue to exchange rhetoric, Australian Foreign Minister Hayden, with concerns of his own, warned that "Australia and the United States have reached a stage in their alliance of quite extraordinary significance." He further stressed the need to determine exactly the value of the alliance to each other and to consider these "current developments in the alliance with great care."⁸

A logical way of coming to terms with a crisis such as this is to go back and reexamine the basic objectives upon which the treaty was originally set up and is now operating. Reaffirming traditional security objectives will help to focus on the overall aims of the treaty; identifying new objectives will provide guidance for evaluating policies and perceptions, and for making adjustments to ensure future alliance integrity.

Security Objectives

A close perusal of the ANZUS Treaty document sheds little light on specific security objectives. Only vague terms are found in the articles of the treaty: "resist armed attack" or "consult [if] territorial integrity, political independence or security . . . is threatened."⁹ The loose wording of the ANZUS Treaty was intentional, specifically designed to retain utmost flexibility through consensus, rather than relying on a formalized structure like that of NATO. What is also different about ANZUS is that, although it was set up originally as a defense treaty only, its broad terms allowed it to develop into an alliance of far more consequence. One would expect, therefore, an all-encompassing ANZUS to have engendered other objectives beyond those connected only with defense and the employment of military power. Both the United States and Australia are acutely aware of the vastness of the South Pacific region, the diversity of history, culture, politics, and economics of the many island states, and the vulnerability of their own sea lines of communication to attack by opposing forces. In a region of such complexity, political and economic objectives also play a large part in regional security.

In his book The Australian--American Security Relationship, Henry S. Albinski, a leading US expert on South Pacific affairs, addressed some of the regional political interests of both countries that stem from these complexities: "Australian and American regional objectives

include the stability and friendship of resident nations and a harmonious climate of intraregional relations." He says further that both countries see their security objectives in the region related to "the collective cooperation as well as the individual viability of regional countries" (emphasis added).¹⁰ Secretary Shultz, speaking of the East Asia-Pacific region in 1985, affirmed the US view of the importance of the two objectives identified by Albinski.

Our goal can be simply stated: peaceful progress for all countries in the region, based on a shared belief in the value of economic cooperation, and mutual respect for the rights of all participants to freely pursue their own interests.¹¹

In closing his chapter on the South Pacific, Albinski gives a more detailed list of traditional American-Australian security objectives in the region. In addition to the aim of fostering an orderly, intraregional political climate, he cites promotion of the health and upkeep of the ANZUS alliance, ensuring adequate access and mobility for ANZUS forces, and minimizing regional Soviet influence as issues central to continued regional peace and harmony.¹² Professor Albinski's list is indeed supportive of US national interests in East Asia and the Pacific as recently articulated by Gaston J. Sigur, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, when he spoke of cooperation and consultation, maintaining the strategic balance through defense commitments, support for democratization and human rights, and strengthening the open-market system.¹³

Australia also has demonstrated her support for these objectives. Australia's views on ANZUS are clear and concise. Prime Minister Hawke recently stated explicitly that any reduction of the capacity of ANZUS by any member would be "an act of mutual insanity." His government is in full support of the continuance of the treaty and is firmly committed to ANZUS;¹⁴ and the political opposition also stands behind the treaty as the basis for its defense posture. At the same time, Australia displays her full commitment to regional stability and friendship through cooperation with and economic development of the microstates of the South Pacific. The leading role she has played in regional politics within the South Pacific Forum (SPF)* in such matters as mediating in fisheries disputes, lobbying France to allow peaceful decolonization of New Caledonia, and proposing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty,¹⁵ as well as the substantial aid she continues to provide the island states, attest to this commitment.

Australia has also been in the forefront in bringing to the notice of the alliance the Soviet Union's increased presence in the South Pacific. She first raised the matter at the 1976 South Pacific Forum and the ANZUS Council

*The South Pacific Forum (SPF) is an organization set up to establish regional cooperation in the South Pacific by promoting viable, independent governments, fair commercial practices, and regional security among the independent nations of the region. The 13 member nations of the SPF are Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.

meeting, but generated little interest in the United States. Then Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser postulated rather accurately that "the Soviet Union would love to have a land-based presence, free of restraint, somewhere in the area."¹⁶ Subsequent warnings went largely unheeded until Kiribati signed a fishing agreement with the Soviet Union in 1985.

Today Fraser's fears have come true. The Kiribati fishing contract has lapsed, but a more dangerous accord has been struck. The Soviet government has obtained fishing rights from Vanuatu to fish the Coral Sea; and part of the agreement is that the Soviets can establish ground facilities at Palikulo on the big island of Espiritu Santo. These facilities are to be used for maintaining and replenishing ships and for ferrying crews to and from the Soviet Union by Aeroflot charters.¹⁷ Australia is gravely concerned that a regional government with renowned radical leftist leanings has openly invited Soviet ground stationing only one thousand miles from Australia's shores.

For New Zealand's part, it would be fair to say that, despite the recent contretemps, her fundamental security objectives, in common with the other alliance members, have remained unchanged. But the 75-percent popular support by the New Zealand people for a nuclear-free state and the moves to legislate this policy indicate a new national security objective of keeping New Zealand's sovereign territory free of any nuclear influence in the future. This

is at odds with past alliance understandings of free access for all ANZUS forces.

In what appear to the United States to be mutually exclusive viewpoints, 78 percent of New Zealanders also support a continued New Zealand commitment to ANZUS. The prime minister denies that his country has been thrown out of ANZUS and his deputy, Geoffrey Palmer, amplified that no member could be ejected from the treaty. Furthermore, Palmer added, port visit denial for nuclear ships was not in breach of the treaty--but US unilateral withdrawal from treaty obligations was.¹⁸ Here, Wellington is saying that New Zealand remains committed to ANZUS. It does so because it has few other viable choices, considering that New Zealand defense is totally reliant on integration with larger Western powers and that the defense relationship available through ANZUS is unavailable elsewhere. But what Wellington is also saying is that in the future, "this is how we propose to run our affairs; it is a bit different from before; but we believe you [US] should be willing to fit in."¹⁹ A maturing New Zealand, moving beyond the colonial mentality, is now demanding a more independent say in regional issues, and one that increasingly takes into account the changing reality of the area.

As this review has shown, the aims of ANZUS include traditional objectives that are intrinsic among member nations with similar backgrounds, cultures, and value systems. These aims are ongoing and unchanging. Such

objectives are common to the interests of the alliance as well as to those of most other nations in the South Pacific. They are, in essence, promotion of regional cooperation, economic development of all nations, minimizing Soviet influence, and maintaining a strong, healthy ANZUS. However, as regional interests (and indeed world interests) have changed, new security objectives are emerging that in some cases conflict with traditional ways of doing business. New Zealand's antinuclear stance is one such example, as is the South Pacific Forum's SPNFZ Treaty. Underlying this is a need within the antipodean countries for greater representation in regional matters and less subjugation to the policies of more powerful allies.

The whole network of ANZUS interrelationships is changing. These new realities and objectives have placed the current alliance in some jeopardy; and there is now a real threat to achievement of the traditional core objectives unless the nations concerned can find a better working relationship. A more equitable working arrangement can only be postulated if the policies and perceptions of today's alliance are examined in detail, for it is here that misunderstandings and tensions arise.

NOTES

CHAPTER 2

1. Ramesh Thakur, In Defence of New Zealand; Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age (Wellington, N.Z.: University of Otago, 1984), 38.

2. For an analysis of the Guam Doctrine in its application to the Asia-Pacific region, see Y. L. Wu, US Policy and Strategic Interests in the Western Pacific (Brisbane, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1975), 1-55.

3. Ramesh Thakur, In Defence of New Zealand, 74.

4. The slogan was coined from a statement made by past Australian prime minister, Harold E. Holt, to then US President Lyndon Baines Johnson, during the former's visit to the United States in 1966.

5. Colin James, "Adrift from ANZUS," Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 August 1986, 15.

6. US Secretary of State George Shultz in Canberra for bilateral talks in lieu of ANZUS Council, cited in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 32, no. 2 (Brisbane, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1986): 172.

7. Radio Australia broadcast from Canberra, TOR 0841, 11 December 1986.

8. Bill Hayden, Australian foreign minister, "Australia-US Relations," a speech to the Commonwealth Club

of California, World Affairs Council, and the Australian-American Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco, 12 August 1986, cited in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, August 1986, 645.

9. Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, Treaty Series no. 2 (29 April 1952).

10. Henry S. Albinski, The Australian-American Security Relationship (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 185.

11. US Secretary of State George Shultz, "Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Basin," an address to the Asia Foundation, San Francisco, cited in Department of State Current Policy, no. 658 (21 February 1985).

12. Albinski, The Australian, 200.

13. Gaston J. Sigur, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, "The Strategic Importance of the Emerging Pacific," an address to Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Pacific Islands Association in Department of State Current Policy, no. 871 (29 September 1986).

14. Lionel Bowen, acting prime minister of Australia, Hansard, official recordings of the Australian Parliament, Australian Government Printing Office, 23 May 1986.

15. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, or Treaty of Rarotonga, was established at Rarotonga, New Zealand, on 6 August 1985. It provided for a ban on peaceful nuclear testing and dumping, and a ban on the

testing of nuclear devices by Pacific nations in the region. It also bound the signatories not to manufacture, station, or deal in nuclear weapons material. The treaty contains three protocols, one of which invites France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to apply treaty provisions to their South Pacific territories. The other two invite the five nuclear weapons states not to use, or threaten the use of, nuclear weapons against parties in the treaty. The treaty was endorsed by all 13 member nations of the South Pacific Forum, and it has been ratified by eight countries (the total number necessary to bring the treaty into force).

16. Malcolm Fraser, remarks in Christchurch on 11 February 1980, cited in Christchurch Press, 12 February 1980.

17. David Knibb, "The Soviet Big Fish," Wall Street Journal, 26 January 1987, 23.

18. James, "Adrift from ANZUS," 23.

19. M. Norrish, secretary of the New Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs, "The Challenging Context of New Zealand's Foreign Policy," a speech to Takapuna Rotary Club, 29 April 1986, cited in The Australian Quarterly, AIPS Sydney, vol. 58, no. 2 (Winter 1986): 192.

CHAPTER 3

POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS

America was nice to its enemies but murder on its friends.

Henry Kissinger, 1968

In his testimony to the 99th Congress during US House of Representatives hearings on ANZUS, Professor Henry Albinski stated that "policies should steadily be calibrated with basic, national objectives, which in turn need to relate to wider interests."¹ In chapter 2, the ANZUS security objectives were reviewed in the light of the South Pacific's wider interests and changing environment. As a follow-on, this chapter centers on the actual policies that exist in the South Pacific today and their effects on both the key powers and the resident states. However, as has already been mentioned, there is more to the current ANZUS crisis than conflicting policies; perceptions of what to expect from past relationships and what to avoid in future relationships have altered and are now beginning to cause deep divisions in the very fabric of the alliance.

At times it is difficult to separate policies and perceptions when one tries to isolate factors of conflict within a relationship. Such is the case within ANZUS, a pact which evolved with few rigid guidelines and one where at times the dividing line between policy and perception has become rather hazy. This chapter therefore does not attempt

to differentiate policy from perception, but examines both together as they pertain to the divisive issues within the ANZUS relationship.

The New Zealand Split

The United States firmly believes that New Zealand has abrogated its alliance responsibilities by its port entry policy. Washington allows that the treaty's fine print does not specifically address port access; but in the US mind, New Zealand has violated the very spirit of ANZUS on which the last 34 years of alliance success has depended. To many Americans, this just reinforces their disillusionment with allies at large. Having witnessed worldwide apathy among traditional allies to past US initiatives in Iran, Libya, and Grenada, much of the American public believes, in the view of the New Zealand analyst Ramesh Thakur, that "allies are generally blind to the Soviet threat, disloyal to the common cause of the West and unwilling to take their fair share of the burdens of defence."²

Certainly one immediate consequence to the United States of the New Zealand action is the repercussion among other friendly nations of a small ally taking a forceful, unilateral stance that could be perceived regionally and globally as anti-American. Many believe that this US concern was the prime reason for the tough move against her old and faithful ally. Prime Minister Lange argues that New Zealand policies are for New Zealand only and that his

country's stand is antinuclear, not anti-American. The United States on the other hand sees this as the logic of a nation that is in effect politically "insular"; and the Reagan administration is convinced that other countries cannot help but be affected by this small nation that has been held in such disproportionately high regard in the past. Thus, at the risk of appearing heavy-handed, bullyish, and uncaring, the United States has taken a decisive stand--more as a warning to other allies than as a direct response to New Zealand--that abrogation of alliance responsibilities will not be cost-free in the future.

The United States disavowal of New Zealand as an ally is a major change of policy within the alliance and one that is not without serious implications. Broadly speaking, relinquishment of security obligations by her former alliance partner means New Zealand no longer has access to US intelligence support, is excluded from joint military exercises with the United States, and is precluded from any further defense development through training, scientific research, and staff interaction. Also, New Zealand no longer has US congressional protection under its former "special relationship" status in matters of trade and commerce, which may well lead to less favorable future bargaining power in US markets.

There is little New Zealand can do in response except to try to convince the United States that the American decision is in the best interests of nobody. Wellington has

made it clear that the nuclear issue is not negotiable; and even if Lange's government relented, or was replaced in a future election, visits by US nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships would be unlikely for years to come as the issue is too politically hot for any New Zealand government to override in the immediate future. In New Zealand's eyes, this has become a matter of fundamental national sovereignty that supersedes any friendship or alliance interests. New Zealand demands the right to be heard around the world, insists on the right to determine her own policies in nuclear-related matters, and believes that to do otherwise is an abdication of her national sovereignty.

And where does Australia fit into all this? She now finds herself in a position much like that of a confused child following the divorce of its parents: having to continue relations with each while trying desperately to effect a reconciliation between the two. To carry the "family" analogy further, Australia has a distinctly "mother" relationship with New Zealand in that both, bound by common geography, heritage, and custom, are strategically one. But a "father" relationship exists with the United States, upon whom Australia relies so heavily for many of the essentials of survival. To say the least, Australia's position is delicate--she is having to walk the thin line between the other two ANZUS partners. She has disagreed with New Zealand's port-access policy and has expressed an

understanding of the US action; but all the while, she has carefully distanced herself from details of the debate.³

Without doubt, the New Zealand split from ANZUS has great potential for enduring harm to the Western alliance in the South Pacific--possibly to the strategic balance within the whole East Asian-Pacific region. An impasse exists: a superpower's demands under a long-standing treaty are at odds with a perceived sovereignty right of a small but traditionally loyal ally. Reaching a consensus seems remote unless one side (or both) compromises its views. The United States wants New Zealand back in the fold as before, but this can no longer be, because the United States' expectation of unrestricted access to all ANZUS territories is now unacceptable to New Zealand. On the other hand, New Zealand's expectation of a future ANZUS arrangement with business as usual except for a nuclear presence may be impossible for the United States to swallow.

The Soviet Encroachment

It is not difficult to see that the Soviet Union is bent on exploiting this and other current difficulties in the South Pacific. Along with the looming ANZUS difficulty, past confrontations between the United States and regional states over confiscated fishing vessels and sovereign fishing rights were precursors to Soviet approaches to South Pacific nations. In the author's view, their timing was no accident--they had picked up the political vibrations.

The mood of the South Pacific islands has changed over the last decade. As P. Lewis Young, a correspondent for Pacific Defence Reporter who specializes in the Southwest Pacific, points out, "The activities of the US fishermen [and their] rampaging, free-booting purse seiners created a bewildered anti-Americanism in an area which has always cherished the idea of the generous American."⁴ The difficulty for these small island nations was that Washington failed to recognize their claims of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ) under the new International Law of the Sea; nor did she recognize for years the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (SPFFA), which was set up to protect commercial fishing interests in the region.

The United States' policy on tuna fishing reflects the view that no state is entitled to exclusive coastal jurisdiction over highly migratory fish species. The island nations, on the other hand, are often totally dependent on their one and only exportable commodity--fish. They felt they were within the law but that the United States, by "poaching" in their territorial waters, was not. Furthermore, the United States showed complete insensitivity to their welfare. "Friendship isn't poaching," said Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Peter Kenilorea. Ieremia Tabai, the Kiribati prime minister, expressed his view that "earning a fishing living from the Russians is better than having to ask our traditional friends to support us."⁵ For

many of these microstates, the issue at stake is one of pure survival in an increasingly commercial Pacific.

The years of rancor ended a few months ago when a formal fishing agreement was negotiated between the SPFFA and American tuna fleets. The draft agreement is still to be ratified by the US Congress, however, and one could argue that, although the belated agreement was welcome and necessary, the damage as far as Soviet influence was concerned has been done. The Soviet Union, capitalizing on past US indifference to the island states' plight, managed to gain a firm and important foothold in the region--first through the Kiribati contract and later through the Vanuatu connection.

Australia feels a sense of frustration over the increased Soviet presence in the South Pacific. Taking Australia's role as a regional leader seriously, successive Australian political leaders have tried unsuccessfully for a number of years to bring to US attention the implications of its policies regarding sovereign rights of small island nations. As Professor Albinski explained, "Australia has calculated that its assumption about a major South Pacific responsibility for itself represents a contribution to the American alliance, and thereby to global security."⁶ And the United States has indeed been perfectly content with Australia's increased significance in the South Pacific. This has obviated direct superpower contact with small independent nations, while ensuring ongoing Western

diplomacy through a regional middle power. The frustration and sense of "I told you so" is therefore understandable when Australia appears thwarted by its ally in its attempts to maintain regional harmony and deny the Soviet Union any chance of influence within the area while doing its share to maintain the strategic balance.

The Continuing Nuclear Debate

Besides New Zealand's antinuclear policy, there are other aspects of the continuing nuclear debate that are undermining traditional alliance harmony. During the last four years under a Labour government, Australia has been a leading critic of the superpowers' policies on disarmament and arms control. She has openly criticized the United States and other nuclear nations for their failure to meet the conditions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and she has vigorously urged establishment of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Hawke government, in 1983, appointed Australia's first-ever ambassador for disarmament, Richard Butler, to ensure continued international representation on these issues. Australia has also publicly censured the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative concept as destabilizing to global deterrence, and has declined to participate in SDI research. These are examples where Australia has been forthright in expressing her own opinions through international forums.

Not all matters of a nuclear nature are rejected in Australia, however. Unlike New Zealand, Australia offers port access to nuclear as well as conventional allied naval forces; and she hosts a number of joint American-Australian electronic sensor stations, three of which place Australia on the Soviet Union's nuclear targeting list. While these policies of the Australian government have their share of opposition from local peace movement and antinuclear groups, the majority of Australians are content in the knowledge that this is the price they have to pay for a viable alliance. It is worth pausing here to note exactly what Australia's perceptions of the ANZUS alliance are in terms of real costs and benefits to its security.

At present, Australia hosts over 20 US and joint US-Australian defense facilities within the country, on which the "big three" (Pine Gap, Nurrungar, and North West Cape) provide essential real-time communications, early warning, and intelligence for the United States. US naval ships visit Australian ports regularly, and United States Air Force B-52 navigation and surveillance flights stage through Darwin in the north. Australia also contributes significantly to the alliance surveillance and intelligence network, and she takes a leading role in defense assistance within the South Pacific. Additionally, Australia assists in the defense network of Southeast Asia as a member of the Five Powers Defense Agreement, which provides a direct link between ASEAN and the Western alliance.

In return, Australia enjoys the indirect benefit of inclusion under the United States' global nuclear umbrella. Direct benefits are participation in joint exercises with the United States, complete support from the US intelligence network, staff interaction with US defense forces, and access as a "favored nation" to Western technology. Few doubt the importance of these direct benefits of the alliance. Rather, the question in many Australian minds is, "Exactly how binding is the ANZUS treaty in today's world should Australia's security be threatened?"

Pragmatic Australians can envisage very few scenarios in which the United States, under ANZUS, would offer direct military assistance to a threatened Australia. Many Australian strategists and defense thinkers, such as Dr Ross Babbage of the Australian National University, now believe that in any conflict short of a global confrontation, Australia would very likely stand alone. To what extent US defense forces are committed to protect Australian security under ANZUS is one of the most pressing defense questions in Australia today.

Still other long-term alliance questions perplex Australians. How will Australia be expected to pay the "premium" for its ANZUS "insurance policy" when the joint defense facilities become redundant or outdated as indeed they must, given the pace of technology and the vulnerability of these vital but strategically soft targets? Also, will ANZUS require Australia to provide military

assistance to the United States in the Philippines or Korea should US bases there come under attack--a prospect politically unpopular for any Australian government? More important, what would be expected of Australia with regard to home porting in the event the United States is forced to withdraw from the Philippines? Should the United States indeed seek Australian home-porting assistance, then America's policies on nuclear weapons handling will clash with Australia's policies as ratified under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. These and other questions raise a great deal of uncertainty with Australians as to exactly what defense benefits they gain from the alliance and at what costs.

Turning now to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, we find that it has become yet another thorn in the side of the superpowers--particularly the United States and France. Spawned by Labour governments of both Australia and New Zealand during the last 20 years, the SPNFZ Treaty entered into force at the end of 1986. Australia, as the initial proposer of the treaty, went to great pains to influence the South Pacific Forum (SPF) to draft a middle road and, therefore, workable treaty. The two crucial, debatable points were port visits for nuclear (armed or powered) ships and right of passage of nuclear ships through the zone. The United States naturally was never particularly enamored of the whole treaty idea, but was

relieved when the final document took a conservative line and allowed free passage for nuclear vessels and left port-access decisions to individual member states. The United States, with other superpowers, has been invited to sign the treaty protocols but has declined, claiming it is "giving the Treaty and its protocols serious high level study [to determine any implications] that would limit ability to defend free world interests."⁷

This political smoke screen is seen in the South Pacific as evidence of how little worth the United States puts on the SPNFZ now that her freedom of operation has not been curtailed. Further evidence of US disregard for the treaty was her reaction to Australia's calls under the protocols of the treaty for the United States to apply political pressure to France to stop nuclear testing in the South Pacific. After all, the South Pacific Forum's concern with France's behavior was one of the prime reasons for creating the treaty in the first place. Prime Minister Hawke made a direct plea for US assistance in this highly charged debate, and the Australian ambassador to Washington, Rawdon Dalrymple, made an impassioned case that "continued American indifference to what the French were doing would be an act of folly [providing] fertile ground for anti-United States and anti-west propaganda and activity."⁸ The US State Department's reaction was to support France's need to modernize its nuclear deterrent, rejecting the Australian pleas out of hand.

The International Trade War

The United States' dismissive response to Australia over French nuclear testing went virtually unnoticed when compared to the later step it took, in the middle of 1986, to support declining US agricultural trade at the expense of Australia. First the subsidized US wheat sales to the Soviet Union, and then subsidized sugar sales to China, brought howls of protest from all levels of Australian society. Timothy Mackey, the then agricultural counselor for the Australian embassy in Washington, reported, "Now for the first time, the common people [of Australia] are asking, 'Is the US really our friend?'"⁹ In government circles, the minister for primary industry, John Kerin, predicted a loss to Australia on wheat sales alone of \$296 million, while the federal treasurer, Paul Keating, announced threateningly that grain sales would force Australia to reconsider its military relationship with the United States.¹⁰ Many Australian farmers called for the closure of the joint US-Australian bases in retribution. Since then, Australia has seen other traditional markets infiltrated by subsidized US produce, in particular its barley market in Saudi Arabia and more recently wheat markets in China. Foreign Minister Hayden sardonically compared Australia's and New Zealand's latest standings with the United States, whereby New Zealand was told it "would remain a friend but not an ally [and] Congress is now telling Australia that it is an ally but not a friend."¹¹

Irrespective of how contentious the "farm bill" decision was for the US Congress, or how much US officials justify their action as counterstrategy to the European Economic Community (EEC), the fact remains that this decision has done a great deal of harm to Australian-American relations. For this is more than trade competition, it is a "gut" issue with Australian people--the way you treat your friends and mates is a fundamental principle that strikes at the very heart of the common Australian. It is important to note here that this "outraged" reaction by Australians gives a good indication of the depth of feeling the country has for its tie with the United States, a tie formed primarily through ANZUS. It highlights the extent of Australia's perception of what the treaty means to her. Correspondingly, the US action also gives some clues as to its own interpretation of how far alliance responsibilities extend.

In Australia's case, as the smaller partner to the United States, it has vital reasons to view the ANZUS Treaty more seriously than does its larger partner. Australia relies on the United States for much of its security, economy, standard of living, and regional political influence; and she stands to gain more in immediate and visible terms from the alliance than does the United States, which is primarily interested in enhancing its long-term strategic interests. As such, Australia (and arguably New Zealand as well) over the years has fostered a relationship

with the United States which far transcended the meaning of the original defense treaty. The broad significance Australia sees in the alliance today stems mainly from this traditional dependence; it is complemented significantly by the tendency of the Australian people to value lasting, deep relationships based on loyalty and commitment much more than formalized, rigid, contractual arrangements.

On the United States side, the tendency these days seems more to a "politics is politics, but business is business" viewpoint. Congress appears to react to powerful electoral constituencies and lobby groups in the short-term interests of the US economy, irrespective of the repercussions to allies or to long-term global economics. Such is the nature of American politics. What this demonstrates to Australia and New Zealand, though, is that when all is said and done, ANZUS has a different basic significance to the United States than it does to them.

The United States has certainly shown that it takes the defense aspects of its alliances seriously. Retribution to New Zealand was one poignant example. Another was US public criticism of the Australian government's recently tabled Dibb Report.* US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger

*The Dibb Report, completed in March 1986, was ordered by the Australian government. It is a report on a 12-month review of Australian defense capabilities carried out by ministerial consultant Paul Dibb. The review's terms of reference included: content, priorities, and rationale of defense forward planning; present and future force capabilities; and whether strategic guidance can be made more explicit.

advised his Australian counterpart that the report's view of the Australian role in ANZUS was unacceptable to the United States. The report's fundamental premise of a "strategy of denial" for Australian defense planning, based on a "layered strategy of defense" with application of military power only within Australia's area of direct military interest (Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, the nearby island states of the Southwest Pacific, and New Zealand), was antithetical to the Western strategy of Soviet deterrence.¹² In this way the United States was reminding Australia of its defense commitment to the total Western alliance, and to the security of the whole South Pacific Region. Yet beyond this pervading desire to ensure defense loyalties from the ANZUS alliance, there appears less US concern for other wide-ranging issues such as economic support and regional harmony. This suggests that, in the US mind, a security treaty is one primarily concerned with defense issues. Dr Dora Alves, renowned ANZUS specialist of the National Defense University, supports this viewpoint:

It should be underscored that the US views ANZUS as a defense treaty and that the steps taken by the US Government are all confined to defense matters.¹³ Furthermore all the steps are reversible.

And what of the consequences of economic protectionism? While the trade war continues, major improvements to Australian-US relations are unlikely to occur. More important and realistic, the effect on Australian markets will no doubt impact South Pacific regional nations. Indeed

a carry-over effect has already been felt, as Australia, much to the chagrin and disappointment of its SPF colleagues, has proposed substantial cuts in its aid to Southwest Pacific nations in an effort to reduce its rising budget deficit.¹⁴

Summary

This examination of the policies and perceptions of members of the ANZUS alliance as they apply to the current disputes in the South Pacific highlights two fundamental divergences of opinion that exist between the United States and regional South Pacific nations. The first is the increasing gap between the nuclear and nonnuclear states of the world in relation to production and use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The second is a global trend among the more powerful nations towards economic hegemony through trade cartels and protectionism, all to the detriment of the world's weaker, less capable nations.

The New Zealand split from ANZUS, the continuing debate on other nuclear issues including the SPNFZ and French nuclear testing in the Pacific, and the economic pressures on primary commercial resources of Australia and the Pacific islands are all direct testimony to these differences. The consequences are an increased Soviet presence in the South Pacific, a gradual breaking down of the ANZUS alliance, and a slow, steady spread of regional anti-Americanism, all of which threaten regional cooperation and stability.

That these differences are challenging the basic security objectives of ANZUS is undeniable. What is also evident to even the most casual observer is that some adjustments to today's policies are needed. These fundamental differences must be taken into account, yet the more traditional security objectives must be met.

NOTES

CHAPTER 3

1. House, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, testimony by Henry Albinski, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 18 March 1985, 93.

2. Ramesh Thakur, In Defence of New Zealand; Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age (Wellington, N.Z.: University of Otago, 1984), 147.

3. News release issued by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs on 12 August 1986, cited in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, August 1986, 741.

4. P. Lewis Young, "Moscow, the Smell of Fish and New Caledonia," Pacific Defence Reporter, 1986 Annual Reference Addition, 17.

5. Ibid.

6. Henry S. Albinski, The Australian-American Security Relationship (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 187.

7. Gaston J. Sigur, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, "The Strategic Importance of the Emerging Pacific," an address to Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Pacific Islands Association, cited in Department of State Current Policy, no. 871 (29 September 1986).

8. Rawdon Dalrymple, Australian ambassador to Washington, quoted in The Australian, 26 September 1985, 6.

9. Susan Katz, "Bumper Crop of Resentment among the Western Allies," Washington Times, "Insight" magazine, vol. 2, no. 36 (8 September 1986): 14.

10. Ibid.

11. Bill Hayden, Australian foreign minister, "Australia-US Relations," a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California, World Affairs Council, and the Australian-American Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco, 12 August 1986, cited in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, August 1986, 645.

12. "Weinberger Criticizes Report Recommendations," Defence News, 10 November 1986, 5.

13. Dora Alves, "US Perspective of ANZUS," in Asia-Pacific Defence Forum, special supplement, Winter 1985-1986, 36.

14. Radio Australia news broadcast, 15 September 1986.

CHAPTER 4

POLICY ADJUSTMENTS

Negotiate until hell freezes over.

Adlai Stevenson

Appraising the ANZUS pact and its security objectives, and present policies and perceptions has revealed that the Western alliance in the region is today challenged more than at any other time since the treaty's inception. There has also been a shift of global interest into the East Asia-Pacific region for economic as well as other purposes. Now is obviously not the time to allow the alliance to be further weakened by these challenges, nor is it the time to see ANZUS fail, for this would be, in the words of the author of the Australian government's Dobb Report, "of enormous benefits to the USSR's worldwide interests."¹ Dora Alves concurs and, in her call for magnanimity among ANZUS members to establish a common ground for agreement, adds that "the prolongation of the completion of the [ANZUS] rupture would strengthen only potential enemies."²

No doubt ANZUS is important. As indicated, its maintenance is a prime security objective of each member nation. According to Henry Albinski, it is important not only for what it does but also for how it appears to outsiders. A faltering ANZUS in disarray, says Albinski, creates doubt in the minds of the nations of the greater East Asian-Pacific community as to the credibility of the

transregional security system as a whole.³ Professor W. T. Roy, chairman of the Department of Politics, University of Waikato in New Zealand, takes this point further. He argues that, among the nations with vested interests in the South Pacific and, particularly, East Asian countries, a reluctance by Japan to build up militarily, and a preoccupation by South Korea with the North and by Taiwan with the People's Republic of China all but preclude any Pacific-wide concept of defense cooperation in the near future. He postulates that, because of these very real limitations, "clearly . . . the core of South Pacific defence must remain the ANZUS pact."⁴

Given the importance of ANZUS, the most logical question to ask is: Can the alliance as it stands today overcome the threats to its coherence? Or, in other words, can the alliance meet its security objectives in the face of augmented fragmentation, increased disharmony, and economic frictions--factors which all provide opportunities for its traditional enemy, the Soviet Union, to extend its influence in the South Pacific? To answer this question, one must speculate on how ANZUS will evolve should New Zealand be completely disassociated from the cooperative defense efforts and whether Australia should be expected to take on a greater regional political role while suffering major trade damage from its main ally.

Many would argue that the US action against New Zealand was an overreaction. Professor Albinski explained to the US

House of Representatives Subcommittee hearings on ANZUS that the United States would have a predicted net loss by distancing New Zealand from the alliance. He warned of the eventual degradation of skills of the thoroughly professional (if small) New Zealand standing forces, the rundown of naval and air surveillance assets that are important to the region, and the weakening of Western political influence among New Zealand's neighbors. He believes furthermore that the "object lesson" taught New Zealand was futile because, without economic sanctions (a course he diagnosed as inappropriate for New Zealand), ostracism proved nothing except to weaken the defense capability of the alliance in general.⁵

The United States has been criticized for a lack of prudent diplomacy in not appreciating the feelings of the New Zealand people or the peculiarities of their politics, while at the same time helping the prime minister to paint himself into a corner. Then, of course, there have been counter criticisms that the New Zealand people had not fully thought through the implications of an antinuclear policy and how diametrically opposed it is to the very essence upon which their defense is based. Both arguments suggest imprudent, inopportune, and inconsiderate diplomacy on each side.

New Zealand, out in the cold, cannot possibly maintain the same defense posture it did before the rift. Only two options appear viable. It could either increase its defense

spending appreciably, an option already dismissed by the government, or reduce defense capacity to cope only with low-level threats to its immediate area. The inevitability of the latter option is that New Zealand will slip into a posture of de facto nonalignment. This situation will impose severe strains on the Australian military, who will need to "double handle" all regional defense matters that involve the United States and New Zealand, through separate contracts with each partner. An isolationist posture therefore is inappropriate to New Zealand, is not sought by her, and is seen by many as eventually harming the bilateral relation with Australia.

Another by-product of New Zealand isolationism is the withdrawal of its forces from Singapore and the resultant loss of a Western voice in the Five Power Defence Agreement (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Malaysia, and Singapore). The prime minister announced on 23 December 1986 that New Zealand would phase out its military presence in Singapore over the next three years, thus ending a commitment that began in 1955 during the Malayan Emergency.⁶

In all, it would appear that, if New Zealand is left out of ANZUS, it cannot help but see its regional defensive and political strength diminished significantly. While the United States may be able to pick up any defense shortfall left by New Zealand, Australia would also be expected to assist militarily. Additionally, she would become even more responsible than at present for maintaining regional

cooperation and pursuing economic development. Whether Australia would be nationally willing, economically capable, or politically able to meet this added responsibility will depend largely on how the United States is perceived locally and regionally in the future. Certainly one point that is not debatable is the motives of the Soviet Union in its regional endeavors. Soviet persistence will only be dampened by a determined and united stand from a strong regional alliance. But this is not the case today.

Western cooperation in the South Pacific region cannot work effectively without ANZUS, and yet, at the same time, the alliance cannot meet its objectives under the present ANZUS relationship. That leaves only one alternative--ANZUS must be changed. The policies that make up the alliance have to be adjusted so that those fundamental differences between the nuclear nations and others over nuclear defense and trade competition are taken into consideration; and the perceptions of alliance member nations as to what the treaty means for them must be duly clarified.

A first step to adjusting policy would be to consolidate the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty itself. Vague promises of assistance in times of trouble in the present treaty appear no longer capable of guaranteeing continued cooperation among its members in a world increasingly divided by global and vested interests. The treaty must be rewritten in a manner to eliminate any doubts in the minds of its signatories as to each party's defense

commitments. It must be drawn up as a defense contractual agreement that specifically addresses contentious issues such as port access for nuclear ships, long-term hosting of member nations' military forces and equipment, and alliance mobilization in times of hostilities. The new contract should make the treaty's limitations clear so that it may not be challenged by disagreements in other arenas beyond its terms of reference.

On the port-access issue, to appease both the United States and New Zealand, a compromise position must be reached. One possibility would be port access for US nuclear vessels only during times of hostilities. The United States must recognize that the loss of New Zealand's defense contribution weakens the Western position in the Pacific, that in some ways the growing global disenchantment over nuclear proliferation has to be acceded to, and that port access in New Zealand has been of little strategic importance in the past. In New Zealand's case, the full implications of its antinuclear stance need to be logically articulated and publicly debated in environments that are detached as much as possible from political rhetoric and pacifist jingoism. If a compromise cannot be defended by the government, then an issue of this importance should be put to public referendum for decision. Only then will the clear wishes of the New Zealand people be represented.

Second, with regard to long-term hosting of member nations' military forces and equipment, an open-access

policy during wartime would appear mutually acceptable to alliance members. A peacetime policy on the other hand would be more difficult to conclude. One possibility is to limit peacetime hosting of bases to those facilities that address only functions of C³I (command, control, communications, and intelligence). This will preclude peacetime basing of nuclear weapons or large-scale military forces in the South Pacific--an arrangement that accommodates Australia and New Zealand. The United States, on the other hand, should be given better guarantees that its vital defense facilities in alliance countries will receive secure, long-term tenure. This is not to usurp the individual country-to-country agreements that govern these facilities, but rather to prevent the sort of diplomatic "blackmail" that seems to arise when essential US defense bases are used as bargaining chips in political differences--a situation unpalatable to the United States and destabilizing to an effective alliance.

The last major point requiring specific definition in the revised treaty is alliance mobilization in times of hostilities. Australian strategist T. B. Millar aptly summed up a practical strategic outlook for Australia when he said, "The 'defence of Australia' involves far more than defending the homeland against attack by hostile forces. Australia cannot opt out of the world."⁷ A continued strategic balance in the East Asian-Pacific region is vitally important to the South Pacific nations, and regional

middle powers such as Australia must participate directly in its maintenance. Australia and New Zealand have to commit themselves, through the alliance, to support the US presence throughout the whole Pacific region. This means militarily assisting the United States to defend its bases in the Philippines, Korea, and Japan should they be threatened. After all, any reduction of US influence in these countries creates a power vacuum which no doubt would soon be filled by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, to preserve alliance integrity, the United States must guarantee automatic theater assistance to the allies in case of South Pacific regional conflicts, regardless of any regional economic considerations the United States may have at the time.

There is no suggestion here that renegotiating ANZUS will be a simple task. Converting a document that has the broadest possible flexibility into a narrow, task-oriented agreement will be extremely difficult because of strong vested interests among member nations. Such a change may even be impossible or politically unfeasible in today's climate. As simplistic as the above solutions may sound, they should not be dismissed out of hand; the fundamental credibility of any alliance depends on its ability to address the crucial issues of national survival and sovereignty. For this reason, the feasibility of changing ANZUS must be given the utmost attention. Also, a revised treaty is the only viable method of overcoming the United

States-New Zealand impasse and its broader ramifications. It is also a sure way to clarify for Australia and New Zealand what they can expect from the alliance in the future, thus ending the plethora of debates concerning this subject. Each member nation would be guaranteed a more definitive commitment from the others and any doubts in the minds of potential aggressors about invocation of the treaty (which is the case at present) would be dispelled.

If a new treaty cannot be agreed upon and ratified, then ANZUS as it stands must be abandoned as unworkable. The possibility of dissolving ANZUS should be used as pressure to encourage all parties to compromise in working out a new and clearly defined treaty.

If this fails, what then is the best alternative relationship to ANZUS? Abandoning ANZUS should not mean abandoning New Zealand. Bilateral treaties would obviously be set up between the United States and Australia and between Australia and New Zealand, with Australia acting as a bridge between the two alliances. The onus would fall heavily on the United States, however, as to how well the two interacted, and therefore how well overall regional defense integrity was maintained. The United States would need to allow enough defense support flow from Australia to New Zealand to enable the latter to continue her political and defense role of the past. In this way, New Zealand could remain defense "solvent" while the United States and

Australia await New Zealand's return to a more conservative antinuclear policy.

A revamped ANZUS agreement should not exclude the defense of the island nations of the South Pacific. At present, island security is monitored by the South Pacific Forum. It is only verbally assured by the ANZUS partners, more as a means to regional stability than to individual islands' protection. Naturally enough, this causes concern among many regional states. Past attempts by some nations, such as Papua New Guinea, to join ANZUS as a means of gaining greater security guarantees have been rejected politely by ANZUS members. A suggestion by Dr Coral Bell of the Australian National University to formalize Pacific islands' defense is worthy of consideration. She advocates "promotion of a Pacific Protocol to the ANZUS Treaty, making the treaty partners more specifically responsible for the security of the island ministates."⁸ An alternate solution proffered by Allan E. Goodman, author Australian strategist, is the "development of an ANZUS rapid reaction force for missions to protect island states and essential Sea Lines of Communication."⁹

Instruments of this nature would do much to enhance stability in the region and to present a more united front against the Soviet Union and other potential aggressors. Also, there is no logical reason why the microstates of the North Pacific--for example, the islands of Micronesia--should not be included in such a protocol.

A new ANZUS treaty tailored to defense security would do much for regional stability. However, stability and individual states' viability are also heavily dependent on economic development. In the world economic scene, there is very little that Australia can do through an alliance to ensure fairer trading practices in the future. Essentially, the international trade war is a problem of global proportions and one that can only be solved in the marketplace or by careful international politicking. To this latter end, Australia is presently pursuing a freeze on international agricultural subsidies through the EEC, the US Congress, and the nations who subscribe to the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT). Failing this, the only hope for middle powers such as Australia, in an international trade war, may be to form trade cartels of their own as the best means to counter larger economic communities. The Cairns Group of 14, named after the 14 countries (including Australia, Canada, and Argentina) which met in Cairns, Australia, last year to determine a strategy against US subsidized agricultural products, may very well be the foundation for such a cartel should Australia's negotiations fail.

Developed countries including those in the Cairns Group of 14 will eventually find some way around their economic difficulties. But it is the Pacific's emerging, newly independent island states which often have vulnerable governments and economies that need special protection by

larger powers against exploitation, particularly from potential enemies. Past measures to do this, including establishment of the South Pacific Forum, have been only partially successful mainly because of lack of superpower support. The United States must realize that it is in her own interest and directly supportive of her security objectives to encourage the SPF in its endeavors. This has not been the case in the past. Whether a formal link between the United States and the SPF to ensure political stability in the South Pacific is appropriate for inclusion in a revised defense treaty is a matter for further debate. Certainly a case could be made along economic lines.

It would seem appropriate that all East Asian-Pacific countries with interests in the South Pacific should be encouraged to take a more meaningful part in ensuring economic development of these emerging societies. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, together with the United States, Australia, and possibly even Indonesia, should collectively devise guarantees that will protect their tiny, struggling neighbors from being exploited. Japan has already conceded this point. Recently, Japanese Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari unilaterally pledged "as much assistance as possible to make the [South Pacific] region more economically prosperous."¹⁰

There are other, less revolutionary but timely, measures that could be taken to ease the tension within the current alliance. The United States needs to reconsider its

stance on France's activities in the South Pacific with regard to both nuclear testing and the decolonization of New Caledonia. The latter issue especially has much potential for future unrest in the region. New Caledonia may be allowed to transition peacefully to independence, and trouble may be averted, with a little US influence. Additionally, the United States should move quickly to ratify the protocols of the SPNFZ Treaty. This would acknowledge support for a treaty that had US best interests in mind when it was drawn up and which does not directly encroach on US freedom of operation. Ratifying the treaty would serve the United States well from two sides. It would send a subtle message to the French, thus avoiding direct confrontation with another ally, and at the same time, it would strengthen the SPNFZ and satisfy the South Pacific Forum. These initiatives would do much to boost the flagging American image among South Pacific nations; and they would reinject into the region some trust and solidarity, which have been seriously eroded over the years.

Conclusion

After more than three decades of unprecedented success, the Western alliance in the South Pacific is in trouble. A new global interest in the Pacific Basin is part of the reason, but a clash of fundamental values that has developed recently between the United States and its two ANZUS partners is also a major cause. The ANZUS pact is a

victim, as is regional stability within the South Pacific, and the atmosphere is encouraging to nobody except the Soviet Union. Differences of opinion now seem irreconcilable under the terms of the existing ANZUS Treaty, which relies on broad interpretation of meaning to encourage cooperation and consensus. Unfortunately, today's issues of nuclear weapons and global economic competition seem too far-reaching to be overcome by the goodwill and vague spirit of cooperation developed in the past. The differences are widening--and they are challenging the security objectives of the alliance.

This study has shown that the ANZUS Treaty, as the keystone of the Western alliance in the South Pacific, remains vital to its security and important to the strategic balance of the Pacific in general. It has also shown that ANZUS in its present form is incapable of solving these differences of opinion now and in the future. Accordingly, this study calls for a complete reappraisal of the treaty to take account of disparate viewpoints and member nations' divergent perceptions.

The study recommends a much-tightened treaty that addresses specific defense issues, including those of a contentious and public nature. It offers practical compromise solutions to home porting and basing of alliance members' forces, both nuclear and conventional, and it provides options where military assistance would be appropriate in times of conflict. In essence, these

compromises are an unlimited access to alliance territories in times of hostilities only, with trilateral military involvement assured in defense of alliance or member nations' security interests. It suggests that defense of island microstates be formally included, and it invites further debate to establish formal US and North Pacific commitment to regional viability and economic development through the South Pacific Forum. Finally, it offers some short-term policy changes for the United States to consider as a means of reestablishing confidence and unity within the region.

Recommendations here are obviously inconclusive; anything to the contrary would be beyond the limits of this study. Rather, these recommendations are considered merely practical starting points from which meaningful negotiation will hopefully emerge.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle of all to negotiating a revised ANZUS Treaty is the United States' general lack of concern for issues relating to the South Pacific--a region of the world particularly low on the US national interests priority list. However, it was the United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who focused so deliberately on the importance of US alliances when he said:

The long term maintenance of these alliances is vital to our mutual interests, and we must remain resolute in our determination to overcome occasional disagreements--even those that become subject to intense public attention.¹¹

The Western alliance in the South Pacific does have disagreements, in some cases substantial ones. Now is the time for magnanimity, tolerance, and creative thinking among member nations. Surely there are sufficient warning signs to suggest that a time for change has come, and surely there is enough of that cooperation, consensus, and spirit remaining from the old ANZUS relationship to see appropriate changes incorporated.

NOTES

CHAPTER 4

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6. David Barber, "Phasing out the Force," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 January 1987, 15.

7. T. B. Millar, in The ANZAC Connection, ed. Desmond Ball (Sidney: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

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10. Takashi Oka, "Japan Asserts Greater Role in
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11. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the
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