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NEIGHBORHOOD(U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC
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
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ASEAN's Neighborhood

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James R. Rush

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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, was for so long belittled and is now so glibly taken for granted that its dramatic meaning is often glossed over: for all its flaws and institutional immaturities, ASEAN is nothing less than a revolutionary reconfiguration of Southeast Asia.¹ Regional states have never before formed such a community, neither as pre-modern kingdoms and other traditional polities, nor as the Western-headed colonial states which prevailed outside Thailand until World War II. Leaders of the newly independent nation states that emerged following the war inherited attitudes of mutual suspicion and rivalry, and they behaved accordingly. Only in the past twenty years has an alternative mentality come to the fore through ASEAN. Although ASEAN has grown by fits and starts and continues to disappoint its promoters--especially where economic cooperation is concerned--its overall advantages have proved to be compellingly attractive to its members, so much so that the preservation and strengthening of the Association itself has become a primary consideration of state. The ASEAN states' approach to Vietnam and the unresolved crisis of Kampuchea illustrates the role ASEAN now plays as a major regional institution. *This document describes the history of ASEAN.*



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Although the history of all Southeast Asia is one of diversity and conflict, circumstances of geography, culture and colonization have conspired to make Vietnam the region's most alien culture and polity. At some proto-historical time, it is true, the inhabitants of what is now northern Vietnam participated in a culture that flourished widely in mainland Southeast Asia and deep into the islands. But during the many centuries in which the societies that eventually became those of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma and Java formed themselves around compatible elements of the high civilizations of

classical India, Vietnamese society absorbed its civilization from China. Until 939 AD much of north and central Vietnam was incorporated as a frontier province within the Chinese empire, and the Vietnamese elite which prevailed thereafter, though passionately independent, still found in China the most attractive inspirations for the structure of their state and for the content of its high culture. In Vietnam, an emperor in the Chinese style governed through a bureaucracy of Mandarin scholars steeped in Confucian precepts; in the rest, god-kings great and small held sway, identifying themselves with one branch or another of India's Hindu-Buddhist tradition, and presiding over a looser hierarchy of officials whose level of deference to the king was often a matter of kinship, and a function of distance more than doctrine. As Buddhism eventually prevailed in all mainland Southeast Asia, the Burmese, Thais, Laotians and Cambodians adapted theirs from India via Ceylon, the Vietnamese from China. Eventually Islam prevailed in most of the island world, but did not reach Vietnam. Vietnam was different to begin with.

In modern times, as new groups of Westernized elites formed within the structure of European colonies, and also in independent Thailand, those of Vietnam learned their Westernness from France. This created something of an artificial kinship between them and their fellows, also French subjects, in Laos and Cambodia, but further set them apart from the others in Southeast Asia who, in the twentieth century, were learning English and Dutch. In recent decades the ascendancy in Vietnam of a powerfully nationalistic Marxist movement, and finally a communist state, has accentuated in modern ideological terms its traditional separatism from the rest of Southeast Asia. Vietnam's otherness is nothing new. Irrespective of other trans-regional variables in the present impasse over Kampuchea, from a historical perspective alone it is hardly surprising that it is Vietnam who is having the hardest time fitting into the neighborhood.

Of all ASEAN societies only Thailand has had a more or less continuous relationship with Vietnam throughout recent centuries, and this has been as a rival. As states of considerable power in their respective heartlands, Thailand and Vietnam have long competed over the weaker polities that lay between them, the Kingdom of Cambodia and the princely states of Laos. Culturally, these societies are akin to the Thais, who, over a period of centuries, came to look upon access to their resources with a certain sense of entitlement. For this reason, and for security's sake, Thai rulers employed a variety of devices to keep the royal houses of the Laotian lowlands and Cambodia within their orbit. These were usually friendly but did not exclude war and hostage taking. Cultural affinities and the Thai practice of exerting their regional seniority indirectly (by governing annexed provinces through Cambodian governors, for example) resulted in a big brother-little brother relationship of "remarkable harmony," says historian Milton Osborne.² Such harmony did not characterize similarly motivated initiatives of the Vietnamese, whose attempts to bring the Mekong polities safely into their orbit was more frankly imperialistic, involving military occupation, the imposition of Vietnamese-style administration, and, as occurred in a Vietnamese sweep into Cambodia in the 1830s, overt attempts to Vietnamize the society by requiring the use of Vietnamese-style dress, changing place names and suppressing the Theravada monkhood. In this instance, Thai forces aided Cambodians in ousting the Vietnamese. In fact, this was but one of several similar occasions from the eighteenth century onward in which the Thais "played the role of Cambodia's protector against the Vietnamese."³ In the reign of Rama III alone (1824-1851) the Thais fought the Vietnamese four times over Cambodia.

France's annexation of Indochina in the late nineteenth century froze the Thai-Vietnamese tug-of-war over Cambodia in Vietnam's favor; because of the imperially imposed structural and cultural affiliations of the two within

French Indochina, Cambodia now evolved in synchronization with Vietnam, although neither was autonomous. For its part, independent Thailand prudently relinquished its Cambodian provinces to France at the turn of the century. The Thai-Vietnamese struggle for control over the middle ground blossomed anew after World War II during the turbulent decolonization of Indochina. For whatever other reasons Thailand might have now become party to the American policy of supporting the regimes of Saigon, the one which reflected Thailand's most enduring interests of state was that a divided and war-torn Vietnam was a weak Vietnam. In Laos and Cambodia during the same years Thailand and Vietnam pursued their feud through Cambodian regimes and movements partisan to their respective interests; and after the triumph of communist governments in all Indochina in 1975, although the Thai's continued to support anti-communist movements in both Laos and Cambodia, the rabidly anti-Vietnamese sentiments of the triumphant Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea was one small boon amidst the general disaster. When in late 1978 the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea, moving as they had repeatedly done in the past to re-establish their pre-eminence in Cambodia, Thailand also responded in a time-tested way, by befriending and supporting those factions of Cambodians dedicated to rooting out the Vietnamese. Much in the current crisis duplicates similar conflicts of the past. In its current phase however, Thailand, in pursuit of its enduring interests, is being supported by China and the United States, and also by its modern regional partners in ASEAN. The first is a manifestation of the traditional Thai practice of forming mutually beneficial relations with a hegemonic power, but the second is an innovation.

With the possible exception of the tiny Sultanate of Brunei, Thailand is the only ASEAN country with a tradition of statecraft centuries old. Scholars of Thailand have pointed out that although in the Indian pattern Thailand has often been predatory around its edges in the direction of Burma, Cambodia and the Laotian and Malay states, the purpose of such actions was not imperialis-

tic per se, but was designed to protect and to enhance the strength, stability and wealth of the core kingdom and its elite structure. For the same reason they have found it useful to ally themselves to powerful outside benefactors and protectors. In earlier centuries this was China, with whom Thai kings corresponded in deferential fashion as senders of tribute; in return they expected the Chinese Emperor to use his influence--primarily among other tributary states in the region--to protect Thailand. In the nineteenth century Thai kings made a shrewd assessment of the Western states swarming into Southeast Asia and chose Britain. Concessions of trade--including opening Thailand to British-borne opium from India--and of territories on the Malay peninsula, now placed Thailand safely within the protection of the British Empire and helped assure Thailand's survival as Southeast Asia's only non-colonized society.

By allying with Japan in 1941 Thailand avoided conquest during World War II and achieved the return of provinces in Cambodia lost to the French at the turn of the century; and at the war's end Thai leaders moved quickly to make the amends necessary to link Thailand securely within the United States' ascendent world system. By making America's Cold War crusade its own, Thai military leaders provided for Thailand's security and gained access to an abundance of new resources for internal economic development.⁴ Although Thailand later moved to disengage itself from some aspects of this arrangement, notably by obliging the United States to cease using Thailand as a base for military operations, fundamentally it remains. Even so, in light of America's post-Vietnam withdrawal from a hands-on role in the region and the new threat in Kampuchea (a threat all the more alarming to Thai leaders because of the Soviet Union's support for the Vietnamese), Thailand has repositioned itself once again, but more pluralistically this time. Augmenting Pax Americana is a new marriage of interest with the Chinese, and

Thailand's active membership in ASEAN, both of whom have rallied to Thailand's side in the fight for Kampuchea.

From the vantage point of China's quarrels with the Soviet Union and the abiding tension between it and Vietnam, China's stake in the outcome in Kampuchea is quite clear. But what of ASEAN?

* * * * *

The idea of ASEAN has emerged from the modern awareness that the various states and societies of Southeast Asia constitute a distinct neighborhood within the global community. In earlier centuries, enduring attitudes of animosity between one society and the next, and predatory habits--as most states, like Thailand, sought to extend their sway or shore-up their frontiers at the expense of their weaker neighbors--obscured this fact from the region's people. Modern colonialism balkanized Southeast Asia in another way, subsuming often artificial collections of indigenous societies into imperial economic and administrative systems managed from London, Paris, Madrid, Washington and the Hague. As new nation states emerged from within the cacoon of colonies, their respective leaders seemed to have little in common one with the other. The climate of the times exaggerated their differences, in ideology, for example, and in patterns of acculturation to the West. Not surprisingly they proceeded based upon intuitions of the past, suspecting their nearest neighbors, and upon their particular colonial experience; they sought security for their vulnerable states in a variety of post-colonial external "communities" and alignments: the Commonwealth and the Free World, the Non-Aligned Movement, SEATO, and the Five Power Defense Arrangement, and so on. Only when these communities proved unreliable did some of Southeast Asia's leaders begin to think in terms of the region as a region. In a way, beginning in the 1960s, Southeast Asians began to see Southeast Asia for the

first time.

Two attempts to form associations of cooperating neighbor states with exclusively Southeast Asian membership failed in the early 1960s. Both the Association of South-east Asia (ASA)--Thailand, the Philippines and the Federation of Malaya--and Maphilindo--Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines--foundered when, in 1963, the loose ends of Britain's Southeast Asian empire, minus Brunei, were gathered together to form Malaysia. In the Philippines, President Diosdado Macapagal claimed that one of Malaysia's new states, Sabah, formerly British North Borneo, was by tradition and treaty actually Philippine territory; and from Indonesia, Sukarno attacked Malaysia as a neo-imperialist concoction and launched an ideology-driven assault upon the new state. This was Confrontation. When Soeharto and his fellow military men assumed power in Indonesia after 1965, having eliminated the Indonesian communist movement and shunted Sukarno aside, they were eager to bring their state into concord with the rest of the neighborhood. No longer a regional provocateur, Indonesia now lent its support to the next attempt to form a regional association, and in 1967 its Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, joined senior officials from Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore (which had separated from Malaysia in 1965) to form ASEAN--the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Convening in Bangkok, they signed a declaration calling for "regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region."⁵

The creation of ASEAN did not wash away longstanding conflict between its constituent societies, but ASEAN, as it matured, was to provide a new structure within which such conflicts could be negotiated and contained. What is more, ASEAN became the institutional vehicle for the spread of a new way of thinking about the region, the fundamental idea of which was that the stability and security of each of us affects the stability and security of us

all: for better or worse, Friends, we are neighbors! From the beginning, then, a major function of ASEAN was to reinforce a code of neighborly behavior. This involved a willingness to cooperate on virtually any issue of mutual interest or conflict, but at its heart was a simple promise: to respect each other's "independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity."⁶ This promise, made explicit by treaty in 1976, provided welcome assurances to the signatories that the vulnerable nation states over which they presided would not be subject to subversions or assaults from each other.

ASEAN's founders also promoted the concept of regional autonomy. This idea arose, first in Indonesia, in response to another historical reality: that throughout history, and dramatically in modern times, Southeast Asian societies have been appallingly vulnerable to predators from the outside. Aside from the Thais, none of ASEAN's ministers and heads of state had been born in an independent state; each was a child of a colony. (The same was true for Southeast Asia's non-ASEAN leaders as well.) Although Southeast Asians now enjoyed political autonomy, prudence and economic necessity still compelled the new states to link up with big powers, and, in so doing, to subordinate themselves within one camp or another in the Cold War. In this respect, the ASEAN states were all firmly anti-communist. Four of the five had formal defense arrangements with Western protectors: Malaysia and Singapore with Britain, Thailand and the Philippines with the United States. And even though Soeharto's Indonesia steered clear of formal alliances, it placed itself unabashedly in the Western camp nevertheless. The anti-communism of ASEAN's political elites was genuine. Malaya, the Philippines and Singapore had confronted internal Marxist-led challenges to the state, and Soeharto's rise to power in Indonesia was popularly legitimized on the basis of his having "saved" his country from its communists. Thai leaders also confronted

subversive Thai communists, and, in collaboration with American war aims in Vietnam, sought to facilitate a non-communist resolution to the turbulence in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Be that as it may, there lurked just beneath the surface an awareness among many of ASEAN's formateurs that however necessary they may be, powerful friends could be nearly as dangerous as powerful enemies, and sometimes more so. Countless historical memories bore this out; to mention only one, the British colonization of Malaya began when the Sultan of Kedah ceded Penang Island to the British in return for protection against the Thais. In modern times small states could still be drawn unwittingly as local pawns into the global contests and strategic maneuverings of big powers. More importantly, the national interests of big states and small states were never fully complementary; far from it. Small states, in short, were too easily taken advantage of, and, when policies changed in distant capitals, could suddenly be left in the lurch at home. It was best, therefore, to be free of such entanglements. This perspective achieved its fullest articulation in newly independent Indonesia, where Mohammad Hatta and Sukarno called for a foreign policy that asserted Indonesia's autonomy from compromising alliances and in which Indonesia would assert itself as an active player in regional and world affairs--bebas-aktif, free and active! Soeharto was in thorough agreement with Sukarno in rejecting major power interferences in Southeast Asia--he viewed Sukarno's alliance with Beijing as a dangerous deviation from the principle--and in supporting the establishment of ASEAN he envisioned an "integrated South East Asia" standing "strongly in facing outside influences and intervention from whatever quarter..."⁷

In the late 1960s the behavior of ASEAN's Free World protectors tended to bear out this point of view. The territorial defenses of Malaysia and Singapore, for example, had been provided for by the United Kingdom in a series of

colonial and post colonial pacts, and reinforced by British and Commonwealth forces stationed locally. As a colonial power Britain had suppressed Malaya's communists in the 1950s; and in the early 1960s Commonwealth forces shielded fledgeling Malaysia during Confrontation. But Britain's decision to withdraw its eastern forces, announced in 1967 and executed in the early 1970s, alerted Malaysia's and Singapore's leaders to the transience of big power guarantees. Even though a new pact, the Five Power Defense Arrangement with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore provided defense assurances from Commonwealth parties, Britain's ex-Southeast Asian colonies now began repositioning themselves in the direction of non-alignment and in clearer collaboration with their ASEAN neighbors. At the same time, the 1968 pronouncement by President Richard Nixon of the Guam Doctrine, and subsequent United States reversals in the Vietnam War, alerted Southeast Asia's SEATO members that America's presence in the region might be equally as transitory. Pressures arose in the Philippines to pull back on Filipino ties to the United States, and Thailand began, in 1969, to reduce the American military presence in Thailand.

As the defense umbrellas of the Free World began to look increasingly unreliable and impermanent the idea of regional autonomy became correspondingly attractive, and in 1971 the ASEAN partners promulgated it as an explicit ASEAN doctrine. This was ZOPFAN, a proposal "to secure the recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interferences by outside powers."³ In deciding for regional neutrality the Association rejected a Malaysian proposal, supported by Singapore, in which ASEAN's neutrality would be guaranteed by three mutually competitive major powers--the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States--in favor of the Indonesian conception in which the Association's members took it upon themselves to protect their own neutrality. In this view even though ASEAN states might

well take comfort from external security treaty pacts in the short run, in the long run the region should seek to rid itself of military alliances with big powers, and to refrain from calling upon powerful outsiders to help settle regional disputes. ASEAN's member countries, said Indonesia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik, should "take charge of their own future and ...reject the assumption that the fate of the region is to continue to be determined by outside powers."⁹

Malik and Soeharto further proposed that this need not be a dream. What was needed was a new concept of security based not upon strong armies, but upon strong national societies, states whose economies, authority structures, and national identities were so strong and mutually reinforcing that they would develop a powerful, self-protecting national resilience; this would prevent subversion from within and thwart predators from without. A regional community made up of resilient national societies would in turn become resilient itself, especially when its members worked cooperatively toward the security of the neighborhood as a whole. Resilient nation states within a cohesive, autonomous region--this was the Indonesian vision for ASEAN, and by and large it soon became ASEAN's vision for itself.

But this was a vision. In reality ASEAN evolved slowly in the early years. Most importantly, its many committees and sub-committees cranked into bureaucratic motion to address a wide range of practical matters from a cooperative perspective: regional banking procedures, shipping regulations, postal services, monetary policy, tourism, agriculture, and trade. The products of these consultations, in the form of new proposals and agreements, coursed upward through ASEAN secretariats in each country and were eventually considered by the collective Secretaries General, other ASEAN-wide councils, and finally by the Foreign Ministers themselves, who met each year. Although the concrete achievements emerging from this process were modest, a collabora-

tive machinery began to mature, and ASEAN put down some region-wide bureaucratic roots. Diplomatically the Association's members did not always go the same way; Indonesia and Singapore failed to follow the lead of the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand in recognizing the People's Republic of China in the mid-seventies, for example. But in other areas the ASEAN states tested their collaborative wings, and initiated joint ASEAN representations to the European Economic Community, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade meetings and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Bilaterally, they stepped up joint military exercises and intelligence sharing. Also, as the relentlessly unresolved crisis in Indochina deepened upon the withdrawal of American forces, ASEAN braced itself to deal with the consequences. At first this took the form of a committee delegated to address problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation, but when the southern regime fell at last and all Indochina came under Marxist regimes, ASEAN's heads of state gathered personally to assess the damage and to address the future.

At the Bali Summit in February 1976, ASEAN's premiers and presidents pledged themselves anew to the achievement of national resilience and regional autonomy, explicitly re-affirming their commitment to ZOPFAN, and initiated new levels of economic, social and cultural interaction. Economic Ministers would now meet twice a year. On a non-ASEAN basis, they tightened their security ties. For the first time officially they also described the ASEAN countries as representing a diplomatic bloc whose members would seek to coordinate and harmonize their respective positions and, where possible, to act in concert. This resounding affirmation of ASEAN, expressed in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, was in part a response to the unwelcome reality that Southeast Asia was now divided clearly along ideological lines, and the corresponding fear that Marxist Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam might become sources of subversion against the ASEAN states, Thailand being most vulnerable. This

particular resolution of things in Indochina also left both communist big powers with client states in the neighborhood, Vietnam and Laos being patronized by the Soviet Union, and Kampuchea, Khmer-Rouge-led, by China. On the face of it, the new state of affairs in Indochina threatened both elements of ASEAN's vision--the integrity and stability of its member states; and its hopes for a regional future free from foreign intervention.

On the other hand, if Vietnam and its neighbors could be persuaded to accept the principles of community behavior and cooperation upon which ASEAN was built, then the end to Indochina's many years of turbulence and civil war, despite Marxist victories, could be a positive outcome for the region after all. Having shored up their team, the ASEAN leaders now proceeded upon this more hopeful premise. In the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, also a product of the Bali Summit, ASEAN's heads of state promulgated a neighborhood code of conduct, the fundamental assertion of which was that a state's respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors must be absolute. Having made the pledge to each other, the ASEAN states now invited "other States in Southeast Asia" to sign the Treaty too. It was a cautious welcome to the neighborhood.

Although Soeharto's Indonesia was in many ways the most obsessively anti-communist ASEAN country where domestic policy was concerned, it had resolutely refused to be drawn into international Cold War pacts. As its neighbors Thailand and the Philippines enlisted, through SEATO, in the United States' war effort in Vietnam, Indonesia had maintained friendly relations with the government in Hanoi. Among Indonesians there existed a deep respect for the Vietnamese nationalists who had persevered longest and hardest to reclaim their national sovereignty; the Vietnamese were, perhaps, communists of an acceptable stripe. Indonesia was especially keen to bring them into the neighborhood on friendly terms.

Vietnam could not in any case be ignored. Emerging in triumph from a long bitter war, it possessed an army better equipped and immeasurably more experienced than any other in Southeast Asia, and of a size outnumbering all ASEAN forces combined. What is more, as its leaders turned their attention from war to economic construction and growth, Vietnam professed to offer an alternative model for development. It would inevitably play a role of increasing importance in the region, and bid well to emerge "as one of the most dynamic powers in Southeast Asia."¹⁰ By 1976 other ASEAN countries had repositioned themselves bilaterally in such a way as to facilitate good relations with Hanoi. Under a civilian government since 1973, the Thais warmed quickly to the victorious regime, having by now moved decisively to remove American military presence from Thailand. (Things soured again when the military seized power back in 1976, however). Malaysia and the Philippines, joining Indonesia, opened embassies in Hanoi, although Singapore held back, and modest levels of trade and other exchanges followed. Malaysia and the Philippines even broached the idea of Vietnam joining the Association.¹¹ These readjustments were a response to the necessity of establishing working relationships with the new regional power, but also to the perception that ideologically based blocs would impede rather than promote regional stability in the long run. With this in mind Soeharto had some years before envisioned an ASEAN that embraces all systems. The dust having settled as it had in Indochina, ASEAN states and the Association itself moved cautiously to make the best of it.

As for the Association, the Vietnamese dismissed it as a tool of "the U.S. imperialists" who were using it, in the wake of defeat, "to rally all pro-American reactionary forces to oppose revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia,"¹² and they dismissed the proffered hand of ASEAN's Treaty as well. Bilaterally, however, Vietnam moved to improve its connections in the neighborhood, and displayed unexpected flexibility when it established full

relations with the Philippines despite American military bases there. In September and October of 1978 Vietnam openly courted ASEAN states when Premier Pham Van Dong visited the ASEAN capitals personally and offered treaties of friendship and non-aggression, which ASEAN's leaders warily rejected in turn. (Vietnam's deepening ties to the Soviets alarmed ASEAN members in the same way that links to Western economies and increased arms purchases from the United States by ASEAN countries alarmed the Vietnamese.) Nevertheless, the cautious linkages, posturing and fending off which characterized ASEAN-Vietnamese relations after 1975 might well have led to a more comfortable accommodation between them had not Vietnam proceeded in December 1978 to violate the one rule about which there could be no compromise.

It is understandable that the Vietnamese assumed the world would forget about Kampuchea in a few weeks.¹³ In this they completely underestimated ASEAN. But so had nearly everyone else. As analysts and even its members and promoters often pointed out, it wasn't a strong organization; its public emphasis (and lackluster achievement) on economic cooperation, and its public face as Southeast Asia's non-communist bloc tended to obscure the powerful ideas and interests which were coalescing within it. These were only secondarily economic and ideological. Fundamentally they were national. The ousted Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot and the new one of Heng Samrin were both communist; and the invasion's impact upon economic circumstances within ASEAN was virtually nil. No matter. The change of government in Kampuchea aroused ASEAN because, one, it placed one ASEAN state, Thailand, in immediate jeopardy, and two, because it occurred as a result of a predatory act by one member of the neighborhood against another. However important reconciliation with Vietnam might be, ASEAN's leaders agreed, it could not occur at the expense of Thailand, nor at the expense of the neighborhood code. Nor, as it turned out, would it be permitted to occur at the expense of ASEAN itself.

Beginning in 1979 ASEAN's leaders articulated a common stand against the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and collectively denied recognition to the new government. And in the years that followed: they put forward a common policy describing an acceptable solution (at its heart, the withdrawal of Vietnam's occupation forces and an act of self-determination within Kampuchea); they lobbied the international community to deny the new regime a seat in the United Nations General Assembly; they promoted an international conference to address the issue; they created and supported the anti-Vietnamese Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea led by Norodom Sihanouk, Son Sann, and Khieu Samphan (of the Khmer Rouge); and they have engaged in numerous attempts involving the principals as well as big power patrons to facilitate a solution to the problem compatible with Thailand's security, Kampuchea's sovereignty and Vietnam's legitimate interests. Confronting Vietnam over the issue of Kampuchea, in short, forced ASEAN into the sort of effective policy collaboration envisioned at the Bali Summit, and it has given ASEAN a high and positive international profile.

On the other hand, for all its efforts to date, ASEAN has not successfully prevailed upon Vietnam to forfeit its domineering position in Kampuchea, nor, in any other substantial way has it altered the state of affairs there. Ironically, it has been the intractable nature of the Kampuchea crisis, with the intractable Vietnamese at the heart of it, that has fostered ASEAN's maturity. In the face of it, ASEAN has been tested and come of age.

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ASEAN's policy toward Kampuchea and Vietnam was dictated from the start by the needs of Thailand: in this crisis Thailand was the "front-line state." Also, Thailand's hard-line position against Vietnam comports with ASEAN doc-

trine--No preying in the neighborhood! Standing firmly by Thailand has been prompted, therefore, by the strong sense of solidarity which has grown among ASEAN members; the crisis might be ours the next time! On the other hand, reacting to Kampuchea has thrown into sharper relief the differences between the various ASEAN countries insofar as their security is concerned; the size, demography, culture, geographical place, and history of each dictates conflicting perceptions. And, clearly related to this, reacting to Kampuchea has also thrown into sharper relief the tension within ASEAN between the vision for regional autonomy and the necessity for external protectors.

In pressing for an uncompromising policy toward Vietnam, Thailand has found its most vociferous ASEAN ally in the Republic of Singapore. Its diplomats, for example, have played a conspicuous role in orchestrating international disapproval against Vietnam, especially in the United Nations. As a very small state without significant natural resources and dependent on trade for its survival, Singapore is potentially one of Southeast Asia's most vulnerable states. Underlying apprehensions for its security is the fact that, although officially "multi-racial," Singapore is undeniably an overseas Chinese society, and a conspicuously prosperous one; it finds itself nestled intimately between Southeast Asia's two large Islamic states, Malaysia and Indonesia. In both of these, anti-Chinese feelings run deep and wide among the indigenous majorities. Singapore, warns Lee Kuan Yew, can take nothing for granted. He and his colleagues have responded to this by forging within Singapore a dynamic modern economy and a militantly nationalistic spirit, and, insofar as the budget has allowed, by providing the city state with a modern defense. In a world of potential predators, one of Singapore's goals is to be tough, prickly and indigestible.

Another goal, however, is to so arrange one's relations with the outside world that one's indigestibility need never be put to the test. It is in this

respect that the advantages to Singapore of being a good team player within ASEAN are overwhelming. Not only is the ASEAN code based upon the sanctity of national sovereignty; ASEAN also provides an institutionalized means of building special relationships for collaboration between Singapore and its neighbors. The more thoroughly integrated is Singapore within the web of ASEAN interests, the safer as well. Without compromising its attitude of proud independence, Singapore has chosen to identify its interests with ASEAN and in some ways has worked overtime to demonstrate its fervor. It was partly in this spirit that Singapore rallied to Thailand. But it did so as well because Lee Kuan Yew's sense of the relative danger posed by various actors in the present crisis is closely attuned to that of the Thai's: Vietnam is the problem, and the problem is immeasurably more acute now because of the Soviet Union's role.

Since its independence in 1965 Singapore has followed an official policy of non-alignment. Although the presence in Southeast Asia of world powers is inevitable and unavoidable, small states are safest, thought its leaders, when not implicated directly in the grand schemes of one over against the other. Along with Indonesia, Singapore avoided SEATO. Practically speaking, however, certain arrangements were necessary, and it was best and also convenient that these be made with those whose economies and governments were compatible with one's own. For Singapore, this was the West. Until the early 1970s Singapore rested safely under Britain's formal protection, and was thereafter party to the Five Power Defense Arrangement. Also as a practical matter, and an ideological one, Singapore supported American policy in Vietnam and inveighed against the communist menace. Subversion by communist conspirators promoted from the outside, Lee Kuan Yew explained, was the most serious threat to his young and vulnerable country. Insofar as the United States acted to check the subversive initiatives of communist big powers it was a welcome presence in the neighborhood.

The ascendancy of the Marxists in Indochina at a time when America's commitment to a strong posture in Southeast Asia appeared to be waning was an alarming turn of events for Singapore. As the People's Republic's attitude turned from hostile to supportive of ASEAN, and as Vietnam moved to institutionalize its special relationship with the Soviet Union, Singapore came to view the Vietnamese-Soviet partnership as the greatest danger to the security of the region, and hence to itself. This perspective wedded perfectly with that of the Thais and has accounted for Singapore's joining Thailand in an uncompromising stance against the occupation. Be that as it may, Singapore's posture may also involve a large element of calculation. Lee Kuan Yew realizes that harping on the Soviet-Vietnam menace helps keep the United States interested and engaged; and a strong affiliation with Thailand gives Singapore useful leverage within ASEAN vis-a-vis its closer Islamic neighbors. Not incidentally, their views about the crisis in Kampuchea and its implications for the long term security of Southeast Asia are somewhat different.

Year after year Malaysia and Indonesia have kept faith with the over Kampuchea. Nevertheless, Malaysia and Indonesia have been conspicuously less hostile toward Vietnam than Thailand and Singapore, and have been aggressive within ASEAN in their attempts to break the impasse with Vietnam and to hasten an end to the crisis. Both have offered new formulas for negotiations, and in recent years, as the formal interlocutor between ASEAN and Vietnam, Indonesia has worked tirelessly to bring Vietnam into a productive dialogue with the others. Their urgency reflects contrary notions about just who, in the long run, the enemy really is.

Philosophically, Indonesia is ASEAN's strongest proponent of regional autonomy and eventual neutrality. This may have something to do with the fact that it is also Southeast Asia's largest country--by population three times bigger than Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam, and ten times larger than

Malaysia--and it also reflects the traumatic circumstances of Indonesia's unfriendly disengagement from its colonial mentor, Holland. Indonesia's for-mateurs sought an independent course in international affairs, and moved actively to avoid being made a proxy in the great global tussle of the Cold War. The destruction of the Vietnam War appalled them: It is best to keep all big powers at bay. Sukarno and Soeharto agreed about this as a theoretical proposition, and Soeharto has successfully projected the idea upon ASEAN. But when it inevitably comes to differentiating among the big powers, Soeharto, like Lee Kuan Yew and the rest of ASEAN as well, opted enthusiastically for the West. Considerations of economic development, domestic security and ideology favored this. Indonesia's leaders are viscerally anti-communist, and like Lee Kuan Yew, they say that externally sponsored subversion represents a major potential threat to their state. But to Indonesia it is not the distant and clumsy Soviet Union and its erstwhile Southeast Asian dependent Vietnam who most threatens them in the long run, it is China.

Indonesia's fear of China has its roots in the interaction, occurring over centuries, of indigenous Indonesians and the emigres from China who established businesses and families in their midst. At what point the stereotyping by ethnic Indonesians of the Chinese as "alien" blended with a perception of China itself as a powerful state looming threateningly to the north is not clear. Local lore had perhaps made a Mongol assault upon Java some 700 years ago popularly known. In any case, by the second half of the nineteenth century, when new and larger waves of Chinese immigrants added to the old, a fear for the Yellow Peril had already developed on Java. Dutch colonial reformers who campaigned against Chinese money lenders and opium merchants may have fanned the flames. By the early twentieth century, as a resurgent China was sending consuls to look after Chinese communities abroad, Indonesian Moslem merchants began organizing themselves against the local Chinese, who by

this time dominated much of the commercial life of the colony. As modern Indonesian nationalism evolved it bore anti-Chinese sentiments within it. Popularly speaking the Chinese were seen to side with the Dutch against indigenous Indonesians, even during the Revolution. Indonesia's Chinese population was incidental to the Indonesian Communist Party, an overwhelmingly Indonesian movement, but China's support for the Party and its alleged role in provoking a Communist Party takeover attempt in 1965 fixed China as Indonesia's Enemy Number One. Indonesia has yet to re-establish diplomatic relations with China, "frozen" in 1967, and is still sufficiently obsessed with the fear of Chinese sponsored subversion that Jakarta's censors black out any Chinese characters which may happen to appear in imported publications.

Indonesia's suspicions of China are only incidentally related to communism and reflect a vaguer fear that one day a mighty China, helped along by its loyal sons abroad, will engulf the smaller societies to its south, not by conquest necessarily, but by undermining them economically and ideologically. The prospect of a resurgent, confident, prosperous and expansive China is all the more reason Indonesia must hasten to become resilient, and all the rest of ASEAN too. And all the more reason to hasten the day when Vietnam, who also loathes and fears China, can become a partner to ASEAN's regional resilience and solidarity. What is particularly alarming to Indonesia about the seven year stand-off with Vietnam is that it has continued to alienate an important potential partner who is inescapably part of the neighborhood, just as it has drawn into ASEAN's midst as an ally Southeast Asia's most dangerous friend, China.

Although this is the fundamental reason Indonesia is eager to calm the waters between Vietnam and ASEAN, Indonesia is also well disposed toward Vietnam for other reasons. Among them is a deep respect for the achievement of Vietnam's independence against powerful adversaries; another, voiced sotto

voce, is the frank opinion that in occupying Kampuchea Vietnam acted with understandable, and legitimate, concerns for its security. As for the Soviets, only desperate circumstances have forced the Vietnamese into a reluctant dependency. These points of view are represented powerfully among the Indonesian leadership, but they have not deflected Soeharto from his staunch support for ASEAN's official position. There must be solidarity in the neighborhood! But they have spurred him to encourage his diplomats, most prominently his current Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, and other agents who work through non-diplomatic channels, to explore all conceivable avenues toward reconciliation.

In many ways, Malaysia is of like mind. A small country whose public face is self-consciously Malay and Moslem, Malaysia's Chinese population constitutes more than a third of the total. Race is the central question of Malaysian politics. Like their compatriots in Indonesia, the Malaysian Chinese have played a role of disproportionate prominence in the society's economic life and modern urban prosperity. Today, in a finely-tuned political arrangement their leaders are subordinated within a Malay-dominated national coalition, and Malaysia's citizens of Chinese descent are subjected by national policy to a program of affirmative action designed to redress the economic balance in the direction of the Malays. It goes without saying that many Malays express doubts about the ultimate loyalty of their Chinese countrymen; and Malaysia's current premier, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohammad, some years ago articulated publically an analagous fear--that in open competition, Malays would be no match for the Chinese.¹⁴ Malaysia's leaders do not now project these anxieties onto the People's Republic of China, with whom Malaysia has had friendly relations since 1974. Nor does there seem to be in Malaysia the popular notion of a China expanding relentlessly southward. Nevertheless, at another level, the prospect of an economically prosperous and politically assertive China might have a more profound influence domestically

in Malaysia than in Indonesia. For Malaysia too, then, China is a problematic friend. When Premier Mahathir enjoins his people to "Look East," he points explicitly toward Japan.

From this perspective the Vietnamese could be a constructive force in the region. But not, in the Malaysian view, at the expense of Thailand, who is not only the front-line state, but also the only ASEAN country with whom Malaysia shares a land border. What happens in Thailand is directly important to Malaysia's national security. Within ASEAN, therefore, Malaysia has supported the Thai diplomatic position, encouraged the creation and support of the anti-Vietnamese Coalition Government led by Sihanouk (indeed, it was formally inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur in 1982), and provided to the Coalition some token military support of its own. While keeping the heat on, however, it has also worked diplomatically to bring Vietnam into negotiations. The "proximity talks" were Mahathir's idea.

The Soviet Union, although troubling to the region in the short run, does not loom large in Malaysian fears. The primary issue of Kampuchea, after Thailand's security, is Vietnam's violation of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. Almost equally important is ASEAN itself. For Malaysia, especially under Mahathir, ASEAN's style of assertive regionalism comports well with Malaysia's efforts to break loose from Western apron strings, and with other national goals, especially those of economic growth. Among ASEAN leaders, those of Malaysia have been aggressive in describing protectionism and other restrictive economic policies practiced by ASEAN's friends in the West as constituting a direct threat to Malaysia and to ASEAN. Mahathir himself has warned that developing countries which are "overwhelmed by unbearable external debts, straitjacketed by protectionism and beggared by volatile interest and exchange rates" cannot become resilient.¹⁵ In Malaysia today this is viewed as second only to domestic polarization as a threat to

the state's security. Standing with ASEAN in negotiating with powerful trading partners and creditors--that is, with ASEAN's official Dialogue Partners--Malaysia's voice is louder and more powerful than if negotiating alone. And this is of course true for the others as well.

Most removed from ASEAN's center of gravity and from the turbulence of the mainland is the Philippines. From the beginning the Philippines has been an officially earnest but somewhat distant partner to the Association. More than any other member, its external links to the United States outweigh by far any felt security deriving from its affiliation with ASEAN. This was reinforced in the 1970s. As other ASEAN states quaked at the American pull-back and rushed to shore up their solidarity, Filipinos could relax in the knowledge that the United States had pulled back...to the Philippines. There seemed no question of the United States removing its substantial military presence there, at least on its own initiative. Of course, overbearing American influence in the Philippines was an ongoing political sore point, and from the outset membership in ASEAN provided a largely abstract Southeast Asia counterpoint to the Philippines' close identity with the United States. As the sole architect of Philippine foreign policy from 1965, and one of the founding promoters of ASEAN, Ferdinand Marcos could have it both ways, and did. This arrangement was quite agreeable to the rest of ASEAN's leaders, too, who in bravely pronouncing ZOPFAN as their goal, counted privately upon a lingering, and some hoped prolonged, Pax Americana to pave the way.

When Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea provided ASEAN its first real test, the Philippines closed rank with the others and has consistently supported ASEAN's position thereafter. On the other hand, the Philippines has not especially engaged itself in the process of defining that position, or of bridging the impasse. The mushrooming domestic crisis of the Philippines during the final bitter years of Ferdinand Marcos' government accounts for

this for the most part, but it is also true that the American security blanket still renders most outside problems somewhat abstract for Filipinos, even if they are happening in the neighborhood. At another level, however, Filipino membership in ASEAN has been considerably more than lip service. Filipino diplomats and officials have participated actively in the Association's organizational life, and along with those from the other ASEAN states have begun forming a substantial trans-national web of correspondents, colleagues and friends. And, as has occurred everywhere in ASEAN in the past several years, Filipino professionals, businessmen and others have joined in the proliferation of clubs and associations that use ASEAN in their names. The ASEAN idea, the ASEAN identity, has taken hold in the Philippines just as it has elsewhere.

Among the difficult tasks the new Philippine government has dedicated itself to is the achievement of a higher level of national autonomy with respect to the United States. Whether or not this will involve removing American military bases remains to be seen, but among those who participated actively in bringing Corazon Aquino to power were individuals who advocate just that. Irrespective of the resolution of this issue, however, ASEAN now provides the Philippines with an alternative way of thinking of itself within the world community. For so long focused almost exclusively upon the United States, as part of ASEAN Filipinos can see themselves as fully autonomous Southeast Asians. It is an attractive idea, and for those Filipinos who aspire to a dramatic departure from past Philippine-American togetherness, it is an idea with important possibilities. For this reason, and because the new Philippine government sees economic advantages to come from its membership, ASEAN matters deeply to the Philippines.

Indeed, this seems now to be true everywhere. In the past decade, very much as a consequence of its highly visible solidarity against Vietnam, and

partly as a consequence of working to achieve and sustain the consensus which makes solidarity possible, ASEAN has matured into a central institution of the region. Confronting Vietnam has not only helped forge ASEAN as a diplomatic bloc, it has also required that ASEAN's machinery for country-to-country cooperation become more highly developed--in dealing with the outflow of refugees, for example. At the same time other aspects of ASEAN have also matured. Very important among them are its region-focused meetings and negotiations with its Dialogue Partners--Japan, the European Economic Community, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Nations Development Programme. These are not designed to replace bi-lateral relations. They do represent ASEAN's attempt, however, to stand together when facing their friends as well as their enemies, especially when addressing issues about which the ASEAN states and their Partners are not of one mind, particularly economic ones. This is not simply a strategy of gaining clout by ganging up. It is also inspired by the ASEAN vision for regional autonomy: dealing with Partners collectively is a way, at the very least ritualistically, of keeping outside powers at bay. This has also strengthened ASEAN.

So has the awareness among ASEAN's leaders that club membership involves other advantages, one of the best of which is the inclination of its members to rally to each other's cause when challenged, and to refrain from criticizing their partners publically. Consider ASEAN's support for Indonesia's position on East Timor, and the absence of public criticism or alarm over the domestic stewardship of Ferdinand Marcos. When, however, the Marcos house finally crumbled, the well established collaborative links among ASEAN partners facilitated frank consultations and a collaborative response. Hopes for economic integration through ASEAN have been largely unrequited so far; ASEAN's economies are unfortunately competitive rather than complementary. But this has not thwarted efforts with the Association to find a

formula whereby the regional economies can become positively interactive; indeed, efforts in this direction are increasing.

A legion of frictions continues to exist between ASEAN member states, and ASEAN cannot eliminate them; to this day, for example, the issue of Sahah has not yet been finally resolved. But it has begun to overwhelm these frictions, to push their implications for regional life to a lower level of conflict. ASEAN has become, in short, a comprehensively valuable institution.

It must be admitted that Vietnam's behavior has done everything to encourage ASEAN's solidarity. When in response to attempts by ASEAN to promote a negotiated resolution to the crisis it has repeatedly insisted upon its prerogative of occupation, even those within ASEAN who are the more sympathetic to Vietnam have been forced to acknowledge that, well, Vietnam doesn't seem to be very cooperative. As official interlocutor on behalf of ASEAN with Vietnam, Indonesia's Mochtar Kusumaatmadja has often emphasized Hanoi's flexible side, cheerfully keeping alive the hope for a breakthrough, and working doggedly for it in consultations with Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. Although not without fruit in terms of keeping the "talk channel" open, Mochtar has yet to pry a concession of consequence from Hanoi. Thus, in a sequence of proposals and responses between ASEAN and Vietnam over several years only negligible progress has been made; instead, periods of apparent thaw seem inevitably to lead to new rounds of stubbornness.

What makes this all the more frustrating is that Hanoi is one of the few variables in the Kampuchea crisis which ASEAN leaders can hope to influence. They acknowledge with chagrin that those variables attaching to great power rivalries, especially that between the Chinese and the Soviets, are wholly beyond their reach and that they are also, alas, ultimately decisive. Given Vietnam's clear intention of making its pre-eminence in Kampuchea permanent, no solution satisfactory to ASEAN--minimally a neutral Kampuchea--seems possi-

ble until resolution of Sino-Soviet animosities makes it so, and even this implies an ability by those communist patrons to prevail upon their Indo-chinese clients which in the end they may not possess. What kind of assurances would it take, for example, and from whom, to make Vietnam retreat from taking a direct hand in the affairs of Kampuchea?

Is there any way to effect a desirable outcome? Certainly none which ASEAN can supply on its own. This is why ASEAN strategy, especially Indonesia's initiatives, is calculated to nudge the smaller variables in a positive direction--keeping the ASEAN-Vietnam dialogue open; easing relations between the United States and Hanoi (Mochtar prevailed upon the Vietnamese to respond earnestly to MIA inquiries, for example); promoting Sihanouk as a figure of compromise for Kampucheans; and treating Heng Samrin's government as an interested party independent of Vietnam's interest in it, and so on--all the while keeping the heat on against Vietnam's occupation forces through the Coalition's guerillas and against Hanoi diplomatically. If and when external factors permit an adjustment in the status-quo, the groundwork laid by ASEAN will effect the nature of that readjustment. This is their best hope, and ASEAN's leaders and diplomats persevere in it.

Some are even optimists. "Time is on our side," says Mochtar. He cites the extremely high cost to Vietnam of a permanent occupation of Kampuchea, not the least unendurable aspect of which is a permanent dependency upon the Soviet Union. "The Vietnamese," he says, "want to be out of Russia's grip as much as we want them to be too." The failure of Vietnam's occupation is as inevitable as the failure of its rigidly planned economy, he believes, and when the steely, dogmatic old guard finally passes in Vietnam, a new generation of pragmatists will take things in hand, and when they do, they will seek a pragmatic solution to Kampuchea. "Meanwhile, we wait."¹⁶ Other ASEAN diplomats have put forward a similar analysis, contending that despite

the conventional wisdom that sees Vietnam hanging on until its opponents give up in despair and boredom, that in fact, "they have no hope of wearing out China." "Only when the Vietnamese finally realize that they are on a losing track," writes Singapore's Kishore Mahbubani, "...will a settlement come about in Cambodia. Until then, Asians--as they have long realized--can only be patient."¹⁷

In the meantime, what is the unresolved dilemma of Kampuchea doing to the neighborhood? It continues to generate destructive turbulence and misery both in Kampuchea itself and in Thailand's border areas, affecting hundreds of thousands of people; and it requires the allocation of extraordinary resources which could be invested better elsewhere. (This is true on both sides, of course.) From the ASEAN perspective, it has drawn big powers back into the region as key players and has once again involved local states in global quarrels, which is always dangerous. That one of these newly re-involved big powers is China is especially alarming to some. On the other hand, the status-quo is not without its advantages, as many have pointed out. Boggling the Vietnamese down in Kampuchea and requiring the diversion of huge sums to pay for the occupation keeps Vietnam weak; this enhances Thailand's stability, although clumsily, and also forestalls the day when a vigorous Vietnam might wish to throw its weight around the neighborhood. The current stalemate also buys time for Sihanouk and Son Sann, leaders of the noncommunist element of the anti-Vietnamese Coalition, to enlarge their influence at the expense of the embarrassing and problematic but now numerically dominant Khmer Rouge. Finally, the longer the stalemate, the tenser relations will become between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese, and between the Vietnamese and the Soviets. The maturation of these tensions just might coerce the Vietnamese into a more flexible attitude after all.

And if this happens? If a solution to the Kampuchea crisis can be found which provides, to their respective satisfaction, for the security of both Thailand and Vietnam, it is likely that other aspects of the communist-noncommunist impasse in Southeast Asia will also be breached, especially if ASEAN holds to its vision for regional autonomy. Like the ASEAN states, Vietnam must find its way to national prosperity and resilience; and it has reasons born of its own historical experience to distance itself from external powers, friend or foe, wherever this is possible. Although committed to a Socialist blueprint for Vietnam, it is first and foremost a nation state, and like its neighbors, it is a youthful and vulnerable one. Ideology aside, they have much in common. The gradual rise to power in Vietnam of younger leaders, post-revolutionary technocrats, planners and managers, will make the discovery of this fact easier as they begin interacting more routinely with their counterparts in the rest of Southeast Asia, interaction which ASEAN's machinery could cause to occur rapidly. For the time being the Kampuchea crisis stands in the way of this development, and may continue to do so indefinitely; but one reason Indonesia has invested so much in keeping the "talk channel" open and in exploring each avenue for resolving the impasse is the hope, reflecting Soeharto's vision for ASEAN, that Vietnam, and Kampuchea and Laos as well, will one day no longer simply be in the neighborhood, but of it too.

FOOTNOTES

¹Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines formed ASEAN in 1967; Brunei joined in 1984.

²Milton Osborne, "Kampuchea and Viet Nam: A Historical Perspective," Pacific Community, IX, No. 3 (April 1978), page 251.

³Osborne, page 251; also page 253.

⁴This follows Suhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand's National Security Issues and Policies," a paper delivered at the First Pacific Workshop on Regional Affairs, Manila, September 1985.

⁵ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967.

⁶Quoted from the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, 1976.

⁷Quoted in Michael Liefer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), page 119.

⁸ASEAN Documentation Series, Kuala Lumpur, 27 November, 1971.

⁹In Liefer, page 149.

¹⁰Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam's External Relations: An Overview," Pacific Community, IX, No. 2 (January 1978), page 229.

¹¹K. K. Nair, ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation (Canberra: The Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australia National University, 1984), page 30.

¹²From the Viet Nam People's Army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, in Thayer, page 221.

¹³See Kishore Mahbubani, "The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast Asian Perception," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983/84, pages 409-10.

¹⁴In his famous book, The Malay Dilemma.

¹⁵New Straits Times, 4 September 1968.

¹⁶Interview, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, September 1986, Jakarta.

¹⁷Kishore Mahbubani, "Prospects for a Settlement in Cambodia," in James W. Morley (ed), The Pacific Basin: New Challenges for the United States, (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1986), page 149.

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