An Appreciation for Vulnerability to Deception at the Operational Level,
Abstract
Historically, the army that concentrates adequate deception effort against specific enemy vulnerabilities to deception has usually been successful in this operation. The army that neglects its potential for vulnerability to deception is often not successful, when an opponent chooses to exploit that vulnerability. The U.S. Army has recently renewed its interest in deception at the operational level has received attention. The USSR has steadily maintained and increased an emphasis in this area since World War Two. Applying this historical condition to the apparent imbalance in developed deception doctrine, the operational planner becomes concerned, if not alarmed, at the potential for U.S. vulnerability to deception at the operational level. This study reviews historical examples of vulnerability to deception. It examines the Soviet concept of deception, or maskirovka, and the corresponding U.S. progress in developing organizations and doctrine for deception. And filtered through the screen of modern warfare conditions, historical vulnerabilities are compared to U.S. conditions to determine current applicability of those vulnerabilities.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 07, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADA184901
Entities
People
- Charles E. Burgdorf
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College