Operational Art in the 1944 Ardennes Campaign
Abstract
This monograph discusses the planning and execution of the 1944 Ardennes campaign, analyzes the reasons for Allied success and German failure, and based on that analysis, examines the validity of certain theoretical concepts relating to the practice of the operational art. The monograph begins with a brief discussion of three major changes affecting the practice of the operational art between the Germans 1940 campaign through the Ardennes and their 1944 campaign: blitzkrieg tactics no longer a surprise, Allied superiority in motorization, and Allied superiority in airpower. It then discusses the strategic setting and examines the operational plans of the two antagonists, with emphasis on the German plan. This is followed by a description and analysis of the campaign itself in three phases: The German Attack Seizes the Initiative, The Initiative Shifts, and The Allied CounterOffensive. For each phase a determination is made what the key factors or elements shaping the operational battlefield were, and their relationship to certain theoretical concepts.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 10, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADA185067
Entities
People
- James O. Kievit
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College