Retrograde at the Operational Level of War,

Abstract

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the doctrine of retrograde operations. Specifically, it answers the question: does current doctrine provide sufficient guidance for retrograde operations at the operational level of war? To answer the question the historical examples of the Germans' Ardennes-Alsace Offensive of 1944 and the Chinese Communist Offensive of 1950 are analyzed. A comparison is made between the major operational problems found in each example and the published doctrine of that era. The evolution of retrograde doctrine after each conflict is also examined to observe if any changes occurred that were influenced by the previous experience. Current doctrine is compared to past doctrine as well as the problems encountered in the two examples. A conclusion is then made as to the adequacy of established retrograde doctrine.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 15, 1987
Accession Number
ADA185079

Entities

People

  • Bruce A. Brant

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Artillery
  • Combat Operations
  • Command And Control
  • Communists
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Doctrine
  • Far East
  • Fire Support
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • New York
  • Second World War
  • Security
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Systems Analysis and Design