


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
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2. This Research Memorandum addresses Soviet political and propaganda efforts to derail deployment of Trident D-5 and TLAM-N. Particular attention is given to Soviet use of arms control negotiations to shift the balance of power in Moscow's favor. Recent arms control positions are examined, stressing those elements concerning Trident and TLAM-N.



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SOVIET POLITICAL RESPONSES TO TRIDENT AND TLAM-N

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ABSTRACT

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THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In a speech to a gathering of European Communist Parties in 1967, Leonid Brezhnev explained the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in these words:

What does this experience teach us? Specifically, it teaches that the situation of "cold war" and the confrontation of military blocs, the atmosphere of military threats, seriously hinder the functioning of the revolutionary, democratic forces. In the bourgeois countries in a situation of international tension reactionary elements become active, the military clique raises its head, and anti-democratic trends and anti-communism in general are intensified.

Conversely, recent years have demonstrated particularly clearly that in a situation of reduced international tension the needle of the political barometer shifts to the left.¹

In other words, Brezhnev recognized that Khrushchev's policy of vocal challenges and threats had backfired: Instead of making a fearful West more compliant, it instead had galvanized Western unity and contributed to a massive American defense buildup. In a 1965 speech to graduates of a Soviet military institute, Brezhnev highlighted the difference between his policy and Khrushchev's:

We shall always remember our great leader's instruction that preparing the country for defense requires "not a burst of passion or a shout" but "prolonged, strenuous, highly persistent and disciplined work on a mass scale." The Party is sacredly fulfilling these behests of Lenin.²

Thus, Brezhnev's policy, in contrast to Khrushchev's, would be to speak softly while building up the Soviet Union's big stick. Only by creating

uncertainty about the causes of the USSR's military buildup could Moscow hope to inhibit an offsetting Western response. As Brezhnev put it in 1967:

More favorable conditions for improving the atmosphere in Europe and for setting up mutually beneficial cooperation among the European countries are now being created. This means that more favorable conditions have also been created for the activities of the Communist parties, for rallying all the forces that support universal peace and security in Europe. This is a success that we all share, comrades.

In this situation the peoples of the countries that belong to NATO, and their governments, are particularly urgently confronted with the question of what this bloc exists for, and what price is being paid for participation in it.³

Thus, the USSR's "peace offensive" and its military buildup were complementary, not contradictory, themes. The "peace offensive," by sowing confusion about Soviet intentions, inhibited the Western response. Similarly, the military buildup, pursued in a quiet but steady fashion, helped generate pressure in the West to reach an accommodation with Moscow. In the words of Marshal V.G. Kulikov, First Deputy Minister of Defense, commenting on the SALT I agreements:

Soberly assessing the situation that had come about in the world, above all the USSR's growing military and economic potential, the USA was compelled to conclude the Treaty and Interim Agreement with us.⁴

ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

According to the American concepts of strategic stability, weapons are stabilizing or destabilizing depending on their own vulnerability ("use or lose") and their ability to destroy the retaliatory forces of the other side. The American criteria, in short, are *technical*, a function of the characteristics of the weapons themselves.

Soviet criteria are different. According to the Soviet concept, it is not weapons that lead to instability, but the policies of governments. Consequently, stability and instability depend on which side is more powerful than the other. In the words of Boris Ponomarev, when he was a candidate member of the Politburo in charge of the Central Committee's International Department:

Force in and of itself is not a vice. What is important is in whose hands it is and for what purposes it is used. Force in the hands of imperialism is the source of military danger. *Force in the hands of socialism has become the source providing peace and the weakening of military danger.* Thus it was in the past, and thus it remains today.⁵

In short, in contrast to the American criteria, the Soviet criteria are *political*: Our weapons are good and your weapons are bad. According to this view, peace is the result not of the technical characteristics of weapons, but of the overall balance of power between the two sides. Therefore, Soviet policy does not seek parity, but rather a steady shift in the military balance in Moscow's favor. To quote Ponomarev again: "The stronger the economic and defense might of the Land of the Soviets, the more they are forced to reckon with us throughout the whole world, and the more durable and reliable is the cause of peace and security of the peoples."⁶

The role of arms control in Soviet policy, consequently, is to assist this shift in the balance of power by using political pressures to restrain Western armaments programs while leaving Soviet programs relatively unaffected. As one Soviet military analyst explained in 1968, in evident anticipation of the forthcoming SALT negotiations:

It is impossible to agree that disarmament may be realized as a result of this sharp and complex question by representatives of the opposing social systems. *Disarmament* cannot be a result of some kind of utopian "calming" of the class political struggle in the international arena. On the contrary, *it can be achieved only as a result of the most active pressure on their governments by the revolutionary forces in the imperialist countries* in conjunction with a flexible and principled

policy by the socialist camp. Any other notion of the paths for achieving disarmament is an illusion.⁷

TRIDENT AND TLAM-N

In their campaign to defeat Trident and the Tomahawk nuclear land-attack missile (TLAM-N) politically, the Soviets must use arguments that appeal to Western political audiences. Thus, whereas much Soviet literature uses the political criteria of stability noted above, a considerable amount adopts the technical language so common among Western analysts. By fusing their political criteria and Western technical language, the Soviets describe all new American systems as first-strike weapons, while none of their own systems receives this label.⁸

Nevertheless, if the Soviets were too blatantly one-sided, their credibility would be undermined, and the political impact of their proposals would be reduced. Consequently, they strive to give their initiatives a patina of fairness and equity, frequently by overlooking some material facts.

A good example of this is Moscow's proposal in the mid-1970s to ban the Trident Ohio-class submarine along with the "analogous" Soviet submarine. On the face of it, this seems entirely reasonable and fair, but on closer examination, the Kremlin's real purpose emerges. Thus, an editorial article in *Pravda* on 13 April 1977 charged that the United States rejected the Soviet offer "because the Pentagon plans propose to equip 'Trident' submarines with missiles of a range and effectiveness as great as those of intercontinental ballistic missiles!"⁹ The article failed to note that the USSR possessed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range greater than that of U.S. SLBMs, allowing its SSBNs to launch their missiles against U.S. targets from Soviet coastal waters. Because of geographical disparities, the United States will not acquire a reciprocal capability prior to the deployment of the D-5. In addition, whereas the Ohio-class is the only new U.S. SSBN to replace its SSBN fleet, the Typhoon is only one of several new Soviet SSBNs. In short, while appearing fair and equitable, the proposal was subtly designed to freeze in place a Soviet advantage.

A similar pattern can be detected in the Soviet attitude toward TLAM-N. Although Moscow's objections to long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are well known, few people realize that it was the United States that wanted to discuss limits on cruise missiles in SALT I and the

Soviet Union that refused. As Paul Nitze, a member of the U.S. SALT I delegation, told the House Armed Services Committee in 1972, "it was then our position that cruise missiles should also be included. The Soviets objected to the inclusion of cruise missiles."¹⁰

Following this rejection of its overture, the United States pursued development of cruise missiles, and by the mid-1970s had made significant advances. At this point, the Soviet Union shifted its position and insisted that long-range cruise missiles fell under the Vladivostok constraints. This distinction in types of cruise missiles, which was enshrined in a protocol to the SALT II Treaty, has been recognized as artificial by Soviet experts. According to Lev Semeyko, a prominent Soviet military observer:

Cruise missiles are, in general, very difficult to control. It is practically impossible, for instance, to account for the missiles of this class installed in submarines and surface ships. The range of the cruise missile is also very difficult to define: It can be 100-1,000 km and therefore it is practically impossible to say whether the cruise missile is a tactical, theater or strategic nuclear weapon.¹¹

Significantly, despite this acknowledgment of the invalidity of the range limitation, the Soviets have criticized the United States for not continuing to abide by the protocol after it expired in December 1981. According to a commentary published in *Red Star* in January 1982:

In the SALT process the United States recognized that cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km are strategic armaments....The Protocol to the treaty, valid through 31 December 1981, provided on a temporary basis for limitation on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km. In the joint declaration on the principles and main avenues for subsequent talks the sides pledged to examine in the future the question of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles with a view to definitely solving it.

Now, however, ignoring these undertakings, the United States is unilaterally deciding to deploy ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles

All the above leads us to the conclusion that, in nurturing plans for the massive deployment of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km, the Reagan administration is displaying total disregard for existing accords. It should be recalled that in a document as important as the "Basic Principles of the Relations Between the USSR and the United States," signed at summit level in 1972, the sides pledged "to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments." The U.S. leaders' repudiation of prior accords and violation of their own solemn statements and pledges not only cast doubt on Washington's interest in any arms limitation agreements but also undermine trust in the United States as a partner in negotiations.¹²

THE PRESENT CONTEXT

Notwithstanding these campaigns against Trident and TLAM-N, the major Soviet propaganda effort has concentrated on other systems that appeared more vulnerable to political pressure. In this regard, weapons based in Europe have proved especially suitable. In the 1970s, the Soviet campaign against the "neutron bomb" contributed to the repudiation of that weapon, and although the campaign against the "Euromissiles" did not prevent their deployment, it did provoke a serious controversy within NATO.

At the present time, the major Soviet campaign is aimed at SDI. Citing the President's observation that a combination of offensive and defensive forces would be destabilizing, the Soviets object to the U.S. strategic modernization program as incompatible with the purposes of SDI and proof that Washington's objective is military superiority.

In this regard, Moscow has begun placing special stress on Trident. As Leslie Gelb of the *New York Times* reported from Moscow in October 1985:

Several Soviet officials and experts were careful to make clear that Soviet flexibility on space-based defenses and on cutting offensive forces would have strings attached. Two experts indicated that the Soviet government could insist on banning the new Trident II missile and perhaps other new strategic weapons.¹³

For its part, the United States offered a proposal that, although still permitting deployment of D-5, would cut back the program substantially. Recently, at Reykjavik, the President proposed banning all ballistic missiles in ten years, and this was accepted by the Soviet Union.

By way of contrast with this apparent narrowing of differences on ballistic missiles, TLAM-N has remained a fundamental point of contention. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit, TLAM-N became a vocal point of controversy between Washington and Moscow, with the Kremlin insisting that President Reagan had agreed to the elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons within ten years. The White House, in turn, responded that although the President had "indicated that elimination of all nuclear weapons had always been his goal . . . no details were discussed at Reykjavik."¹⁴ This sharp public disagreement appeared to validate the observation made a year earlier by Mr. Gelb that "differences over sea-launched cruise missiles could prove to be critical."¹⁵

In this regard, it should be noted that the U.S. proposal to ban mobile ICBMs may provide Moscow with a politically attractive argument concerning TLAM-Ns. Why, the Kremlin might ask, does the United States want to ban mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) because of verification problems, while at the same time it insists that, owing to the same verification problems, TLAM-Ns cannot be subject to any limitations at all? Does this not demonstrate the one-sidedness and hypocrisy of the U.S. arms control position? Given the political attractiveness such an argument may have in some circles, the Navy should be prepared with a response (e.g., an effective ban on nuclear TLAM-Ns would require a ban on conventional cruise missiles, which does not seem possible). Otherwise, it risks the possibility of being embarrassed by uncoordinated and possibly contradictory explanations hastily put forward in response to the Soviet argument.¹⁶

SUMMATION

As we have seen, Moscow tries to shift the balance of power not only by building up its own military power, but also by constraining the Western response. The open political system in the West allows ordinary people to affect governmental decisions, and the Kremlin takes advantage of this opportunity to apply pressure on Western policymakers to make concessions. Over the last decade, however, Soviet efforts have concentrated on countering weapons other than Trident and TLAM-Ns, in part because they thought these other weapons more immediately threatening, but also because they believed these weapons were more vulnerable to political pressure. Nevertheless, recent proposals, which call for deep cuts in strategic offensive forces, may affect the anticipated deployment of the D-5. Similarly, the verification difficulties associated with TLAM-Ns may prove a pressure point the Soviet Union can exploit, particularly if the United States maintains that mobile ICBMs should be prohibited because of the verification problems they present.

NOTES

1. L.I. Brezhnev, *The CPSU in the Struggle for Unity of All Revolutionary Forces* (Moscow: Progress, 1975), pp. 28-29.
2. *Pravda and Izvestia*, 4 July 1965, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 28 July 1965, p. 5
3. Brezhnev, p. 18.
4. *Izvestia*, 24 August 1972, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 20 September 1972, p. 8.
5. B. Ponomarev, "Real Socialism and Its International Importance," *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1979, p. 19.
6. *Pravda*, 13 February 1979, p. 2.
7. Ye. Rybkin, "A Critique of Bourgeois Concepts of War and Peace," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* [Communist of the Armed Forces], No. 18, 1968, p. 90. Emphasis added.
8. A good example of this is the widely distributed pamphlet, "Star Wars": *Illusions and Dangers* (Moscow: Progress, 1985), which describes all new U.S. systems -- including the Midgetman -- as "first-strike nuclear weaponry."
9. "Limiting Strategic Armaments: A Problem Which Can and Must Be Solved," *Pravda*, 13 April 1977, in FBIS:SOV, 14 April 1977, p. AA4.
10. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, *Full Committee Hearings on the Military Implications of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreements*, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972, p. 15132. Also see the letter by Raymond Garthoff, another member of the SALT I delegation, in *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 308.
11. Radio Moscow to North America in FBIS:SOV, 22 January 1982, p. AA5.
12. Yu. Chaplygin, "Seeking to Disrupt Equilibrium: United States is Pressing on With the Production and Deployment of Cruise Missiles," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 12 January 1982, in FBIS:SOV, 19 January 1982, pp. AA7-AA9.

13. *New York Times*, 18 October 1985, p. A14.

14. "Text of U.S. Document on Reagan at Summit," *New York Times*, 24 October 1986, p. A12.

15. *New York Times*, 10 October 1985, p. A14.

16. This problem, however, may now be academic in light of the recent decision to proceed with mobile basing of the MX "Peacekeeper" and Midgetman missiles.