War in the Falklands: The Use and Disuse of Military Theory,
Abstract
This monograph analyzes the 1982 war between the United Kingdom and Argentina over possession of the Falklands in regard to several of the foundations of military theory. It uses this recent campaign which combines air, land, and sea forces armed with modern technologies as a case study of the applicability of traditional military theory to modern warfare. The monograph first reviews the general political background leading up to the outbreak of hostilities on 2 April 1982, then summarizes the salient military events of the war. Next it offers analyses of how politics and military action were interrelated throughout the campaign, how tactics, operations, and strategy interacted during the course of the war, and where the centers of gravity were situated for the opposing forces. It concludes with an overview as to the applicability of traditional military theory to this particular campaign. The monograph concludes that the war in the Falklands was a unique opportunity to contrast two widely divergent approaches to warfare, one which paid heed to military theory and the doctrinal implications that the stem from it and one which ignored many of its foundations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADA186670
Entities
People
- James R. Mcdonough
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College