


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
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




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
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CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING AN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES' DEFENSE
PACT

By GROUP CAPTAIN J. A. J. FEMI, NIGERIAN AIR FORCE



AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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AIR UNIVERSITY

CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
OF WEST AFRICAN STATES' DEFENSE PACT

BY

J.A.J. Femi
Group Captain, Nigerian Air Force

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT

Thesis Advisor: Dr Jack Thompson

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

MARCH 1987

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I wish to place on record my appreciation to Air Cdre J. K. Falope (Retired), whose article in 1980 entitled "Regional Security for West Africa" got me interested in this subject. I acknowledge I have found his exposé so irresistible that his original thought, on which Chapter X of this paper, "Force Structure and Control," is based, has just been slightly amended here. Although he retired from the Nigerian Air Force, I am confident that his brilliance can still be tapped as part of a "think-tank" or as a consultant to the ECOWAS Defence Commission to work out the technical details for the take-off of the ECOWAS Defence Pact.

I also wish to thank Dr Jack Thompson, Visiting Professor of Soviet and European Studies, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, and mastermind of the thesis, who by meticulous scrutiny and ideas guided this work to a form suitable for presentation.

AIR WAR COLLEGE REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Considerations in Establishing an Economic Community
of West African States Defense Pact

AUTHOR: J.A.J. Femi, Group Captain, Nigerian Air Force

➤ This paper seeks to analyze the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) objectives; achievements; the need for a subregional defence; external and internal threats; regional member states; problems; role of major powers at play--France and Nigeria; the military capabilities of member states; and the ECOWAS Defence Pact's provisions and defects. The paper then recommends a force structure if present arrangements are unacceptable, highlights the future prospects of the organization, and ends with a conclusion. Since the defence pact has not been ratified, it is deemed inoperable, and this paper aims to analyze the considerations for establishing the pact and attempts to convince member states of its implications and desirability.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Group Captain John Ade Joseph Femi was born in Nigeria and is a serving member of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF). He had his pilot training with the German Air Force from 1965 to 1967 and later attended various flying courses in U.K., France and West Germany. Group Captain Femi attended a course at the Aeronautical Engineering, Aerospace Systems and Safety Management Center of the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, in 1974; and the Command and Staff College at Jaji, Nigeria, in 1979. His major assignments were as Director of Training, Nigerian Air Force, HQ, Lagos from 1980 to 1981 and 1983 to 1984; Commanding Officer NAF 207 Wing from 1984 to 1985; and Commander 301 flying Training School. Group Captain Femi is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1987.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After independence, the immediate problem Africans faced was the economic weakness of their states, whose economies were run for the colonizers' markets. Industrialization thus could not hold sway in most of the countries. Even after a decade of independence, the least developed countries in the world were in the region. Yet independence was meant to be an instrument for better life for the citizens. It is in the light of this that African leaders started looking for national economic strategies.¹

In desperation, many new nations entered into a series of cooperation agreements with their former colonial masters, but this turned out to be one-sided, since after years of operation, their economic hopes didn't materialize. Instead, they were bled economically. The so-called aid received by the Africans as a development instrument therefore lost its luster. Even economic cooperation on a continental basis met with the familiar problems of communications, currency zones and intrigues by extra-African powers.

The most promising recipe for economic development was next seen to be economic cooperation at subregional level. The

success of the now defunct East African Community comprising Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, along with francophone economic connections seemed to be promising. Prominent Heads of State like Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Eyadema of Togo foresaw the problems of political and economic division based on language and affinity to former colonizers; hence they spearheaded the formation in 1975 of a wider community comprising all the West African countries.

With the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) two years later, President Senghor of Senegal made a proposal for the creation of a West African defence pact. On May 28, 1978, at the ECOWAS summit of the "Authority of Heads of State and Governments," he said:

There is hardly any need for me to demonstrate the fact that development cannot be secured in a climate of insecurity. This being so, we must, among ourselves, establish a genuine West African solidarity pact to guard against external aggression.²

His proposal raises two fundamental questions of who the aggressors could be, and whether the ECOWAS group can successfully sink their differences and devise a collective security system.

An ECOWAS Defence Pact was eventually drawn and signed in 1981, but is yet to be ratified.

CHAPTER II

ECOWAS

Treaty

The ECOWAS is an economic organization formed by sixteen West African states forming a solid geographical bloc stretching from Mauritania to Niger and covering all coastal countries as far south as Nigeria. It is designed to promote self-sufficiency and self-reliance amongst these predominantly English-and French-speaking countries.

The provisions of the treaty establishing ECOWAS, signed at Lome on 4 Nov 76, are

- (1) A pledge for free movement of goods and people in the Community area.
- (2) A comprehensive trade liberalization to be achieved within 15 years.
- (3) A common customs union.
- (4) A fund to compensate states which lost revenue as a result of reducing tariffs.
- (5) Harmonizing agricultural policies and common projects.
- (6) Elimination of disparities in levels of development, and

(7) Common monetary policies.³

Membership

The member states are: Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). Cape Verde joined in Sep 1977.

Organization

"Authority of Heads of State and Governments" meets once a year with a chairman drawn from the member states in turn. The Council of Ministers consists of two representatives from each country. A Tribunal interprets the treaty and settles disputes that may be referred to it. The Headquarters of the Executive Secretariat is in Lagos, Nigeria while that of the fund is in Lome , Togo.

There are four Commissions: (1) Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments, (2) Industry, Agriculture, and Natural Resources, (3) Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy, and (4) Social and Cultural Affairs.

Achievements

Since its effective establishment in 1978, ECOWAS has made progress in the following directions:⁴

a. Fostering of peace and good neighborliness through the protocol on non-aggression.

b. A trade liberalization scheme whose "modus operandi" has been worked out.

c. Protocol on the first phase of free movement of citizens within the Community.

d. Contract already signed in respect of a telecommunication program to link sixteen capitals of ECOWAS nations.

e. The successful conclusion of feasibility studies for trans-West African highway.

f. Harmonization of highway codes in the subregion and the inauguration of a common insurance "Brown Card."

g. The war against desertification through afforestation.

h. The signing of the protocol on industrial development.

j. Games competitions amongst universities, youth and workers' associations.

k. The near conclusion of studies to create a West African Monetary and Customs Zone.

Problems

Despite the rosy achievements, the Community's problems can be summarized as follows:⁴

a. Not all member states pay contributions regularly--this affects execution of programs.

b. Quite a number of decisions are not ratified; those

ratified are not even implemented.

c. Experts are not sent to specialized meetings.

d. Lack of strong links between national governments and the Secretariat.

e. There are about thirty inter-governmental organizations within the subregion. These compete with ECOWAS in terms of functions and lessen commitment of member nations.

f. There is no ideological unity.

g. Political will to act collectively among member nations is very weak.

h. Most currencies in the region are in a chaotic situation and inconvertible for international foreign exchange.

i. Semi-colonial ties.

j. Mass illiteracy.

k. Lack of basic statistical data.

l. Extreme nationalism.

m. Similarities in crops grown in member states.

n. Most of the sixteen countries are poor.

If, after eleven years of the existence of ECOWAS, a West African cannot travel to any ECOWAS capital by rail or road; use currency with little or no difficulty as to conversion; understand the characteristic features prevalent in another member nation; cannot be proud to use goods made in not only his own country, but in other African nations, then it does seem a reflection that the Community has not achieved the purpose for which it was created.

But is all hope lost? Not necessarily, since one of the hopes in establishing such an organization is to promote political stability in the member states, and thus enable them to present a common front on issues affecting the subregion as a whole.

CHAPTER III

REGIONAL SURVEY OF MEMBER STATES

According to Colin Legum³³, the salient points I wish to draw out about the member states are as shown below, highlighting commonalities and a few diversities.

Benin

Agricultural production has declined, while smuggling has increased. Internal tensions have increased while state-controlled enterprises are inefficient and "top-heavy." The first off-shore oil well is the only hope for development realization to raise living standards. Economic ties with Nigeria, Libya, and France are the saving grace.

The Gambia

The crisis of October 1980 showed the importance of the 1967 Treaty with Senegal. Relations with Libya soured, while foreign reserve falls are contained by Arab states and the West.

Cape Verde Islands

The islands, which have suffered the most devastating

drought of any of the West African Sahelian states, remain as dependent as ever on foreign food aid.

Ghana

Economically, the Ghanaians continue to suffer great hardships while Libya is involved in plans to train revolutionaries.

Guinea

Much of Guinea's foreign diplomacy is geared to seeking foreign investment in agricultural business, mining, and in acquiring loans for immediate food and fuel needs. The flagging assistance from the USSR still sustains the bauxite and fishing industries.

Ivory Coast

Looked upon as Black Africa's example of political stability, the Ivory Coasters are worried about urban growth, resentment of French and Lebanese domination of their commerce and bureaucracy, coupled with Houphouet-Boigny's continued refusal to select an "obvious successor." Relations with three of its immediate neighbors--Liberia, Ghana, and Burkina Faso--are strained. It is the only ECOWAS country to defy OAU and trade with apartheid South Africa. For long one of France's "closest and most faithful" allies, Ivory Coast still receives the French financial aid that continues to pour in.

Liberia

Liberia's traditional relations with the US are good, while iron ore accounts for two-thirds of export earnings in a good year.

Mali

The military regime is presiding over a country in disarray politically and economically, undeveloped though not a poor one, with immense agricultural potentials that could become "the bread basket" of the subregion. Mali has ties with the Soviet bloc and China, while Libyan diplomats were expelled. She faced one of the most devastating famines in history.

Mauritania

Mauritania is duly suspicious of Gaddafi's influence in the alleged coup of December 1980, and has maintained neutrality in the Western Saharan Conflict.

Niger

Gaddafi's incursions into Niger have been "gradual but steady;" this landlocked Sahelian country is becoming stable and growing in prosperity. Niger is of far greater strategic importance to France than Chad because of its uranium. Nigeria has replaced Algeria and Libya as Niger's chief source of oil.

Nigeria

Large deposits of uranium have been found and nuclear research has begun in two of her many universities. Long known as "the giant of Africa" in the oil hey-days; relations with her neighbors have been accommodating, and with Libya, a bit strained. More on this country later.

Senegal

Senegal broke her relations with Libya after alleged Libya's abduction of Senegalese citizens by force; but with excellent relations with France.

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone suspended relations with Libya and despite its potential of diamond extraction, her economy has continued to deteriorate with large oil imports and rice imports, the staple food.

Togo

The first military coup d'etat in Africa took place in Togo, which with Nigeria was the moving force for the formation of ECOWAS. Relations with France are excellent, but agricultural self-sufficiency has not yet been achieved.

Burkina Faso

This Sahelian country relies heavily on foreign aid for economic survival, with France as largest donor.

This paper now proceeds to analyze the need for a security pact arrangement for ECOWAS faced with so many problems.

CHAPTER IV
THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL DEFENCE PACT

National Interests

All sovereign states have four fundamental national interests in common: Survival, territorial integrity, maintenance and enhancement of economic well-being, and the promotion of a favorable world order.⁵

No gainsaying that ECOWAS states have these national interests. Conflict cripples the fragile economies of many African states and endangers their vital national interests. The high costs and requirement for equipment and skilled manpower can have a grave effect on their economy. The ability of ECOWAS states to cooperate among themselves economically, politically, and militarily seems to be a prerequisite to protecting national interests, and there is the possibility for development of a more effective bloc in international forums when African issues are being discussed. Additionally, a common defence arrangement could project the region as stable for investment. In a region full of poor countries, where some of its members are too weak to protect themselves, unity and cooperation seem to be the only means of settling regional conflicts, short of armed force.

African High Command

A precursor to ECOWAS Defence Pact in Africa was a "new concept of a continental African High Command (AHC) . . . which appeared before the Rabat summit in 1976."⁶ Its main features were:

a. The creation of regional defence systems linked by bilateral or multilateral defence agreements.

b. A military commander for each; a deputy and representatives of armies of the states.

c. A unit of military defense advisors within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) General Secretariat.

d. A permanent defence committee which would meet bi-annually.

Till today, the AHC has not taken off because of diversities of political opinions, etc.

Accords

Different ECOWAS states have entered into some military defense agreements, for example:⁷

a. China has military assistance agreements with Guinea and Mali.

b. France has defense and/or military cooperation agreements with Benin, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Burkina Faso.

c. The US had security agreements with Ghana, and has with Senegal and Liberia.

These agreements need to be harmonized into a common one to ensure they are not against the interests of the Community in general. A situation in which a member state may find itself having to choose between a member state against whom aggression is being committed and its other security parties, depending on who the enemy may be, is not acceptable.

Another imperative for an ECOWAS Defence Pact is that no African state can be certain that each time it asks for external power intervention (extra-African power, that is), the request will automatically be granted. But where it is a contributing member, this should pose no problem within reasonable requests.

Criticizing or trying to undermine those pacts between ECOWAS states and superpowers is a sure way of reducing dependence on external powers provided that workable alternative arrangement can be offered in their place. This is another litmus for an ECOWAS defence need. The ideal of an integrated and self-reliant subregional market which ECOWAS hopes to attain should, were it to be realized, constitute a more virile mechanism for reducing dependence by the states on the superpowers.

When African countries seek common economic ties, this has to be supported by common security ties to protect their vital interests. Keeping separate and individual defence pacts may not augur well for this objective, as ultimately, they may lead to interference against regimes and encourage divisive

and separated forces.

Other benefits to be gained by having an ECOWAS security pact are:

a. Effective defense against a common enemy depends on strategic and tactical cooperation.

b. Substantial savings are a likely consequence if overlapping and unnecessary military expenditures can be avoided.

c. "A new wave of irrendentism may occur"⁸ when Africans are tempted to "change by force some of the anachronistic legacy left by remote colonial mapmakers in 1884 and 1885. This would be partly suppressed by an established effort to cooperate."

If properly functioning, an ECOWAS defense structure could perform the stabilizing role formerly exercised by superpower intervention, and above all, it does this in the name of the Community rather than as one power offering its protection. Affection for regionalism came from the general realization that "universalism in defense terms is unrealistic, ineffective, and unreliable."⁹

Examples of Regional Defense

Hence, regional defense systems like NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, and the Arab Defense Council sought their common destiny in regional defense agreements since proximity of members to one another makes them

susceptible to a common security problem.

Examples where international economic organizations logically developed a defense component¹⁰ are: NATO forms defense umbrella for EEC, OAS for the Lima Accord, Warsaw Pact protects the COMECON, and the Arab League in the Arab Defense Council. It follows logically then that ECOWAS should be pursued with a defense arrangement, since the general concern by its members is to protect shared interests. If economic integration and cooperation are to be meaningful in West Africa, then they have to be accompanied by a defense and security arrangement.

An attack against a NATO country, for example, or any of them in Europe and North America, is considered an attack against all the other members. So should it be with ECOWAS states.

Development and Security

African states spend an enormous amount of money on military equipment with comparatively large armies, instead of directing such crucial resources toward socioeconomic development. Yet socioeconomic problems are known^{to}, and often do, cause internal instability. The apparent arms race tends to increase national insecurity.¹¹ This creates further threats from within West Africa. But if ECOWAS countries cooperate militarily, then intraregional threats will be reduced. These resources can then be used for other

developments which can further be realized by:

- a. Reducing "parasitic bureaucracies."¹²
- b. Encouraging food production by peasant enterprise instead of importation.
- c. Encouraging foreign investments and not neglecting the countryside; and
- d. Evolving a strategy of self-reliance with increased emphasis on private enterprise.

Although it is possible to achieve a balance between defence and development, in reality, especially in West Africa, it is difficult without resort to outside assistance. But such arrangements, no matter how desirable, are subject to accusations of neocolonialism, and thus are often seen to be threatening to internal security.¹³ So, solution has to be found locally, and that is through the subregion's military cooperation.

No matter how pressured by external forces beyond their immediate control, the Community members should still retain the ability and responsibility to preserve their own security and take their fate in their hands by maintaining a balance between defense and development. This could be attainable through subregional military cooperation. Otherwise, foreign powers under the guise of "development" will want to equip the states with unnecessary arms and weapon systems, which need financial resources and technical expertise, thus driving the already impoverished ECOWAS states to further debts. Then the

states are forced to fall back into the vicious circle of dependency.

Having seen the need for a subregional defense agreement, what then are the threats faced by the ECOWAS states?

CHAPTER V

THREAT ANALYSIS

Under threat analysis, it is intended to identify two major groups of concern:

- a. External: Foreign interests, foreign interventions and Soviet influence. Within Africa itself, but outside the ECOWAS, are South Africa and Libya.
- b. Internal: Boundary issues, invasion, emerging regional powers, refugees, and internal conflicts.

EXTERNAL

Foreign Interests

Foreign presence in West Africa cannot be said to be a missionary crusade of Christianity these days. The prime motivations of the foreign countries could pose a threat because they are not in the best interests of the states in most cases. The interests differ as follows:¹⁴

- a. Economically motivated for access to raw materials including the vast resources still to be tapped or utilized.
- b. Strategic imperatives and ideological rivalry.
- c. Accumulation of outmoded weapons for which a market

must be found.

d. To fill a vacuum created by the departure of colonizers.

Foreign Interventions

The OAU in principle opposes the grave issue of foreign intervention anywhere in the continent; thus any such exercise must be viewed as a threat to the body politic of Africa, except under the auspices of that body--OAU.

"Three types of intervention have been used in the active zone of Africa:"¹⁵ Intervention against external invasion, intervention against internal collapse, and intervention for cooling conflicts. Over the past decade, Western states have intervened in Zaire (twice, in 1977 and 1978), Mauritania (1977) and Chad (1979, 1983, and 1987). External violations also took place in November 1970 in Guinea and in Benin in January 1977.¹⁶ "Numerous French military interventions and the presence of French troops in and around the ECOWAS region" to strengthen French political influence and economic control in the area pose a lot of security worries for some of the ECOWAS member states who just wish to live peacefully with their neighbors.

If the ECOWAS industrialization program should materialize, the cheap supply of raw materials and minerals produced in the region will be consumed internally and not available to the exploitative external forces. These forces

would react hostilely in various ways: use mercenary attack, and sponsor coups d'etat or subtle means like economic sabotage to undermine the security of the subregion.

France and the U.S. have increased their roles in Chad based in part on the suspicion that the Soviet Union was behind Col Gaddafi of Libya's incursions into the territory. France will be dealt with later in this paper; suffice it to say, however, that she maintains a military presence in almost all her former colonies. The fear of the OAU is that should Gaddafi's adventures in West Africa bring about an ideological conflict between the West and the East, greater instability in the subregion will ensure.

The formation of the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force by the U.S. on March 1, 1980, "represented one of the Carter Administration's responses to what was then a three-fold crisis: OPEC-induced oil price spirals prompted concern over the continued availability to the Western nations of oil at reasonable prices. . ."¹⁷ This could be interpreted as a source of threat to any OPEC member country like Nigeria, although it might be assumed that oil price slump does not make that a threat presently. Still, the point has been made.

Soviet Influence

Soviet imperialism is another issue that Africans have to contend with, since the Soviet leaders support

"Liberation movements dedicated to bringing

about national democratic revolutions as stepping stones on the way to socialism. . . of the Marxist-Leninist type in a global struggle for Soviet leadership."18

Their political inroad goes with commercial, cultural and mostly military expansion. Strategic reasons seem to encourage this. West Africa's strategic importance is to be noted as a base area for air and naval operations in the South Atlantic because there are ports and air facilities stretching the length of the Atlantic coast. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union has provided assistance to Guinea and Guinea Bissau.

The Soviet Union may also want to deny ~~these~~ oil routes and mineral supplies to the West, making the region an ideological battleground in the future. Turmoil and conflicts may also be caused by the intervention of Soviet military experts through their surrogates, the Cubans, who encourage "liberation groups." Of deep concern to ECOWAS should be the significance of these interventions since "no radicalized state supported by Cuban and Soviet arms has as yet succeeded in improving the material well-being of its citizens."19 The Soviet Union, for instance, has done nothing substantial in aiding the Sahelian belt famine victims of West Africa, or even Ethiopia, where they have a very strong presence. Instead, these states look to the West for food shipments. ECOWAS citizens prefer bread to guns when starving!

The Cuban military presence in Angola and Ethiopia reached 26,000 and 16,000 respectively, and they have also

served in advisory capacities in Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Somalia, Libya, Congo, etc.²⁰ Although they came to Africa at the request of these countries, especially when the U.S. is still dilly-dallying over whether to offer assistance or not, the problem is: Do they depart easily? There must, therefore, be something fundamentally wrong with Soviet assistance in Africa when their military personnel have been expelled from Egypt, Sudan and Somalia; and friendship treaties have been unilaterally abrogated by these states. Gaddafi in Libya and former Idi Amin of Uganda also brought some degree of Soviet influence in their states.

Perhaps African nationalism is a powerful force that has led to restraints on adopting Communism, hook, line and sinker. Soviet appeal should be acceptable but not their control. As Alexander Dallin put it:

African nationalists may adapt Communism, but they will not adopt it. Communism could perhaps become 'nativized' in Africa, but Communism africanized would not yield a Muscovite Africa. The prospect therefore seems to be: Soviet appeal yes; Soviet control, no.²¹

All the same, ECOWAS states must bear in mind what could be termed the Soviet objectives in Africa in considering what areas the Soviets could pose a threat:²² Secure logistic rights, replace French troops, reduce Western influence and strategic presence, gain additional fishing rights, establish Communist-ruled systems, secure military bases, and finally, "solidify ties to liberation movements."

South Africa

To all Africans, South Africa is enemy number 1, aside from internal problems.

The Pretoria regime is run by a racist clique; its system of government is a danger to peace and an affront to the dignity of man. It is approaching a revolutionary situation that will lead to a racial bloodbath.²³

Unfortunately, it is the economic giant of Africa, its greatest strategic ally for the West, and a major producer of minerals that have great military value to the Western world, which has an essential role to play in their defense given its political leverage. Western Europe, for example, gets 70% of its strategic minerals and 90% of its oil around the Cape.²⁴

It is clearly the strongest nation militarily and economically in Sub-Saharan Africa, with well-trained personnel, modern equipment, and access to many state-of-the-art support systems. What is relevant here is that the increasing prosperity of ECOWAS could lead to more positive support for the freedom fighters trying to cast off the yoke of the despicable apartheid system. South Africa, thus, has reason to threaten the well-being of the Community, especially because of the presence of Nigeria, which has prominently supported the liberation movements in Southern Africa morally and financially.

Is South Africa the only threat in Africa? Not with the "enfant terrible" of Africa--Gaddafi of Libya!

Libya

In a region so vast in area, so diverse in cultures and so subject to economic inequalities and poverty, it is very difficult to build cohesion and encourage national patriotism. In a situation of abject poverty, dissension is common and the citizens can be easily manipulated by outside forces for purposes of destabilization. The social problems present a golden opportunity for Gaddafi's adventurism.

Col Muammar Gaddafi's Pan-Islamic ideology campaign is a threat to political stability throughout the Sahelian states and indeed ECOWAS states. Tripoli's support for foreign nationals willing to espouse revolutionary Islam and Islam fundamentalism has had diverse consequences. "In effect, Libya stands accused of manipulating Islam for purposes of territorial annexation and intervention in the affairs of its neighbors."²⁵

Another source of worry is the problem of Libyan territorial claims, especially in Chad and Niger. The repeated attempts to project Libyan power into the domains of its Sahelian neighbors has generated considerable ill-will.

A catalog of Libyan invasions against ECOWAS and other states confirms the threat posed by Gaddafi:²⁶

a. Chad. Aided Muslim fundamentalist factions, occupied Aouzou Strip--a border region--and intervened militarily in the civil war.

b. The Gambia. Offered military training to young Gambians and aid to subversive groups within.

c. Mali. Gave military and financial aid to Malian dissidents based in Tripoli.

d. Niger. Laid territorial claims and occupied a border post (uranium drive). Sponsored anti-Niger government broadcasts inciting Toubou and Tuareg tribes in Niger against the rulers.

e. Senegal. Encouraged the formation of an Islam fundamentalist political party known as the "Hizboulahi" (God's Party) to turn Senegal into a Muslim state and trained fundamentalist guerillas.

f. Nigeria. Nigeria, though not directly pressured, is duly worried because it is surrounded by states threatened by Libya and it has a moslem majority. Libya could use them to carry out subversive activities. Gaddafi apparently wishes to expand south of the Sahara and is ready to use armed force, as he has done in Chad and Niger, if need be. His merger attempts, first by annexing the Aouzou in 1973 and then proposing the union of Chad and Libya in 1981, were first steps in his demented framework of a great "Jamahiriya" (state of the masses). Nigeria played a significant role in creating ECOWAS and supports the organization financially by almost one-third. If Gaddafi succeeds in causing trouble in Nigeria, then Nigeria might not be able to discharge her obligations to the Community, which will eventually collapse with disastrous

effect. There is speculation that Gaddafi bank-rolled the religious "Maitatsine" riots in the northern parts of Nigeria in 1980 and 1982, which left thousands dead.

Gaddafi's tricks have remained remarkably constant. He rewards his obedient clients for their willingness to accept Libyan hegemony and penalizes the recalcitrant. What the famine-stricken Sahelian states of the ECOWAS need now is peace, in order to put their economy back in gear to recovery. Gaddafi should, in the interest of peace, not turn the subregion to another Lebanon!

Having seen the external dimensions, we can now proceed to the internal threat areas.

INTERNAL THREATS

Border Disputes

Africa's border problems seem worse than those of any other continent.²⁷ The partitioning of Africa by the colonial lords seeking to create arenas for cheap raw materials and finished products disrupted the then existing ethnic and cultural kinship patterns, as borders were arbitrarily drawn. By accident of history, therefore, a permanent source of conflict exists, and ECOWAS states are victims. Major ethnic groups here had each settled in more than one country in the region.²⁸ For instance, "Fulanis" live in eight countries, viz, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania,

Niger, and Nigeria, while "Madingo" or Madinke" tribal groups are formed in six member states of Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Mali. Traditional boundaries were thus artificially conceived, severing the ties of kith and kin.

Colonialism further tramped upon African traditionalism "with European concepts of political, social, and economic stratification."²⁹ Diversities and disparities provided breeding grounds for political factionalism and power struggle, causing instability after independence.

Just to mention a few frontier disputes among a number of ECOWAS member states in the last decade--1974/75 Mali and Burkina Faso; June 1976, Togo and Ghana; December 1978, Senegal and Guinea Bissau. The Nigerian/Cameroun border clashes are also a source of worry. Most of these borders are poorly demarcated, adding to the woes of the situation. Because of inadequate border patrols, smuggling has been a constant and serious problem. States are ready to settle border disputes militarily (especially with external support) when areas under dispute have economic, mineral or oil potentials.

Invasions

A very serious threat is that of "subsidized subversion" teleguided from other African states."³⁰ In this regard, one can still recall the attempted invasion of Guinea in November 1970 by Portuguese-led mercenaries acting for

dissidents and the mercenary invasion of Cotonou (Benin) in January 1977. These had tacit support of neighbors who offered a springboard for military activity. This threat also emphasizes the need for joint military cooperation.

Emerging Regional Powers

Although Western neocolonialism has been one of the fears of Africans, it may be "nascent African imperialism represented by emerging regional military powers, that is the most credible threat."³¹ Uneven military growth tends to promote the chances of armed conflict as the stronger powers may seek military solutions to conflicts.

The post-independence conditions that were effective barriers to armed conflict between states seems to be thinning out with military imbalance. Those conditions were: respect for territorial integrity, the stability of borders, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, self-determination, and recourse to the OAU to mediate disputes.

Without these in practice now, these subregional stronger powers may try to influence events or intervene beyond their borders. The suspicion thus is kept vibrant.

Refugees

Fluidity of borders makes it possible for refugees to pour into neighboring affluent countries like Nigeria and Ivory

Coast. During the Chadian crisis, thousands of refugees crossed into Nigeria; this reccurred in the peak of the Sahelian drought. Subversive elements could easily infiltrate into unpoliced borders creating economic chaos and security risks for recipient nations. The dilemma is that Africans are their "brothers' keepers" traditionally. Ethnic bonds with religious fervour make the refugee issue more complex and emotional in resolving the moral and security aspects entailed. In fact, the religious riots in Kano (Nigeria) in December 1980 were attributed to these refugees.

The refugee issue can be said therefore to be a threat militarily, economically, and socially. Without cooperation, this becomes intractable.

Internal Conflicts

Another serious security threat comes from indigenous conflicts. The Western Sahara and Chadian problems, for instance, primarily had internal causes before foreign intervention. This type of threat places more strain on subregional cooperation. Some of these conflicts could be state-sponsored, especially by ideological missionaries, or those who nurse territorial ambitions. Sadly enough, "African stability continues to be threatened by the internal forces of the 1960s and 1970s, forces caused by and acting as obstacles to economic development."³² They are the inability to control and manage its affairs and the ever-present dominance of

ethnic, tribal, and religious factors in domestic politics.

After analysis of external and internal threats, what can we say about the teething problems?

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS

What are the constraints, obstacles, and problems that inhibit the ECOWAS movement towards collective defense? They range from political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, to military reasons.

Polarization

The armed forces of member states come from diverse colonial backgrounds, and have different traditions, languages, training, and sources of equipment. Pre-colonial days West Africa was a closely-knit entity, though without a history of cohesive development as a group. Colonialization polarized the subregion into two main colonial cultures--the French and the British. The differences promote political destabilization and polarization.

Political Instability

The more than fifty successful coups in Africa resulted from many factors, mainly three easily identifiable ones:³⁴

a. Intra-military factors, such as military cohesion, recruitment, promotion, and deployment practices.

b. Domestic factors, such as economic maldistribution, ethnic and class differences, internal violence, and harmful rivalries.

c. International factors, such as external aid and "contagion" from neighboring states.

Political Insecurity

Security problems surfaced in the form of demands for self-determination, territorial claims, and crises in political leadership. They resulted in civil wars, rebellions, assassinations, military coups, and the attendant large numbers of refugees.

Economics

In terms of "socioeconomic standing" in the globe, thirty-six of the lowest fifty-two states are African, mostly from ECOWAS.

Although Africa as a whole has a per capita GNP that is less than half that of Latin America (\$723 versus \$1,651), African states spend a third more per soldier than do Latin American countries (\$8,791 versus \$6,615).³⁵

Military costs seem to have a negative effect on expenditures for health, nutrition, and education. Result: internal tensions.

Finance thus becomes a crucial factor in having military cooperation. In case of external aggression, ECOWAS will need to pay heavily to ensure communication, transport and

infrastructures are adequate. In effect, funds for socioeconomic sectors will be diverted to arm the defense force--an expensive venture when the sound economic hopes of the Community have not been realized.

"Single sector economy" may not pay off without diversification in the long run. ECOWAS states are also beset with deterioration of exchange rates, economic crises, excessive oil importation costs for most, unreasonable rises in costs of basic needs, problems with international monetary system and international payments, energy crises, and exploding urban population.

Accords

Bilateral military pacts between some ECOWAS states and foreign powers seem not to encourage West African military cooperation, because of pressures from their ex-colonial masters in order to safeguard existing defense arrangements. France seems to be the greatest culprit in this regard.

Two francophone groupings--the West African Monetary Union (UMOA) and the Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO)--were formed as a reaction to the ECOWAS idea and may weaken integration.³⁶ Most of the francophone states have close ties to France that may be costly for them to overlook, as the agreements may be said to be reliable and hard to replace by a new ECOWAS military alliance.

Leadership Tussle

An absence of mutual confidence amongst member states and possible existence of one or two countries within the organization that can be regarded as financially and militarily stronger than others, and who can provide the needed "leadership" for the others--just as the U.S.A and the Soviet Union, for example, provide ^{it} for NATO and the Warsaw Pact--also contribute to the state of non-cooperation. This can be attributed to fear of what some leaders of the Community perceive as "loss of sovereignty;" but NATO and Warsaw Pact states did not surrender or lose sovereignty in agreeing to come together.

There is also the fear of subterranean "leadership" between Nigeria and some of the key francophone states, e.g., Senegal, Ivory Coast. This is attributable to different political background and ideological differences.

Sociological Factors

The diversity of culture, religion, and language is a potential source of misunderstanding, which on many occasions led to tensions and could rock the very foundation of the Community. This situation has not been eased by the apparent inept leadership in some of the countries.

Ethnicity is a principal determinant in political power acquisition and distribution of public "goodies" in the subregion. It could lead to frustration which, if not

contained, could result in crises, violent clashes and other manifestations of instability. This is not a conducive atmosphere for military cooperation. Ethnic conflicts and religious skirmishes are exceedingly dangerous in Africa.

Military Considerations

According to Annette M. Seegers,³⁷ there are many reasons why African states in general are reluctant to create a defensive system. A few of them are technical difficulties (standardization of equipment, training and organizational procedures), fear of loss of sovereignty, as earlier mentioned, and "the number of coups^{that} propelled the African military to political prominence--and political civil leaders were reluctant to relinquish political control over their military establishments."

Equipment

Equipment choice will pose a problem as proliferation of systems is the order of the day in the Community. Nigeria, for example, has aircraft in inventory from the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Holland, West Germany, the U.S., Italy, and Czechoslovakia; while other member states purchase theirs from France, the U.S., China, Switzerland, Brazil, Canada, the Soviet Union, etc. Which equipment will be chosen then? Also foreign groups continue to assail the Community with weaponry of all types--which places a premium on "competence at the

expense of expedience" and needs of its citizens. The Soviet Union will continue "its search for influence, France for markets, the U.S. for local allies." Thus equipment becomes a source of constraint with weapons systems.

Logistics

Even sophisticated equipment and firepower may not prove reliable in combat, considering the existing logistics problems within the Community in maintenance and resupply capabilities. The technical expertise that is prevalently inadequate now becomes another constraint of significance.

Training and Operations

There must be hundreds of foreign military advisors, instructors, technicians, etc., in the subregion from various countries involved in training. How this can be harmonized is also a constraint in military cooperation endeavors. These experts or specialists themselves even compound training efforts by underestimating the problems in recipient countries with their logistical problems, awesome bureaucracy, physical environmental conditions, and different standards of discipline. Organizational procedures for training and operations are not too streamlined either.

Doctrine

Doctrine influences the preparation for and conduct of

national defense by "guiding procurement and weapons acquisition, rationalizing organizational structure, and guiding employment in battle operations."³⁸ The subregion's doctrine, especially in the francophone states, might be to delay the aggressor and protect key national installations until France arrives. This is at variance then with the aspirations of ECOWAS. Another constraint is in implanting European models that are practically unsuitable in Africa. ECOWAS states' doctrinal beliefs, if any, are not based on the subregion's missions and effective model. Emphasis has been on acquiring sophisticated equipment that may not be "combat reliable" because of inherent logistics problems mentioned above and the doctrine to employ it efficiently. What exists doctrinally now are just security statements that are difficult to put into operation because the local environmental situation is not a prime consideration.

Boundary issues and refugee issues have earlier been discussed. Suffice it to say they are also major factors in the analysis of problems and constraints towards military cooperation for ECOWAS.

What then are we to conclude about these problems?

Desired Cooperation

The thrust of the analysis is that these problems, which are "more or less inevitable," cannot be solved by refusing to come together. A solution hinges on the desire to

unite and get organized just as NATO and other defense organizations have done. These alliances did not wait until they eliminated language diversities,^{and} all training, operations, equipment and weapons were standardized before coming to an agreeable military cooperation.³⁹

The problems of logistics, standardization of weapons and training programs, language barrier, and ideological differences can best be tackled within the medium of a collective defense system, not outside it.

It is unrealistic therefore for ECOWAS states to think that these diversities and problems can be resolved without first accepting the idea of a joint defense system.

CHAPTER VII

FRANCE AND NIGERIA: DIVERGENT INTERESTS?

Before solutions to the difficulties discussed above can be presented, the policies of France, the protector of the francophone countries, and Nigeria, the largest black nation in Africa, need to be analyzed. Is France a threat to the realization of ECOWAS military cooperation? Is Nigeria a threat to her neighbors, or to French interests? This chapter will attempt to answer these questions.

FRANCE

Role and Policy

France draws economic strength from its ties with former colonies, including the provision^{of troops,} which is against the held theory that the rest of the colonizers would at least pretend to leave Africa alone. France tries to stabilize francophone governments; she intervened directly in Chad and maintains military forces in some francophone countries.

Now, what are the principles that underly the francophone policy? According to IHEDN (National French Defense Institute),⁴⁰ they can be summarized as follows:

Stability, "respect for the independence" of states and national borders, loyalty to their "friends," and respect of defense agreements. These agreements take various shapes: either protection or cooperation, by "deterrent presence of French soldiers," by direct aid in equipment^{and} supplies, or in the form of advisers and training. The policy also provides "an alternative to simply projecting the East-West conflicts of the north on the African continent."

"There are at least four ingredients to this French commitment:⁴¹ A cultural element (language affinity), a moral element (sense of continuing responsibility), an economic element (sources of crucial raw materials and markets for goods and investments), and a power element.

Economic

In most of these states, French capital and manpower dominate foreign commerce, banking and investments.

This dominance becomes a basic element in French interests in the area, and the French role becomes one of protecting these interests, intervening in a number of forums against external invasion and internal collapse.⁴²

Economic intervention has returned unfortunately "to a level of pre-independence" where countries like Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Togo, with economic growth are still aided by France.

The common elements as "recipients of French economic support" are:⁴³ French presence, a strategic position,

products important to France, and the country's willingness to enter "into a close relationship of reliance on France and a magnitude of need such that France can remain the dominant developed partner in that relationship."

Accords

Military agreements with France by all francophone states except Guinea include at times military assistance, basing in the subregion, or intervention to overthrow a menace, like Bokassa of the Central African Republic. In sum, the bulk of francophone states in ECOWAS still obtain most of their military equipment from France and also look to her for training and other support.

France and Libya

What should be a source of worry to francophone states and ECOWAS military cooperation efforts is the relationship between France and Libya. In Chad, President Mitterand approved "OPERATION STINGRAY" to halt the Libyan advance in August 1983 reluctantly. Mitterand met Gaddafi in Crete in November 1984 and signed a Franco-Libyan mutual withdrawal agreement which was not honored by Libya. It took American "irrefutable proof of Libyan insincerity" before the French agreed that Libyan troops were still in Chad. Even then, Claude Cheysson, France's foreign minister, still declared that France wants to have normal relations with Libya.

This can be attributed to the following:

a. About 50 French enterprises are currently doing business with Libya.

b. French exports to Libya and Libyan oil sale to France amounted to some billion dollars.

c. Ironically, the overwhelming proportion of French sales to Libya was in ^{the} form of military aircraft and missiles.

This leads then to the question: How much can ECOWAS francophone states depend on France, when Libya threatens them?

Reliability

How reliable then is their hope in France as far as ECOWAS interests are concerned? Claude E. Welch, Jr., put it aptly:

However the French acceptance of the Libyan occupation of northern Chad affirmed in a France-Libyan pact announced in September 1986 raises fundamental questions about traditional French commitments to its African allies and the extent to which African leaders can rely on the full backing of its former colonial rulers in the future.⁴⁴

The point here then, is that these states should not expect to find external solution with France always.

France and Nigeria

Nigeria is generally seen as a subregional power, and France as the principal extra-regional actor in ECOWAS. There was distrust in French circles of the intentions of the "giant"

Nigeria, which they considered to be a rival for influence within the region. Although the domestic situation within these states, especially in Niger, Chad, and Cameroun, at the time of independence was quite unstable, Nigeria never proved to be a threat to their independence nor to their governments as had been widely feared.

What Nigeria is worried about is not the secret conventions signed in the 1960s between France and the francophone states, when there was little choice by the latter but to accept these agreements as they were presented, but military defense pacts with superpowers of countries like Senegal and Ivory Coast, for example, that still retain French troops on their soil.

President Mitterand's arrival at the Elysee has, however, replaced the mutual suspicion that had characterized Franco-Nigeria relations with closer diplomatic and economic cooperation. France may not intervene alone in Africa since Mitterand's government agreed to consult OAU. Not to create a vacuum, an ECOWAS defense pact, if properly functioning, performs the stabilizing role formerly exercised by French intervention, and will do this in the name of the Community "rather than as one power offering its protection."

What then is the role of Nigeria in the comity of the ECOWAS member states?

NIGERIA

Nigeria, the only oil-export country in ECOWAS, is often consulted before any major political decision on African affairs is adopted by the OAU. "Nigeria is today possibly the African country most widely courted by both the West and the East, and it is continuously looked to for support within the OAU."⁴⁶ By successful diplomacy, Nigeria was able to get the other countries of the region to form ECOWAS, "an organization trying to reduce the colonial barriers to mutual understanding and friendship." As a sign of her strength and size relative to its partners, Nigeria houses the headquarters of ECOWAS in Lagos, provides a third of the budget, and has a GNP "roughly equivalent to all the other members combined."⁴⁷

She, nevertheless, does not wish to be policeman of the subregion and, by and large, has maintained cordial and friendly relations with neighbors.

Security

Nigeria would like to see a stable neighborhood to avoid disagreements and to prevent use of the relatively weak states as a platform by third parties for incursion into Nigerian territory. Nigeria recalls that Benin granted landing rights to international bodies during the Nigerian civil war in 1967-1970, and that the French used Chad to overthrow Bokassa in the fall of 1979. Nigeria has not physically threatened her

neighbors. Can the same be said of her neighbors?

Threat by Neighbors

Despite the cordial hands of friendship extended by Nigeria to the neighboring states, constant threats posed by them--incidentally francophone--has been a source of irritation. Examples abound: Border clashes with Benin and Cameroun; in May 1981, five Nigerians were killed by Cameroun "gendarmes"; Cameroun has not totally renounced her claims to some parts of Nigeria; on March 1981, elements of Benin's armed forces forcibly occupied Nigerian villages, etc.

Nigeria should, logically, do the threatening, if need be, not the neighbors! It does seem then they are being encouraged to threaten her by external forces. Other difficulties with neighbors include boundary disputes, allegations of mistreatment of nationals, smuggling, fugitives, religious fundamentalism, etc. Peaceful resolutions have been used in the past. It works today; it may not work tomorrow. Will Nigeria continue to fold her arms and allow Cameroun "gendarmes" to kill her soldiers, deprive Nigerians in border towns of their properties, or allow further incursion into her territory? The tension between Nigeria and Cameroun could be reduced if the latter is admitted into ECOWAS, if the "largesse" of France will permit.

ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement

This protocol has unpleasant implications affecting security if its tenets are not followed to the letter. The refugee issue--almost two million ECOWAS citizens are in the country illegally--creates the following burdens to Nigeria:48

a. Laborers, unemployed visitors/immigrants perpetuate "illegal syndicate activities" like smuggling, commit crimes like prostitution, destitution and vagrancy.

b. Uncontrolled and unchecked movement of people, livestock, etc., may bring pests and diseases to Nigeria.

c. A major social problem created by need for additional housing, schools, medical services, and expanded transportation system in the receiving cities.

The country's yearly budget and development programs are bound to suffer for this unplanned "invasion."

Assistance

Among Nigeria's assistance projects to ECOWAS are building roads and bridges to Benin and Niger, trans-Saharan highway construction, funding partly the Guinean iron ore project, relief supplies, airlift assistance, part of OAU Peace-keeping force in Chad, resolution of inter-and intra-state disputes diplomatically, concessionary oil prices, cash grants to countries in natural disasters, aircraft gifts, training of Niger, Benin and other African military pilots, technicians, etc.

Most of the ECOWAS cooperation efforts are seen by Nigeria as a means of decreasing dependence on foreign powers on one hand and promoting the prosperity of all states in the subregion on the other. This cannot be done by threatening her weaker neighbors, overwhelming them, or imposing her views unilaterally. Rather, Nigeria has a record of stressing diplomatic negotiations to solve regional disputes.

Unfortunately now, the country is undergoing a crisis in her economy, which was mismanaged by the Shagari civilian government, because of internalizing IMF loan solution and a collapse of the market for oil prices, her most critical export. The economy is expected to pick up pretty soon, with very stringent economic measures and sacrifice by the citizens. Otherwise, ECOWAS may find they can no longer turn to their "traditional patron for financial bailouts, a strong political voice in world councils, or arbitration in regional disputes."⁴⁹

Defense Pact

Nigeria's interest in seeing the ECOWAS Defense Pact through is also to enhance her security, and to promote support from member states of the organization in case of military attack by a hostile force on a member state. In the perception of the Nigerian leaders, the member nations' security would best be promoted by a regional security arrangement developed and manned by Africans themselves. As former Nigerian Head of

State, Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, said, in response to ^aNATO meeting in Paris on 5 June 1978 to consider military aid to francophone states:50

We totally reject as an instrument of neo-colonialism any collective security scheme for Africa fashioned and teleguided from outside Africa for the economic, political or military interest of any superpower bloc. It is an insult to the dignity and intellect of the African man.

On this note, what one may ask, are the military capabilities of these ECOWAS member states?

CHAPTER VIII

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Bruce E. Arlinghaus' and Pauline H. Baker's assessments are as shown below briefly.⁵¹

GROUND FORCES

Nigeria

Clearly the dominant force in the area, Nigeria's 94,000-man army is the second largest force in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of avoiding tying itself to one supplier, the army has created a lack of homogeneity in equipment. In terms of defending territorial integrity, Nigeria's army has the advantage of being surrounded by smaller and weaker states.

Ghana

The 10-000-man army was once considered professional and disciplined, but a series of lower-echelon coups and coup attempts has doubtless severely damaged the command structure. The army lacks offensive capability. Until discipline and a chain of command are restored, the acquisition of new equipment will be a wasted effort.

Guinea

The 8,500-man army has sought to end its near-total reliance on Soviet equipment and training by opening to the West. It has demonstrated an ability to intervene in neighboring states (at the invitation of the host government), for example, in 1979 in Liberia.

Senegal

The 8,500-man army has an enormous advantage in command experience and training because it was the backbone of the French colonial army, the "Compagnie de Tirailleurs Senegalais," and can defend its borders adequately against its immediate neighbors.

Mauritania

Mauritania finds its small army placed in the role of buffer between the Arab-Berber north and black Africa, and occasionally caught between Morocco's well-disciplined forces and the POLISARIO guerillas. It continues to suffer the adverse effects of a recruiting tradition that draws officers primarily from the Arab north and enlisted men from the black population in the south.

Guinea-Bissau

The army evolved from a successful eleven-year guerilla

struggle against Portugal and seems capable of providing internal security, as well as adequate defense against its immediate neighbors.

Ivory Coast

The Ivorian military is well-trained, professional, and does not suffer from the ethnic recruiting patterns that threaten stability elsewhere. The army appears adequate for providing internal security and could provide adequate defense of vital internal areas until external (presumably French) help arrives.

Benin

Benin's colonial ties and military orientation remains French, although a Soviet inroad has been added. The nation's poverty prevents much modernizations.

Liberia

The 1980 coup in Liberia destroyed what military discipline and training existed in the army. The authority of the officer corps collapsed as privates and sergeants became majors and colonels overnight. The breakdown at the top inevitably led to the disintegration of training, maintenance, and logistical capabilities.

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone's army is one of the better trained and disciplined in West Africa, and remains remarkably British in its traditions, despite more than ten years of independence.

Gambia

As part of its confederation with Senegal, Gambia has reorganized its security forces into a "gendarmerie " and the army on the Senegalese design.

Mali

Remains largely tied to Soviet military equipment although some Western equipment has reportedly begun to arrive. Given the extensive territory it must secure and the army's limited mobility, it is not capable of providing more than point defense.

Niger

The small army faces problems similar to Mali, and finds itself a potential barrier to Gaddafi's attempts to dominate the Sahel region. It is well trained, fairly equipped and mobile in a disciplined, light infantry force.

Togo

The small but disciplined Togolese army appears capable of providing reasonably adequate internal security, but relies principally on France for training and equipment.

Burkina Faso

The 3,700-man army is fairly well-equipped by France, fairly well-disciplined, but with no prospect for modernization or mobility improvement except on a grant-aid basis.

SEA FORCES

The objectives and missions of the ECOWAS states' navies are to protect coastal defenses, enforce maritime regulations, conduct search and rescue operations, and protect fishing and mineral resources in their economic zones. The problems in achieving the objectives stem from "shortages of skilled manpower, lack of adequate training, organizational infrastructural difficulties, poor logistics, and maintenance problems."⁵² Not only is it expensive to build, man, and maintain a navy, it is also expensive to operate one in the face of growing poverty.

Policing economic zones requires sea and air protection that is not within easy reach of the capabilities of their navies. Only Nigeria and Ivory Coast possess surface-to-surface missile platforms, while Benin, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo have torpedoes.⁵³ Although ECOWAS navies do not possess submarines, "great equalizers"--sophisticated missiles and fast-attack aircraft--are being acquired for protection of vital economic

zones. When properly maintained and well-manned, fast attack craft " can change ^{the} equation of naval power in the international arena." They have been described as the "pocket battleship of the missile era."⁵⁴ Thus, these navies have access to a relatively low-cost craft with "significant defensive and offensive capabilities."

AIR FORCES

In a typical ECOWAS setting, fighting over vast distances, by rivers, parched deserts, featureless terrains, and roadless forests, make airpower a must. Identifiable weaknesses in the air forces of the subregion are: "heavy utilization rates, maintenance failures, logistic problems, and combat losses."⁵⁵ These can reduce them to ^{an} ineffective level in a war. Worse still, without an indigenous production capability, equipment attrition becomes almost insurmountable. As long as they are dependent on outside suppliers, the use of airpower will be limited in most conflicts. It can therefore be assumed that external assistance will be the primary factor in development of the subregion's air forces.

Military expenditures make this dependence more involving on outside military and economic aid; dependence that is difficult increasingly to sever. Such is the dilemma of ECOWAS military trends.

In sum, the four critical elements of military

capability--force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability--seem to be problematic in the subregion. Manpower and equipment are vital components; but such "intangibles" as morale, discipline, leadership, and levels of training are also necessary to achieve a combat capable force.

MILITARY BALANCE

Annex A shows the order of battle of ECOWAS member states. We shall now examine the proposed ECOWAS Defence Pact.

CHAPTER IX
ASSESSMENT OF THE ECOWAS DEFENSE PACT

The ECOWAS has a defense pact initialled in 1981 by some of the sixteen members of the organization. ECOWAS Document A/SP3/5/81 "Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense" (Freetown) 29 May 1981⁵⁶ therefore is only a document of intent that is yet to be ratified. To all intents and purposes it is not binding. All the same, the intention of the draft is for the other fifteen countries of the Community to give assistance in any military emergency against one state. Under the pact units from the armies of ECOWAS will form an "Allied Forces of the Community" (AAFC) under a force commander to carry out joint military exercises.

In case of conflict between two member states, the Authority of Heads of State is expected to mediate and "get prepared to deploy "the AAFC as a peace-keeping force". The Community forces may not interfere in purely domestic conflicts.

Provisions

There are four principal Provisions in the pact dealing with Non-aggression, Enforcement, Institutional and Command Provisions, and Finances.⁵⁷ The organization comprises: The Authority of Heads of State and Governments (the Authority), the Defense Council, and the Defense Commission, as one of the

technical aspects.

Article 20 (1) respects the existence of other defense accords between member states and other powers "so long as they are not in contradiction with the spirit of the ECOWAS defense pact."

Defects

What can be said to be the major defects of the provisions of the pact presently? They are: 58

a. No provision for a permanent standing army to handle emergencies quickly.

b. The constraints mentioned in this paper earlier--military, political, and logistics considerations in defending a member state, different traditions, languages, equipment, etc.--need to be bridged by continuous training, which is missing in the present form.

c. Secret military accords signed between member states and superpowers are not available for scrutiny to determine if they are against the "spirit" of the ECOWAS.

d. Nothing is said about the types of funds to be kept and how members will contribute.

e. That pact is silent on a number of issues like: Should the forces aid a tyrant or remain neutral if France wishes to intervene?

f. There is an element of dual authority of the heads of government and the Defence Council in initiating enforcement

action, especially in an emergency.

g. The force structure is not properly addressed.

In the final analysis, the multilateral defense pact under ECOWAS framework supplements rather than supplants other agreements; but then it is just the beginning in joint military cooperation.

Ratification

What is not encouraging, however, is that years after the drafting the defense protocol is yet to be ratified. This typifies the general slowness of the Community to achieve progress towards integration.

At this rate then, the initial enthusiasm for the pact may wane even before an emergency puts its credibility and viability to the test. If not, it has plenty of potential for demonstrating ability to meet its objectives.⁵⁹

What sort of force structure can then, in the face of these odds, be suggested for the regional defense of ECOWAS member states?

CHAPTER X
FORCE STRUCTURE AND CONTROL60

The proposed concept of defense for ECOWAS should be hinged on a connecting system whereby a member state under aggression would be assisted, as a right, with immediate security by the other members. In other words, an attack on one state should be construed as an attack on all.

Deployment Strategy

"Now that an intent document" has been presented, there is need to have a practicable and realistic arrangement before it is ratified. The solution should be one that maximizes force effectiveness at minimum cost.

The options that should be considered are:

- a. Establishment of a standing force that will act as the frontline defense of the Community.
- b. Development of Intervention Forces by each nation for quick operations response.

The first option might involve huge financial outlay and give the false impression that such a force would be for the total security of member states. The second option, however, will not give a false impression or be too expensive. But it has its own disadvantages in mobility and communications, because most member states' airlift capability, railroads, roads, and bridges are not efficient enough for quick

mobilization. The enemy knows these weaknesses, but knowing that he will be confronted by a force that has trained together and achieved a high level of combat readiness will make him do rethinking before attacking a state. The states must therefore possess the will to create a standing force for credible deterrence.

Strength of the Force

"The idea of having a standing force is to deter attack, but if that fails, to hold the enemy till the arrival of reinforcements from the national armies of member states." Because of the financial situation of some states in this endeavor, it is recommended that a composite force of brigade strength with complements of naval and air wings will suffice.

The Infantry Brigade group will consist of three infantry battalions with supporting elements. The Naval Wing will consist of patrol boats and ships for patrol duties and lifting of an entire brigade group. The Air Wing will operate with helicopters and light aircraft capable of carrying out armed attack and rapid airlift.

Contribution

The allocation of responsibilities will be based on the relative strength of the member states' armed forces. All countries except Gambia can contribute at least ground forces. The airpower contribution can be made by seven countries

(Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Senegal, and Ivory Coast). The naval contributions can be made by eight countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Senegal, and Ivory Coast).

Since countries like Benin, Togo, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso cannot make any effective contribution to the air and naval efforts without denigrating their national defenses, they should contribute most of the ground troops.

The supporting units could then come from countries with ^a viable economy and more recent experience in warfare. Such countries are Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Guinea, and Ghana. The Air Wing helicopters should be provided by Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Senegal; while the fast patrol boats and ships should be drawn from Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Ivory Coast.

Each nation in the Community would still be expected to create a cell of Rapid Intervention Force within their national armies ready to be deployed at the shortest possible notice to supplement the standing force if more assistance is needed.

Location of Forces

"The forces should be located along the coastal areas of the subregion since most of the industrial and capital cities of most member states are located along the coast." The forces could be divided into three self-sustaining battalions with their headquarters located at Ghana, Senegal and Mauritania

respectively, since it is not practicable to have effective surveillance along the vast coastline if all the forces are colocated.

The Air and Naval Wings should follow the same pattern of division and each composite force will have its own area of operation.

Command and Control

There should be in each location a Forces Commander who will be responsible to the overall ECOWAS Forces Commander. Since the alliance must exist under the aegis of the ECOWAS authority, a decision-making system capable of responding to any emergency must be evolved.

A full complement of military staff at the ECOWAS Secretariat is therefore suggested, with the most senior military officer advising the Secretary-General on military options in any given situation. If the meeting of Heads of State cannot be convened immediately, the Council of Ministers for defense will take appropriate decisions on their behalf. The Heads of Governments may rescind any decision at their next emergency meeting.

A Defence Council comprising Chiefs of Armies of member states will review the training and equipment standard of the forces and advise on security assessments. It will also arrange regular meets of the various armed forces through interstate military sports, joint exercises, and training.

Finance

"To relieve states of foreign exchange burden, the troops' salaries should be paid in their own local currencies into their individual home accounts, but the ECOWAS fund should assume the responsibility for the daily feeding and maintenance allowance in countries where they are stationed."

Each country should be compensated for the initial equipment supplied by pro-rata deductions, after which the ownership of the equipment reverts to the authority. The cost of operating and maintaining the equipment shall also be borne by the authority. Member states will, of course, contribute regularly to the ECOWAS fund.

In sum, while it is recognized that this approach will be expensive, it seems to be a meaningful proposal if the pact is to stand the test of time. There is no apparent choice but to follow the adage that if you want peace, you must prepare for war. Security does not come cheap. The joint security arrangement as envisaged here may, in the long run, prove to be cheaper than individual states' pursuit of an utopian security.

Finally, what are the future hopes of ECOWAS?

CHAPTER XI

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The future holds prospects and expectations as shown below. Where there are none, recommendations are offered.

ECOWAS

By the year 2000, it is hoped that these would materialize: a gradual trade liberalization within the Community, common external tariff, harmonization of customs, common currency, and a harmonized and standardized informatoin and data system.

The danger which ECOWAS may face in the coming decade could be:⁶¹ Dissipation of energy in creating more regional organizations, "engaging in largely symbolic events," governments' unpreparedness for monetary union, and enlarging its bureaucracy.

Economic Community of West Africa

Pressure needs to be put on the primary members of the CEAO--Senegal and Ivory Coast--to end the incompatibility between ECOWAS and CEAO.

Threat

ECOWAS states may not need the capability to engage an enemy at all levels of conflict initially from "counterinsurgent operations to full-scale armored and mechanized warfare." It is envisaged that the threat, after the defense pact takes off, may be from lightly armed guerilla insurgents in small-scale border disputes.

In the future, occasions for intervention against external invasion are bound to occur, for example,⁶² a Moroccan or POLISARIO invasion of Mauritania, a Libyan or national liberation movement invasion of Niger or Mali, and a Nigerian-Camerounian war.

Military Capability

Political constraints, lack of substantial lift capabilities and of viable logistic support may prevent any long military force deployment without outside help. "The acquisition of these capabilities is a long-term proposition, dependent on the development of a qualified manpower pool with technical abilities.⁶³

Combat effectiveness or capability may be heightened by emphasis on good leadership, training, morale, discipline, and the quality and quantity of arms and equipment that ECOWAS intends to field.

Force Structure

The force structure need is for "readily deployable, highly armed units with strong counter-insurgency skills."⁶⁴ Modest force modernization efforts will concentrate on upgrading, transportation, communications, and engineering capabilities while working on a practical logistic support system.

An integrated ECOWAS force would train together, be equipped with standard weapons, and would collectively defend common sea lanes and other interests.

Doctrine

ECOWAS doctrine must be based on African missions and effective African models without copying foreign ones. The doctrine to be developed should influence the preparation for and conduct of common defense by guiding procurement and weapons acquisition, organization structure and force employment in battle.

The Nigerian military has been used in domestic situations on an emergency basis; such as the 1973 census, for traffic control and for clearing the congested ports during the "cement armada." Success may be questionable; suffice it to note that they are examples of roles the ECOWAS force could be used for in a national crisis situation. This "African solution" in grave situations should be reflected in the doctrine.

Foreign Aid

Since foreign intervention dissipated the fraternal bonds by unnecessary conflicts, reaped raw materials from Africa at low prices, imported finished products into the region at exorbitant and increasing prices, separated kiths and kins by artificial boundaries, fuelled tensions, gave groups guns when they were starving, encouraged food importation instead of local production, created monstrous bureaucracies, used religion to further fractionalize societies and states, imbedded corruption within the body politic of nations, degraded ^{the} role of traditional rulers and kings, who were highly respected as "quellers of quarrels" within communities, left them with mass illiteracy, made Africans believe that their salvation lies in continuing dependence on their colonial overlords, and are still neocolonizing every facet of state development, it is time the ex-colonialists provided substantial positive assistance. For a change, these foreign powers can show genuine interest in the subregion by supporting the ECOWAS defense pact.

France

It is in this light that France is expected to now give moral and financial support to the ECOWAS defense formation by transferring present defense expenses on francophone states to the envisaged common ECOWAS Defense Fund.

U.S.A.

France should call upon the "big brother" and "paymaster of NATO" to do likewise. The U.S. may not need Africa's markets or investment opportunities, but needs its minerals and oil. ECOWAS expects, in the near future, the preacher of a "favorable world order" to abide by its special responsibility to use its power--diplomatic, economic, moral, perhaps even military sales denial by the West--to break the shackles of black and "colored" people in South Africa. Thus, ECOWAS, and indeed the whole of Africa, will be a much more secure region to live in. This, ultimately, will promote the U.S. interest if an acceptable formula for power sharing by blacks and whites can be made.

Arabs

The Arabs can promote Afro-Arab political solidarity by investing surplus capital from oil-rich Arab states in the economic development of the subregion since most of the ECOWAS citizens are affiliated ^{to Arabs} by religious ties, which are of prime importance in Arab thinking.

Libya

Libya would cease to be a threat as soon as Gaddafi knows that the ECOWAS defense organization is a serious affair, since any incursion on any member state will be attack on all.

He cannot afford to pay the political price for discountenancing this.

Brazil

Brazil is making inroads into Africa, which expects her to produce contributions to strengthen the ties. Her foreign policy is conducive to an African setting--Brazil "does not export ideology or impose political preconditions."⁶⁵ Brazilian technology and products are suitable for African application also. A country like Nigeria that is "pivotal in Brazil's African relations" could be in the best position to exert influence to assist the ECOWAS defense, Brazil being the sixth largest exporter of arms in the world,⁶⁶ as a way of cutting down the proliferation of different weapons systems.

Ways Brazil can contribute to ECOWAS include: extending export credits for military equipment, technology of the aviation industry, enrolling member states' students in her military academies and technical training institutions.

Brazil is a "natural partner" because of the African cultural roots of the country as culture and race are significant sources of affiliation in an African world. As Wayne A. Selcher put it:⁶⁷

If the Brazil-Africa link falls short of mutual advantage, the viability of African attempts to find Third World alternatives for their development and security needs can be thrown into serious question.

Apart from moral and financial support to ECOWAS, what

has Nigeria got to offer in the immediate future?

Nigeria

The Defense Industries Corporation (DIC) in Nigeria now assembles rifles, 9mm pistols, 60mm and 81mm mortars, and their ammunition. The corporation could form the nucleus of intra-region armament equipment standardization, with each member state contributing personnel for research and development.

The country has about seven auto and truck assembly plants, including PEUGEOT, which francophone countries can easily identify with. They could serve for vehicle standardization starting with the assemblage of armored fighting and cross-country vehicles at STEYR Motors in the country.

The scientists of "Biafra" during the Nigerian civil war are still available. Their ingenious adaptations in the science of petroleum chemistry and engineering led them into building local refineries for sufficiency in Kerosine, petrol, diesel, and aviation fuel. They also developed a high quality armament, such as "OGBUNIGWE" mortar bombs and flying rockets. They could form the nucleus of scientists for ^{an} ECOWAS arms manufacturing body.

Nigeria has a military academy (The Nigerian Defence Academy) built over fifteen years ago and has trained over three thousand officers for her armed forces. It is now being converted into a technical university. ECOWAS can use this as

a main source of their officer corps training, instead of going abroad. So also are Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Command and Staff College, various Army schools, and the Air Force primary and basic flying schools and technical academies.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has attempted to highlight the considerations for establishing an ECOWAS regional security, and its conclusions and recommendations are summarized below.

ECOWAS

ECOWAS is an economic community formed by sixteen predominantly English--and French-speaking West African countries to promote self-sufficiency and self-reliance. The major achievement since the agreement establishing it was signed in 1976 is fostering of peace and good neighborliness through non-aggression and social activities. There is a myriad of problems innundating the organization, chiefly relating to lack of ideological unity, chaotic economic situation and francophone attachments of neocolonialism.

Need for a Regional Defense

In reviewing the need for a regional defense, national interests were considered, along with ^{the} genesis of African military cooperation in the form of the moribund African High Command. Since no African state can always rely on external

intervention anytime a request is made, it is felt that existing military agreements might not stand the test of time, and salvation is in a regional military alliance. Another imperative is that other military alliances like NATO, Warsaw Pact, still have differences, but these have not prevented such treaties serving common security interests.

Unity of purpose is cheaper in the long run, since common threats can be dealt with in unison, rather than singularly. If economic integration and cooperation are to be meaningful, they have to be accompanied by a defense and security arrangement. In ECOWAS states, socioeconomic development suffers because of enormous amounts of money spent on military equipment and large armies and this causes instability. With less threats from neighbors, the need for large, ill-equipped and ill-trained armies becomes irrelevant.

Threats

Under threat analysis, the external threats are seen as foreign interests, foreign interventions, and Soviet influence. Even within Africa, the extra-regional threats are Libya and, of course, South Africa. Foreign presence within the Community is to serve their own interests and not necessarily for the ultimate good of ECOWAS. Any foreign intervention by "big powers" is anti-OAU, and therefore, a threat, except under the auspices of that body. Foreigners have intervened in Mauritania, Chad, Guinea, and Benin. Soviet imperialism is

also a threat since it encourages "liberation movements" while their assistance is to offer guns instead of bread. This is not in the interest of the famine-ravished Sahelian belt of the region.

South Africa, to all Africans, is archenemy number one, but is supported by the Western world because of its strategic location and immense strategic mineral resources needed by the West.

Libya under Gaddafi has territorial ambitions to build an Islamic empire, fuels dissent in the Community under the guise of religion and inship, destabilizes regimes with its immense wealth in the subregion, exports untenable ideology, and still occupies the Aouzou strip of Chad. Libya has been a threat to Chad, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and to Nigeria indirectly.

Internal threats come in various forms, such as border disputes, "subsidized subregion"^{incursions} masterminded from other states like the attempted invasion of Guinea and Benin, emerging regional powers that promote the chances of armed conflict to settle disputes, refugees who undermine the social, economic and security pillars of recipient states and are there illegally, and finally, internal conflicts based on ideological quests or territorial ambitions.

Regional Survey

The regional survey of the member states highlighted

the teething peculiarities ECOWAS faces, ranging from agricultural decline in Benin, Libyan destabilizations, devastating drought of the Sahelian belt, dependence of a number of states on France for economic and military survival of francophone states, to deteriorating oil revenues for Nigeria.

Problems

The major constraints, obstacles and problems that ECOWAS faces to realize collective defense were identified. They are: polarization by colonial masters, dividing the subregion into francophone, anglophone and Portuguese areas of influence, political instability factors like ethnic, cultural, religious and ideological differences, political insecurity, coups, economic factors of grave exchange rates, excessive oil importation costs, international debts and payments, energy crisis, and exploding urban population.

Others are accords and leadership tussle. The military areas for concern are technical difficulties without standardization of equipment, training and organization, logistics, and lack of doctrine. It was emphasized that these inevitable problems can best be tackled within the framework of a collective defense system, not outside it.

France

The French interests were identified, their commitment

being based on cultural, moral, economic, and power elements. France has defense agreements with almost all the francophone states of ECOWAS, some secret, and is looked to for training and other support. ^{The} French relationship with Libya is purely economic. Whether francophone states can completely rely on France remains questionable. Earlier France fuelled distrust among them and Nigeria, but the situation is gradually improving.

Nigeria

Being the only oil-exporting country in the subregion, Nigeria has become to the states what the US is to the Latin American states. A founding father of ECOWAS and major contributor to its funding, Nigeria has maintained friendly relations with her neighbors, despite provocation at one time or the other.

The protocol on free movement, if not followed to the letter, poses economic and security problems for her due to illegal entries and activities in the country. This has not stopped her from assisting neighboring states morally and financially in times of need. The country frowns at neocolonialism.

Military Capabilities

The military capabilities of each member state were perused with the sad conclusion that the effectiveness of their

conventionally equipped forces is hampered sometimes by politicized leadership, poor discipline, inadequate training and equipment that is of diverse origins, compounded by limited quantities of spares and technical expertise. The mission and role of preserving internal order mostly has always prevailed. The sea and air forces also hinge on external dependence for expertise and supplies except in one or two states.

ECOWAS Defense Pact

ECOWAS Document A/SP3/5/81 "Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense"⁶⁸ is yet to be ratified, and therefore only a document of intent. Its aim is to have collective defense to assist any member state under attack. The defects are mainly in the lack of provision for a standing army, some constraints and dual authority for enforcement action, and above all, quick response is not addressed in the document.

Force Structure and Control

The paper proposed a concept of defense for ECOWAS hinged on a linkage system whereby a member state under aggression would be assisted quickly. The merits and disadvantages of the two options preferred were identified--for a standing force for the frontline defense of the Community, and an Intervention Force for quick response by each state.

A brigade strength with complements of naval and air wings was proposed. Contributions for airpower and sea wing

would come from eight and seven countries respectively, while those that cannot make any effective air and naval contribution--Benin, Togo, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso--without denigrating their national defense should contribute most of the ground troops. The forces, to be divided into three self-sustaining battalions, would be headquartered at Ghana, Senegal and Mauritania. The air and naval wings would follow the same pattern with each composite force having its own area of operation.

It was opined that each location should have a forces commander responsible to the overall ECOWAS Forces Commander. In an emergency, Ministers would decide on a course of action on advice from overall forces commander, with such action to be rescindable by heads of state if necessary at next emergency meeting. Regular sports, joint exercises and training were also suggested. Rules for payment of troops and compensation were also mentioned.

Prospects

Expectations in the future were made regarding the ECOWAS itself, CEA0, threat, military capability, force structure, doctrine, foreign assistance; also the roles expected of France, the US, Arabs, Libya, Brazil, and Nigeria. Appropriate recommendations were mentioned.

In sum, the thrust of this paper has been two-fold:

- a. To highlight all the factors involved in creating a

regional security for ECOWAS states, and

b. To highlight the need for a joint and combined force in defense of the subregion.

No matter whatever problems, constraints, and external pressures the ECOWAS member states might be facing now or likely to contend withⁱⁿ the future, their only salvation is to agree to come together to ratify the ECOWAS Defense pact, amended along the lines suggested here. It is only through collective defense that the hopes and aspirations of the organization's dreams can be realized. The region's leaders will likely face less threats from their immediate neighbors, will not resort to military solutions in disputes, and can concentrate their efforts on building up their states' economies and raising the standards of living of their citizens, for which they were elected, or in case of military regimes, for which they chose to govern. Thus, disjointed, large, ill-equipped, and not well trained armies can be reduced to a manageable level.

Africans can only solve their problems themselves, with outside help maybe; but relying on outside help from superpowers as solutions in security matters is to be resorted to only in an extreme case. This paper has tried to drive these points home and provide a useful outline to ECOWAS states in setting the ball rolling for a common defense to back ECOWAS' hopes.

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CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF 2/2
WEST AFRICAN STATES' DEFENSE PACT(U) AIR WAR COLL
MAXWELL AFB AL J A FENI MAR 87 AU-AWC-87-862

UNCLASSIFIED

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

'Popular Vigilance Brigades': unarmed civilians support police in counter-intelligence and security role.

FOREIGN TROOPS:

Cuba 27,000 (plus 8,000 civilian instructors/advisers): some 13 inf regts in security and in field roles, combat ac pilots, technicians, advisers.

E. Germany 500: intelligence and security advisers.

Portugal, *other*: 500 incl combat pilots, technicians.

USSR 950: advisers and technicians.

OPPOSITION:

UNITA (*Union for the Total Independence of Angola*): some 26,000 'regulars' (1-2 years service), 34,000 militia (spt and log);

Eqpt: captured T-34/85 MBT; BM-21 122mm MRL; 75mm, 76mm, 122mm fd guns; 81mm, 82mm, 120mm mor; 85mm RPG-7 RL; 75mm RCL; 12.7mm hy machine guns; 14.5mm, 20mm and ZU-23-2 23mm AA guns; SAM-7; lt ac reported (probably inactive).

FNIA (*National Front for the Liberation of Angola*): claims up to 5,000; small arms only.

FLEC (*Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave*): (200-300); small arms only.

* Some \$1.5 bn owed to the Soviet Union, mostly for armaments.

† Angola is reported to have received up to \$2 bn in Soviet military materiel between 1983 and 1986.

‡ Delivery data incomplete; eqpt totals uncertain.

§ Serviceability, especially of non-Soviet eqpt, uncertain.

BENIN

GDP	1982: fr 342.90 bn (\$1.043 bn)	
	1983: fr 385.30 bn (\$1.011 bn)	
Debt	1984: \$800.0 m	1985e: \$845.0 m
Def bdt	1982: fr 7.82 bn (\$23.80 m)	
Def exp	1983e: fr 9.50 bn (\$24.93 m)	
FMA	1986: \$40 m	
\$1 = fr	(1982): 328.61	(1983): 381.06
	(1984): 436.96	(1985): 449.26
fr - francs CFA		
Population:	4,011,000	
	18-30	31-45
Men	391,000	251,000
Women	461,000	312,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):

Regular: 3,510.

Terms of service: conscription (selective), 18 months.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

ARMY: 3,200
3 inf bns. 1986-1987
1 para/cdo bn.
1 engr bn.
1 service bn.
1 armd sqn.
1 arty bty.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 10 PT-76.
AFV: reco: 7 M-8, 8 BRDM-2.
Arty: how: 105mm: 4 M-101.
mor: 60mm, 81mm.

NAVY: 150.

Base: Cotonou.

Patrol boats: 5 Zhuk.

AIR FORCE: 160; no combat ac or hel.

Ac: 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 2 Antonov An-26, 1 Fokker F-27 Mk 600, 1 Dassault Falcon 20, 1 Rockwell Aero Commander 500B, 1 Aérospatiale Corvette 200 (VIP), 2 Max Holste MH-1521 Broussard tpts; 1 Reims Cessna 337 lt.

Hel: 1 SA-315B Alouette II, 2 AS-350B Ecureuil, 1 Bell 47G.

PARA-MILITARY:

Gendarmerie: 2,000; 4 mobile coys.

Public Security Force.

People's Militia 1,500-2,000.

BOTSWANA

GDP	1983/4: P 1.264 bn (\$1.131 m)	
	1984/5: P 1.536 bn (\$1.078 bn)	
growth	1982/3: 20.7%	1983/4: 19.1%
Inflation	1984: 8.5%	1985: 10.4%
Debt	1984: \$280.0 m	1985e: \$320.0 m
Def exp	1983/4e: P 24.72 m (\$22.10 m)	
	1984/5e: P 28.91 m (\$20.29 m)	
Def bdt	1986/7: P 14.70 m (\$7.815 m)*	
FMA	1984: \$60.0 m	1985e: \$10.4 m
\$1 = P	(1983/4): 1.1183	(1984/5): 1.4251
	(1985/6): 1.8811	(1986): 1.8811
P = pula		
Population:	1,028,000	
	18-30	31-45
Men:	99,700	57,600
Women:	126,000	77,600

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (both services form part of the Army):

Regular: 3,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 2,850.

2 inf bn gps (5 inf, 1 recce, 1 engr, 1 sigs, 1 log, 1 spt coys).

Equipment:

AFV: *recce*: 30 *Shorland*, 11 *Cadillac* *Cage*.

APC: 30 BTR-60.

Arty: *guns*: 105mm: 6 lt. *how*: 105mm: 4 Model 56 pack. *mor*: 81mm: 10; 120mm: 10.

ATK: *RCL*: 84mm: 20 *Carl Gustav*.

AD: *SAM*: some 60 SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 150; 5 combat ac.

COIN: 1 sqn with 5 BN-2 *Defender*.

Tpt: 1 sqn with 3 Short *Skyvan* 3M, 2 BN-2 *Islander*, 1 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*.

Comms/trg: 1 sqn with 2 Cessna 152, 6 BAe *Bulldog* 120.

Hel: 2 AS-350 *Ecureuil*.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,000 (Police mobile unit).

* The National Development Plan 1979-85 allocated some P 72.0 m to Defence in addition to the budget.

**BURKINA-FASO**

GDP	1983: fr 429.4 bn (\$1.127 bn)	
	1984e: fr 510.0 bn (\$1.167 bn)	
growth	1983: 4.5%	1984: 4.1%
Inflation	1984: 4.8%	1985: 6.9%
Debt	1984: \$500.0 m	1985: \$560.0 m
Def bdt	1984: fr 12.5 bn (\$28.607 m)	
	1985e: fr 15.3 bn (\$34.078 m)	
\$1 = fr	(1982): 328.61	(1983): 381.06
	(1984): 436.96	(1985): 449.26
fr = francs CFA		
Population: 7,920,000*		
	18-30	31-45
Men:	816,000	458,000
Women:	792,000	637,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services incl

Gendarmerie form part of the Army):

Regular: 4,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.

People's Militia 2 years part time; men and women 20-35 (military and civic duties); 40,000 trained.

ARMY: 3,900.

6 Military Regions.

5 inf 'regts': HQ, 3 'bns' (each 1 coy of 5 platoons).

1 AB 'regt': HQ, 1 bde, 2 coys.

1 tk 'bn': 2 platoons.

1 arty 'bn': 1 tp.

1 engr 'bn', 1 sigs 'bn'.

Honour Guard.

Garrison School.

Equipment:

AFV: *recce*: 15 AML-60/-90, some 24 EE-9 *Cascavel* reported, 10 M-8, 4 M-20, 30 *Ferret*.

APC: 13 M-3.

Arty: *how*: 105mm: M-101. *mm*: 107mm: Ch Type-63. *mor*: 60mm, 10 81mm.

ATK: *RL*: M-20 3.5-in (89mm).

RCL: RPG-7, Ch Type-52 75mm.

AD: 30 14.5mm hy machine guns. *SAM*: SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 100; no combat ac or hel.

Ac: 10: 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 2 Nord 262 *Frégate*, 2 BAe/HS-748A/B, 1 Rockwell Aero Commander 500B, 1 MH-1521M *Broussard*, 2 Cessna (1 F-172N, 1 F-337E *Super Skymaster*).

Hel: 3: 2 SA-316C *Alouette* III, 1 SA-365 *Dauphin*.

PARA-MILITARY: 2,100:

Gendarmerie 650; 6 coys (2 mobile).

Security Company (CRG) 250.

* Est from initial results of 1985 census.

BURUNDI

GDP	1984: fr 115,954 bn (\$968.624 m)	
	1985: fr 132,368 bn (\$1.097 bn)	
growth	1984: -1.2%	1985: 7.0%
Inflation	1984: 14.3%	1985e: 3.0%
Debt	1983: \$290.0 m	1984: \$350.0 m
Def exp	1984: fr 3.90 bn (\$32.579 m)	
	1985e: fr 4.20 bn (\$34.800 m)	
\$1 = B fr	(1982) 90.00	(1983) 92.95
	(1984) 119.71	(1985) 120.69
fr = Burundi francs		
Population: 4,917,000		
	18-30	31-45
Men:	571,000	301,000
Women:	579,000	346,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services incl

Gendarmerie form part of the Army):

Regular: 7,200 (incl *Gendarmerie*).

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 5,500.

2 inf bns.

1 para bn.

1 cdo bn.
1 armd car coy.
Equipment:
AFV: *recco*: 6 AML-60, 12 -90, *Shorland*.
APC: 9 M-3, 20 BTR-40 *Walid*.
Arty: *mor*: 82mm: 18.
ATK: *RL*: 83mm: *Blindicide*.
RCL: 75mm: 15 Ch Type-52.
AD: *guns*: 14.5mm: 15 quad.

NAVY: 50.
Base: Bujumbura.
Patrol boats: 3 *Lambro river* (2 in reserve).

AIR: 150; 3 combat ac.
COIN: 3 SIAI-Marchetti SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 Douglas DC-3, 3 Reims Cessna 150.
Trg: 3 SF-260C.
Hel: 2 SA-341 *Gazelle*, 3 SA-316C *Alouette III*.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie (1,500).

CAMEROON

GDP	1983/4: fr 3,089.30 bn (\$7.543 bn)
	1984/5: fr 3,738.00 bn (\$7.934 bn)
growth	1983/4: 5.0% 1984/5: 6.9%
Inflation	1983/4: 16.0% 1984/5: 13.0%
Debt	1983: \$2.5 bn 1984: \$2.8 bn
Def bdgt	1984/5: fr 61.800 bn (\$131.174 m)
	1985/6: fr 49.064 bn (\$125.668 m)*
FMA	1984: \$5.10 m 1985: \$5.00 m
\$1 = fr	(1983/4): 409.5675 (1984/5): 471.1300
	(1985/6): 390.4225

fr = francs CFA

Population:	9,784,000
	18-30 31-45
Men:	1,016,000 735,000
Women:	1,033,000 772,500

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 7,300.

Terms of service: voluntary (pre-military compulsory training programme in force).

ARMY: 6,600.

3 Military Regions; 7 Military Sectors: coy gps under command.
1 armd car bn.
1 para/cdo bn.
4 inf bns.
1 engr bn.
5 fd, 6 AA arty btys.
HQ regt, spt units.

Equipment:

AFV: *recco*: M-8, *Ferret*, 8 *Commando* (20mm gun). *MCV*: 12 *Commando* (90mm gun).
APC: 29 *Commando*, M-3 half-track.
Arty: *how*: 75mm: 6 M-116 pack; 105mm: 16 M-101. *mor*: 60mm: M-1935; 81mm: 20 M-1944; 120mm: 16 AM-50.
ATK: *RL*: 89mm ACL-STRIM. *RCL*: 57mm: 13 Ch Type-52. 106mm: 40 M-40. *ATGW*: *Milan*.
AD: *guns*: 14.5mm: 18 Type-58; 35mm: 18 twin *Oerlikon*; 37mm: 18 Ch Type-63; 40mm: 18 *Bofors*.

NAVY: 350.

Bases: Douala, Port Gentil.

FAC(G): 1 P-48S *La Combattante* with 8 *Exocet* MM-40 SSM.

FAC: 3: 1 PR-48 (could mount SS-12 SSM). 2 *Shanghai-II*.

Patrol craft: 2 coastal; 12 inshore.

Amph: LCM: 2; LCVP: 5; 9 lt assault/spt craft.

AIR FORCE: 350; 15 combat ac, 2 armed hel.

1 composite sqn.

1 Presidential flt.

FGA/COIN: 8 Breguet-Dornier *AlphaJet*, 4 *Fouga Magister*, 1 BN-2T *Defender*.

MR: 2 Dornier Do-128D-6.

Tpt: 3 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 1 DHC-4 *Caribou*, 5 DHC-5D *Buffalo*, 3 C-130 *Hercules*, 2 BAe/HS-748, 7 MH-1521 *Broussard*, 1 Boeing 727-200, 1 IAI-201 *Arava*, 1 PC-6 *Turbo Porter*, 1 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*.

Hel: 1 SA-330 *Puma*, 1 AS-332 *Super Puma*, 3 SA-315B/316C *Alouette II/III*, 4 SA-341 *Gazelle* (2 with *HOT* ATGW), 1 SA-365 *Dauphin II*.

(On order: 1 IAI-201 *Arava* tpt.)

PARA-MILITARY: 4,000.

Gendarmerie: 7 regional groups.

* Excl capital eqpt.

CAPE VERDE

Population: 371,000

	18-30	31-45
Men	40,500	9,100
Women	46,600	17,200

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 1,185.

Terms of service: conscription (selective).

ARMY: 1,000 (Popular Militia).

4 inf coys.

Spt elms.

Equipment:

AFV: ~~recce~~: 8 BRDM-2.

Arty:

mor: 82mm: 16 M-1941; 120mm: 8 M-1943.

ATK: **ML:** 3.5-in. (89mm).

NAVY: 160.

Base: Praia.

FAC: 2 *Shershen*.

Patrol craft: 1 *Zhuk* coastal.

Misc: 1 *Kamenka* survey ship/buoy tender.

AIR FORCE: 25; no combat ac.

Tpt: 2 Antonov An-26.

AIR FORCE: 300; 2 combat ac.

COIN: 2 Socata R-235 *Guerrier*.

Tpt: 5 Douglas (1 DC-4 (VIP), 4 DC-3/C-47).

2 *Aérospatiale* (1 *Caravelle*, 1 *Corvette*).

6 MH-1521 *Broussard*, 2 Cessna 337 *Skyraider*.

Hel: 1 SA-315B *Alouette II*, 4 H-34 (Sikorsky S-58).

PARA-MILITARY: some 10,000.

Presidential Guard 500.

Gendarmerie 700; 3 Regional Legions, 8 'bdes'.

Republican Guard 700.

Security Forces.

National Young Pioneers 8,000 (boys and girls 14-18); unarmed, some elementary drill and discipline.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

GDP 1983: fr 139.0 bn (\$364.772 m)

growth 1983: -2.3% 1984: 1.0%

Inflation 1983: 13.0% 1984: 12.4%

Debt 1984: \$300.0 m 1985: \$355.0 m

Def exp 1982: fr 5.0 bn (\$15.216 m)

1983: fr 6.5 bn (\$17.058 m)

FMA 1983: \$15.50 m

\$1 = fr (1982): 328.61 (1983): 381.06

(1984): 436.96 (1985): 449.26

fr = francs CFA

Population: 2,601,000

18-30 31-45

Men: 280,000 164,000

Women: 279,000 212,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 2,300.

Terms of service: conscription (selective), 2 years, personnel have a Reserve obligation thereafter, term unknown.

ARMY: 2,000.

1 regt HQ.

1 mech bn.

1 inf bn.

1 engr coy.

1 sigs coy ('bn').

1 tpt coy.

Equipment:

Tks: 4 T-55.

AFV: ~~recce~~: 22 BRDM-2, 10 *Ferret*.

APC: 4 BTR-152.

Arty: **mor:** 81mm; 120mm: 12 M-1943.

ATK: **ACL:** 14 106mm.

River patrol craft: 9.

CHAD

GDP 1982: fr 181.0 bn (\$550.805 m)

1983: fr 210.0 bn (\$551.094 m)

Debt 1983: \$130.0 m 1984: \$140.0 m

Def exp 1984: fr 24.0 bn (\$54.925 m)

1985: fr 17.0 bn (\$37.840 m)

FMA 1984: \$5.0 m 1985: \$5.0 m

\$1 = fr (1982): 328.61 (1983): 381.06

(1984): 436.96 (1985): 449.26

fr = francs CFA

Population: 5,100,000

18-30 31-45

Men: 544,000 416,000

Women: 552,000 432,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 14,200 (perhaps 6,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription, 3 years.

ARMY: 14,200; comprises regular and rejoined rebel groups, mostly org as coys.

3 inf bns.

16 inf coys, 3 para coys.

1 ~~recce~~ sqn (Sahara).

2 ~~recce~~ tps (camel).

3 Nomad coys.

3 sigs coys.

Presidential Guard (400 men).

1 armd bn.

2 indep para coys.

2 arty btys.

1 tpt coy.

Numerous indep cdo (guerrilla) 'bns' (gps).

Equipment:

AFV: ~~recce~~: 4 Panhard ERC-90, some 50

AML-60/90.

Arty: **guns:** 76mm: 6 M-1942; 105mm: 6 M-101.

mor: 81mm: M-61; 120mm: AM-50.

1 para/cdo coy.
1 service coy.

Equipment:

AFV: *recce*: 16 EE-9 *Cascavel*, 24 AML-90, 12 EE-3 *Jararaca*. APC: 12 EE-11 *Urutu*, 6 *Com-mando*, M-3, 12 VXB-170.

Arty: *how*: 105mm: 4 M-101. *MAL*: 140mm: 8. *mor*: 81mm, 120mm: 20.

RCL: 67mm: *Armbrust*; 106mm.

AD: *guns*: 23mm: 24 ZU-23-2; 37mm: 10; 40mm: 2. (On order: 6 ERC-90 *Sagaie*, 4 ERC-20, 14 VBL *armd cars*, *mor*, *Milan* ATGW.)

NAVY: 200.

Base: Port Gentil.

FAC(G): 1 Fr 150-ton with 4 SS-12 SSM.

FAC: 3: 1 *Swiftships* 118-ton; 1 *Esterel* 88-ton, 1 80-ton.

Patrol craft: 2 (1 Brazil Type V-3).

Amph: LST: 1; LCM: 3.

Tpt: 1 *Batral* lt.

(On order: 2 P-400, 1 12-m patrol craft, 1 10-m coastal).

AIR FORCE: 600; 13 combat ac.

FGA: 9 Dassault *Mirage* 5GD, 1 DR, 2 RQ.

MR: 1 Embraer EMB-111P1 *Bandeirante*.

Tpt: 4 Lockheed *Hercules* (1 C-130, 1 L-100-20, 2 L-100-30), 4 Douglas (3 C-47, 1 DC-8-30), 4 EMB-110 *Bandeirante*, 1 Grumman *Gulf-stream* III (VIP), 1 Dassault *Falcon*, 1 Nihon YS-11A, 3 Nord 262 *Frégate*, 4 MH-1521 *Broussard*; R: 2 Reims Cessna 337, 2 Fouga *Magister*, 4 Beech T-34C.

Hel: 4 SA-330 *Puma*, 3 SA-316C *Alouette* III.

(On order: 1 AS/Aeritalia ATR-42 tpt, 4 Beech T-34C1 lt tpt ac; 2 AS-350 *Ecureuil* (armed), 5 SA-342 *Gazelle* hel (3 armed).)

PARA-MILITARY:

Coastguard 2,800; 9 patrol craft.

Gendarmerie 2,000; 3 'bdes', 11 coys.

Republican Guard.

Rapid Intervention Force.

* Incl internal security.

GHANA

GDP	1984e: C 276.00 bn (\$7.811 bn)
	1985e: C 313.20 bn (\$5.794 bn)
growth	1984: 7.6% 1985: 5.3%
Inflation	1984: 40.0% 1985: 10.3%
Debt	1984: \$2.0 bn 1985: \$2.2 bn
Def exp	1984e: C 2.75 bn (\$80.575 m)
	1985e: C 3.25 bn (\$59.755 m)
FMA	1984: \$0.30 m 1985: \$0.33 m

\$1 = C (1982): 2.7503 (1983): 3.4495
(1984): 35.3356 (1985): 54.0541

C = cedi

Population: 13,216,000

18-30

31-45

Men: 1,503,000

861,000

Women: 1,485,000

970,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 11,200.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 9,000.

2 Command HQ:

2 bdes (6 inf bns and spt units).

1 *recce* bn.

3 border tps bns (were police/customs).

1 para bn.

1 *mor* bn.

1 *fd engr* bn.

1 *sigs* bn.

Equipment:

AFV: *recce*: 25 *Saladin*.

APC: 50 MOWAG *Piranha*.

Arty: *mor*: 81mm: 50; 120mm: 28 *Tampella*.

RCL: 84mm: 50 *Carl Gustav*. SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 1,200.

Bases: Sekondi, Tema.

2 Command HQ:

Corvettes: 2 *Kromantse* ASW.

FAC: 4: 2 FPB-57, 2 FPB-45.

Patrol craft: 6:

2 *Dela*, 2 *Br Ford* large; 2 *Spear* II coastal.

AIR FORCE: 1,000; 10 combat ac.

COIN: 1 sqn with 10 Aeromacchi MB-326F/KB.

Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 Short *Skyvan* 3M.

Comms/*liaison*: 1 sqn with 6 Fokker (5 F-27, 1 F-28).

Hel: 2 SA-316C *Alouette* III, 2 Bell 212.

Trg: 1 sqn with 11 BAe *Bulldog*.

Forces Abroad: Lebanon (UNIFIL): 1 bn (690).

PARA-MILITARY:

Border Guards some 2,500.

People's Militia 5,000.

Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (National Civil Defence Force).

GUINEA

GDP	1982e: sylis 35.50 bn (\$1.598 bn)
	1983e: sylis 36.30 bn (\$1.551 bn)
growth	1983: 1.0%
Debt	1983: \$1.5 bn 1984: \$1.4 bn

Def exp* 1982: sylis 1.85 bn (\$83.251 m)
 FMA† 1985: \$3.0 m 1986: \$2.3 m
 \$1 = sylis (1982): 22.222 (1983): 23.40
 (1984): 25.36 (1985): 24.83

Population: 5,833,000

	18-30	31-45
Men:	678,000	382,000
Women:	660,000	516,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 9,900 (perhaps 7,500 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription, 2 years.

ARMY: 8,500.

1 armd bn.
 5 inf bns.
 1 arty bn.
 1 engr bn.
 1 cdo bn.
 1 special force bn.
 1 AD bn.

Equipment:

Tks: 45 T-34, 8 T-54, 10 PT-76.

AFV: *recoes*: 25 BRDM-1/-2.

APC: 40 BTR (16 -40, 10 -50, 8 -60, 6 -152).

Arty: *guns/how*: 76mm: 8 M-1942; 85mm: 6 D-44;
 122mm: 12 M-1931/38.

mor: 120mm: 20 M-1938/43.

ATK: *guns*: 57mm.

AD: *guns*: 30mm: twin M-53; 37mm: 8 M-1939;
 57mm: 12 S-60; 100mm: 4 KS-19.

SAM: SA-7, SA-8, 24 SA-6.

NAVY: 600.

Bases: Conakry, Kakanda.

FAC: 6 Ch Shanghai-II.

Patrol craft: 17:

1 Swiftships 65-ft, 1 T-58 ex-MCM, 3 Sov
Shersten, 6 P-6; 6 coastal (incl 4 Sov 2
Poluchat, 2 MC-6), 2 Fr *Stinger* 26-ft inshore.

Amph: LCU: 2.

(On order: 1 Swiftships 77-ft.)

AIR FORCE: 800; 6 combat ac.

FGA: 6 Mikoyan-Guryevich MiG-17F (service-
 ability questionable).

Tpt: 6 Ilyushin (4 Il-14, 2 Il-18), 6 Antonov
 (4 An-14, 2 An-24), 1 Yakovlev Yak-40;
 1 Reims Cessna F-337.

Trg: 2 MiG-15UTI, 5 Yak-18, 3 Aero L-29,
 2 Fairchild C-119.

Hel: 1 Bell 47G, 1 SA-330 *Puma*, 1 SA-341
Gazelle, 1 Hiller UH-12B.

PARA-MILITARY: 9,600

People's Militia: 7,000.

Gendarmerie 1,000

Republican Guard 1,600.

* The USSR, Egypt and Libya have reportedly supplied
 military aid; value unknown.

† US military aid.

GUINEA-BISSAU

GDP 1983: pG 8.0 bn (\$177.778 m)

1984: pG 14.5 bn (\$183.544 m)

Debt 1983: \$138.2 m

Def bdt 1982: pG 375.0 m (\$9.330 m)

\$1 = pG (1982): 40.20 (1983): 45.00

(1984): 79.00 (1985): 147.32

pG = Guinea pesos

Population: 869,000

18-30 31-45

Men: 87,000 60,000

Women: 99,000 79,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services, incl

Gendarmerie, are part of the Army):

Regular: 8,550.

Terms of service: ?conscription (selective).

ARMY: 6,200.

1 armd bn (sqn).

5 inf bns.

1 *recoe* sqn.

1 engr coy.

1 arty bn.

Equipment:

Tks: 10 T-34, 10 PT-76.

AFV: *recoes*: 10 BRDM-2.

APC: 35 BTR-40/-60/-152, 20 Ch Type-56.

Arty: *guns*: 85mm: 8 D-44.

how: 105mm: 1; 122mm: 18 M-1938/D-30

mor: 82mm: 40 M-1937; 120mm: 8 M-1943.

ATK: *ML*: 89mm.

ACL: 75mm: Ch Type-52; 82mm: B-10.

AD: *guns*: 23mm: 18 ZU-23; 37mm: 6 M-1939.

57mm: 10 S-60. SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 275.

Base: Bissau.

Patrol craft: 12: 1 *Shersten* large, 2 Ch *Shantou*, 1
 Sov *Poluchat*, 8 other coastal.

Amph: LCV: 2 T-4.

(On order: 4 *Bazan* coastal patrol craft.)

AIR FORCE: 75; no combat ac or armed hel

Tpt: 2 Dornier Do-27, 2 Yakovlev Yak-40,

1 Reims Cessna FTB-337.

Hel: 1 SA-315B *Alouette* II, 2 SA-316C *Alouette*
 III, 1 Mil Mi-8.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmene 2,000

IVORY COAST

GDP 1984: fr 2,800.0 bn (\$6.408 bn)
 1985e: fr 2,996.0 bn (\$6.669 bn)
 growth 1984: -4.0% 1985: 4.0%
 Inflation 1984: 4.3% 1985: 5.0%
 Debt 1984: \$7.0 bn 1985: \$7.4 bn
 Def bdt 1985*: fr 32.20 bn (\$71.680 bn)
 1986†: fr 32.42 bn (\$91.693 bn)
 FMA 1985e: \$5 m 1986e: \$7 m
 \$1 = fr (1983): 381.06 (1984): 436.96
 (1985): 449.26 (1986): 353.55

fr = francs CFA

Population: 9,818,000

	18-30	31-45
Men:	1,127,000	1,000,000
Women:	1,022,000	759,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 13,220 (incl full time para-military).

Terms of service: conscription (selective), 6 months.

Reserves: 12,000.

ARMY: 6,100.

4 Military Regions: 3 inf bns.

1 armd bn forming.

1 arty gp forming.

1 AA arty bty.

1 engr coy.

1 HQ coy.

1 spt coy.

1 para coy.

Equipment:

Tks: 11: 5 AMX-13.

AFV: recoe: 7 ERC-90. APC: 16 M-3.

Arty: how: 105mm: 4 M-1950.

mor: 81mm: 120mm: 16 AM-50.

ATK: ml: 89mm STRIM. RCL: 106mm M-40.

AD: guns: 20mm: 14 incl 4 M-3 VDA SP;
40mm: 5.

NAVY: 690

Base: Abidjan.

FAC(G): 2 PR-48 *Patra* (4 *Exocet* MM-40 SSM).Patrol craft: 8: 2 *Vigilant* (PR-48), 4 *ANCOR*-
26-m, 2 31-m launches.Amph: 1 *Batral* LSM, 13 assault boats.

Trg ship: 1.

AIR FORCE: 930; 6 combat ac

FGA: 1 sqn with 6 *Breguet/Dornier AlphaJet*.Tpt: 1 sqn with: ac: 7 *Fokker* (3 *F-27*, 4 *F-28*),
6 *Beech F-33C Bonanza*; hel: 3 *SA-330 Puma*,
2 *SA-316C Alouette III*, 2 *SA-365C Dauphin*.Liaison/VIP: 1 flt with: ac: 1 *Fokker F-28 Mk*
4000, 1 *Fairchild Metro*, 2 *Gulfstream II/III*;
hel: 1 *SA-330 Puma*.Other: ac: 2 *Reims Cessna F-337*, 1 *Cessna 421*, 1
Beech King Air; hel: 2 *SA-365C Dauphin*.

PARA-MILITARY: 7,800:

Presidential Guard 1,100.

Gendarmerie 4,400; VAB APC, 4 patrol boats.

Militia 1,500.

Military Fire Service 800.

* Incl equipment cost.

† Incl Ministry of the Navy which has separate budget.

KENYA

GDP 1984: sh 85.881 bn (\$5.958 bn)
 1985e: sh 100.051 bn (\$6.089 bn)
 growth 1984: 3.9% 1985: 4.0%
 Inflation 1984: 10.0% 1985: 12.0%
 Debt 1984: \$2.7 bn 1985: \$2.9 bn
 Def bdt 1984/5e: sh 3.50 bn (\$242.819 m)
 1985/6e: sh 4.20 bn (\$255.599 m)
 FMA 1984e: \$25.0 m 1985e: \$25.0 m
 \$1 = sh (1982): 10.922 (1983): 13.312
 (1984): 14.414 (1985): 16.432

sh = Kenyan shillings

Population: 19,879,000

	18-30	31-45
Men:	2,132,000	1,224,000
Women:	2,203,000	1,317,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 13,650.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 13,000.

1 armd bde (2 armd bns).

2 inf bdes (1 with 2, 1 with 3 inf bns)

1 engr bde.

1 armd recoe bn.

2 arty bns.

2 engr bns.

1 indep air cav bn

5 inf bns (cadre).

1 para bn.

1 AA bn.

Air wing with 15 armed hel.

Equipment:

Tks: 76 *Vickers Mk 1*AFV: recoe: 40 *AMT-60*-90, 8 *Shorland*APC: 50 *UR-416*, 10 *Panhard M-3*

Arty: guns: 40 lt, 105mm: 16 pack

mor: 81mm: 20, 120mm: 10

ATK: *RCL*: 84mm: 50 *Carl Gustav*. 120mm: *Wombat*. *ATGW*: *Milan*, 8 *Swingfire*.
 AD: *guns*: 20mm: 50 TCM-20.
 Avn: (pre-1982 Air Force — now re-formed under Army): combat: 28 ac, 30 hel.
 FGA: 11 Northrop F-5 (9 -E, 2 -F).
 COIN: 17 BAe (5 BAC-167 *Strikemaster*, 12 *Hawk T-52*).
 Tpt: 22: 5 DHC-4 *Caribou*, 6 DHC-5D *Buffalo*, Dornier Do-28D, 2 Piper *Navajo*.
 Trg: 14 BAe *Bulldog* 103.
 Hel: 44: 10 SA-330 *Puma*, 2 Bell 47G, 32 Hughes (15 500 *Scout*, 15 500MD with *TOW* *ATGW*, 2 500D *trg*).
 Msls: *Sidewinder AAM*, *Maverick ASM*.

NAVY: 650.

Base: Mombasa.

FAC(G): 4 Brooke Marine (1 37.5-m, 3 32.6-m) with 4 *Gabriel II SSM*.

Patrol craft: 3 Vosper 31-m (*Simba*) large.
 (On order: 2 Province FAC(G); *Gabriel SSM*).

PARA-MILITARY:

Police (General Service Unit) 1,800:

Police Air Wing, 7 Cessna 1t ac, 3 Bell hel.

LIBERIA

GDP 1983: \$L 920.00 m (\$US 920.0 m)
 1984e: \$L 961.40 m (\$US 961.4 m)
 growth 1983: 1.0% 1984: 2.0%
 Inflation 1983: 3.3% 1984: 2.0%
 Debt 1984: \$US 1.4 bn 1985: \$US 1.5 bn
 Def bdt 1983/4: \$L 22.40 m (\$US 22.40 m)
 1984/5e: \$L 26.00 m (\$US 26.00 m)
 FMA 1984: \$US 12.8 m 1985: \$US 14.0 m
 \$US 1 = \$L (1982/3/4/5/6) 1.0

Population: 2,477,000

	18-30	31-45
Men:	229,000	179,000
Women:	234,000	177,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 6,750.

Terms of service: voluntary; militia conscription authorized, not in force.

Reserves 250,000 males 16-45.

ARMY: 6,100.

1 Executive Mansion Guard bn.

6 inf bns.

1 arty bn.

1 engr bn

1 armd recce sqn.

1 service bn.

1 air recce bn (250).

Equipment:

APC: some MOWAG.

Arty: *how*: 75mm pack; 105mm: 8.

mor: 60mm: 20; 81mm: 10; 4.2-in. (107mm).

ATK: *RL*: 3.5-in. (89mm). *RCL*: 57mm, 106mm.

Avn: *MC*: 1 Cessna 337.

tp: 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3).

tl ac: 10 Cessna (2 172, 1 185, 1 207, 6 337).

(On order: 7 IAI-201 *Arava*: 3 recce, 4 *tp* ac.)

NAVY (Coastguard): 450.

Bases: Monrovia, Bassa, Sinoe, Cape Palmas.

Patrol craft: 6: 3 Swed CG-27 50-ton, 3 Swift-ships (2 38-ton, 1 42-ton).

PARA-MILITARY: National Police 2,000.

MADAGASCAR

GDP 1983e: fr 1,250.0 bn (\$2,904 bn)

1984e: fr 1,400.0 bn (\$2,428 bn)

growth 1983: 0.5% 1984: 1.5%

Inflation 1983: 19.0% 1984: 10.0%

Debt 1984e: \$1.5 bn 1985e: \$1.6 bn

Def bdt 1984: fr 31.73 bn (\$55,029 m)

1985: fr 36.00 bn (\$54,341 m)

FMA 1985: \$3.0 m

\$1 = fr (1982): 349.74 (1983): 430.45

(1984): 576.60 (1985): 662.48

fr = Malagasy francs

Population: 10,224,000

	18-30	31-45
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Men: 1,112,000 649,000

Women: 1,102,000 720,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 21,100.

Terms of service: national service (incl civil), 18 months.

ARMY: 20,000.

2 bn gps.

1 engr regt.

1 sigs regt.

1 service regt.

7 construction regts.

Equipment:

Tks: 12 PT-76.

AFV: *recon*: 8 M-8, (220) M-3A1, 10 *Ferret*,

(235) BRDM-2. APC: (230) M-3A1 half-track.

Arty: *guns*: 76mm: 12 ZIS-3. *how*: 122mm

12 D-30. *mor*: 81mm: 24; 120mm: 8.

ATK: RCL: 106mm.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 50 ZPU-4.

NAVY: 600 (incl 120 marines).
Base: Diego-Suarez.
Patrol craft: 1 PR-48 large.
Amph: LSM: 1 *Batram* with 8 SS-12 SSM.
LCR: 1 EDIC. LCM: 1 N. Korean *Nampo*.
1 marine coy+.

AIR FORCE: 500; 12 combat ac.
FGA: 1 sqn with 4 Mikoyan-Guryevich MiG-17,
8 MiG-21FL.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 BAe/HS-748 (VIP); 4 Antonov
An-26; 2 Yakovlev Yak-40; 6 Douglas DC-3
(1 C-53D, 5 C-47); 1 BN-2 *Defender*, An-12;
1 Piper *Aztec*, 3 Cessna 337, 5 other lt ac.
Hel: 1 sqn with 1 Bell 47, 1 SA-315B *Alouette II*,
2 SA-316C *Alouette III*, 2 Mil Mi-8.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 8,000, incl
maritime police with 5 patrol craft.

MALAWI

GDP	1984: K 1.735 bn (\$1.228 bn)	
	1985: K 1.799 bn (\$1.053 bn)	
growth	1984: 4.1%	1985: 1.9%
Inflation	1984: 20.2%	1985: 15.4%
Debt	1983: \$720.0 m	1984: \$900.0 m
Def bdt	1984e: K 27.9 m (\$19.740 m)	
	1985e: K 35.5 m (\$20.666 m)	
FMA	1984: \$2.5 m	1985: \$2.2 m
\$1 = K	(1982): 1.0555	(1983): 1.1748
	(1984): 1.4134	(1985): 1.7081

K = kwacha

Population:	7,012,000	
	18-30	31-45
Men:	696,000	492,000
Women:	732,000	538,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form
part of the Army):

Regular: 5,250.

Terms of service: voluntary, 7 years.

Reserves: Army: some 500; ex-soldiers have a
5-year obligation.

ARMY: 5,000.

3 inf bns.

1 spt bn (incl 1 recce sqn).

Equipment:

AFV: recce: 10 Fox, 10 BRDM-2.

Arty: guns: 9 105mm. *mor*: 81mm.

ATK: RL: 3.5-in. (89mm). RCL: 57mm.

AD: guns: 14.5mm. *SAM*: 14 *Blowpipe*.

MARINE: 100.

Base: Chilumba.

Patrol boats: 5: 1 Fr 21-m, 1 *Spear*, 3 lake.

AIR: 150; no combat ac or armed hel.

Tpt: 1 sqn with 14 Dornier (6 Do-27, 8 Do-28),
1 BN-2T *Defender* ac.

Hel: 1 sqn with 3 AS-330 *Puma*, 1 SA-316C *Alouette III*, 1 AS-365 *Dauphin*, 1 AS-350 *Ecoueil*.
(On order: 3 Dornier Do-228 lt tpt ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: 1,000; Police: 1 BN-2T
Defender ac (border patrol).

MALI

GDP	1983: fr 420.0 bn (\$1.102 bn)	
	1984: fr 480.0 bn (\$1.098 bn)	
growth	1982: 4.4%	1983: 2.5%
Inflation	1984: 25.0%	1985: 30.0%
Debt	1983: \$880.0 m	1984: \$1.1 bn
Def bdt*	1985e: fr 12.50 bn (\$27.824 m)	
	1986: fr 12.90 bn (\$36.477 m)	
Def exp	1984e: fr 26.00 bn (\$59.502 m)	
\$1 = fr	(1983): 381.06	(1984): 436.96
	(1985): 449.26	(1986): 353.65

fr = francs CFA

Population: 8,115,000

	18-30	31-45
Men:	715,000	452,000
Women:	784,000	653,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form
part of the Army):

Regular: 5,050.

Terms of service: national service (incl civil),
2 years (selective).

ARMY: 4,600.

1 tk bn.

3 inf bns.

1 arty bn.

1 engr bn.

1 para bn.

1 special force bn.

2 AA arty coys.

1 SAM bty.

Equipment:

Tks: 21 T-34. R: 12 Type 62.

AFV: recce: 20 BRDM-2.

APC: 30 BTR-40, 10 BTR-152, 10 BTR-60

Arty: guns: 85mm: 6 D-44; 100mm: 6 M-1944.

122mm: 8 D-30. *MRL*: 122mm: 2 BM-21

mor: 81mm; 120mm: 30 M-43.

AD: guns: 37mm: 6 M-1939; 57mm: 6 S-60.
SAM: 6 SA-3.

NAVY: 50.

Bases: Bamako, Mopti, Segou, Timbuktu.
Patrol craft: 3 river.

AIR FORCE (Army Air Coy): 400; 27 combat ac.†
FGA: 5 Mikoyan-Guryevich MiG-17, 8 MiG-19,
14 MiG-21.

Tpt: 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 7 Antonov (3
An-2, 2 An-24, 2 An-26), 1 Aérospatiale Cor-
vette 200 (VIP).

Trg: 1 MiG-15UTI, 6 Yakovlev Yak-11/-18.
Hel: 3 Mil (2 Mi-4, 1 Mi-8).

PARA-MILITARY:

Gendarmerie 1,200; 8 coys. Republican Guard
2,000.

Militia 3,000.

Civilian Defence Organization 1,500.

* Excl internal security and eqpt procurement.

† Eqpt serviceability questionable.



MAURITANIA

GDP 1983e: OM 46.0 bn (\$839.232 m)
1984e: OM 54.1 bn (\$847.923 m)
growth 1984e: 0.4%
Inflation 1984: 7.0% 1985: 10.5%
Debt 1984: \$1.4 bn 1985: \$1.6 bn
Def bdgt 1982e: OM 3.50 bn (\$67.608 m)
1983e: OM 2.64 bn (\$48.146 m)
\$1 = OM (1982): 51.769 (1983): 54.812
(1984): 63.803 (1985): 77.085
OM = ouguiyas
Population: 1,901,000
18-30 31-45
Men: 177,000 126,000
Women: 182,000 133,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 8,470.

Terms of service: voluntary; conscription
(2 years) authorized.

ARMY: 8,000.

1 inf bn.

1 arty bn

1 Camel Corps.

3 armd recce sqns

1 AA bty.

1 engr coy

1 para coy.

Equipment:

AFV: *reccs:* 15 EBR-75 hy, 39 AML-60, 14 -90,
12 M-3A1. APC: 40 M-3 half-track.

Arty: *mor:* 81mm; 120mm: 8.

ATK: *RCL:* 57mm: M-18; 75mm: M-20; 106mm:
M-40.

AD: *guns:* 14.5mm; 23mm: ZU-23-2; 37mm:
6 M-1939. SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 320.

Bases: Port Etienne, Nouadhibou.

Patrol craft: 8: 1 Fr *Patra*-class; 3 Sp *Barcelo*;
4 Fr *Esterel* (2 32-m, 2 18-m).

AIR FORCE: 150; 9 combat ac.

COIN: 5 BN-2 *Defender*, 4 Cessna 337.

MR: 4 Piper *Cheyenne*.

Tpt: 1 DHC-5D *Buffalo*, 1 Aérospatiale *Cara-*
velle, 2 Short *Skyvan*, 2 BN-2 *Islander*.

PARA-MILITARY: 5,000.

Gendarmerie 2,500; 6 regional coys (Defence
Ministry).

National Guard 1,400.

Border Guard 100.

Auxiliaries 1,000 (Interior Ministry).

MOZAMBIQUE

GDP 1983e: M 82.0 bn (\$3,008 bn)
1984e: M 122.0 bn (\$2,761 bn)
growth 1983: -0.8% 1984e: -10.0%
Debt 1983: \$1.4 bn 1984e: \$1.5 bn
Def bdgt 1985: M 10.30 bn (\$238.592 bn)
1986: M 11.21 bn (\$276.139 bn)
FMA* 1985e: \$1.8 m 1986e: \$3.0 m
\$1 = M (1983): 27.26 (1984): 44.19
(1985): 43.17 (1986): 40.61
M = meticals
Population: 12,725,000
18-30 31-45
Men: 1,512,000 1,056,000
Women: 1,582,000 1,111,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 15,800 (some 10,500 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription (selective),
2 years (incl women).

ARMY: 228,000 (perhaps 75% conscripts)

1 tk bde (Presidential Guard).

7 inf bdes (each 1 tk, 3 inf, 2 mot, 2 arty, 1 AD
bns, spt units).

2 indep mech bns.

7 AA arty bns.

Equipment:†

Tks: 150 T-34, some 100 T-54/-55.

AFV: *recce*: 30 BRDM-1/-2, 16 BMP with *Sagger*.

APC: 200+ BTR-60/-152.

Arty: *guns*: 200: 76mm: M-1942; 85mm: D-44; 100mm: 24 M-1944; 130mm: 24 M-46/D-30.*how*: 105mm: M-101; 122mm: M-1938; 152mm: 20 D-1.

MRL: 122mm: 30 BM-21.

mor: 350: 60mm, 82mm, 120mm.ATK: *ACL*: 75mm; 82mm: B-10; 107mm: B-11.ATGW: AT-3 *Sagger*.AD: *guns*: 400: 20mm; 23mm: ZU-23 (ZSU-23-4 reported); 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60 towed, ZSU-57-2 SP. *SAM*: SA-7, 10 SA-3.**NAVY:** 800.†*Bases*: Maputo, Beira, Nacala, Pemba, Metangula.*Patrol craft*: *large*: 2 SO-1;*coastal*: 25(: 7 Sov (6 *Zhuk*, 1 *Poluchat*), 6Port (1 *Antares*, 3 *Jupiter*, 2 *Bellatrix*), 2

Neth, 10 Indian.

Amph: *LCR*: 1 Port *Alabarda* 500-ton;*LCU*: 2 LDM-100.**AIR FORCE:** 1,000; some 69 combat ac.†

FGA: 5 sqns with some 15 Mikoyan-Guryevich MiG-17, 3 MiG-19, 35 MiG-21.

Hel: 2 sqns with 10 Mil Mi-8, 12 Mi-24/-25.

Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 Tupolev Tu-134, 8 Antonov An-26 (some equipped for COIN operations).

Trg: Aero L-39, 7 Zlin Z-526, 3 MiG-15.

PARA-MILITARY:

Border Guard 9,500: 4 bdes.

Provincial, People's Militias, Local Militias (village self-defence force).

FOREIGN TROOPS: 1,350 Cuban, 300 Soviet, 80 N.

Korean military advisers; 175 E. German security advisers reported. Some 5,000 Zimbabwean and some 3,000 Tanzanian combat troops (varies).

OPPOSITION: National Resistance Movement of Mozambique (MNR or *Renamo*): 18,000 reported, perhaps 10,000 trained.

* Western military aid only

† Eqpt serviceability questionable: perhaps only 50-60% operational. Some eqpt in store.

Debt 1983: \$950.0 m 1984: \$990.0 m

Def bdtg* 1984: fr 4.5 bn (\$10.298 m)

1985e: fr 5.3 bn (\$11.797 bn)

FMA 1985: \$5.0 m 1986: \$5.3 m

\$1 = fr (1982): 328.61 (1983): 381.06

(1984): 436.96 (1985): 449.26

fr = francs CFA

Population: 6,362,000

18-30 31-45

Men: 690,000 480,000

Women: 705,000 493,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 2,270.

Terms of service: conscription (2 years), selective.**ARMY:** 2,150.

3 Military Districts.

2 armed *recce* sqns.

6 inf coys.

1 engr coy.

1 para coy.

1 log/spt coy.

Equipment:AFV: *recce*: 10 M-8, 18 AML-90, 18 AML-60-7

APC: 14 M-3.

Arty: *mor*: 60mm: M-35; 81mm: M-61; 120mm: 15 AM-50.ATK: *ACL*: 57mm: M-18; 75mm: M-20AD: *guns*: 20mm: 10 M-3 VDA SP.**AIR FORCE:** 120; no combat ac or armed hel.

Tpt: 1 Boeing 737 (VIP), 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 2

C-130H *Hercules*, 4 Nord *Noratl*, 3 Dornier Do-28D, 1 Rockwell *Aero Commander* 500,

1 Reims Cessna F-337.

(On order: 1 Dornier Do-228 lt tpt ac).

PARA-MILITARY: some 2,550.

Gendarmene (7850): 5 groups.

Presidential Guard (2200).

Republican Guard (21,500).

Four Nomad patrol groups.

* Excl Republican Guard, Police Force and Presidential Guard.

NIGERIA

GDP 1983: N 46,773 bn (\$64,654 bn)

1984: N 48,490 bn (\$63,449 bn)

growth 1984: -0.6% 1985: 2.4%

Inflation 1984: 44.0% 1985e: 8.0%

Debt 1984: \$20.0 bn 1985: \$21.5 bn

Def bdtg* 1985: N 975,669 m (\$1,093 bn)

1986: N 907,058 m (\$1,034 bn)

NIGER

GDP 1983: fr 697.2 bn (\$1,830 bn)

1984e: fr 640.0 bn (\$1,465 bn)

growth 1982: 4.0% 1983: -3.5%

Inflation 1984: 8.5% 1985: -1.0%

\$1 = N (1983): 0.7234 (1984): 0.7642
(1985): 0.8924 (1986): 0.8770

N = naira

Population: 97,251,000

18-30 31-45

Men: 10,667,000 7,034,000

Women: 10,856,000 7,302,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 94,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.

Reserves: none organized.

ARMY: 80,000.

1 arm'd div (4 arm'd, 1 mech bdes).

1 composite div (incl 1 AB, 1 air portable, 1 amph bdes).

2 mech divs (each 3 mech bdes).

4 arty bdes } organic

4 engr bdes } to divs

4 recce bns } (1 each).

Equipment:

Tks: 40 T-55, 72 Vickers Mk 3, lt 50 Scorpion.

AFV: *reco*: 20 *Saladin*, 90 AML-90, 55 Fox.

APC: 10 *Saracen*, 70 Steyr 4K-7FA.

Arty: *guns*: 122mm: 200 D-30/-74. *how*: 105mm:

200 M-56; 155mm: 25 FH-77B towed, 25 *Pal-*

maria SP. *mor*: 81mm: 200.

ATK: *ACL*: 106mm.

AD: *guns*: some 90: some 60 20mm, 40mm towed;

30 ZSU-23-4 SP. *SAM*: *Blowpipe*, 16 *Roland*.

(On order: 40 ERC-90 AFV, *Swingfire* ATGW; *Blowpipe*.)

NAVY: 5,000.

Bases: Apapa (Lagos; HQ Western Command), Calabar (HQ Eastern Command).

Frigate: 1 *Meko* 360H with 8 *Otomat* SSM, 1 octuple *Aspide* SAM, 1 *Lynx* hel.

Corvettes: 4:

2 *Hippo* (Vosper Thornycroft Mk 9) with 2 triple *Seacat* SAM;

2 *Dorina* (Mk 3) (operational).

FAC(G): 6:

3 *Lurssen* Type-57 with 4 *Otomat* SSM;

3 *La Combattante* IIIB with 2 twin *Exocet* MM-38

Patrol craft:

5 large 4 *Makurdi* (Brook Marine), 1 *Yan-Yan*;

4 *Tring* (Abeking & Rasmussen), 2

Swiftships 20-m, 4 Damen 14.5-m, 14 Inter-marine coastal

Amph: LST: 2 Ro-Ro 1300 (Crocodile); LCU: 2.

Trg: 1 ex-Neth yacht

Hel: 3 Westland *Lynx* Mk 89 MR/SAR.

(On order: 2 *Lerici* MC MV, 10 Swiftships 20-m, 2 Watercraft P-2000, 6 SM-5115 Simoneau

15.8-m, 2 Damen 14.5-m patrol craft, 4 FPB-512 RTK assault landing craft.)

AIR FORCE: 9,000; 53 combat ac.

FGA/interceptor: 3 sqns: 1 with 16 Breguet/Dornier *AlphaJet*, 2 with 17 Mikoyan- Guryevich MiG-21MF (to be replaced); 18 *Sepecat Jaguar* (14 -5N, 4 -BN).

SAR: 1 sqn with: ac: 2 Fokker F-27MPA MR; hel: 20 MBB BO-105C/D.

Tpt: 2 sqns with 9 C-130H-30 *Hercules*, 3 F-27, 5 Aeritalia G-222, 1 Gulfstream Aerospace *Gulfstream III* (VIP), 3 Dornier Do-228 (VIP), 1 *Beech Super King Air*.

Spt: 3 sqns with 13 Dornier Do-28D, 12 Do-128-6. Hel incl 14 SA-330 *Puma*.

Trg: ac: 2 MiG-21U, *Piaggio* P-149D, 12 *Aermacchi* MB-339, 4 *Jaguar*, 25 BAe *Bulldog*; hel: 15 Hughes 300.

AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*.

(On order: 18 MiG-21 (12 MF, 6 U), 8 *AlphaJet* FGA; 3 Do-228 lt tpt; some 4 Do-128-6 utility ac; 5 Boeing CH-47 *Chinook*, 12 SA-330 *Puma* hel.)

PARA-MILITARY:

Coastguard: 15 *Abeokuta*, 3 other patrol craft.

Port Security Police 12,000.

Security and Civil Defence Corps (Ministry of Internal Affairs): Police: UR- 416 APC, 4 hel, 68 small craft, 7 hovercraft (5 AV *Tiger*).

• Excl N 3.94 bn development plan.

RWANDA

GDP 1983: fr 141.9 bn (\$1.504 bn)

1984: fr 153.8 bn (\$1.535 bn)

growth 1983: 1.0% 1984: 2.9%

Inflation 1984: 5.4% 1985: 4.0%

Debt 1983: \$250.0 m 1984: \$330.0 m

Def exp 1983: fr 2.70 bn (\$28.620 m)

1984: fr 3.00 bn (\$29.949 m)

\$1 = fr (1982): 92.84 (1983): 94.34

(1984): 100.17 (1985): 101.26

fr = Rwanda francs

Population: 5,766,000

18-30 31-45

Men: 731,000 351,000

Women: 725,000 407,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):

Regular: 5,150.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 5,000.

1 cdo bn.
1 recce sqn.
8 inf coys.
1 engr coy.

Equipment:

AFV: *recce*: 12 AML-60. *APC*: 16 M-3.
Arty: *mor*: 81mm: 8.
ATK: *RL*: 83mm: *Blindicide*. *guns*: 57mm: 6.

AIR: 150; 4 combat ac.

COIN: 2 BN-2 *Defender*, 2 SIAI-Marchetti SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 *Aérospatiale Caravelle* (VIP); 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3).

Liaison: ac: 2 Socata R-235; *hel*: 6 SA-342L *Gazelle*, 2 SA-316C *Alouette III*.

Trg: 1 CM-170 *Magister*.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 1,200.

SENEGAMBIA

In December 1983 a confederal defence budget was introduced. In 1985/6 it was fr CFA 3.274 bn.

SENEGAL

GDP	1983/4:	fr 977.7 bn (\$2.566 bn)
	1984/5:	fr 1,015.0 bn (\$2.323 bn)
growth	1984:	4.7%
	1985:	3.8%
Inflation	1983:	11.6%
	1984:	11.8%
Debt	1983:	\$1.5 bn
	1984:	\$1.8 bn
Def bdt	1984/5:	fr 28.097 bn (\$64.301 m)
	1985/6:	fr 28.379 bn (\$63.168 m)
FMA	1985:	\$3.0 m
	1986:	\$2.9 m
\$1 = fr	(1982):	328.61
	(1983):	381.06
	(1984):	436.96
	(1985):	449.26

fr = francs CFA

Population: 6,694,000

18-30

31-45

Men: 730,000

353,000

Women: 731,000

513,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: 9,700.

Terms of service: conscription, 2 years selective.

Reserve: exists, no details known.

ARMY: 8,500 (mostly conscripts).

4 Military Zone HQ.

7 inf bns.

1 engr bn

1 Presidential Guard (horsed).

1 *recce* sqn.

1 arty gp.

1 AA arty gp.

2 para coys.

3 construction coys.

Equipment:

AFV: *recce*: 10 M-8, 4 M-20, 30 AML-60, 27 -90.
APC: some 40 Panhard M-3, 25 M-3 half-track.

Arty: *how*: 75mm: 6 M-116 pack; 105mm: 6 M-101. *mor*: 81mm: 8; 120mm: 8.

ATK: *RL*: STRIM-89. *ATGW*: Milan.

AD: *guns*: 21 M-693 20mm, 40mm.

NAVY: 700.

Base: Dakar.

Patrol craft: 7: 1 PR-72M, 3 P-48 large; 3 *Interceptor*.

Amph: LCT: 1; LCM: 2.

(On order: *Osprey*-class fast patrol vessel, 1 EDIC-700 410-ton LCT (1986).)

AIR FORCE: 500; 2 combat ac.

MR/SAR: 1 EMB-111 maritime *Bandeirante*, 1 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*.

Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 Boeing 727-200, 1 *Aérospatiale Caravelle* (VIP); 5 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 6 Fokker F-27-400M.

Trg: incl 6 Fouga *Magister*, 1 Reims Cessna F-337; 6 Socata R-235G.

Hel: incl 1 SA-341 *Gazelle*, 1 SA-330 *Puma*, 2 SA-315B *Alouette II*.

PARA-MILITARY: 6,800 Gendarmene: 12 VXB-170

APC. Customs: 17 coastal patrol craft (11 armed).

THE GAMBIA

GDP	1983/4:	D 614.6 m (\$208.778 m)
	1984/5:	D 625.1 m (\$152.712 m)
growth	1983/4:	6.0%
	1984/5:	1.7%
Inflation	1982/3:	10.2%
	1983/4:	6.4%
Debt	1983:	\$163.0 m
Def bdt	1985/6:	D 7.8 m (\$2.210 m)
Def exp	1983/4:	D 3.0 m (\$1.019 m)
\$1 = D	(1982/3):	2.4759
	(1983/4):	2.9438
	(1984/5):	4.0933
	(1985/6):	3.5289

D = dalasi

Population: 695,000

18-30

31-45

Men: 77,700

65,600

Women: 78,700

59,500

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: (600).

Terms of service: voluntary; some compulsory conditions authorized.

ARMY: (125).
1 inf coy (with Confederal Army).

GENDARMERIE: 400.
Equipment:
Reccs: 8 Ferret. **ML:** 4 M-20 3.5-in. (89mm).

MARINE: 50.
Base: Banjul.
Patrol boats: 2 coastal;
1 31-ton *Tracker*, 1 17-ton *Lance*.

AIR: 25.
Tpt: 1 Short Skyvan 3M, 1 BN-2 *Defender*.

SEYCHELLES

GDP 1983: SR 993.4 m (\$146.788 m)
1984e: SR 1.050 bn (\$148.748 m)
growth 1982: -0.5% 1983: 1.0%
Inflation 1984: 3.2% 1985: 0.9%
Debt 1983: \$71.8 m
Def bdt 1985: SR 60.0 m (\$8.410 m)
1986: SR 70.6 m (\$11.418 m)
\$1 = (1983): 7.7676 (1984): 7.0589
(1985): 7.1343 (1986): 6.1833

SR = Seychelles rupees

Population: 68,200
18-30 31-45
Men: 9,200 4,800
Women: 9,100 3,800

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):
Regular: 1,200
Terms of service: conscription: 2 years.

ARMY: 1,000.
1 inf bn.
2 arty tps.
Spt coy.
Equipment:
AFV: reccs: 6 BRDM-2, (?8) *Shorland*.
Arty: guns: 122mm: 3 D-30/M-1963. **ML:** 122mm: 4 BM-21 **mor:** 82mm: 6 M-1937.
ML: RPG-7. **SAM:** SA-7.

MARINE: 100.
Base: Port Victoria.
Patrol craft: 4: 1 Fr *Sinus*, 1 It *FPB-42*; 2 *Zhuk*.
1 coastal.
Amph: LCT 1

AIR: 100; 2 combat ac.
MR ac: 1 BN-2 *Defender*, 1 Fairchild *Merlin* IIIB.
Tpt: 2 BN-2 *Islander*, 2 Socata R-235.
Hel: 2 SA-316 *Alouette* III.

PARA-MILITARY: People's Militia 900.

SIERRA LEONE

GDP 1982/3: Le 1.939 bn (\$1.536 bn)
1983/4: Le 2.762 bn (\$1.180 bn)
growth 1982/3: -1.8%
Inflation 1983/4: 73.0% 1984/5: 68.0%
Debt 1983: \$400.0 m
Def bdt 1983/4: Le 24.0 m (\$9.562 m)
1984/5: Le 26.8 m (\$8.532 m)
\$1 = Le (1982/3): 1.2626 (1983/4): 2.5100
(1984/5): 3.1412

Le = Leones

Population: 4,016,000
18-30 31-45
Men: 359,000 281,000
Women: 370,000 285,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 3,100.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 3,000.
2 inf bns.
2 arty btys.
1 engr sqn.
Equipment:
AFV: reccs: 4 *Saladin*. **APC:** 10 MOWAG *Piranha*.
mor: 60mm, 81mm.
ATK: **ML:** 84mm: *Carl Gustav*.
AD: **SAM:** SA-7.

NAVY: 100 (coastguard).
Base: Freetown.
Patrol boat: 1 *Tracker* II.

PARA-MILITARY: 800.
State Security Division: 1 special forces bn.

SOMALI REPUBLIC

GDP 1983e: S sh 20.0 bn (\$1.267 bn)
1984e: S sh 23.0 bn (\$1.149 bn)
growth 1985: 4.0%
Inflation 1984: 92.0% 1985: 37.8%
Debt 1984e: \$1.6 bn 1985e: \$2.0 bn

TOGO

GDP	1983:	fr 284.20 bn (\$745.814 m)
	1984:	fr 292.10 bn (\$668.482 m)
growth	1982:	-2.3% 1983: -7.9%
Inflation	1984:	-3.6% 1985: -1.8%
Debt	1984e:	\$900.0 m 1985e: \$1.0 bn
Def budgt	1985e:	fr 8.20 bn (\$18.252 m)
	1986e:	fr 8.50 bn (\$24.035 m)
\$1 = fr	(1983):	381.06 (1984): 436.96
	(1985):	449.26 (1986): 353.65
fr = francs CFA		
Population:	2,961,000	
	18-30	31-45
Men:	281,000	195,000
Women:	340,000	231,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services, incl Gendarmene, form part of the Army):
Regular: 5,110 (incl Gendarmene).
Terms of service: conscription, 2 years (selective).

ARMY: 4,000.

2 inf regts:
1 with 1 mech bn, 1 mot bn;
1 with 2 arm'd sqns, 3 inf coys, spt units (trg).
1 Presidential Guard regt: 2 bns (1 cdo), 2 coys.
1 para cdo regt: 3 coys.
1 spt regt: 1 fd arty bty, 2 AA arty btys; 1 log/tpt/engr bn.
Equipment:
Tks: 7 T-34, 2 T-54/55.
AFV: ~~none~~ 6 M-8, 3 M-20, 3 AML-60, 7 -90,
36 EE-9 Casaciel.
APC: 4 M-3A1, 30 UR-416.
Arty: ~~guns~~ 105mm: 4 HM-2.
~~mmr~~ 81/82mm: 20.
ATK: ~~RA~~ 57mm: 5 ZIS-2; 75mm: 12 Ch
Type 52/56; 85mm: 10 Ch Type-65.
AT: ~~guns~~ 14 5mm: 38 ZPU-4; 37mm: 5 M-39.

NAVY: 100

Base: Lomé.

Patrol craft: 2 coastal.

AIR FORCE: 260; some 11 combat ac.

(CIN: 6 EMB-326GC *Xavante*).

(CIN/trg: 5 Brueget/Dornier *AlphaJet*).

Tpt: 1 Boeing 727, 2 DHC-5D *Buffalo*, 1 Fokker
F-28-1000.

Trg: 3 TB-30 *Epskirt*,
E 2.

Hel: 1 SA-330 *Puma*, 2 SA-315 *Lama*.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,550.

Gendarmene 750; 2 regional sections, 1 mobile sqn
Presidential Guard 800.

UGANDA

GDP	1983e:	sh 541.36 bn (\$4.901 bn)
	1984e:	sh 778.50 bn (\$3.355 bn)
growth	1983:	5.0% 1984: 5.8%
Inflation	1984:	38.0% 1985e: 150.0%
Debt	1984:	\$820.0 m 1985: \$1.0 bn
Def exp*	1983/4e:	sh 20.40 bn (\$87.905 m)
	1984/5e:	sh 19.23 bn (\$37.859 m)
\$1 = sh	(1981/2):	84.158 (1982/3): 110.458
	(1983/4):	232.070 (1984/5): 507.905
sh = Ugandan shillings		
Population:	15,224,000	
	18-30	31-45
Men:	1,540,000	1,047,000
Women:	1,578,000	1,064,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Regular: Total strength unknown; was 6,000, believed absorbing elms of other groups incl Federal Democratic Movement.

National Resistance Army (NRA): loosely org in bdes and bns, mostly equipped with small arms, some hy machine guns; absorbing former Ugandan Army (UNLA) eqpt.

Terms of service: voluntary.

Equipment† incl:

Tks: 10 T-34/54/55, 3 M-4.

APC: 150: BTR-40/152, OT-64, *Saracen*.

Arty: ~~guns~~ 76mm: 60; 122mm: 20.

AT&M: 40 AT-3 *Sagger*.

AD: ~~guns~~ 40: 23mm, 37mm. ~~SA~~ SA-7.

Ac: 6 FFA AS-202 *Bravo* trg.

Attitudes to present government of former opposition elms — Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF; (2,000) in North), Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) — are unclear.

* Excl internal security services.

† Serviceability doubtful.

ZAIRE

GDP	1983:	Z 59.134 bn (\$4.588 bn)
	1984:	Z 99.583 bn (\$2.756 bn)
growth	1983:	1.3% 1984: 2.7%
Inflation	1984:	17.7% 1985: 20.0%
Debt	1984:	\$5.8 bn 1985: \$4.7 bn
Def exp	1983:	Z 1.80 bn (\$139.654 m)
	1984e:	Z 1.95 bn (\$57.734 m)
FMA	1984:	\$7.7 m 1985: \$15.0 m
\$1 = Z	(1982):	5.750 (1983): 12.889
	(1984):	36.129 (1985): 49.873
Z = zaires		

END

FEB.

1988

DTic