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THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF EUROTERRORISM

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degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF EUROTERRORISM: An examination of current terrorist activities directed against NATO and an attempt to explain the coherence of those activities using a campaign plan by Major Jeffrey W. Anderson, USA, 66 pages.

In the past few years the number of terrorist events and activities throughout the world has increased dramatically. Many of these terrorist actions have been directed against the United States or other members of the NATO Alliance. This increase in terrorism in Western Europe led Victorfranco Pisano to coin the term "Euroterrorism". Further, Claire Sterling examined a number of terrorist activities and through the biographies of well-known terrorists concluded that there was in fact an international conspiracy of terrorism and that the Soviet Union was the controlling nation.

This research examines recent events of Euroterrorism to determine if these seemingly unrelated events have an operational level. This is done by attempting to describe the events of Euroterrorism by a campaign plan as defined in JCS Publication 2. This research finds that in fact terrorist activities in Western Europe do follow a campaign plan and, therefore, have an operational level. The study further examines the sources of this plan and refutes the work of other authors that accuse the Soviet Union of state directed terrorism. Instead, this paper concludes that the Soviet Union is responsible for state support of terrorism through its surrogates or puppet states, but does not direct the actions of the various European terrorist groups. Likewise, no other state appears to direct their actions. The paper then concludes that the events of Euroterrorism follow essentially national level campaign plans while the various terrorist groups receive support but not direction from external nations. Finally, a derived national campaign plan for the Red Army Faction is presented.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has successfully maintained the peace in Europe since 1949. In fact, NATO has maintained peace on the European Continent for the longest period in its history. However, recent world events have indicated an increase in the number of terrorist attacks directed against NATO. For more than a decade we have been shocked by headline stories of terrorist attacks, including political murders, hijackings, kidnappings, and assassinations on a worldwide scale. Recently, France, no longer a participating military member of NATO, has drawn more closely to NATO. She has simultaneously been the victim of increased terrorist actions. These events beg the question, are these terrorist activities specifically directed against NATO as a form of low intensity warfare? Further, do these seemingly unrelated events actually follow a master or campaign plan?

Many people argue that there is a terrorist network stretching from Havana to Tehran with an ultimate target of the Western democracies and NATO. This paper answers three interrelated questions. Specifically, are the recent European terrorist actions interrelated? Do they have a coherent underlying plan? Finally, can that plan be characterized as a campaign plan?

If all of these questions are affirmatively answered, then there appears to be an operational level to Euroterrorism.

This operational level is best characterized as the overall orchestration and control of the various components or tactics that are used to achieve some strategic goals. In other words, the operational level for Euroterrorism would be the orchestration of Euroterrorist efforts to achieve the goal of removing the NATO supporting governments of Europe and all vestiges of NATO, with emphasis on removing the influence of the United States from European political affairs.

This research is both timely and historical. When the internal war in Vietnam flared in the late 1950's the United States found itself unprepared to counteract insurgencies of any sort. Doctrine, thinking, equipment, organization, and training had all focused on large-scale, atomic warfare, which would most likely occur in Europe. Our doctrine changed in response to the new threat in Vietnam. Now we again face a threat in Europe for which the U.S. Army is ill prepared. The number of terrorist attacks against military installations and their personnel -- especially U.S. forces in Europe -- has increased significantly during recent years. In fact, according to U.S. Army Training Circular 19-16, the number of attacks against

the military has increased at a faster rate than attacks against other targets. The terrorists have declared the police and the military forces, or any representative of organized government, as their enemies. Each time one of their attacks succeeds, it shows the vulnerability of the society. It demonstrates the inability of the police and the military to protect that society. One hope of effectively countering the threat will depend on our ability to predict our adversaries' next move.

For the purposes of this paper it is accepted that terrorism is a tactic of warfare waged by nations without the economic power, national will, or military power to wage overt war. Likewise, for this research a good operational definition of terrorism, operational art, and campaign planning will be offered. According to Army Regulation 190-52, terrorism is the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, political, religious or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the intended victims.

The general applicability of this study will be limited since the study is limited by time (10 years) and resources. It uses only published literature which is dated and has a limited scope. Likewise, this study examines only selected terrorist actions that have been

directed against members of NATO. Further, it examines only significant terrorist acts that have occurred within the last ten years.

The hypothesis of this study, then, is that there is an operational level to Euroterrorism and that this level may be found, as explained in Chapter 3, through the systematic application of the JCS campaign plan format.

If the hypothesis is correct, then, this study will allow military planners and others to view terrorist actions as coordinated events. Thus, they will be able to take coordinated antiterrorist action.

As shown by the brief literature review in Chapter 2, there are ample sources on this topic, but most of these sources merely report the facts of various events. They do not attempt to develop any coherent relationship or campaign plan among these events.

This study examines the operational level of Euroterrorism, and attempts to determine if there is a master or campaign plan. It seeks to determine if Euroterrorism is in fact a series of interrelated events, if it is a highly organized effort and if it has an underlying plan.

The importance of this research is transparent. If an operational level of terrorism exists, it will give NATO an opportunity to predict with some sense of

confidence and accuracy what the terrorists' likely next move will be. This prediction will enable NATO to take some preemptive or preventive actions without total reliance on marginal intelligence. It will also provide the military with a sense of guidance, the "where we are going" concept so necessary in the development of plans and operations.

By comparing the integral components of operational art and campaign planning with consistent components of terrorism, this paper will determine if in terrorist acts the essential components of a campaign plan can be found. If these elements are found, then we may conclude that Euroterrorism follows a campaign plan and has an operational level as defined by FM 100-5. If we cannot find these essential components, we will be able to conclude that Euroterrorism does not follow a campaign plan, but unable to conclude whether Euroterrorism does or does not have an operational level.

The first competing hypothesis is that Euroterrorism does not have an operational level. This hypothesis is the null hypothesis and would be disproven if I find the elements of a campaign plan in the terrorist acts. It can not be proven by the proposed research. If I do not find the elements of a campaign plan, one of the following hypotheses may be true:

H1: Euroterrorism does have an operational level, but does not follow a campaign plan as defined in

FM 100-5.

H2: Euroterrorism follows a campaign plan and has an operational level, but our intelligence gathering techniques and our analyses of terrorist events are inadequate.

H3: Euroterrorism is in fact composed of isolated, random, and perhaps overlapping events which are generally incoherent and unpredictable.

The challenge for this research, then, is to analyze each of these alternative, competing hypotheses and determine which represents reality. This is done by careful elimination of each alternative explanation.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Despite NATO's apparent success at maintaining peace on the European continent since 1949, the longest period in its history, recent world events have indicated that NATO Europe is the battleground for a new tactic of warfare. On March 25 & 26, 1976, the U.S. Department of State hosted a conference of 200 specialists in problems related to terrorism. This conference concluded that terrorism was flourishing. In fact, the number of terrorist incidents had rapidly risen. The conference reported that between January 1, 1968 and December 31, 1975, there had been 913 terrorist incidents which included; 123 kidnappings, 31 barricade and hostage episodes, 375 uses of explosive devices, 95 armed assaults or ambushes, 137 hijackings, 59 incendiary attacks, 48 assassinations, and 45 other incidents. In total 800 people had been killed and 1700 had been injured. All of these incidents occurring at very low risk or cost to the terrorists.

These events beg the question, are these terrorist activities specifically directed against NATO as a form of low intensity warfare? Further, do these seemingly unrelated events actually follow a master or campaign plan? As explained in Chapter 1, the purpose of this research is to determine if terrorist attacks

against NATO countries have an operational level.

When the internal war in Vietnam flared in the late 1950's the United States found itself unprepared to counteract insurgencies of any sort. Doctrine, thinking, equipment, organization, and training had all focused on large-scale, atomic warfare, which would most likely occur in Europe. Our doctrine changed in response to the new threat in Vietnam. Now we again face a threat in Europe for which the U.S. Army is ill prepared. The number of terrorist attacks against military installations and their personnel -- especially U.S. forces in Europe -- has increased significantly during recent years. In fact, according to U.S. Army Training Circular 19-16, the number of attacks against the military is increasing at a faster rate than attacks against other targets.

According to Army Regulation 190-52, terrorism is the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals often done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a symbolic criminal act intended to influence an audience beyond the intended victims. Their victims include the police, the military forces, or any representative of organized government. Our hope, then, of countering the terrorist threat depends on our ability to predict our adversaries' next move. The terrorists'

next moves depend on their plan for waging a successful operation in Europe.

Terrorist acts are committed by three types of "terrorist", according to Frederick J. Hacker in his book Crusaders, Criminals, and Crazies. For purposes of my analysis, acts perpetuated by crazies with no known or espoused affiliation to a group will not be considered. Terrorists are, by definition, criminals. However, acts committed solely for criminal purposes or for personal rather than ideological gain are not within the definition of terrorism and will not be considered in this research. In general, Euroterrorism will look only at acts committed by ideologically inspired individuals or groups, so-called political terrorists. Hacker calls this group "crusaders". Any terrorist group may have members from all three "C's". Though these categories are not mutually exclusive, they help delimit the scope of this study.

Terrorists and/or terrorist acts share certain common features. These features include acts which:

- 1) Promote fear,
- 2) Are usually promulgated by forces militarily weaker than the opposing police security forces,
- 3) Do not necessarily equate tactical success with mission success. Publicity may be sufficient to secure the terrorists main objectives,
- 4) Are committed by highly mobile forces,

- 5) Are cheap,
- 6) Use limited resources,
- 7) Are covert,
- 8) Use small groups for security and efficiency.

Euroterrorist groups seem to have common characteristics which will be key for this research. They have the following characteristics:

- 1) Organizational Characteristics.
 - a) Bureaucratic organization.
 - b) Recruitment.
 - c) Financing.
 - d) International connections.
 - e) Small groups.
- 2) Operational Characteristics.
 - a) Planning.
 - b) Timing.
 - c) Tactics.
 - d) Collusion.
- 3) Behavioral Characteristics.
 - a) Motivation.
 - b) Dedication/discipline.
 - c) Willingness to kill.
 - d) Willingness to give up life.
- 4) Resource Characteristics.
 - a) Training skills.

- b) Personnel with technical sophistication.
- c) Small group.
- d) Similar weapons.
- e) Similar equipment.
- f) Similar transportation.

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 defines "operational art" as the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations. A campaign is then further defined as a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war. Operational art involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle. Its essence is the identification of the enemy's center of gravity (strength or balance) and the concentration of superior combat power against that point to achieve a decisive success. In this case, it involves the efforts of the terrorist to locate NATO's center of gravity. Operational art requires that commanders define what military condition must be produced in the theater to achieve the strategic goal, what sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition and how the resources of the force should be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions. All of these elements of operational art are formalized in a campaign plan as found in JCS Publication 2, appendix C.

Finally, it is essential to define antiterrorism as measures that decrease the probability of a terrorist act occurring. Thus, counterterrorism measures are responses to an ongoing terrorist incident.

According to Captain Steve Daskal, in Military Review, in the last thirty years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of insurgencies and terrorist acts around the world. These acts constitute a complete, self-contained military art, separate from the "old" rules of conventional warfare. Terrorists use force in many variations against the established governments of the world to either overtly overthrow those governments or to undermine their authority. Some of the terrorists' most popular targets have been the United States and her NATO allies. Their attacks have taken various forms, but in most of the cases examined, they have been directed against the members of NATO. Many nations of the world simply do not have the means to engage in conventional warfare. Instead, they revert to unconventional means as exemplified by terrorism. Based on a review of the literature, this paper assumes that terrorism has been used as a tactic in a form of covert warfare conducted by one people or an element of a society against another people or an organized element of the society, specifically the government.

Some authors argue that the various attacks in

Europe are not isolated, albeit overlapping, events. They are in fact manifestations of a coordinated plan which involves campaign planning at the operational level of war. According to Vittorfranco Pisano, the Marxist-Leninist left is currently attacking the soft underbelly of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) through its conduct of covert warfare in Europe. The terrorists' Marxist-Leninist rhetoric points in this direction. If they are conducting war against the military imperialism of the Western democracies, this war requires multinational terrorist cooperation as demonstrated by the common nature of the targets, the timing of various terrorist events, and the claims of the terrorist organizations themselves. Again according to Pisano, the attacks are coordinated against individuals and institutions connected to NATO.

While it is the intention of these terrorist groups to shed an image of honorable commitment and independence from the Soviet Union, these terrorist organizations appear to be ideologically opposed to the West. They are tactically trained in a similar manner, and logistically supported through Libya and other states with Soviet weapons and munitions. In many cases the terrorists themselves hide in pacifist movements such as Green Peace (Greens). It has been the Greens elected to office in the Federal Republic of Germany that have 1) lobbied for recognition of the Soviet-

controlled German Democratic Republic, 2) promoted a reunification of the two Germanies, and 3) ignored the most rudimentary military/national security efforts. Similar pacifist movements may be seen in Belgium, France and Italy.

Libya has been a willing financier of these ventures. In fact, in February 1985, the Libyan Revolutionary Committee stated that they must arm, train, and help the terrorists to achieve their noble objectives. These are the destruction of NATO and the elimination of the Western Democracies.(1)

Based on the above literature review, then, it seems apparent that recent world terrorist attacks share a common target in NATO countries. Simply stated, it is apparent that terrorists seek to eliminate the democratic forms of government found in most NATO countries. Further, it seems apparent that these terrorist groups do not act totally independently. They share common training experiences in camps run through Soviet surrogates in the Middle East and are financed again by the Soviet Union through such countries as Libya. To say that these terrorist groups are trained and financed by the U.S.S.R. is not proof that they are controlled by her. Thus, the present research will attempt to discover if there is an underlying, centrally controlling plan for Euroterrorism.

Claire Sterling is an American foreign correspondent based out of Italy for the past thirty-five years. Since 1970 she has written political analysis columns for "The Washington Post" and "The International Herald Tribune". She has reported on European, African, Southeast Asian, and Middle Eastern affairs for various national magazines. She is also the author of The Masaryk Case.

In The Terror Network, Claire Sterling argues that the apparently unrelated terrorist events around the world are in fact part of a worldwide terror network. She reports that this network extends from Havana to Teheran and has an ultimate goal of destabilizing the Western democracies and their supporters. To support this theme, Ms. Sterling looks at the lives of several terrorists representing the various terrorist groups of Europe and the Middle East. In each case, she demonstrates that these seemingly unrelated individuals share common goals, training, education, funding, and logistic support. She also examines those who offer sympathy, approval, and substantial monetary support to assist these terrorists in their underground warfare. The author argues that international terrorism must be countered by an Anti-terrorism International.

Ms. Sterling writes that 1968 was the year when international terrorism really began in its current form. Most terrorist bands at that time had little

experience, skill, money, weapons, nor international connections. However, over the next ten years, largely through the direct efforts of Cuba and the Palestine Resistance these groups found training, guidance, weapons, sanctuary and an introduction to the international community. Further, she attempts to make a connection between the international terrorist training camps and the KGB, especially in Cuba. Likewise, the Palestine Resistance is to some extent armed and equipped by the Soviet Union. At least ten percent of all of its personnel have been trained in the U.S.S.R. or one of its East European satellites. Others were trained in North Korea, Cuba, or in Libya, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, and South Yemen by Cuban instructors. Though the Soviet Union may not directly supply the terrorists, the Palestine guerilla organizations are certainly passing on Soviet equipment and weapons to the international terrorists. Finally, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya has become the willing financier of international terrorists, both Black and Red. Ms. Sterling contends that, using oil dollars, the Libyan leader has bankrolled numerous terrorists through training, operations, and even supplied them with necessary money for the purchase of weapons, or the weapons directly.

While I agree with Ms. Sterling that the seemingly unrelated events of international terrorism

are interconnected, I cannot agree that the Soviet Union did or does anything more than provide the terrorists with a loaded gun to use as they see fit. She finds that it was never part of the Soviet design to create or watch over native terrorist movements. Even less is their intention to direct the terrorists' day-to-day activities. There is no mastermind controlling the international terrorist scene. Instead, it has always been the plan of the U.S.S.R. to let the other fellow do it, contributing to Continental terror only by proxy. (2) I find that her argument in this area is particularly weak. If the Soviet Union controls many of the funds, training, and equipment needed to keep the terrorists in existence, selects certain promising terrorist candidates to recruit as KGB operatives, and has the local KGB directors in the embassies as points of contact for terrorists, it seems to follow that they would likely control the activities of the terrorists or expect a voice in their operations. At the very least they would ensure that nothing that the terrorists planned would be detrimental to the Soviet cause.

This book is a superb study of the various prominent characters of international terrorism. However, it does not provide any data that the military professional can use to combat terrorism today. Much of the information that Ms. Sterling presents is dated or pertains to terrorists that have "retired", are current-

ly in prison, or deceased. Otherwise the clandestine nature of terrorist cells would have prevented her access to the information presented in the book or her own fear of reprisals would have limited what she presented. The book is useful for the military professional, particularly those stationed overseas who are directly involved in anti-terrorist activities to recognize the international connections of the enemy. However, while terrorism is the current warfare tactic faced by the Army, there are other books that are more instructive about terrorism for the average military professional than this one. This book gives no practical information concerning how to combat terrorism nor defensive techniques.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

1. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1981).
2. Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Since the revision of the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, the concept of a campaign plan has assumed greater importance to the U.S. Army. During World War II the campaign plan was found to have great utility for U.S. combat units. Using this document the theater commander could communicate his view about the employment of the military resources as his disposal. He could plan for the use of these resources over extended periods of weeks or even months. The modern campaign plan serves much the same purpose.

JCS Publication 1 defines a campaign as a "plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space." Similarly, FM 100-5 states that a campaign consists of "sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles." Finally, JCS Publication 2 says that a campaign plan is "a device used by major commands to express the commander's decision in terms of specific operations projected as far into the future as practicable...an orderly schedule of the strategic decisions made by the commander to allow sufficient time to procure and provide the means to secure desired or assigned objectives".

Thus, if a campaign plan in Euroterrorism may be found it would certainly imply a central plan which is the expression of the strategic aims and means to attain those aims from the plan writer. It would include guidance on timing, resources, priorities, forces, and other planning assumptions which reflect the needs and goals of the central planning authority. It is the means to focus the activities of a number of subcommanders and to ensure that needed resources arrive in the area of operations according to a commonly known time schedule which supports the efforts of each subcommander. The campaign is essentially an elaborate statement of how operations will be conducted within the theater of operations once the military resources have arrived. It describes the operations to be conducted in the theater over the period of time needed to achieve the theater objectives.

The plan, however, will only include those operations which the theater commander can foresee and effectively visualize. This means that the campaign plan need not include the full period of time needed to win the war. It may only address the period of time needed to achieve intermediate theater objectives. The winning of the war may require a number of campaign plans which then tie together to completely achieve the theater strategic aims. These plans are successively

prepared when events and the future come into better focus as the conflict progresses. In a large theater such as Europe several campaign plans may be executed simultaneously, or in parallel. This is especially true when the theater commander has chosen several lines of attack to achieve the theater objectives.

A large theater of war is often divided into a number of smaller regions called theaters of operations. For example, the Allied Command Europe (ACE), because of its size and diversity in terms of geography and people, is divided into numerous theaters of operations, Allied Forces Northern Europe, Allied Forces Central Europe, and Allied Forces Southern Europe. Commanders of theaters of operations and theaters of war prepare campaign plans. It is reasonable, then, to assume that the terrorists and their central planning authority have also broken Europe into several theaters and each of these theaters have their own guiding plans or campaign plans. The synchronization of these campaign plans, then, could be considered a center of gravity for the terrorists. This issue will be addressed in greater detail in subsequent parts of this paper.

Thus, the campaign plan sought in this paper is the link between the strategic goals and plans of the central directing authority and the operations plans and activities of the terrorists in the various countries of Europe.

The campaign plan not only provides the theater commander's vision of how the various operations will be conducted, but it also synchronizes the efforts of subordinate commanders toward achieving the theater goals. Like the music of an orchestra makes the sound harmonious, the campaign plan orchestrates the actions of a number of subordinates toward a common goal and the theater commander is analagous to the orchestra conductor. Subordinate commanders will not normally prepare campaign plans that cover the entire period covered by the higher commander's plan. Instead, their plans are more in detail concerning the actual execution of an operation. (1)

The best description of a campaign plan appears in Field Manual 100-15, chapter 5. The theater commander's campaign plan must visualize his operations from beginning to end and is based on a specific means of defeating his enemy. This may include making the enemy's position in the theater untenable by destroying his logistic support, defeating his allies or separating him from them, occupying facilities and terrain critical to the enemy, separating his forces, attacking his homeland, destroying the will of his nation to continue resistance, destroying his fighting forces, or any combination of these. The plan itself is flexible to allow adjustment during execution based on the exigen-

cies of the conflict. Likewise, the plan must be simple to overcome the potential friction inevitable in any conflict.

An effective campaign plan threatens the enemy in several areas simultaneously. Thus, it retains the initiative and allows the commander the opportunity to act and attack the enemy as his weaknesses become more apparent. The campaign plan is designed to position forces in such a way as to create operational advantages over the enemy before contact is ever made. It allows rapid and advantageous commitment of forces to battle against the enemy. The effective campaign plan must see the enemy's present courses of action as well as his future dispositions and options available. The plan must be sufficiently robust that minor tactical setbacks do not disrupt the flow of the plan and its potential to accomplish the theater goals.

Underlying the campaign plan is the desire for the most rapid and least expensive means to accomplish the theater goals and objectives. The effective campaign plan attacks the enemy throughout the theater with all means available to the theater commander to constantly put pressure on the enemy. Finally, it considers the ways and means to exploit all successes. To successfully do this requires that the commander see the future battlefield and anticipate it and thereby time the application of his forces most advantageously. (2)

As previously explained, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number Two provides a standard campaign plan outline to be used by all Armed Services of the United States. Likewise, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, defines the operational level of war by relating it back to the conduct of campaigns for the achievement of national and military strategic goals. Hence, the operational level of war may be clearly demonstrated if one can demonstrate the campaign plan being followed by all of the individual tactical engagements and battles.

Using this same logic, then, it is reasonable to conclude that Euroterrorism has an operational level if one can demonstrate that the individual terrorist incidents, the tactics of terrorism, follow a coherent, underlying plan that approximates a campaign plan.

The campaign plan format listed in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number Two is used in Appendix A of this paper. As shown, the campaign plan has certain specific ingredients which must be included for the plan to be coherent, and other ingredients which are "optional".

There are specific aspects that should be addressed in a campaign plan. It is the goal of this research to determine if in fact each of these aspects is addressed by current Euroterrorism and, thus, one can

conclude that there is a central controlling plan to the seemingly unrelated acts of Euroterrorist groups.

These areas include:

Assumptions. Do the terrorists seem to address the most likely enemy actions and response to their acts, the amount of force participation likely, the amount of participation and training of allied forces, the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, etc. Do the developed assumptions appear to reflect the theater commander's best estimate of what the reality of the situation will be at the time of execution of each aspect of the plan.

Theater Objectives. Have the terrorists carefully described and articulated the theater objectives in a plan or in some other way so that subordinate commanders fully understand them? Do these stated objectives then guide decentralized planning and the operations of subordinates, thereby increasing the likelihood that separate activities will be synchronized as parts of a coherent theater effort? Do these theater objectives provide guidance to subordinate commanders in the search for intermediate objectives, especially in the absence of specific guidance? Can the terrorists demonstrate initiative and agility by their rapid reaction to capitalize on momentary opportunities and weaknesses of the enemy?

Missions. Is there a broad mission covering a

considerable period of time that leaves the details to subordinates but guides their thinking and planning? Does this mission inhibit the actions of subordinates or does it allow them the latitude to conduct their own, independent operations? Is this mission too confining? Does it assign specific objectives to subordinates in terms of cities or enemy forces?

Phasing. A campaign plan necessarily covers a long period of time. Hence, it should consider a series of sequential operations to achieve the overall objective. Each individual operation constitutes a potential phase. These phases provide for the focusing of effort throughout the campaign. Earlier phases are more detailed, but later phases are addressed. Likewise, a campaign plan must provide transition points between different kinds of operations if phases are used.

Maneuver. For a terrorist, maneuver may be the most difficult aspect of the campaign plan. In this sense, maneuver is the distribution of forces where they will do the most good. The campaign plan must address enemy capabilities and weaknesses, thereby determining the manner in which terrorist forces are disposed. Due to limitations on resources, the terrorists must seek to provide the minimum force sufficient in areas in which he wishes to conduct operations. Hence he concentrates his limited resources in the areas where the enemy is

least prepared and most exposed. He avoids, then, head on encounters and seeks to attack the enemy's rear and flanks, in both the physical and psychological sense. The campaign plan should task organize forces to accomplish this throughout each phase of the campaign.

Support. This includes fire support and logistical support. It includes conventional munitions, chemical and nuclear capabilities. The campaign plan apportions these resources and gives priorities for their use in each phase. The coordination of the fire support and the maneuver means having the correct weapons at the correct location to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Terrorist fire support creates opportunities to maneuver against the enemy's psychological weaknesses, and terrorist maneuver exposes the enemy to his fire power by preying on his mind and causing him to make a mistake, e.g. leaving an entrance to a missile site carelessly unguarded for a moment.

Control Measures. The campaign plan should specify zones of action for each phase of the campaign, thereby specifying areas of responsibility. These control measures are based on the geographic characteristics of the region, the capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy forces, and the availability of lines of communication to tie the operating force back to its parent organization. Likewise, these control measures are not permanent, but develop as the phases of

the operation progress.

Reserves. Major influence on the campaign may be achieved through the careful and timely application of reserve terrorist forces or weaponry. If the terrorist campaign is successful, additional assets will be added to its arsenal in terms of people and equipment as the campaign progresses. The campaign plan must carefully husband the resources available to the terrorist in preparation for a decisive blow to the enemy.

Logistics. The availability of supplies and personnel often regulate the pace of terrorist operations. At the conclusion of an operation the terrorist must often delay further operations while he rebuilds his logistic base. Thus, the campaign plan must carefully manage the limited logistic support available to the terrorist. It also must allow time for the buildup of these logistics before conducting major operations. It should designate priorities for subordinates and provide for the establishment, development, and protection of the terrorist lines of communication. These lines of communication often are centers of gravity for the terrorist just as for conventional forces.

Deception. Deception is the life blood for the terrorist to conceal his true intentions, capabilities, objectives, and vulnerabilities. The campaign plan must

direct a deception effort to protect the terrorist and his organization.

The specific format to be followed in the analysis of the degree to which terrorist activities conform to the essentials of a campaign plan may be found in Appendix C, JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

The campaign plan, then, allows the theater commander and the central planning cell to communicate to subordinate commanders their strategic decisions, priorities, and view of the sequential and simultaneous operations necessary for the attainment of the theater objectives to subordinate commanders. It allows all members of the force to clearly understand the commander's intent. Thus, if there is a central planning and coherence to the seemingly random and unrelated events of Euroterrorism, it should be evident in a central plan. It is unreasonable to conclude that that plan must follow the U.S. format for a campaign plan, but any central plan must include certain common aspects which are most conveniently described in a campaign plan. Hence, the campaign plan and the degree that Euroterrorist operations follow it will serve as the method of analysis for this study.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

1. William R. Williamson, "Campaign Planning,"
Parameters, Winter 1984, pp. 20-25.

2. Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

A campaign plan may definitely be derived for Euroterrorism based on the research of this author. As may be seen, the essential elements of a campaign plan presented in Chapter 3 are all present. While the actual elements and sequence are unimportant, it may be seen that there is an apparent organization to the events of Euroterrorism and these events adequately follow the format of a campaign plan to intuitively derive an operational level.

The most important commonality among Euroterrorists is their agreement that the common enemy to their generally leftist leanings is NATO. The agreement is expressed in the derived mission statement for them. Specifically, the Euroterrorist groups have declared that the government and all of its associations are their enemies. Hence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, sworn to defend Western Europe against attack, specifically an attack by the Soviet Union and/or one of its surrogates or allies, presents an obstacle to the successful takeover of world communism. In concert with their ideology, then, this obstacle must be removed. Hence, NATO, the enemy, must go.

Similarly, the United States, the only super-

power member of NATO, visibly reminds them of the military presence of NATO by stationing forces throughout Europe, with emphasis on Germany and Italy. Based on this visible presence, the United States also becomes the enemy for Euroterrorism, through its association with NATO.

The second obvious area of interrelationship between terrorist groups may be seen in the area of logistics to include supply and training. While these relationships are often indirect, there is no denying that the links do exist.

As shown, most of the training obtained by European terrorists is provided either directly by the Soviet Union or indirectly through one of its surrogates. Likewise, the training may take place in the Soviet Union, proper, or in a training camp in the host nation, the Middle East, or in a satellite or allied nation. It is common that selected terrorist group members will travel to the Soviet Union to attend installations ranging from small, hands-on training camp to the famed Patrice Lumumba University where the theory as well as the execution of terrorist acts are taught. In a number of cases, the Soviet Union has provided "advisors" to train forces within the borders of the host nation. Lastly, the advisors may come from a satellite nation such as East Germany, North Korea, Cuba, or South Yemen. In those cases, it is most common

that the training camp will not be located in the Soviet Union, itself. Instead, it will be located in the host nation or in the Middle East, usually in a place controlled by the PLO.

According to defected General Jan Sejna, the Soviets decided to step up spending on terrorism abroad in 1964. The KGB set up a training camp at Karlov Vary for beginning terrorists. The GRU set up a special school not far away at an old parachute camp. In these two camps, top foreign terrorists from Europe and the Third World were trained. (1)

To a terrorist group there are two types of supplies, the actual equipment, or the means to obtain that equipment. Giangiacomo Feltrinelli personifies the second type of logistic supplier for the terrorists. Feltrinelli graduated from the Vary camp but was never a particularly good terrorist. Thus, he became the banker for the Euroterrorists. Roberto Quintanilla captured and killed Che Buevara in Bolivia. Four years later, one of Feltrinelli's guns was used to kill Quintanilla, the Bolivian consul in Hamburg. Under the name "Robinson Crusoe", Feltrinelli opened account no. 15385 in a Swiss bank. The money in this account was used to finance a "centrale" in Zurich to coordinate services for Germans, Spanish, Greeks, Italians, and French. In 1970, Feltrinelli attended a meeting in the Paris home

of Jean-Edern Hallier along with Baader (founder of the Red Army Faction) and Curcio (founder of the Red Brigades) to "organize European terror". (2)

To accomplish this major undertaking, the fledgling terrorists needed training, weapons, and money. Feltrinelli served as a means to all these ends. He became the personification of the logistic tail of the Euroterrorists.

Similarly, the American raid on the Libyan terror structure of Muammar Qaddafi, was predicated on the knowledge that he was supporting the Euroterrorists as well as other world terrorist organizations. Qaddafi was ostensibly interested in liberating the free societies of Western Europe. Thus, he opened training camps within Libya where students were checked in and out by computer from his capital. He formed terrorist committees in such cities as Rome, Brussels, and Frankfurt. Without any particular distinction between extreme right and extreme left, Qaddafi supports Euroterrorists simply for their destabilizing effect in the Mediterranean area.

Quaddafi has personally arranged terrorism conferences in Malta and later in Benghazi to develop a unified plan of struggle against... "imperialism in America". He has provided training, safe havens, and, most importantly, weapons or money to procure weapons.

Another person exemplifying such logistic

support for international terrorism was Henri Curiel. Curiel established and led a Paris based support apparatus that funneled money, arms, documents, training, and other forms of support services to numerous leftist terrorist groups. He was shot to death on May 4, 1978 in Paris, probably the only thing which put his apparatus out of commission. With a great deal of help from Curiel, by the mid-1970s all major terrorist and guerrilla forces in the world were represented in Paris. In 1976 police in Argentina found documents indicating that a "Europe Brigade" was being contemplated to create tension on the Continent. The brigade was to be armed and financed by Cuba and based in Paris. The services of Henri Curiel were to be used in establishing the venture. In many ways, Curiel became the international paymaster for terrorism.

The mere existence of such international terrorist services indicates a link in the Euroterrorist network. Whether this link is the result of state sponsorship or individual initiative will be further discussed in the next chapter. It is important, however, to note that there is ample evidence to support this portion of a theory of the operational level of Euroterrorism.

While the links between the terrorist groups are clear with regard to mission, their view of the enemy

situation, and their logistic support, it is unclear that they possess a centralized command and control structure that actually orchestrates the operations of the terrorist groups, nor that they have a clearly defineable sequence of events (phases) to proceed to successfully achieve their objectives.

There appear to be three generic phases for the Euroterrorist campaign. Specifically, the terrorist organization must be formed, it must be supplied and maintained, and it must actively recruit new members, and it must accomplish tasks generally satisfying members to continue the group in existence.

The first phase of the terrorist campaign is not directed against the enemy. Instead, it is a group maintenance effort to establish the group, recruit members, and develop a firm hold on those members. Like other forms of low intensity conflict, the terrorist group must develop an ideology that attracts members of the population to it, whether in the final analysis it follows that ideology or not. Once those persons showing some minimum level of interest are identified, the group may take active steps to recruit them, and to then hold them, usually through the commission of a crime, within the group.

In Phase II the terrorists actively begin a campaign of terror directed against those outside their group. Specifically, they begin low level acts such as

bombings to attract the greatest public attention with the smallest investment for them. Bombings appear to be their favored tactic since the planting and detonation of a bomb is fairly safe for a group with few members to begin with, and the detonation attracts a great deal of attention. Likewise, bombings give some flexibility since the terrorists need not detonate the bomb, merely threaten to detonate a bomb at some undisclosed location.

Currently, NATO appears to be faced with an enemy involved in such Phase II operations. It is incorrect, however, to believe that these phases occur separately. One group or portion of the terrorist organization may be in Phase I, while another is in Phase II. Likewise, it is often necessary for a terrorist group to return to Phase I after a significant defeat from police forces or as a group maintenance act to rebuild supplies, retrain or further train personnel, or to develop new plans for terrorist acts (to hide for a while).

However, perhaps the major shortcoming of this study was the absence of a clearly defineable command and control structure for Euroterrorism. While terrorist groups clearly learn from each other through the media, satellite communications, television, and other terrorist groups, the planning necessary to argue

that there is an international control cell does not appear to be present.

Terrorist groups, by the very nature of their structure include the seeds of their own destruction which prevent such an international organization. Psychologists contend that the inevitable effect of the criminal and conspiratorial nature of the terrorist enterprise, corrupts the personalities of group members over time. The terrorists then feed on themselves. Factionalization occurs, energy is spent in internicine conflict, and new groups arise from the ashes of the destroyed older groups. Partly, this phenomenon helps explain the episodic nature of terrorism. This process makes old groups grow feeble and eventually, makes the newly formed groups destroy themselves, too. (3)

Walter Laqueur noted that terrorist campaigns seldom last longer than three or four years. Once the security forces identify the campaign plan and master counter-terrorist tactics, the terrorist losses become unacceptably high, and force an end to the campaign. Then, terrorist enthusiasm wanes and the terrorist group must revert to Phase I or cease to exist. Laqueur argues that the only time that the terrorist campaign lasts longer is the result of strong nationalist, separatist, or religious support. (4) In these cases, the campaign is better defined as insurgency than truly terrorism.

Thus, this study demonstrates that the elements of terrorism can be defined within the outline of a campaign plan as defined by JCS Pub 2. Of course, it is unreasonable to expect that the terrorists' plan would perfectly follow the military campaign planning format. Cultural and ideological differences would prevent this. However, certain key elements must be present to successfully argue that there is a form of orchestration to the Euroterrorist efforts. As shown in Appendix A, with the possible exception of command and control, the terrorist efforts faced in Europe today have all of the elements of a campaign plan, generally confined at the national level. As such we may infer that there is in fact an operational level to Euroterrorism.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

1. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1981), p. 34.
2. Ibid., p. 42.
3. Thomas E. Burns, "United States and Western European Terrorist Groups - Current Status and Future Perspective", Unpublished paper, U.S. Army War College, 1982, p. 12.
4. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

This study has demonstrated that there is an operational level to Euroterrorism. It has done so by comparing facts known about the terrorists with the format of a campaign plan as shown in JCS Publication 2. Based on this research, however, it is clear that there is not a Soviet conspiracy behind Euroterrorism. Likewise, it seems clear that there is not an international terrorist network of the kind indicated by Claire Sterling in her 1981 book, The Terror Network. Instead, Euroterrorism appears to be a simple marriage of convenience for the various terrorist groups in Europe. These groups prefer to keep their affairs under their own control and their ideological differences make it unlikely that they will ever sufficiently agree to provide for a centralized planning cell and operational control for any appreciable amount of time.

In a paper written in 1981, Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation noted that the Soviet Union did provide support for terrorist activities, but that did not adequately explain the existence and persistence of world-wide terrorism. Obviously our search for a coherent plan underlying Euroterrorism was motivated by the desire to find something effective to do to combat international terrorist activities. But, it appears, as

Jenkins stated, a mistake to leap from evidence of Soviet involvement to find a conspiracy behind Euroterrorism and a central orchestration of the terrorist efforts. Such a simple explanation for a rather complex phenomenon would be very appealing. It would focus our efforts against one single villain. But the Soviet Union may not be the "great Satan" that it is often portrayed to be.

The research presented, however, seems to confirm that terrorism is a very complex phenomenon for which there is no simple explanation. While the Soviet Union has declared its support of those conflicts that it calls "national liberation movements," those who fight against colonialism and foreign interference generally emanating from the United States, it is a great leap of faith from such ideological and apparent logistic support to central control of the Euroterrorist.

Soviet support for a movement appears to have little to do with any specific qualification of the group involved. Instead, the group supported need only have objectives and activities which correspond to those of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy at any given moment. Generally, these groups are Marxist guerrilla groups fighting against Western oriented governments.

The direct links between Moscow and terrorist

groups are very elusive, but there are ample indirect links that lead one to conclude that the Kremlin supplies and trains terrorists and guerrillas around the world. Most of this training is conducted through its surrogates or inside the Soviet Union proper. Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated that the Soviet Union which bears the major responsibility for the proliferation of international terrorism. The Soviets vehemently deny their involvement with international terrorism, but the evidence presented substantiates that the U.S.S.R. is deeply involved through provision of weapons, money and training for terrorists. Likewise, it has been the policy of the Soviet Union to either directly or indirectly support any form of conflict that disrupts Western interests and lifestyle. As Claire Sterling states, in effect "the Soviet Union has simply laid a loaded gun on the table, leaving others to get on with it." Former CIA Deputy Director, Ray Cline, states that this Soviet support includes the infrastructure of terrorism; "the money, the guns, the training, the background information, the communications, the propaganda."

Soviet support of terrorism ranges from direct to indirect support which includes arms, training, and money. Much of her support flows through her allies and satellites such as Cuba, Libya, South Yemen and North Korea. Most of the satellite support, though, appears

in the form of training, either cadres or camps and cadres. Jenkins argues that we cannot say that North Korea or Cuba directly trained people to become terrorists. Cuba merely counselled individuals on the use of terror tactics. He contends further that advice is a long way from forming for them a blueprint or coherent plan for Euroterrorism.

It is clear that the Palestinians have received Communist training and Arab financing and have shared their good fortune with terrorist groups in Western Europe by offers of asylum and support. Beyond this second generation support, the evidence of direct Soviet involvement becomes less clear. It certainly does not support an argument for Soviet orchestration of Euroterrorism.

Having, thus, denied the existence of an overriding Soviet conspiracy supporting all Euroterrorism, we now turn our attention to an alternative explanation of the operational level, specifically, orchestration by another international organization. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the events of Euroterrorism can be fit into a campaign plan which explains part of the interrelationships of Euroterrorist groups. However, these international links are at best tenuous. While indirect relationship between terrorist groups and nations may be demonstrated, particularly in

the logistics arena, these are not sufficient to describe an operational level to Euroterrorism.

While the evidence supporting a conspiracy theory of Euroterrorism is very sporadic, there is ample evidence to confirm the involvement of certain states that seem to provide the infrastructure for European terrorism. These states tend to be Soviet surrogates or allies, such as Libya, East Germany, and Cuba. Some estimates indicate that Libya is supporting terrorism in as many as forty countries. Hence, Libya has become one part of the logistic tail for most European terrorist movements.

In a 1981 report from a conference at the National Defense University, "Panel 5" touched directly on this point. They argued that one of the obstacles to the development of a probabilistic theory of terrorism (an operational level) was the ideological differences between groups. Differences in political goals, techniques, and cultures distorted any reports of terrorist incidents as well as coloring the behavior and beliefs of the terrorists themselves. They warned that governments that viewed all terrorists the same might miss an opportunity to eliminate and/or diminish terrorism within their particular sphere of influence.

If we examine the phases and timing of terrorist operations, it is clear that the terrorists conduct their operations when they feel sufficiently strong to

assure some degree of success. This timing seems keyed to their sustainability based on their logisitcs. If there were an overall coordination of effort among the various terrorist groups, one would expect that as one group was decreasing in potency, and hence decreasing their number of operations, another would ascend to take its place. Thus, the central controlling headquarters would have constant pressure on the enemy from one group or another. In fact, this pattern cannot be found. Often several terrorist groups seem to decrease in activity at the same time and to increase at the same time.

Given this situation, the natural response would be to identify preincident indicators which would prepare NATO forces for an increase in Euroterrorism. To date only a few such indicators seem to be available. For example, it is clear that the level of general terrorism through Europe increases during the summer months, when the weather is warmer, tempers are a bit more on edge, aggravations are distorted and the actual conduct of operations is easier and more pleasant. This fact, however, seems to refute any theory of central control of Euroterrorism.

Despite the evidence to refute a conspiracy theory underlying Euroterrorism, and the lack of ideological links among European Terrorist groups to

support a concept of international planning, direction, orchestration, and coordination for Euroterrorism, there does appear to be a comprehensive plan and orchestration of terrorism at the national level. The events of Euroterrorism are clearly not random events. They follow a carefully designed campaign plan within each nation examined.

In each country there is one terrorist group which appears to lead and influence the efforts of all other terrorist activities within the geographic confines of that country. Generally, there is a central planning cell of seven to ten members which control the national terrorist group by the control of information. Due to the clandestine nature of terrorist groups, no individual knows more than a few other members of the terrorist organization, his cell. Thus, any one cell may not have the where-with-all to conduct the operation designated by the controlling headquarters for it. Thus, this headquarters puts it selectively into contact with other cells to build sufficient force and skill to conduct the tactical operation. Therefore, it is clear that the controlling headquarters holds its position based on the power that it derives from control of information concerning the location and membership of the cells throughout the organization.

This small control cell, then, plans those operations which contribute to the maintenance or

mission accomplishment of the group. However, as in physical terms there is one pure tone, denoted by a sine wave, with a great deal of background noise, so there are terrorist acts which support the group and its mission, and other acts that superficially appear to be terrorist in nature that do not serve any purpose for the larger terrorist organization. For example, many criminal acts are concealed under the heading of terrorism and later given the air of legitimacy by the terrorist cell performing the act, but they are in fact background noise and reduce the likelihood that the observer will correctly perceive the terrorists' true aims.

These independent actions cannot be attributed to any mission or tactical operation by the terrorist group. They are purely the development of the local cell and serve only its goals and objectives.

Perhaps the most important implication of the research presented here is the knowledge that Euroterrorism does have a central organization which is not international, but appears to be restricted to the geographic confines of various nations. This means that Allied forces may plan counterterrorist actions based on their knowledge of terrorist groups within the country. In other words, American forces stationed in Germany may develop their counterterrorist campaign plan based on

their knowledge of the RAF without undue concern for the Red Brigades in Italy or the Direct Action in France. While the RAF may have convenience relationships with these organizations, they remain the controlling headquarters for terrorism in West Germany.

This has many implications for the planning conducted by Allied forces. Sun Tzu once said that to know one's enemy will win many battles before the battle is actually joined. In the same way, the knowledge of the terrorists gained from this study and the predictions that may be made based on knowing who is in charge within a specific region, makes counteraction easier and with a greater confidence of success.

A representative campaign plan for one of these country specific terrorist groups, the Red Army Faction, is presented in Appendix A. Obviously, this is an area for further research and study. It is important for the NATO operational commander to consider the probable campaign plan being used by his adversaries, the terrorists in Western Europe, in order for him to develop a counterplan. Only through such study of the terrorist's overall goals and objectives as well as the techniques presented by a campaign plan can NATO hope to defeat and eventually eliminate the threat of Euroterrorism.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Campaign Plan for the Red Army Faction (Germany, France, Belgium)

1. Situation

The Red Army Faction (RAF) (Rote Armee Fraktion) grew out of the West Berlin student demonstrations of 1967-68. It was formerly known as the Baader-Meinhof gang after two of the original leaders, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. Meinhof had freed Baader from prison in May of 1968. With a small group of followers, in 1971 and 1972, they committed criminal acts to support themselves and to obtain weapons, funds, and material. At that time they first used the name RAF. In 1972 the authorities in Germany successfully shot or imprisoned a large portion of the group.

After that time a new group grew up around some of the RAF defending lawyers including Kurt Groenwald, Siegfried Haag, Klaus Croissant, and Jorg Lange. Through their efforts, elaborate communications networks and recruitment centers were established.

In 1978, after a series of setbacks due to the arrest or shooting of many of its leaders, the RAF went underground to reorganize. In 1980 it was discovered that the group had revived and had new members, weapons, and equipment.

a. Directive. Andreas Baader, co-founder of the RAF planned a three stage master campaign for RAF activity. Simply stated it consisted of development, consolidation, and offensive. Later RAF leaders have been preoccupied with releasing fellow terrorists from prison.

b. Enemy Forces. The expressed enemies of the RAF include the United States, especially as represented by its military, the government of West Germany, and NATO.

c. Friendly Forces. The RAF is essentially nihilistic, but it openly declares a leftist rhetoric. The RAF contends that the state system is part of class rule and oppression. Hence the government, its institutions, and its leaders must be opposed by all political and violent means. The RAF also publicly admires the work of Carlos Marighela.

2. Mission. The RAF is dedicated to ridding Germany of the American military presence there, and withdrawing Germany from NATO.

3. Operations.

a. Concept. RAF operations include bombings, bank robberies, shootings, and acts of sabotage against establishment, especially military targets.

(1) Scheme of maneuver. In the early years bank robberies were popular to provide funds for financing terrorist activities. Things that were needed but could not be bought, were simply stolen. The RAF has experimented with numerous weapons and tactics, to include remotely piloted airplanes with bombs attached and homemade rockets, and germ weapons.

(2) Phases of operations. Fortunately, the RAF seems obsessed with sticking to their plans, making their operations fairly rigid. When confronted with a setback, the RAF seeks security in areas where their efforts have been previously accepted, such as actions against nuclear weapons, the American military, and neutron weapons. In so doing, they seek popular support for their efforts.

(3) Timing. Like all terrorist actions, the timing of RAF endeavors appears to be cyclic, depending on the strength and assumed probability that they feel for success.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

4. Logistics

Since its inception, the RAF has understood the importance of a sound logistical infrastructure. The first objective was to get weapons and training for group members. Contrary to an argument for international terrorism, the support for the RAF has

generally been provided internally, through the so-called legal arm.

In 1970 the RAF leaders went to Jordan to train with an element of the PLO. The training was not what they wanted, but it did provide some skills in small arms, escapes and evasions, and explosives. They were forced to leave by King Hussein. Then, the RAF began to build its logistical base. It secured apartments, garages, radio equipment, false identity papers, and executed several bank robberies to finance their efforts. The money was then used to buy weapons and explosives.

Most of the early training obtained by the RAF was self-developed. However, the group members became very proficient in handling explosives, weapons, and in terrorist tactics in general.

5. Command and Signal

a. Command. Christian Klar, born 20 May 1952, in Freiburg, Baden-Wuerttemberg, was considered the chief RAF operator in the recent terrorist hardcore leadership. He was identified in the attack on General Kroesen, the killing of Schleyer's driver and body guards, and a bombing of the U.S. installation at Ramstein on 31 August 1981. Other influential personalities within the hierarchy include Silke Maier-Wilt, a former medical student who is known to have

worked on the RAF attempt to develop bacteriological weapons, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, Adelheid Schulz, and Inge Viett. Other peripheral members include Ingrid Siepmann, Monika Hebing, Susanne Albrecht, Petert Boock, and Eckehard Seckendorff-Gudent.

b. Signal

(1) Communications. Since its inception the RAF has cooperated with a number of terrorist groups both within and external to the Federal Republic. These groups, left and right wing, have shared a common goal of bringing about a change in the governmental structure of Western Europe. Though they have attempted to establish an international terrorist alliance, they have had no apparent success to date. Within West Germany three other terrorist groups appear to have close ties to the RAF. These include the 2 June Movement, the Revolutionary Cells, and the Guerilla Diffusa. Whether these groups are separate and distinct from the RAF or part of it is unclear. There is evidence to support an argument that their operations within West Germany are controlled by the RAF.

(2) Electronics. As with any other sophisticated terrorist organization, the RAF uses the latest electronic equipment to support its operations. From communications devices to experimental remotely controlled weapons, the RAF is a leader in terrorist technology.

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