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
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
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**THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE LONG-RANGE THEATER
NUCLEAR FORCE PROGRAM, ITS OPPONENTS AND
THE EFFECTS OF SPECIFICS OF THE PROGRAM
ON OPPOSITION**

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7 June 1983

Technical Report

CONTRACT No. DNA 001-82-C-0263

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
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY N/A since Unclassified		3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A since Unclassified			
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) HI-3585/3-RR		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) DNA-TR-84-117	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Hudson Institute, Inc.	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Director Defense Nuclear Agency	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) P.O. BOX 26-919 Indianapolis, IN 46226		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Washington, DC 20305-1000	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER DNA 001-82-C-0263	
9c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO 62715H	PROJECT NO W99QAXO
		TASK NO A	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO DH006068
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE PROGRAM, ITS OPPONENTS AND THE EFFECTS OF SPECIFICS OF THE PROGRAM ON OPPOSITION			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Armbruster, Frank E.; Yokelson, Doris; Clemmons, Constance; Guthe, Kurt; and Kahn, Herman.			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Technical	13b. TIME COVERED FROM 820815 TO 830607	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 830607	15. PAGE COUNT 384
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency under RDT&E RMSS Code B385082466 W99QAXOA00019 H2590D.			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
15	7		
15	6		
		Force Modernization Tactical Nuclear Forces Theater Operation	
		Western Europe Foreign Policy	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This report examines West European opposition to the modernization of NATO intermediate range nuclear forces (i.e., the deployment of Pershing-Z ballistic missiles and ground launched cruise missiles). Notable differences between U.S. and European perceptions of the peace movement are discussed.			
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☐ UNCLASSIFIED UNLIMITED ☒ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL SANDRA E. YOUNG		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 202/325-7042	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL DNA/CSTI



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FOREWORD

The draft copy of this study was delivered to DNA in two parts. Section II was completed in February 1983 and presented to DNA on March 2, 1983. The draft of the entire study was delivered in June 1983, with no updating of Section II. At the suggestion of DNA, no substantive changes have been made to the June draft; only corrections of typographical errors and light editing for clarity and purposes of grammar have been carried out. For a number of reasons, these editorial functions were not completed until mid-December of 1983. Because no updating has been done and no substantive changes have been made, we are leaving the June date on the document with the warning that Section II is unchanged and not updated from its original February completion date.

Though much concerning the probable European and U.S. public opinion and political trends discussed in this study has already occurred, and many significant events have transpired since February and June, we feel the main points made in the document on these and NATO alliance issues are as valid, or even more valid, today.

Certain largely technical questions, including some of the complex ones concerning the development and use of nuclear weapons, were not considered when this paper was written.

1. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY

This study examines West European opposition to the modernization of NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), i.e., the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The study is divided into five major sections in addition to this Overview and Summary. In Section II, alternative West European scenarios are described with an emphasis on political factors, but also with attention to the effects of economic conditions and public attitudes on the political milieu. While broad political trends are determinants of the nature of the governments that will make decisions on defense issues, public opinion is a determinant of which political groups are in power and what pressures will to be brought to bear on these groups. Among the interest groups in Western Europe likely to attempt to influence officeholders and political candidates, peace groups and their sympathizers are given particular attention. The emphasis is also placed on the effects of the anti-nuclear opposition in the Federal Republic of Germany, with a less detailed examination of similar movements in Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.

Section III describes salient aspects of U.S. public opinion that bear on the future of the INF modernization program, and indeed, of NATO itself. This section includes a discussion of traditional and current American attitudes toward overseas military commitments, arms control measures and defense expenditures.

Section IV considers the possible effect on American opinion of West European attitudes toward East-West political relations, the European and U.S. roles in NATO, the Soviet military threat and U.S. efforts to constrain Soviet expansionism outside of Europe.

Section V compares the composition and agenda of the U.S. and European peace movements and the political and public opinion environments in which these movements operate.

Based on the previous sections, Section VI discusses the general milieu in which potential variations in the specifics of the present INF modernization program might be made. It estimates the possible effect of several variations on some members of the European anti-nuclear opposition groups.

An appendix contains tables and charts showing some of the details of West German public opinion trends, primarily on politics, foreign policy and defense issues.

West European Scenarios, Public Opinion and Peace Groups (Section II)

This section contains a series of scenarios covering various trends in political developments in West Germany (written some time before the

German election in March 1983) and one "surprise-free" scenario each for Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.* All the scenarios have some common underlying assumptions. It is assumed, for example, that the Western economies, will, in the relatively near future, bottom out in their downward trend and begin to improve. It is further assumed that the recovery will be steady although not spectacular. The section also outlines characteristics of the peace movements and trends in public opinion in each country.

West Germany (Section II.B)

For at least the next year, it is assumed that the majority of voters in West Germany will continue to position themselves at the center or slightly to the right on the political spectrum. The primary concern of the German electorate with unemployment and economic conditions in general is assumed to continue, at least until the upturn in the economy (postulated in this study) begins to affect the average German. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) is currently in bad repute because, during its last few years in power, the German economy turned sluggish and the social-welfare state became overextended. The more conservative Helmut Kohl government, recently elected for reasons largely unrelated to the defense debate, is, somewhat coincidentally, also a government more friendly to an improved defense. It is assumed likely that such a government will be in power for at least the medium-term future (i.e., the next four to eight years).

Survey data in the Federal Republic give evidence that the Germans would like to believe their present security problems could somehow be remedied at a low political, economic and military cost. Within German political elites and the public-at-large, a clinging to the detente-oriented Ostpolitik of the 1970s and a tendency to accommodate the Soviet Union persist, and it is assumed this will continue in the near future. (Many Germans hold these views, even though they also feel the Soviets are using present West German relations with the East for political purposes detrimental to the West). It should be noted that trade with the Soviet bloc is also very popular.

Such attitudes foster groups which advocate impractical schemes for disarmament and German (or European) neutralism. They even make it acceptable to blame the U.S. for blocking these "solutions" and to conceptualize the security problem as one in which two alike superpowers are quarreling while innocent West European onlookers are caught in the middle of the controversy. The majority of West Germans would prefer

* A surprise-free scenario, as used here, means a scenario of likely developments, which always includes some surprises. If we had to wager, we would wager on something like the "surprise-free" scenario. The one for West Germany, for example, assumed a general trend of events which was close to that which developed in and after the March election.

that the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles not be stationed in Germany, but they apparently see a need for them and voted for the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) party that favors their deployment. Nonetheless, most Germans are more interested in the arms-control half of NATO's 1979 dual-track decision. All of these attitudes make for an environment generally sympathetic to the appeals of the peace movement.

Simultaneously, however, majorities of West Germans hold the following beliefs: 1) the Federal Republic should remain a part of NATO; 2) U.S. troops should continue to be stationed in West Germany; 3) the Soviet Union is less trustworthy than the U.S.; 4) the U.S. is the "best friend" of West Germany; and 5) the peace movement will tend to hinder rather than help progress toward disarmament. Although the German people are sympathetic to the cause espoused by the peace movement, they are largely indifferent to the movement itself or distrust the young, anarchistic, "decoupled" Greens and the possible danger they pose to domestic stability. It is important to note that questions related to defense and foreign policy issues may appear somewhat hypothetical to the average German citizen, because so few see a significant military threat emanating from the Soviet Union. (For example, in March 1982, according to one public opinion poll, more than 8 in 10 Germans thought it unlikely the Soviet Union would attack Western Europe within the next five years. See Section II.B.2.g.(3))

Great Britain (Section II.C)

The surprise-free scenario for Britain sees the current Thatcher government continuing at least through the decision period for the INF modernization program. The policies espoused by the Conservative Party and Social Democratic/Liberal Alliance provide about as much support from Britain for a rejuvenation of NATO as one could expect today. With the assumed bottoming-out of the decline in growth in the Western economies and the beginning of an upturn in Britain's economy as well, the popularity of the Conservative government might increase. There could then be somewhat less competition in the national budget from the various social-welfare programs, and this might help boost the allocations for defense. On the other hand, if the economy fades as an issue in the news media, the nuclear arms question and associated unilateral actions to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons might assume greater salience in public opinion.

As in Germany, the primary concern of the average British subject is the economy, specifically unemployment (which is the highest since the Great Depression). British success in the Falklands conflict might have saved the Thatcher government from the same fate as other European governments in power during the downturn in the Western economies.

Neutralism, and other somewhat extreme notions of easy solutions to Britain's defense requirements in the face of the militarily powerful,

rather determined and dynamic Soviet bloc, are "respectable" in Britain today, as are their proponents. Opposition to U.S. missiles in Britain is also acceptable. NATO is viewed favorably, but not as favorably as it is in Germany: one in five British would opt for a new alliance for Europeans only, with the U.S. as an ally, but not a partner, in the treaty. (See Section 11.C.3.) Most favor detente and trade with the Soviets. Peace groups are against both British independent nuclear forces and the GLCMs assigned to Britain, but the majority of the public sees nuclear weapons as necessary to deter Soviet aggression.

In the surprise-free scenario, British public opinion and peace-group activities are assumed to follow the trends now apparent. There is a great deal of opposition in Britain to the INF modernization program, but to many there seems to be no substitute for maintaining the nation's security. The government, as it is now constituted, should probably be able to preside over the deployment of all or some of the 160 GLCMs designated for basing in Britain.

The Netherlands (Section 11.D)

The Netherlands will probably continue to have the same government it has today throughout the period of decision-making for the INF modernization program. The current conservative government, which is more amenable to defense issues than the previous one, has quite a bit of political support. Indeed, the conservative Liberal Party, a partner in the governing coalition, was even the choice of the very young (12-18 year olds) who normally make up the backbone of the Dutch peace movement. (See Section 11.D.2.) Despite its conservative orientation, however, this government is basically reluctant to accept the Dutch contingent of GLCMs and faces considerable political opposition on this issue. While the peace groups in the Netherlands have lost much of the momentum they seemed to have had two years ago, public opinion is still quite strong against nuclear weapons being stationed in the Netherlands.

The most important national problem in Holland, as in the rest of Europe, is unemployment. But in this country, concern over nuclear weapons is so great that it even exceeds that for crime, presently a very urgent issue in the Netherlands, as elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, the Dutch appear to be much more concerned than any other missile host country about nuclear weapons. They are also more in favor of neutralism. In addition, arms control was considered by far and away the largest number of Dutchmen to be the best approach to national security. (See Section 11.D.3.)

The Dutch peace movement has had a large church involvement in the recent past. Dutch pacifism reached its peak in 1981 when one out of every two Dutchmen rejected the force modernization program for the Netherlands. The Dutch peace movement actually looks on itself as a "missionary" to the peace movement of the rest of Europe, and its call is for the Netherlands to disarm unilaterally as a beginning for worldwide disarmament. Since

1981, as mentioned above, the Dutch peace movement has been on the decline. Nevertheless, the Dutch today do not look on the Soviet Union as overwhelmingly more dangerous than the U.S. and do not see much of a difference between the willingness of either to limit nuclear weapons.

The Netherlands can be expected to continue to procrastinate in deciding to deploy its share of GLCMs. However, the combined pressure (tacit or explicit) from the other NATO allies (particularly if West Germany installs its complement of missiles) might bring the Netherlands eventually to deploy some of the planned force of 48 GLCMs.

Belgium (Section II.E)

A surprise-free scenario for Belgium assumes the current middle-of-the-road government will remain in power throughout the period of the Pershing II and GLCM deployment decisions, partly because of assumed economic improvements and the support of the Christian Democratic labor unions, and partly because of a parliamentary maneuver which allows the government to rule by decree and face only one vote of confidence each year in January. This tactic insulates the government from votes of confidence on every major issue that comes before the parliament and could increase the average tenure of Belgian governments beyond that experienced by the 31 other governments since World War II.

As in the Netherlands, public opinion in Belgium does not favor the emplacement of nuclear weapons on Belgian territory, so the force modernization program is facing political difficulties. Nonetheless, the most conservative party, the Liberal Party, showed new strength in the last election. This development and the willingness of the Prime Minister and his party--the other partner in the government coalition--to go along with the program probably make for the best possible milieu in Belgium for INF deployment and, in general, for increased Belgian support for NATO. Even this environment, however, may not be adequate to prevent severe problems over the installation of the weapons in Belgium.

Italy (Section II.F)

The surprise-free scenario for Italy--whose government was the first to approve the deployment of force modernization missiles on its territory--is that the Italian governmental process will continue to muddle along in its own way with each successive governing coalition and somehow maintain Italy's position in NATO. Even the Italian Communist Party (PCI) is anxious to indicate its support for democracy and its independence from Moscow. At the moment it apparently also has no desire to become part of a ruling coalition and be tarred as the "party in power." The Italian communists reportedly want to avoid being blamed for Italy's problems. On the other hand, if there is an economic recovery, they may lose appeal to the degree to which they are not strong enough to lead a popular-front government. Probably only a popular-front government,

dominated by the communists, would change Italy's policy to remain a member of NATO or even to support the force modernization program. Recently, however, the communists have made increased opposition to the INF and the Soviet SS-20s one of their main political campaign themes, second only to unemployment, in the hope of attracting the young vote. It is also said that the Italian Communist Party feels that in order to attract voters in the upcoming election it must shake its image as the perennial opposition party. It has spoken of a coalition with the Socialists, an idea rejected by that party.

There are peace groups in Italy and opposition to the force modernization program, but they do not seem to have significant support among the Italian population. (In fact, the peace movement, by and large is more prevalent in Northern Europe, where its overall strength and sources of support also vary by population density and age.)

American Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense Issues (Section III)

Since World War II, the American public as a whole has considered U.S. military support for the defense of Western Europe essential to the security of Europe and the U.S. and a self-evident obligation as a major partner in the NATO alliance. In early 1980, three out of every four Americans favored defending any major European ally attacked by the Soviet Union. This support was at a much higher level than it had been during the early 1970s.

But attitudes toward the defense of Europe represent only one small part of a changing amalgam of American public opinion toward defense concerns and cannot be viewed apart from a variety of other attitudes Americans hold. American public opinion is a complex and subtle balance of attitudes, some of which appear paradoxical and each of which can shift in a different way as perceptions change. Thus, if one is to gauge American opinion concerning issues of war and peace, a wide range of strongly-held values and beliefs must be taken into account simultaneously. These include 1) the traditional American isolationist "pacifism"; 2) the fear of war, yet willingness to fight; 3) a fundamental desire for nuclear arms control, yet persistent, and even increasing, distrust of Soviet motives; 4) the wish to maintain a "hard" rather than "soft" line toward the Soviet Union, yet hope that U.S.-Soviet relations will improve; and 5) the perception that the Soviets are superior to the U.S. in conventional and nuclear forces, yet support for reduced defense spending. (The last is a recent change from the trend in the late 1970s and beginning of the '80s, a change which coincides with the economic downturn in the U.S.)

The response of the public-at-large to the nuclear freeze illustrates the persistent combination of a peculiarly American "pacifism" and an unshakable determination to keep the nation militarily strong. All population groups--even the normally "conservative"--overwhelmingly support

a verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons; yet they almost equally overwhelmingly oppose such a measure if it gives the Soviet Union "somewhat greater nuclear strength" than the U.S. and if either side could cheat. (See Section III.B.4.)

Opposition to the Soviet system is so strong that large majorities of Americans have even consistently maintained that they would be "willing to risk the destruction of the United States rather than be dominated by the Russians." (See Section III.B.4.)

The Possible Effects of West German and Other European Opinion on American Public Opinion (Section IV)

A threat to the strengthening of NATO and programs associated with such an effort (e.g., the INF deployment/arms-control package) might eventually stem not only from Europe, but also from the U.S. American policies regarding the NATO alliance are not as important to the American public as European--and even U.S.--NATO policies are to the European populations. Nonetheless, particularly with the recent emphasis in the U.S. on the problems of deficit spending, the large portion of the U.S. defense budget that is spent for the defense of Europe may come under increased scrutiny by the Congress and news media.

Europeans feel friendly toward the U.S. and distrust the Soviets, but only a small minority think it likely that the Soviets will attack Western Europe in the next five years. Defense issues may therefore seem "hypothetical" to them. Many of them opt for neutralism and even disarmament, but large majorities in Germany and Great Britain favor fighting a conventional war if they are attacked by the Soviets. Some West Europeans seem to feel they are the victims of a competition between the two "superpowers" in Europe, and a sizable majority of the British and a plurality in France lack confidence that the U.S. can deal wisely with world problems.

The West Germans continue to rely on "detente" with the East and the Ostpolitik despite the occurrence of Soviet and Soviet-proxy, expansionist military and police actions in Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Afghanistan and even Poland--and despite the fact that the majority of Germans believe Moscow is using the West German urge to accommodate the East in order to expand Russian power. West Germans also feel the Soviets profit most from the Ostpolitik, but 74 percent want to continue it. A plurality (45 percent) of West Germans would choose to lose their democratic freedoms to the Soviets to avoid nuclear war (31 percent would go to war). Yet over 60 percent of West Germans and 56 percent of the British have a "great deal" or "fair amount" of confidence that if they were attacked, the U.S. would come to their aid, even if this "risked a direct attack against the United States itself." (See Sections IV.A and B.)

Furthermore, large numbers of Europeans are "Eurocentric" in their attitudes about defense. U.S. efforts to oppose extreme leftist aggression in places other than in Europe--e.g., in Vietnam and today in Central America--have brought loud protests from many influential Europeans, both in and out of government.

The average American may think these attitudes seem unrealistic, and he might also become annoyed with those Europeans who equate U.S. and Soviet aims and interests vis-a-vis Western Europe. One result could be a general dissatisfaction with present NATO arrangements. It appears, for example, that more than two out of every three Americans do not think the West Europeans are carrying their fair share of the burden of Western security, and two in three feel that Americans are shouldering too much of it. (See Section III.B.5.) This estrangement might, in turn, lead to a kind of coalescence in the U.S. of 1) elements of the "left," who want to cut defense budgets; 2) those of the "right," who think the Europeans are being too friendly and accommodating toward the nations of the Warsaw Pact; and 3) those who worry about government deficit spending. Such a coalition of opposition in the Congress, backed by American public opinion, could weaken the U.S. contribution to NATO. Powerful groups, however--e.g., the so-called "Eastern Establishment"--would still be strongly opposed to the U.S. diminishing its commitment to NATO. Thus, it is by no means clear that even with a coalescence of normally opposed political forces, U.S. support of NATO would be drastically curtailed. On the other hand, as mentioned above, such support eventually could be endangered by shifts in American public opinion.

A Comparison of U.S. and West European Peace Movements (Section V)

This study found that the peace movements in Europe and the U.S. are characterized by remarkable similarities in moral ideology, aims, composition, and tactics; there are, of course, dissimilarities as well. This study suggests, however, that the differences in the political, social and economic environments within which the peace movements function might provide some of the most significant keys to determining the eventual impact of the peace movements on defense policies, here and abroad. Some important differences between the American and European milieus are outlined below.

European attitudes appear to be quite different from American with regard to risking a nuclear war or actually going to war to avoid domination by the Soviet Union. Europeans largely waver on the question of whether they prefer to be "Red or dead." They also do not perceive the Soviet Union to be as dangerous as Americans see it to be. Some of the European values, beliefs and views come from a Eurocentrism that does not take heed of a security threat if it does not directly affect Western Europe. The U.S., on the other hand, has security interests that span many areas of the world which are endangered by communist and communist-supported military actions.

One European fear (particularly in West Germany) is that Western Europe will become the nuclear battlefield for a war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Indeed, as indicated earlier, in an ironic way, some Europeans feel that the political-military confrontation in Europe is strictly between the two superpowers. Europe is, in a sense, an onlooker or even a pawn in this confrontation. Therefore, if conflict breaks out, the U.S. and the Soviet Union will fight "their" war on European soil.

Another significant difference in the U.S. and European environments lies in the degree of love and pride of country: for example, nine out of ten Americans felt that the U.S. was the best place in the world to live in contrast to seven out of ten West Germans who preferred living in Germany. Eighty percent of Americans were very proud to be American compared with 38 percent of Europeans; seven out of ten Americans said they would be willing to fight for their country, contrasted with only four out of ten in Europe. (See Section V.A.1.) The Americans' greater national pride and willingness to defend their country suggest they have a higher morale than the Europeans; this could, in turn, affect the milieu in which peace groups operate.

The makeup of the American and European peace movements today is highly eclectic. This study suggests that identifying pacifists by social, economic or political groupings (e.g., ecologists or religious) can sometimes lead to inaccurate conclusions; it proposes that what is called for is a different set of variables, one that cuts across the so-called "inchoate mass" of the peace movement. (See V.B.1.) Thus, rather than environmentalism or religious belief, more workable variables might be those that characterize peace activists as young, better-educated, from large urban centers, inclined to be left politically and elitists. At the same time, they may also happen to be environmentalists, religious or members of a political party, but the above-mentioned variables are what distinguish them from the rest of the ordinary citizens involved in these giant groups.

What is argued here is that many of the characteristics often attributed to the peace movement groups may be misleading or carelessly chosen, based on little more than appearances. What is more probable is that we are dealing not with ecologists and religious groups per se, but with activist pacifists who may or may not also be ecologists or religious or atheists, or of any other social category.

Some of the notable differences between the U.S. and European peace movements are the following:

(1) In Europe the peace movements are much more directly involved politically and parliamentarily than they are in the U.S. For example, there is no U.S. political party equivalent to the Greens party in West Germany, nor is the "disarmament position" so strongly accepted by the U.S. administration as it is by the governments of the Netherlands, and in a more limited way, Belgium.

(2) It appears (although this has been by no means statistically established) that in West Germany there may be greater numbers of youth under 30 more intensely involved in anti-nuclear protests than in the U.S. Survey data show that over 70 percent of the Greens are 14 to 29 years of age; nearly half are teenagers between the ages of 14 and 19 years. Data further show that many of the involved youth are either in an academic high school or in the universities. (See V.B.4.)

(3) It has been claimed that the West German peace movement is unique because the youth of the Greens party and the peace movement are "reincarnations" of the German neutral nationalists of the past. The survey data, however, do not indicate that the Greens and the youth who support the Greens are necessarily nationalistic. On the contrary, these people, by criteria that could be considered to indicate nationalism, seem likely to be the least nationalistic of all West Germans. (See Section II.B.2.d.)

(4) The different types of strategic and theater nuclear forces deployed (or slated for deployment) in the U.S. and Western Europe bring about a divergence of targeting, basing and policy issues between American and European peace groups. In the U.S., the peace groups are, above all, concerned with the U.S. strategic forces. In Europe, their opposition is focused on the Pershing IIs, GLCMs, and to a lesser degree, NATO tactical nuclear weapons. The image of Europe as a battleground is, of course, much bleaker in the European countries. Since the demarcation of Eastern and Western Europe runs along the border between East and West Germany, the uncomfortable political realities posed by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are experienced differently by peace groups in Western Europe and the U.S.

The European Negotiating Milieu, Some Variations of Specifics of the Force Modernization Program and Their Possible Effects on European Opposition (Section VI)

It is difficult to determine the potential outcome of predicted foreign and defense policies, including their reception abroad, without looking into the environment in which these policies will have to be accepted. In the recent past, the most controversial NATO defense policy has been that of a force modernization program. As indicated above, this program has drawn the fire of peace groups, politicians, the media and a good percentage of average citizens across Europe. Because of the European media coverage given the "peace movement" and the sympathetic reception its appeal has had among so many Europeans, in and out of public life, the American news media has given exceptional coverage to the European peace movement and its effect on the force modernization program. However, in order to determine the possible fate of any foreign or defense policy, it is necessary to consider why the peace movement seems to be successful.

Although there are varying levels of fear of nuclear war throughout Western Europe, it is important to know if this fear is the only cause for the opposition to the INF modernization program. In developing policies to facilitate the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, government officials must comprehend any additional motivations for the opposition. In fact, on close examination, there seem to be quite a few motivations, and the issue is much more complex than simply that of the rejection of the missiles because of fear of "nuclear death."

One motivation which might make any military buildup, even a conventional one, difficult at this time is the concern of West Europeans, and West Germans in particular, that such a buildup might "destabilize" the "political understanding" built up over the last decade between Eastern and Western Europe. This political understanding is, in itself, looked on as a means of avoiding war with the Soviets. In fact, one of the difficulties in West Germany, and to some extent throughout Western Europe, is that the Ostpolitik and detente with the Soviet Union are so important to many influential people that anything that would disturb the relationship with the Soviets risks being undesirable. This, in turn, leads to many other developments which tend to create difficulties in getting acceptance in NATO countries for things American, including the INF modernization program--although it was West German Chancellor Schmidt, who, in 1977, warned of the growing disparity between the NATO and Warsaw Pact theater nuclear forces.

The East/West Relationship, Western Political Leadership, the Peace Movement and the Effort at Western Rearmament (Section VI.A)

In order to justify the Ostpolitik and detente, some Europeans stress the virtues of the East and the value of continuing relations with the Soviet bloc. In international affairs virtue is usually a relative quality. In this case, since it is relative between the two superpowers, in order to highlight the virtues of the Soviets, these same Europeans emphasize the flaws of the U.S. while playing down the glaring faults of the Soviet system. Eventually, in this process, the Soviet bloc and its leaders, on balance, seem to a sizable minority of Europeans no worse than the U.S. and its leaders. As a secondary effect of this process, it becomes difficult to convince certain Europeans that there is any danger from the "left," while some even see the danger as really coming from the "right" (i.e., from the U.S. and particularly the Reagan Administration). Among such Europeans, serious communist military and political efforts, such as those in Afghanistan, Poland, Angola and Ethiopia, cause no greater emotional protest than that against the minimal support given by the U.S. to the government of El Salvador against extreme leftist guerrillas. Among the non-defense motivations for Western Europe to maintain the detente with the Soviet Union and its satellites is the attractiveness of trade with the East.

The U.S. encouraged this detente policy in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. This position may have been indirectly partly responsible for the presently compliant attitude of some of the European allies toward NATO's adversaries. American attempts throughout the 1970s to accommodate to this West European view of the confrontation between East and West also may have done much to encourage it. Furthermore, the large Soviet buildup of strategic and conventional forces, which changed the balance of power between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, could have contributed considerably to a perhaps somewhat rationalized optimism in the European outlook toward relations with the Soviet bloc. It is possible that the Soviet Union with its "no-nonsense" policy, not only with its own satellites but also toward the West, may have given the impression it is a determined, high-morale "winner." On the other hand, inactivity in the face of Soviet-bloc intervention in Angola, Ethiopia and even Central America, as well as the outcome of the war in Vietnam and our tolerant policy toward our allies, may possibly have reinforced the impression of a vacillating, accommodating U.S.

Public opinion in West Germany and Western Europe still indicates that the majority of citizens feel friendship for the U.S. while only a very small minority express such feelings for the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, the vast majority also do not expect an attack by the Soviet Union in the near future. Many Europeans apparently feel that disarmament is a safer policy than continuing to possess nuclear weapons. (For example, in one poll, 31 percent of the British public felt that because Britain itself had nuclear weapons, the risk of nuclear attack against their country was increased. See Section II.C.3.a.)

In light of the background outlined above, an evaluation of the potential of the European peace movement and the broader political forces that affect the NATO rearmament plans becomes very complex. In making the analysis it is of some value to compare today's situation with that in the 1950s, the last time a large rearmament program was initiated by NATO and the U.S. and the era in which nuclear weapons were first introduced into Europe. In the 1950s there was a concerted effort by the Soviet Union and European leftists, as well as by traditional pacifist groups, to prevent the formation of NATO, the rearmament of Germany and, of course, the introduction of nuclear weapons into Europe. There was a similar effort to oppose U.S. rearmament.

The parallels with today are too close to be ignored. The fear of war and nuclear destruction in Europe was very high at the time (the destruction of World War II was still fresh in the minds of Europeans), and more people then than now were fearful of the emplacement of American nuclear weapons on European soil. The results of the "peace campaign" of the 1950s failed, even though, for example, the "Stockholm Peace Pledge" was widely circulated throughout Europe and gained well over one million signatures.

The differences between now and then, in addition to the new edge which the Soviets are thought to have in military forces and the effects

of Ostpolitik and detente, seem to be partly a question of leadership (or lack thereof) and the Western governments' attitudes toward the East. In the 1950s, the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was a strong leader and viewed the communist bloc as a totalitarian system that was a danger to Europe and the rest of the world. The Eisenhower Administration also looked on the Sino-Soviet bloc as a dangerous alliance of totalitarian states.

Today the approach of European governments toward the East is considerably different, as mentioned above, and even the repression of the workers' movement in Poland with military force--at the insistence of the Soviet Union--was not enough to effect a change.

A Discussion of the Possible Effects of Variations in the Force Modernization Program on Opposition Groups (Section VI.B)

Given the agenda of the various political factions in Europe and the numerous issues which tend to shape European public opinion, as well as the possible near-term political developments in Europe, defining ways in which the planned INF program might be altered to placate the variety of opposition becomes complicated. To develop variations which could be more easily defended against opposition groups and not weaken, or perhaps even improve, the NATO INF capability is even more complex. Moreover, to date, very little has been done to strengthen the positions of the supporters of the current program.

One of the difficulties so far has been that the INF modernization program, like so many other weapon systems and defense programs, was developed on a relatively narrow political-military base and, as a result, has not been accompanied by a well-developed rationale to help defend it against opposition from the peace movement. First of all, with the exception of the legitimacy of deterrence, the morality of the deployment and projected use of these systems has, to date, been neglected by NATO officials and other proponents, and indeed seems hardly to have been considered during the conception and development of the missiles and the overall program. This has allowed the peace groups to gain the moral initiative.

In addition, the effect of the new weapon system on the threat to the population has not been clearly explained. This is probably partly due to the fact that Europeans who favor the program view these weapons purely as instruments of deterrence and prefer not to talk about their wartime use. They clearly do not want to see them fired, and indeed a sizable proportion would probably surrender before they would engage in a nuclear conflict with the Warsaw Pact. Government spokesmen for the NATO countries of Western Europe are extremely fearful of sparking public debates on nuclear weapons employment policy. This leaves the ground open for the peace groups, who insist that if the weapons are deployed they will be used, and if used, Europe will be destroyed in an all-out war.

The U.S., on the other hand, generally characterizes these weapons as "bargaining chips" (even if government officials do not always use that term). And, if the ultimate objective of the "zero option" is achieved, the Pershing IIs and GLCMs will have accomplished much more than any nuclear weapon systems have in the past. If they lead to some reduction less than the total elimination of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, they may or may not have been responsible for great accomplishments. Nonetheless, in order to defend the systems against attacks from the peace groups and sympathizers, the NATO governments must begin to talk about things other than simply INF deployment as a means of achieving arms reductions.

As indicated above, there seems to be a need for a justification of these systems based on moral grounds. This need transcends the requirements for a debate with peace groups. It can be said that the greatest contribution of the peace groups, and particularly of the clerics who have become involved in the peace movement, is that the critical moral issues associated with nuclear weapons policy have been injected into the arms debate. This benefits everyone, including the defense establishments supporting these missiles. Weapons systems can and should be developed with these moral issues in mind.

The most recent, extensive and perhaps most important effort by the clerics is probably the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace of the National Catholic Council of Bishops in the U.S. (See Section VI.A.3 for a discussion of this Pastoral Letter and European views.) European Protestant and Catholic clerics have, of course, also addressed the issue, but have taken no unanimous position. Furthermore, the position of the majority of European Catholic bishops--as well as the Vatican--apparently does not agree on all points, or at least with the inferences some might draw from the Pastoral Letter.

If the Soviets insist on keeping intermediate, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Europe (SS-20s and others), it might be possible to make a convincing moral argument in favor of unilateral action by the U.S.--to avoid collateral damage in case deterrence of nuclear war fails--through the use of some variant of the Pershing II. This argument is as follows: If the dreaded time ever came when the Soviets unleashed, or perhaps indisputably were about to unleash, their SS-20s, NATO would need an option to keep down casualties and destruction on both sides. By basing the Pershing IIs in remote regions and then using the weapons' high accuracy to allow the use of very low-yield, clean, air-burst warheads, or, if possible, preferably conventional submunition or some other type of high-explosive warheads against the SS-20s, in an actual bombardment collateral damage could be avoided, or at least drastically reduced on both sides. Furthermore, with the Pershing IIs located in more remote areas than planned, if the SS-20s were used in "counter-battery" strikes against them, the Pershings would draw the warheads to these remote regions, and the probability of collateral damage in more populated areas could be reduced. Indeed, this "moral war-fighting doctrine" for the force modernization program seems to indicate that many more Pershing IIs,

with even greater accuracy and conventional explosive warhead capability--or better still, many more of a longer-ranged variant with this accuracy and warhead--should be developed, as opposed to the planned mix of Pershing IIs and GLCMs.*

A similar, morally justifiable argument in favor of the GLCMs is more difficult to fashion. Of course, a conventional warhead for these missiles and greater accuracy could greatly change the debate.

Such arguments might change the positions of the less committed European politicians and citizens who sympathize with peace groups, while supporting the European advocates of the program. Thus, changes in the specifics of the force modernization program might be possible without diminishing (and even perhaps enhancing) NATO's intermediate-range weapons capabilities. Such changes would affect targeting, basing and even a change in the mix of missiles. As noted above, these suggested changes might possibly call for an increase in Pershing IIs (or a longer-range variant), and a decrease in the number of GLCMs deployed. They might even require some variation in the number of weapons certain NATO powers would accept, in order to get more remote basing and avoid collateral damage caused by Soviet counter-battery nuclear fire.

The costs of such changes measured in political effort have to be weighed against the effectiveness of the new mix and variants of missiles, as well as the political gains of defusing some of the opposition to, and strengthening the support of, the force modernization program.

*The argument that if the U.S. and NATO possessed a "first-strike" capability--the Soviets already possess such a force in their SS-20s and other missiles--it would significantly increase the probability of an American president premeditatedly starting a nuclear war and inordinately raise Soviet fear of such an action, is far from conclusive. (See Section VI.B.1.)

II. WEST EUROPEAN SCENARIOS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND PEACE GROUPS

A. Introduction

The effect that introducing new NATO defense weapons will have on the European peace movement--and, as importantly, on the other segments of the European bodies politik, as well as on the American public who may pay for a large part of these systems--will depend on a wide variety of interdependent factors. Potential opposition to the installation of new systems could be based on a range of grounds; and, particularly when moral issues are raised, it might be difficult to defend the systems' installation. But any change in the state of affairs in Europe might alter the situation.

A key element is how much of a threat the Europeans perceive the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to be. Present public opinion indicates that only a small minority of Europeans feel the Soviets are likely to invade Western Europe in the next five years. Most Europeans today do not really believe they are in danger from the Soviets. But trends in the perception of danger from the East indicate that spikes in concern and valleys in complacency coincide with the presence or absence of crises with which Europeans can identify. The establishment of martial law in Poland, for example, temporarily raised concern among Europeans; the invasion of Afghanistan, however, was apparently not feared by the Europeans as Soviet military expansionism.

Other issues directly and indirectly impinge strongly on these attitudes. Economic conditions, of course, play a pivotal role. The economic situation can, for example, have a significant indirect effect on determining what government is in power at the time the weapons are deployed. Indeed, it was because of economic problems in Germany in the autumn of 1982 that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) government found itself suddenly out of power following its successful election bid in 1980. A series of squabbles with its coalition partner the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and losses in Laender elections, attributable to worsening economic conditions, led to the defection of the FDP to the opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Steps have been taken to hold a new election on March 6, 1983. Since the local election in Hamburg on December 20, 1982, however, it is not clear if the trend against the SPD and supportive of the CDU and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), will continue. But if the CDU/CSU gains a majority nationally, the administration could be expected to take a more strongly pro-defense and pro-missile attitude. With a larger percentage of the Bundestag members being more enthusiastic and perhaps more willing to support force modernization in the national debate with the peace movement, the average German, and indeed some current supporters of the peace movement, might be convinced of the wisdom of deployment. At the least, those in favor of the missile systems would be less vulnerable to arguments to change their minds.

Harsh economic conditions and the public's tendency to hold the government in power responsible for them also led to the fall of liberal governments in Belgium and the Netherlands and the installation of more conservative

governments--which, coincidentally, are somewhat more sympathetic to defense efforts than their more liberal predecessors. In Britain, a conservative government remains rather stable, largely because of the victory in the Falklands crisis. By coincidence, therefore, the governments in power on the continent are generally more friendly to defense spending and force modernization efforts than their predecessors.

But the governments' willingness to engage in a debate over the installation of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) will not necessarily mean they will win it. If people are to be convinced--particularly those in the peace movement and the clerics--the actual benefits of the system must outweigh all types of costs. Not only must the question of the kind of attack such weapons are likely to draw on Western Europe be addressed, but also questions about what these weapon systems would target in Eastern Europe and Russia, and how much collateral damage the weapons would cause. These moral issues will also be important in the U.S. in a debate with opponents of the weapons. Much of the force modernization program, as it is today, may not stand up under this kind of scrutiny.

In addition, the relatively large-scale expenditures earmarked for the new weapon systems--particularly if the host nations do not want them--could be criticized in the U.S. In this respect, American conservative forces may find themselves aligned with the peace groups in their opposition to these and other weapons programs. The huge budget deficit, which many conservatives say is the root of our economic woes, has caused both conservatives and liberals to consider reducing defense expenditures. A continuing recession and government deficit-spending might bring the combined pressure of a strange group of bedfellows to bear on the defense budget. Hawks, doves, left-and right-wingers might succeed in reducing defense allocations. If they do, there remains the question of what is to be cut. It is always easier to cut a program that does not yet exist than one that has already been started. If the Pershing IIs and GLCMs meant for Europe are still in the planning stages, they may confront opposition from another group of adversaries--the defenders of programs that are already under way.

In the U.S. at the moment a huge defense budget has had support largely because of the conservative Republican Reagan Administration. A continuing recession, however, might cause the present administration to be voted out in 1984 or result in Republicans losing control of the Senate. In the first case, the entire Reagan economic program would become vulnerable; in the second, when the Democrats, who are mostly inclined to reduce defense spending, are chairing all the relevant committees, some defense allocations--perhaps in particular those earmarked for the GLCMs and Pershing IIs for Europe--could be in difficulty.

On both sides of the Atlantic, numerous variables, including those mentioned above, impinge on the eventual fate of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Indeed, the personalities of government and opposition leaders as well as key proponents and opponents of the systems can affect the outcome. In the U.S., for example, the Pastoral Letter now being issued by the Catholic Bishops might be seen as identifying not only the Catholic church, but some

very high-ranking American clergymen with arms control and disarmament. Moreover, statements have already been made in the U.S. that the increased arms expenditures are being borne by the country's racial and ethnic minorities and by the poor, through the reduction in welfare outlays. A growing criticism of this sort could bring the underprivileged and their supporters to oppose missile deployment.

The huge number of variables and the fluctuating course of events create a wide range of scenarios affecting the deployment decisions. Within each scenario several key themes may, in some cases, be identified by what they describe. For example, there are economic, political, public opinion, foreign policy and NATO alliance themes, all of which differ in varying degrees from the present ones. Clearly, all of these have many combinations and permutations which could combine to form scenarios. But half a dozen themes, with all the possible combinations and permutations of the numerous variables arising from variations in each of these themes, simply make too many scenarios; moreover, a great number of the scenarios are too improbable to seriously consider for policy-making purposes. Perhaps most importantly, many of these scenarios fall so close to the main ones that, for policy-making purposes, their requirements are fundamentally the same as those of the main scenario.

In developing these scenarios for West Germany, we will stress a spectrum of possibilities extending from a "surprise-free" scenario to those which we consider less likely to occur but which are still not improbable. For Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy we will use only the "surprise-free" scenarios, sometimes with discussions of branch points and possible alternative routes leading from them.

The "surprise-free" scenario is considered surprise-free only to the extent that events occur as they do in the real world, which, of course, means that it will be full of surprises. The other scenarios will also have unexpected occurrences, but at greater variance from the fundamental direction of developments.

The political theme is the one chosen here to characterize the scenarios. In addition, reference is made to other factors, such as economic developments, which are important because of their direct and indirect effect on public opinion and political decisions. Some other vital issues, however, which have an across-the-board effect on public opinion and political decision making--e.g., the moral questions surrounding nuclear weapons--are not specifically mentioned in this section, but they are directly dealt with at some length in other parts of the study.

The scenarios are "country-type," that is, they are organized by country. The country receiving the greatest emphasis and the one which will be considered first is the Federal Republic of Germany.

In general, the surprise-free scenarios assume developments in Europe and the U.S. will follow the trends in public opinion and political and economic development that are evident today. These include the current

European approaches to foreign and defense policy. But there will be branch points in the scenarios that can make a significant difference, depending on which branch is taken.

B. West Germany

1. West German Scenarios

The German election of March 6, 1983 may cause a difference in degree in the direction of German foreign policy, but not a great change. If, contrary to previous expectations, the FDP should remain a viable party by gaining five percent of the vote (a result which is too close to call at present, as will be discussed later), and set up a majority coalition with the CDU/CSU, the current government and its policies would most likely continue. Therefore, no new scenario need be written for the present government. It is conceivable that, despite the current bitterness between the FDP "defectors" and the SPD, the SPD would rather choose to set up its working majority with the FDP than with the Greens party. This would be the same coalition as that of the previous government, but without Helmut Schmidt.

With the election, however, an immediate opportunity for some change occurs. If the CDU/CSU cannot get a majority and the FDP does not draw the required minimum five percent, the SPD could conceivably gain a majority of the vote--or more precisely, over 50 percent of the seats in the Bundestag. Depending on what it would take for the SPD to gather a voting majority, this development could result in a considerable change in the intensity of support for the West German Ostpolitik.^{*} If the SPD has to appeal to the left and manages to hold the center and more conservative SPD groups in line, it might have to undertake a more ardent pursuit of the Ostpolitik and create more "initiatives" to the East; this might result in a dampening of support for NATO or modernization of NATO nuclear forces. This SPD might favor a policy in which, to guarantee its safety, Germany should engage in more friendly relations with the Soviet Union and downplay its identification with NATO.

If neither the CDU/CSU nor the SPD could obtain a majority of members in the Bundestag, a "Grand Coalition" of the two would also become a possible scenario. The SPD might consider the price of an SPD/Greens coalition to be potentially too high: a new, early general election could be called for if this coalition became chaotic and resulted in an unstable government, which could end in a shattering setback for the SPD. With this in mind, the SPD could settle for a role of a powerful, or even predominant, partner in a Grand Coalition government and wait for better times. This would not be the first such coalition in the Federal Republic. It is likely

^{*}The West German foreign policy toward the East, originated under the Willy Brandt Social Democratic government at the beginning of the 1970s.

to be branded by the left as the "death of democracy," but this would not be new either--the left also said this about the original Grand Coalition.

Another scenario could, of course, see the SPD taking a chance and going into coalition with the Greens. An SPD/Greens coalition would give the Greens a spectacular amount of leverage in the government. As indicated above, however, this coalition could be hard to hold together, particularly if the policy of the new coalition government were to swing too far left and if the CDU/CSU missed getting the majority by a small margin. In that case, the more conservative members of the SPD might actually break out of the coalition and side with the CDU/CSU on defense and other issues. If, indeed, the CDU/CSU had drawn about 48 percent of the vote and an equivalent percentage of Bundestag members, then a slight shift of a few members from the SPD on key issues would stop leftward toward swings in defense and foreign policy. The question would then be how far the policies would have to swing left before the SPD/Greens coalition would begin to come apart at the seams.

There is virtually no possibility of a CDU/CSU/Greens coalition in the Bundestag. It is improbable that the Greens and the CDU/CSU could agree on the declaratory foreign and defense policies that the CDU/CSU is likely to favor. Furthermore, since the Greens largely espouse limits-to-growth beliefs which are not likely to appeal to CDU/CSU industrialists, the CDU/CSU and the Greens can hardly be expected to agree on many domestic issues. There are a few areas, however, in which their interests do more closely coincide, oddly enough, one of them being parliamentarianism. The Greens, who claim to oppose all forms of bureaucratic government and are intensely anti-parliamentarian, are sometimes more severely at odds on this issue in Laender governments with the highly bureaucratic and parliamentarian SPD than with the less-organized and more decentralized CDU.

The outcome of the March 6th election depends very much, of course, on what happens between now and then: if the CDU/CSU can continue to blame economic conditions on the SPD and plead the necessity for a "consensus" vote to allow them to seriously get the economy on a recovery path, and if there is a backlash against the SPD for stressing the GLCM and Pershing II deployment issue in the election campaign on the grounds that the SPD is "decoupling the United States from Europe,"* the CDU/CSU might gain the majority they need in the Bundestag and maintain control of the government. In any event, for the West German "surprise-free" scenario, we are assuming that the CDU/CSU does get a majority in the Bundestag, or at least the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition (if the FDP gets five percent of the vote) maintains a majority, and does continue to govern. This would, of course, be a "surprise" in some ways, but as indicated above, in "surprise-free" scenarios there are always surprises.

*See The New York Times, January 31, 1983, p. A-7, for a statement to this effect by the Federal Republic's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher; and The New York Times, January 24, 1983, p. A-1, for French President Francois Mitterand's even stronger inference "that the question of maintaining Germany in the West" hinged on this issue.

Future political developments in Germany are at present extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict, because a swing of even one percentage point in the outcome of the federal election on March 6th could create radical changes in the political arena. Current polling methods are simply not accurate enough to predict raw voting data with that degree of accuracy. District by district predictions for seats in the Bundestag might be possible because of the clustering of party members in specific districts, and there might often be larger margins of victory because of this. The assumption until now has been that the FDP might well not get the five percent that it needs to remain a viable party under the constitution of the Federal Republic. However, many West German voters will probably know of the problems that a group of Greens deputies in the Bundestag would pose for the country (discussed in more detail later), and if they do not give majority support to either the SPD or CDU/CSU, they may feel the only responsible vote left is with the FDP. Recent polls of decided voters show the FDP very close to, or at, five percent of the vote;* so should support for the FDP increase by only a fraction of one percent, the present CDU/CSU/FDP government, or even a renewed SPD/FDP government, might result. (A disturbing factor in the recent polling is that 18.8 percent of the voters surveyed were still "undecided," a very high number for West Germany, particularly at this late date.)

There is also a question of whether the Greens will receive five percent of the federal vote. The polls mentioned above indicate that of those voters who have made a decision, the Greens would get about five percent if the election were held now. But there is a combined effort by both the SPD and the CDU/CSU to try to prevent the Greens from becoming a pivotal party in the Bundestag.** If, despite this effort, the Greens do become the swing party, it will make a very significant difference in any predictions. This eventuality could also hinge on a one percentage point difference in the vote. As indicated above, the best pollsters in the world cannot predict elections within that narrow a spread, particularly with so many "undecided." The political scenarios described later are therefore all within the realm of possibility and are clustered into two groups in the order of their probability of occurrence: the first cluster of 1) a CDU/CSU government; 2) a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition government; 3) an SPD/FDP

* A poll by the Hamburg newspaper Welt am Sonntag published January 30, shows CDU/CSU 45.1 percent, SPD 44.4 percent, FDP 4.8 percent, Greens 5.2 percent, "don't know" 18.8 percent. (The New York Times, January 31, 1983, p. A-7.) This may have been a telephone survey, which can sometimes be less accurate than direct interview polls. A survey of the week of January 13, 1983 by the EMNID Institut, the Gallup Poll Organization affiliate in West Germany, showed the CDU/CSU with 47 percent, the SPD with 42 percent, and both the FDP and the Greens with 5 percent each. Due to statistical variations, these polls could be saying about the same thing. The report on the EMNID poll did not give the number of "undecided."

** The Economist, January 22, 1983, p. 38.

coalition government; 4) an SPD government; and then, depending on what happens to the Greens, and running significantly behind the first four possibilities 5) a Grand Coalition government; and 6) an even less likely SPD/Greens coalition government.

In at least the first three scenarios, we assume a continuation of the trends in public opinion regarding West Germany's relations with the East, the U.S., and other NATO countries. But there may be many surprises in this "surprise-free" scenario. Any grave crisis in Eastern Europe, particularly if Soviet troops were to interfere, could drastically change German feelings--at least temporarily--about the danger of Soviet armed aggression and, consequently, about German policy toward the Soviet bloc. Even a Soviet attempt to influence the March 6th election could affect the outcome. Soviet Party Chief Andropov's open endorsement of the SPD candidate Hans-Jochen Vogel as the next German chancellor could cut either way. Traditionally, the endorsement of the Soviets was the kiss of death in the West; but it remains to be seen if the lure of the Ostpolitik is so strong that Soviet endorsement no longer bears that stigma.* Additionally, any significant change in policy in other NATO nations could greatly affect German attitudes toward relations with the East: for example, a signal by the U.S. administration that gives the impression that the U.S. has basically given up the struggle with the Soviet Union over the Soviet striving for "hegemony"; or a declaratory policy by Britain or France which essentially abandons NATO opposition to Soviet military and political predominance.

In addition to German public opinion on defense issues, trends of opinion on secondary, supporting issues will be considered in these scenarios. These attitudes are important because they are indicative of what is happening to the society. An apparently growing self-indulgence, materialism, and even hedonism could weaken the ability to make hard choices and strength of will needed to defend Germany. In the surprise-free scenario, the present general trends in public opinion toward NATO and the U.S. are assumed to continue, and, in addition, the desire for Ostpolitik and its effect on German attitudes toward relations with the East do not change drastically.

In analyzing the possible impacts of a scenario on NATO--and specifically on the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs--we must, of course, consider whether any significant variation in public opinion would cause a drastic change in both European and American policies toward European defense issues. This brings us to a key consideration, which has received very little attention in the press concerning force modernization and other NATO questions: that is, the effect of American public opinion on European defense and the role of the U.S. in Europe. To the extent that deviations in public opinion in Europe or the U.S. would have a significant impact on internal political processes that affect defense and foreign policy issues, they will be considered in each of the scenarios.

* See Ibid. pp. 37 and 38 for a discussion of this issue.

a. A CDU/CSU Government

If, after the March 6th election, the CDU/CSU is in power--and if they can continue to stay in power for the next few years (which depends very heavily on the state of the economy as well as on crises in Eastern Europe)--the Ostpolitik will be followed with somewhat less fervor than it was under the SPD government, but it will nonetheless be maintained. The CDU/CSU is the more conservative party, but like the Republican party in this country, it is bound to lend an ear to the opinions of businessmen. Because of this, and because the economy of the Federal Republic is sagging, it is quite unlikely that the drive for trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will be drastically curtailed. Many businessmen in West Germany, like businessmen everywhere, tend to rationalize their patriotism to accommodate business requirements.

The question of how increased trade under the continuation of the Ostpolitik would affect German-Soviet relations is difficult to answer, but one can foresee that the Soviets would probably gain considerable leverage through large commercial arrangements with the Federal Republic. For example, if in the future, the Soviets were disturbed by West German policies in other than commercial areas, the Soviets could drag their feet or even issue threats to reduce commercial activities which could bring German industrialists to protest these policies. In fact, only the possibility that the Soviets might cut back on commercial activities might cause businessmen to be less-than-enthusiastic supporters of "firm" policies with the Soviet Union. It is quite likely that the larger these commercial activities between German industrialists and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union become, the more leverage the Soviets will have and the more likely it will be for the industrialists to reduce their support for noncommercial policies that would annoy the Soviets.

This surprise-free CDU/CSU government, therefore, with its businessmen adherents, may not in every instance support NATO or the modernization program as strongly as might be expected. The attitude toward trade with the U.S.S.R. could, of course, be affected by economic, as well as other, factors. If the Western economies recover and begin to grow, the Western market for German goods may increase to the extent that trade with the East will become less significant. Indeed, if a really large boom should occur in Western economies, the Germans might be able to have full employment with less trade with the East, or at least without greatly enlarged trade with the East.

Here again we are at an economic branch point, and the road from it could have a great effect on German defense and foreign policies. At the moment, the German economy is more or less moribund, but similar to expectations in the U.S. economy, most people anticipate an upturn. On the other hand (as in the U.S.), this expectation seems to be based largely on the economic record since World War II, which indeed shows that after each recession there was a recovery within a relatively short period of time. Recessions in Germany seem to have been much less severe than those in the U.S., but the post-World War II pattern of the economies of both countries has been cyclical.

The problem today is that the indicators which in the past predicted a recovery seem to be less reliable bellwethers than we thought. In other words, there now appears a possibility that the German and other Western economies may be on a long-term decline and that what we are hearing in the U.S. and Europe are the kinds of things we heard in 1929-1932, when recovery was "just around the corner." Nevertheless, in this surprise-free scenario, the central theme will be that the Western economies recover from the present slump. Even assuming an economic recovery, however, there is still the question of the degree and speed of recovery. A very strong recovery, particularly in the near future, would be a real surprise. In the central theme of the surprise-free scenario, we assume a relatively strong and rather long-enduring recovery.

b. A CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition Government

This, of course, would be a continuation of the government in power today and is quite likely to occur if--and these are the important qualifying factors--the FDP garners at least five percent of the vote and the CDU/CSU, although not gaining a majority, earns enough Bundestag seats to form a majority coalition with the FDP. If the FDP should get five percent, this may be the most likely surprise-free scenario. Under this government, it is likely that we can expect a continuation of policies more or less like the current ones today, but the extent will depend on how the new coalition government interprets the results of the election. If the CDU/CSU comes out in a relatively strong position--that is, stronger than the SPD--one can expect the programs of the current government to be carried forward, and, as a matter of fact, support for defense spending and the force modernization program might increase somewhat. If the SPD polls an equal number of votes, or perhaps even slightly more than the CDU/CSU, or if the Greens draw rather heavily, the CDU/CSU might take this as a signal that their programs are not altogether popular, and the coalition government might reduce its efforts to push force modernization. If the results of the election are unclear, we are likely to see a continuation of the current policy toward missile deployment, but perhaps with some wavering because of public demonstrations and peace movement opposition.

c. An SPD/FDP Coalition Government

The leaders of the SPD, particularly Helmut Schmidt, were furious with the FDP for splitting up the former SPD/FDP coalition government. The FDP broke away from the SPD in midterm and joined the CDU/CSU to form the present administration. Getting these parties back into a coalition, therefore, would be difficult work. Nonetheless, if the SPD and the FDP drew enough votes so that an SPD coalition with the FDP would give them the government, and the CDU/CSU, on its part, did not win enough seats to form a majority coalition with the FDP, the SPD would be in a dilemma. An alternative for the SPD would be to form a majority coalition with elected Greens deputies, but it would be a dangerous alternative (see the description of the SPD/Greens coalition government below).

Even though it would be a bitter pill to swallow, the SPD might have to form a coalition with the FDP as the lesser of two evils in order to attain a working majority.

The SPD party and Bundestag leaders are skilled politicians; and although they might now feel more insecure in coalition with the FDP compared to the period prior to the FDP defection, an SPD/FDP government might still look considerably more stable than one with the Greens. Even if a new SPD/FDP government were to split up again, it would not have the same short- and long-term dire consequences for the SPD that a short-term coalition with the Greens and then a split-up of that government would have. The other choice for the SPD is, of course, a Grand Coalition with the CDU/CSU (see the discussion of that government below), but in a Grand Coalition the SPD would lack the dominance it would have in an SPD/FDP coalition. Of course, if the FDP does not draw five percent of the vote and it disappears as a party, this option will also disappear.

An SPD/FDP coalition government should function largely the way it did for so many years prior to the FDP defection. The big difference would be that Helmut Schmidt would no longer be the Chancellor; and it would remain to be seen if Hans-Jochen Vogel could maintain control of the left-wing of the party and keep the SPD/FDP coalition alive. The domestic and foreign policies of any SPD/FDP government would be somewhat similar to those of the majority SPD government described below and those previously advocated by Helmut Schmidt. The businessmen of the FDP will no doubt support the Ostpolitik with as much vigor as some left-wing SPD members, but for different reasons. At the same time, the FDP is more conservative on defense issues, so it might act as a brake on left-wing SPD efforts to cut defense programs. In fact, on certain votes, including those for some domestic "welfare-state" programs, the FDP would probably join with the SPD conservative wing.

Welfare-state issues might tip the balance in voter preference in the election campaign in a way that would have a great effect on German foreign and defense policies. If public reaction to present CDU/CSU efforts to curb welfare programs is unfavorable, German voters might prefer to put an SPD/FDP coalition in office. In addition, if defense spending and force modernization become significant issues in the coming election, the SPD might end up either getting a majority or so close to a majority that it could form a coalition government with the FDP. If the defense and foreign policy issues do become critical in the election, and the SPD does win outright or form this kind of coalition, then one could expect a reduction in support for defense spending and for force modernization programs, but an increase in activities which promote the Ostpolitik.

d. An SPD Government

If the CDU/CSU should do very badly in the coming election, there is a possibility that the SPD could garner a majority of seats on its own, something it has been unable to do in the past. A substantial

CDU/CSU loss is thinkable if disturbing political or economic events were to occur between now and March (indeed, the December 1982 election in Hamburg, bringing in an unexpected SPD majority, cast doubt onto the outcome of the Federal election); if the SPD's last-minute, anti-force modernization campaign should swing the electorate to the SPD; if the present chancellor, Helmut Kohl, lacked personal attraction; if the party or its platform failed to appeal to the public; or if the economic measures already taken by the interim CDU/CSU/FDP government became strongly unpopular.

One significant effect of an SPD majority might be an increase in emphasis on "detente" with the East. If the SPD gained its victory by appealing to the left so as to prevent the defection of the SPD left-wing to the Greens, and if the more conservative wing of the party did not protest, a movement to the left in foreign and defense policy might occur. The shift might not be as significant as that resulting from a coalition of the SPD and the Greens; but generally speaking, an SPD government of this type is likely to be more strongly committed to the policies of detente and Ostpolitik than the present one.

If the economic problems in Germany were to continue, the competition for federal monies between the "welfare-state" programs and defense expenditures could well become exacerbated--and this administration is likely to be more sympathetic to "welfare-state" programs than the CDU/CSU government. As mentioned above, however, if the detente and Ostpolitik foster vital trade with the East, the German industrialists in the CDU/CSU are not likely to be enthusiastic about curtailing the trade, particularly if the German and other Western economies are in difficulty. But, as also mentioned above, the SPD cannot swing too far left or it might find its programs defeated in the Bundestag. More moderate SPD members might vote with the opposition to kill radical legislation intended to weaken West German military defenses or fragment NATO. There would, therefore, be restraints on an SPD government's possibly radical foreign and defense policy measures. Nonetheless, it is to be expected that a majority SPD government would now assume that it was identified as anti-missile deployment. It has been said that such an election outcome would "make full deployment under a Vogel government exceedingly unlikely."* An SPD government would, however, less likely be as anti-defense as a coalition government of the SPD and the Greens described last in this list.

e. A Grand Coalition Government

If neither the CDU nor the SPD gains a majority in the March election and the FDP drops out as a political force because it fails to draw five percent of the vote, some other minority party might have significant power to influence the formation of the government. If this

*"The Bonn Opposition Seizes Campaign Issue," The New York Times, January 24, 1983, p. A-1.

minority power were the Greens, both the major parties would be faced with almost overwhelming problems. The SPD/Greens government scenario below describes the kinds of difficulties which would likely face the SPD if it were to try to form a coalition with the Greens.

There is, however, another choice. If the Greens were to remain adamantly opposed to cohesive parliamentarianism and make radical-left, inflexible demands, the major parties might have to consider forming a Grand Coalition. The SPD might be reluctant to do this for fear that its left-wing members would slide off and join the Greens, but the alternative--trying to form a coalition with the Greens--could lead to a kind of political chaos with nightmarish problems, some of which have been outlined in the SPD/Greens government scenario. In effect, by going into coalition with an intractable radical Greens party, the SPD could risk a disaster for the party that might set it back decades. A stormy coalition and an unstable government in Bonn could lead to a collapse of the government within a few months. A new election might be necessary, at which time an unhappy electorate would be likely to give the CDU/CSU an overwhelming majority. Furthermore, those few months could endanger the state of the nation.

The SPD in a Grand Coalition with the CDU/CSU would guarantee a strong coalition and a stable government. It would also guarantee that SPD members would hold some key ministries. This is a safe procedure and has a precedent in the Grand Coalition of the two parties from 1966 to 1969, when the CDU leader Kurt Georg Kiesinger was chancellor.

Grand Coalition policies are, of course, more likely to be centrist, with the CDU/CSU tending to pull them to the right and the SPD to the left. Strong as this coalition would be, there are branch points also in this scenario that could greatly affect the road that is taken and the degree to which certain policies are followed. For example, unless the left-wing members of the SPD were to actually split off from the party and join the Greens, they would provide a strong incentive within the coalition to pursue an Ostpolitik/detente policy with the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, if the economy did not recover, Eastern trade would be important to union members whose jobs would depend on it; this would further increase the pressure on the SPD to continue the Eastern policies. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the industrialists of the CDU could also be in favor of maintaining this trade posture. To the extent that trade with the East affected foreign and defense policy, there might be pressure not to rock the boat.

A detente atmosphere--even a forced one--tends to divert attention from the difficult and burdensome business of building up the defense of the nation. The Ostpolitik is looked on by many as an easy and profitable substitute for a range of defense measures. Of course, in this coalition, CDU/CSU Bundestag members, as well as many moderates in the SPD, would probably still be in favor of close ties with the U.S. and a strong alliance with NATO. Furthermore, these politicians are not so naive as to believe that the Soviet Union is a "passive, almost benign"

country.* There will, however, still be a competition for federal funds; and if the German economy is faltering, the "welfare-state" programs of the SPD will be competing for funds with defense. These pressures, along with the constraints arising from detente and trade with the East, could also reduce support within a Grand Coalition for large defense allocations, or possibly even relatively inexpensive programs, that would appear "provocative" to the Soviet Union. The modernization program may be one of these.

Of course, if the Western economies, including that of West Germany, were to boom and/or there were political crises in Eastern Europe--particularly if the Soviet Union tried to quell them with heavy-handed repression--the picture could change significantly. It is assumed, however, in the central theme of this scenario that although the economy will recover over the next few years, the recovery will not be rapid, nor will there be a crisis behind the Iron Curtain intense enough to decisively frighten the Germans. Events in Poland in 1981-82, for example, did not accomplish this.

f. An SPD/Greens Coalition Government

In an SPD/Greens coalition scenario, neither major party gets a majority of members in the Bundestag, and a coalition government must once again be formed. This scenario is surprise-free in that the FDP does not get the required five percent of the vote to be seated in the Bundestag, but the Greens do.

The likelihood of the CDU/CSU being able to form a coalition with the Greens should be very remote. Somewhat less remote, however, may be the possibility of the SPD going into coalition with the Greens. At this juncture, there is a very important branch point to be considered; that is, whether the Greens would really become involved in the "parliamentarianism" needed to make the coalition work. They have, until now, taken a sort of anarchistic approach to political activity, and indeed, in some of the Laender where they have won political victories, they have not been able to resolve the issue of how to participate in government. In Hamburg in 1982, they ultimately refused to go into coalition with the SPD, thereby causing a re-election which the SPD won handily.

If the Greens should maintain their anti-party ideology on the national level, it might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to form a working coalition with them. On the other hand, traditionally when parties see an opportunity to gain power--and the Greens might gain spectacular power should they be the swing group in a coalition--they either attempt to mold the attitudes of their members as a whole or purge themselves of those who cannot function under the new power setup. Generally

* See Section VI for a description of a Greens foreign policy position which uses these terms.

professional politicians (and politicians are what we are talking about if the Greens become a power in the Bundestag) would not get themselves elected if they were not practical enough to sense opportunities that are not to be thrown away lightly. If this should indeed be true of the Greens, it might solve one problem for the SPD--but perhaps only give rise to another.

Normally, politicians who abandon anarchism and anarchists in order to gain positions of leverage know the value of that leverage. The question that arises at this point is whether the Greens know how far they can push their advantage. The SPD can be pulled to the left by such a coalition partner, but it cannot be pulled too far to the left. A vote against government legislation, or even a vote of no confidence in a parliamentary system, need not necessarily come from a coalition partner splitting off to vote with the opposition: it can come from within one's own party. Of course, traditionally, it is the party discipline that makes the parliamentary system work. But this discipline extends only so far. If the government takes actions that are too drastic, party members can break ranks to help stop the measures or ensure the government's demise.

The SPD would have to be very careful in getting into such a coalition. If, indeed, the anarchistic attitude of the Greens should surface, or if the Greens' demands should become too radical, the repercussions could be enormous. Even threats of such activity could cause the government to become very unstable. Such a shaky and unpredictable federal government is likely to be very unpopular with the German voters. In fact, if after several stormy months, the government actually did fall and new elections were held, the probability of the CDU/CSU getting an overwhelming majority (and setting the SPD back decades in its political growth) would be rather high. SPD politicians know that coming to power under certain circumstances is worse than not coming to power at all. A chaotic coalition with the Greens that resulted in a new election within a few months could be one of these circumstances. Even in the short run, the coalition could be counterproductive for the SPD, to say nothing of the dire effect on the country. Nor should the effect of this latter problem on SPD members be underestimated. True politicians often have a deep appreciation for the system in which they work and for the effect irresponsible actions can have on the country. If the average SPD member felt that a coalition government of which his party was a major partner was taking an irresponsible course, he might well side with the CDU/CSU on a no-confidence vote. The long shadow of these possible problems might actually fall on the SPD before the March election, especially if there are voter surveys indicating that neither the SPD nor the CDU/CSU can get a majority.

The main theme of this scenario, however, is perhaps arbitrarily assumed to be one in which the Greens' Bundestag members are indeed real politicians who do sense the power that lies within their grasp and therefore do become "parliamentarians." Under such circumstances, the SPD might have to go to considerable lengths to placate the Greens on their

causes in order to get through desired domestic social policies. It is precisely on the overextended social and economic programs that the CDU/CSU is at loggerheads with the SPD. This means the SPD will need Greens' support for the social welfare programs. In return for this support, the Greens might well demand the SPD's compliance on their higher priority issues of environment and national defense. If the SPD really has to placate the Greens on the national defense issue, some NATO policies, including force modernization, could be put in jeopardy. This does not mean there will be wild changes in current German policies toward NATO. An attempt, for example, by the Federal Republic to withdraw from the NATO alliance would probably fail because there are enough moderate SPD members who would oppose it or who would even, if necessary, support a vote of no confidence to stop the withdrawal.

On the other hand, conciding factors might happen to reinforce a move to weaken the FRG defense efforts: a deepening recession, which sharpens the conflict between federal monies for "welfare-state" programs and defense; no disturbing crises behind the Iron Curtain; an increase in trade with the Soviet Union; "cultural exchanges" with the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, as indicated in the CDU/CSU government scenario, if the Soviets were to state that certain German defense and foreign policies were unnecessarily provocative and began to drag their feet in trade relations with West Germany, the CDU/CSU might find its industrialist members hedging on clear support for these "provocative" defense efforts.

As suggested in the CDU/CSU government scenario, however, a strong resurgence of Western economies might make trade with the East less important to German industrialists, and therefore this kind of pressure might not be so great as it is today, with the German economy in the doldrums. Again, if a crisis should break out in Eastern Europe--and particularly if Soviet troops were used to quell it--German pacifism might lose strength.

For this scenario we are assuming the main theme to be that the economies of the West do revive, but not necessarily in a great boom of activity, and that a severe crisis does not occur East of the Iron Curtain. Clearly, however, these are important branch points; and if different routes were taken, they would make a great difference in the milieu in which NATO efforts, including the modernization program, would operate.

In any event, under this SPD/Greens government scenario, attempts to modernize German and NATO defense capabilities in Europe are likely to encounter more intense opposition than under any other scenario.

2. The West German Peace Movement and Public Opinion

a. The Social Basis of the West German Peace Movement

A great deal has been written about the potential, significance and influence of the West German Greens party and the peace movement; this has generated a literature of common assumptions about this movement, some of which by now has almost taken on a quality of "accepted wisdom." Yet when the characteristics of this group, the context in which it works and how it relates to the main body of the West German population are observed in detail, evidence emerges that may bring into question certain of these assumptions. The following sections will examine some of the demographic, historical, social and political evidence and suggest possible consequences that may be drawn from it.

It has, of course, become something of a truism to say that the supporters of the West German peace movement and Greens are essentially better-educated youth. One scientific study, based on a poll taken in the fall of 1981 by the EMNID Institut, the West German affiliate of the Gallup Poll organization, established that potential activists for the West German peace movement are largely young, have an advanced academic education, and prefer a party other than the CDU/CSU.* The study found, for example, that 41 percent of those who were 18-35 years of age and had received their Abitur** or gone to a university considered themselves to be potential activists; that is twice as many as in any other population group. Moreover, less than 3 percent of the 30 percent of the population who were firm CDU/CSU supporters could be classified as potential activists. This means that the potential for peace activism in West Germany is basically confined to a small and select portion of the public.

The figure below, taken from the study in Der Spiegel, graphically illustrates these results. As can be seen, the overwhelming potential for the peace movement exists among the better-educated young and represents a small segment of the total population.

But this population segment has been a rapidly growing "new class" of educated elite youth. The percentage of West Germans who have completed academic training and gone to a university has increased significantly within the last decade and a half. In the early 1950s, only 6 percent of youth had applied to universities and colleges; by 1977 this had tripled to 18 percent.

* Study done by the sociologist, Professor Manfred Kuechler and reported in "18 bis 35 + Abitur = Aktivgruppe," Der Spiegel, Vol. 35, No. 48 (November 23, 1981), pp. 65-68. Potential activism was measured by the respondent's reaction to the peace movement of "might be possible to" or "would definitely" play an active role in the movement, or "am already active" in the peace movement.

** The Abitur is a diploma from a Gymnasium (an academic senior high school) that entitles a student to study at a university.

THE POTENTIAL FOR THE PEACE MOVEMENT AMONG THE
WEST GERMAN POPULATION, FALL 1981

POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE

FIRM CDU/CSU SUPPORTERS

2.8

EDUCATION

AGE

SENIOR HIGH, UNIVERSITY UP TO 35 YEARS

36-60 YEARS

60 YEARS & OVER

3.1

22.0

40.9

INTERMEDIATE

UP TO 35 YEARS

36-60 YEARS

60 YEARS & OVER

3.8

14.7

25.6

PRIMARY

UP TO 35 YEARS

36-60 YEARS

60 YEARS & OVER

3.2

7.4

11.6

NOTE: THE HEIGHT OF EACH BAR SHOWS THE SIZE OF THE POPULATION SEGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE WEST GERMAN POPULATION; THE WIDTH OF EACH BAR EQUALS 100 PERCENT FOR EACH SEGMENT; THE DARK PORTION OF THE BAR REPRESENTS THE PERCENTAGE OF EACH GROUP CONSIDERED TO BE "POTENTIAL ACTIVISTS"; THE ACTUAL PERCENT IS SHOWN IN A CIRCLE.

SOURCE: DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 35, NO. 48 (NOVEMBER 23, 1981), p. 68.

Moreover, in 1965 the number of students who had received their Abitur from a Gymnasium was 48,000; in 1978, this figure had increased more than four times to 204,000. By 1978, as many as one-fifth of all secondary school students were enrolled in the academic track in a Gymnasium.*

In addition, the total number of students at all nonacademic general and vocational secondary schools increased 33 percent in the 12 years between 1965 and 1977--from 9.5 to 12.5 million. Despite this growth in enrollment, however, projected figures for 1980** reveal that as many as two out of three West Germans have only an elementary school education.***

Of perhaps equal significance to the growth of a new class of educated youth is the sharp rise in the number of women attending universities: the percentage almost doubled in the period between the early 1950s and late 1970s. In 1952/53, 20 percent of university students were women; in 1977, almost 40 percent.

In 1977, the majority (57 percent) of the 676,300 students enrolled at universities and teacher training colleges were majoring in the so-called "soft sciences"--the social, cultural, and language sciences. The breakdown

*The educational data in this section has been compiled from information and statistics in the following sources: "Gesellschaftliche Daten 1979," Berichte und Dokumentationen, Band 20 (Bonn: Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, August 1979), pp. 57-99; Tatsachen ueber Deutschland (Guetersloh, West Germany: LEXIKOTHEK Verlag, 1980 B), pp. 298-317 and the English version, Facts About Germany (Guetersloh, West Germany: LEXIKOTHEK Verlag, 1980 B), pp. 298-317; Information, No. 14, "Higher Education," the Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn (September 1979); and Information, No. 15, "The Education System," The Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn (February 1980).

**Released by the prestigious West German polling organization, the Allensbach Institut fuer Demoskopie in Allensbach am Bodensee.

***It is difficult to establish, without some extensive research, just how many years of elementary schooling the general population has actually had. At present, compulsory schooling begins at age 6 and lasts 9 years, to age 15; however, many people may have only gone to the Grundschule (primary school) from grades 1-4, until the age of 10. In any case, these categories seem to slide around according to the poll organizations using them, and different terms are used to cover different periods of schooling.

The Secondary I level of education generally runs from ages 10 to 16; the Secondary II level, the upper and higher level grammar and technical schools, vocational schools and on-job training programs, usually begins at age 16 and continues to age 19. From 19 on, students go to the university, if they have followed an academic career, or to the advanced technical and vocational schools.

by disciplines was as follows: philology, cultural sciences, sports--36 percent; economics, social sciences--21 percent; mathematics, natural sciences--19 percent; engineering--10 percent; medicine, dental medicine, veterinary medicine--10 percent; art--2 percent; and agronomy--2 percent.*

In 1976 the average period of study at a university was 6.5 years. Very few university students in Germany complete their studies in less than 6 years. Since those who are going on to the university generally finish their academic training at the Gymnasium when they are 19, this means that students do not graduate from the university until they are about 26 years of age. Thus, we can conclude that a large percentage of potential peace movement activists--described above as those under 30 with a higher education--are still actually students. Moreover, polls indicate that the majority of peace movement supporters are very young students, in their middle to late teens.**

Another point worth noting is that there has been a change in the occupational backgrounds of the fathers of the university students. As shown in the chart below, the major shift between 1952/53 and 1976 was an almost five-fold increase in the percentage of fathers who were wage earners or workers and a simultaneously significant decrease in the numbers who were self-employed. It is difficult to interpret these findings without careful research, and it may be largely a result of an occupational shift due to changes in the social system, but it appears that today a considerably greater number of university students are coming from working-class homes than they did 25 years ago. This may provide one of the bases for the difference in outlook between these new "post-materialist elites" and their upper-class traditionalist predecessors. These figures do not even speak for an increase in professional and managerial backgrounds, as would be expected, but for a rise in worker origins.

And, finally, the change that may be perhaps of greatest importance to the education of today's West German youth is the almost radical liberalization of many West German schools. Students now are being taught and treated far more permissively than they were in prior generations. Recent


* Information, No. 14, "Higher Education," part 3.

** See Section II.B.2.e, "The Political Potential of the Greens."

While still Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt is reported to have made the subjective comment:

"By law, they've reached their majority, but the fact is that the mature years" come much later. Youth lasts and lasts, he said, and there's never been a generation so "informed, disinformed and deformed" by the mass media. "They live in great material well-being. They have contempt for this, but they also claim it as being very much due them." See John Vinnocur, "Defiant Youth of Europe Mainly Defy Stereotype," The New York Times, Sunday, November 1, 1981.

OCCUPATION OF GERMAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' FATHERS
(IN PERCENT)



SOURCE: INFORMATION, NO. 14, "HIGHER EDUCATION," THE PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, BONN (SEPTEMBER 1979), PART 7.

West German educational concepts, like the American, favor developing the "whole person," and the earlier unquestioned authoritarianism of teachers has been widely replaced by student "self-expression."

The major source of the youthful support for the Greens and the peace movement is the disproportionately great number of Germans who are now between the ages of 15 and 20. The population structure shows a very large bulge for those age years, a second, narrower one for persons in their forties, and a third, where the population tapers off, for the post-World War I babies who are presently in their late fifties and early sixties. This large mass of "young adults" is now pouring into the limited job market, swelling the ranks of the unemployed. Indeed, some consider the tension caused by the population bulge, better education and under-employment of youth to be a breeding-ground for potential social unrest:

...so many young people are entering an economy that cannot employ them in a capacity suitable to their educational backgrounds and concomitant expectations...

The concept of relative deprivation has been forwarded by German sociologists to explain youthful resentment....In the Federal Republic today, 450,000 of the 1.8 million unemployed

are under twenty-five years of age; 155,000 of those under 20 are unemployed. This unemployment exists despite Germany's excellent system of apprenticeship and on-the-job training. By the mid-eighties, we might find 400,000 young unemployed Germans competing with over 100,000 unemployed young foreigners living in Germany for the scarce employment opportunities. This situation seems already upon us. Thirty-five thousand young foreigners under the age of eighteen are unemployed, and this figure should grow very rapidly. It will combine economic deprivation with socio-psychological strain.*

The table below shows the distribution of the population by age in 1950 and 1977. Taking 30 years of age as the political and social threshold between "young adulthood" and "adulthood," in 1977, 22 percent of West Germans were 15-29 years old, and 58 percent, 30 and over.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION BY AGE, 1950 AND 1977

<u>AGE</u>	<u>AS OF 9/13/50</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>AS OF 12/31/77</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
UNDER 6	4,121,000	8.1	3,653,000	6.0
6 TO 15	7,730,000	15.2	8,579,000 ¹	14.0
15 TO 20	3,659,000	7.2	5,745,000 ²	9.3
20 TO 45	18,099,000	35.6	20,722,000 ²	33.8
45 TO 65	12,437,000	24.5	13,347,000	21.7
65 & OVER	4,763,000	9.4	9,307,000	15.2

¹ UP TO 21;

² OVER 21.

SOURCE: INFORMATION, NO. 1, "TERRITORY AND POPULATION," THE PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, BONN (1980), PART 5.

These age distribution figures are presently particularly important in Germany for a number of political reasons: one, of course, is the presence of a large number of young people at a politically volatile age (and ever-increasing percentages in the politically volatile hothouses of

* Abraham Askenasi, "Idealistic Protest: The New German Religiosity," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 1982/83), pp. 259-260.

academic institutions);* another is that, unlike the previous generation, the great majority of today's leaders and elites either had no experience of the Nazi era and World War II or were children at the time. This is distant history to them, of a passing or past generation, which has little or no meaning in their lives.**

This historical hiatus is widely recognized in Germany today. The present Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who is now 52 and had experienced the war as a child, has frequently made references to this point in speeches and interviews. In doing so, he has urged Germans not to forget American generosity in helping the Germans rebuild their nation in the postwar period.

(1) The West German Population and The Public Opinion Sample

As of 1977, the median age of the population was 37.5 years, a three-year increase over the median age in 1950. Since 1950, the population development has been a very complicated one, being sharply affected by the entry of millions of refugees and expellees from the East after World War II and the mass influx of foreign workers in the 1960s and '70s.

* If the German experience is anything like the American, a longitudinal study by Lipset and Ladd of the liberal-conservative orientations of American college generations found that:

Colleges are encapsulated communities....After graduation,... most...reenter the highly differentiated larger society and take part in middle-class life in job, family and community. The intellectual legacies of the college years are by no means all lost, but the intense pressures of the encapsulated community which make for the distinctive and wildly fluctuating character of student political opinion are for most removed as abruptly as they had been introduced.

See Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., "College Generations--from the 1930s to the 1960s," The Public Interest, No. 25 (Fall 1971), pp. 99-113.

** Most West Germans have no first-hand knowledge of what happened on that 1933 day that Die Zeit, the nation's most respected weekly, has called "the day that changed the world."

Two-thirds of the population of 61 million was not even born on that January 30 when the 43-year-old Hitler--a onetime Austrian house painter who had acquired German citizenship barely a year before--became Chancellor.

See Robert Haeger, "West Germany--50 Years After Hitler Took Over," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 94, No. 4 (January 31, 1983), p. 37.

Despite the immigration, the population overall declined from the beginning to the end of the 1970s. The birth rate fell steadily during the decade, and from 1972 on, the death rate was significantly higher than the birth rate. In 1979, at 9.4 births per 1000 inhabitants per year, West Germany had the lowest birth rate in the world. Recent unofficial figures indicate, however, that the number of births has been increasing yearly since the end of the 1970s.

The 1982 representative cross-section of the West German population, 16 years and older, provided by the Allensbach Institut fuer Demoskopie polling organization, gives guidelines for interpreting the results of the West German opinion polls used in this study. The sample sizes of the population groups are based on actual demographic data.* Briefly, the categories of the Allensbach sample show the following:

Sex

Women as a whole outnumber men, although men slightly outnumber women up to age 50.

Age

The age categories frequently used by the polling organizations break down as follows: 16-29 years, 26 percent; 30-44, 25 percent; 45-59, 23 percent; and 60 and over, 26 percent (total: 100 percent).

Population

About one-half of all West Germans now live in towns and small cities of between 5,000 and 100,000 inhabitants; another 34 percent are in large cities of 100,000 or more. In 1980, only 6 percent lived in areas where there were fewer than 2,000 persons. This indicates a substantial population shift since 1950 away from rural areas and into towns and small- to medium-sized cities. Some of this occurred as towns and cities swallowed up ever-larger surrounding farm, village and suburban areas and incorporated them into the urban structure.

The distribution of the population throughout the land is, however, very uneven. Much of the populated area of West Germany is presently made up of so-called "Ballungsraeume," or major urban conglomerations, something like the American Megalopolis, but much more crowded. Important Ballungsraeume are the Rhein-Ruhr region, the Rhein-Main district around Frankfurt, the Rhein-Neckar area with its center at Mannheim-Ludwigshaven and the Swabian industrial belt around Stuttgart, as well as the heavily-populated areas surrounding the cities of Bremen, Hamburg, Hannover, Nuernberg-Fuerth and Munich. Today the West Germans are pressed together

* Actual and projected figures are derived from official data reported in the 1980 Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic.

247 persons to the square kilometer. Among the European countries, only the Netherlands and Belgium have higher population densities. In the Ruhr area alone, 9 percent of the entire West German population lives on 2 percent of the land.* Thus, the population has become increasingly urbanized over the last two decades. As will be shown later, the highest potential for radical political activism is among the young living in the cities. Indeed, the three large cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and West Berlin, which are also independent federal states, contain significantly greater proportions of Greens party supporters than there are in any other areas in West Germany.

For historical trend interest, the chart below shows the change in the German population structure going back to 1871:

PORTION OF THE POPULATION IN COMMUNITIES WITH
...TO UNDER... INHABITANTS (IN %)

	REICH TERRITORY		BUNDES TERRITORY				
	1871	1910	1939	1950	1961	1970	1977
UNDER 2,000	63.9	40.0	27.5	25.5	20.7	18.7	7.9
2,000-5,000	12.4	11.2	10.7	11.7	11.5	11.2	8.5
5,000-20,000	11.1	14.1	12.5	16.5	17.2	18.9	23.8
20,000-100,000	7.7	13.3	12.6	15.0	16.5	18.8	25.1
100,000 & over	4.8	21.3	36.8	31.3	34.2	32.4	34.7

SOURCE: "GESELLSCHAFTLICHE DATEN 1979," BERICHTE UND DOKUMENTATIONEN, BAND 20 (BONN: INFORMATIONSAMT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG, BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, AUGUST 1979), P. 13.

This density of population should not lead one to believe that West Germany is hopelessly without forests, clear waters, and country air--an impression one may get from the anxiety expressed by the Greens. One commentator likened this anxiety to that felt in earlier days, when the Germans were seeking Lebensraum:

One can't help thinking of the "bad old days," when the German people were subjected to a propaganda campaign about being a "Volk ohne Raum." A people without space. Now the anxiety is one about becoming a people without oxygen, ein Volk ohne Sauerstoff, and it is equally absurd. Let me quote a few statistics which the "Statistische Bundesamt" officially released last July. Some 86% of the Bundesrepublik of West Germany consists of fields, woods, meadows and waters. The woods alone comprise 30%. (For urban housing and business premises only 6%; for

*Tatsachen ueber Deutschland, pp. 20-21.

the traffic network 5% of the national territory; and the space for sport, play, etc., comes to some 3%.)*

With regard to security, it must be remembered that a significant percentage of West Germans live very close to the East German border, within the so-called "Zonal Fringe Region" (Zonenrandgebiet), a 30 to 50 kilometer-wide belt running 1,381 kilometers north-south. Many of West Germany's large cities are located in this region, not far from the border: Hamburg (30 miles), Braunschweig (20 miles), Luebeck (2 miles), Kassel (20 miles). This zone also contains some of the most heavily industrialized areas of the country.

Occupation and Household Size

As the table below shows, blue-collar workers make up about 42 percent of the work force, white-collar workers, 36 percent. The next largest group is public servants, 9 percent, followed by self-employed persons, 8 percent. Farmers are the smallest group, only 5 percent of the work force. The trends since 1950 show significant shifts in occupation, in particular major increases in the numbers of white-collar workers and public servants and a sharp drop in the number of farmers.

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION

<u>OCCUPATION</u>	<u>1950</u> %	<u>1960</u> %	<u>1970</u> %	<u>1980</u> %
BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS	45.9	47.6	45.8	41.5
FARM WORKERS	4.9	1.9	0.9	0.8
WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS	16.0	22.9	31.2	36.1
PUBLIC SERVANTS	4.0	4.7	5.6	8.7
SELF-EMPLOYEDS, PROFESSIONALS	11.1	11.0	9.1	8.0
FARMERS	18.1	11.9	7.4	4.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS: PUBLIC OPINION POLLS 1967-1980 (WESTPORT, CT: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), p. 4.

In 1978, 62 percent of all West Germans (including family members who help in the family business) were in the work force. The unemployment figure for the month of December 1982 rose to 2.2 million persons or a rate of 9 percent; the 1982 annual unemployment figure showed a 45 percent

* Helmut Schoeck, "Protesting for a Brave, Green World," Encounter, Vol. LIX, No. 6 (December 1982), p. 50. Schoeck is Professor of Sociology at the University of Mainz.

increase over 1981. Twenty percent of the work force belongs to a union; of these, 16 percent are men, 4 percent women.

Finally, almost three-fifths of all Germans live in households of one or two persons: 29 percent, one person; 29 percent, two persons; 18 percent, three persons; 15 percent, four persons; and 10 percent, five or more persons; the average number of persons per household is 2.50.

Region and Land

West Germany consists of the 10 federal states (or Laender)* of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen (city-state), Hamburg (city-state), Hesse, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. In addition, the city-state of West Berlin is fully integrated by the Federal Republic into its legal and economic system; but West Berlin is not a part of West Germany, nor is it governed by it, and West Berlin's deputies to the West German parliament are not entitled to vote in plenary sessions on legislative matters or in the election of the Federal Chancellor.

The table below shows the 1980 regional breakdown provided by the Allensbach Institut, based on official population statistics:

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY REGION AND LAND, 1980

<u>REGION</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
NORTH GERMANY	20
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN	4
HAMBURG	3
BREMEN	1
LOWER SAXONY	12
NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA	28
RHINE-MAIN/SOUTHWEST	31
HESSE	9
RHINELAND-PALATINATE	6
SAARLAND	2
BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG	14
BAVARIA	18
WEST BERLIN	<u>3</u>
	100

* A federal state (Land) has its own state government and representation in the upper chamber of the federal parliament, the Federal Council (Bundesrat).

b. Historical Trends and Makeup of the West German Peace Movement

After World War II, while a destroyed Germany rebuilt itself and rapidly grew as a nation, West German pacifists and peace movements initiated several major disarmament and anti-nuclear campaigns. Indeed, the vanquished Germans agonized over each defense issue that arose as the nation took its place as a partner in the developing Western alliance: rearmament and NATO, the stationing of nuclear weapons on German soil, conscription and the growth of the Bundeswehr (armed forces)--each engendered more or less vigorous opposition. This section will outline several of these surges of antimilitarism and describe some of the streams that led to the formation of the present peace movement.*

By the beginning of the 1950s, the West German public was deeply divided on the rearmament of the then-West Zone of Germany; indeed, intense extra-parliamentary opposition permeated a very broad segment of the population. From 1949 to 1955, the year the Bundeswehr was established, three major campaigns against rearmament could be identified:

1. The "Ohne-mich-Bewegung" ("Count-Me-Out-Movement"), formed in 1950 by leftists who feared renewed Prussian-German militarism.
2. The "Volksbefragungs-Bewegung" ("Plebescite Movement"), founded in 1951-52, supported by pacifist, neutralist and communist groups who demanded, instead of rearmament, a peace agreement based on unification and military neutrality.
3. The "Paulskirchen-Bewegung" ("Paul's-Church Movement"), made up of trade unionists and Social Democrats opposing the military agreements of 1955.

The two latter campaigns were notably less interested in security policy than they were in the "national question"; that is, the reunification of Germany.

As the decade wore on, West Germany plunged into a period of rapid economic growth, and the public opposition to rearmament, which was so widespread at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, steadily waned. Toward the end of the 1950s, however, the stationing of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on West German soil caused a new shock of opposition: enormous anti-nuclear and anti-rearmament demonstrations and numerous rallies--including the Easter marches in Germany and Great Britain--took place,

*A major source for the background of this brief historical outline was Wilfried von Bredow, "Zusammensetzung und Ziele der Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Aus Politik und Zeit Geschichte, B 24/82 (June 19, 1982), p. 3ff.

and a number of protest groups and appeals sprang into being. Included among them was an appeal made in April 1957 by eighteen West German scientists opposing atomic weapons in the Federal Republic. Another movement, the "Kampf den Atomtod" ("Struggle Against Atomic Death"), was organized by the SPD, trade unions and the FDP, and was joined by a number of intellectuals and artists. The opposition collapsed, however, when the Social Democrats and trade unionists pulled out of the coalition after the Russians issued the November 1958 "Berlin Ultimatum," which demanded that West Berlin become a "demilitarized free city."

In the first half of the 1960s, the "Easter-March" movement continued as the only publicly active campaign calling for security policy alternatives. It later merged with segments of the youth and student protest movements which were, however, comparatively little occupied with European political-military security; their left-socialist, student-rebel spokesmen openly hero-worshipped guerrilla leaders of the Third World and vehemently opposed the Vietnam war. The image of the U.S. became heavily tarnished during this period; indeed, it is likely that many of today's peace groups, with their strong overtones of anti-Americanism, had their roots in the opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

Toward the end of the 1960s, the number of conscientious objectors increased sharply, supported by a campaign of the Protestant Church Council (EKD) which challenged the basic moral position of the soldier in defense forces relying on nuclear weapons. At the same time, there were internal conflicts concerning policy, form and image within the Bundeswehr.

The 1970s saw the growth of the ecology movement, segments of which evolved into political protest groups opposing the installation of nuclear power plants. By the late 1970s, the scope of some of these groups had broadened to include a censure of the consumer society and its political order; the "Green lists" were organized for the June 1978 state elections and developed into a political arm--the Greens Party--for the highly disparate elements of this movement.

It was not, however, until after the NATO Ministers had made the NATO dual-track decision on intermediate force modernization in 1979, and President Reagan took what appeared to be a more aggressive stance toward the East, that the strategies and policies for the use of nuclear weapons and disarmament began to be once again seriously articulated.

Today's anti-nuclear positions, which grew out of historical pacifist and neutralist tendencies, are heavily mixed with new ideals, primarily ecology. Consistent with these strains of historical pacifism and neutralism are those (also historical) of a united Germany. Yet the present West German peace movement, though stressing German issues, is clearly part of a larger, international trend. Thus, in the fall of 1981, a huge peace demonstration in Bonn was directly followed by a series of similar rallies in the capitals of Western Europe and in the U.S. Moreover, German and other European peace leaders have visited

and spoken before U.S. peace meetings and taken part in American demonstrations.*

Indeed, the Bonn demonstration of between 200,000 and 300,000 persons, which occurred on October 10, 1981, was organized as a joint venture by the Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV) of the Netherlands and the West German church peace group, Aktion Suehnezeichen/Friedensdienst e.V. (ASF-- "Action Sign of Atonement"); the latter group also organized two "peace weeks" campaigns in Germany in November 1980 and 1981 under the motto, "Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen" ("Peace without weapons").** The church groups formulated four basic demands which were highlighted at the peace demonstration:

1. No new atomic weapons in Europe;
2. NATO governments must reject deployment of American intermediate-range missiles;
3. An atomic weapons-free Europe, in which atomic weapons are neither made, stored, or used;
4. European governments should, on their own initiative, open disarmament negotiations and take steps to further detente.***

Although the stated goal of the Bonn demonstration was that of disarmament by both the East and West, in actuality the West German peace movement, in common with other Western peace movements, focuses its call on the West to disarm and generally displays a strongly emotional anti-Americanism. To a predominant element in the present peace-ecological movement, the so-called post-materialists and new class of educated young

*"European Nuke Foes to Tour U.S.," The Christian Science Monitor, March 23, 1982, p. 2. "An 11-member delegation from peace groups that sponsored mass disarmament rallies in Western Europe last fall arrived in the United States for a two-week speaking tour....The visit is being co-sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee and Clergy and Laity Concerned." See also The New York Times, April 3, 1982, "European Atomic Arms Foes Tour U.S." The delegation toured 50 American cities; its speakers included the Rev. Volkmar Deile, a West German Protestant Evangelical Church minister who was a principal organizer of the fall Bonn demonstration, and Sienie Strikwerda of the Netherlands' Women for Peace and Women Against Nuclear Weapons, who helped organize a rally of 350,000 people in Amsterdam in November 1981.

** Guenther Schmid, "Zur Soziologie der Friedensbewegung und des Jugendprotests," Aus Zeit und Zeit Geschichte, B 24/82 (June 19, 1982), p. 28. Eighty of the "old" and "new" leftists groups joined in the call for the Bonn peace demonstration.

*** Von Bredow, pp. 7-8.

elites, America symbolizes many of the evils of the modern Western economic and political order. To them America is a militaristic, atomic death-dealing aggressor and the power-hungry, materialistic and rapacious user of the earth's goods. Against this aggression, the role of the Soviet Union is seen as defensive, and the Russians arm themselves essentially as a reaction to the threat from the West.

Although the peace movement has seized the banner of anti-nuclearism, it does articulate a generalized feeling of "angst" about the fate and course of the nation prevalent today among the population. This angst stems from many uncertainties: possible economic and political instability, an unsure personal and national future, and less immediate, but nevertheless present, the nuclear danger threatening Europe.

According to the West German analyst Wilfried von Bredow, the present peace movement is distinguished from earlier ones in Germany in two basic ways:

1. Although it is a peculiarly German mix, it is also part of an international West European and American peace movement.
2. Its active membership is more heterogeneous than earlier peace movements.*

The first point is supported by a quantity of data showing interrelationships among the peace movements and the similarities in aims, ideologies and composition. The second appears debatable: compared with the tide of disarmament sentiment and fear of atomic war that swept across West Germany in the 1950s, popular support for today's peace movement might well be considerably less broad-based.**

In his penetrating analysis, von Bredow has identified four main philosophical and political currents that make up the new West German peace movement. He sees these as 1) Christian-humanistic pacifism, 2) ecology, 3) undogmatic socialism, and 4) communism.***

(1) Christian and Humanistic Pacifism

Von Bredow traces the German pacifist position in its leftist, secular form back to the beginning of the 20th century. This historical, humanistic pacifism combined in the post-World War II era with the Protestant movement, which attempted to atone for the general lack of Protestant church opposition to Nazism and the war. A number of Protestant church leaders and organizations took on the role of spokesmen for the moral and spiritual conscience of the vanquished people. Even today,

* Ibid.

** See especially Sections V.B and VI.A.1 for discussions of these two points.

*** Von Bredow, p. 13.

although some Catholic pacifist groups are involved, the West German peace movement is essentially supported by a social Protestantism that has been especially active as a youth and protest organizer. Religion in West Germany and the peace activities of church groups are discussed in detail in Section 11.B.2.c.

(2) Ecology

The ecology movement developed in the 1970s, essentially from citizens' action groups (Buergerinitiativen) which, by 1978, had proliferated into "over 38,000 such groups...with a total membership far greater than that enjoyed by the established political parties."*

In the Federal Republic, actual political party membership is very low--around 5 percent of the voting-age population of about 43 million--but the turn-out in elections is extremely high, reaching into the 90 percentile for federal elections. (See Section 11.B.2.e.(2) on political participation.)

But membership in other types of groups--clubs (Vereine) and associations (Verbaende)--is normally extraordinarily high, and "there is hardly a German adult who isn't a member of a number of groups." The story goes that when a farmer emigrated overseas from Lower Saxony some years ago, he had to resign from 33 of these clubs.** One quarter of all West Germans belong to sports clubs (Sportvereine); there are 14,500 choral clubs (Gesangvereine) with over one and a half million members. Indeed,

Riflemen and stamp collectors, dog breeders and pigeon racers, local patriots and small gardeners have joined together in thousands of groupings...Some assume importance in local politics....But these associations do not play a defined political role.***

Other common-interest organizations do, however, play a specific political role, in particular by lobbying and rallying votes. These organizations, formed for mutually-recognized social and economic objectives, include, for example, the giant trade union and employer associations, such as the German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) with 7.75 million members and the Confederation of German Employers Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA). But there are also thousands of others:

* Geoffrey Pridham, "Ecologists in Politics: The West German Case," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 31 (Autumn 1978), p. 437.

** Facts About Germany (Guetersloh, West Germany: LEXIKOTHEK Verlag, 1980), p. 282.

*** Ibid.

...house owners, tenants, motorists--to name but a few--have associations, some with very large memberships.

Their influence is undoubtedly great, but those critics who maintain that the Federal Republic of Germany is "under the rule of the associations" are certainly exaggerating.*

The citizens' action groups are yet another type: they were generally formed spontaneously, usually by a small number of citizens who felt the authorities were not paying attention to a certain local problem, such as pollution or lack of day care for children of working mothers. Eventually, some of these civic action groups began to operate nationwide as environmental protection umbrella organizations. The ecology-Greens party evolved from continued political protest in the late 1970s against nuclear energy and the political establishment; its activities, though at times similar in content, are to be distinguished from those of the citizens' action groups. A brief, excellent summary of the history of this development deserves to be quoted in full:

While many citizens' action groups were small local efforts, often temporary and uncoordinated, others have become established and expanded, leading to the formation of cover organizations such as the Bundesverband Buergerinitiativen Umweltschutz (BBU) and the Bund Natur-und Umweltschutz Deutschland. However diffuse these groups may be geographically, together they are a significant form of popular mobilization and draw on considerable sympathy among the public at large.

What inaugurated the present ecologist movement (as distinct from the Buergerinitiativen whose activities it has attempted to integrate) were two issues that crystallized as an object of sustained political protest in late 1976 when the older problem of pollution became linked to the new issue of nuclear energy as a result of the Government's changed emphasis in its energy programme since the oil crisis of 1973. The first serious protests arose over the plans to install a nuclear power project at Wyl in Baden-Wuerttemberg early in 1975, escalating during 1976-77 with similar and in some cases violent demonstrations over the proposed power stations at Brokdorf and Gorleben. These protests have involved socially-conscious citizens, alarmed at the possible environmental and human effects of the projects, and also a minority of fringe left-wing activists. The outcome, particularly after the heavy-handed use of security forces at Brokdorf, was to sensitize wider and notably "non-political" elements of society to the issue in a way comparable to the public engagement on the question of rearmament in the 1950s. In the past year (1978) the ecologist movement has gelled even more with the broadening of the debate to include a systematic (albeit highly subjective) criticism of consumer society as such,

* Ibid.

aimed at both established political structures and official policy priorities.

Two developments then led to the inauguration of a full-scale political campaign for the June 1978 state elections with the organization of the "Green Lists"....The formation of "Green Lists" or other electoral groups was thus an attempt to channel in a more overt political direction what had up to then been a highly disparate movement. That they have ignited public interest and can count on latent support is indicated by a certain consistent sympathy or readiness to vote for an ecologist party in opinion surveys in 1977 and 1978, which gave them an electoral potential of 6 to 10 percent and a "sympathy potential" of over 20 percent.*

Thus were channeled into the ecological-peace movement, supporters of a wide range of disparate, heterogeneous philosophical and social ideologies, alternative lifestyles and local activist causes. Although there is extensive latent sympathy for environmental and peace issues among the public at large, and some members of citizens' action groups may have been drawn into active participation in the peace movement, it is highly unlikely that more than a very small percentage will agree with the value system of the Greens or actively support it in the form it is today.**

(3) Undogmatic Socialism

Those who are most occupied with the theoretical interpretation of the goals of the Greens-peace movement are the self-named "Undogmatic Socialists." Their position, outstandingly articulated by a communist refugee from East Germany, Rudolf Bahro, rests on a demand for bilateral nuclear disarmament and a rejection of cooperation with both the communist bloc and Western capitalistic countries. In their view, the communist states of Eastern Europe have failed to realize utopian Marxist goals; but the capitalist system is seen as essentially evil, spawning social, economic and spiritual evils that can only be eliminated by doing away with the capitalistic industrial order itself. The ecological, anti-nuclear struggle is seen as a means toward emancipation from this order:

What appears on superficial consideration as an environmental problem is in reality a global ecological crisis, this being the most important expression of the capitalist industrial system. And this is the only industrial system that exists anywhere in the world. This system is inherently deadly, and will prove to be so even if the bombs don't fall.***

* Pridham, pp. 437-438.

** See Section II.B.2.e, "The Political Potential of the Greens."

*** Rudolf Bahro, "Capitalism's Global Crisis," New Statesman (December 17-24, 1982), p. 27.

In contrast to the "traditional leftists" in the Greens party who are willing to work within the system, the Undogmatic Socialists are uncompromising in their belief that there is no way to begin to change the exploitation of the worker and the environment except to "first of all... bring the industrial system to a halt."* As discussed more fully in Section 11.8.2.d., a serious ideological rift is forming between these two basic factions of the party. The Undogmatic Socialists' theories have influenced young people in universities, segments of the trade unions and also marginal SPD groups, particularly the youth organizations.

(4) Communism

Although the vote for the Communist Party (DKP) in elections is minimal, in some organizations--as for example, sections of the trade unions--the communists have a disproportionate influence. Communists are also drivers in the peace movement; for example, they are reportedly the force behind the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation (KFAZ), which is said to be one of the primary organizers of the November 1980 so-called "Krefelder Appell" ("Krefeld Appeal") against theater-nuclear weapons modernization.** The Krefelder Appell has reportedly been signed by 1.2 to over 2 million West German citizens to date.

Another possible communist influence on the Greens Party and the peace movement may come from the communist affiliations of some of the Greens deputies in local parliaments. For example, 9 seats were won by the Greens in the local election in Hamburg on June 6, 1982 (that is 7.7 percent of the total vote cast). Four seats were filled by Greens deputies who had some communist connection: one had been a member of the German Communist Party until 1982, when he became an Alternative candidate, and three were still co-workers in known communist-affiliated organizations.***

West German government agencies have publicly identified several individual peace groups as communist-controlled, including the German Peace Union (DFU), the German Peace Society/United Opponents of War (DKG/VK), and the previously-mentioned Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation. Moreover, the East German Communist Party is said to be channeling significant sums of money to the West to support peace activities:

* Ibid., p. 28.

** Von Bredow, p. 11; Schmid, p. 28; and David S. Yost and Thomas C. Glad, "West German Party Politics and Theater Nuclear Modernization Since 1977," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1982), p. 545. A report on the activities of the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation, based in Cologne, was issued in 1980 by the Federal government's Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (Cologne), which is responsible to the Federal Minister of the Interior. (Schmid, p. 28 and the The Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1982, p. 12.)

*** Stern, June 16, 1982, pp. 67-70.

In West Germany, says one government official, "We have enough information that the peace movement and the Greens are supported by organizational help and some cadres of the DKP (the West German Communist Party)." He named 50 to 60 million Marks (\$20 to \$24 million) as the annual sum East Germany funnels into the West German anti-nuclear movement directly or through the DKP.*

Another study notes that the DKP is receiving 50 million Marks "from the East German Communist party (SED) to support its various fronts and peace initiatives."** But, at present the DKP's influence among the West German peace groups seems to be waning:

Small as it is, the DKP is among the best-organized political units in Western Europe (some of its cadres have been trained in East Germany and the Soviet Union). However, its impact on the West German peace movement as a whole seems to have dwindled in 1982. The DKP's silence on the events in Afghanistan and Poland, its rigid pro-Soviet line, and its criticisms of the nonofficial East German peace movement (which has a strong base in the independent-minded East German Lutheran Church) have made the party vulnerable to attacks by other groups.***

The attempts of West German Communist Party members to dominate the Greens have attracted media attention. One report tells of an April 4, 1982 meeting in Bonn in which representatives of 37 groups "describing themselves as elements of the anti-missile movement, planned a major demonstration against President Reagan when he visits Bonn...June 10." A spokesperson for the Greens is quoted as saying, "The Communists dominated the meeting completely. It took place under seemingly democratic rules, but that was a joke. We could barely get a word in."

The meeting--at which were represented such groups as the German Student Federation, the Evangelical Student Committee, the Federation of German Youth Groups, and the German Peace Society--rejected resolutions condemning Soviet interference in Poland and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan....They adopted, however, by a large majority, a motion condemning the United States' actions in Central America, the Middle East, southern Africa, and other regions.****

* The Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1982, p. 12.

** J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXI (November-December 1982), p. 54.

*** Ibid., p. 54.

**** The New York Times, April 6, 1982.

Apparently the rift caused by the communists' domination of the floor resulted in the Bonn demonstration being less successful than the planners had originally hoped.

According to one political analyst, "The Communists are concerned about the widening gap between themselves and other groups in the West German peace movement, although they still control many of them."* The extent of this control is in question and involves a careful analysis of the influence of the multifarious elements and streams of the peace movement.

c. Are the Greens and the Peace Movement Religious?

(1) The Involvement of the Clerics in the Peace Movement

The West German Protestant Church Council (EKD) has become a major focus for the peace movement and for youthful social radicalism in West Germany. As mentioned earlier, its key peace organization Aktion Suehnezeichen/Friendensdienst e.V. (ASF) sponsored the massive anti-nuclear weapons demonstration with its Dutch church counterpart on October 10, 1981 in Bonn, West Germany. The Hamburg Evangelical Church Days in June 1981 drew 80,000 young German Protestants to rally against nuclear arms and the deployment of missiles on German soil; in November of 1981 the ASF held 4,000 peace weeks in 3,000 Protestant churches throughout West Germany, paralleling the activities of the Dutch Protestant Church. The EKD was also a sponsor of the Krefeld Appeal against the proposed deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, which, as mentioned in the previous section, has reportedly been signed by over 2 million West Germans and is commonly believed to have been organized by the communist-dominated Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation. In addition, Kurt Scharf, the Director of Aktion Suehnezeichen, spoke before the United Nations' Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, the same session that was addressed by Helmut Schmidt, then Chancellor of West Germany. According to Scharf, "nuclear weapons are not a means for carrying out politics. 'Their use as a threat alone is blasphemy.'"**

Kurt Scharf was one of the early members of the well-known Bekennende Kirche (translated, "Church of Proposed Avowal") which based its active opposition to Nazism on the philosophy of Karl Barth and "reaffirmed in the famous 1934 Barmer proclamation the primacy of justice and peace for the Christian acknowledgement of legitimate political leadership."***

* Vermaat, p. 54.

** Abraham Ashkenasi, "Idealistic Protest: The New German Religiosity," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 1982/83), p. 269.

*** Ibid., p. 261.

Ministers of the Bekennende Kirche carried the banner for anti-militarism in the post-World War II period.

Despite its radical peace activism, the Council of the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) still officially maintains its position toward the use of nuclear weapons established in the so-called Heidelberg Theses in 1959. Essentially the Heidelberg Theses allow a West German Protestant to say either yes or no to the use of nuclear weapons to secure peace. The two positions are spelled out in points 7: "The Church must recognize the renunciation of arms as a Christian way of acting"; and 8: "The Church must recognize that participation in the attempt to safeguard peace in freedom through the presence of nuclear weapons is still a possible Christian way of acting today."* But leaders in the EKD Council support and further the first--"Peace Without Weapons"--and they have abandoned the Just War Doctrine as a way of judging the morality of nuclear weapons.**

It has been suggested that a major influence on the EKD in the middle of the 1960s to launch "an assault within its midst on the established structure and ideas of national defense and nationalism within German society," was the activity of the East European churches in the Ecumenical Council (World Council of Churches).*** A number of events within the Ecumenical Council brought German Protestantism into direct contact with church groups in Eastern Europe. The EKD Council initiated a more conciliatory policy toward the Eastern churches and governments and became increasingly more involved in international church politics addressing the issues of developing nations, anti-militarism and disarmament. In addition, the EKD Council began to associate itself with some of the more radical social movements of the '70s. These activities eventually blossomed into the massive peace demonstration in Bonn.

There is now a move by EKD leaders to involve the Roman Catholic Church in the nuclear debate:

The "Atoners" and "Reforming Idealists" in West German Protestantism want to follow the Dutch in spreading their movement into the sluggish Catholic Church. Joint initiatives are underway, and the Catholic hierarchy certainly will be confronted by a non-conformist youth (from its Bund der Deutschen Katholischen Jugend and perhaps Pax Christi)....Similar developments are underway under different forms in the GDR.****

*"The Preservation, Promotion and Renewal of Peace," A Memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany, EKD Bulletin, Special Issue, October 1981, pp. 64 and 66.

** Ibid.

*** Ashkenasi, p. 264.

**** Ibid., p. 265.

Catholic activity on the nuclear issue may have been accelerated by the draft Pastoral Letter put out by the American Catholic Bishops in October 1982. The Letter has apparently been "widely read in Roman Catholic circles here [in West Germany]. In just two weeks Publik Forum sold 10,000 reprints and another press run has been ordered."* The editor of the leftist Roman Catholic weekly Publik Forum is quoted as saying "It was always said that the peace movement was anti-American...And now here were the American bishops--or some of them at least--siding with the peace movement."** According to church sources, a West German Catholic Bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace was supposed to be issued at the end of February, but will probably not be published until after the March elections because of its political sensitivity.

(2) Religious Characteristics of the West German Population

Today, about 85 percent of the West German population belongs to either the Evangelical Protestant or Roman Catholic church; that is, they are baptized into the church, and are considered to be church members. Protestant church membership dropped from 51 percent in 1960 to significantly less than a majority today. In fact, for the first time there are now slightly fewer Protestants than Catholics in West Germany: the 1980 figures show Catholics, 43 percent; Protestants, 42 percent.

The Evangelical Protestants are in the majority in the north of West Germany, Catholics in the south. Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Bavaria are mainly Catholic; Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia are about equally divided between the two major denominations; and Protestants predominate in the rest of the Laender.***

Although membership remains very high, actual church attendance has fallen off drastically since the beginning of the 1950s. The figures below, comparing church attendance between 1953 and 1980, show the startling loss of religiosity among the West Germans. Today, only 45 percent of the Catholics go to church either regularly or occasionally, compared with 82 percent in 1953; and as few as 14 percent of the Protestants now ever attend church.


When the Protestant church attendance is broken down by age and sex, results are even more dramatic: in 1980 only 2 percent of the 16-29 year olds and 4 percent of the men were regular churchgoers. The highest Protestant church attendance was registered by the elderly (18 percent) and women (12 percent).

* James M. Markham, "In Germany, Atom Debate Stirs Catholics," The New York Times, January 9, 1983, p. 15.

** Ibid.


*** Facts About Germany (Guetersloh, West Germany: LEXIKOTHEK Verlag, 1980 B), pp. 278-282.

CHURCH ATTENDANCE, WEST GERMANY, 1953 & 1980




SOURCE: GERD MIELKE AND PETER SCHOOF (UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG), "RELIGION AND VOTING ATTITUDES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY," FROM A REPORT ISSUED BY THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE (IDEA); IN "RELIGIONS," SOZIAL-REPORT, SR 5/82, INTER NATIONES, BONN, BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, PP. 3-4.

REGULAR CHURCH ATTENDANCE AMONG PROTESTANTS, WEST GERMANY, 1963-1980
NATIONAL, AND BY SEX AND AGE



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN THE GERMANS, ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED. WESTPORT, CT.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981, P. 235.

REGULAR CHURCH ATTENDANCE AMONG CATHOLICS, WEST GERMANY, 1963-1980
 NATIONAL, AND BY SEX AND AGE



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN THE GERMANS, ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED. (WESTPORT, CT.: WESTVIEW PRESS, 1981), P. 235.

Significantly more Catholics than Protestants regularly go to church, but the decline in Catholic church attendance has been more precipitous than that of the Protestants. Regular Catholic church attendance among the 16-29 year olds fell from 52 percent in 1963 to 16 percent in 1980. That was far greater than the drop among the total Catholic population and 5 percent greater than that of the next age level, the 30-44 year olds. Catholic churches, like the Protestant, are being regularly visited by the elderly, 60 and over (51 percent), women (37 percent), and 45-59 year olds (36 percent). These are the old-guard Catholics who vote overwhelmingly CDU/CSU.


Two additional figures below show voting patterns by religious background. In 1980 Catholics and Protestants split rather evenly in casting their votes for the two major opposition parties: Catholics--51 percent, CDU/CSU; Protestants--49 percent, SPD. Another 32 percent of the Catholics voted SPD and 29 percent of the Protestants chose the CDU/CSU. The results change significantly, however, when only regular churchgoers are considered. In that case, no matter what the denomination, the churchgoer is much more inclined to vote CDU/CSU. As a matter of fact, in 1980 the CDU captured 70 percent of the total vote of regular churchgoers of all denominations.

Two tables on religious belief and the importance of God give further insight into the waning religiosity of the West Germans. The first shows that belief in God and in Jesus diminished significantly between 1967 and the beginning of the 1980s; moreover, the pollsters found that the younger and better-educated the respondent, the less interested he or she was in religious questions. The second reveals that, compared with other nationals, West Germans placed themselves slightly above the midpoint (5.67) on a one-to-ten point scale--considerably below the level of persons in Catholic countries, the U.S. and South Africa--in rating the importance of God in their lives.

It would be fair to say that West German youth is the least fundamentally religious group in West Germany today. There is also no evidence of a truly widespread religious revival among German youth or, indeed, among the West German population as a whole. Far from being religious, the youth seem to have strayed from the stability and ethics that organized religion had always provided:


There are many indications that the West German youth was in an unstable psychological state in the late '70s. By 1978, 150,000 young people joined religious sects. This is a very significant number in a country with two well-established religions and is evidence of a strong sense of anomie. Twenty-one percent of German youths had positive feelings for such religious sects; 44 percent were not totally opposed; 13 percent said sects were interesting because they showed a new way. In Berlin during 1979 there was a volume of 600 million marks in the heroin traffic. Some estimate that heroin addiction was as high as 80,000 in 1979, most users being under 30; 22,000 German children leave home a year. There has been a steady increase in juvenile delinquency. Statistics for 1978 were

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE AND VOTING PATTERNS, 1953 & 1980



SOURCE: GERD MIELKE AND PETER SCHOOF (UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG), "RELIGION AND VOTING ATTITUDES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY," FROM A REPORT ISSUED BY THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE (IDEA); IN "RELIGIONS," SOZIAL-REPORT, SR 5/82, INTER NATIONES, BONN. BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, PP. 3-4.

REGULAR CHURCHGOERS AND VOTING PATTERNS, 1953 and 1980



SOURCE: GERD MIELKE AND PETER SCHOOF (UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG), "RELIGION AND VOTING ATTITUDES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY," FROM A REPORT ISSUED BY THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE (IDEA); IN "RELIGIONS," SOZIAL-REPORT, SR 5/82, INTER NATIONES, BONN, BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, PP. 3-4.

RELIGIOUS BELIEF--WEST GERMANY
1967, 1979, & 1982

BELIEF IN JESUS

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1979</u>
JESUS IS THE SON OF GOD AND SAVIOR	42%	33%
BY AGE: 14 - 24		25
BY AGE: 60 & OVER		46
JESUS IS A GREAT PERSON & AN EXAMPLE TO ME		21
JESUS HAS NO SIGNIFICANCE TO ME		38
JESUS NEVER LIVED		7

BELIEF IN GOD

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1982</u>
BELIEF IN GOD OR A HIGHER BEING	90%	79%	72%
BELIEF IN LIFE AFTER DEATH	48	53	39

THE 1967 and 1979 SURVEYS FOUND THAT THE YOUNGER AND BETTER-EDUCATED THE RESPONDENTS WERE, THE MORE OFTEN THEY DECLARED THAT RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS WERE UNIMPORTANT TO THEM.

SOURCES: 1967 & 1979: INSTITUT FUER MARKT- UND SOZIALFORSCHUNG (IFAK) TRAUNSTEIN, WEST GERMANY; REPORT OF AN ARTICLE IN DER SPIEGEL CARRIED IN THE FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, DECEMBER 22, 1979. SAMPLE WAS 2,000 MEN AND WOMEN, 14 YEARS AND OVER.

1982: INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF VALUES, CENTER FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN THE APOSTOLATE (CARA), WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 1982.

IMPORTANCE OF GOD IN LIFE, MAY 1982
(SCALE OF 1 TO 10)

USA	BLACK	9.04
	HISPANIC	8.92
	NATIONAL	8.21
SOUTH AFRICA	WHITES	8.55
	BLACKS	8.45
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND		8.02
NORTHERN IRELAND		7.49
ITALY		6.96
SPAIN		6.39
BELGIUM		5.94
GREAT BRITAIN		5.72
WEST GERMANY		5.67
FINLAND		5.35
NETHERLANDS		5.33
FRANCE		4.72
JAPAN		4.49
DENMARK		4.47
SWEDEN		3.99

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF VALUES, CENTER
FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN THE APOSTOLATE
(CARA), WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 1982.

98,320 crimes and 193,548 suspects. These are just some of the many indicators of social dislocation among West German youth.*

A number of well-placed participants and observers of the West German political scene see the peace movement as religious. As discussed earlier in this section, since the end of the 1970s, clerics of the West German Evangelical church, and groups affiliated with them, have been deeply involved in the organization and promotion of peace activities. But evidence in journals or in the available data fails to show clearly which of the many peace groups is the most influential or that the majority of peace movement supporters are religious. On the contrary, the data on the political arm of the movement, the Greens, indicate that this is one group in Germany that would be very unlikely to be "religious" in the traditional sense as measured by church attendance.


The strongest Greens support comes from where one would expect it to originate: in the big cities of Hamburg, Bremen and West Berlin, which are predominantly Protestant. Moreover, the young are heavily overrepresented: the 14 to 19 year olds constitute almost one-half (46 percent) of those who favor the Greens, and the 20 to 29 year olds, slightly more than one-quarter (almost 26 percent). Thus, over 70 percent of the Greens are 14 to 29 years of age (a report in The Economist of September 18, 1982 estimated this to be as low as 62 percent). Another 18 percent are 30 to 49 years old; only 6 percent are 50 to 64; and an even fewer 5 percent are 64 and over. Further, those who have their Abitur and who are in, or have gone to, a university tend most strongly to favor the Greens; and one-half of all students support them. To sum up, almost half their supporters are 14 to 19 year olds, largely high school and university students, unmarried, and not connected with any particular religion. This support is overwhelmingly from the Protestant areas; and, as we have seen, practically no Protestants of this age group go to church.**

Moreover, as discussed later in the section on the political potential of the Greens (11.B.2.e.), most of the young Greens had been adherents of the SPD before they switched to the Greens. The likelihood of Protestant SPD supporters of all ages, and especially the young, of attending church is extremely low: as the figure below shows, in 1980 only about 6 percent of Protestant SPDers of all ages were regularly attending church, a significantly lower percentage than Catholic SPDers (who are much fewer in number) and overwhelmingly lower than Catholic CDU/CSU voters. As noted earlier, 70 percent of all regular churchgoers supported the CDU/CSU. Thus, all the data point to the likelihood that the young who are inclined to be left-wing in political orientation are the least likely to be religious. For a detailed discussion of these and other characteristics of the Greens, see the following sections of this study dealing with the specifics of the West German peace movement.

*Ashkenasi, p. 260.

** This discussion is based on data from Aktueller Politische Dienst, June 1982, published by the EMNID Institut, Bielefeld West Germany, which are detailed in Section 11.B.2.e.(1), "Support for the Greens."

WEST GERMANY
REGULAR CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY PARTY PREFERENCE, 1963-1980



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN THE GERMANS, ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED.
(WESTPORT, CT.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 235.

d. National Neutralism?

In recent writings, the supporters of the Greens and the peace movement appear to have become almost stereotyped as national neutralists. Indeed, the Dutch peace movement has actually begun to fear a rise of the despised old German nationalism in the West German peace movement; and this fear has apparently contributed to a cooling off in the relations between the two.

There is no doubt that the Greens and the peace movement supporters are neutralist. One might even venture to say they are neutralist, not only with regard to the disarmament of West Germany and the abandonment of the NATO alliance, but also to the extent of rejecting the entire Western, capitalistic social system in the face of the East. The ultimate theoretical repudiation of the Western alliance includes the repudiation of all of Western society with its inherent evils. This is the basis for the Greens' difficulty in going into political coalitions, as well as in offering solutions to the problems of the economy and workers within the existing economic and social context: in purely theoretical terms, the Greens could not, for example, ameliorate the lot of the worker with the same economic means they consider to be evil. In this ideological aspect, therefore, the Greens cannot deal with the problems of unemployment, improvement of social welfare and the growth of the economy, grounded as they are in the capitalist economic and social order which is inherently, and thus irreparably, defective.

As the March 6th election draws near, however, it is apparent that some leaders of the Greens party have had to compromise their ideology in the interest of political pragmatism and have drawn away from this theoretical rejection of the entire capitalist order, thereby creating fundamental tension within the Greens' camp.

Rudolf Bahro, who was expelled from East Germany in 1979, remains the most articulate spokesman for the purist ideology of the so-called "Undogmatic Socialists" who uncompromisingly reject the very fabric of capitalist society. Opposing this position, the more practical Marxist leaders within the Greens, the so-called "traditional" leftists, have attempted--particularly in the large city-states--to woo the workers by addressing themselves to economic problems within the system. The tension between these factions broke out into the open in Hamburg as a prelude to the March 6th election:

On the economics debate, as on other matters, the rising influence of Marxist groups that have moved into the Greens party was perceptible. These "traditional" leftists, who are particularly strong in Hamburg and West Berlin, have moved the Greens away from an almost anarchistic view that combating unemployment is wrong because it strengthens the capitalist order.

Thomas Ebermann, the Greens' Hamburg chief, forcefully persuaded the overflowing auditorium to adopt positions that would permit the Greens to compete with the entrenched West German trade unions....

Rainer Trampert, another Hamburg leftist who is a party spokesman, warned that Mr. Vogel was out to steal the Greens' issues and voters. He said sarcastically that the Social Democrats' historic role had been "to gather in opposition elements in order to better lead bourgeoisie society."

But other Greens, many of whom at times hanker for the apocalyptic collapse of industrial society, charged that leftists like Mr. Trampert were leading the party in the direction of eventual cooperation with the Social Democrats in Parliament.*

The leftist-socialist-humanist-pacifist ideals and movements have, of course, a strong tradition in modern German history. Because of this, much has been made of the linkages of the present Greens and peace movement to these historical influences, which are frequently characterized as having peculiarly Germanic, romantic and nationalistic strains, at times infused with an almost mystical quality. Indeed, the speculative linking of today's peace movement with these historical currents may have contributed to the heightened sense of their importance in the Greens' political scene.

Certainly a number of the issues the Greens' support today resemble the causes of the national neutralists of the past. For example, the Greens have advocated German withdrawal from the NATO alliance (as opposed to the views of the total West German population); they have rejected the stationing of new American nuclear weapons on their territory; they have been making contact with East German peace movements, particularly through the East German Protestant church leaders (against whom the East German government has taken swift repressive measures); and they, unlike the majority of West Germans, would like everyone to get out of Germany--East and West--and leave the Germans alone.

But does this signify the Greens are nationalistic? On the contrary, all existing data point to the fact that the Greens and the supporters of this movement, who are the young and well-educated, are the least nationalistic of all West Germans, have the least pride in their country, are the least willing to defend Germany, are becoming more self-conscious with the concept "Fatherland," are the least interested in reunification, and have the greatest doubts of supporters of any political party that East and West Germany will ever reunite.** Furthermore, the political

* James M. Markham, "A-Arms Opposition in West Germany," The New York Times, January 17, 1983, p. 3. Thomas Ebermann was a member of the Communist party until 1982, when he became an Alternative candidate.

** See also Section II.B.2.g.(2) showing that twice as many youthful Greens as any other population group chose to accept Russian domination over defending Germany. Moreover, over 80 percent of the Greens preferred an Austrian-type neutrality over a military alliance with the West, compared with 30 percent of the CDU/CSU supporters, 37 percent of the Social Democrats and 24 percent of the Free Democrats.

attitudes of these young are unstable and can swing rapidly from one movement or cause to another. The EMNID organization, the Gallup poll affiliate in West Germany, noted the political volatility and immaturity of German youth:

One has to constantly reckon with swings in opinion among the "young generation," even those which appear to have an "evil" connotation for the West Germans. By these are meant right-radical tendencies, hatred of foreigners, nationalism in its negative aspect, perhaps even chauvinism. The "Greenhorns" [in German the "Greenbeaks"--Gruenschnaebeln], that is, the immature, young, and unripe people of the past, have become the "young Greens" of today. And what color will many of them have tomorrow?*

Curiously enough, for all their stated rabid anti-Americanism, the young Greens have taken over a peculiarly American-styled, utopian-materialistic ideology, similar to the counter-culture ideology of the 1960s and '70s in the U.S. In addition, German youth patronize "American" shops, which flourish in Germany, wear jeans, imitate the sounds of American rock music, and watch American TV shows. (The TV series "Dallas" is the most popular show in West Germany. It has been anecdotally reported that all of West German society is divided into three "Dallas camps": one that regards Dallas as "camp" and watches it while comfortably drinking wine and eating cheese; one that purposely refuses to watch it; or one--the large majority--that seriously watches it.) A quote from the French singer Yves Montand, about French anti-Americanism, will do as well for the West German attitude: "Don't count on me to boycott Hemingway, Faulkner, jazz, jeans, or hamburgers."**

The ambivalent relationship of some West German youth, in particular the Greens, to Western (American) affluence and materialism, has been touched on by the social analyst Stephen F. Szabo in a discussion of the new generation in Germany. His description of this generation sounds like a ticking off of Herman Kahn's list of "New Emphases," characterizing the emergence of a post-materialist society and a "new class" of highly-educated, symbolist elites. It is worthy to be quoted in full:

....Germans born since the end of World War II have come of age in a society both affluent and stable. They have little or no direct experience with the building of the Berlin Wall, and to many the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia is only a dim memory. They grew up in Brandt and Schmidt's Germany, not Adenauer's. Their view of the Soviet Union has been shaped by detente rather than Cold War. Their experience of America,

* EMNID Institut, Aktueller Politischer Dienst, June 1982, p. 46.

** U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 93, No. 25 (December 20, 1982), p. 35.

especially for those who have attended universities has been one of Vietnam, Watergate, and Iran. Thus, they have come of age in a period in which the father figure has become discredited.

In the early 1980s...their own futures suddenly appear more uncertain. They are also questioning the dominant values of postwar West German society, which they associate with excessive materialism, centralization, and bureaucratization. The critique of the Atomstaat (the atomic state) by the Greens has merged with the anti-nuclear weapons critique of the Peace Movement to a larger, counter-cultural protest movement. Its anti-modern, anti-industrial romanticism is reminiscent of traditional themes of German debate associated with a "cultural resistance to the West." All this is occurring in a society where the authority of the prewar generation has been compromised by its association with the Third Reich. It is not surprising, therefore, that this protest movement incorporates an anti-American element. The critique of America is part of a larger cultural critique of West German society values.

Many younger Germans would like to drop out of the situation in which they have been placed by geography and history. The desire for greater control over their lives and the decisions which affect their prospects often takes on a utopian character. There are nationalist strains and their striving for greater independence and more control over their society and its foreign policy, but the aims of this independence appear to be quite limited and parochial. A poster at a peace demonstration fairly summarizes the mood of many: "We are afraid."*

Note that Szabo, like other observers of the Greens' scene, found that the counter-cultural protest of the Greens and peace groups was reminiscent of "traditional themes" of German romanticism, characterized by "nationalistic strains."

The dilemma of the new German elite youth appears to be embedded in a relinquishment among West Germans as a whole of what Henry Kissinger, after the Falkland crisis, called "...certain basic principles like honor, justice, and patriotism [which] remain legitimate and have to be defended..."** Indeed, the patriotic reaction of the British in the Falkland crisis was considered unfitting by many Germans, and the West German press reaction was intense and "conspicuously unsympathetic" to the British.***

*Professor Stephen F. Szabo, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., "The New Generation in Germany," Transatlantic Perspectives, No. 7 (December 1982), pp. 11-12.

**Melvin J. Lasky, "Embattled Positions," Encounter, Vol. LIX, Nos. 3-4 (September-October 1982), p. 106.

***Ibid.

According to the British journalist Melvin J. Lasky, "This touch of noblesse was felt by the contemporary Germans to be almost obscene. In the new German mind this was taken to be only something which they call 'Hurrah Patriotismus,' a relapse into old emotions to which they are now immune." Lasky referred to a recent affair in which Karl-Heinz Bohrer, the London correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, wrote a series of articles attacking the West German reaction to the Falkland crisis. Bohrer, who springs from the younger liberal-left post-World War II generation, lashed out at the "insipidity" of today's West Germans:

...We West Germans will have to learn again that our historic catastrophe and disillusionment in total defeat in no way "relativises" the value of patriotism; or we will be living in another form of political lie....

Who wants to die for the Falklands? But the question seems to suggest that for something higher, or better, the sacrifice might be worth making. This is delusive. In truth we are not ready to die for anything, certainly not for a principle....

Lasky observed that the Germans had become spiritually weak, without ties to their "archaic consciousness":

What suddenly came with the force of "shock of recognition" was the petty-mercantile psychology (Haendlergesinnung) for which the Germans once used to revile the English, repeating Napoleon's insult against a spiritless "nation of shopkeepers." A few generations ago the "German spirit" was reflected in the attitudes of Max Scheler and Thomas Mann and their devotion to a certain "heroic spirit." What a change there has been!

...A society like the German one today, cut off from its past, lives only in the present;...[with] its "topical consciousness...."

Bohrer, too, severely condemned the businessmen's mentality:

We are the new Phoenicians....We Germans have no public philosophy, no revered state symbols, nothing but a harmless federalism of prospering provinces waiting for the next Carnival and new wine. Others will have to do the fighting for us; others will have to defend principles, make sacrifices, mourn heroes. We have become the voyeurs and opportunists of contemporary history....*

The German liberal-left was clearly disturbed by Bohrer's article. One of the replies to Bohrer's attack was written for the highly-respected

* Ibid., pp. 107-108.

Hamburg paper Die Zeit by Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, Director of the London School of Economics and prominent liberal theoretician for the FDP. He argued that it would be a mistake to think all British were chauvinistic; there were two Britains, he wrote: "one calm and intelligent; the other new, aggressive, hard and ruthless...."*

Today, many West Germans seem to have discarded the sharp distinctions between political rights and freedoms which they so fiercely defended as part of a divided Germany in the immediate post-World War II period. These political distinctions have become watered down in favor of a non-partisan position that recognizes and accommodates a Realpolitik; that is the political reality of a status quo established by power. Indeed, the present initiatives for dialogue between East and West Germany are now symbolized by the German phrase "'deutsch-deutsch," that new and neutral diplomatic coinage which avoids the old implications of hostility which still mark the usages of 'East Germany' and 'West Germany.'***

East Germany is now simply referred to in West Germany as the "DDR"--the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic). In recent times prominent writers and intellectuals of the two Germanies met twice for talks initiated by the East Germans--talks which, incidentally were well-covered by the West German media--to discuss art, literature, peace, and the likelihood of the two Germanies becoming a European battlefield. According to Francois Bondy, the West Germans have reconciled themselves "to a kind of Orwellian newspeak where nothing in international affairs ever gets to be called by the right name":

"German-German" has come to be the adjective that characterizes the relations between the two independent sovereign states which emerged from the Allied and Soviet division of the defeated Third Reich. It is a quiet word of discreet camouflage, disguising all the differences, and merging all the contrasting colors into an environmental blur. It has now also been conscripted into service for the Peace Movement, uniting all Germans on both sides of the "East-West" frontier, as if both were being mortally endangered by the NATO defence establishment.***

(1) Are You Proud to be a German? What the Polls Say

The religious-based organization, Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA), in Washington, D.C., sponsored an International Study of Values survey, the early findings of which were published in 1982. Two correlated questions were felt to be indicative of a sense of national

* Ibid., p. 107.

** Francois Bondy, "European Diary," Encounter, Vol. LIX, No. 2 (August 1982), p. 39.

*** Ibid., p. 40.

pride. One asked if the respondent were proud to be whatever nationality he or she was; the other, if there should ever be another war, would you be willing to fight for your country?

The responses among selected West European nations and the U.S. are shown below: The Dutch and West Germans registered the lowest pride: only 2 out of every 10 West Germans felt very proud to be German, a paltry patriotism compared with, for example, the U.S., where 8 out of 10 were very proud to be American. In fact, only 6 out of 10 West Germans had a positive feeling about their nationality (combined responses of "very proud" and "rather proud").

When this response was correlated with that of willingness to fight for their country, clearly those who were least proud to be German were also less willing to go to war to defend Germany. This correlation was particularly strong among younger Germans, 18 to 29 years of age.

Throughout the 1970s, the Allensbach Institut also questioned the West Germans about their national pride. In contrast to the above results, this trend showed that in general about 4 out of 10 Germans were very proud of their country, and at least another third was rather proud. During the ten-year period as many as 8 out of 10 had a positive feeling about their nationality, a significantly higher proportion than in the CARA poll. These results are also shown in a table below.

The Allensbach survey of January 1980 indicated as well that the young (16 to 29 years) were considerably less proud to be German than persons 30 and over; in fact, national pride increased with age. Twice as many persons 60 and over (66 percent) were very proud of their nationality as the 16 to 29 year olds (31 percent). A large percentage of the young were, however, undecided about their feelings (15 percent).

As might be anticipated, those who felt proud to be German were also considerably less likely to want to emigrate from Germany. Figures in another table show that emigration appealed to significantly greater numbers of 16 to 29 year olds (35 percent) than to the total population (21 percent). Moreover, as a final table in this set reveals, fewer Germans in 1979 (68 percent) than in 1953 (78 percent) preferred living in West Germany, and the drop was even greater among the young under 30 years of age (1979, 54 percent, 1953, 69 percent).^{*} Of the four out of ten youths in 1979 who preferred living elsewhere than the Federal Republic, half wanted to go to another European country and half outside of Europe.

The reasons for wanting to live in another country are, of course, complicated; particularly among the young they may have less to do with national feelings than with seeking economic opportunities, getting

^{*} In comparison, in 1981, 90 percent of Americans felt that the U.S. is the best place in the world to live. Civic Service survey, March 1981 in Public Opinion, (June/July 1982), p. 23.

NATIONAL PRIDE
CARA POLLS, 1981

IF YOU WERE ASKED, ARE YOU PROUD TO BE (NAME OF COUNTRY), WOULD YOUR ANSWER BE VERY PROUD, RATHER PROUD, NOT VERY PROUD, NOT AT ALL PROUD, OR ARE YOU UNDECIDED?

	<u>VERY PROUD</u>	<u>RATHER PROUD</u>	<u>NOT VERY PROUD</u>	<u>NOT AT ALL PROUD</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>
EUROPE AS A WHOLE	38%	38%	12%	7%	5%
BY COUNTRY:					
WEST GERMANY	21	38	18	11	12
ENGLAND	55	31	8	3	3
NORTHERN IRELAND	46	33	9	4	8
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND	66	25	5	1	3
FRANCE	33	43	8	9	7
BELGIUM	27	44	12	7	10
NETHERLANDS	19	41	21	10	9
SPAIN	49	34	8	4	5
DENMARK	30	41	18	4	7
ITALY	41	39	11	6	3
UNITED STATES	80	16	2	1	2

WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT FOR COUNTRY
(CORRELATED WITH NATIONAL PRIDE)
WEST GERMANY, CARA POLL, 1981

OF COURSE, WE ALL HOPE THERE WILL NEVER BE A WAR AGAIN. BUT, SHOULD THERE BE ANOTHER ONE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR YOUR COUNTRY?

		<u>PROUD TO BE GERMAN</u>		
	<u>NATIONWIDE</u>	<u>VERY PROUD</u>	<u>RATHER PROUD</u>	<u>NOT VERY/NOT AT ALL PROUD</u>
YES	34%	52%	38%	20%
NO	41	30	36	53
UNDECIDED	25	18	26	27
<u>BY AGE: 18-29</u>				
YES	34	60	49	15
NO	40	29	26	56
UNDECIDED	26	11	25	29
<u>BY AGE: 30 & OVER</u>				
YES	34	50	36	23
NO	41	31	38	51
UNDECIDED	25	19	26	26

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF VALUES, 1982, CENTER FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN THE APOSTOLATE (CARA), WASHINGTON, D.C. EUROPE: NATIONAL ADULT SAMPLES TOTALING 12,463. WEST GERMANY: SAMPLES OF ABOUT 2,000 PERSONS POLLED BY THE ALLENSBACH INSTITUT, MARCH & NOVEMBER 1981.

PROUD TO BE GERMAN?
ALLENSBACH POLLS
 (TOTAL POPULATION, 16 YEARS & OVER, INCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

QUESTION: ARE YOU PROUD TO BE A GERMAN? WOULD YOU SAY VERY PROUD,
 RATHER PROUD, NOT VERY PROUD, NOT AT ALL PROUD?

	<u>SAMPLE SIZE</u>	<u>VERY PROUD</u>	<u>RATHER PROUD</u>	<u>NOT VERY PROUD</u>	<u>NOT AT ALL PROUD</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>
OCTOBER 1971	2000	42%	34%	7%	4%	13%
AUGUST 1972	1959	33	38	9	7	13
AUGUST 1974	1509	48	35	5	4	8
NOVEMBER 1975	2099	36	40	6	6	12
DECEMBER 1975*	1000	43	37	8	3	9
DECEMBER 1979/ JANUARY 1980	1133	44	35	6	5	10

*TOTAL POPULATION, 18 YEARS AND OVER.

ALLENSBACH POLL, DECEMBER 1979/JANUARY 1980
 (BY AGE)

	<u>SAMPLE SIZE</u>	<u>VERY PROUD</u>	<u>RATHER PROUD</u>	<u>NOT VERY PROUD</u>	<u>NOT AT ALL PROUD</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>
TOTAL	1133	44%	35%	6%	5%	10%
16-29 YEARS	240	31	38	7	9	15
30-59 YEARS	613	41	39	7	4	
60 YRS & OVER	280	66	25	2	2	

SOURCE: ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE, 1981/NO. 23, P. 26.

NATIONAL PRIDE AND EMIGRATION

ALLENSBACH POLL, NOVEMBER 1981

(TOTAL POPULATION 16 YEARS AND OVER, INCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

QUESTION: WOULD YOU YOURSELF LIKE TO EMIGRATE?

<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>		<u>PERSONS WHO ARE PROUD TO BE GERMAN</u>		
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>VERY</u>	<u>RATHER</u>	<u>NOT AT ALL</u>
YES	21%	11%	19%	44%
NO	67	82	67	39
UNDECIDED	<u>12</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>17</u>
	100	100	100	100

<u>16-29 YEAR OLDS</u>		<u>PERSONS WHO ARE PROUD TO BE GERMAN</u>		
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>VERY</u>	<u>RATHER</u>	<u>NOT AT ALL</u>
YES	35%	26%	30%	49%
NO	45	59	50	33
UNDECIDED	<u>20</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>18</u>
	100	100	100	100

 SOURCE: ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE, 1981/NO. 6, P. 8.

IN WHICH COUNTRY WOULD YOU LIKE TO LIVE?

ALLENSBACH POLL, 1981
(TOTAL POPULATION 18 YEARS AND OVER, INCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

QUESTION: IN WHICH COUNTRY WOULD YOU PREFER LIVING?

	<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>		<u>PERSONS UNDER 30 YEARS OF AGE</u>	
	<u>1953</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1979</u>
IN GERMANY, IN THE FRG	78%	68%	69%	54%
IN ANOTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY	10	15	13	20
IN A COUNTRY OUTSIDE EUROPE	7	12	12	20
OTHER OR NO ANSWER, UNDECIDED	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
	100	100	100	100
SAMPLE SIZE	3,243	2,001	754	422

SOURCE: ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE, 1981/NO. 23, P. 27.

away from home, a desire to travel or curiosity about other lands. The young are also not yet tied down by family life and job responsibilities and can more easily get away. Despite these observations, the important point clearly remains that significantly fewer youth prefer to remain in Germany than the population as a whole.

(2) Fatherland and Flag

In February 1981, only one-third of the young said they liked the sound of the word "Fatherland" (Vaterland) compared with two-thirds who found it unsuitable for our times. Like the feeling of national pride, the appeal of Fatherland increased with age, Germans over 60 being more than twice as likely to favor it as the young. Furthermore, unlike that of any other age group, support for Fatherland among the youth declined between 1975 and 1981 (41 down to 35 percent). There was a considerable difference in response by voter preference: in February 1981, Fatherland appealed to as many as 7 out of 10 CDU voters compared with slightly more than one-half of SPD supporters.

About one-half of the West Germans seem to have become accustomed to the sight of their black-red-gold flag. Allensbach polls show that since 1961 slightly under 50 percent felt pleased when they saw the German flag somewhere, twice as many as in April 1951. Up to the early 1980's, however, 4 out of 10 West Germans still ignored the flag; most (about 30 percent) simply didn't like it; the other 10 percent were uninterested or failed to understand why they would have a reaction to it. Tables showing the choices for Fatherland and Flag follow below.

(3) German Reunification--Issue or Nonissue?

The West Germans have had the curious and unhappy problem of having to give names to two parts of a divided Germany. The change from past to present in their popular names for the two Germanies has become a unique indicator of the change in the political situation, in particular, German reunification. What the West Germans formerly called the East zone (Ost Zone) in 1966 is now simply called the DDR (in English, GDR). Even now some of the recalcitrant old timers call the other part of Germany the Ost Zone. The Western part of Germany has largely become a straightforward Germany or Federal Republic, which presently runs a close second.

The subtleties in the name changes for West Germany can be noted in the ranking of choices in the table below: between March 1966 and May 1980, "Germany" shifted position from a low third place to the top of the list; "Federal Republic" moved from first to second place; and "West Germany" dropped from a close second to a tie for a low third. One could hardly ask for a clearer statement of the historical process Germany has been undergoing since the middle of the 1960s. Clearly, the two Germanies are now simply recognized in the Western part as two different states with two different governments.

"FATHERLAND"

ALLENSBACH POLLS, 1975 AND 1981

(TOTAL POPULATION 16 YEARS AND OVER, INCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

QUESTION: THE WORD "FATHERLAND": DOES THAT HAVE A GOOD
SOUND TO YOU, OR DO YOU FEEL THAT IT NO LONGER
SUITS OUR TIMES TODAY?

<u>ANSWER</u>	<u>SAMPLE SIZE</u>	<u>GOOD SOUND</u>	<u>NO LONGER SUITS</u>	<u>NO</u>
TOTAL POPULATION, NOV. 1975	2099	60%	38%	2%
TOTAL POP., FEB. 1981	2135	59	39	2
16-29 YEARS 11/1975	537	41	56	3
16-29 YEARS, 2/1981	599	35	61	4
30-44 YEARS, 11/1975	597	55	42	3
30-44 YEARS, 2/1981	555	54	44	2
45-59 YEARS, 11/1975	450	63	35	2
45-59 YEARS, 2/1981	447	69	29	2
60 YRS & OVER, 11/1975	515	82	17	1
60 YRS & OVER, 2/1981	534	81	17	2
SPD VOTERS 2/1981		55		
CDU VOTERS 2/1981		71		

SOURCE: ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE, 1981/NO. 23, P. 30.

FLAG
(ALLENSBACH POLLS, 1951-1981)
(TOTAL POPULATION 16 YEARS & OLDER, INCLUDING W. BERLIN)

QUESTION: DO YOU FEEL GLAD TO SEE THE BLACK-RED-GOLD FEDERAL
FLAG SOMEWHERE?

	APRIL 1951	MAY 1952	APRIL 1953	OCT. 1961	AUG 1972	SEPT. 1977	JULY 1981
YES, I FEEL GLAD	23%	27%	31%	46%	40%	47%	47%
IT DEPENDS ON THE OCCASION	--	--	--	4	5	4	4
INDIFFERENT, UNINTER- ESTED, WHY SHOULD I FEEL GLAD?	21	25	24	17	15	12	12
NO, DON'T FEEL GLAD	33	27	26	22	31	30	29
OTHER ANSWERS (UNDECIDED, BLACK- WHITE-RED IS MORE BEAUTIFUL, DON'T KNOW, NOT FAMILIAR, I HAVE NOTHING AGAINST THIS FLAG, NO IDEA, NO ANSWER)	<u>23</u> 100	<u>21</u> 100	<u>19</u> 100	<u>15</u> 100	<u>14</u> 100	<u>11</u> 100	<u>12</u> 100
SAMPLE SIZE	2025	2057	1043	880	1959	2002	991

SOURCE: ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE, 1981/NO.23, P. 24.

WHAT SHALL I CALL THE GERMANIES?
ALLENSBACH POLLS, 1966 AND 1980

(TOTAL POPULATION, 16 YEARS AND OVER, INCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

QUESTION: HERE IS A MAP OF GERMANY. ON THE LEFT YOU HAVE OUR AREA AND ON THE RIGHT THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY. WHEN YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY WITH PEOPLE YOU KNOW, WHAT DO YOU CALL IT, WHAT DO YOU SAY?

	<u>1980</u> <u>MAY</u>	<u>1966</u> <u>MARCH</u>
GDR (DDR IN GERMAN)	61%	11%
EAST ZONE	16	48
THE OTHER SIDE, OVER THERE	7	5
EAST GERMANY	6	12
THE ZONE	3	9
THE EAST	3	-
SOVIET-OCCUPIED ZONE, SOVIET- OCCUPIED TERRITORY, OCCUPIED ZONE	1	4
CENTRAL GERMANY	x	4
SOVIET ZONE	x	3
OTHER/NO REPLY/DON'T KNOW	<u>12</u>	<u>9</u>
	109	105

x: LESS THAN 0.5%.

QUESTION: AND WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT OUR PART WITH PEOPLE YOU KNOW WHAT DO YOU CALL IT?

	<u>1980</u> <u>MAY</u>	<u>1966</u> <u>MARCH</u>
GERMANY	34%	12%
FEDERAL REPUBLIC	26	36
WEST GERMANY	12	29
FRG (BRD IN GERMAN)	12	-
OUR PART, HERE	5	5
THE WEST	5	8
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	4	3
THE FEDERAL AREA	1	2
OTHER/NO REPLY/DON'T KNOW	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
	106	102

SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E10.

Many polls of West Germans about reunification depend on reactions to the political and human realities. The issue of reunification has simply disappeared from the list of concerns Germans consider important.* Indeed, today the problems of reunification are too enormous and complex, and the effects too inconceivable, to be contemplated by the Germans. But obviously, in human terms, the separation of the two Germanies cannot be forgotten: these are all Germans, cruelly separated by antagonistic political systems; millions of older Germans fled from their homes in East Germany; large numbers of Germans have either relatives or friends in the GDR or have visited there. When the Germans are asked, solutions to achieve reunification generally entail, of necessity, some sort of neutralization of either the two Germanies or of one or the other. Since the sacrifice to achieve this would be too great, the issue goes no further. Furthermore, few countries other than West Germany would care to see the reunification of the two Germanies in any form.

Obviously, any polls about reunification will reflect the extreme sensitivity of this issue. It is to be anticipated that young people would be less interested in reunification, since they personally were not involved in this history, have lived their entire lives with the status quo, and have many fewer ties to East Germany. Supporters of the Greens party, therefore, who are largely young, would be expected to be less interested in reunification than voters in the other political parties.

Indeed, the results of two July 1981 Allensbach polls, shown in the table below, bear this out. Yes, 62 percent of all Germans very much want the two Germanies to reunite; but, no, another 62 percent do not think they ever will. These are large differences in response between the young and old, by the strength of personal ties to the DDR, and by political orientation. Slightly more than two-fifths of the 16 to 29 year olds find reunification important, compared with about three-fourths of those 45 and over; and CDU/CSU voters are twice as likely as Greens to want the two Germanies to reunite. Moreover, hardly any supporters of the Greens party or the young think that East and West Germany will ever reunite; but 21 percent of those 60 and older and 16 percent of the CDU/CSU voters still keep this vision as a possibility.

A few questions from an EMNID Institut survey taken in early 1981 about various aspects of reunification are shown below. Included are blame for the division of Germany; who would bring about reunification; is the Iron Curtain a lasting border; and what kind of government would West Germans like to see in a united Germany? The response to the last is overwhelmingly (68 percent) a Western-type state.

*One percent in an Allensbach poll in 1981. The question asked for "the most important political concern," and responses were open-ended, i.e., without a specific list of choices, but volunteered by the respondent. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Who Needs a Flag?," Encounter, Vol. LX, No. 1 (January 1983), p. 78.

REUNIFICATION, JULY 1981
ALLENSBACH POLL

QUESTION: DO YOU WANT REUNIFICATION VERY MUCH, OR IS IT NOT TOO IMPORTANT TO YOU?

	<u>WANT VERY MUCH</u>	<u>NOT IMPORTANT</u>	<u>NO ANSWER</u>
TOTAL	62%	32%	6%
AGE:			
16-29 YEARS	44	50	6
30-44 YEARS	56	37	7
45-59 YEARS	73	20	7
60 YEARS & OLDER	76	18	6
RELATIVES/FRIENDS IN DDR:			
YES, HAVE SOME	74	19	7
NO, HAVE NONE	54	40	6
POLITICAL ORIENTATION:			
CDU/CSU	72	23	5
SPD	64	31	5
FDP	54	46	-
GREEN PARTY	35	53	12

QUESTION: DO YOU THINK THAT EAST AND WEST GERMANY WILL EVER REUNITE, OR NOT?

	<u>BELIEVE THEY WILL</u>	<u>DON'T THINK THEY WILL</u>	<u>CAN'T SAY</u>
TOTAL	13%	62%	25%
AGE:			
16-29 YEARS	7	69	24
30-44 YEARS	11	67	22
45-59 YEARS	14	60	26
60 YEARS & OLDER	21	52	27
RELATIVES/FRIENDS IN DDR:			
YES, HAVE SOME	17	65	18
NO, HAVE NONE	11	61	28
POLITICAL ORIENTATION:			
CDU/CSU	16	57	27
SPD	10	64	26
FDP	17	71	12
GREEN PARTY	3	79	18

SOURCE: WORLD OPINION UPDATE, VOL. V, NO. 5 (SEPT./OCT. 1981).

REUNIFICATION--JANUARY 1981BLAME FOR THE DIVISION OF THE NATION?

SOVIET UNION	33%
GDR	23
HITLER	22
WESTERN ALLIES	20
ADENAUER AND THE CDU/CSU	6
THE TWO POWER BLOCS	15
ALL BEAR SOME OF BLAME	13

WHO WOULD MOST LIKELY BRING ABOUT REUNIFICATION?

THE COURSE OF HISTORY	20%
GOVERNMENT OF GDR & WEST GERMANY	18
THE U.S.A. & U.S.S.R. JOINTLY	17
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE IN THE TWO GERMANIES	14
NOBODY	14
U.S.S.R. ALONE	11
A STRONG-ARM POLITICIAN	4
U.S.A. ALONE	3
THE U.N.	3
THE SDP-FDP COALITION	2
NATO	2
THE CDU/CSU	1
THE CHURCHES	1

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT SURVEY REPORTED IN DIE WELT
 (THE GERMAN TRIBUNE, NO. 984 [APRIL 21, 1981],
 P. 3).

REUNIFICATION--JANUARY 1981 (CONT'D.)PRESS FOR REUNIFICATION?

PEOPLES IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS GERMANY, KOREA, AND CHINA SHOULD PRESS FOR REUNIFICATION	63%
ACCEPT THE SITUATION AS IT IS	34

WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT IN A UNITED GERMANY?

WESTERN-TYPE STATE	68%
MODELED ON THE EAST	7
DON'T CARE WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT	7
INDIFFERENT TOWARDS REUNIFICATION	17
REJECT REUNIFICATION	5

	<u>CDU/CSU</u>	<u>SPD</u>	<u>FDP</u>
WESTERN-TYPE STATE	75%	68%	59%
INDIFFERENT TOWARDS REUNIF.	14	27	

IS IRON CURTAIN A LASTING BORDER
DIVIDING GERMANY IN TWO?

IRON CURTAIN IS LASTING BORDER	69%
IRON CURTAIN IS NOT LASTING BORDER	30
NO OPINION	1

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT SURVEY REPORTED IN DIE WELT (THE GERMAN TRIBUNE, NO. 984 [APRIL 21, 1981], P. 3).

e. The Political Potential of the Greens

(1) Support for the Greens

Estimates of the percentage of potential Greens' voters under 30 years of age range from 62 to over 70 percent.* As indicated in previous sections, the overwhelming support for the Greens appears to come from youth in their mid- to late teens, a large number of whom are still likely to be students and are frequently academically-educated.

The teenagers and young adults of the baby-boom generation are starting in vocations or preparing to attend universities in ever greater numbers; they are also being widely educated under the new concept of the development of the "whole person," in contrast to that of simply mastering the three "Rs." Those who go to the universities--and their numbers are increasing significantly--are often still students at age 26, 27, or 28. As of 1977, a majority of these university students were studying the so-called "soft" sciences. In addition, most youth today are growing up in densely populated suburban areas surrounding and connecting cities, or in the cities themselves; indeed, the West German population has largely become confined to major urban conglomerations.**

Survey data indicate that the city-states of Hamburg, Bremen and West Berlin contain over one and a half times as many Greens' sympathizers as there are in any other federal state (Land). In a July 1982 EMNID survey, 30 percent of the population, 14 years and over, of these city-states favored the Greens party. In comparison, the next highest level of support, in Hesse, was down sharply to 19 percent. And in the most populous state in West Germany, North Rhine-Westphalia, only one in ten indicated a preference for the Greens.*** Tables giving the breakdown of party sympathy are shown below.

Note in the tables that the overwhelming appeal of the Greens was to the very young, and that after age 19, sympathy for the party dropped precipitously. Only 18 percent of those 20-29 years of age, compared with 46 percent of the 14-19 year olds, preferred the Greens. The over-30 population registered well under 10 percent sympathy. As the voting age is 18, a large fraction of the Greens' support, therefore, comes from nonvoters.

Significantly, in this EMNID survey the very young gave practically no support to the SPD. Other than their preferences for the Greens, they divided their choices, one-fifth each, between the CDU/CSU and no party at all; in fact, their support for the SPD was an insignificant 8 percent.

*Section 11.B.2.c.(2) contains a further discussion of these numbers. The 62 percent figure is from The Economist, September 18, 1982, p. 51.

**See Section 11.B.2.a. for the demographic and educational background of potential Greens' and peace movement supporters.

***EMNID Institut, Aktueller Politische Dienst, June 1982.

PARTY SYMPATHY BY AGE AND EDUCATION: JULY 1982
EMNID POLL
WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS & OVER

QUESTION: "WHICH PARTY APPEALS TO YOU THE MOST AT THE PRESENT TIME?"

PARTY	TOTAL %	AGE					PRIMARY %	EDUCATION	SR. HIGH (ABITUR) ^a UNIVERSITY %
		14-19 %	20-29 %	30-49 %	50-64 %	65+ %		INTER- MEDIATE %	
CDU, CSU	39	22	28	46	44	41	43	39	24
SPD	24	8	23	20	31	36	29	16	16
FDP	6	1	5	9	5	5	4	11	7
NPD	*	-	-	*	-	1	*	-	-
DKP	*	-	*	*	-	-	*	*	-
THE GREENS	12	46	18	7	4	3	7	19	26
OTHER PARTIES	*	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-
NONE OF THESE	14	22	16	14	13	9	13	12	25
NO ANSWER	4	*	7	4	3	4	5	2	2
% TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SAMPLE SIZE	1005	121	143	353	232	157	644	242	119

* LESS THAN ONE PERCENT.

- NO RESPONSE.

^a ABITUR IS THE ACADEMIC HIGH SCHOOL (GYMNASIUM) DIPLOMA.

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, AKTUELLER POLITISCHER DIENST, JUNE 1982, P. 49.

PARTY SYMPATHY BY MARITAL STATUS AND RELIGION: JULY 1982
EMNID POLL
 WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS & OVER

QUESTION: "WHICH PARTY APPEALS TO YOU THE MOST AT THE PRESENT TIME?"

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> %	<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>			<u>RELIGION</u>		
		<u>SINGLE</u> %	<u>MARRIED</u> %	<u>WIDOWED, DIVORCED</u> %	<u>PROTESTANT</u> %	<u>CATHOLIC</u> %	<u>OTHER</u> %
CDU, CSU	39	27	43	43	32	50	20
SPD	24	16	27	26	29	19	25
FDP	6	3	7	6	10	2	1
NPD	*	-	*	-	-	1	-
DKP	*	-	*	*	*	*	-
THE GREENS	12	32	5	7	14	7	-
OTHER PARTIES	*	1	-	*	-	1	-
NONE OF THESE	14	17	13	13	12	17	-
NO ANSWER	4	3	4	3	4	4	-
% TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SAMPLE SIZE	1005	242	625	131	506	499	100

* LESS THAN ONE PERCENT.

- NO RESPONSE.

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, AKTUELLER POLITISCHER DIENST. . .

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THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE
PROGRAM ITS OPPON (U) HUDSON INST INC INDIANAPOLIS IN
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
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
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PARTY SYMPATHY BY OCCUPATION: JULY 1982

EMNID POLL

WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS & OVER

QUESTION: "WHICH PARTY APPEALS TO YOU THE MOST AT THE PRESENT TIME?"

PARTY	TOTAL %	OCCUPATION						
		BLUE COLLAR %	WHITE COLLAR %	PUBLIC SERVICE %	SELF-EM- PLOYED %	PEN- SIONER %	HOUSE- WIFE %	STUDENT %
CDU, CSU	39	38	40	33	80	39	40	20
SPD	24	29	21	28	6	31	34	6
FDP	6	10	8	5	7	3	3	5
NPD	*	*	-	-	-	1	-	-
DKP	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	-
THE GREENS	12	6	14	6	1	5	4	48
OTHER PARTIES	*	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
NONE OF THESE	14	14	10	29	4	15	15	19
NO ANSWER	4	3	5	-	2	5	4	1
% TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SAMPLE SIZE	1005	171	192	42	67	160	216	121

* LESS THAN ONE PERCENT.

- NO RESPONSE.

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, AKTUELLER POLITISCHER DIENST, JUNE 1982, P. 50.

PARTY SYMPATHY BY FEDERAL STATES: JULY 1982

EMNID POLL

WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS & OVER

QUESTION: "WHICH PARTY APPEALS TO YOU THE MOST AT THE PRESENT TIME?"

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> %	<u>FEDERAL STATES</u>						
		LOWER SAXONY %	HAMBURG, BREMEN, BERLIN %	NRW %	HESSE %	RHINE- PAL. SAAR %	BADEN- WUERT. %	BAVARIA %
CDU, CSU	39	38	20	41	39	41	41	44
SPD	24	25	17	24	21	21	31	25
FDP	6	7	17	6	3	*	9	1
NPD	*	-	-	1	-	-	*	-
DKP	*	*	-	*	-	-	-	-
THE GREENS	12	16	30	10	19	11	6	6
OTHER PARTIES	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	1
NONE OF THESE	14	8	15	15	8	27	12	17
NO ANSWER	4	6	1	3	10	-	-	6
% TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SAMPLE SIZE	1005	161	76	277	90	77	150	174

* LESS THAN ONE PERCENT.

- NO RESPONSE.

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, AKTUELLER POLITISCHER DIENST, JUNE 1982, P. 51.

The EMNID poll results in the table below show a huge shift between 1974 and 1982 in teenager sympathy from the SPD to the Greens. Six out of ten youth under twenty switched their choice, leaving the SPD with only 10 percent in 1982.

PARTY SYMPATHY: YOUTH UNDER 20 YEARS OF AGE
EMNID POLLS

PARTY	JULY 1982	JULY 1974
CDU/CSU	29%	24%
SPD	10	62
FDP	1	10
DKP	-	4
NPD	-	-
THE GREENS	60	-

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, AKTUELLER POLITISCHER DIENST,
JUNE 1982, PP. 44, 45.

To sum up this group of tables: almost one-half of the students and the 14-19 years old preferred the Greens party, one-fourth of the academically better-educated, one-third of those who were single, and just under one out of four claiming no religion. Thus, the strongest Greens' sympathy came from teenagers, students, the unmarried, the better-educated, and those not connected with any particular religion.

When the party voting preferences were asked, however, of the eligible voters, 18 years and over (excluding West Berlin), the heavy teenage nonvoter support was eliminated, and the 18-19 year olds revealed themselves to be significantly less enthusiastic about the Greens than the high-schoolers. The question asked periodically by EMNID Institut for many years was, "If there were a federal election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?" About one-quarter of the 18-19 year olds picked the Greens or other parties, while 40 percent said they would choose none of the parties, leaving a huge number of undecided among the youngest voters. These voters are also significantly less likely than older voters to turn out in elections.

Two tables that follow show the responses to this question by age, education and occupation. As indicated, among the voting population the outstanding preference was given to the Greens by the 18-19 year olds, with substantially less support from the 20-29 year olds. The better-educated were next most significantly inclined toward the Greens; and, among the occupations, white-collar workers were clearly most supportive.

PARTY PREFERENCE BY AGE AND EDUCATION: JUNE 1982
EMNID POLL
 ELIGIBLE VOTERS, 18 YEARS AND OVER
 (EXCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

QUESTION: "IF THERE WERE A FEDERAL ELECTION NEXT SUNDAY, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR? PLEASE PICK THE NUMBER OF THE PARTY YOU WOULD DECIDE ON."
 (LIST OF CHOICES GIVEN TO RESPONDENT)

PARTY	TOTAL %	AGE					PRIMARY %	EDUCATION INTER- MEDIATE %	SR. HIGH (ABITUR) UNIVERSITY %
		18-19 %	20-29 %	30-49 %	50-64 %	65+ %			
CDU, CSU	42	11	31	50	43	43	45	42	29
SPD	29	19	32	24	29	37	32	22	23
FDP	6	5	6	9	4	2	4	12	9
NPD, DKP, THE GREENS, OTHER PARTIES	7	23	14	6	2	5	4	11	19
NONE OF THESE	10	40	11	7	12	4	9	9	18
NO ANSWER	6	2	7	4	10	8	8	4	4
% TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SAMPLE SIZE (OF THOSE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE)	894	36	132	350	223	153	602	199	92

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, AKTUELLER POLITISCHER DIENST, JUNE 1982, P. 53.

PARTY PREFERENCE BY OCCUPATION: JUNE 1982
 EMNID POLL
 ELIGIBLE VOTERS, 18 YEARS & OVER
 (EXCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

QUESTION: "IF THERE WERE A FEDERAL ELECTION NEXT SUNDAY, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR? PLEASE PICK THE NUMBER OF THE PARTY YOU WOULD DECIDE ON."
 (LIST OF CHOICES GIVEN TO RESPONDENT)

PARTY	TOTAL %	OCCUPATION					
		BLUE COLLAR %	WHITE COLLAR %	PUBLIC SERVICE %	SELF-EM- PLOYED %	FARMER %	PEN- SIONER %
CDU, CSU	42	39	41	36	70	54	41
SPD	29	34	26	21	12	12	32
FDP	6	7	7	5	8	-	1
NPD, DKP, THE GREENS, OTHER PARTIES	7	4	11	4	4	-	6
NONE OF THESE	10	8	11	33	2	-	9
NO ANSWER	6	8	3	*	4	34	10
PERCENT TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SAMPLE SIZE (OF THOSE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE)	894	299	321	41	67	12	154

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, AKTUELLER POLITISCHER DIENST, JUNE 1982, P. 54.

A third table shows a spring 1981 survey by the Allensbach Institut, giving the breakdown in party support and the reservoir of sympathy for the Greens within selected population groups. Here again, the main Greens' voter support came from the 18-29 year olds, white-collar workers and managers. About 14 percent of the 18-29 year olds picked the Greens as their first choice, and another 12 percent, their second choice. Percentages in all other age groups were significantly lower, but high enough to generally give the Greens the 5 percent needed in the federal election for the party to be represented in the Bundestag.

The Greens had won over 5 percent of the vote in the 1982 Laender elections, but there is evidently a ceiling to the percentage of votes the Greens can draw. The two tables below indicate upper figures of about 15 percent in July 1982 in sympathy for the Greens among the entire West German population, 14 years and over, and of 8 percent in party choice among the voting population. (The figures in these two tables were arrived at by proportionally adjusting the percentages of those who had previously named a political party to a total of 100 percent.) Although the peace movement includes a range of heterogeneous organizations and ideologies, there is no groundswell of support for the party that is its political arm. Indeed, in the December 1982 re-election in Hamburg--the Land in which the Greens have their highest appeal--the Greens lost 0.09 percent of the vote cast for them in the election held the previous June, and ended up with a final tally of 6.8 percent and 8 seats. The Greens had refused to go into coalition with the SPD to govern the city, forcing a new election.

Public opinion polls published in January 1983 give the Greens between 5 and 6 percent of the vote in the federal elections. A survey conducted by the EMNID Institut in the week beginning January 13 showed the Greens with 5 percent of the vote, the CDU/CSU, 47 percent, the SPD, 42 percent, and the FDP climbing back up from its reverses of the past fall, 5 percent.* The conservative paper, Welt Am Sonntag, issued a recent poll which showed the CDU/CSU pulling 45.1 percent of the vote, the SPD, 44.4 percent, the FDP, 4.8 percent, and the Greens, 5.2 percent. The startling figure in this poll is the huge 18.8 percent of undecided voters.**

Two further opinion polls published on January 19 gave the Greens 6 percent of the vote and the FDP, 4 percent, still under the 5 percent required to remain in parliament. Whether the Greens will be able to secure the requisite 5 percent is impossible to predict at this time. Needless to say, 5 percent is all the Greens need in order to gain extraordinary political leverage in determining West German policy, and the German voters are well aware of this.***

A final table on potential Greens' support throws a fascinating light on the possible election outcome. It gives the results of a poll by the

* Financial Times, January 28, 1983, p. 1.

** The New York Times, January 31, 1983, p. A-7.

*** See Section 11.B.1 for a discussion of West German political scenarios.

GREENS' SUPPORTERS AND RESERVOIR OF SYMPATHY FOR THE GREENS
IN SELECTED POPULATION GROUPS: MAY/JUNE 1981
 ALLENSBACH POLL OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS
 (EXCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

NOTE: SUPPORT WAS MEASURED BY A QUESTION,
 "WHICH PARTY DO YOU PREFER THE MOST?"

	<u>GREENS' PARTY SYMPATHY</u>			<u>DON'T SYMPATHIZE WITH GREENS PARTY AND WON'T VOTE FOR IT</u>
	<u>FIRST CHOICE</u>	<u>SECOND CHOICE</u> ⁽¹⁾	<u>SECOND CHOICE</u> ⁽²⁾	
<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>	6.4%	5.6%	4.2%	83.8% = 100%
<u>MEN</u>	6.1	5.1	5.1	83.7
<u>WOMEN</u>	6.6	6.0	3.5	83.9
<u>AGE GROUPS</u>				
18 - 29 YEARS	13.7	12.4	5.1	68.8
30 - 44 YEARS	5.8	5.2	3.7	85.3
45 - 59 YEARS	5.0	3.1	4.6	87.3
60 YEARS & OLDER	1.6	2.0	3.5	92.9
<u>RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE</u>				
CATHOLIC	4.5	6.3	4.2	85.0
PROTESTANT	6.4	4.6	3.8	85.2
<u>OCCUPATION (INCLUDING UNEMPLOYED)</u>				
<u>UNTRAINED & TRAINED</u>				
BLUE COLLAR WORKERS	6.1	5.2	3.5	85.2
SKILLED WORKERS	5.5	8.0	3.5	83.0
<u>NON-MANAGERIAL WHITE COLLAR WORKERS (WCW)</u>	7.4	5.8	3.3	83.5
MANAGERIAL WCW	8.5	3.2	8.0	80.3
<u>NON-MANAGERIAL CIVIL SERVANTS (CS)</u>	4.6	4.4	4.8	86.2
MANAGERIAL CS	7.9	6.4	7.5	78.2
<u>SELF-EMPLOYED (EXCLUD- ING FARMERS)</u>	5.0	2.9	4.9	87.2
FARMERS	5.1	4.6	2.9	87.4

¹ AND "PERHAPS VOTE FOR IT" (RESERVOIR OF VOTERS).

² BUT "WON'T VOTE FOR IT."

SOURCE: ALLENSBACHER ARCHIVE, IFD-SURVEY 3096.

PARTY SYMPATHY: JUNE/JULY 1982⁺
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 14 YEARS AND OVER

CDU/CSU	48%
SPD	30%
FDP	7%
OTHER (GREENS, NPD, DKP)	<u>15%</u>
	100%

PARTY PREFERENCE: JUNE/JULY 1982⁺
TOTAL WEST GERMAN ELIGIBLE VOTERS, 18 YEARS AND OVER

CDU/CSU	51%
SPD	34%
FDP	7%
GREENS	8%
OTHER (NPD, DKP)	<u>*</u>
	100%

⁺PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS WHO NAMED A POLITICAL PARTY, ADJUSTED PROPORTIONALLY TO TOTAL 100 PERCENT.

*LESS THAN ONE PERCENT.

SOURCE: EMNID POLLS IN AKTUELLER POLITISCHE DIENST, JUNE 1982, PP. 44 AND 47.

VOTE SWITCH BETWEEN THE FEDERAL ELECTION
OF OCTOBER 1980 AND SPRING 1981
 ALLENSBACH POLL

VOTERS WERE ASKED TO CHOOSE FROM A LIST OF THE FOLLOWING PARTIES IN MAY/JUNE 1981 IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION, "IF THERE WERE ANOTHER FEDERAL ELECTION HELD NEXT SUNDAY, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?"

PARTY CHOICE SPRING 1981	PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST (SECOND BALLOT) IN THE OCTOBER 5, 1980 FEDERAL ELECTION				TOTAL MAY/JUNE 1981 %
	CDU/CSU %	SPD %	FDP %	OTHER PARTIES %	
CDU/CSU	96.8	11.7	21.9	15.0	49.8
SPD	2.0	72.9	15.1	10.0	33.6
FDP	0.4	7.8	53.9	-	10.1
THE GREENS	0.8	6.7	9.1	75.0	5.8
OTHER PARTIES	-	0.9	-	-	0.7
TOTAL PERCENT	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: ALLENSBACH INSTITUT, POLITICAL PANEL, IFD-SURVEYS NO. 3195 AND 4103, OCTOBER 1980 AND SUMMER 1981. NATIONAL SAMPLES OF 810 PERSONS, 18 YEARS AND OVER (EXCLUDING WEST BERLIN).

Allensbach Institut showing party switching between the time of the October 1980 federal election and the spring of 1981. As can be seen, while CDU/CSU voters remained firmly committed to their party, significant numbers of voters from the other parties switched to the CDU/CSU, giving it a very strong lead. The FDP lost almost half its voters: about two-fifths of them went to the CDU/CSU, another quarter to the SPD, and the rest to the Greens. The FDP has had a stormy career in the past few months, changing coalition partners, losing a large percentage of its following, splitting into liberal and conservative groups, and patching up the split at a party convention in Freiburg in January 1983. But as the March election approaches, the FDP seems to be regaining some of its lost voter support. Moreover, the public may be sufficiently worried about the possibility of the Greens gaining 5 percent of the vote to decide to throw their support in favor of the FDP, thereby assuring its position as the coalition partner.

(2) Voter Participation and Political Interest

Almost every eligible West German voter casts his vote, particularly in the federal elections. Slightly under 89 percent of the voters went to the polls in the national election of 1980. But even some of the state (Land) elections consistently draw well over an 80 percent turnout. Two tables below and one in the Appendix show the trends in voter participation in state and federal elections since World War II.

Another table below shows the number of qualified voters in the 1976 election and the high voter turnout by age and sex. As can be seen, almost 10 percent fewer of the young than the middle-aged cast their votes in that election.

There appears to have been a peaking of interest in politics from the early 1950s to the late 1960s and then a stabilization of this interest around the 40 percentile throughout the 1970s; the figure that follows traces the trendline in Allensbach polls from 1952 to 1980. The breakdown by population segments yields some interesting results: Although women's interest in politics increased three-fold between 1952 and 1980, it was still only about half that of men in March 1980 (61 to 33 percent); young persons were slightly less politically interested than those 30-59 years of age; managers and public servants, the secondary school-educated, the Greens and those professing no particular religion were most inclined toward politics.

Despite this development of political interest and the remarkably high voter turnout in elections, only about 5 percent of the voting population in 1979 were actually members of a political party.* Out of approximately

* In an Allensbach poll of January 1980, 9 percent of the total population sample reported they were members of a political party; 78 percent said they would be unwilling to join a political party. (Noelle-Neuman, The Germans, p. 154.)

VOTER TURNOUT IN FEDERAL AND STATE (LAND) ELECTIONS

VOTER PARTICIPATION IN
FEDERAL (PARLIAMENTARY) ELECTIONS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
AUGUST 1949	78.5
SEPTEMBER 1953	86.0
SEPTEMBER 1957	87.8
SEPTEMBER 1961	87.7
SEPTEMBER 1965	86.8
SEPTEMBER 1969	86.7
NOVEMBER 1972	91.1
OCTOBER 1976	90.7
OCTOBER 1980	88.6

VOTER PARTICIPATION IN STATE ELECTIONS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
SCHLESWIG- HOLSTEIN	4/1971	79.2	RHINELAND- PALATINATE	3/1970	79.4
	4/1975	82.3		3/1975	80.8
	4/1979	83.3		3/1979	81.4
HAMBURG	3/1970	73.4	BADEN- WURTTEN- BERG	4/1968	70.7
	3/1974	80.4		4/1972	80.0
	6/1978	76.6		4/1976	75.5
LOWER- SAXONY	6/1970	76.7	BAVARIA	11/1970	79.5
	6/1974	84.4		10/1974	77.7
	6/1978	78.5		10/1978	76.6
BREMEN	10/1967	77.0	SAAR	6/1965	81.8
	10/1971	80.0		6/1970	83.1
	9/1975	82.2		5/1975	88.8
NORTH RHINE- WESTPHALIA	7/1966	76.5	BERLIN (WEST)	3/1971	88.9
	6/1970	73.5		3/1975	87.8
	5/1975	86.1		3/1979	85.4
HESSE	11/1970	82.8			
	10/1974	84.8			
	10/1978	87.7			

SOURCE: GESELLSCHAFTLICHE DATEN 1979, PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS AND
INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY, AUGUST 1979.


VOTER TURNOUT IN THE FEDERAL ELECTION, BY AGE
OCTOBER 3, 1976

APPROXIMATE AGE FROM... TO UNDER... YEARS	ELIGIBLE VOTERS			VOTER TURNOUT		
	TOTAL (1000)	MEN %	WOMEN %	TOTAL %	MEN %	WOMEN %
UNDER 21	2,090	50.5	49.5	84.1	84.9	83.2
21-30	5,970	50.5	49.5	84.9	84.8	85.1
30-40	7,300	50.5	49.5	90.5	90.1	91.0
40-50	6,834	50.0	50.0	93.1	93.3	92.9
50-60	5,577	42.0	58.0	93.8	94.8	93.0
60-70	5,378	40.1	59.9	93.7	94.8	93.0
70 & OVER	4,540	37.6	62.4	88.0	91.2	86.0
TOTAL	37,688	46.1	53.9	90.4	90.8	90.0

SOURCE: GESELLSCHAFTLICHE DATEN 1979, PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS AND
INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY, AUGUST 1979.

INTEREST IN POLITICS, NATIONAL SAMPLE, WEST GERMANY, 1952-1980

QUESTION: "ARE YOU INTERESTED IN POLITICS"



SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E6, P. 3.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP1979

SPD	1,022,000
CDU	676,000
CSU	166,000
FDP	81,000
DKP	46,000
NPD	10,000

1982

SPD	987,000
CDU	701,000
CSU	175,000
FDP	87,000
DKP	46,000
NPD	10,000
GREENS	23,000

SOURCE: 1979 DATA: FACTS ABOUT GERMANY (GUETERSLOH, WEST GERMANY: LEXIKOTHEK VERLAG, 1980), P. 94; 1982 DATA: GREENS: THE ECONOMIST, SEPTEMBER 18, 1982, P. 51; OTHER PARTIES: THE LONDON TIMES, FEBRUARY 7, 1983.

42 million persons of voting age, 18 and over, in that year, about 2 million belonged to political parties. The table above shows the breakdown in party membership in 1979 and 1982. The SPD party apparatus is clearly much better organized than that of its strongest opposition, the CDU; but when the CDU membership is merged with that of the CSU, its sister party, and the FDP, its present coalition partner, the total membership of the right-center-liberal coalition comes fairly close to that of the left-center.

(3) Liberal-Conservative Position

The trendlines gauging West German party preferences have little to do with party membership. For the last decade, except for the brief 1980 election period, the SPD has been clearly less popular than the CDU/CSU with the voters. The Allensbach Institut has kept tabs with party popularity, asking the same question as that posed earlier by the EMNID Institut: "If the federal elections were held next Sunday which party would you vote for?" The trendline, shown in the chart that follows, is highly sensitive to the state of the economy, political events, international crises, and the personality of the candidates. The general tendency toward the CDU/CSU, however, seems to reflect the basic center-to-slightly-conservative political philosophy of the West German population as a whole.

According to a 1978 Allensbach poll, 7 out of 10 persons considered themselves to be center or moderately right, and only 17 percent, moderately left. There was little support for the radical extremes, although more Germans placed themselves far right (4 percent) than far left (1 percent). Charts in the Appendix give a more detailed breakdown of the the political spectrum by political interest, major party preference and age. They reveal that the young, the SPDers and the politically interested were more inclined to place themselves toward the left than the population as a whole, although the center still predominated each group. SPD supporters were the most left-leaning of all three population categories.


An EMNID survey taken three years later, in October 1981, paralleled the findings of the November 1978 Allensbach poll. On a scale of one to ten, running from extreme left to extreme right, the total West German population placed itself slightly to the right of center at 6.1. The median lies between rungs 5 and 6 of the scale. The table below shows the range of political parties and their self-placement: the Greens placed farthest left (at 4.3), the SPD voters, slightly left-of-center (5.0), the FDP, slightly right (6.2), and the CDU/CSU voters, the farthest right (7.1).

This conservative political philosophy does not signify that the Germans are prepared to relinquish the elaborate and comprehensive social welfare benefits provided to them by the state. On the contrary, no party, including the CDU/CSU, could suggest a basic overhauling of this social system without risk to its political future, and no party would. All major parties realize, however, that some of these programs have become almost disastrously overextended. Undertaking cutbacks is one of the

TREND IN PARTY POPULARITY, 1973-1982

QUESTION: "IF FEDERAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD NEXT SUNDAY, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?"

TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION




SOURCES: ALLENSBACH POLLS IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CONN.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), PP. 214-215; POLITIK, JANUARY 23, 1982; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, APRIL 26, 1982; THE NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23, 1982; FINANCIAL TIMES, JANUARY 20, 1983.

POLITICAL POSITION

QUESTION: "HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR OWN POLITICAL POSITION?"

TOTAL POPULATION, NOVEMBER 1978



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CONN.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 149.

LEFT OR RIGHT?
SELF-PLACEMENT SCALE

QUESTION: "LEFT" AND "RIGHT" ARE TERMS OFTEN USED TO IDENTIFY A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. PLEASE TELL ME WHERE YOU WOULD PLACE YOURSELF ON THE SCALE ON THIS LIST. "1" SIGNIFIES EXTREME LEFT; "10" SIGNIFIES EXTREME RIGHT.

SELF-PLACEMENT BY PARTY PREFERENCE

<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>GREENS</u>	<u>SPD</u>	<u>FDP</u>	<u>CDU/CSU</u>
6.1	4.3	5.0	6.2	7.1

EMNID POLL OF SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1981 FOR DER SPIEGEL. SAMPLE OF 2,148 RESPONDENTS, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 18 YEARS AND OLDER.

SOURCE: JOERG R. METTKE (HG.), DIE GRUENEN: REGIERUNGSPARTNER VON MORGEN, SPIEGEL-BUCH, P. 39.

FREEDOM VS. EQUALITY
CARA, 1981

QUESTION: WHICH OF THESE TWO STATEMENTS COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR OWN OPINION?

- A) I FIND THAT BOTH FREEDOM AND EQUALITY ARE IMPORTANT, BUT IF I WERE TO MAKE UP MY MIND FOR ONE OR THE OTHER, I WOULD CONSIDER PERSONAL FREEDOM MORE IMPORTANT, THAT IS, EVERYONE CAN LIVE IN FREEDOM AND DEVELOP WITHOUT HINDRANCE.
- B) CERTAINLY BOTH FREEDOM AND EQUALITY ARE IMPORTANT, BUT IF I WERE TO MAKE UP MY MIND FOR ONE OF THE TWO, I WOULD CONSIDER EQUALITY MORE IMPORTANT, THAT IS, THAT NOBODY IS UNDERPRIVILEGED AND THAT SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES ARE NOT SO STRONG.

	US	GB	IR	JP	EUR	WG	F	I	SP
	(PERCENT)								
1. AGREE WITH FREEDOM	72	69	46	37	49	37	54	43	36
2. AGREE WITH EQUALITY	20	23	38	32	35	39	32	45	39
3. NEITHER (VOLUNTEERED)	3	4	5	15	9	19	8	5	13
4. DON'T KNOW	5	4	11	16	7	5	7	7	12

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF VALUES, CENTER FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN THE APOSTOLATE, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1982. US = UNITED STATES; GB = GREAT BRITAIN; IR = IRELAND; JP = JAPAN; EUR = EUROPE; WG = WEST GERMANY; F = FRANCE; I = ITALY; SP = SPAIN.

very unpleasant and difficult tasks that needs to be faced in this depressed economy; there are few popular choices as to how and where cutbacks should be made.

The CARA International Study of Values, mentioned earlier, attempted to probe in 1981 the extent to which various populations preferred social equality vs. personal freedom. As the table above shows, the West Germans split evenly in their choice between the two. Americans, on the other hand, were uncompromising in choosing free enterprise and personal freedom; in fact, 7 out of 10 picked it, the highest margin within any nation listed, and almost twice as many as the Germans.

To sum up, the majority of West Germans appear to be at core political conservatives who readily accommodate a liberal social welfare system. These values helped shape policy under the SPD for the past decade. The former SPD Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, was the most popular political figure in Germany since Konrad Adenauer, and he reflected this mood, initiating liberal social welfare programs and moderate, centrist political and foreign policies. When the economy went sour, Schmidt lost out in a bitter political shuffle. The public does indeed want an improved economy, but also essentially little change from the comforts of the social welfare state; the CDU is now in the difficult situation of having to accommodate this position while it pares back some of the programs and introduces unpopular economic reforms.

(a) Right Extremism

There has been growing concern with increased activities by right extremists in West Germany. The tables that follow reveal that in November 1981 almost 8 out of 10 Germans feared them as a danger to democracy and favored their criminal prosecution. Surprisingly, the young, students, the better-educated, those from the larger cities and professing no religion were the least inclined to see them as a danger. This may be because they are more willing to tolerate deviant groups or more radical ideas within a functioning democracy; or they may be more inclined to support radicalism of either extreme.

(b) Political Activism

The Greens appear to be much more politically committed than any other party supporters. In an EMNID poll taken in March 1982 for Der Spiegel magazine, two-thirds of the Greens--twice as many as the Christian Democrats--were strongly interested in current events in politics and public policy. SPD adherents were the least interested in current political events. Furthermore, 7 out of 10 Greens in an Allensbach poll were willing to participate in a party meeting, compared with about 4 out of 10 supporters of the three other parties. Interestingly, youth under 30 were slightly less inclined than the 30-59 year olds to attend a party meeting.

Throughout the politically-engaged decade 1966 to 1978, almost 9 out of 10 students surveyed by the Allensbach organization did not belong

DANGER OF RADICAL RIGHT IN WEST GERMANY

QUESTION: "RECENTLY WE HAVE MORE OFTEN HEARD ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION: ARE THESE GROUPS A DANGER TO OUR DEMOCRACY OR NOT?"

ENMID POLLSTOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION

	<u>MARCH 1980</u>	<u>OCT./NOV. 1980*</u>	<u>NOV. 1981**</u>
	%	%	%
YES	20	56	78
NO	78	41	21
NO ANSWER	2	3	1
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

SHOULD NEO-NAZI ACTIVISTS IN WEST GERMANY
BE PROSECUTED OR LEFT ALONE?

QUESTION: "SHOULD THE PEOPLE WHO OPENLY APPROVE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND ITS IDEOLOGY AND ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN EFFECTUATING IT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BE CRIMINALLY PROSECUTED OR SHOULD THEY SIMPLY BE LEFT ALONE?"

ENMID POLLSTOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION

	<u>MARCH 1980</u>	<u>OCT./NOV. 1980*</u>	<u>NOV. 1981**</u>
	%	%	%
CRIMINALLY PROSECUTED	54	69	80
LEFT ALONE	44	27	18
NO ANSWER	3	3	3

* ASKED AFTER THE BOMB EXPLOSION ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1980 AT THE MUNICH OKTOBERFEST, IN WHICH 13 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 219 WOUNDED. OFFICIALS SUSPECTED THE RADICAL RIGHT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXPLOSION.

** POLL TAKEN 11/12 - 12/1/1981 OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF 1,009 WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS AND OVER.

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, INFORMATIONEN, NO. 12-1981, p. 10.

DANGER OF RADICAL RIGHT IN WEST GERMANY

BY AGE, EDUCATION, PARTY PREFERENCE, RELIGION, CITY SIZE AND OCCUPATION
EMNID POLL, NOVEMBER 1981

	AGE					EDUCATION					(ABITUR)		PARTY PREFERENCE					OTHER NONE, NO PARTIES ANSWER %							
	14-29 YEARS		20-29 YEARS		30-49 YEARS		50-64 YEARS		65 & OVER		STU- DENT		PRI- MARY		INTER- MEDIATE		SENIOR HIGH UNIVERSITY		CDU/ CSU		SPD		FDP		
	%		%		%		%		%		%		%		%		%			%		%		%	
TOTAL	21	34	18	18	20	20	37	20	19	19	34	19	16	27	19	28									
RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS NO DANGER TO DEMOCRACY	18	40	12	16	13	16	37	17	20	20	19	12	19	12	13										
LET NEO-NAZI ACTIVISTS ALONE (DO NOT CRIMIN- ALLY PROSECUTE)																									

RELIGION

CITY SIZE IN 1,000

OCCUPATION

	OTHER, NONE		BLUE COLLAR WORKER		WHITE COLLAR WORKER		CIVIL SERVANT		EMP. & FARMER		PEN- SIONER		HOUSE- WIFE		STUDENT	
	%		%		%		%		%		%		%		%	
	21	19	35	13	21	26	27	15	23	32	14	16	37			
RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS NO DANGER TO DEMOCRACY	21	15	14	9	21	22	25	16	15	25	13	9	37			
LET NEO-NAZI ACTIVISTS ALONE [DO NOT CRIMIN- ALLY PROSECUTE]																

POLL TAKEN 11/12 - 12/1 1981 OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF 1,009 WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS AND OVER. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSE BY MEN AND WOMEN, AND UNION MEMBERSHIP. THERE WERE VERY STRONG CLEAVAGES IN THE RESPONSES BY FEDERAL STATES AND SIGNIFICANT ONES BY MARITAL STATUS.

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, INFORMATIONEN, NO. 12-1981, PP. A1-A8.

to any political organization. Moreover, a student who was involved was inclined to join several types of political organizations simultaneously, e.g., a political party, student, youth or single-issue group. Commitment to these groups was much stronger in 1978 than in 1966. A table and bar charts showing this series of polls can be found in the following pages.

(c) Attitudes Towards the SPD Working with the Greens and Communist Groups

Slightly over one-half of the West Germans in the EMNID poll of March 1982 was opposed to the SPD working together with the Greens in state or city parliaments. However, both the Greens and the SPD favored this cooperation--the Greens overwhelmingly, the SPD less so. CDU/CSU adherents opposed such a collaboration as strongly as the Greens supported it (by a margin of 7 out of 10 in both cases).

Moreover, 70 percent of the Germans were against the SPD occasionally working together with communist parties and groups (Allensbach, September 1980). There were sharp differences in response by major party preference and age, although all segments polled disapproved of SPD-communist cooperation: Only 60 percent of the Social Democrats were opposed, compared with 90 percent of the CDU/CSU supporters and 66 percent of the Free Democrats; and the young were much less likely to reject the notion (58 percent) than the older population (80 percent).

The range of responses to the possibility of SPD-Greens collaboration is borne out in the pre-election survey taken by the EMNID Institut in the period ending January 25, 1983 and just published by Der Spiegel.** The question asked was "What should the SPD do if the CDU/CSU becomes the strongest party, but does not win an absolute majority and not the Free Democrats, but the Greens get elected to the Bundestag?" Out of five choices presented to the respondents, a plurality of SPD voters (30 percent) and the overwhelming number of Greens (65 percent) picked "set up a coalition with the Greens." The total West German population, however, preferred first, "tolerate a CDU/CSU government" (34 percent), and second, "set up a coalition with the CDU/CSU" (24 percent)--that is, a broad majority was for a conservative solution. But a surprising 1 in 5 chose "coalition with the Greens." The last response might reflect the wording of the question, in which it was assumed that the Greens had been elected to the federal parliament, and to which the practical response for some might be, "work with the elected party." (The chart below shows the results of the EMNID-Der Spiegel survey.)

According to latest reports, however, the SPD leadership--ranging from Willy Brandt to Helmut Schmidt--has in fact disavowed working with

* Allensbach polls in The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 211.

** Vol. 37, No. 6 (February 7, 1983), p. 84.

INTEREST IN CURRENT POLITICAL EVENTS

QUESTION: "ARE YOU INTERESTED IN CURRENT EVENTS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY? WOULD YOU SAY..."

	TOTAL %	GREENS %	CDU/CSU %	SPD %	FDP %
VERY STRONGLY	9	22	11	5	8
FAIRLY STRONGLY	19	45	20	19	20
AVERAGE	50	21	48	52	50
LESS STRONGLY	17	10	17	19	20
NOT AT ALL	5	2	4	5	2


EMNID POLL, MARCH 1982, FOR DER SPIEGEL. ASKED OF 1,222 RESPONDENTS, A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF THE WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 18 YEARS AND OVER.

SOURCE: JOERG R. METTKE (HG.), DIE GRUENEN: REGIERUNGSPARTNER VON MORGEN? SPIEGEL-BUCH, P. 38.

WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A POLITICAL PARTY MEETING
BY PARTY AND AGE: SEPTEMBER 1980

QUESTION: "IF YOU WERE ASKED WHETHER YOU WOULD DO SOMETHING FOR THE PARTY YOU FAVOR, DO YOU FIND ANYTHING ON THESE CARDS THAT YOU WOULD DO FOR THE PARTY THAT YOU THINK IS BEST?"


RESPONSE FOR: WOULD PARTICIPATE IN A MEETING OF THIS PARTY



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED.,
THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CONN.: GREENWOOD PRESS,
 1981), P. 211.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP
STUDENTS, 1966 & 1978

QUESTION: "DO YOU BELONG TO ONE OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS?"



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED.,
THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CONN.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981),
P. 273. "SINGLE-ISSUE GROUP" WAS NOT ASKED IN 1966.

SPD/GREENS COLLABORATION
NATIONAL AND BY PARTY PREFERENCE

QUESTION: 'UNTIL RECENTLY, IN ALMOST EVERY INSTANCE, THE SPD AND GREENS REFUSED TO WORK TOGETHER, EVEN WHEN BOTH PARTIES WERE REPRESENTED IN STATE OR CITY PARLIAMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE GREENS AND THE SPD WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A COLLABORATION.

OPINIONS ARE DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE. WHAT DO YOU THINK: SHOULD THE SPD COLLABORATE WITH THE GREENS WHEREVER THIS POSSIBILITY ARISES, OR SHOULD THE SPD CONTINUE TO REFUSE SUCH A COLLABORATION?"


EMNID POLL, MARCH 1982

	<u>TOTAL</u> %	<u>GREENS</u> %	<u>CDU/CSU</u> %	<u>SPD</u> %	<u>FDP</u> %
COLLABORATE WITH GREENS	40	70	24	55	45
CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO COLLABORATE WITH THE GREENS	54	28	69	38	53

SOURCE: JOERG R. METTKE (HG.), DIE GRUENEN: REGIERUNGSPARTNER VON MORGEN?, SPIEGEL-BUCH, P. 49.

SPD COOPERATION WITH COMMUNIST GROUPS?
TOTAL AND BY AGE: SEPTEMBER 1980


QUESTION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF IT WHEN THE SPD OCCASIONALLY WORKS TOGETHER WITH COMMUNIST PARTIES AND GROUPS, OR SHOULD IT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DO SO?"



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CONN.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 199.

SPD COOPERATION WITH COMMUNIST GROUPS?
BY PARTY PREFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 1980

QUESTION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF IT WHEN THE SPD OCCASIONALLY
 WORKS TOGETHER WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTIES AND GROUPS,
 OR SHOULD IT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DO SO?"



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-
 NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CONN
 CONN.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 199.

POSSIBLE SPD ELECTION TACTICS
JANUARY 25, 1983

QUESTION: "WHAT SHOULD THE SPD DO IF THE CDU/CSU BECOMES THE STRONGEST PARTY, BUT DOES NOT WIN AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY, AND NOT THE FREE DEMOCRATS, BUT THE GREENS GET ELECTED TO THE BUNDESTAG?"

<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>	<u>CDU/CSU GOVERNMENT</u>	<u>SPD VOTERS</u>	<u>GREEN VOTERS</u>
31	50	13	2
"Tolerate a CDU/CSU government"			
24	28	22	7
"Set up a coalition with the CDU/CSU"			
13	5	20	20
"Set up a minority government tolerated by the Greens."			
19	6	30	65
"Set up a coalition with the Greens."			
11	9	14	4
"Negotiate with the other parties over new elections."			

SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 37, NO. 6 (FEBRUARY 7, 1983), PP. 17-19.

the Greens should the Greens get into parliament. The SPD leaders believe that the SPD is gaining in electoral strength; the party leaders would rather wait for new elections than be torn apart by a strong CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag and the pressures of a Greens coalition party.*

Given the inability of the Greens to work together, or go into coalition, with the SPD in any of the Land parliaments where they have been elected, it is curious to note that the overwhelming majority of Greens favors Greens-SPD cooperation. The anti-party ideology of the Greens may be confined to the forerunners of the party rather than represent the rank and file of its young sympathizers; or the Greens may be acknowledging that cooperation is a political necessity.

f. West German Domestic and Foreign Policy Concerns

(1) The Most Important Problem

Social Democratic leaders have made deployment of American nuclear missiles the outstanding issue of the federal election campaign. Surely, they have touched on an underlying angst pervading West Germany today--a realistic fear of the potential of nuclear destruction. But the missiles are not the main issue that concerns the Germans: clearly the most important problem to them, measured by any opinion poll, is the state of the economy, especially unemployment. The deciding factor as to which major party comes out ahead in this election will most likely be who can give the voter the most hope for solutions to the economic problems.

In the last decade, measured against this overwhelming concern about the economy, worry about nuclear weapons has been peripheral. Obviously, nuclear armament has become the central issue in the media and in the campaign itself, but this may lead to a misinterpretation of its true priority for the West German voter. It frequently happens that a candidate fails to get elected because he or she has championed a cause which was of less immediate concern to the voter, and neglected to understand the real priorities and issues. Of course, both parties are well aware that they must come up with creative solutions to unemployment; but if the CDU/CSU can convince the public that its economic program will ultimately be the most successful, then it stands a good chance of getting elected, bringing with it its more conservative stand on the nuclear missiles. Even the Greens have realized they must come to terms with the pressing economic problems if they hope to win worker votes.

Two Gallup International polls of Germans in 1975 and 1980 show inflation and unemployment dominating the list of the most important problems facing the country. Inflation and unemployment together accounted for an overwhelming 81 percent of the response in 1975. Their total dropped to

* Ibid.

50 percent in 1980, supplanted in part by the 17 percent who cited energy problems. In the following pages a set of tables and a chart show the results of these questions, as well as responses to the polls cited below on national concerns.

In an international poll taken in October 1982, the Louis Harris organization asked West Germans, "Which of the following are your greatest concerns for yourself and your country today?" Because the respondent could give multiple answers, the percentages add up to more than 100; in addition, the question wording suggests that the respondent had to pick from a preset list of issues. Unemployment was the top choice with 75 percent; it was followed by excessive government spending, 41 percent; crime, 38 percent; nuclear weapons and social injustice, 32 percent each. Threat of war was next with 25 percent; and at the very bottom of the list was inadequate defense (12 percent).

Allensbach trends show great anxiety about economic problems in the late 1970s, the total loss of German reunification as an issue, and a renewed concern with the East/West conflict in 1980.

At the end of every year in the last half decade, Gallup International measured the outlook of various populations toward key issues in the year ahead. Between 1978 and 1981, the West Germans grew very pessimistic about economic prosperity, a possible rise in unemployment, and an increase in strikes; they also anticipated that 1981 and 1982 would be considerably more troubled than previous years.

(2) The Greens and the Populace: Diverging Preferences and Priorities

There is frequently a wide divergence of opinion and priorities between West German citizens as a whole and supporters of the Greens. Certain key areas were explored by the Allensbach and EMNID Institutes in 1981 and 1982 that highlight these differences; the results are given in detail in the tables that follow. They reveal, for example, that the Greens overwhelmingly stress the importance of environmental protection over all other problems, while Germans in general are equally concerned about the environment and maintaining an adequate supply of energy. On security issues, few Greens were interested in improving relations with the U.S., protecting Germany against attack from the East, and strengthening NATO. The public's reaction, however, was clearly different: almost one-half wanted good relations with the U.S.; the same number felt it important to take steps against an attack from the East; and almost 4 out of 10 favored strengthening the Western military alliance. The question of employment of radicals in the public sector also caused a wide split in response between the population as a whole and the Greens. As might be anticipated, only 1 out of 10 Greens was against employing radicals in the public sector, compared to 4 out of 10 nationally.

Two key questions on disarmament and anti-Americanism threw a sharp light on the political contrasts. Concerning disarmament: The Greens

THE MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL PROBLEM
WEST GERMANY

QUESTION: "WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM
FACING THIS COUNTRY TODAY?" (1975-1980)

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1975-1976</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
HIGH COST OF LIVING, INFLATION	27	42
UNEMPLOYMENT	23	39
FOREIGN DEBTS	--	--
DISSATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT	5	3
CRIME/VIOLENCE	9	5
ENERGY PROBLEMS	17	1
STRIKES, LABOR UNREST	4	--
DRUGS	--	--
RACE RELATIONS/RACISM	1	3
FOREIGN POLICY/RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS (1980)		
INTERNATIONAL (1976)	3	4
PEACE/WAR	6	2
DEFENSE/SECURITY	1	1
SOCIAL PROBLEMS	--	--
APATHY/LACK OF MOTIVATION	--	--
ALL OTHERS	1	3
NO ANSWER; DON'T KNOW	<u>4</u>	<u>12</u>
	101%	105%

SOURCE: GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLLS.

GREATEST CONCERNS FOR SELF AND COUNTRY
WEST GERMANY


QUESTION: 'WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOUR GREATEST CONCERNS FOR YOURSELF AND YOUR COUNTRY TODAY?'

	<u>OCTOBER 1982</u>
	<u>2</u>
UNEMPLOYMENT	75
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT SPENDING	41
CRIME	38
INFLATION	32
NUCLEAR WEAPONS	32
SOCIAL INJUSTICE	32
THE THREAT OF WAR	25
THE ENERGY CRISIS	24
POOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	20
INADEQUATE DEFENSE	12

SOURCE: A LOUIS HARRIS ORGANIZATION SURVEY FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE AND THE ATLANTIC
INSTITUTE, PUBLISHED IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 25, 1982.

MOST IMPORTANT CONCERN IN WEST GERMANY

WEST GERMAN NATIONAL RESPONSE--1951-1980



SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT 1980/E9.

WEST GERMAN OUTLOOK FOR COMING YEAR*
1977-1981

	DEC. 1977 %	DEC. 1978 %	DEC. 1979 %	DEC. 1980 %	NOV. 1981 %
1. PREDICTION FOR COMING YEAR					
BETTER	13	21	13	8	13
WORSE	22	10	20	37	28
SAME	50	54	51	48	50
DON'T KNOW	15	15	16	7	9
2. UNEMPLOYMENT**					
INCREASE	48	-	30	56	69
DECREASE	4	-	13	8	3
REMAIN THE SAME	48	-	45	31	22
DON'T KNOW		-	12	6	7
3. LABOR PREDICTIONS**					
INCREASE IN STRIKES	29	-	31	37	43
DECREASE	15	-	19	7	6
REMAIN THE SAME	16	-	35	47	41
DON'T KNOW		-	15	9	11
4. PROSPERITY PREDICTIONS					
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY	-	18	17	4	2
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY	-	25	27	41	49
REMAIN THE SAME	-	44	56	46	39
DON'T KNOW	-	13		9	10
5. PEACE PREDICTIONS					
PEACEFUL YEAR	-	21	22	6	10
TROUBLED YEAR	-	41	34	54	54
REMAIN THE SAME	-	25	30	31	26
DON'T KNOW	-	8	14	13	10

* SEE FOLLOWING PAGE FOR QUESTIONS.

** QUESTIONS WORDED DIFFERENTLY IN 1977 AND 1979.

SOURCE: GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLLS.

GALLUP POLL PREDICTION QUESTIONS FOR
PRECEDING TABLE--1980 SAMPLE

1. "SO FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED, DO YOU THINK THAT 1981 WILL BE A BETTER OR WORSE YEAR THAN 1980?"
2. "LOOKING AHEAD TO NEXT YEAR 1981, DO YOU THINK THE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED IN THIS COUNTRY WILL INCREASE, DECREASE, OR REMAIN THE SAME?"
3. "WILL STRIKES AND INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES INCREASE, DECREASE, OR REMAIN THE SAME?"
4. "WILL IT BE A YEAR OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, OR ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY OR REMAIN THE SAME?"
5. "WILL IT BE A PEACEFUL YEAR MORE OR LESS FREE OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, A TROUBLED YEAR WITH MUCH INTERNATIONAL DISCORD, OR REMAIN THE SAME?"

VARIANT QUESTIONS--1977 SAMPLE

2. WHICH OF THESE DO YOU THINK IS LIKELY TO BE TRUE OF 1978:
A YEAR OF FULL EMPLOYMENT OR A YEAR OF RISING UNEMPLOYMENT?
3. WHICH OF THESE DO YOU THINK IS LIKELY TO BE TRUE OF 1978:
A YEAR OF STRIKES AND INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES OR A YEAR OF
INDUSTRIAL PEACE?

SOURCE: GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLLS.

believed the East was definitely more interested than the West in disarmament. Needless to say, the population as a whole had the reverse impression, that the West was more interested. On Americans: one-half of the national sample liked Americans, compared to only one-third of the Greens.

Polls on nuclear power plants and energy in Germany also provide overwhelming contrasts in the political party responses. In a fall 1981 survey by Allensbach, almost three times as many Greens as CDU/CSU voters opposed building new atomic power plants (91 to 33 percent). Again, 85 percent of the Greens in a March 1982 EMNID poll wanted the building of nuclear power plants to be stopped. In sharp contrast, six out of ten of the CDU/CSU and FDP voters thought Germany needed more of these plants to maintain its standard of living. The public as a whole also favored more nuclear power plants, by slightly more than 50 percent.

The same EMNID survey offered wide divergencies in response to the NATO dual-track decision on the nuclear force modernization in Western Europe. The Greens opposed the NATO decision by a margin of 5 to 1 while the CDU/CSU adherents favored it by the same margin. The public also supported it, by slightly less than 2 to 1.

Did the Greens prefer Brezhnev to Reagan? Yes. They had negative feelings for both, but Reagan was ranked lower in their estimation than Brezhnev. On placing the two men on a sympathy scale running from +5 to -5, the Greens rated Brezhnev -1.7, Reagan -2.5*. As might be expected, this differed sharply from the priorities of the rest of the population, who gave Reagan a + 1.1 and Brezhnev a -2.0 rating on the scale. Also, as might be anticipated, CDU/CSU voters were the strongest Reagan supporters and Brezhnev opponents.

Germans today have greater doubts about the future of mankind than they had in the mid-1960s. Two Allensbach questions were asked several times over the last decade and a half: "Do you believe in progress--by that I mean that a better future lies ahead for mankind, or don't you believe in this?"; and "When you think about the future--do you believe that life will always get easier for people or more difficult?" The responses to both questions, shown below, revealed a growing pessimism. From a high of 60 percent in 1972, belief in progress steadily dropped to 34 percent in 1978, where it has remained to the present time. And between 1968 to 1981, rising numbers of Germans considered life to be getting more difficult for them (44 percent increasing to 69 percent). The Greens had somewhat less faith than other voters in progress and a much stronger belief that life will become more difficult.

Since pessimism may be frequently based on economic fears, the motivation for this loss of faith in future progress is not at all obvious. In fact, another Allensbach trend shows a generally steady, long-term

* EMNID Institut poll, fall 1981, reported in Der Spiegel, Vol. 35, No. 48 (November 23, 1981), pp. 65-68.

IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL PROBLEMS--NATIONAL AND GREENS

THESE CARDS LIST SEVERAL OF OUR NATIONAL PROBLEMS. WOULD YOU SELECT THOSE WHICH YOU PERSONALLY CONSIDER IMPORTANT?

	<u>NATIONAL</u> <u>%</u>	<u>GREENS PARTY</u> <u>%</u>
SUPPORT ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION--FOR EXAMPLE, DO MORE FOR CLEAN WATER AND AIR, FIGHT NOISE POLLUTION, ETC.	65	92
AN EFFECTIVE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME	63	35
INSURE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF FUTURE ENERGY	62	36
INSIST THAT POLITICIANS BE MORE HONEST THAN THE AVERAGE CITIZEN	57	71
MAKE SURE THAT RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ARE GOOD	47	15
TAKE STEPS TO INSURE SAFETY FROM A MILITARY ATTACK FROM THE EAST	47	18
DON'T EMPLOY RADICALS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR	41	11
STRENGTHEN NATO, AND STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY ALLIANCES IN THE WEST	38	11

SOURCE: WORLD OPINION UPDATE (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1982), P. 129; POLL FROM INSTITUT FUR DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE, JUNE 1982. NATIONAL ADULT SAMPLE OF APPROXIMATELY 2,000.

EAST AND WEST INTEREST IN DISARMAMENT--NATIONAL AND GREENS

DO YOU HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE (EAST) (WEST) IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN DISARMAMENT?

	EAST		WEST	
	NATIONAL	GREENS	NATIONAL	GREENS
	%	%	%	%
YES, CERTAINLY	17	30	47	21
PERHAPS	39	39	33	44
CERTAINLY NOT	30	18	11	26
CAN'T SAY	14	13	9	9

DO YOU LIKE THE AMERICANS?--NATIONAL AND GREENS

LET ME ASK YOU VERY GENERALLY--DO YOU LIKE THE AMERICANS, OR DO YOU DISLIKE THEM?

	NATIONAL	GREENS PARTY
	%	%
LIKE	51	33
DISLIKE	19	33
UNDECIDED	19	23
NO OPINION	11	11

SOURCE: WORLD OPINION UPDATE (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1982), P. 129; POLL FROM INSTITUT FUR DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE, JUNE 1982. NATIONAL ADULT SAMPLE OF APPROXIMATELY 2,000.

NATO DUAL-TRACK DECISION
BY PARTY PREFERENCE

QUESTION: "NATO HAS DECIDED THAT FROM 1983 ON, AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WOULD BE STATIONED IN WESTERN EUROPE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, IT HAS SUGGESTED CARRYING ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION TOWARD A DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT THAT COULD LEAD TO A TOTAL OR PARTIAL RENUNCIATION OF THESE MISSILES. ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST THIS RESOLUTION?"

EMNID POLL, MARCH 1982

	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>%</u>	<u>GREENS</u> <u>%</u>	<u>CDU/CSU</u> <u>%</u>	<u>SPD</u> <u>%</u>	<u>FDP</u> <u>%</u>
FAVOR	40	14	53	30	31
OPPOSE	24	52	14	29	36
INDIFFERENT	13	12	12	17	9
HAVEN'T MADE UP MY MIND	22	23	22	24	24

SOURCE: JOERG R. METTKE (HG.) DIE GRUENEN REGIERUNGSPARTNER VON MORGEN?, SPIEGEL-BUCH, P. 40.

FUTURE NEEDS FOR ATOMIC POWER PLANTS IN GERMANY

IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION, WHICH OF THE TWO SPEAKERS WOULD YOU AGREE WITH?

SPEAKER #1: I BELIEVE THAT OVER THE NEXT 20 YEARS WE CAN SATISFY OUR ENERGY NEEDS WITHOUT BUILDING NEW ATOMIC POWER PLANTS. IF WE SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ENERGY SOURCES SUCH AS SUN, WIND, AND BIOGAS, WE WILL NOT NEED NEW ATOMIC POWER PLANTS.

SPEAKER #2: I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WILL HAVE ENOUGH ENERGY FROM OUR CURRENT ATOMIC POWER PLANTS OVER THE COMING 20 YEARS. JUST FURTHERING THE NEW FORMS OF ENERGY WILL NOT BE ENOUGH.

	WILL NOT NEED NEW ATOMIC POWER PLANTS	WILL NEED ATOMIC POWER PLANTS	DON'T KNOW
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
NATIONWIDE	41	44	15
MEN	37	52	11
WOMEN	46	36	18
<u>AGE GROUPS</u>			
16-29 YEARS	52	39	9
30-44 YEARS	43	47	10
45-59 YEARS	36	46	18
60 YEARS & OVER	34	43	23
<u>BY EDUCATION</u>			
LOW	38	43	19
HIGH	44	47	9
<u>BY COMMUNITY SIZE</u>			
RURAL	40	51	9
SMALL TOWN	38	47	15
MEDIUM-SIZE CITIES	42	42	16
LARGE CITIES	42	41	17
<u>BY POLITICAL PARTY</u>			
CDU/CSU	33	54	13
SPD	40	46	14
FDP	39	44	17
GREENS	91	7	2

SOURCE: INSTITUT FÜR DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1981. NATIONAL ADULT SAMPLE OF 2,000; IN WORLD OPINION UPDATE, VOL. VI, NO. 3 (MAY/JUNE 1982), P. 80.

ATOMIC POWER

THERE ARE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARD ATOMIC ENERGY. ONE PERSON SAYS: IF WE WISH TO MAINTAIN OUR STANDARD OF LIVING, WE MUST BUILD NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN THE COMING YEARS.

THE OTHER SAYS: THE DANGERS ARE TOO GREAT. BECAUSE OF THIS WE SHOULD NOT BUILD ANY MORE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. WITH WHICH OPINION DO YOU AGREE?

EMNID POLL, MARCH 1982

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>GREENS</u>	<u>CDU/CSU</u>	<u>SPD</u>	<u>FDP</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
MORE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS	52	15	63	42	61
NO MORE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS	46	85	34	57	39

SOURCE: JOERG R. METTKE (HG.), DIE GRUENEN: REGIERUNGSPARTNER VON MORGEN? SPIEGEL-BUCH, P. 42.

DO YOU BELIEVE IN PROGRESS?

	<u>1967</u> <u>JULY</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1972</u> <u>OCTOBER</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1975</u> <u>JULY</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1977</u> <u>NOV</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1978</u> <u>NOV</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1980</u> <u>JANUARY</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1981</u> <u>DECEMBER</u> * <u>%</u>
BELIEVE IN PROGRESS	56	60	48	39	34	31	34
DON'T BELIEVE IN PROGRESS	26	19	30	35	40	41	47
UNDECIDED, IT DEPENDS	15	18	20	22	23	24	19
NO OPINION	3	3	2	4	3	4	

* HALF-GROUP A.

SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/ES, P. 5; DECEMBER 1981 FROM ALLENSBACH BERICHTE.

DECEMBER 1981
BY SELECTED POPULATION GROUPS

	<u>BELIEVE</u> <u>IN</u> <u>PROGRESS</u> <u>%</u>	<u>DON'T</u> <u>BELIEVE</u> <u>IN</u> <u>PROGRESS</u> <u>%</u>	<u>UNDECIDED,</u> <u>NO</u> <u>ANSWER</u> <u>%</u>	
<u>TOTAL</u>	34	47	19	= 100%
<u>MEN</u>	38	45	17	
<u>WOMEN</u>	29	50	21	
<u>AGE GROUP</u>				
16-29 YEARS	38	47	15	
30-44 YEARS	35	46	19	
45-59 YEARS	33	45	22	
60 YEARS & OVER	28	51	21	
<u>PARTY PREFERENCE</u>				
CDU/CSU VOTERS	31	49	20	
SPD VOTERS	35	50	15	
FDP VOTERS	36	47	17	
GREENS VOTERS	26	58	16	

SOURCE: ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE.

WILL LIFE GET EASIER OR MORE DIFFICULT?

QUESTION: WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT LIFE
WILL ALWAYS GET EASIER FOR PEOPLE OR ALWAYS MORE DIFFICULT?

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	DECEMBER <u>1981*</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
ALWAYS MORE DIFFICULT	44	57	60	65	69
ALWAYS EASIER	31	15	11	8	6
REMAIN THE SAME	18	21	22	17	20
DON'T KNOW	7	7	7	10	5

DECEMBER 1981
BY SELECTED POPULATION GROUPS

	<u>MORE DIFFI- CULT</u>	<u>EASIER</u>	<u>REMAIN SAME</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	
<u>TOTAL</u>	69	6	20	5	= 100%
<u>MEN</u>	68	8	19	5	
<u>WOMEN</u>	71	4	20	5	
<u>AGE GROUPS</u>					
16-29 YEARS	66	5	22	7	
30-44 YEARS	68	7	21	4	
45-59 YEARS	75	6	15	4	
60 & OLDER	69	6	19	6	
<u>PARTY PREFERENCE</u>					
CDU/CSU VOTERS	73	6	17	4	
SPD VOTERS	68	6	20	6	
FDP VOTERS	63	9	25	3	
GREENS VOTERS	80	4	9	7	

* HALF-GROUP B.

SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLLS IN ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE.

increase from 1957 to the middle of the 1970s in the numbers of people who believed atomic power could be of great use if mankind learned to handle it intelligently--46 percent in 1957 up to 64 percent in 1976. In 1979 there was a slight tapering off to 60 percent, perhaps reflecting a renewed growth in sentiment that war is possible in the coming years.

(3) Confidence in Public Institutions

West Germans today appear to have a fairly high level of confidence in their democratic institutions.* The EMNID polls that follow show that top confidence was placed in the country's Federal Constitutional Court and public health organizations (by a margin of 8 out of 10). But the public also gave fairly high marks to many other institutions: the Justice Department, radio, the armed forces, the FBI and schools, each of which rated 70 percent or over. Confidence in several other institutions was also not far below this. The lowest regard in 1982 was for the political parties (39 percent). Senior high schools and universities, as well as newspapers, grew most in public esteem between 1979 and 1982.

In a separate sampling, EMNID asked youth between the ages of 14 and 24 to rate their confidence in these institutions and organizations. Responses by age and educational levels are shown in the table below. In general, the lowest level of confidence was felt by those who had their Abitur or were in the university. In fact, a senior high or university education appeared to be a key variable in determining disillusionment with the various public institutions. The better-educated youth gave their strongest support to higher education and public health; this was, in fact, the only support that matched that of the general public.

The gaps in confidence were widest, however, between the Greens and sympathizers of all other parties. In 1982 the Greens had about half as much confidence in several institutions as all other party adherents. Greens gave particularly low marks to the Federal Constitutional Court, the Justice Department, the armed forces, the Agencies for the Protection of the Constitution, local officials, the church, business, the federal parliament and federal government, and the political parties. The Greens' ratings of the senior high schools, universities and trade unions were the only ones on a par with the national average.

* This has been borne out by the strongly positive German results in Euro-barometre surveys on satisfaction with the function of democracy, included in the section on Belgian public opinion, II.E.2.a. In October 1981, except for the Luxembourgers (75 percent contented), the West Germans had the highest satisfaction (71 percent) with the function of democracy in their country among the European Community nations. And this satisfaction had apparently increased significantly in the last decade: The West German trend shows 44 percent satisfied in September 1973, 73 percent in October 1980, and 71 percent in October 1981.

TREND IN CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 1979-1982

QUESTION: "I WILL NOW READ YOU A LIST OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PLEASE TELL ME AS I READ OFF EACH INSTITUTION OR ORGANIZATION IF YOU HAVE CONFIDENCE IN IT OR IF THAT IS NOT THE CASE. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT.....?"

	<u>EMNID POLLS</u>		
	<u>1982</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1981</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1979</u> <u>%</u>
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT	82	78	83
PUBLIC HEALTH	80	80	80
JUSTICE	74	70	73
RADIO	74	--	--
ARMED FORCES	71	74	68
AGENCIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION	70	--	--
SCHOOLS	70	--	--
TELEVISION	69	62	69
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITIES	69	57	59
LOCAL OFFICIALS	68	73	72
CHURCH	67	66	65
BUSINESS	65	54	50
FEDERAL PARLIAMENT	61	64	67
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	59	--	--
NEWSPAPERS	57	47	47
TRADE UNIONS	53	52	48
POLITICAL PARTIES	39	40	43

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, INFORMATIONEN, NO. 3, 1982, P. 9.
ASKED OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF APPROXIMATELY 1,000
WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS AND OLDER.

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS--BY PARTY PREFERENCE, EDUCATION, & RELIGION--1982
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 14 YEARS & OLDER
 (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

QUESTION: "I WILL NOW READ YOU A LIST OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PLEASE TELL ME AS I READ OFF EACH INSTITUTION OR ORGANIZATION IF YOU HAVE CONFIDENCE IN IT OR IF THAT IS NOT THE CASE. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT.....?"

ORGANIZATION	TOTAL %	PARTY PREFERENCE				EDUCATION			RELIGION	
		CDU	OTHER NONE, NO PRI -			MAY	INTER-MEDIATE	SR-HIGH UNIV.	PROT.	CATH. OTHER
			CSU	SPD	FDP	ANSWER				
FED. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT	82	85	81	93	48	85	84	80	73	80 86 75
PUBLIC HEALTH	80	80	83	83	61	79	80	81	78	78 82 73
JUSTICE	74	75	76	84	51	74	76	73	69	73 72 74
RADIO	74	73	78	69	65	76	79	66	67	76 73 66
ARMED FORCES	71	76	70	72	40	71	77	61	58	73 71 60
AGENCIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION	70	75	66	73	31	75	72	68	59	68 72 61
SCHOOLS	70	70	69	57	58	87	70	64	64	67 74 60
TELEVISION	69	72	70	63	49	69	73	65	52	70 70 56
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITIES	69	65	73	89	68	64	67	73	76	73 66 59
LOCAL OFFICIALS	68	70	71	82	33	62	69	68	59	67 71 58
CHURCH	67	75	63	70	43	64	69	62	68	68 72 33
BUSINESS	65	71	60	69	39	64	66	63	58	65 67 42
FEDERAL PARLIAMENT	61	60	67	65	24	69	66	51	58	63 72 44
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	59	47	75	75	22	65	63	50	53	66 52 44
NEWSPAPERS	57	56	54	61	47	72	59	55	48	59 57 40
TRADE UNIONS	53	44	61	65	49	58	55	51	42	55 51 48
POLITICAL PARTIES	39	36	40	53	24	43	41	34	36	40 36 38

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, INFORMATIONEN, NO. 3, 1982, P. A1-A18.

CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS--YOUTH
WEST GERMAN YOUTH, 14-24 YEARS, BY AGE AND EDUCATION, 1982

QUESTION: "I WILL NOW READ YOU A LIST OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PLEASE TELL ME AS I READ OFF EACH INSTITUTION AND ORGANIZATION IF YOU HAVE CONFIDENCE IN IT OR IF THAT IS NOT THE CASE. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT.....?"

EMNID POLL, SPRING 1982

	BY AGE				BY EDUCATION			
	TOTAL	14-15 YEARS	16-19 YEARS	20-24 YEARS	PRIMARY O.L.	PRIMARY M.L.	INTER- MEDIATE	SENIOR HIGH, (ABITUR) UNIVERSITY
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
PUBLIC HEALTH	83	86	83	81	90	90	83	71
RADIO	78	82	78	77	88	86	81	62
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT	77	85	80	70	85	81	80	65
HIGH SCHOOLS/								
UNIVERSITIES	74	75	75	72	71	71	76	75
TELEVISION	72	77	74	69	83	81	78	51
SCHOOLS	69	65	69	70	70	75	70	59
JUSTICE	68	70	72	63	75	72	69	59
ARMED FORCES	61	63	67	56	75	69	64	42
CHURCH	60	63	64	57	65	64	62	53
LOCAL OFFICIALS	59	67	62	55	77	66	62	40
AGENCIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF								
THE CONSTITUTION	59	63	65	53	74	69	61	39
FEDERAL PARLIAMENT	58	65	61	54	73	61	62	45
NEWSPAPERS	58	66	58	55	75	63	59	43
BUSINESS	56	63	61	49	73	63	58	36
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	56	64	58	51	66	58	58	46
TRADE UNIONS	48	53	45	49	60	53	47	37
POLITICAL PARTIES	35	41	34	34	49	37	36	25

* SAMPLE OF 1,008 WEST GERMAN RESPONDENTS, 14-24 YEARS.

SOURCE: EMNID INSTITUT, INFORMATIONEN, NO. 3, 1982, P. 11.

The breakdown by religion also showed significant differences: those who had no religion tended to be much less confident of the nation's institutions. The non-religious gave particularly low ratings to, of course, the church, but also to the federal government and parliament, business, and newspapers.

In sum, West Germans appear pleased with the way democratic institutions are working in their country. The main dissatisfaction comes from the better-educated, those who belong to no religion, and, to a very high degree, from the Greens. The special Weltanschauung of the Greens sets them frequently at odds with the prevailing institutions of the state and the priorities of the average German.

g. Peace and Defense Attitudes in West Germany*

(1) Pacifism and Sympathy for the Peace Movement

An autumn 1981 EMNID-Der Spiegel poll found that about 9 percent of the voting age population--mostly highly-educated young--were potential peace activists. Of these 9 percent, 7 percent felt they might become active in the movement; only 1 percent said they would definitely become involved, while another 1 percent were already in the movement. More importantly, however, there was a latent sympathy for the movement among almost two-fifths of the population who "found the peace movement basically good but did not wish to participate in it."**

This sympathy is not likely to translate into actual voting support for the Greens party.*** But it can form--and recently seems to have formed--a basis for resistance to NATO nuclear force modernization in West Germany and a tendency to relinquish a strong defensive posture against the Soviet Union. Unless the Greens actually obtain 5 percent of the vote in the March federal election, and thus become very powerful in manipulating political events, this large pool of peace movement sympathizers--together with another 22 percent who were indifferent to the movement--could eventually become more important to the fate of the NATO missiles than the small number of voluble peace activists. In this poll, only 1 out of 10 rejected the peace movement outright.

*The voluminous survey data researched for this section is gathered in an extensive collection of tables and charts in Part II of the Appendix and Section IV. Please refer to these tables for much of the supporting material for statements made in this section.

**Der Spiegel, Vol. 35, No. 48 (November 23, 1981), pp. 65-68. EMNID Institut surveyed a representative sample of 2,150 West Germans, 18 years and over, in the first half of October 1981. The poll is discussed in some detail at the opening of Section II.B.2.a.

***See Section II.B.2.e., "The Political Potential of the Greens."

A further indication of latent opposition to the use of weapons and a tendency toward pacifism may be found in another result of this poll. Responding to the question "I reject all weapons and rule out any use of violence," 7 percent agreed; 15 percent agreed, but would not identify themselves as pacifists; 29 percent were undecided; and 20 percent disagreed, but were prepared to be tolerant of the view. Only 17 percent repudiated the statement.

At the same time, at least one-half of the population felt the peace movement had no influence on the outcome of the armament issue. The other half was evenly divided between believing, on the one hand, that a strong peace movement would help motivate disarmament negotiations and, on the other, that a strong peace movement would make it less likely for the West to close the armament gap.*

In sum, the West Germans appear to sympathize with the goal of peace and the rejection of violence but are unsure of the nature and impact of the peace movement and have no wish to participate in it. A set of tables and charts giving the responses to this poll is presented in the following pages.

(2) Neutralism

From the end of the 1970s to the present time, polls on neutralism showed a mixed bag of responses to a variety of questions. In the fall 1981 survey referred to above, EMNID asked the Germans if they would favor a neutrality similar to Austria's or an alliance with the West that could resist the Soviet Union. The public chose a Western alliance by a strong 63 to 35 percent margin. A second EMNID poll in Newsweek, March 15, 1982, showed 3 out of 4 Germans believing it better to defend their country than to accept Russian domination. On the other hand, the 1982 International Study of Values, conducted by the Gallup organization, found the West Germans, by a 41 to 35 percent margin, unwilling to fight for their country if there were another war; another 24 percent were undecided.**


Results of the latest EMNID poll published in Newsweek on January 31, 1983 revealed a clear majority (57 percent) favoring a move toward West European neutralism in the East-West conflict. Moreover, the trend in a "better-red-than-dead" question asked by the Allensbach Institute from May 1955 to July 1981 showed greater numbers of Germans at the end

* See Section II.B.2.c.(1), for a discussion of the two positions toward the use of nuclear weapons recognized by the West Germany Protestant Council (EKD) since the Heidelberg Theses in 1959: i.e., peace through disarmament or through defense.

** Survey undertaken for the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA), Washington, D.C.

ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE MOVEMENT
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 18 YEARS & OVER, OCTOBER 1981

QUESTION: "WHAT ABOUT THE PEACE MOVEMENT: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO IT?" (RESPONDENT WAS ASKED TO CHOOSE FROM A LIST OF SEVEN POSSIBILITIES)



SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 35, NO. 48 (NOVEMBER 23, 1981), p. 63.

ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE MOVEMENT
TOTAL AND BY PARTY PREFERENCE, 18 YEARS & OVER, OCTOBER 1981


QUESTION: "THERE ARE MANY ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS IN THE PEACE MOVEMENT WHICH DESPITE THEIR OTHERWISE DIFFERENT POLITICAL VIEWS, ARE UNITED IN WARNING ABOUT THE DANGER OF A NEW WAR AND DEMANDING AN END TO THE ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS. WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS PEACE MOVEMENT?"

EMNID POLL

	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>%</u>	<u>GREENS</u> <u>%</u>	<u>CDU/CSU</u> <u>%</u>	<u>SPD</u> <u>%</u>	<u>FDP</u> <u>%</u>
REJECT IT TOTALLY	10	2	16	7	4
HAVE MISGIVINGS ABOUT IT	19	1	24	15	15
AM INDIFFERENT TO IT	22	11	24	20	17
FIND IT BASICALLY GOOD, BUT WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN IT	39	16	31	47	55
MIGHT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN IT	7	47	3	8	9
WOULD DEFINITELY PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE	1	8	1	1	--
AM ALREADY ACTIVE IN IT	1	15	--	1	--


SOURCE: JOERG R. METTKE (HG.), DIE GRUENEN: REGIERUNGSPARTNER VON MORGEN?, SPIEGEL-BUCH, P. 39.

PARTICIPATION IN PEACE MOVEMENT
BY PARTY PREFERENCE, 18 YEARS & OVER, OCTOBER 1981



SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 35, NO. 48 (NOVEMBER 23, 1981), P. 63.


PARTICIPATION IN PEACE MOVEMENT
BY AGE, OCTOBER 1981



SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 35, NO. 48 (NOVEMBER 23, 1981), P. 63.


POTENTIAL FOR PACIFISM IN WEST GERMANY
TOTAL POPULATION, 18 YEARS & OVER, OCTOBER 1981

QUESTION: "PACIFISTS REJECT ALL WEAPONS AND ANY USE OF VIOLENCE.
WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THIS ATTITUDE?" (RESPONDENT
HAD TO PICK ONE OUT OF FIVE CHOICES)



SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 35, NO. 49 (NOVEMBER 30, 1981),
P. 106.

INFLUENCE OF PEACE MOVEMENT
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 18 YEARS & OVER, OCTOBER 1981



SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 35, NO. 48 (NOVEMBER 23, 1981), P. 63.

of the '70s unwilling to "defend democratic freedom," with nuclear war if necessary, even if it meant living under communist rule. A key factor, however, influencing the responses in this trend would be the use of the trigger phrase "nuclear war" which would necessarily skew the answers. In 1981 there were negligible differences in the responses by age, and significant cleavages by party preference: for example, about 65 percent of the Greens chose to avoid war at all costs, compared with approximately 37 percent of the CDU/CSU supporters. This breakdown, as well as other surveys and trends on neutralism, may be found in Part II of the Appendix.

The breakdown by age and party preference in the March 1982 EMNID Newsweek poll reveals that over twice as many 18-34 year olds as those 35 and over, and twice as many Greens as CDU/CSU adherents, chose Russian domination over defending Germany. The autumn 1981 EMNID poll also showed a huge cleavage between the responses of the Greens and all other party supporters on the neutrality question: 82 percent of the Greens favored an Austrian-type neutrality over a Western alliance, compared with 30 percent of the Christian Democrats, 37 percent of the Social Democrats, and 24 percent of the Free Democrats.* Ironically enough, the 35 percent of the total population in the Newsweek poll that chose the neutralist position still tended to support the presence of American troops in West Germany.

The SPD has made the question of willingness to deploy the new NATO nuclear weapons the central issue of the March election campaign. The party has bet on the unpopularity of the weapons deployment and the mood of the public toward conciliation with the Soviets to carry the election. Indeed, recent polls seem to bear out a drift toward neutralism and lessened fear of Russian aims. The pivotal issue, however, may not be the nuclear missiles, but the economy/unemployment. There is also some belief on the part of political observers that the SPD campaign emphasis on the missile deployment could backfire in the election.


According to a pre-election poll, conducted by the Sinus Institut in Munich in September 1982, and picked up by Chancellor-candidate Vogel, a growing number of West Germans seem to advocate a changing relationship with the East and West. The poll results indicated that since March 1980, increasing numbers have supported better relations with the Eastern bloc, opposition to nuclear force modernization, arms control, more independence from the U.S. and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.** Responses revealed that 85 percent of the voters (79 percent in March 1980) wanted a continuation of detente with the Soviet Union and East European countries; only 14 percent (down from 24 percent) were for the "stationing of more and new American atomic weapons in the Federal Republic and Western Europe; 69 percent (49 percent) favored "more independence for the Federal Republic vis-a-vis the U.S." Simultaneously, the percentage that considered the

* Werner Harenberg, "Sicherer Platz Links von der SPD?" in Mettke, Die Gruenen, p. 41.

** Der Spiegel, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 10, 1983), p. 28.

NUCLEAR WAR OR DOMINATION
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 16 YEARS & OVER, 1955-1981

QUESTION: "NO ONE CAN PREDICT THE FUTURE, BUT WHAT WOULD YOUR OPINION BE IF ONE DAY WE HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN LETTING EUROPE BECOME SOVIET OR USING ALL MEANS TO DEFEND IT. WHAT IS REALLY MORE IMPORTANT, TO DEFEND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM EVEN IF IT LEADS TO NUCLEAR WAR, OR TO AVOID WAR AT ALL COST, EVEN IF IT MEANS LIVING UNDER COMMUNIST RULE?"



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 7, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, NEW YORK.

U.S. to be the strongest military power rose (from 26 to 35 percent), while estimates of the military strength of the Soviet Union decreased (from 57 to 43 percent). More importantly, 51 percent felt that the Federal Republic is in "no military danger" from the Soviet Union. In matters of disarmament, distrust for the aims of the U.S. grew while trust in the Soviet Union showed an increase. At least one-third of those who favored the CDU/CSU and majorities of all the other parties believed that neither superpower was genuinely interested in disarmament.

Another pre-election poll, taken by the Gallup organization in Western Europe and the U.S. and published in Newsweek (January 31, 1983), showed a general inclination among the West sEuropean toward neutralism and limited support for the deployment of the missiles should the U.S. and the Soviet Union not come to an arms limitation agreement (the Netherlands even opposed deployment by 51 percent). But the phrasing of these questions was such that the U.S. and Soviet Union appeared to be the true protagonists in the East-West conflict while the West Europeans were participating as reluctant onlookers. Under these circumstances, the tendency of the Europeans in response to the questions would likely have been to say, "A pox on both your houses." Indeed, although they disliked the Russians more than the Americans, the Europeans gave the impression they wanted to stay out of what was to them essentially a Soviet-U.S. conflict. The responses to these questions are shown in the table below.

(3) Fear of War, the Russian Threat, Detente and Ostpolitik

It has become commonly accepted that fear of war has increased markedly in recent years. Indeed, long-term trends on the probability of war indicate an upturn in apprehension at the end of 1979 and then a slight decrease in 1981-82. This could lead one to believe that the increase was largely due to the NATO decision to modernize the missile force in Europe. Examination of the trend reveals, however, that fear of war throughout the last three decades was highly sensitive to political events and international crises, regardless of the presence of nuclear weapons on European soil. Thus, the most important variable in the trend appeared to be, not nuclear, but political.

For example, in the decades of detente between the two periods of heightened apprehension--that is, 1979, when the world experienced the hostage crisis in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial rule in Poland and the 1950's, when East-West relations were at times harrowingly tense and the West was rearming--fear was generally low and perturbations occurred with little relationship to the existence of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Euro-barometre polls of the European Community indicate the rise between 1977 and 1980 in the belief that war is probable within 10 years. From 1980-81, however, most of the EEC countries experienced a significant lessening of apprehension. Not so in West Germany, however, where the anxiety remained high: from a low of 11 percent in July 1971, it went

THE NATO ALLIANCE AND ARMAMENTS: A MOVE TOWARD NEUTRALISM?
JANUARY 1983

ON THE ISSUE OF LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHOM DO YOU FIND MORE CREDIBLE, RONALD REAGAN, OR SOVIET PARTY LEADER, YURI ANDROPOV?

<u>COUNTRY POLLED</u>	<u>RONALD REAGAN</u>	<u>YURI ANDROPOV</u>	<u>NEITHER</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>
UNITED STATES	59%	10%	14%	17
FRANCE	36	14	24	26
WEST GERMANY	43	14	43	*
NETHERLANDS	23	21	40	16
GREAT BRITAIN	38	18	33	11

IF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT AGREE ON LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE END OF 1983, SHOULD NATO PROCEED WITH ITS PLAN TO DEPLOY PERSHING II MISSILES AND CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE?

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>
UNITED STATES	45%	31%	24%
FRANCE	34	29	37
WEST GERMANY	37	35	28
NETHERLANDS	33	51	16
GREAT BRITAIN	43	34	23

SOME HAVE SAID THAT WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE SAFER IF IT MOVED TOWARD NEUTRALISM IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT. OTHERS ARGUE THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE DANGEROUS. WOULD YOU, YOURSELF FAVOR OR OPPOSE A MOVE TOWARD NEUTRALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE?

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>FAVOR</u>	<u>OPPOSE</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>
UNITED STATES	41%	45%	14%
FRANCE	43	41	16
WEST GERMANY	57	43	*
NETHERLANDS	53	32	15
GREAT BRITAIN	45	42	13

* LESS THAN ONE PERCENT. ON THESE CRITICAL QUESTIONS, WEST GERMAN VOTERS WERE PRESSED TO MAKE A CLEAR DECISION.

THE NATO ALLIANCE AND ARMAMENTS: A MOVE TOWARD NEUTRALISM? (Cont'd.)

WHO IS MORE LIKELY TO INITIATE A NUCLEAR ATTACK IN EUROPE--THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION?

<u>COUNTRY POLLED</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>SOVIET UNION</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>
UNITED STATES	12%	65%	23%
FRANCE	11	49	40
WEST GERMANY	20	45	35
NETHERLANDS	20	45	35
GREAT BRITAIN	28	48	24

WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT U.S.-SOVIET HOSTILITIES WILL ESCALATE INTO A THIRD WORLD WAR?

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>VERY LIKELY</u>	<u>SOMEWHAT LIKELY</u>	<u>NOT LIKELY</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>
UNITED STATES	13%	38%	44%	5%
FRANCE	7	33	54	6
WEST GERMANY	10	24	66	*
NETHERLANDS	10	21	60	9
GREAT BRITAIN	20	31	44	5

THE ADVOCATES OF A NUCLEAR FREEZE SAY THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY HAVE ENOUGH NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DESTROY EACH OTHER AND WANT BOTH SIDES TO BAN ALL TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT IS YOUR VIEW?

	<u>STRONGLY FAVOR</u>	<u>FAVOR</u>	<u>OPPOSE</u>	<u>STRONGLY OPPOSE</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>
UNITED STATES	30%	34%	19%	10%	7%

* LESS THAN ONE PERCENT. ON THESE CRITICAL QUESTIONS, WEST GERMAN VOTERS WERE PRESSED TO MAKE A CLEAR DECISION.

NOTE: FOR THIS INTERNATIONAL NEWSWEEK POLL, THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION AND ITS AFFILIATES IN EUROPE INTERVIEWED REPRESENTATIVE NATIONAL SAMPLES OF ABOUT 500 ADULTS IN EACH COUNTRY (754 IN THE U.S., 723 IN WEST GERMANY) BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON BETWEEN JAN. 17 AND 19. THE MARGIN OF ERROR IS PLUS OR MINUS FOUR TO FIVE PERCENTAGE POINTS.

SOURCE: NEWSWEEK, VOL. CI, NO. 5 (JANUARY 31, 1983) P. 17.

to 25 percent in April 1980, and to an even higher 32 percent in October 1981.

These and other survey results on the danger of war are grouped in tables in the following pages. Gallup polls in this series of tables show another significant drop between 1981 and '82 in fears of war among European Community nations. In 1982 clear majorities in these countries felt there was less than a 50 percent probability of war in the next 10 years, and fewer than previously thought there would be more than a 50 percent chance. Although West Germans became considerably more optimistic, there was a note of uncertainty in their response (including a large 17 percent "no opinion").

An EMNID trend, on the probability of war within three years, illustrates the point made above. It shows the intense fear of war in 1950, when one-third felt it was probable, relative to the diminished sense of danger over the next two decades. Though few Germans since 1962 (a mean of about 5 percent) have thought war to be probable, a substantial number have considered it possible. Numerous perturbations in the trend can be clearly seen, especially the one from July to December 1979, when the severe crises mentioned above occurred in the East. Thus, in July 1979, 80 percent saw no danger of war; by December this response had plummeted to 59 percent.

In the June 1982 poll, the last of this EMNID trend, the breakdown by population groups showed that women, the young, the better-educated, public servants, Protestants, those from the city-states of Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin, and Free Democrats were most inclined to believe in the possibility of war.

Several Allensbach polls covering the two decades between 1961 and 1981 showed a trend broadly similar to EMNID's. After a decade and a half of fairly steady growth in the belief that no one would risk a large-scale war again, a sharp perturbation downward occurred from 1979 to 1980, a drop which was largely recouped over the following year. In July 1981, however, a new surge of concern was registered, when equal percentages (about 45 percent) anticipated and rejected the possibility of a new world war. Because the question was not asked between 1967 and 1975, the trend line could be misleading, for it does not take into account perturbations that might possibly have occurred between those years. At the beginning of the '80s, the pattern of responses showed the elderly fearing war by a small margin over those under 60 years of age, but no other clear differences by age emerged.

In the most recent survey on this issue, the EMNID Newsweek poll of January 1983, 2 out of 3 Germans did not believe that U.S.-Soviet hostilities were likely to escalate into a Third World War (1 out of 4, somewhat likely; 1 out of 10, very likely).

Apparently the Germans do not feel threatened by the Russians unless some crisis brings the possibility of danger close to home. At present,

THOSE WHO CONSIDER A WORLD WAR "PROBABLE"¹
WITHIN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	<u>B</u>	<u>DK</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>IRL</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>NL</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>EC</u> ²
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
JULY 1971	8	:	11	12	:	13	7	11	:	:	12
OCT.-NOV. 1977	21	10	13	14	14	14	11	17	13	:	14
APRIL 1980	33	18	25	42	31	32	15	24	39	:	34
OCTOBER 1981	32	:	32	25	28	18	27	20	21	8	24

¹PROBABILITY GREATER THAN 50 PERCENT; PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE GIVING A DEFINITE REPLY.

²COMMUNITY OF SIX IN 1971 AND OF NINE IN 1977 AND 1980. THIS QUESTION WAS NOT ASKED IN DENMARK IN 1981.

SOURCE: EURO-BAROMETRE, NO. 16 (DECEMBER 1981), P. 9. B=BELGIUM; DK=DENMARK; D=DEUTSCHLAND (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY); F=FRANCE; IRL=IRELAND; I=ITALY; L=LUXEMBOURG; NL=NETHERLANDS; UK=UNITED KINGDOM; GR=GREECE.

CHANCES OF WORLD WAR IN NEXT 10 YEARS*
 GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLLS, END OF 1981 AND 1982
 (ON A SCALE OF 0 TO 10)

QUESTION: "WITH THE HELP OF THIS CARD (RESPONDENTS WERE HANDED A CARD WITH POSITIONS FROM 0: 'NO DANGER OF WAR' TO 100: 'WORLD WAR CERTAIN'), PLEASE TELL ME WHAT YOU THINK THE CHANCES ARE OF A WORLD WAR BREAKING OUT IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS. THE MORE LIKELY YOU THINK THE CHANCES ARE, THE HIGHER THE NUMBER YOU WOULD PICK. THE LESS LIKELY, THE LOWER THE NUMBER. PLEASE READ OFF THE NUMBER."

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	BEL- GIUM %		DEN- MARK %		FRANCE %		WEST GER- MANY %		ITALY %		NETHER- LANDS %		UNITED KINGDOM %	
	82	81	82	81	82	81	82	81	82	81	82	81	82	81
MORE THAN 50%	18	27	9	23	20	24	16	28	14	18	17	19	16	20
50-50	12	13	15	15	19	19	11	13	11	14	17	21	13	16
LESS THAN 50%	54	44	61	54	60	51	56	49	72	67	60	55	65	59
NO OPINION	16	17	15	9	1	6	17	11	3	2	6	6	6	6

* LESS THAN 1 PERCENT.

NOTE: PERCENTAGES MAY ADD TO MORE OR LESS THAN 100 PERCENT DUE TO ROUNDING.

SOURCE: THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 196 (JANUARY 1982), P. 6 AND NO. 208 (JANUARY 1983), P. 5; THE GALLUP POLL RELEASE, DECEMBER 26, 1982.

PROBABILITY OF WORLD WAR WITHIN THE NEXT THREE YEARS
WEST GERMANY

QUESTION: "DO YOU BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A WORLD WAR WITHIN THE NEXT 3 YEARS? DO YOU THINK IT IS PROBABLE, POSSIBLE, OR IMPROBABLE?"

	<u>PROBABLE</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>	<u>IMPROBABLE</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
JULY 1950	35	48	17	--
SEPT 1962	4	29	55	12
SEPT 1964	2	16	74	8
APRIL 1965	2	26	63	9
JUNE 1967	6	30	55	9
OCT 1968	3	29	60	8
JULY 1979	2	17	80	1
DEC 1979	4	35	59	2
JAN 1980	9	40	49	1
DEC 1980	3	29	68	0
JULY/AUG 1981	5	32	63	0
JUNE 1982	6	38	56	1

SOURCE: EMNID POLLS IN INFORMATIONEN, VOL. 34, NO. 5/6, 1982, PP. 9-10, ISSUED BY THE EMNID INSTITUT. THE JUNE 1982 POLL WAS OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF 1,011 WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS AND OVER.

IS ANOTHER WORLD WAR POSSIBLE?--1961-1981
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 16 YEARS & OVER

QUESTION: "DO YOU THINK THAT WE HAVE TO RECKON WITH THE PROSPECT OF
 A NEW WORLD WAR BREAKING OUT AGAIN, OR DON'T YOU THINK ANYONE
 WILL RISK A LARGE-SCALE WAR AGAIN?"

	MUST RECKON WITH WORLD WAR	NO ONE WILL RISK THIS	OTHER/NO (CONCRETE) RESPONSE	
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
1961, AUGUST	46	45	9	= 100
1963, JANUARY	42	49	9	= 100
1965, FEBRUARY	41	48	11	= 100
1967, JUNE	38	54	8	= 100
1975, DECEMBER	29	63	8	= 100
1979, SEPTEMBER	32	59	9	= 100
1980, JANUARY	44	50	6	= 100
JANUARY/FEBRUARY	38	56	6	= 100
FEBRUARY	36	58	6	= 100
MAY	36	54	10	= 100
1981, JANUARY	34	59	7	= 100
JULY	46	45	9	= 100

SOURCE: ALLENSBACH SURVEYS IN AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY
GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, REPORT BY THE INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE
ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 24.

IS ANOTHER WORLD WAR POSSIBLE?
TOTAL AND BY AGE, 1979-1981

QUESTION: "DO YOU THINK THAT WE HAVE TO RECKON WITH THE PROSPECT OF A NEW WORLD WAR BREAKING OUT AGAIN, OR DON'T YOU THINK ANYONE WILL RISK A LARGE-SCALE WAR AGAIN?"

	AGE				
	TOTAL POPULATION	16 TO 29 YEARS	30 TO 44 YEARS	45 TO 59 YEARS	60 YEARS & OVER
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>SEPTEMBER 1979</u>					
NO ONE WILL RISK IT	59	60	61	59	55
MUST RECKON WITH WORLD WAR	32*	31	31	33	35
<u>JANUARY 1980</u>					
NO ONE WILL RISK IT	50	52	51	53	44
MUST RECKON WITH WORLD WAR	44	42	42	41	49
<u>FEBRUARY 1980</u>					
NO ONE WILL RISK IT	56	53	61	59	49
MUST RECKON WITH WORLD WAR	38	42	34	35	43
<u>JANUARY 1981</u>					
NO WILL RISK IT	59	61	64	58	54
MUST RECKON WITH WORLD WAR	34	34	29	35	37

* TOTALS ADD UP TO LESS THAN 100 PERCENT BECAUSE OF THE "UNDECIDED, NO (CONCRETE) ANSWER" RESPONSE.

SOURCE: GERHARD HERDEGEN, "DIE JUGEND DENKT ANDERS," DIE POLITISCHE MEINUNG, VOL. 26, NO. 195, 1981, P. 57.

the Germans are heavily invested in the preservation of the Ostpolitik and do not believe the Soviets, despite recent events in Afghanistan and Poland and the missile build-up on the Eastern front, realistically present a threat to them. In the September 1982 Sinus poll, one-half said that the Federal Republic is in no military danger from the Soviet Union, and an overwhelming 81 percent in March 1982 thought it unlikely that the Soviet Union would attack Western Europe within the next five years.


But West German hopes and fears in relation to the Soviet Union contain tensions that set the stage for an ambiguous political relationship with the powerful neighbor to the East. The nature and effect of this relationship has been analyzed in some detail in Sections IV and VI of this report. For example, the West Germans overwhelmingly support the continuation of the detente and the Ostpolitik, yet do not believe the Soviets have the basic good will to reach an understanding with the West, nor do they think the Soviets are fundamentally willing to seek a reconciliation with the West. Moreover, they evidently believe the Russians profit the most from the Ostpolitik and that the Soviet Union's aim in furthering detente is to expand its power and gain military superiority over the West. In general, their opinion of the Soviet Union is unfavorable (77 percent in the March 1982 EMNID poll). Yet, despite their ambiguous feelings and apparently fundamental distrust of Soviet aims, West Germans increased their support of detente with the Soviet Union and the East European countries to a high of 85 percent (Sinus), and, by a margin of almost 6 out of 10 favored a move toward neutralism in Western Europe (EMNID-Newsweek, January 1983).

(4) Support for the NATO Dual-Track Decision and Missile Deployment

Support for the NATO dual-track decision remained essentially constant in two polls taken by EMNID Institut in October 1981 and January 1983. Four out of every ten favored the resolution in both polls, two out of ten opposed it, and a surprisingly large one-third was undecided. This sizable group of undecided citizens could possibly have a significant effect on the stationing of the missiles at the end of this year. Much will depend upon who wins in the coming federal election, what coalitions are formed, how the uncommitted line up before the election, and if they will be swayed by peace movement activities during the year.

The important change that did take place between late 1981 and early 1983 was in the apparent coalescence of attitudes within the right-left camps. The figure below reveals that during the one and one-half years the CDU/CSU and FDP voters increased their support of the resolution, while the SPD and Greens voters solidified their opposition. Presumably, as the time of the election approaches, and the nuclear issue gets more and more attention during the campaign, many in this sizable group of undecided voters will make a political commitment that puts them in one or the other camps.

NATO DUAL-TRACK DECISION: CHANGE OF OPINION AMONG WEST GERMAN VOTERS
EARLY OCTOBER 1981 AND JANUARY 1983



SOURCE: EMNID POLLS IN DER SPIEGEL, VOLUME 37, NO. 6 (FEBRUARY 7, 1983), P. 90.

Choosing between the two parts of the NATO dual-track decision, the public heavily favored negotiations over deployment of the missiles (64 to 34 percent). Moreover, Allensbach polls revealed that, since the middle of 1980, West Germans have opposed stationing American medium-range missiles in Europe when the purpose is to counterbalance Russian missiles (the survey question did not mention arms-reduction negotiations). The public even thought that deploying the missiles to strengthen NATO should be prevented, if the deployment is not accompanied by arms limitation talks.* As might be expected, overwhelmingly greater numbers of Greens than adherents of the other political parties opposed the missiles; Christian Democrats even favored deployment, by a 40 to 30 percent margin. (Charts giving detailed responses to these and other security questions cited below are included in the Appendix.)

German attitudes toward the stationing of American troops in Europe were, however, different from those toward missile deployment. In fact, support for the American troop presence increased over the last three decades. From being an "unavoidable necessity" in the early 1950s and '60s, the troops became a "welcome protection" in the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, in early October 1981 almost two-thirds (62 percent) said they would regret the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe.** Increasing percentages also favored reinforcing NATO troops (25 percent in 1971, up to 50 percent in 1980). In March 1982 most Germans believed that the presence of both American troops and nuclear missiles in Western Europe provided greater security against attack than if they were removed. Indeed, from February 1976 to July 1981, a majority believed "that an attack from the East can best be prevented by a policy of deterrence, i.e., if the West is sufficiently armed."***

As the chart that follows shows, trust in the ability of the U.S. to deal with world problems declined sharply between the fall of 1981 and January 1983 (62 percent down to 43 percent--combined responses of "very great" and "great"). This decline was, however, largely attributable to the disaffection of the Social Democrats and the Greens. Most voters of the governing CDU/CSU/FDP coalition still maintained great trust in the ability of the U.S. to make wise decisions.**** And finally, the majority of Germans (53 percent) supported the continuation of the NATO alliance in the form it is today.*****

* Source: Allensbach polls, May and August 1981, in American-German Relations, the Allensbach Institut for Demoskopie, p. 30.

** Emnid poll for Der Spiegel, Vol. 35, No. 48 (November 23, 1981).

*** Allensbach polls in American-German Relations, p. 35.


**** EMNID Institut poll in Der Spiegel, Vol. 37, No. 6 (February 7, 1983), p. 90.

***** EMNID Institut poll, February 1982, reported in World Opinion Update, Vol. VI, No. 3 (May/June 1982), p. 72.

CONFIDENCE IN U.S. TO DEAL WITH WORLD PROBLEMS
WEST GERMAN VOTERS

QUESTION: "IN GENERAL, HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN
THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO DEAL WITH
TODAY'S WORLD PROBLEMS?"

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1981 AND JANUARY 1983
(IN PERCENT)



SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 37, NO. 6 (FEBRUARY
7, 1983), P. 90.

C. Great Britain

1. Surprise-Free Scenario for Great Britain

Prior to the invasion of the Falkland Islands, the party in power in Britain was having problems similar to those of other governing parties in this time of recession in the Western world. The great concern among the British electorate had shifted from inflation to unemployment; and although inflation was coming down in 1981, the Conservative party under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher apparently began to bear the brunt of the concern over unemployment. The popularity of the Conservative party began a general slide which, though interrupted by perturbations, occasionally brought them lower in favor than the Labour Party and the alliance of the Social Democrats and Liberals. By September of 1981, 44 percent of the electorate said they would vote for the Social Democratic-Liberal alliance, 32 percent would choose Labour, and only 23 percent would vote Conservative, if an election were held "tomorrow."

Just prior to the Falklands crisis, however, support for the Social Democratic and Liberal alliance slipped considerably, to around the 30 percent mark, and Labour lost much of its March 1982, 38-27 percent lead over the Conservatives. Indeed, by the time of the Falklands war, support for the Conservatives, Labour and the alliance appeared to be running about neck and neck.

After the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, however, the popularity of Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative party began an upward swing, which, except for some perturbations, remained rather constant until mid-1982, when Conservative support rose to 51 percent. It is generally conceded that the Conservatives now have a good chance in a general election. In the local elections, held just one month after the Falklands invasion, the Conservatives did unusually well, considering that these elections are thought to be largely a referendum on the performance of the government and customarily swing heavily against the party in power. Since the popularity of the Conservatives had fallen, one would have expected a debacle if there had been no Falklands crisis. As it happened, however, extrapolation of the local election results to the national picture indicated that the Conservatives would gain about 40 percent, Labour 31 percent, and the alliance about 26 percent. Prior to the fighting, the alliance and Labour had been expected to pick up hundreds of seats in these local elections, but, instead, the seats remained Tory. Two by-elections took place during the war; prior to the conflict, they had been expected to show alliance strength, but now the Conservatives won them easily.*

Because the new Social Democratic party had attracted the more conservative defectors from Labour, as of the autumn of 1982, the 30 Social Democratic MPs could be assumed to be less antidefense than the residual.

*Robert Worcester and Simon Jenkins, "Britain Rallies Round the Prime Minister," Public Opinion (June/July 1982), pp. 53 and 54.

now quite left-wing, Labour Party. The 12 Liberal MPs in the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition are assumed to have a somewhat similar attitude. The Labour Party, however, is quite anti-defense; indeed in 1979 it returned to the support of unilateral disarmament (this issue is discussed in some detail below). Michael Foot, Labour's leader, who is reported to have a position left of James Callahan on defense and nuclear issues, is said to appeal to the middle and right of the Labour Party only to the extent that he is not Tony Benn, "the increasingly extreme ideological leader of Labour's left wing."* Thus, it seems that--at least until a general election, and perhaps thereafter--not only will the Conservative Party have a significant number of its own members in the Parliament to back its defense programs, but it can probably depend on support from the new alliance of the Social Democrats and Liberals for reasonable measures.

Of course, if the economic slide in Britain continues, there could be a drastic coincidental effect on the defense posture. This could occur through a fall of the Conservative government. It is possible that, once the enthusiasm for the Falklands "adventure" begins to wane, and if really dire economic circumstances descend upon Britain, public opinion will again switch against the party in power. In such an event, the Thatcher government might find itself unable to gain a majority on defense issues or might even form a coalition (perhaps with the Social Democrats) with enough seats to hold onto power. If this were to occur, all speculation on defense expenditures and support for defense actions would of course change. If Labour were to return to power, it would be a quite left-wing party that might be unwilling to deal with its Social Democratic defectors or the Liberals, to say nothing of the Conservatives. With majority support given to this more leftist Labour Party headed by Michael Foot, who opposes the use of nuclear weapons and favors unilateral disarmament, the entire British government posture in regard to NATO commitments, including the force modernization program, could differ significantly from that which it is today.

The assumption in this "surprise-free" scenario, however, is that the economic downturn will bottom out before it becomes much more severe. (This does not mean that we postulate the British economy will reverse the generally downward trend it has been experiencing since the latter part of the 19th century, when Great Britain began to have competition in the export of machinery, steel, and textiles. It will not grow as Germany or Japan or perhaps even the U.S. did; but we assume it will begin to improve at a slow pace.) The further premise is that the Conservatives are capable of cashing in on their reputation for the Falklands war to the extent that they do not become extremely unpopular; nor are large defections in their own ranks or disillusionment within the SDP/Liberal alliance to be expected. Thus, it is asserted that, within limits, the Conservatives can carry forward a defense program to support NATO.

* Arthur Cyr, "War and Politics in Britain," Current History (December 1982), pp. 410 and 411.

Much may depend on the timing of a general election. The Conservatives may wish to get involved in a general election before the defense issues come before the House so that they can first assure themselves of firm ground and some tenure. On the other hand, they may feel that defense is already a hot election issue and may try to delay a general election until after the programs have been voted on. Thus, if they lose an election over these issues, but win the vote in the House, they will have at least accomplished what they wanted. If they call an election before they have the necessary House votes on defense, they may go down in defeat in anticipation of the defense controversy, without having passed the programs into law. Much depends on what parliamentary actions are necessary and the extent of popular support for the defense programs.

2. Public Opinion and Peace Campaigns

Although the present Conservative administration under Prime Minister Thatcher is clearly committed to the NATO decision to deploy 160 American cruise missiles in Britain at the end of 1983--and most likely will do so unless it should lose its political lead during this year--the attitudes of the British public are by no means unambiguous toward this issue. Particularly through their Labour party, the British have had a history of strong opposition to nuclear defense. Indeed, in its fall 1982 conference, the Labour party--dominated by the left and severely reduced in strength by the defection in March 1981 of key moderate supporters to the Social Democratic party--decided by a more than two-thirds majority to

ensure that the next general election manifesto contains an unequivocal, unambiguous commitment to unilateral disarmament... [by] opposing unconditionally the replacement of Polaris by Trident or any other system and the deployment of cruise missiles, the neutron bomb and all other nuclear weapons in or by Britain: [and by] closing down all nuclear bases, British or American, on British soil or in British waters.*

This position is not new to the Labour party. In 1960, under the leadership of the moderate Hugh Gaitskell, Labour also adopted a policy of unilateral disarmament. Moreover, in 1964 and 1974, Labour ran on the promise to do away with the British nuclear deterrent, and once in office, not only did not eliminate it, but actually increased the nuclear weapons budget. Today, a comparable phenomenon can be witnessed in France: there a socialist government is strengthening its national defense, is relying heavily on a modernized nuclear weapons arsenal, and is, furthermore, calling on its West German neighbor to strengthen its resolve in defense against the East.

The Falkland Islands war helped the Conservative government immeasurably to regain its slipping popularity. As a result of the war, British

* The Economist, October 9, 1982, p. 13.

voters reversed their declining support for the Thatcher government and gave it a commanding lead over the opposition. Not long after the war's end, an early autumn 1982 opinion poll gave the Tories 42 percent of the vote to Labour's 30 percent and the Social Democratic/Liberal alliance's 27 percent.* (This was almost identical to the results extrapolated from the local election returns mentioned above in the "Surprise-free Scenario for Great Britain.")

The ultimate decision on nuclear weapons deployment in Britain will be dependent substantially on developments in Britain's sometimes turbulent political situation, which, in turn, is highly sensitive to economic events. These major factors--political and economic--could well surpass the activities of antimissile protestors and peace movement campaigners, led by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), in determining whether Britain says yes or no to the weapons. This does not mean, however, that the peace activities will not be severely disruptive at times or have an important influence on the tide of opinion toward the role of nuclear weapons in British defense policy.

The present Conservative government is planning a public relations campaign to counter the influence of the anti-nuclear movement, and it has been arguing that although most peace protestors are sincere and well-meaning in their efforts, the European peace movement has been receiving substantial financial support from the Soviet Union as a means of undermining Western defense. According to Peter Blaker, the Armed Forces Minister, the Soviet Union has given about \$12 million to the European peace movement; he further stated that three Russians, including two diplomats who were expelled from NATO countries, had been giving "improper support towards the so-called peace movement." Mr. Blaker also contended that some CND Council members were communists.**

Of perhaps more significance than disarmament groups to the outcome of the missile deployment issue are a number of leaders of the English churches, who have intensified their anti-nuclear debate. Roman Catholic church leaders have joined American Catholic bishops in questioning the basic morality of nuclear deterrence. While recognizing the belief of many English Catholics that nuclear arms help to protect "the civil freedom in which they can profess their faith," these Catholic leaders avow that an act of war directed at civilians is immoral and any threat to commit an immoral act is in itself immoral. To involve themselves directly in this debate, Catholic church leaders have arranged to meet regularly with Francis Pym, the British Foreign Secretary.

* The Economist, October 9, 1982, p. 14. Poll taken by Market and Opinion Research International (MORI).

** John Hunt, "Tories to Campaign Against Anti-Nuclear Movement," Financial Times, December 13, 1982, p. 6.

A Church of England group led by John Baker, the Bishop of Salisbury, is producing a working paper called "the Church and the Bomb--Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience." The group has asked that Britain abandon its independent nuclear deterrent. According to The Christian Science Monitor, this Anglican group "gained much publicity for the peace movement by arguing that 'the evils caused by this method of making war are greater than any conceivable evil which the war is intended to prevent...the cause of right cannot be upheld by fighting a nuclear war.'"^{*}

There is, however, substantial disagreement with these positions among other important church leaders, such as Cardinal Hume, the Chairman of the Roman Catholic Bishops Conference of England and Wales, the Church of England's Bishop of London, and the board for social responsibility of the Church of England. A recent report by this board, headed by the Bishop of London, took strong opposition to the working paper of the group led by the Bishop of Salisbury.^{**} For a more detailed discussion of the peace debate among the British and other West European clergy see Section VI.A.3.

Peace activities here and in West Germany were stepped up in December 1982, the third anniversary of the NATO dual-track decision. These demonstrations were directed against specific missile and military sites: in West Germany against 40 military bases; in Britain against a potential cruise missile site on a U.S. military base outside London and a possible planned alternative NATO command headquarters near High Wycombe, which protestors fear will become a target for Soviet missiles.

To what extent will these and other planned anti-nuclear defense activities for 1983 influence the British decision to deploy all or some of the American cruise missiles? And more importantly, to what extent will the British public give support to NATO defense, the use of nuclear weapons, the alliance with the U.S., and opposition to Soviet dominance in Europe?

Although missile deployment has become a major political issue in 1983, and one on which Labour hopes to capitalize, the British people have been overwhelmingly concerned with other problems in the last three years. Unemployment, which has reached the 12 percent level, the highest since the Great Depression of the 1930s, was named by 68 percent as the greatest cause for concern in a Louis Harris-International Herald Tribune poll taken in September 1982. Crime was a surprising second choice, as can be seen in the list that follows:

^{*}David K. Wells, "Europe's Antinuclear Voice Gains in Volume and Intensity," The Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 1982, pp. 12-13.

^{**}"Church and Bomb," The Economist, February 5, 1983, pp. 21-22.

THE GREATEST CAUSE FOR CONCERN
GREAT BRITAIN

	<u>SEPTEMBER 1982</u> [*]
	<u>%</u>
UNEMPLOYMENT	68
CRIME	40
INFLATION	28
THE THREAT OF WAR	28
NUCLEAR WEAPONS	28
POOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	24
SOCIAL INJUSTICE	15
THE ENERGY CRISIS	11
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT SPENDING	10
INADEQUATE DEFENSE	9


^{*} MULTIPLE ANSWERS WERE POSSIBLE, SO THE PERCENTAGE TOTAL EXCEEDS 100. FROM A SURVEY SPONSORED BY THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE AND THE ATLANTIC INSTITUTE, PARIS, FRANCE, AND TAKEN BY THE LOUIS HARRIS ORGANIZATION IN SEPTEMBER 1982. REPORTED IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 25, 1982.

In a series of polls taken by the prestigious survey organization, Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) from early 1979 to late 1981, the three top worries were (1) unemployment, (2) high prices and inflation, and (3) strikes and industrial disputes. The figure below shows the trends between those years and the overwhelming predominance of the unemployment issue by the end of 1981.

Polls by Social Surveys Ltd., the British Gallup Poll organization, taken between the fall of 1980 and the beginning of 1982, also show economic problems swamping all other worries. In January 1982, Labour was thought by a slight 25 to 21 percent edge over the Conservatives to be able to best handle the top problem.

THE RISE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
MORI POLLS

QUESTION: WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT
ISSUE FACING BRITAIN TODAY?



NOTE: TOP THREE CATEGORIES ONLY ARE SHOWN HERE.

SOURCE: PUBLIC OPINION, VOL. 4, NO. 5 (OCT./NOV. 1981), p. 27.

TOP PROBLEM

QUESTION: WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IS THE MOST URGENT PROBLEM
FACING THE COUNTRY AT THE PRESENT TIME?*

	<u>JAN. 1982</u>	<u>OCT. 1981</u>	<u>NOV-DEC. 1980</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
UNEMPLOYMENT	72	77	59
COST OF LIVING, INFLATION	11	10	18
OTHER ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (1980-- STRIKES, LABOR UNREST)	4	3	2
OTHER NON-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS(1980- PEACE/WAR)	11	10	2
DON'T KNOW	2	--	3

* IN NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1980, THE POLL QUESTION READ, "IN YOUR OPINION,
WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING THIS COUNTRY TODAY?"

AND THE NEXT MOST URGENT PROBLEM

QUESTION: AND WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IS THE NEXT MOST
URGENT PROBLEM? (INCLUDES TOP PROBLEM)

	<u>JANUARY 1982</u>	<u>OCTOBER 1981</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
UNEMPLOYMENT	82	89
COST OF LIVING	37	36
OTHER ECONOMIC PROBLEMS	9	11
STRIKES	7	5
EDUCATION	6	4
DEFENSE	5	9
HOUSING	5	5
PENSIONS	4	--
HEALTH	--	4
INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY	3	3
LAW AND ORDER	2	6
OTHER/DON'T KNOW	24	20

SOURCE: SOCIAL SURVEYS LTD. POLLS IN WORLD OPINION UPDATE, VI, NO. 1
(JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1982), P. 8 AND VI, NO. 3 (MAY/JUNE 1982),
P. 65. POLL SAMPLES WERE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 ADULTS NATION-
WIDE. THE JANUARY 1982 POLL WAS TAKEN FOR THE DAILY TELEGRAPH.

3. Public Attitudes Toward Security Issues and Nuclear Missile Deployment

The British, like the West Germans, appear to have ambivalent feelings with regard to the defense of Western Europe and the NATO nuclear missile force deployment. The British are pessimistic toward prospects for peace; they also have an obviously growing loss of faith in American judgment on international and defense issues. In a Newsweek poll* in the spring of 1982, a bare plurality had a favorable overall opinion of the U.S. (46 percent favorable, 44 percent unfavorable). Furthermore, 60 percent of the British said they had little or no confidence in America's ability to deal wisely with world problems. A clear majority (56 percent) were confident, however, that the U.S. would "do whatever is necessary to defend Britain, even if this risks a direct attack against the U.S. itself."

Surprisingly, the same percentage thought it as likely for the U.S. to launch an attack in Europe within the next five years as the Soviet Union (21 percent each). And the British were obviously worried about American nuclear missiles on West European soil becoming targets for a Soviet attack: 42 percent believed the missiles would increase the chances of an attack as opposed to 29 percent who felt the missile provided greater protection; another 24 percent thought the missiles had no effect either way. They were evenly split on the impact of stationing American troops in Western Europe: one out of four felt the troops increased the possibility of an attack, while another one out of four believed they afforded greater protection; almost one-half thought the troops had no influence at all on events. Despite the horrible prospects of a war, 3 out of 4 said they would rather fight to defend Great Britain than accept Russian domination. This represented, along with the West Germans, the highest resolve among the NATO countries.

Almost a year later, in January 1983, Newsweek published a poll taken by the Gallup organization in Britain that revealed similar kinds of responses. Key findings: a 38 to 18 percent margin felt that Ronald Reagan was genuinely more interested than Andropov in limiting nuclear weapons; and a plurality thought that if the Geneva negotiations were to fail, NATO should proceed with its plan for deploying Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe (43 percent yes, 34 percent no, 23 percent don't know). But a slightly larger percentage would prefer a move toward neutralism in Western Europe in the East-West conflict than would oppose it (45 to 42 percent).

The British appeared considerably more afraid than the French, West Germans or Dutch that U.S.-Soviet hostilities would escalate into a Third World War: one-half thought it was very or somewhat likely, as opposed to slightly over 4 out of 10 who felt it could not happen. And a surprising

* Newsweek (March 15, 1982): poll taken by Gallup International.

28 percent--a significantly higher number than in France, West Germany and the Netherlands--saw the U.S. as a more likely nuclear aggressor in Europe than the Soviet Union; another one-quarter couldn't decide between the two; less than a majority picked the Soviet Union.

A plurality of the British, however, wanted the NATO alliance to continue in the form it is now, that is, including Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada, although this support was not nearly as great as that of the Germans and the Danes. In the Gallup international poll of February 1982, 37 percent wanted to continue with the NATO alliance, while another 20 percent picked a changed alliance, that is, a NATO with West European forces unified under a European command, but allied to the United States.

a. Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons

From the evidence--and this has been demonstrated by protests of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)--a fundamental fear in Britain is that nuclear weapons on British soil would become targets for Soviet missiles. The results of Gallup polls taken in 1980 and 1981 underscore the ambivalence the British feel toward the use of nuclear weapons and indicate a growing angst. The majority felt it was a bad idea for Britain to "give up on relying on nuclear weapons for defense, whatever other countries decide," but this majority declined from 1980 to 1981 (67 to 58 percent). Moreover, a growing number thought that if Britain had nuclear weapons it would increase the risk of a nuclear attack (from 20 to 31 percent). As many as 72 percent in October 1981 were worried about nuclear weapons (up from 65 percent in September 1980), and about one-half were in agreement with the antinuclear demonstrations that had taken place in Britain and elsewhere. Very few, however, had ever demonstrated against nuclear weapons (4 percent) or written to protest the weapons (2 percent). At this time, the British feared the presence of Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe more than the proposed installation of American missiles in Western Europe. The tables below show the results of these two polls.

In August 1981, a sizable 71 percent disapproved of storing American neutron bombs in Britain. Eight out of ten said they had heard or read about the neutron bomb, and almost two-thirds were familiar with the statement that it kills people and not property or tanks.*

As of spring 1982, about one-half of the British opposed signing a petition for a world disarmament campaign calling for complete disarmament and the transfer of military expenditures to end world poverty. The national response and the results by sex, age, and social class can be seen in the table below (ABC1 represents the higher socio-economic

* Social Surveys (Gallup poll) Limited, August 19-24, 1981. National adult sample of approximately 1,000. World Opinion Update, Vol. 5, No. 5 (November/December 1981), p. 152.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY--GREAT BRITAIN
GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLLS

FIELDWORK, NOVEMBER 1981

"DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE IN BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE. DO YOU PERSONALLY FEEL:"

	<u>%</u>	
COMPLETELY IN AGREEMENT WITH THESE PARTICULAR DEMONSTRATIONS	23	
TO SOME EXTENT IN AGREEMENT WITH THESE PARTICULAR DEMONSTRATIONS	29	52
TO SOME EXTENT OPPOSED TO THESE PARTICULAR DEMONSTRATIONS	15	
COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO THESE PARTICULAR DEMONSTRATIONS	24	39
DON'T KNOW	8	

"IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH REPRESENTS THE GREATER THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF BRITAIN?"

THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET MISSILES IN EASTERN EUROPE	43
THE PROPOSED INSTALLATION OF AMERICAN MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE	29
DON'T KNOW	25

"DO YOU THINK FROM AN INTERNATIONAL POINT OF VIEW BRITAIN SHOULD:"

BE ON SIDE OF U.S.A.	43
BE ON SIDE OF RUSSIA	1
BECOME NEUTRAL	46
DON'T KNOW	10

FIELDWORK, OCTOBER 1981

"WHICH OF THESE STATEMENTS BEST DESCRIBE YOUR VIEWS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?"

	<u>LATEST</u>	<u>SEPT. 1980</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
TOTAL WORRIED	72	65
WORRIED AND WILLING TO JOIN DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THEM	10	7
WORRIED AND WILLING TO WRITE TO MP, NEWSPAPERS	7	4
WORRIED BUT WON'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT	17	17
WORRIED BUT DO NOT THINK ANYTHING CAN BE DONE ABOUT THEM	38	37
NOT WORRIED ABOUT THEM	26	30
DON'T KNOW	3	5

"HAVE YOU EVER":

a. "BEEN ON A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS?" (YES)	4	3
b. "WRITTEN TO YOUR MP OR A NEWSPAPER AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS" (YES)	2	1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY--GREAT BRITAIN
(continued)

"IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT BRITAIN SHOULD GIVE UP ON RELYING ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR DEFENCE WHATEVER OTHER COUNTRIES DECIDE. DO YOU THINK THIS IS A GOOD IDEA OR A BAD IDEA?"

	<u>LATEST</u>	<u>SEPT. 1980</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
GOOD IDEA	33	21
BAD IDEA	58	67
DON'T KNOW	9	12

"DO YOU THINK IT IS LIKELY OR NOT THAT THERE IS EVER GOING TO BE A NUCLEAR WAR?"

YES, LIKELY	42	39
NO, NOT LIKELY	42	45
DON'T KNOW	16	16

"DO YOU THINK THE FACT THAT BRITAIN ITSELF HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCREASES OR DECREASES THE RISK OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THIS COUNTRY?"

INCREASES	31	26
DECREASES	36	37
NO EFFECT	22	27
DON'T KNOW	10	10

NOTE: TOTALS MAY NOT ADD TO 100 PERCENT DUE TO ROUNDING.

SOURCE: THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 196, JANUARY 1982, P. 18.

BRITISH SENTIMENT ON WORLD DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR FREEZE--1982

WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN

PETITION

TO ALL GOVERNMENTS AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, 1982:

WE, THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, DEMAND:

1. THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ALL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
2. THE ABOLITION, BY AGREED STAGES, OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, LEADING TO
3. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
4. TRANSFERENCE OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE TO END WORLD POVERTY

IF SOMEONE ASKED YOU TO SIGN A PETITION LIKE THIS, WOULD YOU SIGN SUCH A PETITION OR NOT?

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SEX</u>		<u>AGE</u>			<u>CLASS</u>	
		M	F	18-34	35-54	55+	ABC1	C2DE
				(FIGURES IN PERCENT)				
YES, WOULD SIGN	41	41	41	46	38	40	39	43
NO, WOULD NOT SIGN	49	53	45	47	52	47	53	46
DON'T KNOW	10	6	14	7	10	13	8	11

WOULD YOU SUPPORT OR OPPOSE A PROPOSAL TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE HALT TO THE MANUFACTURE AND INSTALLATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT?

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SEX</u>		<u>AGE</u>			<u>CLASS</u>	
		M	F	18-34	35-54	55+	ABC1	C2DE
				(FIGURES IN PERCENT)				
WOULD SUPPORT	65	66	65	69	62	65	64	67
WOULD OPPOSE	22	26	18	21	25	21	26	20
DON'T KNOW	13	8	17	10	13	14	10	13

SOURCE: MARKET & OPINION RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL (MORI), MAY 6-10, 1982. ADULT SAMPLE OF 1,948 RESPONDENTS. CONDUCTED FOR THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN, PUBLISHED IN WORLD OPINION UPDATE, VI, NO. 4, JULY/AUG 1982.

class levels, C2DE the lower). As revealed in the table, the upper classes were less likely to favor such a petition and youth were more inclined to support it, although the age difference was not so great as might be anticipated. Over 6 in 10, however, gave their support to a nuclear freeze, and this support basically held firm, regardless of sex, age, or socio-economic level. The rather large "don't know" response could indicate ignorance of the issues or uncertainty about the conditions under which a nuclear freeze would take place.

b. Conclusions

In this milieu can conclusions be drawn about the possible British reaction to the nuclear weapons deployment? It can be noted that many of the shifts in attitudes towards security and defense took place from the end of 1979 on. This might have resulted partly from the NATO ministers' decision to deploy the new weapons systems in Europe and the subsequent antiwar activities, but also partly as a reaction to the series of international crises that began in 1979. There is now a greater concern about the possibility of war and the stationing of nuclear weapons on British soil. There also appears to have been an erosion of faith in the U.S.'s ability to handle crises and a growing sense that the U.S. is becoming more aggressive. It is not clear whether the British are becoming more neutral, because polls taken two years ago indicate as strong a desire for neutrality as today. But the reaction of the British in the Falklands war was highly patriotic and restored support for the Conservative government.

Much of how the British will react to the deployment of American cruise missiles in Britain will depend on the political and economic conditions in the country, as well as on peace movement activities in the coming year. If the Tories remain in government--and it appears as if they will in the wake of the Falklands crisis--then the likelihood of the missiles being deployed is, of course, increased. Moreover, if the economy is in very bad shape, the nuclear issue will likely dwindle in importance as a problem. In sum, the British would prefer not to have the nuclear weapons deployed on their soil, but they may also not want to lose the defensive option that is at present available to them.

D. The Netherlands

1. A Surprise-Free Scenario for the Netherlands

The center-left coalition government of the Netherlands, which, unlike the Thatcher government in Britain, had no Falkland Islands crisis to draw the venom from public opinion over the worsening economic situation, found itself in trouble in the election of September 1982. With about 10 percent unemployment and no sign of improvement, the Liberal party (a conservative party in Holland) increased its share of the vote by 30 percent, up to 23 percent of the votes cast. The Labor party drew 30.4 percent of the vote; the Christian Democrats 29.3 percent; and the

Democrats '66, a small faction of the center-left coalition, dropped to 4.3 percent. In fact, in relation to the Christian Democrats, the Laborites did slightly better this year than last. This year they edged the Christian Democrats and their leader Prime Minister Andreas van Agt by 1.1 percent of the vote, whereas last year the Christian Democrats topped Labor by a slight margin. Last year, Mr. van Agt was asked to form a government, which he did in coalition with Labor. Because this year, as usual, none of the parties was close to receiving a majority, and the Liberals (conservatives) drew so heavily in the voting, the Christian Democrats and Liberals were in a position to refuse an offer of a coalition by the Laborites and the Democrats '66. This left the Liberals and the Christian Democrats to form a center-coalition majority government, or, as some may even call it, a "center-right" coalition.

It is hard to tell how much effect events elsewhere in Europe had on this election. There are also some questions about the impact of the political personalities in the campaign. The Liberal Party's leader, Ed Nijpels, has an attractive personality, and Mr. van Agt is also one of the most popular politicians in the Netherlands. There is no question, however, about the consequences of the economic factors in this election. Opposition to the GLCMs to be stationed in the Netherlands did not cause a big swing to the Laborites, although it was a main plank in the Laborites' platform. Indeed, the big swing, including that of students, 12 to 18 years of age, was to the conservative Liberal party.

The political situation is somewhat similar to that in West Germany, and the fate of Labor rather like that of the SPD. Because of the deepening recession and deficit spending, the welfare-state programs of European Social Democrats were a disadvantage in 1982.

Coincidentally, the Liberal Party has taken a stronger stand than the Christian Democrats in favor of defense programs, which includes support for the deployment of the Dutch-based GLCMs. And, of course, the Liberal position is almost 180 degrees out of phase with the Laborite, anti-defense, anti-force modernization platform. The Christian Democrats, unlike the Laborites, are not anti-defense, but they are not nearly as pro-defense as are the Liberals.

The Christian Democrats have within their ranks the typical spread of a centrist party. Prior to the elections last September, for example, Prime Minister van Agt did not take a position on the force modernization program.* On the other hand, Dutch governments have not been completely negative toward improvements in defense. The last government, a center-left coalition, continued to make allocations for its NATO commitments; and although it did not keep up the 3 percent budget allocation in real terms--required by the agreement with the U.S. and other NATO members--it did manage about 1.8 percent.

* The New York Times, September 9, 1982. p. A-3.

There are indications that van Agt and his Christian Democrats, by and large, would feel comfortable in a coalition with the quite conservative Liberal Party. On the other hand, the force modernization program, similar to other nuclear weapons programs (the neutron bomb, for example), would find difficulty in rallying solid support among the Christian Democrats. There are undoubtedly a number of Christian Democrats who would vote with the Laborites against force modernization; but, on the other hand, there may also be some Laborites who would join forces with Christian Democrats in support of this program.

In the Netherlands, as in most of Western Europe, the "surprise-free" scenario assumes that an economic bottoming out will occur in the not-too-distant future. There is also an assumption that there will be a gradual growth in Western economies as a whole, but nothing to duplicate the rapid economic development in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Under these circumstances, Christian Democrats and Liberals may be able to hold positions of power for the next several years. If the economic crisis stabilizes itself and does not become more severe--and particularly if there is some slight return to economic growth and a reduction of unemployment--the problem of defense expenditures may lessen. On the other hand, if economic issues are no longer as critical, the issue of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands might become politically more important. In fact, there is a good possibility that the Netherlands may continue to demonstrate a considerable amount of foot-dragging in approving the deployment of the weapons, almost regardless of economic factors. In other words, it is quite possible that even this centrist or center-right government may vacillate on this issue. There are many ways this could occur. One would be, of course, to simply delay bringing the issue up in the parliament. Another way would be to have "local hearings" throughout the country on this important national decision.

The Dutch would, of course, find themselves under greater pressure from the U.S., and perhaps also from the Germans (if indeed the Germans agreed to deploy the weapons), to come to a conclusion by the early part of 1983. The Dutch could delay until mid-1983, or even late 1983, and argue that they are still not hampering deployment, particularly if the glitches in testing and production of the weapons continue to dog the IOC. Nonetheless, assuming there is not an economic catastrophe--which might indeed throw the current party in power out and put the Laborites in control--to endanger NATO programs and, particularly, the force modernization, the current government in the Netherlands should be more amenable than the last to defense issues. It remains to be seen, however, how susceptible they will be to other pressures that may arise in the next few years against defense efforts and deployment of U.S. nuclear systems on their soil.

2. The Peace Movement and Public Opinion in the Netherlands

The Dutch peace movement assumes particular importance because of its almost missionary commitment to converting the West to unilateral

disarmament: the movement's new strategy, adopted in 1977, is expressed in its slogan, "All nuclear weapons out of the world, beginning with the Netherlands" (Alle kernwapens de wereld uit, om te beginnen met Nederland). Armed with this commitment, the Dutch peace movement, through its central organ, the Inter-Church Peace Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, or IKV), has spilled over the Dutch border: together with a West German Protestant peace group, it organized a mass demonstration in Bonn in October 1981; it has also been active in establishing contacts in the U.S., Britain, Belgium, and the German Democratic Republic.

The Dutch peace movement has also relatively more influence on public policy within the Netherlands than its counterparts within other West European countries and the U.S. Actually, neutralism has a long historical precedence in the Netherlands: for centuries the Dutch have remained largely neutral in international affairs, frequently for pragmatic, commercial reasons, but also because of humanistic and idealistic goals. (In modern times, these humanistic ideals have been nourished by the socialist movement.) Even when, in the late 1930s, German expansionist aims had become apparent, the Dutch maintained a neutral independence; they were thus poorly prepared to fight when the Germans launched their blitzkrieg against them in May 1940.

But a perhaps more important reason for the strength of the peace movement is the historically central role religion has played in Dutch society and subcultures. "Holland is a religious country by tradition. This is the reason why religious peace lobbies are capable of exerting political pressure to such an extent."*

According to one political analyst, "the single most important event in Dutch postwar political history was the decline and fall of the Catholic Party (the KVP) in the decade after 1967."** After Vatican II, the practically monolithic religious, social and political structure of Dutch Catholicism--Catholics form about 38 percent of the population--was radicalized by actions of the Dutch bishops. Church customs became exceedingly liberalized, mass attendance dropped off rapidly (from 75 percent in 1967 to 46 percent in 1972), and the Catholic party, which since the beginning of the century had regularly commanded 90 percent of the Catholic vote, quickly disintegrated. "In 1959 the Dutch Church was regarded as the most conservative and orthodox in Western Europe; by the mid-1960s, the most radical."*** In the autumn of 1980, the remnants of the Catholic party merged with two Protestant confessional parties to form the leading center-moderate Christian Democratic Party (CDA), which, until the Fall of 1982, was guided by the popular Prime Minister Andreas van Agt.

* J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Neutralist Tendencies in the Netherlands," The World Today, Vol. 37, No. 12 (December 1981), p. 484.

** Herman Bakvis, "Electoral Stability and Electoral Change: The Case of Dutch Catholics," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (September 1981), p. 322.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 342.

The peace movement in Holland today appears to be in some disarray compared with its condition a year or two ago. There seems to be a backlash among Dutch citizens against the peace campaign, and counter-groups and movements, concerned about pacifist disarmament, have been organized. Moreover, as indicated above, in the last Dutch election in September 1981 the Liberal Party (VVD) captured 23 percent of the vote. One of the surprising things about this election was that heavy support for the conservatives came from the young: "A little noticed component of this election is what appears to be a marked conservative shift among Dutch youths. A recent national poll of students, aged 12-18, showed a significant preference for the conservative Liberal Party."*

The Dutch peace movement also seems to have become suspicious of the nationalistic aims of its neighboring peace movement in West Germany. This has apparently caused some cooling off in relations between the two--at least there are expressed reservations on the part of the Dutch. This is a far cry from the elation that surrounded the huge, October 1981 anti-nuclear rally in Bonn that was organized as a cooperative venture by the Dutch IKV and the West German Protestant church organization Aktion Sühnezeichen (ASF). In any event, the Dutch peace movement has obviously decelerated its activities in the past year. One observer of the Dutch political scene assessed the present situation as follows:

In 1981, pacifism reached a peak. One out of two Dutchmen rejected a possible installation of cruise missiles. Four hundred thousand people marched in a demonstration in November 1981 in Amsterdam, which was mainly directed against Western defense. Since then, the movement has weakened. Today it presents less of a threat to a responsible foreign and defense policy than it did during the last three years.**

The writer believes there are several reasons for the change: first, when President Reagan proposed a zero-option at the arms reduction talks in Geneva, "the image of America 'as a war-monger' with no interest in arms negotiation fell apart. Second, the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland and especially the Polish government's imposition of martial law and repression of Solidarity, distressed the Dutch very much. Third, the Dutch are apparently becoming more aware of the huge Soviet arms buildup."*** All the West European peace movements are planning stepped up anti-missile deployment activities this year prior to the stationing of the missiles, so it remains to be seen whether the movement will regain its intensity and influence.

* Jon Nordheimer, "Rightists Tip the Scale in Dutch Election," The New York Times, September 9, 1982, p. A-3.

** Joris J.C. Voorhoeve, "Pacifism in the Netherlands," Freedom at Issue, No. 67 (July-August 1982), p. 4.

*** Ibid., p. 4.

The beginning of the present-day Dutch peace movement has been traced to the campaign to oppose the neutron bomb. According to reports, the political orientation of the anti-neutron bomb movement was pro-Soviet, and the campaign, which eventually reached deep into the general public and penetrated the parliament, was organized, among others, by the Dutch Communist Party.* By 1977, the Action Group "Stop the Neutron Bomb" had secured the support of church leaders and theologians. The then General Secretary of the IKV joined the so-called "Committee of Recommendation, and by March/April 1978, 'a people's petition' was signed by over a million people."** The neutron bomb issue caused a crisis in government, and eventually the Dutch government took a position opposing the bomb.

The Dutch peace movement had apparently developed into a well-disciplined, highly-effective organization:

...a group of well-organized and intelligent pacifists established a network of institutions which promoted unilateral reductions of nuclear weapons, defense cuts, and unconditional policy of detente with the East, and criticism of U.S. foreign policy....The ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture, Recreation, and Social Works came to subsidize various pacifist, Marxist, pseudo-Marxist, and other left-wing organizations attempting to change the political preferences of the Dutch public with massive campaigns reaching into elementary schools. A body of churchmen and left-wing political scientists organized an Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), which gradually grew into a very effective pacifist organization, with 400 cells throughout the country. It was aided by a number of political-science research institutions and financed by nine participating church organizations, private donations (and indirectly) government funds.

Peace organizations such as IKV and Pax Christi came to cooperate with groups dominated by communist party members....Confronting a weak government and weak diffident foreign and defense ministers, the pacifist movement gained influence over the left-of-center groups in parliament. Parliament forced the government to force a decision on the modernization of nuclear weapons which involves 48 U.S. cruise missiles for installation on Dutch territory. The question was delayed until an uncertain future date.***

The IKV, which was founded in 1967, has members from all the major Dutch churches, although it speaks and acts as an autonomous body. Its

* Vermaat, p. 484ff.

** Ibid., p. 485.

*** Voorhoeve, pp. 3-4.

greatest strength comes from the Netherlands Reformed Church, whose leaders had opposed atomic weapons in 1962 and supported unilateralism in 1980:

IKV organizes "peace weeks" every year and since 1977 such "weeks" have been manifestations of unilateralism. IKV considers the de-nuclearization of the Netherlands a necessary step toward de-nuclearizing Europe. It favors "unilateral initiatives" which supposedly will reduce traditional Soviet fears of the West and may, eventually, lead to a process of mutual disarmament. IKV is of the opinion that the Soviet Union is not as aggressive as is generally assumed. Therefore, false "enemy images" and "idols" such as nuclear deterrence should be banished. The movement aims to create a "peace structure" in Europe. It is critical of West European integration and favors the unification of Eastern and Western Europe as well as the active participation of the Soviet Union in tomorrow's Europe.*

Part of the IKV goal is to ally Holland as the "guiding nation" (gids-land) with other small powers and to internationalize its peace aims. The cooperative Dutch-German mass demonstration in Bonn in October 1981 was a triumphant step in the missionary campaign to make the Netherlands "a progressive guide to the rest of the world by setting an example of international behaviour."**

3. What Concerns the Dutch?

Like the rest of the Europeans, by far the greatest concern of the Dutch today is unemployment, named by 70 percent in a Louis Harris survey of October 1982. But the particular anxiety the Dutch have with the nuclear issue can be seen by their placement of nuclear weapons second on the list of concerns (49 percent). As it was in polls in Britain and West Germany, crime was surprisingly high on the list: in third place, picked by 45 percent of the people. Inadequate defense was at the very bottom of their concerns (named by only 5 percent), as it was for all other West European countries in the Harris poll.

That the Dutch rank the problem of nuclear weapons first among security issues is supported by the response to another question asked in the Harris survey. Almost one-half chose productive arms control talks as most important to Western security, twice as many as for any other security measure. This priority is similar to that of the Germans, who in other polls revealed a greater interest in the arms negotiation portion of the NATO dual-track decision than in the deployment of the missiles.

* Vermaat, pp. 486-487.

** Ibid., p. 487.

THE GREATEST CONCERN FOR SELF AND COUNTRY
THE NETHERLANDS

QUESTION: WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOUR GREATEST CONCERNS
FOR YOURSELF AND YOUR COUNTRY TODAY?

	<u>OCTOBER 1982</u>
	<u>%</u>
UNEMPLOYMENT	70
NUCLEAR WEAPONS	49
CRIME	45
THE THREAT OF WAR	32
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT SPENDING	20
SOCIAL INJUSTICE	19
POOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	17
THE ENERGY CRISIS	10
INFLATION	9
INADEQUATE DEFENSE	5

SOURCE: LOUIS HARRIS SURVEY SPONSORED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE AND THE ATLANTIC INSTITUTE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 25, 1982.

MOST IMPORTANT TO WESTERN SECURITY
THE NETHERLANDS
 BY TOTAL POPULATION AND PARTY PREFERENCE

QUESTION: WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE MOST IMPORTANT TO WESTERN SECURITY?

OCTOBER 1982

	PARTY PREFERENCE				
	TOTAL	CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS	LABOR PARTY	LIBERALS	DEMOCRATS 66*
	%	%	%	%	%
MILITARY BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION	23	28	18	36	29
EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN-U.S. COOPERATION	21	28	13	30	20
IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD	17	11	22	11	17
STRENGTHENED ECONOMIC UNITY IN WESTERN EUROPE	20	20	20	20	23
CONTINUED CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION	22	23	25	18	24
PRODUCTIVE ARMS CONTROL TALKS	49	42	53	44	46
GREATER DEFENSE COLLABO- RATION IN WESTERN EUROPE	10	10	6	16	16
OTHER OR NO OPINION	7	6	8	2	5

* PERCENTAGES SHOULD BE INTERPRETED WITH CAUTION BECAUSE SAMPLE IS SMALL.

SOURCE: LOUIS HARRIS SURVEY IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 25, 1982.

The breakdown of this Harris question by party preference gives a good sense of the various positions of the political parties. For example, the conservative Liberals, although also most interested in arms control talks, were much more concerned than voters of other parties about having a military balance with the Soviet Union. Labor Party adherents were the least interested in a military balance and European-U.S. cooperation; they were also more likely than members of any other party to opt for continued contacts with the Soviet Union. Again, defense collaboration was generally of the least concern to all party voters, although the Liberals were more inclined to support it. Tables giving the results of these Harris survey questions are shown above.

4. Security and Disarmament: Do the Dutch Want to be Neutral?

The question of whether the Netherlands will accept American missiles on their soil remains very much up in the air. The most recent Gallup International poll published in Newsweek in January 1983 shows the Netherlands, compared to France, West Germany and Great Britain, most critical of American intentions and least critical of the Soviets, by far most strongly opposed to deploying Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and least opposed to a move toward neutralism in Western Europe. There was an unusually large "don't know" response in every West European country to each of these poll questions. But some of the Dutch "don't knows" seemed to reveal a particular uncertainty about the reliability and intentions of the U.S. as well as the Soviet Union. For example, in answer to the question "Who is more likely to initiate a nuclear attack in Europe, the United States or the Soviet Union?", 31 percent said the Soviet Union, 20 percent the U.S. and a whopping 49 percent didn't know. A negligible margin felt Ronald Reagan was more credible than Andropov on the issue of limiting nuclear weapons: 23 percent Reagan; 21 percent Andropov; 40 percent neither.

In the same survey, a majority felt that should the U.S. and the Soviet Union not agree on limiting nuclear weapons by the end of 1983, NATO should not proceed with its plan of deploying American missiles in Western Europe. Another 53 percent favored a move toward neutralism in Western Europe (32 percent opposed).*

Does this represent a change in basic Dutch attitudes toward Western security and the NATO alliance? The trends in the two tables shown below would indicate that this is not the case; they reveal a decade-long, unmistakable and sustained advocacy of Western defense efforts and membership in NATO.

A question asked by NIPO at the end of August 1981 was intended to gauge the reasons why the Dutch opposed nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations. NIPO asked a sample of 1,047 Dutch voters, 18 years and older,

* International Gallup Poll reported in Newsweek (January 31, 1983), p. 17. The Gallup Dutch affiliate is the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion (NIPO).

WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS

QUESTION: ACCORDING TO YOU, IS A MILITARY COUNTERWEIGHT
TO RUSSIAN AND OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NEEDED
IN WESTERN EUROPE, OR ISN'T IT NECESSARY?

	<u>JULY</u> <u>1974</u>	<u>OCT.</u> <u>1979</u>	<u>JAN.</u> <u>1980</u>	<u>DEC.</u> <u>1980</u>	<u>OCT.</u> <u>1981</u>	<u>JAN.</u> <u>1982</u>
MILITARY COUNTERWEIGHT IS:						
NEEDED	68%	67%	65%	68%	65%	67%
NOT NECESSARY	15	21	22	21	19	22
NO OPINION	17	12	13	11	16	11

SOURCE: THE NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION (NIPO), THE GALLUP
AFFILIATE IN THE NETHERLANDS, REPORTED IN THE GALLUP REPORT,
NO. 196 (JANUARY 1982), p. 21.

DUTCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATO ALLIANCE

QUESTION: HOLLAND IS A MEMBER OF NATO, THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION. WHAT DO YOU THINK: SHOULD
OUR COUNTRY REMAIN A MEMBER OF NATO OR LEAVE IT?

	<u>JULY</u> <u>1974</u>	<u>OCT.</u> <u>1979</u>	<u>JAN.</u> <u>1980</u>	<u>DEC.</u> <u>1980</u>	<u>OCT.</u> <u>1981</u>	<u>JAN.</u> <u>1982</u>
REMAIN MEMBER OF NATO	76%	76%	76%	76%	69%	76%
LEAVE NATO	9	12	14	12	12	13
NO OPINION	15	12	10	12	19	11

SOURCE: NIPO, GALLUP AFFILIATE IN NETHERLANDS, THE GALLUP REPORT, NO.
196 (JANUARY 1982), p. 21.

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THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE
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
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
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"There is a lot of discussion and there even are demonstrations concerning nuclear weapons and also nuclear power stations. Which things play a big role in this, according to you? Feelings? Rational considerations? Religion? Pro-Russian or anti-American attitudes? Fear? Anti-militarism in general? Patriotism? Or what?" Sixty percent of the sample answered fear and 27 percent feelings:

Very few of the respondents felt that they themselves or the people that they observe are moved by anti-American feelings (9 percent), pro-Russian attitudes (6 percent), religious beliefs (6 percent), or even general pacifism (19 percent). Rational considerations were considered to be part of the background by one out of every four, but usually in combination with such things as fear and feelings.

Reasoning with fear is difficult. Maybe many of the Dutch and many people in other nations have developed a case of "nucleophobia" rather than a case of Hollanditis.* Demonstrations against nuclear power plants attract large and sometimes rather aggressive crowds about as easily as peace marches. Several NIPO studies have shown attitudes toward nuclear power and nuclear weapons are closely related. **

Clearly, fear plays a large and understandable role in the desire for general disarmament and also in the move toward neutralism. Much of the West European opposition toward the new missile deployment appears to be due to the fear that the missile sites will become targets for a Russian missile attack. One of NIPO's surveys brought a new twist to this: it found that "about one in ten Dutchmen, while against putting new nuclear weapons in Holland, was in favor of stationing new cruise missiles and similar weapons in other West European countries."***

There was considerable reservation among the public about the peace movement's belief that the Netherlands would set an example to the rest of the world by disarming unilaterally. In October 1981, NIPO polled the reaction to this statement: "When Holland sets the example of removing nuclear weapons, other countries will do so too." About half of the Dutch disagreed with this statement; only one out of 4 agreed. Yet when they were asked if they favored the IKV slogan "Help nuclear weapons out of the world, starting with the Netherlands," 54 percent said yes.

Other 1981 polls revealed strong disagreement with the belief that the absence of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil would spare the country a

* A word coined by Walter Laqueur signifying an infectious disease caused by pacifist and neutralist bacteria.

** The Gallup Report, No. 196, January 1982, p. 20.

*** Ibid., p. 20.

possible nuclear attack. Moreover, 50 percent would like to see all nuclear weapons removed from the Netherlands but thought it was not yet possible to do so, as opposed to 29 percent who wanted the weapons removed immediately. Concerning the neutron bomb, in November 1981 a margin of 7 out of 10 opposed its deployment in the Netherlands.

The Dutch, like other Europeans, feel that war is more probable now than it was four years ago.* And very few Dutch believe they could survive a European war in which Holland was involved. According to a NIPO poll, almost 70 percent expected the worst (32 percent, certain death; 36 percent, a very small chance of personal survival), while another 20 percent felt they did not have a good chance of surviving.

Given this context and the magnitude of the past efforts of Dutch peace groups, the present fear of the basing of new nuclear weapons in the Netherlands is comprehensible. What some might not be aware of is that these missiles are meant to replace most of the older ones that are already deployed on Dutch soil. Since nuclear weapons have been in Holland for many years as part of the NATO defense, today's disarmament efforts may be due less to the presence of nuclear weapons than to a change in the milieu in which they are viewed.

E. Belgium

1. A Surprise-Free Scenario for Belgium

The only real surprise would occur if the Belgian government lasted for more than two years. Almost as hard on governments as Italy, Belgium has averaged slightly less than one government a year since the war. The current one has shown a surprising amount of strength after almost a year in office, as reflected in the local elections in October, and has also carried out some administrative/parliamentary maneuvers that seem to have made it more stable. These maneuvers resulted from a successful drive to get special powers for the government through the parliament, powers which allow it to govern and pass measures by decree, thus avoiding a parliamentary debate over each issue and a possible dissolution of the government because of the failure of one of its measures to pass. Under the current system, there is a major confidence vote each January, and if the government survives the vote, it is pretty safe for the rest of the year.

In the October 10, 1982 local elections this government showed surprising strength in the number of votes cast for the Christian Democrats and Liberals. The only major opposition gains were those of the Ecologists, who received over 10 percent of the vote in many of the large towns. While the Socialists were very disappointed--particularly since unemployment is

* See Section II.B.2.g. for a table showing the results of this poll in Eurobarometre, No. 16 (December 1981), p. 9.

so high and their opposition to the government so obvious--they showed virtually no gains in these municipal elections, except in towns like Charleroi, where they had already controlled the council and where there was a very high rate of unemployment.*

Prime Minister Wilfred Martens' government has discussed and tried many techniques for settling the critical problems in Belgium. The most pressing concerns at this time are similar to those facing the rest of the Western economies; but regarding unemployment, Belgium's problems seem to be more severe than those in any other EEC country, including Britain. Under Martens' government, unemployment went from 11.6 percent in 1981 to an estimated 13.9 percent in 1982.** The economy is stagnant, industries are without orders, and there is a general economic malaise in the country. Martens at first talked of indexing wages and prices and then dropped the idea and put a cap of 7 percent on all pay raises, cut taxes on industry and reduced the national budget from 190 billion to 156 billion Belgian francs, largely at the expense of "welfare-state" programs, but also at the expense of proposed increases in the defense budget.*** Belgium did not experience a 3 percent real increase in defense spending agreed upon among NATO allies, but the 1981-82 defense budget did increase by 2 percent in constant dollars.****

This center-right government, which functions without the Socialists, could cause antagonism in Wallonia. This district is heavily Socialist but works with the small Christian Socialist Party and the Liberal party (as in Holland, this is a conservative party).***** Over the past year the central government has been weathering strikes, particularly in Wallonia, in response to its wage policies, but the strikes were called for different purposes. The Socialist unions called strikes aimed at toppling the government, but the Christian Democratic unions were striking against management in favor of higher wages, rather than at government policy. As long as the nonsocialist unions maintain this support, the government can survive.¶ There has also been some success in bringing down government spending. However, any sharper downturn in the economy, or perhaps

* The Economist, October 16, 1982, pp. 74 and 75.

** The New York Times, December 1, 1982, p. 1.

*** The Economist, October 16, 1982, pp. 74 and 75; February 6, 1982, pp. 67 and 68.

**** Anthony H. Cordesman, "Defense Burden Sharing, a Brief Scoreboard on Our Major Allies (and Ourselves)," Armed Forces Journal International, October 1982, p. 64.

***** Giles Merritt and Larry Klinger, "The New Men Face a Rough Future," Financial Times, January 11, 1982, Section III, p. 1.

¶ Larry Klinger, "Belgium Hit by More Strikes," Financial Times, December 8, 1982, p. 2.

even the failure of the recession to "bottom out," might bring this government down in 1983.

Here again, the "surprise-free" road taken from the economic branch point is that the Western recession will begin to bottom out and this government will remain in power, at least until the force modernization program in Europe has been settled. As indicated earlier, however, even if this government were to remain in power, should the Belgium economy continue its present downward trend, the probability of neglecting defense spending would be quite high, particularly with the government's drive to cut the national budget. On the other hand, if this government were to fall and a Socialist government replace it, it is more than likely that a left-wing government would try to make up for maintaining welfare spending by not increasing, or even reducing, the defense budget. The current government is probably as good as one can expect at the moment as far as Belgium's commitment to NATO is concerned. The Liberals are, after all, defense-oriented, and they are in this government.

There is another factor in the Belgian political scene which distinguishes it from that in any other northern European country and which could endanger the government and its commitment to NATO defense efforts, including the theater nuclear force modernization program. This factor is the much-discussed split between the northern, Flemish-speaking section and the southern, French-speaking part of the country. There has been, and continues to be, tension between the two groups. And, in addition, the Walloon, or southern section of the country, which hosts the steel and other heavy industries, has been hit harder by the current economic crisis. In fact, it has been in somewhat of a crisis since 1975 because of declining activity in its heavy industries.

As mentioned earlier, Wallonia is heavily Socialist, and the Socialists are not part of the present government. This causes additional political problems, but they may not be so grave as some people seem to think. There has been some talk of separatist movements, but they never seem to come to fruition. Perhaps this is because France would be unlikely to want to annex the French-speaking section of Belgium, and it is equally unlikely that the Netherlands would want to incorporate Flemish-speaking Flanders. There is also a religious division between the Low Countries: Belgium has many Catholics, while the Netherlands is predominantly Protestant. Moreover, there seems to be no desire on the part of the Belgians to really dissolve their nation and attach themselves to neighboring countries. There are many reasons for this, not the least of which may be that they would only become one of several provinces of a large country, while they currently make up approximately half each of Belgium.* Furthermore, politicians are unlikely to relinquish whatever power they have too easily.

* Merritt and Klinger.

Thus, while regional differences play a role in Belgian politics, it seems at the moment that local political organizations, as well as citizens, would prefer to remain within the Belgian nation, regardless of their language or religious preferences. The danger of political dissatisfaction does not seem, therefore, to be one of sparking serious separatist activities. On the other hand, it does mean that difficulties could arise which could unseat a government in Brussels if the dissatisfaction of one group or the other became extreme. Belgian governments have been dealing with this problem rather successfully; and even though the Socialists and their base in the Walloon district are not represented, as long as the people feel the current government can solve the economic crisis, it seems they may be willing to support it.

2. Public Opinion, Nuclear Missile Deployment and the Peace Movement in Belgium

a. General Outlook

Compared to the other European NATO nations, Belgium appears in many respects to suffer from the greatest degree of pessimism, and perhaps anxiety, about what the future holds for it. One could venture the assumption that much of Belgium's low morale, even in regard to East-West security and the possibility of war, may be attributable to the serious economic and political difficulties the country is now facing. Regarding the issue of the deployment of 48 cruise missiles on Belgian soil, the government has taken a wait-and-see attitude. This position seems to have resulted largely from the economic and political disarray within the country rather than from pressures from an effective disarmament movement, which, until now, has failed to materialize. After a long delay, Belgium finally made the commitment in principle to the deployment of the cruise missiles, but only if the U.S.-Soviet talks were to end without any significant agreement. The Ardennes has been picked as a potential missile site.

Belgium's severe unemployment problem could possibly have even a direct, as well as indirect, effect on the opposition to missile deployment. In December 1982 it was reported that many unemployed joined peace demonstration crowds in Belgium.* Since large numbers of unemployed in Europe are youth, the unemployment problem could possibly serve to exacerbate peace protests planned for 1983.

The peace movement in Belgium, as in Holland, contains religious as well as secular elements. The outstanding religious peace group is Pax-Christi "which, like the Dutch IKV, has declared itself in favor of a Europe without power blocs."**

*David K. Willis, "Europe's Antinuclear Voice Gains in Volume and Intensity," The Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 1982, pp. 12-13.

**J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movements," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXI (November-December 1982), p. 53.

Each year the Gallup International organization surveys people in many nations for their hopes and fears for the coming year. In November 1981, the Belgians revealed themselves to be significantly more pessimistic about 1982 than any other members of the European Community. Six out of 10 Belgians thought that 1982 would be worse than the previous year, compared with the second most pessimistic, the Irish (52 percent). In every other area surveyed--unemployment, labor problems, overall economic prosperity and peace in the world--only the Dutch appeared to approximate the anxiety of the Belgians. The tables below show the predictions for Belgium for 1981 and 1982; they reveal a drop in morale between those two years.

In Euro-Barometre and Gallup International polls, Belgians and West Germans were the Economic Community members most inclined to worry about the possibility of war in the next ten years.* In 1982 there was apparently some decrease in the intensity of fear that had become marked in Western Europe around the end of the 1970s; in any event, the general milieu in which deployment is to take place at the end of this year is one of more heightened concern with the danger of war. If the plans for intense disarmament activity in Western Europe are carried out this year, it would be difficult to imagine that even Belgium, which until now has not had a cohesive peace movement such as that in the Netherlands or West Germany, would not be strongly affected by the protests.

Although there are separatist tendencies in Wallonia and Flanders, and the nation is facing political and economic uncertainties, Belgians today appear to be significantly prouder of their nation than their neighbors are in the Netherlands and West Germany. Seven out of ten Belgians said they were very or rather proud to be Belgian, compared with six out of ten Dutch and West Germans who felt proud of their nationality.

The general pessimism of the Belgians regarding their economic and political situation seems to have become reflected in their loss of confidence in the functioning of their democratic system. For the past decade, the Economic Community has been polling Economic Community members for their satisfaction with the way democracy works within their country. Belgians registered a sharp drop in satisfaction from 1973 (62 percent) to 1981 (35 percent). Only Belgium and Italy reported a decline, and these are, of course, the countries in which governments rise and topple like bowling pins.

b. Public Attitudes Toward the NATO Alliance and Western Security

The fence-sitting of the Belgian government on the deployment of the missiles is reflected in the responses of the public toward various

*See Section 11.B.2.g for tables giving the results of these polls.

PREDICTIONS FOR 1981 AND 1982*
BELGIUM

	<u>NOVEMBER 1981</u>	<u>DECEMBER 1980</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>1982 (1981) PREDICTIONS</u>		
BETTER	5	7
WORSE	62	53
SAME	26	32
DON'T KNOW	7	8
<u>UNEMPLOYMENT PREDICTIONS</u>		
INCREASE	79	75
DECREASE	3	3
REMAIN THE SAME	13	16
DON'T KNOW	4	5
<u>PROSPERITY PREDICTIONS</u>		
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY	2	2
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY	68	66
REMAIN THE SAME	24	26
DON'T KNOW	6	6
<u>PEACE PREDICTIONS</u>		
PEACEFUL YEAR	4	4
TROUBLED YEAR	61	55
REMAIN THE SAME	26	32
DON'T KNOW	9	10

*GALLUP POLLS IN THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 185 (FEBRUARY 1981), P. 4, AND NO. 196 (JANUARY 1982), P. 5.

DANGER OF WAR IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS?
BELGIUM

	<u>ECONOMIC COMMUNITY</u> <u>EURO-BAROMETRE POLLS</u>			
	<u>JULY</u> <u>1971</u>	<u>OCT.</u> <u>1977</u>	<u>APRIL</u> <u>1980</u>	<u>OCT.</u> <u>1981</u>
NO DANGER OF WAR	40%	27%	14%	18%

SOURCE: EURO-BAROMETRE, NO. 16 (DECEMBER 1981), TABLE 3, APPENDIX.

ARE YOU PROUD TO BE A BELGIAN?

QUESTION: IF YOU WERE ASKED, ARE YOU PROUD TO BE A BELGIAN, WOULD YOU ANSWER VERY PROUD, RATHER PROUD, NOT VERY PROUD, NOT AT ALL PROUD, OR ARE YOU UNDECIDED?

	<u>1981</u>
VERY PROUD	27%
RATHER PROUD	44
NOT VERY PROUD	12
NOT AT ALL PROUD	7
UNDECIDED	10

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF VALUES, CARA, MAY 1982.

SATISFACTION WITH THE FUNCTION OF DEMOCRACY

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY¹

	<u>SEPTEMBER 1973</u>			<u>OCTOBER 1980</u>			<u>OCTOBER 1981</u>		
	<u>SATIS- FIED</u>	<u>NOT SATIS- FIED</u>	<u>DIFFER- ENCE</u>	<u>SATIS- FIED</u>	<u>NOT SATIS- FIED</u> (PERCENTAGE)	<u>DIFFER- ENCE</u>	<u>SATIS- FIED</u>	<u>NOT SATIS- FIED</u>	<u>DIFFER- ENCE</u>
BELGIUM	62	32	30	34	51	-17	35	49	-14
LUXEMBOURG	52	37	15	77	22	55	75	22	53
NETHERLANDS	52	38	14	51	45	6	59	36	23
IRELAND	55	43	12	48	46	2	58	32	26
FRANCE	41	46	-5	36	52	-16	53	34	19
DENMARK	45	53	-8	60	35	25	68	28	40
UNITED KINGDOM ²	44	54	-10	51	43	8	48	43	5
WEST GERMANY	44	55	-11	73	21	52	71	23	48
ITALY	27	72	-45	21	77	-56	19	78	-59
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	48	46	2	53	45	8			

¹THE COUNTRIES ARE CLASSIFIED HERE IN DESCENDING ORDER ACCORDING TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "SATISFIED" AND "NOT SATISFIED."

²NORTHERN IRELAND NOT INCLUDED IN 1973.

SOURCE: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EURO-BAROMETRE, NO. 16 (DECEMBER 1981), p. 11.

security issues. Gallup international polled the Belgians in February 1982 on their reactions to NATO and the threat from the East.* Noteworthy is the extraordinarily high percentage of "don't know" responses among the Belgian population, in most cases overwhelmingly greater than that in all the other countries polled. The large number of Belgians that has been unable to make up its mind about these issues may constitute a possible swing vote on the question of eventual missile deployment.

Although fear of war has increased, Belgians were not worried about an attack from the Soviet Union in the next five years (53 percent, not likely; 23 percent, likely; 24 percent, don't know). Further, only one-half of the population had a favorable opinion of the U.S. (29 percent, don't know); less than one-half had confidence in the U.S. to deal wisely with the world's problems (25 percent, don't know); yet almost one-half thought the U.S. would come to Belgium's defense even if this meant a direct retaliatory attack by the Soviet Union against the U.S. (21 percent, don't know). Confidence in NATO's defensive ability was also low compared with that of other NATO countries: 7 percent had a great deal of confidence, 36 percent a fair amount, and 33 percent not very much or none at all; 24 percent didn't know. The public was evenly split on the question of the effect of deploying American nuclear missiles in Western Europe: one-fourth thought it increased the chances of an attack, another one-fourth that it provided greater protection, and three out of ten answered "don't know." Similarly, concerning the effect of stationing American troops in Western Europe, 22 percent thought it increased the chances of an attack; 25 percent, it provided greater protection; and again, a large 26 percent had no opinion.

When asked to choose from a list of six alternatives for a West European defense system, a plurality of 35 percent responded with "don't know." Only one out of four thought that Belgium should continue in the NATO alliance as it is, that is, including the U.S. and Canada, while another 18 percent would choose to establish a unified West European defense force within NATO under European command, but allied to the U.S. Very few picked withdrawing from NATO or breaking away totally from an alliance with the U.S.

And finally, a plurality of Belgians favored defending Belgium rather than accepting Russian domination; again, almost as many had no opinion on this issue. The question asked was, "Some people say that war is now so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say it would be better to fight in defense of Belgium than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?" Forty-five percent responded "better to fight," 14 percent "better to be dominated," and an overwhelming 41 percent, "don't know."

The U.S. is pressing Belgium to begin work on the missile deployment site in the Ardennes. A poll taken as far back as September 1980 showed

* Newsweek, March 15, 1982, p. 11.

the Belgians opposed, by a margin of 42 to 26 percent, to the stationing of the American missiles on Belgian soil.* The attitude in the country today is pessimistic regarding the political, economic and international outlook, and Belgians are very uncertain about solutions to security problems. Coping as they are with the political and economic crises that have plagued their country, Belgians seem little committed to increasing the nuclear defense of the West.

F. Italy

1. A Surprise-Free Scenario for Italy

Late in 1982, Italy's 42nd government since World War II toppled when Mr. Spadolini, the first non-Christian Democratic Prime Minister since the war, lost the support of parliament. A Republican, Mr. Spadolini was Prime Minister in what was fundamentally a Christian Democratic-Socialist coalition. Mr. Fanfani, who (like the present Prime Minister of Belgium) was Prime Minister of Italy four times previously, is now head of the 43rd government since World War II.

The Italian governmental/political situation seems even more hectic than that of Belgium. Indeed, with a third of the voting strength lying with the Communists, the Christian Democrats and Socialists sharing the vast majority of the remainder of the votes, and the rest divided among splinter parties, the situation is anything but politically stable. On the other hand, the Socialists have, over the years, split farther and farther from the Communists and declared their dedication to the democratic system. The Communists, too, have constantly supported the democratic process** and roundly condemned Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. The result is that though the Communist strength in Italy is a worry to NATO, and the constantly changing governments do not engender belief in Italy's stability, in their own way Italians manage to cope.

The unemployment situation in Italy, while traditionally bad, was slower to reach the doldrums found in other parts of Western Europe: unemployment figures were 7.1 percent in 1978, 7.5 percent in 1979, 8 percent in 1980, 8.6 percent in 1981, and 9.9 percent in 1982; they are estimated to go to 10.5 percent in 1983, considerably below those in Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands for 1982 and 1983.*** Italy has, therefore, not yet as severe an unemployment problem as some of her West European neighbors and has experienced really worsened conditions for a shorter period of time.

* Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "Is NATO in Trouble? A Survey of European Attitudes," Public Opinion (August/September 1981), p. 30.

** John Earle, "Good Government Looks Difficult, But Crucial," The London Times, October 13, 1982, p. 14.

*** The New York Times, December 1, 1982, p. 1.

Other economic problems, however exacerbate the situation: Italy's indexed wages, when passed on to the consumer, helped to drive up inflation to 17 percent in the fourth quarter of 1982; meanwhile, industrial production dropped by 6 percent in September. Government deficit spending goes on unabated, and the public sector deficit continues to soar, with both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists unwilling to take the unpopular measures that would be needed to stabilize the economy. The "accepted wisdom" seems to be evolving into the idea that the Communists must somehow be accommodated for the government to get enough authority to act on these volatile economic issues. Perhaps more importantly, Premier Fanfani seemed to be sympathetic to that view.

Clearly, this government is also in a precarious position, and further economic problems are likely to cause it to topple. Unless a Communist-dominated popular front government were to take over, however, another fallen government would make very little difference. (The Communists seem to be unwilling to get themselves into a coalition position in which they can be blamed for Italian troubles as "a party in power.") There are all kinds of difficulties in Italy all the way down to, or up to, an unreliable mail system; but the Italians seem to manage.

There are several factors, of course, that do not appear in governmental statistics and that are not obvious at first glance. Italy has the largest underground economy in Western Europe; many of the unemployed are not really without money; and those in very low-paying jobs often make money elsewhere. Furthermore, there is an organization, an "apparatus," working informally within Italy that is quite effective. The extended family, in which everyone has a relative who knows someone who is doing something, allows flexibility outside the normal channels and even helps provide housing and sustenance for unemployed relatives.

Moreover, from another very important point of view, things are improving in Italy. The terrorism that ran rampant in Italy for the last several years is abating. In 1980, there were 833 acts of terrorism and political violence that cost 135 lives; in 1981, 368 with 24 dead; in the first half of 1982, only 98 with 18 dead. This is an increase in the average number of dead for a six-month period over 1981; but, overall, the acts are down, and there is evidence that Red Brigade members are becoming disillusioned with their views of a Utopia gained through revolutionary violence. This becomes clear as more and more of the imprisoned Red Brigade members begin to give information to the police. The most wanted right-wing terrorists have also been captured, killed, or have fled the country. There are remaining areas of Red Brigade influence, however, such as in Naples, and criminal gang killings have increased. Even these gangs are coming under pressure, however. The Archbishop of Palermo and priests of his diocese have condemned the Mafia in Sicily for mafioso killings and have called on the state to protect the citizens and challenge the Mafia power.*

*Earle, "Good Government Looks Difficult," p. 14.

It seems that Italy is in the same position as that of other NATO powers in being short of funds for defense efforts. In fact, Italy's foreign debt, like Denmark's, has grown so large that her credit rating may get a little shaky. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that heavy expenditures for defense will be forthcoming. Furthermore, as indicated above, economic conditions could have a more drastic secondary effect on defense if chaotic economic conditions should make a Communist-dominated, popular-front takeover possible. Without really chaotic conditions of one kind or another, however, it is unlikely the change of governments will alter attitudes on the issue of defense. The Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists have, at least heretofore, failed to show opposition to Italian participation in NATO and the maintenance of feasible national defense forces. Indeed, Italy was the first European NATO power to approve of the force modernization program.

2. Italian Public Opinion, the Peace Movement and Security

The Italian government, like the British, is committed to accepting the new U.S. cruise missiles; 112 are to be deployed at Comiso in Sicily. All the Italian governments, regardless of their makeup, have strongly supported the stationing of the missiles in Sicily if the zero-option is not agreed to at the arms reduction talks in Geneva. The preparation of the site is going ahead, despite occasional demonstrations. The missiles are to be deployed during a period of three years, beginning in 1984. The Italian commitment to the nuclear force modernization is a decisive factor in whether the nuclear force deployment in the European theater takes place: this is because the West Germans have stipulated that their acceptance of new American missiles on their soil is contingent on at least one other West European NATO nation accepting them as well. The Belgians and Dutch have been waffling on this issue and delaying a commitment; Italy determined early on to accept the missiles, and each Italian government has remained firmly committed to the decision.

Italy has, however, asserted its right to final control over the use of the 112 cruise missiles. According to the Italian Defense Minister, Lelio Lagorio, in an interview published in the middle of January 1983, "The base at Comiso is a NATO base, but Italy claims for itself the right to have the last word on the use of the arms installed there."*

The question frequently asked is why there is less opposition in Italy to the new missiles than among the other West European nations. According to reports, part of the reason is that the large and powerful Italian Communist Party is going to lengths to show that it is politically moderate and independent of the Soviet Union.** The Communists are also trying to downplay disruptions and avoid being pegged as the party responsible for unstable conditions in Italy.

* Washington Times, January 25, 1983, p. 6.

** Time, January 31, 1983, p. 13; Public Opinion, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February/March 1982), p. 7.

Luigi Barzini, an Italian journalist and writer, offered the following opinion about the reasons for the low-profile communist role in the peace movement in Italy:

...in Italy, the communists cannot back the peace movement very openly, because they are trying very hard to demonstrate to the world that they are independent of the Soviets. How could they do that and at the same time back a peace movement which is directed solely against the United States? All these peace movements are disorderly. They represent small minorities of people. I don't think they will have a great deal of weight in the future.*

Although they take a moderate and careful public position on defense, the Italian Communists have been reported to be substantially involved in the activities of the peace movement.** The major peace demonstration that took place in Rome on October 24, 1981 was organized largely by an umbrella group controlled by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Committee for Disarmament, Pax-Christi and the Catholic left, environmentalists, and individual socialists (but not the Socialist Party per se):

The Italian peace movement's main target is the proposed deployment of cruise missiles in Sicily. However, the movement also criticizes the Soviet nuclear arms buildup. This is in line with the position of the PCI, which favors a "third way," i.e., a Europe independent of both "superpowers." An influential figure in the Italian peace movement is former NATO general Nino Pasti, one of the Generals for Peace.***

Two Roman Catholics bishops have also recently opposed the deployment of the cruise missiles: Bishop Dante Bernini, the president of the Italian bishops' conference, and Bishop Luigi Bettazzi, the international president of the Pax-Christi movement. Although a comparatively small organization, Pax-Christi has become disproportionately influential in the present-day peace activities of Catholic circles. The U.S. and Holland have the largest membership--about 20,000 in each country:

Pax-Christi has an importance out of all proportion to its worldwide membership of about 65,000. Originally set up in Lourdes, as a union of French and German Catholics who wanted to heal the wounds of the second world war, it spread to the United States in 1973, towards the end of the Vietnam war, where it works for "disarmament, conscientious objection,

* Public Opinion, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February/March 1982), p. 7.

** J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXI, No. 6 (November-December 1982), p. 51-52.

*** Ibid., p. 51.

a just world order, education for peace and alternatives to violence." It now has about 20,000 American members, including 133 out of 357 American Catholic bishops.*

Pax-Christi numbers about 5,000 each in West Germany, Italy, France, and Belgium, and about 2,000 in Britain. Monsignor Bruce Kent, the former chaplain for Pax-Christi in Britain, is now general secretary of Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).

A new issue that may have to be considered may be the effect of the American Catholic bishops' Pastoral Letter on the conservative Italian Catholic Church. Were the Pastoral Letter to have an impact similar to the one it has had in West Germany, where it has been widely publicized among the Catholic church parishes, it could conceivably lead to a broader questioning among Italian Catholics as to the morality of the nuclear missiles.

a. The Climate of Public Opinion and Attitudes Toward Defense

In Italy, as elsewhere in Western Europe, pressing economic and domestic problems lead the list of the most important problems. In an October 1982 Harris survey, crime shared the top of the list with unemployment, attesting to the impact of the crime and terrorist problem in Italy. Although people were worried about the threat of war, nuclear weapons themselves were a comparatively low-priority concern. Inadequate defense was at the bottom of the list, as it was in all other West European countries surveyed.

Looking forward to 1982, Italians felt a little more apprehensive than they had been in the previous year. In the table below, two Gallup polls show that in 1981 and 1982 overwhelming numbers of Italians anticipated conditions of growing unemployment and economic difficulties. About one-half predicted that 1982 would be worse than 1981; another one-half anticipated that 1982 would be a troubled year.

In Economic Community polls asking about the probability of war within the next ten years, Italians responded, as did other West Europeans, with a sharp increase in fear of war at the end of the 1970s.** But, in October 1981, Italy appeared to be less worried about the threat of war than were the other members of the Community (except for Greece). This response was supported by the results of the two Gallup polls taken at the end of 1981 and 1982, which showed the Italians less apprehensive about war than their northern neighbors in the European Community.***

*"Church and Bomb," The Economist, February 5, 1983, p. 21.

** Euro-Barometre, No. 16 (December 1981), p. 9. See Section 11.8.2.g for a table showing the results of these polls.

*** The Gallup Report, No. 196 (January 1982), p. 6; and the Gallup Poll, December 26, 1982. These polls are in a table in Section 11.8.2.g.

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM--ITALY, 1982

QUESTION: WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOUR GREATEST CONCERNS
FOR YOURSELF AND YOUR COUNTRY TODAY?

OCTOBER 1982

CRIME	62%
UNEMPLOYMENT	61
INFLATION	46
THE THREAT OF WAR	42
POOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	26
SOCIAL INJUSTICE	25
THE ENERGY CRISIS	22
NUCLEAR WEAPONS	21
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT SPENDING	16
INADEQUATE DEFENSE	7

SOURCE: LOUIS HARRIS SURVEY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE
AND THE ATLANTIC INSTITUTE, REPORTED IN THE INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 25, 1982.

PREDICTIONS FOR 1981 AND 1982, ITALY

	<u>NOVEMBER 1981</u>	<u>DECEMBER 1980</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>1982 (1981) PREDICTIONS</u>		
BETTER	25	28
WORSE	49	45
SAME	23	24
DON'T KNOW	3	3
<u>UNEMPLOYMENT PREDICTIONS</u>		
INCREASE	69	66
DECREASE	10	10
REMAIN THE SAME	18	21
DON'T KNOW	2	3
<u>PROSPERITY PREDICTIONS</u>		
ECONOMIC PROSPERTY	9	10
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY	66	62
REMAIN THE SAME	22	25
DON'T KNOW	3	4
<u>PEACE PREDICTIONS</u>		
PEACEFUL YEAR	11	17
TROUBLED YEAR	48	39
REMAIN THE SAME	35	33
DON'T KNOW	7	11

SOURCE: GALLUP POLLS IN THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 185 (FEBRUARY 1981), P. 4, AND NO. 196 (JANUARY 1982), P. 5.

According to the 1982 Harris survey, the Italians felt that the security of the West depended largely on strengthened economic and defense collaboration in Western Europe and on effective European-U.S. cooperation. In the poll results shown in the table below, the centrist parties were clearly the most inclined to stress Western defense collaboration; the Christian Democrats looked mainly toward effective European-U.S. cooperation; and the Socialists and Communists favored strengthened economic unity in Western Europe and continued contacts with the Soviet Union. The Italians appeared in general much less worried than the Dutch and the West Germans about productive arms control talks.

In the International Study of Values survey, issued by CARA in May 1982, about 4 out of 10 Italians felt very proud to be Italian.* This was a significantly higher margin than in Europe as a whole, and twice as many as in West Germany. However, almost one-fourth of all Italians also felt "not very happy" or "not at all happy"; this figure was almost twice as high as that in the rest of Europe. Moreover, the clear majority (57 percent) said they would not be willing to defend Italy in the event of war. (No mention was made in this question of fighting a "nuclear war," which would have skewed the answer significantly toward unwillingness.)

Furthermore, Italian morale had dropped so low by October 1981 that, in an Economic Community poll, only 19 percent claimed they were satisfied with the way democracy was functioning in Italy. Compared to the responses from the other Economic Community nations, this was rock-bottom pessimism.** Furthermore, according to CARA's ranking of countries by the average level of confidence in their institutions, Italy placed lowest in confidence (Ireland topped the list, the U.S. was second, Northern Ireland third, and Great Britain fourth).*** The tables below give the Italian response to three of the questions asked by CARA.

As suggested in the surprise-free scenario, Italians seem to make do outside of the system. In a 1979 Gallup International poll, over one-half said they lived with the attitude "just live a life that suits my taste without thinking about money or fame," a significantly greater number than West Germans and Americans, and widely divergent from the British response. Although Italians are known to be strongly anti-clerical, in the same poll they showed a rather high degree of religiosity compared

* See Section II.B.2.d for a table giving the cross-national results of this poll. CARA stands for the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, based in Washington, D.C.

** Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre, No. 16 (December 1981), p. 11. A table showing comparative responses is in Section II.E.2.a.

*** International Study of Values.

MOST IMPORTANT TO WESTERN SECURITY--ITALY, 1982

QUESTION: WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE MOST IMPORTANT TO WESTERN SECURITY?

	PARTY PREFERENCE				
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS</u>	<u>CENTRIST PARTIES</u>	<u>SOCIAL- ISTS</u>	<u>COMMUNISTS</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
STRENGTHENED ECONOMIC UNITY IN WESTERN EUROPE	30	23	43	41	33
GREATER DEFENSE COLLABO- RATION IN WESTERN EUROPE	29	24	48	27	25
EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN-U.S. COOPERATION	27	38	48	19	18
PRODUCTIVE ARMS CONTROL TALKS	23	19	30	26	25
IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD	16	17	19	19	16
CONTINUED CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION	16	9	14	26	29
MILITARY BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION	15	17	21	19	11
OTHER OR NO OPINION	10	11	2	5	6

SOURCE: LOUIS HARRIS SURVEY IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 25, 1982.

ARE YOU PROUD TO BE ITALIAN?
ITALY, MAY 1982

QUESTION: HOW PROUD ARE YOU TO BE AN ITALIAN?

VERY PROUD	41%
QUITE PROUD	39
NOT VERY PROUD	11
NOT AT ALL PROUD	6
DON'T KNOW	2

AND WILLING TO FIGHT FOR YOUR COUNTRY?
ITALY, MAY 1982

QUESTION: OF COURSE, WE ALL HOPE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE ANOTHER WAR, BUT IF IT WERE TO COME TO THAT, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR YOUR COUNTRY?

YES	28%
NO	57
DON'T KNOW	15

ARE YOU HAPPY?
ITALY, MAY 1982

QUESTION: TAKING ALL THINGS TOGETHER, WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE:

	<u>%</u>
VERY HAPPY	10
QUITE HAPPY	65
NOT VERY HAPPY	19
NOT AT ALL HAPPY	4
DON'T KNOW	2

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF VALUES, CENTER FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN THE APOSTOLATE (CARA), MAY 1982.

with other West European populations. Six out of ten believed "there exists one and only absolute God," and "there is a soul separate from the body and the human being." They strongly opposed mercy killing in case of a fatal disease such as cancer. The table below shows cross-national responses to this poll.

In the CARA survey of May 1982, 83 percent considered themselves to be religious independently of whether they went to church or not; this response outranked the 81 percent in the U.S. On a scale of one to ten, measuring the importance of God in life, Italy placed at 6.96, higher than any other continental European country, but below the U.S., South Africa, Ireland and Northern Ireland.*

Given the unstable milieu in which the Italians are now living and their low morale regarding their political system and institutions, it comes as no surprise to find that in the Newsweek poll of March 1982, only one-half would fight in defense of Italy rather than accept Russian domination: 48 percent, better to fight; 17 percent, better to accept domination; 35 percent, don't know. This showed considerably less resolve than that of the British, West Germans, French or Americans (better to fight: Great Britain, 75 percent; West Germany, 74 percent; France, 57 percent; and the U.S., a high 83 percent). Yet, Italians showed comparatively strong confidence in the NATO alliance and in the ability of the U.S. to deal with world problems: 53 percent said they had a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the U.S., compared with 35 percent in Great Britain, 40 percent in France, 45 percent in Belgium and 57 percent in West Germany. Furthermore, almost one-half had a great deal or fair amount of confidence in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe. This is a greater degree of confidence than that felt by the French (39 percent) and Belgians (43 percent), but less than that of the British (56 percent) and West Germans (61 percent). Almost one-fourth of the Italians had no opinion on this issue.

b. Conclusions

Italy has been getting along under unstable political, economic and social conditions for many years, and this appears likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Italians retain a dismal view of their political system, institutions and organized church (but not of religious belief per se). Yet each government that has assumed power has reaffirmed Italy's strong commitment to Western security and supported the deployment of the new cruise missiles in Sicily in the event the zero option is not agreed upon in Geneva. The Italian Communist Party has gone along with this decision, and there has been less opposition in Italy to the force modernization than in any other West European country.

* International Study of Values. See Section II.B.2.c.(2) for a table giving the complete list of rankings.

CROSS-NATIONAL RELIGIOUS VALUES AND LIFESTYLES*
GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLLS

QUESTION: DIFFERENT PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARD
LIFE. WHICH ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COMES CLOSEST
TO YOURS?

	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>WEST GERMANY</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
A. TO WORK HARD AND GET RICH	9	8	6	11
B. TO STUDY EARNESTLY AND BECOME FAMOUS	5	1	2	2
C. JUST TO LIVE A LIFE THAT SUITS MY TASTE WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT MONEY OR FAME	56	15	40	48
D. TO LIVE EACH DAY AS IT COMES WITHOUT GETTING TOO SERIOUS OR TENSE	17	43	26	11
E. TO RESIST ALL EVILS IN THE WORLD AND LIVE A CLEAN AND RIGHT LIFE	10	30	15	24
F. TO GIVE EVERYTHING IN SERVICE OF SOCIETY WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT MYSELF	1	3	3	1

*NO ANSWER PERCENTAGES HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED.

CROSS-NATIONAL RELIGIOUS VALUES AND LIFESTYLES*
(continued)

QUESTION: I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ON RELIGION.
PLEASE CHOOSE THE ANSWER WHICH COMES CLOSEST TO
YOUR FEELING ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING:

	<u>ITALY</u> <u>%</u>	<u>UNITED</u> <u>KINGDOM</u> <u>%</u>	<u>UNITED</u> <u>STATES</u> <u>%</u>	<u>WEST</u> <u>GERMANY</u> <u>%</u>
A. THERE EXISTS ONE AND ONLY ABSOLUTE GOD	63	57	76	52
THERE ARE MANY GODS EXISTING	2	5	2	6
I'M NOT SURE, BUT I FEEL GOD EXISTS	23	22	17	28
B. THERE IS A SOUL SEPARATE FROM THE BODY IN THE HUMAN BEING	64	44	77	63
THERE IS NO SOUL SEPARATE FROM THE BODY IN THE HUMAN BEING	13	23	14	32
C. PEOPLE'S DAILY LIFE NEED NOT BE GOVERNED BY RELIGIOUS COMMANDMENTS	38	54	24	53
PEOPLE'S DAILY LIFE SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY RELIGIOUS COMMANDMENTS	48	34	68	40
D. WHEN A PATIENT HAS A FATAL DISEASE SUCH AS CANCER, MERCY KILLING SHOULD BE ALLOWED	37	66	48	71
E. WHATEVER THE CIRCUMSTANCES MERCY KILLING SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED	46	20	37	22

* NO ANSWER PERCENTAGES HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED.

SOURCE: WORLD OPINION UPDATE, VOL. V, NO. 3 (MAY/JUNE 1981), PP. 64-65.
DATA EXCERPTED FROM REPORT ENTITLED SURVEY IN 13 COUNTRIES OF HUMAN
VALUES, 1980. SURVEY DESIGNED BY THE LEISURE DEVELOPMENT CENTER
AND CONDUCTED BY GALLUP INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTES, SEPTEMBER-
NOVEMBER 1979. NATIONAL ADULT SAMPLE SIZES: ITALY, 1042; UNITED
KINGDOM, 987; UNITED STATES, 1127; W. GERMANY, 1020.

IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN LIFE
(ITALY, PERCENTAGES)

QUESTION: INDEPENDENTLY OF WHETHER YOU GO TO CHURCH OR NOT,
WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE:

	<u>US</u>	<u>GB</u>	<u>IR</u>	<u>EUR</u>	<u>WG</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>IT</u>	<u>SP</u>
A RELIGIOUS PERSON	81	58	64	63	58	51	83	63
NOT A RELIGIOUS PERSON	16	36	32	24	22	31	9	30
A CONVINCED ATHEIST	1	4	1	5	3	10	4	4
DON'T KNOW	2	3	3	8	16	8	4	4

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF VALUES, CARA, MAY 1982.

The Communists have, however, been involved with peace activities in tandem with Italian peace groups, notably those of the Catholic left. The impact of the American Catholic bishops' Pastoral Letter is yet to be felt, as well as the flurry of anti-nuclear peace activities planned for 1983 in the various West European countries. Italy is, however, aware of its dependence on the NATO alliance and the U.S. for its defense, and equally, of its critical role as a firm supporter of the missile deployment in determining whether the other West European countries will accept the missiles. At present, Italy favors the zero option and firmly supports a nuclear balance in Europe.

III. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE ISSUES

A. Traditional American Opposition to Military Involvement and War

An earlier Hudson Institute study, examining public attitudes in the U.S. after World War II toward war and foreign engagements, found that Americans (1) have a fundamental and persistent fear and dislike of war; (2) throughout the last four decades, have consistently preferred to respond to international crises with economic and technical aid and were unwilling to send in military forces, or even military aid of any kind; and (3) strongly supported noninterventionism during this postwar period in which they also favored active U.S. participation in world affairs, collective security pacts, the strengthening of the U.N., and the containment of communist influence.*

Yet, despite its unmistakable antipathy toward military involvement, the public initially supported the president whenever he took military action and sent in U.S. troops. There is an observable phenomenon that Americans will "rally 'round the president" in international crises, apparently in the belief that he has acted wisely according to the facts he has at hand.** Moreover, the U.S., though reluctantly drawn into a military conflict, has invariably proven itself to be a "warrior nation." If, however, the action was extended, casualties began to mount, and time and events seemed to show that the action was unsuccessful, public support dropped.*** Wars as a rule do not benefit presidential popularity and apparently have an even more adverse effect if the war is seen as the president's war--that is, "he got us into it"--rather than one that was inherited from a previous administration.****

*Doris Yokelson, "Public Attitudes Toward War, the President and Foreign Relations," Appendix to Vol. III: "The Future of the Nixon Doctrine in Pacific Asia," of The United States and Pacific Asia in the Seventies, HI-1661-RR, 29 September 1973.

**This has led to some paradoxical public opinion poll responses. For example, in a Gallup poll taken in May 1970 after President Nixon had sent U.S. troops into Cambodia, the public simultaneously approved of the way Nixon was handling the situation (50%) and opposed sending U.S. troops to help Cambodia (59%) (Gallup Opinion Index, No. 60, June 1970, pp. 3-7).

For the definitive work on these issues, see John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973). See also the brief discussion and charts on public support for the president in a series of international crises in "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, Vol. 3, No. 1A (February/March 1980), pp. 25-29.

***Yokelson, pp. 1-19, and 1-60 to 1-62.

****See John Mueller, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson," in The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 1 (March 1970), p. 23.

Thus, Americans, as is true with most other peoples, traditionally have been "pacifists" in their reluctance to go to war. The U.S. public is deeply concerned about the danger and possibility of war and tends to want to avoid actions that can bring the U.S. closer to becoming involved in a conflict. If the conflict looks as if it might be costly, or if one which is already under way begins to look senseless in terms of its costs and achievements, opposition to it can become strong.

This attitude has had a long tradition in American history, even when the causes for the conflict have been considered laudable.* For example, during the American Civil War, when the North was fighting for the declared purposes of preserving the Union and ending human bondage in the country, in some Northern areas people grew weary of the war as it dragged on with ever-mounting casualties, and withdrew their support. Indeed, by 1863, New York City was so torn by antidraft riots that Federal regiments had to intervene to restore order.

Nor were Americans eager to enter World War I: in 1916 President Wilson was elected largely on the platform that "he kept us out of war." This vote may also have reflected the traditional American desire "to keep out of foreign entanglements," which George Washington warned of at the birth of the nation. Following this war, in which the U.S. fought to "save democracy," American avoidance of foreign entanglements was greatly strengthened when the secret treaties which divided up the German colonies among our European allies were disclosed.

Prior to World War II, until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the unpopularity of going to war against Nazi Germany was reflected in public opinion and the actions of Congress:

In 1940, during the Battle of Britain, Americans were opposed to sending war materials to Britain in U.S. ships for fear of becoming involved in the war with the Nazis (even though 70 percent felt that aiding Britain was the best way to stay out of the war). In June 1941, the draft extension passed the House of Representatives by one vote, even though it had a proviso that no U.S. draftees could be sent overseas. In 1941, although 85 percent of the public wanted to stay out of the war, 62 percent said they would rather enter the war than see Britain lose.**

* See Section V for a lengthier discussion of the isolationist-pacifist trends in the U.S.

** Frank Armbruster, with contributions by Doris Yokelson, The Forgotten Americans. The Values, Beliefs, and Concerns of the Majority (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1972), pp. 102-103.

The Vietnam War appeared extremely unpopular compared to the Korean War; indeed, opposition was so much more vocal during the Vietnam War than the Korean that there is a belief that the Vietnam War was simply quite a different kind of war from any our nation had fought. But survey data shows that, in actuality, support for the Vietnam War was maintained much longer than that for the Korean War; moreover, opposition to it was much slower in starting and took much longer to reach the level of opposition to the Korean War, which approached the peak of intensity only a few months after its onset.*

Initial support for sending in troops in both cases was substantial (about 67% for Korea, 65% for Vietnam). In the Korean War, however, the U.S. government gave the impression that if China were to join the conflict, the war would become a large one, with high casualties. When, in fact, China entered the war, opposition to it jumped from about 20 percent to 50 percent of the population. The opposition remained generally around the 45 percent level until President Eisenhower was elected and vowed to visit Korea; clearly, the public thought he could settle the war. It seems apparent that during both wars, opposition increased when it appeared to the public that the U.S. government had no policy for winning the war, had no idea of how to win it, and did not understand the reasons for, or conditions of, the conflict.

Despite the intense opposition to the Korean War, and the unpopularity of President Truman because of our involvement in it, over the next decade the public supported a series of minor military interventions which other presidents initiated in such diverse places as Lebanon, Cuba (by proxy) and the Dominican Republic; moreover, a decade later, it favored President Johnson's new military move in Vietnam. As the Vietnam War dragged on and casualties rose, a situation was created that might be considered analogous to the one, described above, that existed in New York City during the Civil War, when the city was racked by draft riots.

There is an interesting and unexpected sidelight to public opinion during the Vietnam War: for most of the war the strongest support came from the young (21-29 year olds) and, for the first three years of the war, from the college-educated. Moreover, at no time during the war was the support of the grade-school educated (many of whom were mothers, who did not want their boys to go to war) and those 50 years and over as great as that of the better-educated and those under 50.**

* Ibid., pp. 104-105.

** The determinants of the college-educated support are not clear: since the end of World War II, the better-educated have had a greater inclination toward internationalism and interventionism than those who were not well-educated. But the college-educated are also apt to be more affluent and politically conservative; thus their interventionism has also tended toward opposing the spread of communism.

Since the advent of nuclear weapons, American opposition to military engagement has also concerned itself with the destructive power of the weapons and the threat to the American homeland itself. The intercontinental bomber and missile, linked to nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, has for the first time brought the country itself within striking distance of hostile powers and served to intensify Americans' wish to stay out of wars.

The spiraling defense costs--although apparently thought by the average American necessary to counter the huge Soviet arms build-up that has taken place within the last decade and a half--and the recent recession are added factors to American reluctance to support defense efforts and military engagements. Survey data show that the human costs of the recent recession began to strike home: support for increased defense spending dropped drastically between 1981 and 1982 after having grown steadily since 1974.

The current crises in El Salvador and other countries in Central America present the American people with another potentially difficult decision to make as to whether, and how much, to get involved. There are tensions of not wanting to be drawn into a military engagement (our historical, predominantly isolationist, "pacifism"); desire to protect ourselves and our neighbors from the encroachment of communism, yet uncertainty of our need to be there; reluctance to become mired in what might seem to be another Vietnam. Recent polls show that--consistent with historical American attitudes--the public overwhelmingly opposes expanding our military involvement in El Salvador, including increasing military aid and the number of military advisors; at the same time, almost two-thirds think the area is vital to U.S. security.*

1. The Most Important Problem

One trend has proved itself to be a particularly useful gauge of American anti-war sentiment. For almost 50 years Gallup has asked periodically the question, "What do you think is the most important problem

*The Gallup Poll Release, March 31, 1983 and a New York Times/CBS News Poll of April 1983 reported in The New York Times April 15, 1983, p. 1. The New York Times/CBS News Poll offers another look at public opinion paradoxes: 61 percent of the public believed that El Salvador and other Central American countries were very important to the defense interests of the U.S. (27 percent not very important). Yet, of these 61 percent, only 23 percent thought the U.S. should send economic aid to the Government of El Salvador, 9 percent military equipment, and 15 percent American troops as advisers; almost one-half (46 percent) thought the U.S. should stay out. Of the 27 percent who believed Central America not to be very important, the overwhelming number--78 percent--felt the U.S. should not get involved. The total sample response was 57 percent, stay out; 17 percent, send economic aid; 11 percent, U.S. troops as advisers; and 6 percent, military equipment.

facing this country today?" In nearly 40 years of polling, from 1935 through the Vietnam War (to September 1972), "keeping out of war," "threat of war," "danger of war," and "possibility of war," were rated 48 times as one of the three most important issues of the day and 38 times as the top issue. Not surprisingly, in polls taken in 1935 and 1937, "keeping out of war," and "neutrality" were in the top three, and in two polls in 1939, "keeping out of war" was the number one problem. By 1947 it was again one of the top three. It was number one in 1948, perhaps because of the Berlin Blockade, and again the top problem in October 1949 and May 1950.

After the Korean war began in June 1950, it remained one of the three most important issues (and mostly number one) until the truce in the summer of 1953. "Keeping out of war" was the top concern in April 1954, July 1955, October 1956, September 1957, February 1958, November 1958 (perhaps because of the Taiwan Straits crisis), February 1959, October 1959, March 1961, and March 1964.

The Vietnam War became number one in November 1964 and again in August 1965, and stayed in top place, with the exception of a poll in October 1967, in 13 polls through February 1970. In May 1970, the war ranked second place behind campus unrest; but except for one November 1971 poll, which rated it second behind inflation, it remained the top issue throughout 1971 and 1972.*

In recent times, the concerns of the American public have been overwhelmingly economic; indeed, the 1982 choices of the most important problem suggest the intensity of this preoccupation.

Moreover, the trend in Gallup polls for the last decade shows that, except for a brief period at the end of 1979, economic concerns swamped all other issues (see the following chart). The depth of this concern is further indicated in a Harris poll taken in November 1982 in which a majority (56 percent) believed the U.S. to be in an economic depression and a margin of 51 to 43 percent did not expect "the economy will be expanding at a healthy rate a year from now."** The public's economic worries may presage trouble for efforts to find support in the U.S. to finance defense programs, including, and perhaps especially, the NATO force modernization.*** The Gallup poll trends on the most important problem are shown in the table and chart below.

* Armbruster, p. 102-103; and Doris Yokelson, "Public Attitudes Toward Poverty and the Characteristics of the Poor and Near-Poor," Vol. III of Collected Papers on Poverty Issues, HI-2277-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, June 1975), pp. III-41 to III-43.

** The Harris Survey, November 22, 1982.


*** See Section IV for a broad discussion of these issues.

"WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM
FACING THIS COUNTRY TODAY?"

	<u>GALLUP POLL</u>		
	<u>OCTOBER 1982</u>	<u>AUGUST 1982</u>	<u>JUNE 1982</u>
UNEMPLOYMENT; RECESSION	61%	48%	41%
INFLATION: HIGH COST OF LIVING	18	23	25
ECONOMY (GENERAL)	11	16	11
HIGH INTEREST RATES	4	8	10
FEAR OF WAR	3	6	10
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT SPENDING	4	5	6
REAGAN BUDGET CUTS	3	5	5
MORAL DECLINE IN SOCIETY	3	4	4
INT'L PROBLEMS/FOREIGN RELATIONS	2	3	3
CRIME	3	3	3
ALL OTHERS	6	6	8
DON'T KNOW	2	3	3
TOTALS ⁺	120%	130%	129%

⁺ADD TO MORE THAN 100 PERCENT DUE TO MULTIPLE ANSWERS.

SOURCE: THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 206, NOVEMBER 1982, PP. 22-23.



SOURCE: THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION. LATEST: THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 206, NOVEMBER 1982, P. 22.

B. Today's Defense Milieu

1. Concern Over the Prospect of War

The numbers of those concerned with the likelihood of war rose rapidly at the end of 1979 and continued to remain at higher levels to the present time. Today, however--unlike the reaction during several earlier post-World War II periods--the public does not appear to be preoccupied with war. Indeed, fear of war has a low priority on current lists of important national problems.

The likelihood of war question, asked by different poll organizations, frequently varies in its wording, especially regarding the projected number of years, if the war is nuclear or not, and if it is a "war" or a "world war." Thus, many poll results cannot be compared or used to plot a trend. One short-term trend, however, is revealed in the following table of NBC News/Associated Press polls: it indicates the growth from 1978 to 1980 in the public's perception of the likelihood of war within three years. The question uniformly asked was "How likely is it that the United States will become involved in a war during the next three years? Would you say that it is very likely, somewhat likely, or not likely at all?"

As noted earlier in the German portion of this study,* the trend in fear of war appears to be very sensitive to the occurrence of international crises. It was found, for example, that public apprehension of the danger of war increased significantly at the end of 1979 when the U.S. hostages were seized in Iran, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Polish martial rule was initiated. As can be observed, the American public reacted similarly at that time.

Two Gallup international polls, assessing the chances of a world war within the next ten years, showed that between 1981 and 1982 fear of war was reduced in many European Community countries, but that no change was indicated in the U.S. The difference between the European and American responses could reflect the results of other polls that suggest that West Europeans presently do not feel endangered by the Soviet Union, nor have they been more than weakly reactive to any communist threat beyond the borders of Western Europe itself.** The U.S., on the other hand, responds to security threats in the Pacific, Middle East and Latin America, as well as in Europe. Recent conflicts involving the U.S. in a number of these areas have aggravated American fears.

Like all people, Americans are deeply concerned about nuclear war. When Louis Harris asked in 1982, "How concerned are you about the possibility that the world will be plunged into a nuclear war?", 54 percent

* In Section II.B.2.g.(3).

** See the discussions of West European public opinion and security issues in the country portions of Section II and, in particular, of Eurocentrism--and Germanocentrism--in Section IV.A.

LIKELIHOOD OF U.S. BEING IN A WAR IN THE NEXT THREE YEARS

	<u>VERY LIKELY</u>	<u>SOMEWHAT LIKELY</u>	<u>NOT LIKELY AT ALL</u>
<u>1978</u>			
JANUARY	13%	31%	56%
MARCH	20	33	47
JUNE	18	35	47
SEPTEMBER	12	32	57
NOVEMBER	10	27	63
<u>1979</u>			
NOVEMBER 27-28	33	40	27
DECEMBER 11-12	31	44	25
<u>1980</u>			
JANUARY	40	43	16

SOURCE: "OPINION ROUNDUP," PUBLIC OPINION (FEBRUARY/MARCH 1980), P. 21.
SURVEYS BY NBC NEWS/ASSOCIATED PRESS, LATEST THAT OF JANUARY
17-18, 1980.


CHANCES OF WORLD WAR IN NEXT 10 YEARS: U.S. AND
SELECTED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
(1981 AND 1982)

	<u>U.S.</u>		<u>WEST GERMANY</u>		<u>ITALY</u>		<u>NETHER- LANDS</u>		<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>		<u>DENMARK</u>	
CHANCES OF WORLD WAR IN NEXT 10 YEARS	NOV 82 %	DEC 81 %	NOV 82 %	DEC 81 %	NOV 82 %	DEC 81 %	NOV 82 %	DEC 81 %	NOV 82 %	DEC 81 %	NOV 82 %	DEC 81 %
MORE THAN 50 PERCENT	29	31	16	28	14	18	17	19	16	20	9	23
50-50	20	22	11	13	11	14	17	21	13	16	15	15
LESS THAN 50 PERCENT	42	41	56	49	72	67	60	55	65	59	61	54
NO OPINION	9	6	17	11	3	2	6	6	6	6	15	9

SOURCE: THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 196 (JANUARY 1982), P. 6; AND NO. 208 (JANUARY 1983),
P. 5 (FIELDWORK DONE NOVEMBER 1982).

CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR

"HOW CONCERNED ARE YOU ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE WORLD WILL BE PLUNGED INTO A NUCLEAR WAR--VERY CONCERNED, ONLY SOMEWHAT CONCERNED, OR HARDLY CONCERNED AT ALL?"



SOURCE: THE HARRIS SURVEY, JUNE 17, 1982.

in March and 50 percent in May said they were very concerned. And looking ahead in 1981 to the possibility of a nuclear war in the next 10 years, 19 percent of the public said such a war was very likely, 28 percent said fairly likely, 26 percent said fairly unlikely, and 23 percent said very unlikely.* In the same poll the overwhelming majority felt that "your own chances" of living through an "all-out nuclear war" were not very likely: 60 percent said they were poor; 32 percent, just 50-50; and only 5 percent, very good.**

2. The American Public's View of U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense: Understanding the Balance

When asked about the year's outlook, since the end of the 1970s Americans have entertained little hope for peaceful world conditions. As the figure below indicates, expectations for a troubled year ahead rose sharply over those for peace at the end of the 1970s. From 1980-1982 the respondents were offered a third option, "remain the same," which a plurality picked in November 1982; but very little confidence was shown in any real improvement for 1983.

In addition, public approval for Reagan's handling of foreign policy declined--in most cases, sharply--toward the end of 1981 in polls taken by various public opinion organizations. The rates and periods of the decline differed in Gallup, Louis Harris, NBC News/AP, CBS News/New York Times and ABC News/Washington Post surveys, and there were perturbations in response throughout the year; but all showed a changeover from approval to disapproval by March-April 1982--although the ABC News/Washington Post response reversed itself from disapproval to approval between March and April.*** The trend of Gallup polls from spring 1982 to January 1983, however, showed relatively little slippage and even recorded a spurt of approval in June 1982.**** (The Gallup trend is shown in a table below.)

Gallup's reading (in October 1982) of the drop in support for Reagan's handling of both foreign policy and national defense issues, was El Salvador:

* The Gallup Report, No. 189, June 1981, p. 27.


** Ibid., p. 28. Compare these results with those recorded about two decades ago: February 1963: poor, 52 percent; just 50-50, 37 percent; very good, 5 percent; September 1961: poor, 43 percent; just 50-50, 40 percent; very good, 9 percent.

*** The trends in survey results for each of these organizations are shown in "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April/May 1982), pp. 35-36. (Approval, March-April 1982: Gallup, 36 percent; Harris, 39 percent; NBC/AP, 35 percent; CBS/NT, 37 percent; ABC/Washington Post, 43 percent in March, up to 53 percent in April.) The question was worded differently, but consistently, by each of the organizations.

**** The Gallup Poll Release, February 6, 1983.

PEACE PREDICTIONS FOR 1960-1983--UNITED STATES

"WHICH OF THESE DO YOU THINK IS LIKELY TO BE TRUE IN (YEAR)...: A PEACEFUL YEAR MORE OR LESS FREE OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, OR A TROUBLED YEAR WITH MUCH INTERNATIONAL DISCORD?"¹



¹ 1981-1983: "..., OR REMAIN THE SAME?"

² 1963: "DO YOU THINK THAT 1963 WILL BE A PEACEFUL YEAR OR A TROUBLED YEAR?"

³ 1978: 12 PERCENT SAID "SAME."

SOURCE: THE GALLUP REPORT NO. 208, JANUARY 1983, P. 5.

REAGAN'S HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICY
(GALLUP POLLS--MARCH 1981 TO JANUARY 1983)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NATIONAL</u>
1983: JAN. 14-17	36%
1982: OCTOBER	38%
JUNE	45%
APRIL	36%
FEBRUARY	44%
1981: DECEMBER	49%
OCTOBER	56%
AUGUST	52%
MARCH	53%

In October, 1981, clear majorities backed the President in both areas, but these levels began to erode during late 1981 and the early part of 1982, dropping sharply in the spring as a result of the intense publicity about El Salvador. As soon as El Salvador left the news, Reagan's foreign policy and national security ratings rebounded somewhat, only to drop again during July and August. Many analysts have read the current drop as a consequence of the Mideast War and Reagan's seeming inability to influence and restrain the Israelis in their actions in Lebanon.*

The reasons for the public's responses to the president's handling of foreign policy are practically unlimited, because the interactions of variables are essentially unlimited. The responses are also highly sensitive to international events. Thus, depending on the issue, the timing, the world situation and the way the poll questions are asked, approval and disapproval of foreign policy can be motivated--to give one example--by a desire for the U.S. to get tougher, or its opposite, to reduce tensions. As a result, the public's intentions are sometimes obscured, or seem paradoxical.

For example, two weeks after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, although the public overwhelmingly opposed using military force, two out of three felt the U.S. should get tougher with the Russians.** Moreover, in NBC News/Associated Press surveys taken throughout 1981, the number of respondents who thought Reagan was not tough enough in dealing with the Soviet

*Gallup Worldview, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1982), p. 4.

** Survey by CBS News/The New York Times January 9-13, 1980, reported in "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February/March 1983), p. 22.

Union doubled over the period from February to October: February, 11 percent; April, 14 percent; August, 20 percent; September, 19 percent; and October, 23 percent. The percentage of those who felt Reagan was too tough with the Soviet Union never topped 7 percent in all the polls.* This occurred in a year in which Reagan's overall job approval rating had dropped sharply (to 59 percent) by mid-year.**

Another survey of 12,782 voters, taken as they left the polls on November 4, 1980 (the Iranian hostage crisis was still unresolved), showed 54 percent agreeing with the statement "We should be more forceful in our dealings with the Soviet Union even if it increases the risk of war," 31 percent disagreeing, and 15 percent having no opinion or no answer.***

Recent Gallup surveys about President Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union may serve to illuminate some of the public thinking on these issues. Between October 1981 and August 1982, support for Reagan's handling of relations with the Soviet Union fell 9 percentage points (from 53 to 44 percent; 22 percent in both polls answered "don't know").**** What did the decline in support mean?

Another Gallup survey provides what Gallup has called "an intriguing insight into which way Americans lean when it comes to dealing with Moscow." In a September 1982 telephone survey, 1,000 adults were asked, "Some people say that President Reagan has taken too hard a line in his policies toward the Soviet Union. Others think he has been too soft in his policies. What do you, yourself, think?" While 34 percent responded that Mr. Reagan's policies were "about right," almost as many--31 percent--volunteered the opinion that he is "too soft." This was about twice as many as thought he was taking "too hard" a line (16 percent).***** According to Gallup, this result, rather than being unique, supported the findings of survey after survey of American attitudes toward the Soviet Union:

The very negative feelings that most Americans have toward the Soviet Union, demonstrated in one public opinion survey after another, find renewed expression in these results. Thus, while some critics have faulted Mr. Reagan for being overly aggressive in some of his rhetoric and actions directed at

* Reported in "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, Vol. 4, No. 6 (December/January 1982), p. 26.

** The Gallup Release, June 19, 1981.

*** Survey by CBS News/The New York Times, reported in "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, Vol. 3, No. 6 (December/January 1981), p. 37.

**** As reported in Gallup Worldview, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1982), p. 6.

***** Ibid.

Moscow, such a view does not appear to find acceptance with the American people at large. Even among those who express overall disapproval of Mr. Reagan's handling of his job as president, considerably more say he is "too soft" as opposed to "too hard" in his dealings with Moscow.*

Rather than lessening, the negative feelings toward the Soviet Union appear to be on the rise, even while Americans desire that the production, storage, and use of nuclear weapons be banned. According to The Harris Survey of April 11, 1983, "A record 85 percent majority now feels hostility toward the Soviets up from 60 percent in 1976 with 51 percent saying categorically that that nation is our enemy."**

During the highly tense international environment of 1980, opinion grew significantly in favor of having U.S. military strength surpass that of the Soviet Union. In CBS News polls asking the public if "you think the military strength of the United States should be superior to the Soviet Union, should be about equal in strength, or doesn't the United States need to be exactly as strong as the Soviet Union?" the trend in the responses was as follows:***

MILITARY STRENGTH OF U.S. AND SOVIET UNION

	<u>SHOULD BE SUPERIOR</u>	<u>SHOULD BE AB. EQUAL</u>	<u>NEED NOT BE AS STRONG</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>
JUNE 1979	42%	45%	7%	6%
AUGUST 1980	51	42	2	5
SEPTEMBER 1980	51	41	4	4
OCTOBER 1980 ⁺	58	36	5	-

⁺THE OCTOBER 1980 PERCENTAGES ADD UP TO 99 PERCENT WITHOUT THE "NO OPINION" RESPONSE. THUS, THESE PERCENTAGES INCLUDE "NO OPINION" AND COULD INDICATE NO CHANGE IN THE TREND. POLLS BY CBS NEWS.

At the same time, support for increased defense spending soared to its highest point in the decade.

* Ibid.

** 1976 figure from the Christian Science Monitor, January 17, 1983, p. 2.

*** Connie de Boer, "The Polls: Our Commitment to World War III," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 1981), p. 129.

The recent public perception, as described below under defense spending, has fluctuated between believing the two powers to be equal in nuclear strength and, as in the latest poll, that Russia is nuclearly superior to the U.S. Yet, support for defense spending plummeted during the recession of 1981 and 1982 to the lowest point since the middle of the 1970s.

The above discussion suggests that the public's desire to have a tougher and more forceful foreign policy--even, if necessary, to the risk of war--is strongly correlated with the occurrence of international crises and with bellicose acts or a perceived threat by the Soviet Union. Moreover, this reaction takes place in a subtle balance with a variety of other powerful concerns and convictions and cannot be viewed apart from them. In fact, American public opinion is a changing amalgam of attitudes, some of which appear paradoxical and each of which can shift in a different way as perceptions change. Thus, if one is to gauge American opinion concerning issues of war and peace, a wide range of strongly-held values and beliefs must be taken into account simultaneously. These include 1) the traditional American isolationist "pacifism"; 2) the fear of war, yet willingness to fight; 3) a fundamental desire for nuclear arms control, yet persistent, and even increasing, distrust of Soviet motives; 4) the wish to maintain a "hard" rather than "soft" line toward the Soviet Union, yet hope that U.S.-Soviet relations will improve; and 5) the perception that the Soviets are superior to the U.S. in conventional and nuclear forces, yet support for reduced defense spending. Indeed, the holding of one attitude or conviction does not necessarily mean the relinquishment of another. A policy-maker must be aware of the seeming paradoxes and attempt to probe "the core of public sentiment and the tolerable limits of public policy...."* For if something goes wrong--and this may include even a defeat in battle--the leader is to blame, especially if he is perceived to have caused the problem.

Two examples will illustrate this point: While the Tet offensive by Viet Cong forces in Vietnam in early 1968 was quickly crushed, for various reasons it acquired the appearance of being successful. As a result of the offensive, the American public's disapproval of President Johnson rose 13 percent. In World War II, even though Winston Churchill was esteemed as a wartime leader, the defeat of British forces at Tobruk caused strong British public displeasure with Churchill himself.**

In the Gallup Organization survey conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in November 1982, results showed, as might be anticipated, that

*Michael E. Schiltz, Public Attitudes Toward Social Security 1935-1965, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, Research Report No. 33, p. 181.

**Yokelson, "Public Attitudes Toward War," pp. 1-3 to 1-4.

...the public rating of U.S. handling of most recent foreign-policy crises (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, imposition of martial law in Poland, the situation in El Salvador, Israeli invasion of Lebanon, U.S. hostage crisis in Iran) ranged from fair to poor. Only the Falklands crisis, in which the U.S. played a minimal role, earned a positive rating.*

The Falklands crisis was handled quickly, successfully, honorably, and victoriously, and for what was perceived to be good cause.

Recent polls indicate concern for the fate of arms negotiations and the administration's role in lessening the possibility of war. A skeptical majority has consistently believed that a war would become an all-out nuclear war, yet does not think it very likely that the two super-powers will move toward nuclear disarmament in the near future.**

In March 1983, Louis Harris found the public (by a 64 to 29 percent margin) believing that President Reagan is doing an unsatisfactory job of negotiating an arms agreement with the U.S.S.R. (66-31 percent in January 1983). Almost one-half also worried that he might lead the country into nuclear war (slightly down from the 57 percent in January 1983).*** Moreover, a Gallup poll at the end of 1982 found 70 percent of the population saying they would favor "the U.S. going further than it has so far in trying to develop better relations with the Soviet Union" (21 percent opposed), and 31 percent expected relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to improve because of the change in leadership in Moscow (21 percent expected relations to worsen, and 30 percent to stay the same).**** However, in dealing with the Soviet Union, the public is clearly distrustful of Soviet military aims and does not favor putting the U.S. at a military disadvantage, as discussed in the section on nuclear freeze below.

Given the above responses, one would assume that nuclear war would top the list of national problems; yet it has a comparatively low priority. Clearly, it is not an issue with which the public is preoccupied at the present time. Yet the fear of nuclear, or conventional, war will affect the opposition to defense policies perceived to increase the danger of war.

* Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1983, p. 6.

** Gallup poll, September 22-24, 1981, reported in Opinion Outlook, (October 19, 1981), p. 7, and The Harris Survey, April 22, 1982.

*** Christian Science Monitor, January 17, 1983, p. 2, and The Harris Survey, April 11, 1983.

**** The Gallup Poll Release, December 9, 1982.

3. Defense Spending

In Gallup polls taken over the past year, the plurality of Americans switched from believing the Soviet Union has a nuclear superiority over the United States (in May 1982) to the nuclear strength of both powers is about the same (November 1982) and back again to the Russians are stronger (March 1983). The figure below shows the trendlines during this period. Although the Soviets were seen to have greater nuclear power than the U.S., about one-third of the population consistently maintained the belief that the nuclear strength of both superpowers is about equal.

A series of Roper Organization surveys covering the period from November 1977 to April 1982 revealed a steady increase to the autumn of 1980 in the numbers of those who thought the U.S. was behind Russia in nuclear military capability (28 percent in 1977 up to a plurality of 43 percent in September-October 1980); from autumn 1980 to April 1982, however, the percentage remained even (at a plurality of slightly over 40 percent).*

In terms of military power, in March 1982 twice as many respondents believed the Soviet Union to be stronger than the U.S. Gallup poll results showed 43 percent naming the Soviet Union (up from 32 percent in 1979), 22 percent the U.S. (1979--33 percent) and 28 percent about equal (1979--26 percent).

But despite these perceived inequalities of military and nuclear strength, the American public, in this time of recession, social program cutbacks, and huge government deficit spending, is clearly looking for reductions in the defense budget. As the figure below indicates, support for increased defense spending, after rising continually from the middle 1970s, crashed from 51 percent to 16 percent between 1981 and 1982.

It is worth noting that in November 1982, those who felt we were spending too much and about the right amount on defense also included majorities of groups that are considered politically and economically conservative: Republicans, earners in the over \$25,000 income bracket, professionals and businessmen, and those over 50 years of age. The table below gives the breakdown by responses of selected groups.

As might be anticipated, there is a significant correlation between the responses to the questions on defense spending and nuclear strength. According to Gallup poll cross-tabulations


...the public's perceptions of whether the U.S. or the Soviet Union has a nuclear advantage are closely linked to their attitudes about U.S. defense spending. Among the 41 percent plurality who feel we are spending too much on defense, the weight of opinion is that the U.S. and the USSR are about equal in nuclear strength. On the other hand, among the 16 percent

*"Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, Vol. 5, No. 4 (August/September 1982), p. 37.

NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OF U.S. AND U.S.S.R.


"AT THE PRESENT TIME, WHICH NATION DO YOU FEEL IS STRONGER IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION--OR DO YOU THINK THEY ARE ABOUT EQUAL IN NUCLEAR STRENGTH?"

TOTAL POPULATION 1982-1983
GALLUP POLL



SOURCE: THE GALLUP POLL RELEASE, NOVEMBER 28, 1982 and April 21, 1983.

DEFENSE SPENDING
TOTAL U.S. POPULATION 1969-1982



SOURCE: THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 208, JANUARY 1983, P. 12.

DEFENSE SPENDING BY SELECTED GROUPS, NOVEMBER 1982

QUESTION: "THERE IS MUCH DISCUSSION AS TO THE AMOUNT OF MONEY THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SPEND FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY PURPOSES. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS? DO YOU THINK WE ARE SPENDING TOO LITTLE, TOO MUCH, OR ABOUT THE RIGHT AMOUNT?"

	<u>TOO LITTLE</u>	<u>TOO MUCH</u>	<u>ABOUT RIGHT</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>
NATIONAL	16%	41%	31%	12%
RACE				
WHITE	17	40	32	11
NON-WHITE	15	44	27	14
EDUCATION				
COLLEGE	15	50	29	6
HIGH SCHOOL	18	38	32	12
GRADE SCHOOL	16	30	32	22
REGION				
EAST	12	48	31	9
MIDWEST	16	43	30	11
SOUTH	18	31	36	15
WEST	20	41	26	13
AGE				
TOTAL UNDER 30	16	48	27	9
18-24 YEARS	15	49	25	11
25-29 YEARS	19	45	29	7
30-49 YEARS	16	41	32	11
TOTAL 50 & OLDER	17	35	34	14
50-64 YEARS	16	39	32	13
65 & OLDER	17	30	37	16
INCOME				
\$25,000 & OVER	17	44	32	7
\$20,000 - \$24,999	21	40	33	6
\$15,000 - \$19,999	18	40	33	9
\$10,000 - \$14,999	18	38	33	11
\$ 5,000 - \$ 9,999	14	35	31	20
UNDER \$5,000	9	49	20	22
POLITICS				
REPUBLICAN	20	29	41	10
DEMOCRAT	14	46	28	12
INDEPENDENT	19	43	27	11
OCCUPATION				
PROFESSIONAL & BUS.	16	47	30	7
CLERICAL & SALES	10	45	33	12
MANUAL WORKERS	18	38	31	13
NON-LABOR FORCE	15	35	34	16
CITY SIZE				
1,000,000 & OVER	14	45	29	12
500,000 - 999,999	18	48	29	5
50,000 - 499,999	17	40	30	13
2,500 - 49,999	17	40	35	8
UNDER 2,500, RURAL	18	35	32	15

SOURCE: THE GALLUP REPORT, NO. 208, JANUARY 1983, P. 12.

who think we are not budgeting enough for military purposes, the Soviet Union, by a 5-to-2 margin, is considered to have a nuclear edge over the U.S.

There is a strong political coloration to public opinion on both nuclear superiority and the adequacy of U.S. defense expenditures. Equal proportions of Democrats for example, believe the United States (25 percent) and the Soviet Union (24 percent) are stronger in nuclear arms while 35 percent think there is nuclear parity between the two nations. Republicans, on the other hand, are about twice as likely to say the Soviet Union is stronger (36 percent) as say the U.S. excels in this area (19 percent). Independents are much more apt to hew to the Republicans' line of thinking than to the Democrats'. Similarly, a preponderance of Democrats feels the U.S. is spending too much for defense while Republicans lean to the view that our spending is about right.*

4. The Nuclear Freeze Issue

The American public is overwhelmingly in favor of a nuclear freeze--but there are essential qualifications. As can be seen by the above discussion, American opinion toward a nuclear freeze is hardly working in a vacuum; it interacts with numerous other attitudes, some of which have been discussed above, that provide a framework in which the freeze response can be better understood.

In general, the American public has high ideals, which, except for an end to high unemployment and a decline in prejudice, it does not see being fulfilled in its lifetime. In a Louis Harris survey taken in November 1982, over 9 out of 10 Americans had hopes for an end to high unemployment, an easing of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, a decline in terrorism and violence, a decline in racial and religious prejudice, and an end to the production, storage, and testing of all nuclear weapons by all countries on earth. Although majorities thought high unemployment would be ended and racial and religious prejudice could be diminished in their lifetime, the three other future hopes were not considered possible of achievement. The survey responses are shown in the following table.

An informative article on the freeze framework by the social analyst Everett Carl Ladd supported the conclusion of this report that since World War II there has been a clear-cut continuity of American attitudes toward war and nuclear weapons. In an introduction to his article, Ladd stated that his results were based on the examination of "hundreds of

* The Gallup Report, No. 208, January 1983, p. 10. As the above November 1982 poll shows, however, the thinking of the Independents did not follow the Republican line in defense spending.

HOPES FOR THE FUTURE^{*}
NOVEMBER 1982

"LET ME READ YOU SOME THINGS SOME PEOPLE HAVE SAID THEY WOULD LIKE
TO SEE HAPPEN. SHOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE (READ EACH ITEM) OR NOT?"

FUTURE HOPES

	<u>LIKE TO SEE</u>	<u>NOT LIKE TO SEE</u>	<u>NOT SURE</u>
AN END TO HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT	98%	1%	1%
A REAL EASING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION	97	2	1
A DECLINE IN TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE	96	3	1
A DECLINE IN RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS PREJUDICE	96	3	1
AN END TO THE PRODUCTION, STORAGE, AND TESTING OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ALL COUNTRIES	90	8	2

"DO YOU THINK THAT WILL HAPPEN IN YOUR LIFETIME, OR NOT?"

FUTURE HOPES HAPPEN IN YOUR LIFETIME?

	<u>WILL HAPPEN</u>	<u>WILL NOT HAPPEN</u>	<u>NOT SURE</u>
AN END TO HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT	73%	21%	6%
A DECLINE IN RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS PREJUDICE	52	44	4
A REAL EASING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION	38	55	7
A DECLINE IN TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE	26	70	4
AN END TO THE PRODUCTION, STORAGE, AND TESTING OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ALL COUNTRIES	15	81	4

^{*} A LOUIS HARRIS SURVEY OF A CROSS-SECTION OF 1,256 ADULTS NATIONWIDE
TAKEN BY TELEPHONE AT THE END OF NOVEMBER 1982. REPORTED IN THE HARRIS
SURVEY, DECEMBER 23, 1982.

questions on nuclear weapons reaching back to the beginning of the 'atomic era' in 1945." Ladd concluded:

The most striking finding that emerges from this extensive review is that American opinion on nuclear weapons and war has changed scarcely at all over nearly four decades. The nuclear freeze campaign of 1982 has not been prompted by some recent change in the public's thinking or concerns. [Emphasis in original.]

Americans are concerned about atomic weapons, and they would like to see steps taken to curtail nuclear proliferation. But this commitment isn't new. From the onset of the nuclear age, the public has had grave doubts about the very essence of...[this] development....*

Ladd then argued that although Americans in 1945 and in recent times believed that the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a correct one, they have always had strong doubts about nuclear weapons based "on ample appreciation of the bomb's awful destructiveness." Yet doubts about the intent of the Soviet Union have been equally as strong:

From this fear of the bomb there has sprung widespread support for efforts to minimize its destructive potential. Thus, the plurality of the public in 1950 favored efforts to reach an agreement with Russia to control the atom bomb "before we try to make a hydrogen bomb" and in 1958, the plurality endorsed a U.S.-Soviet treaty banning nuclear weapons testing. This same impulse led 77 percent to tell CBS News/New York Times interviewers in May 1982 that they favored "the United States agreeing to a 'nuclear freeze' with the Soviet Union."

These enduring views are central parts of American opinion on nuclear weapons, and yet they are only half the story. For, as appalled as the public is about nuclear weaponry, it sees no realistic alternative to a heavy reliance on such weapons in the country's defense. The main reason for this is that the public considers the Soviet Union an untrustworthy adversary that would use its own nuclear superiority--or any other military advantage--against vital U.S. interests.

At no time since World War II have Americans shown any confidence that the Soviet Union could be trusted to uphold the spirit and letter of a nuclear arms limitation agreement.... There is overwhelming doubt about Soviet follow-through, except under carefully monitored conditions.

*"The Freeze Framework," Public Opinion, Vol. 5, No. 4 (August/September 1982), p. 20.

Beyond this, the public continues to believe that a strong nuclear arsenal is needed to block Soviet aggression. Throughout post-World War II, Americans have opposed having the United States promise that it would use nuclear weapons only if the Soviet Union used them first. In the event nuclear war did result, Americans by large majorities have asserted consistently--as they did last March in a Los Angeles Times poll--that they would be "willing to risk the destruction of the United States rather than be dominated by the Russians."*

A recent survey by the University of Massachusetts revealed an almost Masada-like public determination to die rather than accept communist domination. Of the 792 people questioned, 49 percent favored nuclear war over communist rule; even more startling, 33 percent said "they preferred 'all-out nuclear war' to living under communist rule even if it meant the death of everyone in the United States, the enemy's country and the population of some other countries."**

Thus, Americans have strongly expressed their dislike of atomic weapons and their wish to curtail nuclear weapons deployment and development, but they have never lost the conviction that it is necessary to maintain a strong military capability against the Soviet Union, or discarded their fundamental distrust of Soviet motives.

This was again the public reaction in two surveys, taken a year apart by the New York Times/CBS News Poll Organization. In the May 1982 poll, 72 percent favored the nuclear freeze idea; but, in a reversal of opinion, a 60 to 30 percent margin would oppose it if it would give the Soviet Union "somewhat greater nuclear strength" than the U.S., 67 to 26 percent would oppose an agreement whereby the U.S. froze its weapons first, and 71 to 18 percent would not want a freeze if either side could cheat. Conversely, support for a nuclear freeze increased to 87 percent if the freeze "would result in the United States and the Soviet Union having about an equal amount of nuclear strength," and to 83 percent if either country could be caught if it were cheating.*** Bar charts showing the results of this poll follow.

An April 1983 poll showed essentially the same general attitudes toward the nuclear freeze. The New York Times reported the following:

By about 3 to 1, those interviewed saw the Soviet Union as a growing threat as well as an immediate danger. But by an

* Ibid., p. 41.

** Taken by pollster Padraig O'Malley; reported in Soviet Aerospace, April 11, 1983, p. 105.


*** New York Times/CBS News Poll in The New York Times, May 30, 1982, pp. A-1 and A-22.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD A NUCLEAR FREEZE

All poll respondents were asked the first question shown below. Those who said they opposed a freeze were then asked the two following questions. Their answers were incorporated into the responses to the first question, increasing the percentage favoring a freeze. Those who said in answer to the first question that they favored a freeze were then asked the last three questions. Their answers were incorporated into the responses to the first question, decreasing the percentage favoring a freeze. Those with no opinion in answer to the first question were asked all questions.


TOTAL POPULATION

"Do you favor or oppose the United States agreeing to a 'nuclear freeze' with the Soviet Union--that is, putting a stop to the testing, production and installation of additional nuclear weapons by both sides?"




TOTAL PERCENTAGE FAVORING A FREEZE IF...

"What if a nuclear freeze would result in the United States and the Soviet Union having about an equal amount of nuclear strength...?"



"What if both the United States and the Soviet Union could catch the other country if it were cheating...?"



TOTAL PERCENTAGE OPPOSING A FREEZE IF...

"What if a nuclear freeze would result in the Soviet Union having somewhat greater nuclear strength...?"



"What if...the United States would have to freeze its weapons first...?"



"What if either the United States or the Soviet Union could cheat...without being detected...?"



NEW YORK TIMES/CBS NEWS POLL OF 1,470 ADULTS CONDUCTED MAY 19-23, 1982.
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 30, 1982, P. A-22.

even bigger margin, 2 to 1, the respondents felt that the American arms buildup would result only in a further buildup of Soviet arms and not in serious negotiations.

The public's approach to preventing nuclear war and reducing nuclear arms--by a margin of 64 to 25, according to the poll--was to seek a mutual freeze on nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union rather than a military buildup by the United States.*

Two Gallup poll reports, from the spring and winter of 1982, underscored the paradoxes of public attitudes toward the nuclear freeze. The April 27, 1982 Gallup Poll Watch concluded that the public was overwhelmingly positive to the idea of a nuclear freeze and held many opinions sympathetic to those of the peace movement: the disbelief that a nuclear war with the Soviet Union could ever remain limited; opposition to "using tactical nuclear weapons to prevent the fall of Western Europe to conventional Soviet forces"; and the belief that the U.S. has enough weapons to destroy its enemies (although the sense was that the U.S. is either behind, or equal to, the Soviets in nuclear capability). Along with this set of attitudes, however, were those of mistrust of the Soviet Union:

...the polls have also shown significant public reservations about a freeze if it means the Russians will maintain a nuclear advantage or that the U.S. must take the first step toward disarmament without the Soviet Union's compliance.

The key to public resistance to a nuclear freeze is attitudes towards the Soviet Union. Polls show that the public does not trust the Soviets to keep their side of the bargain, and any freeze question which suggests that somehow the U.S. must rely on the Soviets or that a freeze will give the Soviets an advantage is voted down.

A March Newsweek poll showed 60 percent of respondents favoring the freeze position when it was described as the belief that the U.S. and Soviet Union have enough weapons to destroy each other, and as such there should be a ban on all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. But majority support gave way to majority opposition when 61 percent said they opposed a freeze if it means the Soviet Union would maintain a nuclear advantage in some areas.**

The December 5, 1982 Gallup Poll Release revealed an even more complex interaction of nuclear freeze opinions. Although overwhelming numbers (71 percent) favored "an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for an immediate, verifiable freeze on the testing, production and

* Leslie H. Gelb, "Poll Finds Doubt on U.S. Strategy on the Russians," The New York Times, April 15, 1983, p. 1. The poll of 1489 adults was taken from April 7 to 11, 1983.

** The Gallup Poll Watch, April 27, 1982.

deployment of nuclear weapons," only 39 percent thought it would be possible to set up a system to check whether the Soviets were keeping to the agreement. Moreover, of the 47 percent who believed it would not be possible to check on Soviet actions, 2 to 1 (65 to 30 percent) still favored a bilateral nuclear freeze. Those who thought it was possible to verify the agreement overwhelmingly favored a freeze (85 percent to 11 percent). In a March 1983 Gallup poll, once again, 7 out of 10 Americans supported a verifiable bilateral freeze agreement.*

Moreover, when the public was asked its view of a U.S. unilateral freeze in a referendum question by the Gallup organization in October 1982, the majority (about 55 percent) was opposed, but a large number supported it (about 43 percent).** Bar charts giving the responses to three of these Gallup Poll questions are shown below.

In the December 1982 Gallup Poll, somewhat less support for a verifiable freeze was given by the South, Republicans, and those 50 and older--although even these more "conservative" groups strongly favored the freeze. The table below gives the breakdown of opinion by selected population groups and includes the cross tabulations of the responses to the questions on verification and comparative nuclear strength with that of the nuclear freeze question. The percentages of the original responses to the cross-tabulated questions are given in parentheses.

The latest survey of Americans' views on a nuclear freeze was taken in March 1983 by Louis Harris.*** Overwhelming majorities supported many of the major points made by disarmament groups, but an equally overwhelming majority would not compromise on the issue of unilateral disarmament:

- By a 63-34 percent majority, the public believed it is very likely or somewhat likely "that a third world war using nuclear weapons will break out in the next 20 years."
- An 81-10 percent majority said it was not possible "for one side to win a limited nuclear war," and a "limited nuclear war would inevitably become an all-out nuclear war" (little change from the 86-89 percent margin in December 1981).
- 79-16 percent favored Congress passing a resolution that "would call upon the United States and Congress to negotiate a nuclear freeze agreement with the Soviet Union under which both sides would ban the future production, storage and use of their nuclear weapons" (similar to the 76-21 percent registered in January 1983).

* The Gallup Poll Release, April 21, 1983.

** The Gallup Poll Watch, October 31, 1982.

*** The Harris Survey, April 11, 1983.


U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR FREEZE AGREEMENT

"WOULD YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR AN IMMEDIATE, VERIFIABLE FREEZE ON THE TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?"

GALLUP POLLS

NOVEMBER 1982


MARCH 1983



SOURCE: THE GALLUP POLL RELEASE, APRIL 21, 1983.

VERIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR FREEZE AGREEMENT

"DO YOU THINK IT WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SET UP A SYSTEM FOR VERIFYING OR CHECKING WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION IS LIVING UP TO THE TERMS OF A NUCLEAR FREEZE AGREEMENT?"




SOURCE: THE GALLUP POLL RELEASE, DECEMBER 5, 1982.

UNILATERAL FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION

SUPPOSE THAT ON ELECTION DAY, NOVEMBER 2, [1982] YOU COULD VOTE ON KEY ISSUES AS WELL AS CANDIDATES. PLEASE TELL ME HOW YOU WOULD VOTE ON THESE PROPOSITIONS: ...PROPOSITION 4: NUCLEAR FREEZE. A FREEZE ON THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIET UNION AGREES TO DO THE SAME."

(NOTE: QUESTION REFERS TO A UNILATERAL FREEZE; OTHER GALLUP SURVEYS HAVE SHOWN MAJORITY OPINION IN FAVOR OF A BILATERAL FREEZE.)

SEPTEMBER 1982
GALLUP POLL



SOURCE: THE GALLUP POLL WATCH, OCTOBER 31, 1982.

NUCLEAR FREEZE AGREEMENT BY SELECTED POPULATION GROUPS
DECEMBER 1982

"WOULD YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR AN IMMEDIATE, VERIFIABLE FREEZE ON THE TESTING, PRODUCTION, AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?"

	<u>FAVOR</u>	<u>OPPOSE</u>	<u>NO</u> <u>OPINION</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
NATIONAL	71	20	9
EAST	75	18	7
MIDWEST	75	16	9
SOUTH	65	23	12
WEST	70	20	10
REPUBLICANS	67	28	5
DEMOCRATS	73	17	10
INDEPENDENTS	74	17	9
PROTESTANTS	71	19	10
CATHOLICS	72	20	8
18-29 YEAR OLDS	75	17	8
30-44 YEAR OLDS	73	19	8
50 AND OLDER	67	22	11
NOT POSSIBLE TO VERIFY (47%)	65	30	5
POSSIBLE TO VERIFY (39%)	85	11	4
U.S. STRONGER IN NUCLEAR ARMS (22%)	68	24	8
SOVIET UNION STRONGER (30%)	68	29	3
ABOUT EQUAL (33%)	81	13	6

SOURCE: THE GALLUP POLL RELEASE, DECEMBER 5, 1982.

- By 69-25 percent, the public supported the idea of "every country that has nuclear weapons banning the production, storage, and use of those nuclear weapons" (70-25 percent May 1982; 73-23 percent March 1982).
- An 80-17 percent majority favored "all countries that have nuclear weapons agreeing to destroy them" (up from 74-22 percent in May 1982 and 61-37 percent in March 1982).
- By 78-19 percent, Americans opposed "the United States deciding to gradually dismantle our nuclear weapons before getting agreement from other countries to do the same" (compared with 82-15 percent in March 1982).

According to Harris, all key population groups now support a nuclear freeze agreement "including a 78-19 percent majority of those who voted for Reagan in 1980 and a 72-23 majority of Republicans."*

5. Potential American Resistance to Aid for NATO

Since World War II, Americans have strongly favored giving military support to our European allies. This is in contrast to the traditionally strong reluctance to get involved militarily in most other places in the world (exceptions are always, of course, Canada and Mexico). As of spring 1980, about 3 out of 4 Americans favored the U.S. military defense of its major European allies if any one of them were attacked by the Soviet Union. The trend of this opinion over the past decade is traced in the chart below.


Americans apparently consider support for our allies in Europe to be essential to the security of Europe and the U.S. Our support could possibly waver, however, were certain unfavorable factors present at the same time. The combined effect of the recession, the federal budget deficit, the cutback in domestic programs, the traditional American reluctance to go to war and the present fear of all-out nuclear war could become one of the most important hurdles NATO might have to face in modernizing its missile force in Europe. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that a loose, ad-hoc coalition of some unusual bedfellows might form in the U.S. in opposition to the program: the members and sympathizers of the peace movement joining forces with conservatives who would like to see reductions in the budget.

Of course, U.S. public opinion is normally not as focused as European public opinion is on European defense issues. And clearly, Americans have had less influence on U.S. government decisions regarding European defense than Europeans have had on their governments' defense planning. This lack of awareness in the U.S. could change, however, if an open

* Ibid.

U.S. MILITARY DEFENSE OF EUROPEAN ALLIES

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD COME TO THE DEFENSE OF ITS MAJOR
EUROPEAN ALLIES WITH MILITARY FORCE IF ANY OF THEM ARE
ATTACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION



SOURCE: SURVEY CONDUCTED BY LLOYD A. FREE AND WILLIAM
WATTS FOR CIVIC SERVICE, INC., ST. LOUIS;
QUOTED IN PUBLIC OPINION, VOL. 3, NO. 2
(APRIL/MAY 1980), P. 48.

debate were to occur in the media or in Congress over the force modernization plans or other NATO issues. Americans may well have difficulty understanding why the U.S. government spends so much on the defense of Europe while the U.S. struggles to overcome a huge budget deficit and pay for essential domestic programs--and this becomes especially provoking when one realizes that the U.S. defense budget is a considerably larger percentage of its gross national product than that of any of its NATO allies.

A Harris survey, conducted for the International Herald Tribune and the Atlantic Institute in 1982, showed 68 percent of the U.S. public agreeing that Western Europe was not doing enough in "shouldering its fair share of the burden of Western security," and another 66 percent agreeing that the U.S. was doing too much.* Should this perception become sharpened, the desire to alleviate the economic squeeze in the U.S. might prompt Americans to call for the reduction of expenditures earmarked for the defense of Europe.

* International Herald Tribune, October 25, 1982.

IV. THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF WEST GERMAN AND OTHER EUROPEAN OPINION ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

West European opinion toward NATO, the Warsaw-Pact threat to Western Europe, European defense expenditures and the way they might affect the European NATO powers' defense and force modernization programs are often considered by policy planners. What is less often taken into account, but ultimately may be of great importance to European defense efforts, are certain political and public opinion aspects of the West European milieu which might be hard for the average American to understand, and which might affect his attitude regarding the extent of American support for European defense. There are indeed varying points of view even among well-informed Americans, not only concerning which West European foreign and defense policies best suit U.S. national interests, but also regarding the motivations and attitudes which underlie these policies. To be sure, the average American is unlikely to be aware of the details of American defense involvement in Europe and certainly will be less informed on European defense programs than the average European; but should something cause the media to focus on these policy issues, American public opinion could become crucial to their implementation. For example, if these issues were debated in the U.S. Congress and the details were to find their way into the American news media, the effect might be that both the legislators and average citizens might question the huge budget allocations for American defense efforts in Europe. Indeed, in this event, one could imagine some strange alliances on Capitol Hill: conservatives worried about deficit spending and liberals opposing bigger defense budgets.

There are several trends in both European foreign and defense policies that might give rise to concern in the U.S. about whether America's "best interests" are being served in Western Europe. There may also be concern about why West Europeans "act that way." The following section discusses these trends, some current policy issues which interact with the trends and the possible reactions of an average American who apparently sees the U.S. as the "good ally," ready to help Europe defend itself.

A. West German Government Policy and Public Opinion

With the demise of the Adenauer administration in West Germany, a drastic change of attitude occurred in the German government. Adenauer's policy had been to refuse to negotiate with the Soviets until Germany's rights, including reunification, had been considered. The firm Adenauer policy--of simply not negotiating under conditions which gave the Communist bloc advantages over the West Germans--ended in the 1960s. It was replaced with a Social Democratic Party-sponsored program known as the Ostpolitik. The Ostpolitik was quite different from the Adenauer policy in that its premise was that negotiating with the East--termed launching "initiatives" toward the East--was beneficial to the West. This process had a genuinely idealistic component: it was to lead to a normalization of relations between East and West, a lessening of tensions and the loosening

of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe.* Further, it was assumed that by increasing trade and improving relations with the Soviet bloc, the Russians would become more friendly and their political and ideological beliefs would evolve into something closer to those of the West. By 1980, the Ostpolitik was still favored by the majority of West Germans, but the goals of reunification of Germany and the reduction of the cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc were long relinquished.

What Europe would have been like today without the Ostpolitik is, of course, impossible to say. Many in Germany, and elsewhere in the West, apparently believe the Ostpolitik is the cornerstone of German policy and feel it preserves peace. They may also feel that the detente atmosphere it provides allows the NATO alliance to keep together, because the armed forces can be kept within limits the NATO economies can support. In addition, they may believe that the fear of disrupting detente helps to restrain the Soviets from greater efforts in pressing for "hegemony" in Europe and elsewhere. They may thus see a laudable effect on worldwide dealings with Soviet communism and even on conditions in Eastern Europe, and/or they may not be overly concerned about such issues. As we shall see, since a majority of Germans feels that the Soviet Union "misuses" the Ostpolitik "in order to expand its own power," the desire to continue the policy apparently does not stem from ignorance of political reality. The Germans may simply feel it is the best deal that can be made--the lesser of several evils--and that without it things would be even worse and the Soviet Union more threatening. And many in Western Europe and the U.S. would agree with them.

Although the American taxpayer, at least with the benefit of hindsight, might have some trouble following the basic reasoning that underpinned the Ostpolitik, he might more easily understand the underlying unspoken fear of many Europeans: there seemed to be no answer to the threat of nuclear war in Europe, and such a war would mean the destruction of Europe. Even conventional war would be devastating, and Many Europeans felt that any conventional war in Europe would go nuclear. The only road left open therefore was "negotiation." Even if the Ostpolitik had its costs, it would cost less than a war.

Of course, twenty years of a previously quite different policy had not led to war. Moreover, an informed average American might also point out that negotiations are not an absolute safeguard against war. The U.S. was "negotiating" with Japan even as bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor, and Russian-German trade was flourishing in June 1941 just before the German attack.

A skeptical U.S. citizen might suspect that the Ostpolitik had developed its appeal for other reasons as well: through it West Germany could increase its trade with the East, bringing about improvements in the German economy, upping industrial profits, reducing unemployment, and producing jobs and higher wages.

*Timothy Garton Ash, "Why Germans Don't Love Us," Harper's (March 1983), p. 21. Mr. Ash is Central European correspondent of the Spectator.

The French and some British are now worried, however, about Germany's weakening will to resist the Soviets and the danger from policies of the left wing of the SPD and naive leftist pacifists.* Perhaps it is even becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the troubling, and still largely rejected, possibility that some Americans feared in the mid-1960s; that is, that the Ostpolitik, instigated by the SPD--and specifically by Willy Brandt (with the encouragement of the U.S. government)--would tend to weaken the Western alliance's resolve to oppose Soviet expansionism and ideology to a greater extent than it would bring the East closer to the philosophy and thinking of the West.** Had the average American taxpayer known the details of the policy they might have worried him.

Repression in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the takeover of Afghanistan in 1980--to say nothing of events in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cuba and Central America--seem not to have discredited the detente and Ostpolitik. Nor apparently has the suppression in Poland in 1982--though it jolted the Germans--failed to discredit them. A Brezhnev Doctrine-Europe is a reality:

A very senior West German official claims that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan does not disprove the central thesis underlying Ostpolitik--that international tensions and the risks of nuclear war are reduced by closer economic, cultural and political ties between East and West.

And what would disprove that thesis?

Soviet aggression in Europe. Here is the deep difference in world views lying behind the policy disagreements between Germany and America. It will take a lot to shake West Germany from this Eurocentric--specifically, Germanocentric--position. Even with Kohl's conservative government now in Bonn, the Reagan administration will have to contend with major policy differences.***

A not irrational American observer might find many events in the last two decades that could support this Eurocentrism--and Germanocentrism--which may even include an inability to recognize threats outside Europe to democracy from the left. For example, Willy Brandt, the architect of the Ostpolitik, has now openly opposed U.S. policies in Central America. Through the Fourth Socialist International, he has urged indigenous Social Democrats to join the Soviet/Cuban communist-supported Sandinistas in Nicaragua and communist-supported guerrillas in El Salvador.

* See Section VI.A.2.

** See Section VI.A.2 for a broader discussion of these issues.

*** Ash, "Why the Germans Don't Love Us," p. 20.

Furthermore, he has spoken out strongly against American attempts to aid centrist governments and other groups in those areas which oppose communists. When a legitimate Social Democratic leader from Nicaragua traveled to Germany in 1982 to disclose what really was happening in Nicaragua, neither Willy Brandt nor any of the other SPD leaders would receive him. Other European NATO countries show, and have shown, similar tendencies; for example, French Socialists support the same leftist movements in Central America. And when the U.S. was trying to help South Vietnam from being taken over by the communist North, some of the European allies were quite outspoken in their opposition to U.S. efforts. In fact, French and British ships delivered goods to the port of Hanoi. These attitudes are, of course, by no means held by all Germans or all citizens of the other NATO powers.

As mentioned earlier, however, news media coverage could focus American attention on opposition groups. This could not only antagonize Americans, but U.S. "isolationism," advocated by our European allies in Southeast Asia and now in Central America, might be applied by the average American to Europe as well. Indeed, after our European allies lobbied heavily to get the U.S. to pull out of Southeast Asia, they were disturbed when the Mansfield amendment came up; they realized that a U.S. withdrawal could also mean withdrawal from Europe, and concerned European statesmen began to quiz Americans on this possibility.

Yet, although the ideological confrontation between communists and noncommunists is seldom mentioned in Germany, the average German does have a persistent fear of the East and the Soviets, or at least a fear "of being threatened by the East." This fear seems to fluctuate with the occurrence and degree of Soviet bellicosity. Furthermore, as mentioned above, as recently as the fall of 1981, a majority of West Germans (58 percent) believed Moscow misuses the West German wish to reach an understanding with the East in order to expand its own power, while 40 percent believed Moscow was sincere about detente.* In 1980, 55 percent of West Germans felt the Soviet Union profited most from improved German-Soviet relations, but 74 percent felt Germany should "continue the policy of detente in the future."**

B. Some Apparent West German and West European Attitudes on Defense Policy


The average American may feel that, in addition to affecting foreign policy, some European attitudes that are difficult for him to comprehend may have drifted over into thinking about defense. For example, as the following charts show, although the plurality of Germans prefer Soviet

* EMNID Institut poll in Focus On: The Mood of a Nation, German Information Center, N.Y., No. 2 (April 1982), p. 4.

** Allensbach Institut survey reported in The Allensbach Report, 1980/E4.

THREAT FROM THE EAST, 1976-1981
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 16 YEARS & OVER

QUESTION: "DO YOU WORRY ABOUT OUR BEING THREATENED
BY THE EAST, OR NOT?"



SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN
PUBLIC OPINION, REPORT BY THE INSTITUT FUER
DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 25.

domination to opposing a Soviet invasion by all means "even if it leads to nuclear war," a majority also have a "great deal" or "fair amount" of confidence that the U.S. would aid West Germany militarily in case of a Soviet attack, even "if this risked a direct attack against the United States itself."

The belief today of many Germans and Western analysts that the Soviets are uninterested in and/or unlikely to attempt the military conquest of West Germany, may make the Germans' attitude toward defense policy more comprehensible. They may simply feel that the whole discussion of a Soviet military invasion of West Germany is a hypothetical one.

This attitude may be reinforced by the idea that conquering Western Europe by conventional means would be a nasty job for the Russians; and indeed, the polls seem to indicate that in a conventional war the Germans and other Europeans would be willing to fight for their countries to prevent Soviet domination. (They might also understand that a united Communist Germany is not a happy prospect for the Soviets, especially after the Russians have had the experience of a united Communist China on their eastern frontier.) Notice the absence of the words "nuclear war" in the question asked in February 1982, which seems to make all the difference in West European willingness to fight in defense of the country rather than accept Russian domination.

On the other hand, in response to a question asked in 1981, "Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?" only 35% of the West Germans said yes. (71% of the Americans, 62% of the British, 42% of the French, 28% of the Italians, and 22% of the Japanese answered yes.)* The difference in the responses to this question compared to the last might stem from the "...would you be willing to fight..." personal approach to the issue. This may have confused the question for some Europeans: that is, women or old men might not have answered yes because they were not potential soldiers; although this seems not to have affected the American and British responses.


The poll data seem to indicate that the West Europeans, including the West Germans, will probably be ready to capitulate at the first indication of the imminence of a nuclear war in Europe, which many might consider only sensible to do. Opting for neutralism long beforehand, however, is another matter. The Soviet dominance of a neutralized, nonnuclear Western Europe might swiftly take place at great cost to Western Europe, and pragmatic Americans might also see a plethora of problems for West Europeans.**

* International Survey of Values, Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, May 1982.

** Finland's experiences with the Soviet Union since World War II have at times been very unhappy ones.

NUCLEAR WAR OR DOMINATION, 1955-1981
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 16 YEARS & OVER

QUESTION: "NO ONE CAN PREDICT THE FUTURE, BUT WHAT WOULD YOUR OPINION BE IF ONE DAY WE HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN LETTING EUROPE BECOME SOVIET OR USING ALL MEANS TO DEFEND IT. WHAT IS REALLY MORE IMPORTANT, TO DEFEND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM EVEN IF IT LEADS TO NUCLEAR WAR, OR TO AVOID WAR AT ALL COSTS, EVEN IF IT MEANS LIVING UNDER COMMUNIST RULE?"




SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 7, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, NEW YORK.

CONFIDENCE IN U.S. MILITARY DEFENSE OF EUROPE
SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

QUESTION: "IF YOUR COUNTRY'S SECURITY WAS THREATENED BY A RUSSIAN ATTACK, HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN THE UNITED STATES TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND YOUR COUNTRY, EVEN IF THIS RISKED A DIRECT ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ITSELF?"

TOTAL, FEBRUARY 1982




SOURCE: GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982. POLLING IN WEST GERMANY WAS DONE BY THE EMNID INSTITUT IN FEBRUARY 1982 OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE, 18 YEARS AND OVER.

LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET ATTACK WITHIN FIVE YEARS
SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

QUESTION: "HOW LIKELY DO YOU THINK IT IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL
ATTACK WESTERN EUROPE WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS?"

TOTAL, FEBRUARY 1982



SOURCE: GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982.

REASON FOR SOVIET ARMAMENT
TOTAL, WEST GERMANY, OCTOBER 1981

QUESTION: "WHAT IS THE MAJOR REASON FOR SOVIET ARMAMENTS MEASURES?"

TO ATTACK THE WEST AT SOME FUTURE TIME	FOR DEFENSE IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK	TO BE ABLE TO PUT DOWN POSSIBLE UP- RISINGS IN AREAS OF SOVIET DOMINATION	TO EXPAND THE DOMAIN OF COMMUNIST POWER	TO EXERT PRESSURE ON OTHER COUNTRIES




SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 4, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, NEW YORK. POLL WAS OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF 2,150 WEST GERMANS, 18 YEARS AND OVER.

WAR OR DOMINATION?
U.S. SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

QUESTION: "SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT WAR IS SO HORRIBLE THAT IT IS BETTER TO ACCEPT RUSSIAN DOMINATION THAN TO RISK WAR. OTHERS SAY IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FIGHT IN DEFENSE OF YOUR COUNTRY THAN TO ACCEPT RUSSIAN DOMINATION?"

TOTAL, FEBRUARY 1982



SOURCE: GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982.

Regardless of their opinions on other issues, however, the Germans, by and large, believe that the U.S. is their best friend; and interestingly enough, the French are rated second. One suspects this might have something to do with American and French firmness toward the Soviets on issues regarding Europe (for the French, probably dating from de Gaulle's diplomatic stand against the Russians in support of the West Germans). In other words, there may be some correlation between willingness to oppose the Soviets--which the Germans may see as willingness to defend them--and the idea of friendship. For example, in April 1977, the number of Germans who considered the Americans to be their best friend was as low as 34 percent. The same question asked in July 1980 indicated that this had grown to 53 percent. The hostage crisis had redirected American opinion to the need for a stronger military capability; and this could possibly mean a stronger defense force better able to defend Europe. The change in the German attitude might also be partly attributable to candidate Reagan's rhetoric during the U.S. election campaign in 1980, when he spoke about defense against the expansion of communism--although there were press reports that such discussions frightened the Germans.

In December 1981 and January 1982, 51 percent of the West German population felt that the U.S. was the Federal Republic's best friend; in April/May 1981, 49 percent. Ten percent rated France as Germany's best friend in April 1977; this increased to 18 percent in April 1981. Furthermore, with the exception of Great Britain, in March 1982 our West European allies had a highly favorable opinion of the U.S. (Britain, 46% favorable, 44% unfavorable; France, 55% and 32% respectively; West Germany, 73% and 24%; Italy, 63% and 21%; Belgium, 49% and 22%). They were unanimously disapproving of the Soviet Union (Britain, 14 percent favorable, 74% unfavorable; France, 13% and 73%; West Germany, 20% and 77%; Italy, 13% and 68%; Belgium, 11% and 61%).*

The same 1982 poll seemed to indicate that although the Germans thought that their best friend, the U.S., had a fairly good grasp of foreign policy--and the Italians and Belgians more or less agreed--the French, and particularly the British, had no such idea, believing that the U.S. really could not handle world problems.

Furthermore, as indicated earlier, our NATO allies are usually little interested in following strong U.S. policy leads against Soviet-backed threats anywhere except in Western Europe. In other words, our NATO allies apparently see no quid pro quo requirements for U.S. support of their defense in Europe. In fact, as mentioned above, Europeans--in particular the French Socialists and the West German Social Democrats--side with what many Americans would call the proxies of the Soviet Union right in our own back yard in Central America and the Caribbean. Such attitudes are unlikely to endear the European allies to the majority of U.S. voters or even to many Congressmen and Senators.


* An EMNID poll published in Newsweek, March 15, 1982. The poll was co-sponsored by Gallup International and Newsweek and carried in leading newspapers and periodicals in Europe.

CONFIDENCE IN U.S. TO HANDLE WORLD PROBLEMS
SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

QUESTION: "IN GENERAL, HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN THE
UNITED STATES TO DEAL WISELY WITH WORLD PROBLEMS?"

TOTAL, FEBRUARY 1982

□ GREAT DEAL/FAIR AMOUNT
□ NOT VERY MUCH/NONE
■ DON'T KNOW



SOURCE: GALLUP INTERNATIONAL POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982.

C. Neutralism, Disarmament, and Reconciliation With the East

Certain indicators could lead an American to infer that although the Germans fear the East, some Germans and West Europeans feel that Western Europe can be neutral in disputes over Germany between the Soviet Union and the U.S. Many of these Europeans have outspoken feelings in this direction and others, no doubt, have hopes that it might be possible. Some West Germans seem to think the situation is really one in which the two superpowers are bickering and West Germany is caught in the middle.* As indicated earlier, this is not believed by the majority of Germans or even West Europeans; although latest polls, discussed in Section 11.B.2 on West German public opinion, reveal a growing tendency to choose neutrality, while the "superpowers fight it out." Some Europeans feel they can somehow actually stand aloof from extreme crises that occur over a divided Europe and, specifically, a divided Germany. Some might even think they could remain neutral, or at least not be attacked, while the U.S. and the Soviets bombard each other with intercontinental nuclear weapons over a dispute in Europe. As indicated earlier, to the average American, ideas like these are likely to be difficult to understand. But they are hard to resist for some in Europe, especially for those who do not believe there is a danger of attack from the Soviet Union.

Today in Germany we find the same response to appeals from the peace movement. People are sympathetic to the idea that no more nuclear weapons need be built by the West or at least deployed in Western Europe, and that the Germans--and indeed all of Western Europe--should simply opt out of the complex problem of the East-West confrontation without any great risk.** Of course, this could lead to turning Western Europe, or at least Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Denmark, into a "big Finland," with the Soviets dominating these countries' foreign and even many domestic policies. This is, of course, what some American analysts have considered to be the Soviet aim over the past 35 years.***

Two Allensbach poll questions are interesting in that they do not reflect the peace activists' faith in the Soviets' desire for disarmament. One question was, "Do you have the impression that the East is seriously interested in disarmament?" and three responses are given spreading from 1956 through July 1981. Unfortunately, there is only one center point


* See Section VI.A.1, for a discussion of this attitude.

** See Section 11.B.2 on the peace groups and public opinion in Germany.

*** See European Trends and Issues, Part III, "The Detente and Its Possible Effects on European and U.S. Policy," by Frank Armbruster, HI-682-D/3, April 28, 1966, p. 14. "It might be said the American troops were needed to keep all Europe from becoming another Finland." By 1970, however, it seemed apparent that U.S. forces in Europe might not have as much of an effect as hoped in delaying this trend under U.S. policy as it was developing.

IS THE EAST INTERESTED IN DISARMAMENT?
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 16 YEARS & OVER, 1956-1981


QUESTION: "DO YOU HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE EAST IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN DISARMAMENT?"



SOURCE: AMERICAN GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 40.

RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS FOR RECONCILIATION
TOTAL WEST GERMAN POPULATION, 16 YEARS & OVER, 1959-1981

QUESTION: "DO YOU FEEL THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE BASICALLY WILLING TO SEEK A RECONCILIATION WITH THE WEST AT PRESENT, OR DON'T YOU THINK SO?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DOMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 43.

RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS FOR RECONCILIATION

BY POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE, JULY 1981

QUESTION: "DO YOU FEEL THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE BASICALLY WILLING TO SEEK A RECONCILIATION WITH THE WEST AT PRESENT, OR DON'T YOU THINK SO?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 43.

RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS FOR RECONCILIATION

TOTAL AND BY AGE, JULY 1981

QUESTION: "DO YOU FEEL THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE BASICALLY WILLING TO SEEK A RECONCILIATION WITH THE WEST AT PRESENT, OR DON'T YOU THINK SO?"



SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 43.

(in 1964) during the two and a half decades, so it cannot be established if the trend was gradually downward or if it contained perturbations. What can be seen is that most Germans thought the East was definitely not interested in disarmament, although in recent years that belief lessened significantly (definitely not interested: 1956, 57%; 1964, 53%; 1981, 44%).

The other question was, "Do you feel that the Russians are basically willing to seek a reconciliation with the West at present, or don't you think so?" Again, taking a median line from 1965 through 1981, although a majority did not believe in the sincerity of the Soviets, there was a drop in the numbers who thought the Russians were not genuinely interested in a reconciliation. There are, however, great variations in the responses throughout the 1960s and 1970s. For example, in 1980, perhaps because of the Afghanistan crisis, 70 percent felt that the Russians were basically unwilling to seek a reconciliation with the West. That was a 10 percent jump up from the previous point in 1977; the response dropped again to 48 percent in 1981.* There was also considerable variation in the responses by political party preference and age in 1981: the Greens trusted, and the CDU/CSU mistrusted, the Russians by large majorities; the young were inclined to believe in the Russian intent, the other age groups were not so inclined. The long-term trend answers to these two poll questions and the age and party breakdown in 1981 are shown in the accompanying charts.

D. Nuclear Weapons and Morality

There is one motivation for opting out of the nuclear confrontation that many Americans can understand and that has been considered extensively by the peace movement. It has been given little emphasis by most defense-oriented people and defense ministries and governments on both sides of the Atlantic. This motivation stems from a dilemma over the moral issues involved in making, deploying and planning to use "weapons of mass destruction." Under our cultural and religious systems, thermonuclear warfare and deployment of modern delivery systems can raise grave moral questions, which, the peace groups claim, hopelessly transcend the normal moral doctrines governing warfare. This position might be correct, but it also might not be; for determining the morality of a weapons system requires a great deal of technical knowledge about the system and its effect. Nonetheless, theologians sympathetic to pacifism have made a "half-argument" against the weapons in the West and called for a permanent Western foreclosure of the option to use, or even develop, new weapons delivery systems in the face of the nuclear-armed Soviets. At first, technically-competent government people sponsoring the weapons systems placed little emphasis on the moral issue; they then attempted to handle the peace groups and their theologically-inspired arguments, but at times directed their

* American-German Relations as Seen by German Public Opinion, Allensbach, Institut fuer Demoskopie, October 7, 1981, pp. 40 and 43.

rebuttal at the wrong issues and couched in the wrong terms. As of today, the situation generally has not been improved on either side of the Atlantic.

The result has been that this vital issue, of intrinsic importance in its own right, has cut deeply into the fabric of the West's defense capability and will cut even deeper unless answers to it other than those of the pacifists are developed.* At the moment, therefore, the average, thoughtful, concerned American can empathize and sympathize with this European motivation for opposing nuclear weapons; many Americans face this same problem.

On many other matters, however, there is clearly a large gap between the kind of European attitudes discussed above and the thinking of the average American. It is possible that such differences of opinion may bode ill for American efforts in the defense of Europe, including the force modernization program. The Europeans and Americans would agree that America is their best friend. They could also agree to an unfavorable opinion of the Soviet Union. But on other issues, such as willingness to fight for their country (a mere 35 percent of West Germans would fight), the ability of West Europeans to remain neutral in a conflict between the Soviet Union and the U.S. over Europe, and the idea that in the confrontation over Europe we need the Europeans more than they need us, there would be grave differences between American and European opinion.

E. The Force Modernization Issue

The facts on the force modernization program, as the average American may see them, are that the Soviet Union has deployed a powerful force of SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe and in the western Soviet Union that threatens our NATO allies. The U.S., at considerable expense to its taxpayers, has suggested that ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles be built by the U.S. and stationed in Western Europe to counter the SS-20s. But the U.S. is also willing and eager to reduce these powerful intermediate-range nuclear forces. President Reagan has suggested the "zero option": if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20s and other intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SS-4s and SS-5s), we will not deploy the ground-launched cruise missiles or the Pershing IIs.

The average American taxpayer might be surprised to find that many West European citizens have little sense of gratitude toward our willingness to "protect them," or at best, to convince the Soviets to withdraw the new nuclear forces that threaten them. He might also be confounded by the intense debate going on in Western Europe over whether to allow the

* See Section VI for a discussion of this issue and some problems in getting "answers" applying specifically to at least part of the force modernization program for Europe.

U.S. to base the Pershing IIs and GLCMs there. He might reason that these weapons are, after all, intended to neutralize the power of the Soviet missiles that threaten West Europeans with nuclear destruction and to provide the grounds to negotiate for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. One could sympathize with the taxpayer's surprise, while realizing that the average American is probably unfamiliar with the forces and processes that have been at work in Europe since the early 1960s.

Against this general background, the average American is quite likely to conclude that if Europeans do not want us to spend billions of dollars on a force modernization program for Europe, we will simply save the money and use it elsewhere: to reduce our huge government deficit, perhaps invest in an anti-ballistic missile system to help defend the U.S., or even improve our own strategic weapons balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

F. Summary

None of this is meant to imply that the average American feels less strongly about his commitment to the defense of the U.S. and Europe than is indicated in the poll data. What can be inferred is that an attitude might develop among the U.S. public--an attitude which is beginning to show up in the American poll data--that the Europeans are not carrying their fair share of the burden of defending Europe. Moreover, Americans may feel that the effort they are making in Europe is not producing enough reciprocal support from their European allies for American policies elsewhere in the world. If Americans think Europeans could afford to spend more on their own defense, but continue to avoid it--partly because the U.S. will continue to spend heavily on European defense--and if they also sense that too much European sympathy lies with leftist attempts to seize power in Latin America, American public opinion could be adversely affected.

The huge federal budget deficit in the U.S. today is often blamed on high interest rates, which many consider to have caused the worst recession since the 1930s. This brings the federal budget, including defense spending, under scrutiny. If cuts have to be made in defense, the money that is earmarked for the defense of Europe could become very vulnerable, particularly if it is seen to be competing with monies for defense of the U.S. As we have seen in the polls, Americans are also concerned about the threat from Soviet strategic forces and the question of the morality of all nuclear weapons programs. Under these circumstances, what the U.S. public thinks could finally be as important as European opinion to the fate of the NATO defense programs, including force modernization.

V. A COMPARISON OF U.S. AND WEST EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS

A. A Comparison of the West European and American Environments in Which the Peace Movements Function

This study found that the peace movements in Europe and the U.S. are characterized by remarkable similarities in moral ideology, aims, composition, and techniques; there are, of course, dissimilarities as well, but they appear to be less striking. Perhaps even more importantly, however, research revealed that the climates of opinion in the U.S. and Europe, within which the peace movements function, differ in a number of significant ways; and that, indeed, they could provide some vital keys to the eventual impact of the peace movements on defense policies. For this reason, this section begins with a brief discussion of some of the differences in basic U.S. and European public attitudes. The conclusions are drawn from the survey data in the American and European public opinion sections of this report, which may be referred to for further details.

1. Public Attitudes in the U.S. and Western Europe

In the U.S. there has been a longstanding and consistent desire to stay out of wars, to negotiate to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to follow what is considered a realistic process of trying to do away with the nuclear threat. Yet, simultaneously, there has been an equally persistent distrust of the Soviets and intense concern for the consequences of a Russian military victory and the domination of the U.S. This feeling is so strong that even when stark questions are asked that presume the destruction of the U.S., a large percentage of Americans still prefer war to Russian or communist domination. It should be mentioned that none of these responses is a recent phenomenon: public opinion polls taken throughout the three decades since the beginning of the 1950s have revealed fundamentally the same attitudes.

Section III of this report, on American public opinion, examined these complex and pragmatic attitudes at length and traced the long-term survey trends on native American "pacifism." This section also looks at American pacifism, but in the context of a historical review of the make-up, behavior and impact of certain pacifist movements.

The response to the nuclear-freeze question illustrates the persistent combination of peculiarly American pacifism and unshakable determination to keep America strong. All population groups--even the normally conservative--overwhelmingly support a verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons (nationally, 7 out of 10 in a March 1983 Gallup poll); yet equally overwhelming numbers would oppose a freeze if it gave the Soviet Union "somewhat greater nuclear strength" than the U.S. (60-30 percent in a May 1982 New York Times/CBS News poll) and if either side could cheat (71-18 percent in the same poll).

This response is appropriate to a long history of similar responses. As reported in Section III, the well-known opinion analyst Everett Carl

Ladd, after an exhaustive study of long-term attitudes toward nuclear weapons, made the following observations:

The most striking finding that emerges from this extensive review is that American opinion on nuclear weapons and war has changed scarcely at all over nearly four decades. The nuclear freeze campaign of 1982 has not been prompted by some recent change in the public's thinking or concerns... [Emphasis in original.]

These enduring views are central parts of American opinion on nuclear weapons, and yet they are only half the story. For, as appalled as the public is about nuclear weaponry, it sees no realistic alternative to a heavy reliance on such weapons in the country's defense. The main reason for this is that the public considers the Soviet Union an untrustworthy adversary that would use its own nuclear superiority--or any other military advantage--against vital U.S. interests.*

Ladd further notes that large majorities of Americans have even consistently maintained--as they did in a March 1982 poll in the Los Angeles Times--"that they would be 'willing to risk the destruction of the United States rather than be dominated by the Russians.'"**

A spring 1983 University of Massachusetts poll, also cited in Section III, revealed an even fiercer reaction: one-half of the public chose nuclear war over communist domination, but another one-third actually said they preferred "'all-out nuclear war' to living under communist rule even if it meant the death of everyone in the United States, the enemy's country and the population of some other countries."***

European attitudes appear to be quite different from American with regard to risking a nuclear war or fighting a war to avoid domination by the Soviet Union. Europeans largely waver on the question of whether they would rather be "Red than dead"; and they also do not perceive the Soviet Union to be the danger that Americans see it to be. (Sections II and III contain various European and American public opinion surveys on the issues of resolve, neutralism, and defense.)

Part of the European sense that the Soviet Union is not a military threat may be due to the failure of some Europeans--among them prominent leaders--to regard an action as dangerous that is not a direct threat to Western Europe itself: a kind of Eurocentrism that is not concerned with military moves beyond its borders (such as those that occurred in, for

*"The Freeze Framework," Public Opinion (August/September 1982), p. 20.

** Ibid., p. 41.

*** Taken by pollster Padraig O'Malley; reported in Soviet Aerospace, April 11, 1983, p. 105.

example, Afghanistan, Central America and Southeast Asia). The U.S., on the other hand, has security interests that are global. See Section VI, passim, for a detailed discussion of these contrasting world views.*

A European fear is that Western Europe--and the Germans are particularly sensitive to West Germany's strategically vulnerable position across the entire Central Front--will be the nuclear battlefield for a war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Indeed, in an ironic way, some Europeans feel that the confrontation in Europe is between the two superpowers, who will fight their war on European soil; and Europe is, in a sense, an onlooker or even a pawn in this confrontation. (See the numerous surveys and detailed discussions in the country studies in Section II supporting this argument, and an elaboration of the issue in Section VI, which also includes suggestions for alternative, intermediate-range, missile-basing modes.)

There is a significant difference in the attitudes between Americans and Europeans toward the basing of missiles in their countries. In the U.S., although Americans are as aware as Europeans that the weapons could become targets for Soviet missiles, those who live in the areas that are to receive the new missile systems--e.g., dense pack MX or the new MX deployment in existing Minuteman silos--are usually in favor of the deployment. One of the reasons frequently given is that more business will be generated in the area and more jobs created by the construction work involved. But, apparently, one of the reasons is also patriotism. For example, citizens of Peetz, a tiny Colorado town where new MX missiles are to replace Minuteman missiles in silos within the town limits, were reported to have "scant concern over the potential danger of living in the bull's-eye of a Soviet first strike against this nation's strategic forces." One reason cited:

Underlying the tranquil atmosphere here is a deeply held conviction that the missiles are necessary, that if the government deems Peetz the best place for them, the community is more than willing to do its part.

"A lot of guys have given their lives for the freedoms I'm enjoying right now," says the Gillham's son Richard, who helps run the family ranch. "My opinion of the Russians is not extremely trusting, so I'd just as soon have some missiles around to try to keep those freedoms. It's not worth spending all our resources on, but that's where we have to trust our leaders as to how much we do need." Personally, I'd be more afraid if we didn't have any missiles.**

* See also Timothy Garton Ash, "Why Germans Don't Love Us," Harper's (March 1983), pp. 19-20, for recent anecdotal reports of Eurocentrism and the Soviet threat.

** "Living with 'the Bomb' and Loving It--Mostly," U.S. News and World Report (January 24, 1983), pp. 63-64.

One of the most frequently-heard European fears about the deployment of the new missile force on European soil is that the missiles will become targets for Soviet weapons and turn Europe into a nuclear holocaust. This fear has been stressed by certain peace groups--for example, by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain--and by general protests, like the one in Britain that opposed the stationing of NATO headquarters on British soil. (The various country studies in Section II describe public opinion toward this issue in some detail.)

Another striking distinction between the U.S. and European environments can be found in the feelings of love and pride of country: for example, 9 out of 10 Americans said that the U.S. was the best place in the world to live* in contrast to 7 out of 10 West Germans who preferred living in Germany.** Eight out of 10 Americans were very proud to be American compared with 4 out of 10 Europeans; 71 percent of Americans said they would be willing to fight for their country in contrast to only 43 percent in Europe.***

There are other indicators, such as belief in God--which is considerably stronger in the U.S. (95 percent) than in Europe (75 percent overall).**** The Americans' greater faith in a supreme being, combined with a strong pride of nationality and willingness to defend their country, suggest that American morale is higher than European; this difference could, in turn, impact variously on the milieus in which the peace groups operate.

However, the interplay of morale and differing attitudes in the U.S. and Europe is very complex. For example, even though the U.S. might be considered to be high morale (using the measures mentioned above), the average person in the U.S. considers a nuclear war to be more likely in the next 10 years than do the citizens of most of the nations of Europe.***** In this respect, one might say that Americans are low-morale and Europeans are high-morale; but actually this is not so: the Europeans feel that war is unlikely to occur, but are unwilling to fight one; the Americans feel that war is likely to occur, but are more willing to fight it.

*Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981, Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut; cited in "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, Vol. 4, No. 3 (June/July 1981), p. 28.

**Allensbach Institute poll of 1979, reported in Section II.B.2.d.

***International Survey of Values, Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA), Washington, D.C., May 1982.

****Ibid.

*****See Section III on American opinion and portions of Section II on European survey data for detailed accounts of attitudes toward the likelihood of war.

B. A Comparison of the Peace Movements

1. Characteristics of Peace Activists: Rearrangement of the Matrix

In the U.S. and Europe there are certain--now very few--traditionally pacifist groups, such as the Amish and Mennonites, that have maintained an absolute and unshakable pacifist position. To them it is irrelevant who is fighting and what the issues are; they are totally and irrevocably neutral and uninvolved.

Except for these groups, however, the makeup of the American and European peace movements is more eclectic than is sometimes portrayed. If one were, for instance, to divide the population of the countries of Europe into identifiable groups--for example, religious, irreligious, atheist, pro-ecology, anti-ecology, conservative, liberal, Social Democrat, Christian Democrat, communist, anarchist, elitist, common-man, white-collar worker, blue-collar worker, city-dweller, rural-dweller, college-educated, non-college-educated, clerics, lay persons--one would find pacifists among them, particularly in the broader sense now used, that is, those who are against the use and deployment of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it would be difficult to determine which groups contained the largest percentage of pacifists. The same would be true in the U.S., with the exception of the clearly pacifist groups such as the Mennonites and Amish.

A brief rundown of several of these categories will serve to point out some of the difficulties in identifying pacifist origins in the peace movement today. It might be possible to assume that pacifists in the U.S. are, for example, more inclined to be Democrats than Republicans; but it certainly would not be safe to say that conservationists and ecologists are more pacifist than any of the other groups mentioned. The reason why: contrary to a somewhat widely-held notion, truly dedicated, active ecologists in the U.S. are very largely hunters and fishermen, and they tend to be strongly pro-defense. One might further assume there are more pacifists and nuclear-weapons opponents among elitists than non-elitists; but this is truer of some elitists than of others, and also hinges on the definition of the term, and type of, "elitist."

Some observers argue that the peace movement on both sides of the Atlantic--and particularly in Europe--is essentially a religious movement. Once again, however, there is a problem of defining what constitutes "religious." Survey data from West Germany show, for example, that the more religious, measured in traditional terms of church attendance, are clearly inclined to conservatism and rightist policies. Furthermore, evidence indicates that, percentage-wise, there are more pacifists and nuclear-weapons opponents today among communists than among the religious; yet, despite the proportionately greater percentage of communists involved, the peace movement is not generally identified as a communist movement. Because communists make up a much smaller percentage of the population, clearly, there are in absolute numbers fewer communists than religious in the peace movement. Some observers in Europe and the U.S. suggest, however, that because of their apparatuses, discipline, and skill in "writing

the agenda," the communists have a much greater influence on the "peace movement" than their numbers would indicate.*

What is argued here is that many of the characteristics frequently attributed to peace movement groups may be misleading or carelessly selected, based on little more than appearances. What is more probable is that we are dealing not with ecologist and religious groups per se, but with activist pacifists who may or may not also be ecologists or religious or atheists, or of any other social category.

What is suggested, then, is that the matrix should be cut another way and other characteristics chosen as the leading variables. In West Germany, for example, the evidence reveals that what is known until now about members and sympathizers of the Greens Party, recognized as the most influential arm of the peace movement, is the following: They are mainly

- from the large cities
- under 30 years of age
- leftist in political orientation
- better-educated elitists.**

Elitists are described here as those who think of themselves as elitists and are preoccupied with elitism: they are essentially intellectually-oriented and frequently disconnected from real-world experiences, yet feel that, compared with the average person, they have a superior grasp of problems and solutions. They may consider themselves to be the "leading edge" within the society. Because they feel themselves fundamentally superior to the common man, many prefer participatory democracy to representational democracy. Only a small number of elitists are the so-called "true believers," or hardened ideological activists, part of the core of movers behind the various causes. (In West Germany, some observers of the political scene suggest that the other portion of this core group is made up of members of the various West German communist factions.***) Most elitists may never become activists, but they constitute a broad spectrum of "sympathizers." And finally, it is important to note that very few ecologists, religious or socialists--who are found among the masses of people, at all social and educational levels--will be elitists.

In summary: the makeup of the American and European peace movements today is highly eclectic. This study suggests that identifying pacifists

* See Section II.B.2.b, "Historical Trends and Makeup of the West German Peace Movement," and the last half of this section for a discussion of, and reaction to, communist involvement.

** Each of these characteristics has been discussed in detail in the West German part of Section II, especially B.2.a, B.2.c, B.2.d and B.2.e.

*** See, for example, the work of Werner Kaltefleiter, professor of political science at Christian-Albrechts University, Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany.

by social, economic or political groupings (e.g., ecologists or religious) can sometimes lead to inaccurate conclusions; it proposes that what is called for is a different set of variables in the matrix, one that cuts across the so-called "inchoate mass" of the peace movement.* Thus, rather than environmentalism or religious belief, more workable variables might be those that characterize peace activists as young, better-educated, from large urban centers, inclined to be left politically, and elitists. Persons with these characteristics may also happen to be environmentalists, religious or members of a political party, but the above-mentioned variables distinguish them from most of the ordinary citizens in these giant groups.

a. Ecologists

The ecologists in West Germany and the U.S. are a case in point. Some political analysts in Germany have suggested that the beginning of the anti-nuclear peace movement there sprang essentially from the thousands of disparate Buergerinitiativen--local citizens groups--whose antipollution protests, the analysts said, eventually led to demonstrations against nuclear power plants and then to yet another step, opposition to the use of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely, however, that the mass of members of the Buergerinitiativen would become engaged in this final protest. Moreover, along the line--from the middle to late seventies--a political arm, the "Greens," was formed, and the ecological debate was widened to include a criticism of the Western social and economic systems, a position from which most citizens would be even further removed. Thus, major steps were taken that the large majority of persons, essentially engaged as Buergerinitiativen in fighting local wrongs, and being largely centrist in political outlook, would not likely favor: (1) the politicization of activities into an anti-Western, anti-parliamentarian party, outside the major parties; and (2) the shift from protesting nuclear power plants to opposing the nuclear defense of West Germany against a nuclear-armed Soviet Union.**

Indeed, although the Buergerinitiativen were a new and spontaneous type of local, civic action, nature, ecological, garden, hunting and fishing associations have flourished for generations, and Germans, it is said, belong en masse to tens of thousands of groupings of every sort.***

In the U.S. as well, hunters and fishermen, through the payment of license fees and contributions, have for decades been buying land and

* Term used in an article by David Shribman, "Who Won on Freeze?" The New York Times, May 6, 1983, p. B-6.

** The March 6, 1983 West German federal election seems to have substantiated the support by the West German citizens for largely conservative, pro-Western, traditional and parliamentary values.

*** Facts About Germany (Guetersloh, West Germany: LEXIKOTHEK Publishers, 1980), p. 282. A discussion of this will be found in Section II.B.2.b. on the historical trends of the West German peace movement.

waters for public preserves and have impelled conservationist causes. These conservationists and environmentalists are overwhelmingly ordinary citizens who strongly support the American system and the defense of their country.

2. The Eclecticism of Peace Movements Past and Present

a. The U.S.

In this century, anti-war movements in the U.S. have been composed of some strange bedfellows. For example, prior to World War II, large majorities of Americans opposed U.S. involvement in a war with Germany; yet, ironically, during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact (1939 to 1941) three of the most outspoken "pacifist" groups were the German-American Bund, the American Communist Party, and the America First Committee. Up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the U.S., the prewar period saw antiwar sentiment fired by such contrasting personalities as Charles Lindberg, Earl Browder, Father Coughlin, and Eddie Cantor.

Until the end of the 1930s, a shifting amalgam of pacifist efforts--including traditional pacifist groups stemming from World War I, such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), Women's International League for Peace (WILFP) and American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), as well as new peace campaigns, rightists, socialists, communists, neutralists, isolationists, internationalists, clerics, students--pressed for American neutralism in the face of "Europe's unregenerate politics."* The communists had been strongly interventionist until the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, when they abruptly switched to a neutralist position and joined the pacifists. In the last years of the decade, however, pacifist groups in the antiwar movement split apart over the issue of U.S. interventionism in the European war, and "in the face of Hitlerism in Europe and Japanese military expansion in Asia, most American peace activists decided after 1940 that war was more necessary for the moment than peace."**

Only one national antiwar coalition was active in September 1939 and the spring of 1940: the Keep America Out of War Congress (KAOWC), which linked pacifists and socialists like Norman Thomas. Shortly after,

* Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American History (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 132.

In this vast country, there were regional differences in the sources and strength of isolationist "pacifism": the isolationism was stronger in the Midwest; the Far West tended to focus on Japan and the Pacific; the "Europhile" East-Coast establishment, which included some academicians, intellectuals and journalists, was opposed to pacifist-isolationist activities.

** Ibid., p. XIV.

the pacifists pulled out of the coalition; and the America First Committee became the spokesmen in the U.S. for antiwar sentiment:

Protesting Roosevelt's bold assistance to the Allies, the Congress [KAOWC] struggled to revitalize a progressive antiwar bloc until September 1940, when the right-wing America First Committee arose to resist interventionist pressures. While pacifists withdrew, the KAOWC fell gradually under the influence of antiwar socialists and behind isolationist plans for a Fortress America concept of defense. Then the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor suddenly hurled the United States into war on two fronts. Hastily, the America First Committee disbanded, and its members hurried to back the national war effort.*

Today, as in the past, the peace movement in the U.S. is a highly eclectic mass of campaigns, thousands of groups, clearinghouses, resolution supporters, rally participants, and experienced organizers. Its members and sympathizers come from religious groups such as the traditionally pacifist AFSC, the post-World War II Catholic Pax-Christi, and more recently, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops; physicians' and scientists' organizations, including the active Physicians for Social Responsibility headed by Helen Caldicott, the Union of Concerned Scientists led by Henry Kendall of MIT, and the Federation of American Scientists under Jeremy J. Stone; women's groups, like the durable WILFP and the Women Strike for Peace (WSP), started by Dagmar Wilson in 1960; civil rights organizations; students, intellectuals, entertainers; leftists, socialists; and Soviet communist-influenced organizations, such as the well-known World Peace Council (WPC), based in Helsinki, and its American affiliate, the United States Peace Council (USPC), organized in 1979. Even with the organizational capacity that put together the massive anti-nuclear rallies, such as the one held in June 1982 in New York City, and the growth of the nuclear-freeze campaign, the movement "remains an inchoate mass."** Moreover, peace-movement groups, here and abroad, today as in the past, tend to have differing aims, self-interests and distinctive means for achieving objectives; thus, although they may coalesce for a while behind a broad, common cause, they traditionally disagree, split off and decompose as a cohesive movement.

Many of these groups were born--and reborn--in opposition to the American intervention in Vietnam. In response to that war, a large array of organizations and coalitions mushroomed, including many of the traditional, pacifist groups--some of which expanded to include an amalgam of various causes--religious groups, students and leftists. At the time, even the National Conference of Catholic Bishops came out with a statement saying that the war was not worth the price being paid for it. No large umbrella organization equivalent to that of the America First Committee prior to World War II came into existence, but in some respects it was

* Ibid., p. 133.

** Shribman, "Who Won on Freeze?," p. B-6.

not necessary. For a somewhat unique situation existed during the Vietnam War in that much of the news and broadcast media was against the war, and the public was exposed to this point of view in many TV programs and newspaper reports.

With the phased withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and the ending of the draft, pacifist organizations "withered away," and that great phase of pacifism in the U.S. was over. Despite the more recent efforts of peace activists to stimulate new interest in various pacifist causes on the campuses, these efforts have been surprisingly unsuccessful. Students have been essentially preoccupied with preparing for jobs and a career, and so long as they are not being drafted, many seem to have lost personal concern with war issues. Similar reports about students have come out of West Germany recently: for example, in the university town of Tuebingen that "gave the antinuclear Green Party its earliest, and most impressive, electoral breakthroughs" and in which "seven Greens and three pro-Soviet Communists are fixtures in the town's 57-member legislature," students appeared apathetic to any issue other than jobs, prior to the March 6th federal elections:

In Tuebingen the issues seem blurred, or poorly defined....
Missiles seemed to excite no one.

At the university, a dozen students sat around and agreed
that their mood was down, dominated by the fear of eventual
joblessness....

...the Greens' candidate for Parliament here...acknowledged
that as he made the rounds in his electoral district, one
question was dominant--jobs. The Green program offers virtu-
ally nothing on this issue.*

With the rise of left-wing insurgency in El Salvador and the American efforts to intercede, many of the Vietnam "isolationist/pacifist" organizations came to the fore again. These groups made great attempts to get students on the campuses to support a "hands-off-El Salvador" position, but demonstrations could not be organized, and the students were generally found to be apathetic in their response toward this issue, as well as to the MX and anti-nuclear campaigns. Support for a nuclear freeze was then sought among such unlikely groups as New England town meetings, state legislatures, and fraternal associations, groups for whom discussions of national and international issues of this type and magnitude are generally not suited. Though the town meetings and other associations voted in favor of a nuclear freeze, it was apparently very hard to create committed new activists in the pacifist cause from their ranks. A nuclear freeze resolution was passed by the House of Representatives in May of this year, but is not expected to be voted by the Republican Senate. American

* James Markham, "German Vote: The Students Are Unstirred," The New York Times, February 13, 1983, p. 9.

public opinion is overwhelmingly pro-freeze, but also equally overwhelmingly opposed to a freeze if the Soviet Union thereby realizes a military advantage over the U.S.; these attitudes are analyzed in Section III of this report on American public opinion toward U.S. foreign policy and defense issues.

The anti-nuclear campaign has had perhaps some of its greatest response among certain religious organizations and clerics that traditionally have not been pacifist. The one receiving the most publicity in recent months has been the five-member, ad-hoc committee of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops; it has produced several drafts of a pastoral letter that was adopted in May by the overwhelming majority of the bishops attending the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in Chicago. This letter, which could be considered to be a "pacifist-oriented" document, may become one of the strongest pacifist influences on anti-nuclear arms sentiment both here and abroad. Catholic bishops in the West European churches have already begun to respond to it and have issued their own policy statements.

Today, a number of the peace groups seem to have lost a good deal of their pacifist objectivity and appear to have taken a largely politicized direction, stressing disarmament of the West and non-deployment of Western missiles, while tolerating Soviet nuclear armament and the emplacement of Soviet SS-20 missiles as necessary for Russia's defense. Some groups in the movement, here and abroad, do not see the Soviet Union as a threat; indeed, they condemn Western attempts to curtail Marxist-Leninist expansionism in Latin America as violently repressive, while rationalizing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Some of the oldest and most active pacifist groups in the U.S. also appear to have relinquished their purely pacifist stands and taken on a more political and ideological direction: they represent not only pacifist sentiment, but an indictment of the American social and economic order, along with solicitude toward Third-World "liberation" violence and Soviet political interests. Thus, the AFSC not only helped organize the campaign that resulted in the pro-freeze vote by 161 Vermont town meetings, but "[i]n the United States...has organized lobbying efforts on behalf of the PLO and speaking tours for its propagandists."^{*} An AFSC official has written that the U.S. "is the very fount of violence in many places in the Third World," while a pamphlet under AFSC auspices "warns against passing judgment on the violence perpetrated by 'liberation' movements."^{††}

^{*}Rael Jean Issac and Erich Issac, "The Counterfeit Peacemakers: Atomic Freeze," The American Spectator, Vol. 15, No. 6, June 1982, p. 9.

^{††}The official, Russell Johnson, noted this in a 1982 article in the Fellowship of Reconciliation magazine. Reported in Dorothy Rabinowitz, "The Building Blocks of the Freeze Movement," Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1982, p. 30. Her material was drawn in part from the peace collection of the Swarthmore College library in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania.

The WILFP, "an enthusiastic public supporter" of the PLO, issued a foreign policy statement saying that "All life on earth is threatened by U.S. imperialism." The leader of the WILFP, while finding military intervention always "regrettable," nonetheless thought the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan "'understandable,' given the 'Soviet interest in having close relations with a neighboring country with which it shares a 2,000 mile border.'"*

The Clergy and Laity Concerned, which now has 25,000 members, found

the movement against the Vietnam War represented a "struggle against American imperialism and exploitation in just about every corner of the world." The task now, the group said, was to join those who "hate the corporate powers which the United States presently represents..."**

These attitudes are remarkably similar to those of the Greens party in West Germany, which theoretically rejects the Western capitalistic, social system as inherently evil.*** Indeed, the causes and allegiances of some groups in the U.S. and West Germany are startlingly coincidental: and in the case of the Greens, their crusade in support of the PLO has led to some grotesque ironies. A recent article reported that a Greens calendar had the following notation on one of its last pages:

ISRAEL THE MURDER BANDS. After we appealed last year "Kauft nicht bei Juden" [Don't buy from Jews] because the Jewish Unrechstatt [unlawful state] pursues aggressive policies in the Middle East, bombs nuclear power stations, occupies foreign land, murders the inhabitants with military terror... the "money mafia of the world" has struck again.

The calendar goes on to make a special appeal to readers to boycott Jaffa oranges--first because they are grown by Jews, second because they are chemically treated. "Kauft nicht bei Juden" was, of course, originally a Nazi slogan.****

A fundamental mind-set shared among the young West German and members of some of the U.S. groups mentioned above is anti-Zionism: that is, a rejection of the America that exemplifies the inhumane and rapacious democratic, capitalist, consumerist and technological social order of the West. This is the new elite, described earlier, and it motivates the movement that bridges the Atlantic:

* Rabinowitz, p. 30.

** Ibid.

*** See Section II.B.2.d, "Nationalism," for the implications of this view.

**** Ash, Harpers, March 1983, p. 1.

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
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
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So when the young West Germans rebel against the "industrial system" or the "consumer society," or "capitalism," or the limitations of parliamentary democracy, or the social mores of what the Baader-Meinhof generation called the "Raspberry Reich," they are rebelling not just against their own country but against America.*

b. Western Europe

The West European peace movements, like the American, are highly eclectic. Observers of the peace movement scene in West Germany are themselves unclear about the configuration of the peace movement and who steers it. Indeed, one German newspaper correspondent has gone so far as to write, "The peace movement does not exist," and referred to the "thrown-together heap of the peace movement."** A reporter of the prestigious, conservative West German newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, wrote in December 1982 that the peace movement in West Germany has become indistinct and broken up, there are so many little groups that you cannot count all of them, the leaders of the movement have no connection with each other, and the dates of campaigns and rallies are set up by each group so that they do not coincide, or may even compete with each other.*** Under the circumstances, it would appear that whatever group or faction has the best organization would be the strongest moving force in the peace movement. It has been suggested that the Greens and the German communist party supply this organization.

For the purpose of simplifying the discussion of the various peace groups in West Germany, three lists of the major elements, excerpted from articles by political correspondents in leading West German newspapers, are provided below (as direct and condensed translations):

From the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 12, 1982****

1. Greens. The Greens, the political arm of the peace movement, now have deputies in the parliament and have the advantage of having votes. They have appropriated the slogan, "Swords to Plowshares." The Greens are extraordinarily strong in the peace movement, and it is difficult to oppose their voice.

* Ibid., p. 19.

** Hansjoerg N. Schultz, "Anschweigen gegen den Atomaren Knall," Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 3, 1981, p. 1.

*** Georg Paul Hefty, "Die 'Friedensbewegung' ist ratlos," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 4, 1982.

**** Guenter Bannas, "Wer hat teilgenommen an der Demonstration in Bonn?"

2. Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP)--German Communist Party. Without doubt the DKP supports the exploitation of the "peace movement" across the East German border under the approving eyes of Moscow and East Berlin. Their partners can also be found among the Young Socialists (Jungsozialisten) and Young Democrats (Jungdemokraten). Coalitions and federations of other groups are influenced by organizations of the communist apparat.

3. Bundesverband Buergerinitiativen Umweltschutz (BBU). A federation of about 1,000 citizens-initiative groups stemming from participatory democratic-Greens thought. Members of these groups strengthen this influence on the peace movement.

4. Not to be forgotten are the Church Youth Groups, especially of the Evangelical church. Their participation in the peace movement appears to be above suspicion, and makes them attractive.

5. The importance of the rest of the groups pales in comparison to those above. Minorities such as guest workers, the handicapped, autonomous groups, "alternatives"--and women's groups as well--can be for peace.

From the Stuttgarter Zeitung, October 3, 1981*

The peace movement is a loose, unorganized, extraparliamentary grouping of Greens, Bunte, leftists, pastors, social workers, and pacifists.

1. The Evangelical Church. The Hamburger Kirchentag was a forum of different groups, and included, in particular, many young people.

a. The strongest church group within the peace movement is the Wuertemberg church's Aktion Ohne Ruestung Leben ("Living Without Armaments") started in 1978 and headed by Pfarrer Hermann Schaeufele.

Closely connected with the above groups are two others that particularly appeal to young evangelical Christians:

b. Christen fuer die Abruestung ("Christians for Disarmament") founded in 1976, whose mentor is Pastor Konrad Luebbert.

c. The Berlin Aktion Suehnezeichen started after World War II to atone for the wrongs perpetrated in Germany during the Nazi time. Young volunteers from this group went to Poland or Israel in a spirit of reconciliation to help rebuild these countries. Its motto was "Never again war, never again weapons." This group, headed by the Berlin Pastor Volkmar Deile, organized the widespread peace weeks in November 1980 and 1981.

*Schultz, p. 1.

The so-called grand old men of the church are playing important roles in the peace movement: Helmut Gollwitzer, Martin Niemöller, and Heinrich Albertz.

2. Leftists. The leftists are very important politically in the peace movement because some are directly in the Social Democratic Party and even in the Free Democratic Party. Communal action has been undertaken by a broad group of these leftists, including some SPD deputies, Young Socialists, Young Democrats, leftists who no longer find a political home in the SPD, and communists. Their best-known activity was the so-called Krefelder Appell (the Krefeld Appeal), which has to date reportedly been signed by over 2 million West Germans. A leader of this call against West German armament, which is strongly under suspicion of communist influence, was the Deutsche Friedens-Union (DFU), considered to be a communist-front organization. Petra Kelly, the outstanding leader of the Greens party, also worked on the Krefeld Appeal.

3. Radical Pacifists. These are in the Greens and are also partially represented in other groups. Many of them work in the Deutschen Friedensgesellschaft/Vereinigte Kriegsdienstgegner (DFG/VK).*

From the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 4, 1982**

Important groups named in this article are the following: The Komitee fuer Frieden, Abruestung und Zusammenarbeit (KOFAZ) (Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation), the DFG/VK, Aktion Suehnezeichen, leading organizations of Buergerinitiativen, the Greens, and elements of the SPD.

Approximately 10 percent of the West German population--about four million people--have signed various appeals or petitions against the use of nuclear weapons. These include the following: Krefeld, Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, Bielefeld, Starnberg, and Datteln. According to this article, Petra Kelly and Josef Weber initiated the Krefeld Appeal. The DFG/VK and the KOFAZ called for further signatures on the Krefeld Appeal in November 1982. The goal of these groups: to bring anti-nuclearism "into every house."

According to a speaker for the Evangelische Kirche Deutschland (EKD), in November, peace weeks were held in churches in from 5 to 6 thousand communities--that is about one-half of the West German communities.

Brief descriptions of the various peace organizations in the other West European countries where missile deployment is to take place have been given in Section II of this report under each of the countries.

*This organization as well as the German Peace Union (DFU) and the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation (KOFAZ) have been publicly identified by government agencies in West Germany as being communist-controlled.

**Hefty.

Included are the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), the most influential peace lobby in the Netherlands; the Pax-Christi in Belgium and Italy; and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Great Britain. Leaders of these organizations have tie-ins to each other: for example, Monsignor Bruce Kent, who is now general secretary of CND was formerly chaplain of Pax-Christi in Britain.

3. The Communist Presence in the Peace Movements

There is strong evidence that communist influence--and attempts at influence--on peace movements here and abroad has been substantial in the various phases of the development of the present-day peace movement. Particularly mentioned in this respect is the Helsinki-based peace organization, the World Peace Council, which is generally thought to be Moscow-dominated and has tie-ins to the various peace groups in the U.S. and Western Europe. Two recent, lengthy articles which claim considerable influence by this group and by the communist parties operating in the various West European countries, as well as their recognized affiliate organizations, trace in careful detail the communist manipulation of the European peace movement. They can be referred to for the most complete media discussion of this issue:

J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXI, No. 6 (November/December 1982), pp. 43-56.

Wynfred Joshua, "Soviet Manipulation of the European Peace Movement," Strategic Review, Volume XI, No. 1 (Winter 1982), pp. 9-18.

Some of these communist activities and tie-ins have been discussed throughout this report and in particular in Section II under the various countries. For example, perhaps the most obviously-known connection is the Dutch communist party influence in initiating the "Stop the Neutron Bomb" campaign in the Netherlands. In West Germany as well, the West German communist party has been tied in with various peace groups in openly-recognized cooperative peace ventures; some of these are discussed in the West German historical trends part of this study, Section II.B.2.b. Direct communist influence in the West German and Dutch peace movements appears to have diminished since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial rule in Poland; furthermore, the Greens party of West Germany has been openly trying to prevent communists from dominating their meetings and agendas.*

The general approach to assessing the role that the Soviet Union and West European communist parties have played in attempting to manipulate and organize aspects of the peace campaign is excellently summarized by Mr. Vermaat in the article referred to above:

* The New York Times, April 6, 1982.

It is the aim of this article to describe the tactics and instruments employed by the Soviet Union in this "campaign" and to assess its effectiveness. In so doing, it is not my intention to suggest that the West European peace movement became a mere tool for Moscow's foreign policy objective. Rather, it is my intention to describe how Moscow sought to stimulate and control the locally-based peace movements, and to make some tentative estimates regarding where it succeeded and where it failed. In brief, Moscow succeeded reasonably well in the initial period between 1977 and 1980. Thereafter, its ability to manipulate the peace movement for its own interests became increasingly problematic, as a result, first, of the impact of the invasion of Afghanistan and, later, of Soviet conduct with respect to Poland.*

4. Differences Between the Peace Movements in the U.S. and Western Europe

In making a comparison between the U.S. and European peace movements, this section has discussed differences and similarities in (1) the environment or milieu of public opinion, and (2) the focus, or direction, of the peace movements themselves. Earlier in the section, a number of important dissimilarities in the environments of the U.S. and Western Europe were noted, and a way was suggested to more accurately identify the characteristics of peace movement activists and sympathizers here and abroad. Now some of the notable differences in the characteristics of the American and European peace movements will be considered. These are listed below with no attempt made either to put them in order of importance or to categorize them:

(1) In Europe the peace movements are much more directly involved politically and in the parliamentary process than they are in the U.S. For example, there is no U.S. political party equivalent to the Greens party in West Germany, nor is the "disarmament position" so strongly accepted by the U.S. administration as it is by the governments of the Netherlands, and in a more limited way, Belgium.

(2) It appears--although this has been by no means statistically established--that in West Germany there may be greater numbers of youth under 30 more intensely involved in antinuclear protests than in the U.S.: this despite the reports, noted earlier, of German university student apathy toward national issues just before the Federal Republic's March 6th election.

Moreover, West German teenagers appear to be more sympathetic to the Greens party than their counterparts in the U.S. are to any comparable grouping. Survey data from the EMNID organization, the Gallup poll affiliate in West Germany, show that over 70 percent of the Greens are 14 to 29 years of age; nearly half are teenagers between the ages of 14 and

* Vermaat, p. 43.

19 years.* Data further show that many of the involved youth are either in an academic high school or in the universities.**

(3) It has been claimed that the West German peace movement is unique because the youth of the Greens party and the peace movement are "reincarnations" of the German neutral nationalists of the past. Apparently, one of the reasons for the cooling of the relationship between the Dutch and the West German peace movements is that the Dutch believe the West German peace movement contains strains of a nationalistic revival. The survey data, however, do not indicate that the Greens and the youth who support the Greens are necessarily nationalistic. On the contrary, these people by criteria that could be considered to indicate nationalism, seem likely to be the least nationalistic of all West Germans. (See Section II.B.2.d. on "National Neutralism?")

(4) As mentioned earlier, the concerns of the West European peace movements are almost exclusively West European; those of the peace movements in the United States are, in contrast, more global.

(5) The political pressures on the West European and American peace movements are of a different level and intensity. Since the demarcation of Eastern and Western Europe runs along the long border between East and West Germany, the uncomfortable political realities posed by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are experienced, and responded to, differently by peace groups in Western Europe and the U.S. The various levels of these perceptions have been discussed earlier in this section and are covered in great detail throughout the study.

(6) The different types of strategic and theater nuclear forces deployed (or slated for deployment) in the U.S. and Western Europe bring about a divergence of targeting, basing and policy issues between American and European peace groups. In the U.S., the peace groups are, above all, concerned with the U.S. strategic forces. In Europe, their opposition is focused on the Pershing IIs, GLCMs, and to a lesser degree, NATO tactical nuclear weapons. The image of Europe as a battleground is, of course, immensely heightened in the European countries.

(7) Europe is one of the most densely-populated areas of the world, and the deployment of the nuclear missiles in Europe has been, compared to the missile basing in some parts of the U.S., generally closer to highly-populated places. One of the suggestions of this study is that the new European missiles might be deployed in more remote areas, away from population centers; European fears that they would become targets of Soviet missiles attacking the bases might thereby be somewhat mitigated.***

* EMNID Institut, Aktueller Politischer Dienst, June 1982, pp. 49-56.

** See especially Sections II.B.2.a, II.B.2.c and II.B.2.e.

*** See Section VI.B. for a discussion of the targeting, basing and weapons issues relating to items (6) and (7).

VI. THE EUROPEAN NEGOTIATING MILIEU, SOME VARIATIONS OF SPECIFICS OF THE FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON EUROPEAN OPPOSITION

Many factors are involved in determining which, if any, variations in the specifics of the force modernization will make the program more acceptable to opposition groups in Europe. The effect of variations in the program on the political and military effectiveness of the force needs, of course, to be considered. Conversely, the likely reaction to variations that are constrained by criteria of political/military effectiveness will also be significant. There are, however, other elements which are equally as important, and these concern the international political and military environment and the domestic milieus within the NATO countries in which the missiles are to be deployed. They will, therefore, be discussed first in this section, followed by an analysis of the viability of certain force variations within these environments. There are also powerful factors other than the strictly political/military ones to be considered. Perhaps the most powerful--and possibly the most neglected by proponents of weapons systems--is the question of the morality of the decisions regarding weapons systems. These, too, will be considered here.

A. The East/West Relationship, Western Political Leadership, the Peace Movement and the Effort at Western Rearmament

1. The Political/Military Environment of the Force Deployment

The present European milieu affecting missile deployment decisions might best be examined by beginning with a question: Why is the effort to stop U.S. and NATO rearmament apparently having more of an impact today than it did in the 1950s, when there was a similarly strong public opposition to the U.S. and NATO military buildup? In the 1950s, as today, enormous peace efforts were being made by Social Democrats, trade unionists, pacifists, leftists and communists to prevent the rearmament of Germany. The Soviets even dangled the possibility of the reunification of Germany before West Germany as bait if she would not join NATO and rearm. The traditional feelings of Germany (and indeed of Europe) as a "third force" that could function in the vacuum between the radically new and experimental Soviet Union and the giant, traditional, technical, capitalist U.S. were already there. Indeed, the sense of being the "third force or bridge" between the Soviet Union and the technical, capitalist West had been rather strong in Germany in the 1920s, and the Treaty of Rapallo symbolized a German-Russian understanding at that time. It is likely that feelings of hopelessness similar to those that defeated Germany had after World War I led to the same kind of appeal of the "third-force" idea to those Germans who, according to one source, "felt it opportune to evade or deny the reality of pressing political choices."* (Of course,

* See David Gress, "What the West Should Know About German Neutralism," Commentary, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January 1983), pp. 26-31 for a discussion of this issue.

"third-force" ideas are also held outside Germany: e.g., de Gaulle's independent France; Britain's traditional "third-force" status--not European, but "of Europe," the balancing force for the continent, the bridge to the New World.)

A well-known, but not often-remembered, fact is that there was a great fear of both conventional and nuclear war in West Germany in the 1950s. Korea was looked on as a diversion from the real Soviet attack which was to engulf Europe. Moreover, for some, the election of President Eisenhower in 1952 intensified these fears because he was "a military man." The destructiveness of war was still fresh in the minds of the Germans and still obvious across the land.

In 1958, when tactical nuclear weapons were being brought to Germany, there were huge demonstrations and rallies, mostly by young people, against German rearmament in general and "atomic death" in particular; and the Easter marches began in West Germany and Great Britain. These demonstrations had support, not only from youth, but from large numbers of sympathizers from other population groups. Trade unions were involved, and in Germany the SPD gave considerable support to the movement against atomic weapons.* In fact, it is said that "the movement against rearmament that began in Germany in the late 1950s was led by the Social Democratic Party..." and there seemed to be a substantial following of this point of view at that time. In 1958, 120,000 people demonstrated in Hamburg against the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on German soil. A poll indicated that 83 percent of West Germans agreed with the position of the marchers, and over half of those surveyed said they would be ready to go on strike to prevent the installation of such weapons.**

Despite this fear, intense opposition and feverish activity of peace groups, particularly those with a strong leftist tinge, NATO went on with its buildup of conventional forces and the installation of tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, by 1959, the Social Democrats and the trade unions in Germany had changed their basic position on defense and come to accept Adenauer's entire package on foreign and defense policy.***

In the 1980s, however, the "peace movement" seems to be having more success than it did in the 1950s in weakening NATO governmental support for a force modernization program and for heavier defense expenditures in general. This does not appear to be necessarily the result of much greater opposition now than in the late 1950s to improved defense and nuclear weapons, or because of an increased fear of war of all kinds. In fact, the trade unions and the "hard-liners" of the SPD seem to have

* See Peter Merkl, "Pacifism in West Germany," in SAIS Review, No. 4 (Summer 1982), pp. 86-87.

** Abraham Ashkenasi, "Idealistic Protest: The New German Religiosity," The Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 1982/83), p. 263.

*** Merkl, p. 87.

the same attitude now that they had in 1959: "The hard-liners emphasized the traditional trade union/working class constituency of the party which valued jobs over environmental concerns, and international security with a well-armed NATO over risky experiments."* Moreover, there is considerable support in the CDU/CSU ranks for stronger defense measures. Even German public opinion against these weapons is no stronger than it was in the late 1950s. What then seems to be the difference?

Obviously, there will be huge variations in opinion among individuals and groups toward national security, the threat from the Soviet Union and various political issues. Many of these opinions are based on logical conclusions, and all take into consideration the increase in nuclear warheads and greater conventional forces in Europe since the 1950s. Most of these positions have been frequently, or continuously, aired publicly.

There is a point of view, however, which is seldom heard today but is well worth adding to these various opinions. Although this interpretation is usually satirized as being old cold-war rhetoric--and it does, in fact, overlap with the kinds of positions associated with that phrase and may appear relatively improper--it is as likely as any other to contribute to an understanding of European attitudes and behavior. Part of this interpretation can be, in effect, summarized by the phrase in the Bible which Maxwell Taylor once used for the title of a book: "If the trumpet be uncertain how shalt thou..."

It is very important to formulate a problem in terms that make clear what the problem is, and to not formulate it in ways which allow or encourage wishful thinking and counterproductive answers. It can be argued that an accurate formulation of the problem of the defense of Europe should include the consideration that the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West is basically ideological and not just one of national interest; that such confrontations almost invariably end up with the total defeat of one side and are rarely reconciled--and if reconciled, they take decades and centuries, not years to do so; that there are important changes going on in the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc, and that these changes have been, on balance, negative from the American viewpoint of this confrontation.

There are, of course, many opinions regarding the causes for the alleged changes. In particular, we note that West Europeans are in some real sense "tired," and despite the enormous economic success since World War II, their morale, their esprit, their political will, their sense of independence vis-à-vis the Soviets have not been restored. Part of the reason for this is the perceived military threat from the East and the dynamism, discipline and aggressiveness of the communists.

A second characteristic is what we may think of as intrinsic to Western leadership. Americans on the whole--and, remarkably, this is now true of Western Europeans--do not like periods of tension. They assume

* Ibid., p. 90.

that the tension will cost a great deal. This is clearly incorrect historically. One can characterize World War I as caused by arms races and tensions and World War II by insufficient arms races and insufficient tensions. It can be argued that today the morale of the West has been greatly eroded by antimilitary feelings and attitudes and some degree of wishful thinking in regard to Soviet behavior. From this point of view, any encouragement of entente is inadvisable, and for some it is felt to be the same as true detente. Now we are using the terms literally: entente to mean growing together, detente to mean a decrease in tension. Detente here has an element of both terms, particularly implying good-will missions, exchanges, and so on.

The reality of thermonuclear war is so forbidding and so terrifying that it is difficult for many people to face up to the possession of nuclear weapons by both the West and East and be willing to endure a high level of tension. In this atmosphere, anyone who challenges the basic premises of detente and Ostpolitik looks a bit strange. But it is very important to note that a different point of view, though perhaps not 100 percent right, may quite correctly describe the European situation and is one of several dependable perspectives.

From this standpoint, one is concerned that, in Germany, over 15 years of Ostpolitik have made detente with the Soviet Union extremely important. As indicated earlier, however, a view of East-West relations has developed which might be hard for the average American to understand. This view sees the Soviet Union as no real threat to the West. A still more questionable view, held by a significant minority of Germans, sees the Soviet Union and the U.S. having a quarrel (and by implication one having as righteous a position as the other) in which Europe and Germany should not be involved. The Greens have a most extreme position on this issue. One of the few things they are said to be able to agree on is a "bare-bones foreign policy, which casts the United States in the role of aggressor in the arms race and the Soviet Union as a passive, almost benign force."*

Moreover, what might be considered a somewhat strange attitude for an ally even seems to come through in some of the statements of important public figures in West Germany. Commenting on speeches by SPD members, including Mr. Apel and Mr. Vogel at a rally in Dortmund, The New York Times stated, "From the tone of speechmaking at Dortmund it was apparent that the Social Democrats do not feel they have to defend German interests against the Soviet Union but against the Reagan Administration. The inescapable message was that, unlike Chancellor Kohl, Mr. Vogel has the backbone to stand up to Washington."** There are even those in Europe who say that it is because the U.S. continues this quarrel with the Soviet

* James M. Markham, "Germany's Volatile Greens," The New York Times Magazine, February 13, 1983, p. 73.

** The New York Times, January 24, 1983, p. 1.

Union that Europe remains divided. To the extent that this refers to a free, united Europe, this is, of course, a strange position, one with which East Europeans do not agree.

Because of "detente"-type arrangements, such as the recent pipeline agreements between Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union, many East Europeans--for example, Poles and Hungarians--feel that Western Europe has conceded Soviet domination of their countries through fear and for selfish monetary gains. East Europeans see Russia and appeasement of Russia to be continuing the division of Europe, and they lose hope of West Europeans ever being effective in helping to reunite a free Europe. Eastern Europe lives with reality, and it hopes to bring this reality to Western Europe. Nonetheless, Western Europe continues to say that detente and Ostpolitik are for the good of all Europe, including Eastern Europe.

If the theory that some West Europeans have--that the U.S. is manipulating them for its own good in its quarrel with the Soviet Union and that both superpowers are equally to blame for the crisis--becomes more widely accepted, it may eventually threaten to divide the U.S. and Western Europe. As indicated earlier, there may come a time when the U.S. tires of being equated with the Soviet Union and its satellites, and having the President mentioned in the same breath as Mr. Andropov. It is, after all, the Soviet Union and its satellites which use human suffering for leverage in their international affairs. When East Germany wishes pressure to be brought on West Germany it cuts down on, or denies, West Germans access to relatives in East Germany. In the Soviet Union, the spigot is tightened or loosened on the emigration of Jews and others according to Soviet aims in foreign policy. Difficulties are made for Poles to go back and visit relatives in Poland, and Hungarians to Hungary. These are the kinds of actions in which the U.S. does not indulge. The dialogue has already become so warped that today it seems it has almost become bad form to mention that Mr. Andropov stepped out of fifteen years as head of the KGB, one of the largest, most dreaded and ruthlessly oppressive state secret police organizations in history. Instead, in this strange environment, it is the U.S. and its leaders who often must defend their record and intent to a seemingly growing minority of Europeans.

Though modern peace groups have accomplished some vital and welcome changes in the process of defense policy making (which will be discussed later), they have also added to this strange milieu. The dialogue of the peace groups, even of peace clerics, on both sides of the Atlantic has largely abandoned one of the major tenets of Western thought and theology on the issue. These groups no longer speak of peace with justice. "It is a profound mistake--but not uncommon--to discuss nuclear weapons as if the rough military symmetry between the superpowers were matched by a moral symmetry."* Modern "religious" pacifists seem to advocate a selfish

* James Finn, "Nuclear Terror: Moral Paradox," America (February 19, 1983), as quoted in Memo to Members, Freedom House, New York, N.Y., March 1983, p. 8.

peace at any price, and even what in the late 1930s used to be called appeasement. Moreover, the Greens, while appealing to the more hedonistic traits of young Germans, paradoxically have attacked materialism and linked this attack to disarmament.

2. Leadership and Declaratory Policy

The question still remains, however, why do so many influential West Europeans feel this way? Why do they tend to acquiesce in these ideas, and in particular, why do they do so now when they seemed less likely to do so in the 1950s? There are, of course, many reasons, but, as indicated earlier, some of the possible ones are not often mentioned. One reason undoubtedly might have been that in the 1950s the U.S. looked determined, was in the midst of a large rearmament program, and had nuclear dominance over the Soviets. The U.S. had succeeded, by force of arms, in keeping South Korea from being brought into the communist camp, and it had directly challenged communist expansionism elsewhere. Then came the Berlin crisis of 1959, which, by revealing the Russian danger close to the heart of Europe, helped to form European attitudes. There were, however, other differences which should not be forgotten.

Those were the Adenauer years. As mentioned in Section IV, Konrad Adenauer was a man of principle, stubborn in his belief that he was morally right, and he felt no compunction about not negotiating with the Soviets. Those were the days when it was felt that the reunification of Germany and Europe could only be brought about by pressures on the Soviet bloc. They were the days of the Hallstein doctrine, which stated that the government of the Federal Republic of Germany would break off diplomatic relations and consider it an affront if any nation recognized the so-called German Democratic Republic. At this time, the Eisenhower Administration first talked of "roll back" of communism in Eastern Europe, under the leadership of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. After 1956 and the Hungarian uprising, this declaratory policy was not so frequently referred to, but the administration continued active plans to stem communist expansionism. It was that administration which developed the initial, apparently workable, plans for the Bay of Pigs campaign.

In other words, in the 1950s, because of declaratory and action policies, the U.S. government probably appeared strong and as though it considered itself morally right, and looked even somewhat committed to preventing or rolling back the expansion of communism and communist influence. Furthermore, the West German government had a similar attitude. Certainly, our actions were not deterred at that time simply because the Soviets might brand them as "destabilizing." It might not have looked then as though the Soviets were the inevitable winners and Soviet communist hegemony was the wave of the future in the inevitable movement of history.

In the 1980s, however, large pluralities of the population in the NATO alliance feel that the Soviet Union is militarily stronger than the U.S.; and because the U.S. slowed down its development and deployment of new strategic weapons systems in 1965 and the allies neglected their

defense efforts, it might literally be true. Furthermore, in 1961, the Soviets broke their formal agreements with Britain, France, and the U.S. and built the Berlin Wall; and nobody in the allied Berlin garrison raised a finger to stop them. In addition, there was the Soviet suppression of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia and our allies' acquiescence to the "Brezhnev Doctrine," which stated that everything east of the Iron Curtain must be formally recognized by Western powers as the Soviet "sphere of influence" and that no contacts could be made with these countries by Western Europe for political purposes without going through Moscow. There was no quid pro quo here, however. Everything west of the Iron Curtain was not considered a U.S. sphere of influence; and Moscow continued to deal individually and independently on political issues with West European countries and pressure groups within them, without going through or even informing Washington.

By 1973 there had been the Vietnam debacle, followed quickly by the takeover of Angola by the Soviets through their tens of thousands of Cuban "gurkhas"; then Ethiopia; then efforts at takeovers in the Caribbean; and finally Nicaragua. In all these situations the U.S. might well have looked impotent. Meanwhile, the Soviets continued to make it clear that people in their "sphere of influence" would not be allowed to change camps. When the Afghans attempted to throw out their puppet communist government, the Soviets quickly sent in 100,000 men, countless tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, planes and helicopters--even though Afghanistan is not in the "vital" Warsaw Pact area and did not present a "threat" from Western Europe to the "security of the socialist motherland." Throughout this period many citizens and even government leaders of the West European allies became more and more vocal in their complaints, both officially and unofficially, against U.S. foreign policy aimed at attempting to stop what the U.S. considered to be communist takeovers outside Europe.*

Some members of the European peace movement do not seem to be aware that when they condemn the U.S. for fostering violence, yet tolerate the violence of Marxist guerrillas, the issue need not be solely one of war and peace, but could be one of "left-right" political ideology. Nor do they see the inconsistency of pointing out the flaws of anti-Marxist leaders and rationalizing away the aberrations of the leaders of the communist world. These attitudes are not limited to West Europeans--they can be found among Americans, but they are generally not so widespread nor held by people as prominent as those in Europe.

It is quite likely that the U.S. is paying the price for losing in Vietnam. Some have attributed events in Angola, Nicaragua and El Salvador to this Vietnam failure. Today it is possible to say that the Soviets could be the eventual winners in the ongoing, worldwide communist/anti-communist confrontation. This has, of course, largely to do with the

* See Section IV.

present lack of U.S. military superiority over the Soviets and our less-than-satisfactory recent history in opposing communism.

But there is also something else involved. Throughout the 1970s, the U.S. was generally less dynamic in its foreign policy and was, in fact, usually on the defensive. The U.S. appeared as if it were morally insecure in its defense and foreign policies (and in part of the defense policy--e.g., the Mutual Assured Destruction declaratory policy--it probably should have been). U.S. leaders might have started to lose the look of men of principle who were dedicated to a highly moral goal of defending people against the incursion of communist totalitarianism. U.S. leadership may have looked weaker than the Russian; its ideological commitment may have also looked weaker. It is said that Egon Bahr, who "admits he was once a cold war opponent of the Ostzone" (East Zone of Germany), changed his mind when President Kennedy did nothing about the Berlin Wall: "And Bahr knew which side he respected. The Soviets had will, character, resolution; they could do the unthinkable. The Americans were all rhetoric, public relations and indifference."*

As the European allies increased their influence over the U.S. in foreign policy, European leaders began to argue that "rigid" U.S. policies were unwise. Some of this criticism may have stemmed from possible European weakness in the face of an adamant Soviet bloc, increasing in military strength; certainly there have been no leaders in Germany to compare with Adenauer in confrontations with the Soviets. Edward Pearce compares the Ostpolitik to the Osthilfe of the Weimar government for Prussia, which "however rationalized, was given in quivering fear to the strong and needy." Pearce suggests that current West German policy toward the East reflects "timidity and infinite capacity for self-deception."** Under these circumstances, with much of Western Europe in fear of the Soviet Union and/or wanting Eastern trade, it probably appeared simpler for many Europeans to rationalize away much of what went on behind the Iron Curtain--and even the Iron Curtain itself--and take out their frustrations on the "weaker," more compliant of the two superpowers. The U.S. apparently became a target for these frustrations (as did Great Britain after World War II, when it withdrew from its previous role as a world power). American media and policy makers, no doubt influenced by the European media, began to concentrate on these "anti" groups while virtually ignoring the opinions of other Europeans who were of a very different mind.

In opinion surveys, the majority of West Europeans have not put U.S. policies toward Europe and NATO--or even defense issues--at the top of the list of problems that concern them most. By and large, Europeans have been more concerned with the economy, and large numbers have not felt hostile toward the U.S. or believed the U.S. was "using" them. Far from giving these Europeans something to rally round, the U.S. has often

* Edward Pearce, "Delusions About the Pipeline," Encounter (November 1982), p. 39.

** Ibid., p. 38.

ignored them or did not know they were there.* This does not mean that heavy-handed U.S. meddling in European politics or decision-making is called for; but it meant acknowledging like-minded people and not giving exclusive attention to those who criticized the U.S. and its policies. In some cases, the critics did represent a significant number of average Europeans; but frequently full attention and publicity were given to small groups, particularly those in Germany. Since the U.S. endured these European criticisms--and indeed even tried to adjust its policy to take them into consideration--many of the current European defense and foreign policy positions, so puzzling to many Americans, were, in effect, encouraged.

Had the Europeans been dealing with a U.S. with a "no-nonsense" attitude that cared more for U.S. interests and the danger to liberty around the world than for European censure, these European positions might have been more restrained. Even the French have gained more with their firm policy in dealing with other West Europeans in the European Economic Community and elsewhere. In fact, by having encouraged detente and Ostpolitik and having done little to discourage Western Europe's fading sense of responsibility in the defense area (or even in areas such as East-West trade) in the past, the U.S. is not without some responsibility for the now rather deeply-ingrained self-indulgence in Western Europe today.**

In any event, a sizable minority of Europeans now say they trust the Soviet Union more than the U.S., even on the issue of starting a nuclear

* U.S. television network news bureaus seemed generally unaware of trends in the 1983 West German election campaign until two or three days before election day, and some TV broadcasters failed even then to recognize what was happening.

** In the mid-1960s some Western analysts warned of the danger of this policy and U.S. encouragement of it. See European Trends and Issues, Part III, "The Detente and its Possible Effects on European and U.S. Policy" by Frank Armbruster, HI-682-D/3, April 28, 1966 for a long discussion of the danger of weakening the structure of the Western Alliance and the morale of its individual members. See especially pp. 23-25 for a discussion of such dangers stemming from the Ostpolitik of West Germany. This section warns, among other things, of the dangers of "left-wing neutralist agitation from within" and "the cries of alarm about the effect on West Germany (and other European allies) of U.S. opposition to Communist aggression elsewhere in the world that would assail the President with each new confrontation--that is, the claims that he is throwing away Europe for Guatemala, South Vietnam, Laos, etc.--may come closer to being persuasive, because they would come much closer to being true."

See also European Trends and Issues, Part I, "Themes for Alternative West European Futures," by Frank Armbruster, HI-682-D/1, April 8, 1966 for a discussion of U.S. and other NATO-allied approval of the Ostpolitik. On page 23 the author notes: "In his Ost memorandum, Willy Brandt pointedly introduced his report with statements from President Johnson, former President Kennedy, Couve de Murville, President de Gaulle, and Lord Hume, lending their approval."

war (see European public opinion survey data in Section II). Some say the Soviets are arming "defensively" because of the military power of the West. (One cannot help but be reminded of Nazi Germany's declared fears of an attack by Poland in 1939.) European public opinion survey data included in the "country" parts of Section II of this study imply that some even feel that failing to build up their weapons arsenal is as good a way to achieve national security as arming oneself against the powerful military threat to the East. Such attitudes, and perhaps even more so, the preoccupation with detente and Ostpolitik, often make for difficult U.S.-West European relations:

For a period, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and American determination to make the Soviet Union pay a heavy price for its actions dominated the political scene, and arms control faded into the background. European nations, however, were for the most part uneasy about the direction of American policy and reluctant to support actions which in their view would seriously undermine the East-West relationship, particularly the degree of stability in Europe that had been carefully nurtured in the past decade.*

Finally, from the start, the West German government "qualified its position" regarding the force modernization program because, as it was reported, "the desire to enhance German security through modernization was matched by an acute awareness of the need not to jeopardize the political gains Bonn had achieved in terms of improved relations with the East."**

It would be wrong to suggest that American actions could cause Europe to quickly return to its attitude of the 1950s. Europe and the U.S. have let the Soviets get too far ahead militarily. But, more importantly, possibly due to the implementation of the Ostpolitik, and perhaps partly because of American weakness in foreign policy, West European morale has eroded too far. The U.S. might, however, be able to do more than some would expect to reduce the drift of European foreign and defense policies toward accommodation with the Soviet bloc--or at least reduce European attacks on U.S. policies--by stressing its own demands in these areas. Furthermore, a stiffening of the U.S. position would not necessarily be counterproductive with the Soviets. The countries that in the past fared best in relations with the Soviet Union, as far as independent, self-interested actions are concerned, have usually been those that acted firmly with them, often regardless of their military strength, e.g., Nazi Germany, Tito's Yugoslavia, Communist China and even Adenauer's West Germany.

* The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces, report prepared by the C.R.S. for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, December 31, 1980, pp. 39-40.

** Ibid., p. 26.

The first questions which suggest themselves at the mention of stiffer U.S. "leadership" in NATO foreign and defense policies are the following: Would the U.S. president attempt it? Which European leaders, if any, would support him? What would opposition be like in the U.S. and Europe? These questions raise a corollary set of questions: Could the U.S. government develop policies and defend its position in ways which would allow it to seize the moral initiative? Could West European governments do the same? Would the U.S. president be willing to use strong leverage on Europeans to keep them in line and perhaps press them to shoulder a larger share of the burden of defending Europe?

Although some may see such a shift in U.S. and NATO policy as highly desirable from the U.S. point of view, and, in the long run, even for Western Europe, the conditions necessary for the move are hardly propitious. Although there are presently conservative governments and leaders in Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany, the media, public opinion, opposition parties, members of their coalition partners and even some members of their own parties are weak on the defense issue and are now comfortable in condemning the U.S. for trying to "dictate" policy to them. An American president who took such a course would need enough bipartisan backing at home to withstand not only the opposition from Europe, but from the "left" in the U.S., much of the "East Coast elite," much of the media, and many "intellectuals." It is unlikely that a U.S. president will receive that kind of backing in the U.S. today, and it is even more unlikely that all, or perhaps even most, political leaders in Europe would support him. Of course, if the President took the proposition of a "no-nonsense" policy on Europe directly to the American people, if he spelled out what the NATO alliance is costing us and what we are not getting out of it, and if he had a sound moral basis for all the issues involved, the public response might be so strong that he might well steamroller his political opposition. That would be, however, a drastic step to take, particularly with little support from Europe.*

On the other hand, a little firm "leadership" should never be underestimated as a rallying point around which people of like mind can gather. A case in point was Mitterand's statements to the Germans in January 1983 on the force modernization program. At the risk of being accused of interfering in the West German election campaign, he came out in support of the CDU/CSU's position favorable to the installation of the new weapons on German soil, and, in effect, reminded his fellow socialists in the SPD of their responsibility to support NATO and the defense of their nation. The result was some upsurge of support in the German press for the CDU/CSU's position. Mitterand's speech came the same day that, in a burst of "left patriotism," Mr. Vogel "demanded" the U.S. move from the zero-option position, and The New York Times speculated that the SPD had "hedged so far and so fast as

* We might look for support for the force modernization part of such a policy from Mitterand, but not for other parts of it. Some British journalists also seem to be in favor of a firm U.S. line with Germany over her new Osthilfe plan. (See for example, Edward Pearce in Encounter [November 1982], p. 37.)

to make full deployment [of GLCMs and Pershing IIs] under a Vogel government extremely unlikely."* (Kohl said that Mitterand's statement was worth three percentage points for the CDU/CSU in the March 6th election.)

But Mitterand's statements and the attitude of French officials and French news media should not be regarded only in light of the West German election. Among other things, they may give a clue to the role that "like-minded" Europeans might expect of the U.S. First of all, it was reported that "to many the speech really reflected a deeper change in French attitudes toward West Germany, and France's willingness now to say out loud what is often thought, but sublimated in other allied countries: that the question of maintaining West Germany's involvement in the West is now a serious one, and the key stake in the outcome is the missile issue." In his speech, Mitterand said the missile debate was "less one of numbers than of political will for the Atlantic alliance, in this attempt to decouple the United States and Western Europe."** Mr. Apel of the SPD seemed to underline this view when he said that the Reagan Administration had to craft a position "that takes into consideration European interests, otherwise the alliance is in genuine danger."*** There are some German public opinion surveys that may lead one to conclude that if the SPD anti-missile policy is seen to be likely to "decouple" the U.S. from West Germany, opposition to the missiles and even to U.S. leadership might lessen; indeed, this feeling may have cost the SPD at the polls in March of 1983.****

French TV began to talk of Germany as the alliance's "soft underbelly," and Le Monde asked whether Germany could any longer be France's "eastern bulwark," or was it about to "concede to the Soviet Union a kind of veto power over its means of defense." Some French government officials are said to now be of the opinion that "segments of the West German political class are dominated by a desire for accommodation with the Soviet Union." It is reported that, "...the French are waiting to see if the United States considers the problem, regardless of its discomfort, as one meriting public discussion."*****

Though there is no evidence that large majorities of Europeans trust President Reagan's judgment (or indeed that in some countries the majority even trust the judgment of Americans at all on foreign policy issues), there is strong evidence that the Europeans do not want to split with the U.S. on NATO. Furthermore, despite the problems of the "negotiating

*"The Bonn Opposition Seizes Campaign Issue," The New York Times, January 24, 1983, p. 1.

**"Missile Debate Widens," The New York Times, January 24, 1983, p. 1.

***"The Bonn Opposition Seizes Campaign Issue," p. 1.

**** See Section II.B.2 and the Appendix for opinion surveys on traditional German desires for close ties with the United States.

*****"Missile Debate Widens," p. 1.

environment" mentioned above, the attitude among average Europeans is pro-American--at least compared to pro-Soviet--and European politicians may not have as much freedom to ignore the U.S. as some might think. As we have seen, public opinion surveys of European countries seem to indicate that people want to keep up the friendship with the U.S., really trust the U.S. more than the Soviets (and, in fact, fear the Soviets) and are sensitive to American attitudes on certain matters, particularly those having to do with the U.S. role in NATO. Therefore, with a morally-strong defense posture recommendation for NATO, the president and the U.S. would probably have considerable leverage on European NATO countries. Exercising this ability to use American leadership, in conjunction with morally-sound, militarily and politically effective defense recommendations, might help NATO supporters and their leaders in Europe to have something to rally around. Variations in a defense program which placate the opposition are, of course, an important way to get a program accepted; but rallying existing supporters, giving them a defensible program as well as useful arguments to enable them to defend their position, and using American influence to see that their leaders and spokesmen have a fair hearing in their governments, are also important actions to get programs accepted. As indicated earlier, however, this is a difficult and sensitive undertaking, particularly if there is significant opposition in the U.S. Congress and/or among the American public.

A "surprise-free" scenario for the U.S. position on NATO policy contemplates some stiffening of our position, but no sharp turn to a strong leadership and firm policy position (though the French attitude referred to above may improve its chances, and a firm position might increase NATO's opposition to the Soviets). A noticeable willingness for some movement in that direction is more likely under the Reagan Administration than it was under the previous one, particularly if the Western economy should recover well. The suggestions in Part B of this section, to alter specifics of the force modernization program to improve the probability of acceptance in Europe, are based on such assumptions.

3. Today's Evolving Peace Movement

Against the background outlined above, some other important changes have taken place which could significantly affect the development of defense policies. Perhaps one of the most important is that the current peace movement has raised the level of the debate over nuclear weapons, perhaps largely through the involvement of members of the clergy, by stressing overriding moral issues. From this point of view, the current NATO nuclear weapons policy, possibly including a large part of the force modernization program, may be on very weak ground.* Today's peace activity has encouraged weapons proponents to consider the moral issues raised by the design, manufacture, deployment and use of nuclear weapons, which, as mentioned earlier, have traditionally received little emphasis by these proponents. Now, fortunately, though belatedly, this crucial moral factor will receive more consideration in making policies for weapons' development and use.

*This issue will be discussed in Part B of this section.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the peace movement took on a more legitimate and respectable appearance by basing the immorality of nuclear weapons on the killing of innocents and on excessive destruction and numbers of dead on both sides. But this new aspect of the debate over the weapons often follows a neo-theological "half argument," taken from part of the traditional Christian Just War Doctrine, that places much emphasis on "peace" and little on "with justice." In addition, while leaning heavily on the doctrinal rule of proportionality that stresses the immorality of weapons because of the "disproportionate" destruction they cause, the pacifists say the old Just War Doctrine no longer applies to nuclear weapons: they often seem to ignore the impressive increases in accuracy, drastic reductions in warhead yield (perhaps even down to conventional explosives) and great changes in potential targets. Whether or not these weapons can meet the Just War-Docctrine criteria of use may hinge on complex technical issues that would give pause to an objective theologian, at least on the question of permanently foreclosing the option for the Western alliance to own the weapons.

In any event, the current peace movement has developed arguments--and speaks in a language--quite different from those of the pacifists of the 1950s. The original source of the introduction of this new rhetoric may be "involved" clerics. This would differentiate the current peace movement from the one of the 1950s in a very significant way. In the 1950s, both in Europe and the U.S., organizations connected with the church and, with few exceptions, clerics tended to shy away from these issues. Today, however, members of the hierarchy of the church and ad hoc committees of the hierarchy and other clerics have taken a much more outspoken position on the issue. The 1981 memorandum of the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD), "The Preservation, Promotion and Renewal of Peace" (authorized version), while admitting to opposing points of view, basically takes the position that the traditional Christian Just War Doctrine does not apply where nuclear weapons are involved.* According to an article in The Economist of February 5, 1983, however, in October 1982 the EKD "declared that 'taking part in nuclear deterrence was still Christian.'"

The article indicates that opposition to much of the 1981 memorandum is now becoming evident in Europe. "Even in Holland...[Catholic] auxiliary Bishop of Rotterdam, Ronald Baer, argues that the church is not a 'pacifist movement'," and accuses the Dutch branch of Pax Christi of "a violation of the strict separation of faith and politics." The Pope's message to the United Nations last June stated that, "in current conditions, deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way towards progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable." While commending the anti-nuclear people for their "profound and sincere desire for peace" the Pope noted that "their projects, proposals and policies...can often lend themselves to political exploitation."

* Special issue of the EKD Bulletin, October 1981. The EKD is a central council for the Lutheran church in Germany.

** "Church and Bomb," The Economist, February 5, 1983, pp. 19-22.

The Economist reports that West Germany's Cardinal Hoffner (the "head of the Catholic hierarchy in the FRG") takes a position similar to the Pope's. So does Cardinal Hume, the chairman of the Roman Catholic Bishop's Conference of England and Wales. The Church of England recently took up last October's "working party's report" and faced not only a "more temperate and Christian answer...by the Church of England's board of social responsibility," but also the Bishop of London. He charged that the first paper (the working party's report) "makes this issue of nuclear weapons 'a moral prescription without qualification' and 'removes the necessity to consider the demands made by many other issues, such as those of the preservation of liberty, truth, and human dignity.'" The paper by the board of social responsibility, on the other hand, implies that the Just War Doctrine can still be applied. Even on the question of proportionality, "the Church of England's board of social responsibility observes that the 'harm to be avoided' may still even be greater." The Economist's writer adds that because of the board's position on the "principle of discrimination," this, among other things, "also suggests that if nuclear weapons remain in use, it is better to have the newer, more accurate sort (which could in some circumstances discriminate between legitimate targets and civilian populations) rather than the old blast-and-radioactive-cloud brutes."

The Pastoral Letter of the Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in the U.S. seems to be saying something similar to the 1981 EKD memorandum; that is, many of the tenets of the Just War Doctrine no longer apply because of nuclear weapons. But in the U.S. there also seem to be "opposing points of view," some of them held with great conviction, both among the Catholic clerics and laity and the Catholic Bishops themselves. Referring to those who, in effect, consider the Just War Doctrine inapplicable where nuclear weapons are involved, one priest writes:

Some Catholic Bishops of the United States appear to have concluded that, in light of current technical developments in the U.S. weapons systems employing the use of nuclear energy, the moral use of such weapons systems is no longer a viable possibility. As a consequence, some advocate civil disobedience while others opt for unilateral disarmament. One may wonder if such Prelates have thought through the implications and possible consequences of the actions they advocate. One may also wonder whether they have carefully considered their own competence in the highly complex field in which they have presumed to pontificate. One may also note that such personal judgments do not seem to be in agreement with the more authoritative statements of the Church.*

* Rev. E.J. Sweeney, "The Bishops and National Security," The Wanderer, February 10, 1983, p. 1. (Reverend Sweeney became a priest after retiring from the U.S. Army as a colonel. He is a graduate of West Point and the National War College and worked in strategic war planning for the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

A position which apparently differs from that of the Bishops was expressed by Bishop John J. O'Connor, a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace of the National Catholic Council of Bishops drafting the Pastoral Letter, who stated:

I've consistently taken the position that it's our responsibility to present as clearly as we can those moral and theological principles which we feel should be followed by policymakers in the development of political and military doctrine. I felt that I didn't have the technical expertise to address specific military tactics. I tried to be in accord with the Holy Father's approach on that point.*

Bishop O'Connor also stressed that the Popes always talked about "peace with justice" and that good intentions are not enough to bring about peace.** Abandoning the traditional teachings on morality in war given out by the saintly and brilliant Doctors of the Church and profound theologians of all Christian denominations, as well as by the Popes down to John Paul II, leaves Christians little in the way of guidance. Many Christians, including clerics, seem to instinctively feel that there must be a morally-acceptable, better way to cope with this problem than some of those proposed by the pacifists: foreclosing forever the option to build improved weapons systems or adopting unilateral disarmament in the face of an expansionist, heavily-armed Soviet bloc. Bishop Edward O'Rourke of the Peoria Diocese "expressed agreement with the...view that the U.S. should develop weapons that could more precisely target military instead of civilian targets....'That,' he said, 'could limit the death and destruction of a nuclear exchange. This has not been adequately addressed by the Pastoral draft,' he said. 'The entire freeze movement hasn't talked this through.'*** Yet in the West today, some clerics seem to have, in effect, already taken positions from which one might infer that the Just War Doctrine no longer applies, and some have become active in the peace movements.

There are several theories, most of which seem questionable, as to why this is happening now and did not happen in the 1950s. For example, it is said that in Germany in the 1950s, clerics were still too guilt-ridden about their inactivity under Hitler to speak out. Yet U.S. clerics at the time did not share these guilt feelings and they also did not speak

*"Peace with Justice...Bishop O'Connor Outlines Views on Pastoral," Catholic New York, Vol. 11, No. 12 (December 12, 1982), p. 4.

**Dr. Timothy A. Mitchell, "Bishop O'Connor Analyzes Bishops' Pastoral," The Wanderer, December 9, 1982, p. 1. See also the writings of Archbishop Philip M. Hannan of New Orleans, La., in The Wanderer of November 25, 1982, p. 1, and the discussion of the Pastoral in Catholic New York, November 28, 1982, pp. 4-7.

***"Bishop Edward O'Rourke Backs Congressmen Critical of Pastoral," The Wanderer, January 13, 1983, pp. 1, 8.

out on defense issues. That, we are told, was because U.S. Catholic clerics still reflected the "immigrant syndrome" of having to be superpatriots to prove their loyalty. Of course, there was also little pacifist activism among the "native" American Protestant clergy and among non-German, European Catholic or Protestant clergy.

The increase in peace activism among the clergy today might be caused by a number of things: (1) raised levels of conscience because of broader public discussion of the issues; (2) the acceptance, and even the acclaim, the peace movement and activists get from the media, academia, and elsewhere; (3) the general "liberalization" of clerical behavior since the 1960s; (4) the effect of the misinterpretation of the encyclical Pacem in Terris and documents issued by leaders of other churches in the 1960s; and (5) other factors, which also disturb laymen, such as the increase in the number of nuclear weapons. But whatever the cause, since the 1960s, some clerics have been in the "movement," and the "movement" has had a direct or indirect clerical input to the rhetoric and the neo-theological "half arguments."


This phenomenon has had two effects: first, it has led to the idea that "the church" is the motivating force, and indeed, perhaps to some extent, the teaching and directing element of the peace movement. Insofar as this may be taken to mean that the word is spread to activists from the pulpits by pacifist clergy and through religious newspapers and magazines, this almost certainly is not true, as we have seen.* Typical peace activists in West Germany, for example, are young and seldom go to church or read religious news material. Cleric activists do, of course, lend prestige to the "movement"; but it would be a stretch of the imagination to suggest that the normal peace activist in West Germany has particular respect for clerics, their way of life or their ideas. These people do not follow clerics. They will, of course, endorse a "church-sponsored" peace rally and join many other people to flock to it (or a Communist and/or atheist-sponsored rally), and they will readily take up the portions of the Christian doctrine which support their position while avoiding those which do not.

Despite the salutary effects mentioned earlier, the European peace movement is more troublesome than a truly theological or church-led movement. It involves clerics and engages in theological discussions with which many feel comfortable. Further, it uses half arguments which have in them points that are in and of themselves correct and must be a vital part of the nuclear weapons issue. For example, implementing the "assured destruction" policy--striking crowded cities with nuclear weapons--is an evil idea. The problem arises, however, in the other half of the peace movement's argument. These pacifists insist that nuclear (and some even add, conventional) wars cannot be limited or even controlled--a conclusion almost overwhelmingly dependent upon technical issues--and that if we wish not to be evil, we must unilaterally not improve or increase, and must even do away with, our weapons.

* See Section 11.B.2.c.

It would probably be better in this case if we were dealing with a truly theologian-led movement. Theologians usually will weigh issues on strictly moral grounds. They will, for example, consider what happens to justice under some kinds of "peace"; they will also listen to arguments by technicians about how one can preserve justice without undue destruction in war before they will recommend capitulation.

Unlike the 1950s, therefore, today we have a peace movement which has a tendentious theological approach--e.g., emphasizing the "peace" of the Just War Doctrine, but not stressing preserving justice--along with the usual left-wing elements (since the enemy is on the left) and traditional pacifists. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, on some issues of morality, they are correct. In regard to these issues, defense officials must make morally responsible weapons policy decisions and learn to speak to these issues in a way that can convince moralists. This, as mentioned earlier, is considerably different from the 1950s, but it is an improvement. The other, often politically- and economically-based arguments--e.g., guns versus butter, more arms, more tensions--some of which have been mentioned above, have not changed much.

Appendix: Part ISUPPORTING TABLES AND CHARTS TO SECTIONS ON
WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD DOMESTIC
AND POLITICAL ISSUESSATISFACTION WITH LIFE YOU LEAD, 1973-1980
TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 15 AND OLDER

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY, 1973-1980
TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 15 AND OLDER

QUESTION: "ON THE WHOLE, ARE YOU VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED, OR NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS (IN YOUR COUNTRY)?"

	1973 IX	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
VERY SATISFIED	5	13	11	9	9	9	10	12	9
FAIRLY SATISFIED	39	66	67	69	67	68	70	68	64
NOT VERY SATISFIED	44	16	16	16	16	15	13	12	17
NOT AT ALL SATISFIED	11	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	4
NO REPLY	1	2	4	4	5	6	5	6	6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLL IN EURO-BAROMETRE, NO. 14, DECEMBER 1980.

VOTER TURNOUT IN STATE ELECTIONS SINCE 1949, WEST GERMANY
(PERCENT)

DATE	SCHLES- WIG-HOL- STEIN	HAMBURG	LOWER SAXONY	BREMEN	NORTH RHINE- WESTFALEN	HESSEN	RHINE- LAND- PFALZ	BADEN WURTEMBERG	BAVARIA	SAAR- LAND	WEST BERLIN
BEFORE 1949*	69.8	79.0	65.1	67.8	67.3	73.2	77.9	69.8	75.5	95.7	86.3
1949 - 1953	78.2	70.5	75.8	83.3	72.3	64.9	74.8	63.7	79.9	93.1	90.4
1953 - 1957	78.6	80.9	77.5	84.0	72.6	82.4	76.0	70.3	82.4	90.3	91.8
1957 - 1961	78.7	77.3	78.0	79.2	76.6	82.3	77.2	59.0	76.6	79.1	92.9
1961 - 1965	70.1	72.3	76.3	76.1	73.4	77.7	75.5	67.7	76.5	81.8	89.9
1965 - 1969	74.1	69.8	75.8	77.0	76.5	81.0	78.5	70.7	80.6	--	86.2
1969 - 1972	79.2	73.4	76.7	80.0	73.5	82.8	79.4	80.0	79.5	83.1	88.9
1972 - 1976	82.3	80.4	84.4	82.2	86.1	84.8	80.8	75.5	77.7	88.8	87.8
AFTER 1976	83.3	76.6	78.5	78.5	80.0	87.7	81.4	72.1	76.6	85.0	85.0
AVERAGE	77.14	75.58	76.52	78.68	75.37	79.64	77.94	69.87	78.39	87.11	88.80
OVERALL AVERAGE:	78.6%										

A-1-3



*STATE ELECTIONS THAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS.

SOURCE: ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E17.

POLITICAL POSITION

WEST GERMANY, BY AGE, NOVEMBER 1978

"HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR OWN
POLITICAL POSITION?"




SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CT.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 149.

POLITICAL POSITION

WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER, BY PARTY PREFERENCE, NOVEMBER 1978

"HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR OWN
POLITICAL POSITION?"




SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CT.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 149.

POLITICAL POSITION

WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER, BY POLITICAL INTEREST, NOVEMBER 1978

"HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR OWN POLITICAL POSITION?"




SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CT.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 149.

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' POLITICAL INTEREST

"ARE YOU INTERESTED IN POLITICS?"

TOTAL WEST GERMAN STUDENTS, DECEMBER 1978



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CT.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 273.


A-1-8

Appendix: Part II

SUPPORTING TABLES AND CHARTS TO SECTIONS ON WEST GERMAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFENSE, SECURITY,
AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

AN AUSTRIAN-LIKE NEUTRALITY FOR GERMANY?

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981




SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN DER SPIEGEL, VOL. 35, NO. 49 (NOVEMBER 30, 1981), P. 94.

NEUTRALISTS AND AMERICAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL
FALL 1981

ONLY THOSE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE IN FAVOR OF A NEUTRAL GERMANY (35 PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION) WERE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:

"SINCE YOU ARE IN FAVOR OF A NEUTRAL GERMANY, WOULD YOU THEN WELCOME THE DEPARTURE OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM GERMANY?"




SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 4, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

NEUTRALISTS AND THE AMERICAN PRESENCE
FALL 1981

QUESTION ASKED ONLY OF THE NEUTRALISTS (35 PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION)

"IS THE FOLLOWING OFT-REPEATED AND FAMILIAR STATEMENT TRUE OR FALSE? 'WITHOUT THE AMERICANS ALL WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST'?"




SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A
NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 4, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN
INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

NEED FOR A WESTERN ALLIANCE

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981

"THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY NEEDS A POLITICAL AND MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. A NEUTRAL GERMANY WOULD BE ISOLATED AND INSUFFICIENTLY ABLE TO RESIST THE PRESSURE OF THE SOVIET UNION. DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE?"



SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 4, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

NEUTRALITY OR AN ALLIANCE, 1961-1978
TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

QUESTION: "WHICH DO YOU THINK WOULD BE THE BETTER FOREIGN
 POLICY: SHOULD WE REMAIN MILITARILY ALLIED WITH
 THE U.S. OR SHOULD WE ATTEMPT TO BE NEUTRAL?"*

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1978</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S.	40	46	44	41	51	49	57
BE NEUTRAL	42	37	38	42	38	36	27
UNDECIDED. DON'T KNOW	<u>18</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>16</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*WORDING OF THE QUESTION 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1974: "WHICH DO YOU THINK
 WOULD BE THE BETTER FOREIGN POLICY: SHOULD WE REMAIN MILITARILY ALLIED WITH
 THE U.S. OR SHOULD WE ATTEMPT TO BE NEUTRAL, AS FOR EXAMPLE, SWITZERLAND?"


SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E4.

NUCLEAR WAR OR DOMINATION

WEST GERMANY, BY SEX, AGE, AND POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE, JULY 1981

"NO ONE KNOWS WHAT WILL HAPPEN, BUT WHAT DO YOU THINK--IF WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE CHOICE OF EITHER LETTING EUROPE BECOME SOVIET OR RESISTING THE MOVE WITH EVERY MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL, WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT, TO DEFEND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM, EVEN IF IT LEADS TO A NUCLEAR WAR, OR TO AVOID WAR ABOVE ALL, EVEN THOUGH IT MEANS HAVING TO LIVE UNDER A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT?"

"AVOID WAR ABOVE ALL" RESPONSES



SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 34.

RUSSIAN THREAT, 1952-1980

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

QUESTION: "DO YOU HAVE THE FEELING THAT WE ARE OR ARE NOT THREATENED
BY RUSSIA (1980: "BY THE EAST")?"


	1952	1958	1964	1968	1969	1971	1976	1979	1980
	<u>JULY</u>	<u>MAR.</u>	<u>NOV.</u>	<u>NOV.</u>	<u>SEPT.</u>	<u>APR.</u>	<u>AUG.</u>	<u>FEB.</u>	<u>JAN.</u>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
ARE THREATENED	66	51	39	54	32	28	47	35	63
ARE NOT THREATENED	15	27	37	32	55	46	38	46	28
UNDECIDED	<u>19</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>9</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E3.

EASTERN THREAT

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981

"IS GERMANY THREATENED BY THE EAST?"




SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 3, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

WORRY ABOUT THREAT FROM THE EAST
WEST GERMANY, BY AGE, MAY & JULY 1981

"DO YOU WORRY ABOUT OUR BEING THREATENED BY THE EAST, OR NOT?"

"WORRY" RESPONSES



SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 25.

PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE, 1956-1980

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

QUESTION: "DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE WEST AND THE EAST CAN
PEACEFULLY CO-EXIST, OR DON'T YOU BELIEVE SO?"

	<u>1956</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1959</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1962</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1976</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1979</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1980</u> <u>%</u>
CAN PEACEFULLY CO-EXIST	46	46	36	49	56	53
DON'T BELIEVE SO	40	38	51	33	27	34
NO OPINION	<u>14</u> 100	<u>16</u> 100	<u>13</u> 100	<u>18</u> 100	<u>17</u> 100	<u>13</u> 100

SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E4.

RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD DETENTE, 1976-1980



TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

QUESTION: "HERE TWO MEN ARE HAVING A CONVERSATION ABOUT
RUSSIA. WITH WHICH OF THEM WOULD YOU TEND TO
AGREE?"

	<u>1976</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1977</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1980</u> <u>%</u>
"I THINK THE RUSSIANS ABUSE OUR WILLINGNESS TO RECONCILE WITH THE EAST. THEY USE OUR WILLINGNESS TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO FURTHER EXPAND THEIR POWER IN THE WORLD."	62	60	68
"I THINK THE RUSSIANS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THE POLITICS OF DETENTE. THEY DON'T ABUSE OUR TRUST IN ORDER TO EXPAND THEIR POWER IN THE WORLD."	19	20	13
UNDECIDED	<u>19</u> 100	<u>20</u> 100	<u>19</u> 100

SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E3.

MOSCOW'S SINCERITY ABOUT DETENTE
TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981



SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 3, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

WHO PROFITS MOST FROM OSTPOLITIK?, 1973-1980

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

QUESTION: "WHO DO YOU THINK HAS PROFITED MOST FROM THE
IMPROVEMENT IN GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS--THE
SOVIET UNION OR WEST GERMANY?"

	<u>1973</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1977</u> <u>%</u>	<u>1980</u> <u>%</u>
THE SOVIET UNION	45	44	55
WEST GERMANY	9	6	6
BOTH EQUALLY	31	33	25
IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY	<u>15</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>14</u>
	100	100	100

SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E4.

OSTPOLITIK WORTH THE EFFORT?

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

QUESTION: "DO YOU THINK THAT OSTPOLITIK, THAT IS TO SAY, THE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EAST EUROPEAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES,
IS WORTH THE EFFORT, OR NOT?"

	1973 %	1980 %
WORTH THE EFFORT	49	51
NOT WORTH THE EFFORT	29	28
UNDECIDED	22	21
	100	100

SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E4.

CONTINUE DETENTE?

WEST GERMANY, BY SEX, AGE AND PARTY PREFERENCE, JANUARY 1980

QUESTION: "SHOULD GERMANY CONTINUE THE POLICY OF DETENTE IN THE FUTURE, OR DON'T YOU THINK IT MAKES SENSE TO CONTINUE?"


	<u>CONTINUE DETENTE</u>	<u>NO SENSE IN CONTINUING</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>		
	%	%	%		%
TOTAL POPULATION	74	17	9	=	100
MEN	78	15	7	=	100
WOMEN	71	19	10	=	100
<u>AGE</u>					
16-29 YEARS	74	17	9	=	100
30-44 YEARS	77	19	4	=	100
45-59 YEARS	75	15	10	=	100
60 AND OVER	72	17	11	=	100
<u>PARTY PREFERENCE</u>					
CDU/CSU	59	28	13	=	100
SPD	89	7	4	=	100
FDP	85	8	7	=	100

* SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E4.

THE MILITARY GOAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981

FEEL THAT MILITARY
SUPERIORITY IS THE GOAL
OF THE SOVIET UNION

FEEL THAT THE SOVIET UNION
WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A
MILITARY BALANCE




SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 3, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

MOSCOW'S FEAR OF WESTERN THREAT

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981

"IS MOSCOW REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT A THREAT BY THE WEST?"




SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 3, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE, 1976-1981

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"A QUESTION ABOUT ARMAMENT IN THE EAST AND WEST--FROM ALL THAT YOU'VE HEARD, HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP? IS THE EAST MORE POWERFUL, THE WEST MORE POWERFUL, OR ARE THEY EQUALLY POWERFUL?"



SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED.,
THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CT.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981),
 P. 437.

TREND IN WEST GERMAN VIEW OF EAST-WEST POWER RELATIONSHIP, 1954-1981

QUESTION: "WHICH SIDE DO YOU CONSIDER STRONGER AT THE PRESENT
TIME: THE AMERICANS AND THE WEST ON ONE SIDE OR
THE RUSSIANS AND THE EAST ON THE OTHER?"

	<u>EMNID POLLS</u>				
	<u>WEST</u>	<u>EAST</u>	<u>BOTH EQUAL</u>	<u>NO ANSWER</u>	
	%	%	%	%	
1954	40	23	33	4	= 100
1956	33	23	39	5	= 100
1958	33	30	34	3	= 100
1960	32	22	38	8	= 100
1961	34	22	41	3	= 100
1962	39	15	29	17	= 100
1963	46	10	33	11	= 100
1964	54	7	29	10	= 100
1965	47	12	31	10	= 100
1966	39	15	33	13	= 100
1968	34	21	35	10	= 100
1974	23	24	43	11	= 100
1975	27	29	44	1	= 100
1976	16	35	47	2	= 100
1981	15	41	43	1	= 100

SOURCE: EMNID-INSTITUT, INFORMATIONEN, NO. 12, 1981, P. 16.

WEST GERMAN VIEW OF EAST-WEST POWER RELATIONSHIP
BY PARTY PREFERENCE

QUESTION: "WHICH SIDE DO YOU CONSIDER STRONGER AT THE PRESENT TIME: THE AMERICANS AND THE WEST ON ONE SIDE OR THE RUSSIANS AND THE EAST ON THE OTHER?"*

EMNID POLL--END OF 1981

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>CDU/ CSU</u>	<u>SPD</u>	<u>FDP</u>	<u>OTHER PARTIES</u>	<u>NO ANSWER</u>
	%	%	%	%	%	%
WEST	17	19	13	3	25	19
EAST	36	42	32	45	36	29
BOTH EQUAL	45	38	53	50	37	45
NO ANSWER	2	1	2	2	2	7

* ASKED OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF 1,011 WEST GERMANS, 14 YEARS AND OLDER FROM NOVEMBER 11-DECEMBER 15, 1981.

SOURCE: EMNID-INSTITUT, INFORMATIONEN, NO. 12, 1981, P. 17.

TREND IN PROJECTED EAST-WEST POWER RELATIONSHIP, 1974-1981

QUESTION: "AND IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH SIDE WILL BE STRONGER
IN ABOUT FIVE YEARS?"*

	<u>EMNID POLLS</u>			
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1981</u>
	%	%	%	%
WEST	18	18	12	17
EAST	30	40	43	36
BOTH EQUAL	36	40	42	45
NO ANSWER	16	1	3	2

* ASKED OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF 1,011 WEST GERMANS,
14 YEARS AND OLDER, FROM NOVEMBER 11-DECEMBER 15, 1981.


SOURCE: EMNID-INSTITUT, INFORMATIONEN, NO. 12, 1981, P. 16.

A-11-22

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES
NATIONAL, SELECTED WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

"WHAT IS YOUR OVER-ALL OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES?"

FEBRUARY 1982




SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982, SPONSORED BY GALLUP INTERNATIONAL, NEWSWEEK, AND LEADING NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS IN EUROPE.

A-11-23

OPINION OF THE SOVIET UNION
NATIONAL, SELECTED WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES


"WHAT IS YOUR OVER-ALL OPINION OF THE SOVIET UNION?"

FEBRUARY 1982



THE FRG'S BEST FRIEND, 1977-1981
TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"WHICH COUNTRY IN THE WORLD DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC'S BEST FRIEND?"




RUSSIA: LESS THAN .5 PERCENT.

SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC
OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH,
OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 4.

THE FRG'S BEST FRIEND

BY AGE, AUGUST 1981

"WHICH COUNTRY IN THE WORLD DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC'S BEST FRIEND?"




RUSSIA: LESS THAN .5 PERCENT FOR ALL AGES.

SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT
FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 4.

THE FRG'S BEST FRIEND

BY POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE, AUGUST 1981

"WHICH COUNTRY IN THE WORLD DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S BEST FRIEND?"




RUSSIA: LESS THAN .5 PERCENT FOR ALL PARTIES.

SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 4.

MOST LIKABLE PEOPLE

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981


"WHICH PEOPLE DO YOU FIND MOST LIKABLE?"



SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 5, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

LIKING FOR AMERICANS, 1957-1981
TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"DO YOU REALLY LIKE THE AMERICANS OR ARE YOU NOT ESPECIALLY FOND OF THEM?"




SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 7, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981

"HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS?"




SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 5, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. AS A CONSUMER SOCIETY

WEST GERMANY, TOTAL, AGE AND PARTY PREFERENCE, MAY 1981

"PEOPLE CAN HAVE GREATLY DIFFERING OPINIONS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. I AM GOING TO READ YOU A FEW THINGS OTHER PEOPLE HAVE TOLD US ABOUT THE U.S. IN EACH CASE PLEASE TELL ME WHAT YOUR OPINION IS--WHETHER YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE?"


"IF SOMEONE SAYS THAT THE AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETY AND THROW-AWAY MENTALITY SERVES AS A WARNING TO THE WORLD, WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THIS, OR NOT?"



SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 6.

ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. AS LAND OF OPPORTUNITY
 WEST GERMANY, TOTAL, AGE AND PARTY PREFERENCE, MAY 1981

"IF SOMEONE SAYS THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BE THE LAND OF
 UNLIMITED OPPORTUNITIES, WHERE EVERY INDIVIDUAL HAS THE
 CHANCE TO MAKE HIS FORTUNE, DO YOU ALSO THINK SO, OR DON'T
 YOU SEE IT THAT WAY?"



SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 6.


ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. AS DEFENDER OF FREEDOM, 1958-1981

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"A QUESTION ABOUT THE AMERICANS: TAKE A LOOK AT THIS--HERE ARE TWO MEN TALKING ABOUT THE AMERICANS. WHICH OF THE TWO SAYS WHAT YOU ALSO THINK? WHO WOULD YOU TEND TO SAY IS RIGHT, THE ONE ABOVE OR THE ONE BELOW?"

STATEMENT 1: "I THINK THAT THE AMERICANS HONESTLY TRY TO DEFEND FREEDOM IN THE WORLD. OF COURSE THEY ALSO HAVE ECONOMIC INTERESTS, BUT FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ARE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO THEM."

STATEMENT 2: "I THINK THE AMERICANS ONLY PRETEND AS IF FREEDOM WERE MORE IMPORTANT TO THEM. ACTUALLY, THE ONLY IMPORTANT THING FOR THEM IS TO SECURE AMERICAN MARKETS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY."




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 10.

ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. AS DEFENDER OF FREEDOM
BY AGE AND PARTY PREFERENCE, AUGUST 1981

"A QUESTION ABOUT THE AMERICANS: TAKE A LOOK AT THIS--HERE ARE TWO MEN TALKING ABOUT THE AMERICANS. WHICH OF THE TWO SAY WHAT YOU ALSO THINK; WHO WOULD YOU TEND TO SAY IS RIGHT, THE ONE ABOVE OR THE ONE BELOW?"

STATEMENT I: "I THINK THAT THE AMERICANS HONESTLY TRY TO DEFEND FREEDOM IN THE WORLD. OF COURSE THEY ALSO HAVE ECONOMIC INTERESTS, BUT FREEDOM AND HUMAN DEMOCRACY ARE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO THEM."


STATEMENT II: "I THINK THAT THE AMERICANS ONLY PRETEND AS IF FREEDOM WERE MORE IMPORTANT TO THEM. ACTUALLY THE ONLY IMPORTANT THING FOR THEM IS TO SECURE AMERICAN MARKETS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY."



SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 10.

ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. AS RUTHLESS WORLD POWER
WEST GERMANY

"IF YOU HEARD SOMEONE SAY THAT THE U.S. SHIES AWAY FROM NOTHING THAT STRENGTHENS ITS POSITION AS A WORLD POWER--AND THAT IT EVEN SUPPORTS FASCIST REGIMES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND SOUTH AMERICA TO THIS END--WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THIS PERSON, OR NOT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 20.

CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ROLE IN WORLD POLITICS, 1979-1982

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES IS CAPABLE OF
TAKING A WISE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN WORLD POLITICS TODAY, VERY
CONFIDENT, FAIRLY CONFIDENT, NOT SO CONFIDENT, OR NOT AT
ALL CONFIDENT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN
PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE
ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 18.

LIKELIHOOD OF U.S. ATTACK ON EASTERN EUROPE
NATIONAL, SELECTED WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

"HOW LIKELY DO YOU THINK IT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ATTACK
EASTERN EUROPE WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS?"

FEBRUARY 1982




SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982.

COOPERATION WITH U.S. OR SOVIET UNION, 1973-1981

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"A GENERAL QUESTION ABOUT GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: IN THE FUTURE SHOULD WE COOPERATE EQUALLY WITH THE U.S. AND RUSSIA, OR MORE CLOSELY WITH RUSSIA, OR MORE CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 14.

RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. OR SOVIET UNION?, 1954-1981

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"IF WE HAD TO DECIDE BETWEEN THESE TWO POSSIBILITIES, WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE: A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. OR A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 14.

IS U.S. HEADED FOR A COLD WAR?

WEST GERMANY, TOTAL AND BY PARTY PREFERENCE, MAY 1981

"IF SOMEONE SAYS THAT THE U.S. IS HEADING FOR A 'COLD WAR' AND
IS MAKING THE WORLD UNCERTAIN AGAIN, WOULD YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE
WITH THIS PERSON?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC
OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH,
OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 21.

WEST GERMAN SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN MEASURES REGARDING AFGHANISTAN

WEST GERMANY, TOTAL AND BY PARTY PREFERENCE, JANUARY 1980

"DO YOU TRUST THE U.S. TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN THE PRESENT AFGHANISTAN CRISIS, WHICH THE EUROPEANS COULD ALSO STAND BEHIND, OR ARE YOU OPPOSED TO GERMAN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN POLICIES?"

"HAVE TRUST" RESPONSE



SOURCE: THE ALLENSBACH REPORT, 1980/E3.


WESTERN GERMAN SOLIDARITY WITH AMERICANS

"ONE MAY HAVE VARIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT WHAT STAND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC SHOULD TAKE REGARDING AMERICAN POLICY. WRITTEN HERE ARE TWO OPINIONS--WHICH OF THE TWO WOULD YOU TEND TO AGREE WITH, THE ONE ABOVE OR THE ONE BELOW?" (PRESENTATION OF AN ILLUSTRATION.)

THE ONE ABOVE: "I THINK THAT IF WE DEMAND THAT THE AMERICANS STAND BY US IN EUROPE, THEN WE HAVE TO SHOW BY OUR ACTIONS THAT WE SUPPORT THEIR POLICY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, EVEN IF WE DON'T ALWAYS AGREE AND MUST MAKE SOME SACRIFICES."

THE ONE BELOW: "I AM OF A DIFFERENT OPINION. WE SHOULD NATURALLY SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICANS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, BUT WHEN THEY ADOPT AN UNREASONABLE POLICY, THEY CAN'T EXPECT OF US THAT WE FOLLOW WITH MEASURES THAT HARM OUR OWN INTERESTS."

TOTAL POPULATION, MAY 1980 & MAY 1981
BY AGE AND PARTY PREFERENCE, MAY 1981




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 16.

WEST GERMAN SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

"A QUESTION ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY: IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, SHOULD THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC ALWAYS BACK THE AMERICANS IN MATTERS OF FOREIGN POLICY, OR SHOULD IT DECIDE FROM CASE TO CASE WHETHER IT FOLLOWS THE AMERICANS OR GOES ITS OWN WAY?"

TOTAL POPULATION, 1980-1981
BY AGE AND PARTY PREFERENCE, MAY 1981




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 16.

SUPERPOWERS' INTEREST IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981

"ARE THE U.S.A. AND THE SOVIET UNION REALLY INTERESTED IN
DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS?"




SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF
A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 3, ISSUED BY THE
GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

IS THE WEST INTERESTED IN DISARMAMENT?, 1956-1981

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"DO YOU HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST IS DEFINITELY INTERESTED
IN DISARMAMENT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC
OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH,
OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 40.

A-11-45

SUPPORT FOR DETERRENCE, 1976-1981

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"IF SOMEONE SAYS THAT AN ATTACK FROM THE EAST
CAN BEST BE PREVENTED BY A POLICY OF DETERRENCE,
I.E., IF THE WEST IS SUFFICIENTLY ARMED, WOULD
YOU AGREE WITH THIS, OR DISAGREE?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN
PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE
ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 35.

CONFIDENCE IN NATO
NATIONAL, SELECTED WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

"HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN NATO'S ABILITY TO DEFEND
WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST AN ATTACK?"

FEBRUARY 1982




SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982.

EFFECT OF STATIONING NUCLEAR MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE
NATIONAL, SELECTED WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

"WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF HAVING AMERICAN NUCLEAR MISSILES STATIONED IN WESTERN EUROPE?"

FEBRUARY 1982




SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982.

NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1979-1981

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"NATO--THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE ALLIANCE--PLANS TO STATION AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TO COUNTERBALANCE RUSSIAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF THIS, OR NOT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 28.

NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

TOTAL AND BY SEX, JULY 1981

"NATO--THE WESTERN DEFENSE ALLIANCE--PLANS TO STATION AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TO COUNTER-BALANCE RUSSIAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF THIS, OR NOT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 28.

NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

BY AGE, JULY 1981

"NATO--THE WESTERN DEFENSE ALLIANCE--PLANS TO STATION AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TO COUNTER-BALANCE RUSSIAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF THIS, OR NOT?"

3




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 28.

NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

BY POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE, JULY 1981

"NATO--THE WESTERN DEFENSE ALLIANCE--PLANS TO STATION AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TO COUNTER-BALANCE RUSSIAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF THIS, OR NOT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION.
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 28.

PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER, MAY & AUGUST 1981

"NATO--THE WESTERN DEFENSE ALLIANCE--PLANS TO STATION AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TO COUNTER-BALANCE RUSSIAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. DO YOU THINK THIS SHOULD BE PREVENTED, OR NOT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 30.

PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT
BY SEX AND PARTY PREFERENCE, MAY & AUGUST 1981

"NATO--THE WESTERN DEFENSE ALLIANCE--PLANS TO STATION AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TO COUNTER-BALANCE RUSSIAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. DO YOU THINK THIS SHOULD BE PREVENTED, OR NOT?"

"SHOULD BE PREVENTED" RESPONSES




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 30.

NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER, 1981

"THE NATO 'TWO-TRACK' DECISION WAS MADE SOME TIME AGO. ACCORDING TO THIS DECISION, THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED, ON THE ONE HAND, TO STATION MISSILES TO OFFSET THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN DISARMAMENT TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ALL IN ALL, DO YOU THINK THIS TWO-TRACK DECISION IS GOOD OR NOT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 32.

NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION

BY AGE

"THE NATO 'TWO-TRACK' DECISION WAS MADE SOME TIME AGO. ACCORDING TO THIS DECISION, THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED, ON THE ONE HAND, TO STATION MISSILES IN EUROPE TO OFFSET THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN DISARMAMENT TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. DO YOU THINK THIS TWO-TRACK DECISION IS GOOD OR NOT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981,
 P. 32.

NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION

BY PARTY PREFERENCE

"THE NATO 'TWO-TRACK' DECISION WAS MADE SOME TIME AGO. ACCORDING TO THIS DECISION, THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED, ON THE ONE HAND, TO STATION MISSILES IN EUROPE TO OFFSET THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN DISARMAMENT TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. DO YOU THINK THIS TWO-TRACK DECISION IS GOOD OR NOT?"




SOURCE: AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AS SEEN BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION,
INSTITUT FUER DEMOSKOPIE ALLENSBACH, OCTOBER 7, 1981, P. 32.

MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THE NATO DUAL-TRACK DECISION

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981


"SINCE THE NATO DUAL DECISION CONSISTS OF TWO PARTS, THERE CAN BE DIFFERENT VALUES PLACED ON EACH PART. PLEASE TELL ME WHICH OF THE TWO OPINIONS YOU WOULD BE LIKELY TO AGREE WITH:"



"IT IS IMPORTANT TO NEGOTIATE ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS WITH THE EAST AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO AVOID HAVING TO DEPLOY AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE ROCKETS IN WESTERN EUROPE."



"IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO RESTORE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEREFORE, SOONER OR LATER THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO DEPLOY MEDIUM-RANGE ROCKETS IN WESTERN EUROPE."



SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 2, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.




OUTCOME OF ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS
TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981

"WHAT DO YOU THINK THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE
[ARMS-LIMITATION] NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE?"

A ZERO SOLUTION--"THE
DISMANTLING OF SOVIET
MEDIUM-RANGE ROCKETS
AND THE RENUNCIATION
BY AMERICANS OF DE-
PLOYMENT IN WESTERN
EUROPE."

"BOTH SIDES WILL AGREE
TO LIMIT SUCH ROCKETS
AND THE U.S. WILL SUB-
SEQUENTLY DEPLOY FEWER
MEDIUM-RANGE ROCKETS
THAN CURRENTLY
PROJECTED."

"THE NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN THE U.S.A.
AND THE SOVIET
UNION WILL COLLAPSE
AND LEAD TO A NEW
ARMS RACE."




SOURCE: EMNID POLL FOR DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION,
NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 2, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION
CENTER, N.Y.

REINFORCEMENT OF NATO TROOPS, 1971-1980

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 16 AND OLDER

"WOULD YOU BE FOR OR AGAINST NATO REINFORCING THEIR TROOPS?"




SOURCE: ALLENSBACH POLL IN ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, ED., THE GERMANS (WESTPORT, CT.: GREENWOOD PRESS, 1981), P. 436.

EFFECT OF STATIONING AMERICAN TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE
NATIONAL, SELECTED WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

"WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF HAVING AMERICAN TROOPS STATIONED
IN WESTERN EUROPE?"


FEBRUARY 1982



SOURCE: EMNID POLL IN NEWSWEEK, MARCH 15, 1982.

WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN TROOPS, 1952-1981

"DO FOREIGN TROOPS CONSTITUTE AN 'UNAVOIDABLE NECESSITY' A 'WELCOME PROTECTION,' OR AN 'UNDESIRABLE BURDEN'?"




SOURCE: EMNID POLLS IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION,
NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 7, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN
INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

A-11-62

SHOULD U.S. WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS?

TOTAL WEST GERMANS, 18 AND OLDER, FALL 1981

"WOULD YOU WELCOME IT IF THE UNITED STATES--FOR WHATEVER REASON--WERE TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM EUROPE?"



SOURCE: EMNID POLL SPONSORED BY DER SPIEGEL IN FOCUS ON: THE MOOD OF A NATION, NO. 2, APRIL 1982, P. 5, ISSUED BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, N.Y.

OPINION OF THE BUNDESWEHR (ARMED FORCES)

TOTAL AND BY AGE

QUESTION: "DO YOU HAVE IN GENERAL A GOOD OR BAD OPINION
OF THE BUNDESWEHR (THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES)?"

ALLENSBACH POLL
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1980

	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>BAD</u>	<u>HALF & HALF</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>	
	%	%	%	%	%
TOTAL POPULATION	47	16	27	10	= 100
<u>AGE</u>					
16 TO 29 YEARS	33	29	28	10	= 100
39 TO 44 YEARS	49	13	30	8	= 100
45 TO 59 YEARS	51	11	28	10	= 100
60 YEARS AND OLDER	55	10	22	13	= 100

SOURCE: GERHARD HERDEGEN, "DIE JUGEND DENKT ANDERS," DIE
POLITISCHE MEINUNG, VOL. 26, NO. 195 (1981), P. 57.

A-11-64

AD-A188 194

THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE
PROGRAM ITS OPPON (U) HUDSON INST INC INDIANAPOLIS IN
F E ARMBRUSTER ET AL 07 JUN 83 HI-3585/3-RR

3/5


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