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
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The Meaning of Freedom

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By Bruce Palmer, Harry Summers, Martin Blumenson, Robert Elton

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- View From the Fourth Estate Arthur T. Hadley
Back To The Front

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"NOT TO PROMOTE WAR. BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE..."

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Howard D. Graves, *Commandant*

PARAMETERS

The Army's Senior Professional Bulletin

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The Meaning of Freedom

TOM WOLFE

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During a recent afternoon drive to West Point it occurred to me that there are only 13 years left of the 20th century. I was appalled to think of what is going to happen in the year 2000, with all the TV specials. If you think the Statue of Liberty Weekend was slightly overdone, wait until you see the year 2000. What will the TV specials about the 20th century say? For a start they will record the fact that this was the century in which wars became so big, they became known as World Wars. They will record the fact that this was the century in which mankind developed the means of exploding the entire planet by pressing a couple of buttons (or turning a few missile-silo keys), but also the century in which man developed a means to escape to the stars through space flight, once he'd done it. But I think that above all, the 20th century will be remembered as the era of the fourth phase of freedom, which is the phase this country is in right now.

It is the most bizarre form that freedom has ever taken, and I think this should be of particular interest to the officer corps of the American armed services. I think you will find this fourth phase very frustrating. It may even bring you grief. But I'll get to that in a moment.

The first phase of American freedom was like that of practically every country born of a revolution. In the first phase, you are fighting for freedom from a particular government that you consider tyrannical. The leader of our first phase was, of course, George Washington, who commanded the Revolutionary forces. The second, third, and fourth phases, however, have created freedoms unique to the United States. They are what have made this country different from any other country in the history of the world.

The second phase was a calculated campaign for freedom from class distinctions. The old British class system was very much in place in this country at the end of the Revolution. You may recall from your courses in history that George Washington was offered the title of king. He declined, but as you can read in General Dave Palmer's *The River and the Rock*, Washington lived like a king. During the Revolution itself, when he had 10,000 men in rags that tried to pass for uniforms, Washington himself lived in the grand Stephen Moore mansion at West Point. He had so many servants they used to deal with the guests on a man-to-man rather than zone basis. The meals went on for three to four hours, always in the grand English fashion with two or three kinds of meat and two or three kinds of fowl, chicken, pheasants, game hens, the lot. As soon as the Lucullan main courses were over, the tablecloths would be changed. The tablecloths were custom-made for George Washington with special embroidery. Then the servants brought out more bottles of wine and half-opened nuts from the tropics and the guests would sit around for another couple of hours. Washington defeated the British militarily, but it was Thomas Jefferson who led the fight against the British status system.

The first thing Thomas Jefferson did after writing the Declaration of Independence was to campaign in the Virginia Legislature to end the system of entails. The laws of entail declared that only male blood relatives could inherit land; and land was almost the entire basis of wealth at that time. He then led a fight against primogeniture, the passing of entire estates to oldest sons. That became illegal in the United States. The ending of primogeniture broke the back of the British class system in this country. In 1839, William Steven Van Rensselaer of New York died as the head of a family that had 700,000 acres of land in New York and adjoining states. Within 50 years every single acre of that land was owned by strangers. And in 1930, when the last of the line died, he left an estate of \$2500. Jefferson's campaign was deliberate and detailed. When Jefferson was elected President in 1800, the White House was not yet finished. He moved into a boarding house in Washington and ate at the foot of the table. It was a major consideration in a class-ridden society: where you sat at the table. In the White

Tom Wolfe, writer and journalist, graduated cum laude from Washington and Lee University in 1951 and later took a doctorate in American studies from Yale. His cultural criticism, bearing the mark of the New Journalism which he pioneered, is best captured in such books as *The Kandy-Kolored Tangerine-Flake Streamline Baby*; *The Pump House Gang*; *Radical Chic and Mau Mauing the Flack Catchers*; *Mauve Gloves & Madmen, Clutter & Vine*; and *The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test*. *The Right Stuff*, a national best-seller, won the American Book Award for general nonfiction. In 1980, he received the Columbia Journalism Award for distinguished service to the field of journalism. His first novel, *The Bonfire of the Vanities*, was published in 1987. The present essay was adapted from Mr. Wolfe's Sol Feinstone lecture, "The Meaning of Freedom," at West Point, N.Y., on 8 October 1987.

House he installed circular tables for dining, so that there would never be a head of the table. Through substantive and symbolic devices, he set out to destroy the apparatus of class distinctions.

It is hard to understand the significance of this unless you have also lived in a European country. It is very illuminating to be an American businessman and to go to Switzerland, which is a very peaceful democracy, and just live there for a few years. Every year you have to renew your work permit, and to renew your work permit you go to the police station; and the first time an American goes in, he announces his purpose and is told to sit down, and a policeman comes out with a folder an inch thick. Our businessman has done nothing exciting. He has worked for a corporation. He hasn't even jaywalked anywhere. He hasn't had a parking ticket. Yet here is a fat folder in the police station with his name on it. So he says, "What on earth is that?" The policeman says, "C'est votre dossier, monsieur." "This is my dossier? Well, what's in it?" "C'est votre dossier, monsieur." And he quickly gets the message that he shouldn't ask; and if he does, he is not going to be told; and it dawns on him that his rights have been leased to him by an unseen patriarchal social order that knows best.

By the same token a European coming to the United States finds that democracy in America rubs him the wrong way. The classic example would be the liberal from Europe who from afar has loved the United States, believes in the American form of liberty, comes here to worship, to pay homage like Charles Dickens, who came to the United States in the 1840s. He was the most famous writer in the world at that time. He was a great liberal, and he came here to worship at the altar of American democracy as a way of fighting against class injustice in England, and he kept having the following sort of experience. Somewhere along the Hudson River, I believe it was, he stayed overnight in an inn; he was to catch a stagecoach into New York the next morning. The stagecoach arrived early in the morning. Here's Dickens with his valet and about six or eight pieces of luggage. The valet is having a hard time getting it all up on top of the stagecoach. The driver turns to Dickens and says, "Okay, Mac, shake a leg, we haven't got all day here. We gotta get going." The valet is indignant. He looks at the driver and says, "Just a minute. Do you realize whom you are talking to? This is Mr. Charles Dickens. You do not call Mr. Charles Dickens 'Mac.'" At which point the driver says, "Oh gee, I'm sorry. Okay, Charlie, let's get a move on. We gotta get out of here, Charlie." Now, Dickens, after a couple of weeks of this, was viscerally unable to like the United States any longer. Intellectually, he insisted on liking it. Personally and viscerally, he never wanted to set foot in the United States again.

In the United States you can find an upper class if you set arbitrary numbers for money and servants—having servants being the key to upper-class status throughout the world—and declare that anyone maintaining

those numbers qualifies as upper class. But it will be just that, something arbitrary, because the apparatus and symbolism of class deference no longer exist. I will never forget working for the *New York Herald Tribune* and following Nelson Rockefeller around New York during his campaign for governor. Once a group of reporters was out on Park Avenue, following Rockefeller from some sort of meeting. One of his aides said, "Governor, we are terribly behind schedule. We had better go to the apartment and make a phone call to so-and-so." Rockefeller, very grandly for the benefit of the reporters, said, "That's not necessary. We don't have to go to the apartment. There's a telephone booth right there. I'll go down and make the call myself. Give me a nickel." This was interesting to me for two reasons: first, because a telephone call in New York had not cost a nickel for 15 years; but mainly because it was an example of how an American politician with wealth and servants must aspire downward in appearances. For someone like Giscard d'Estaing to have put on any such exhibition would have been unthinkable.

The third phase of freedom in the United States began just after the Civil War, and this can best be described as the freedom of everyone to better himself in America—and the implicit promise that he will. To the rest of the world this was, and is still, a startling notion. Most countries have had what we might call zero-sum economic competition. If the proletariat or the peasantry, to use the Marxist terminology, is going to get more, then something has to be taken away from the upper classes. In the United States, the announcement was made in the Declaration of Independence that everyone has the right to pursue happiness. As Saint-Simon, the great French utopian, said 150 years ago, "Happiness is a new idea in Europe." Now the promise of improvement for everyone depended in no small part, according to the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, the creator of the famous Turner thesis, on the existence of the American frontier with its seemingly infinite free land for all who were adventurous enough to settle it. It was Turner's thesis that the frontier created the American character and that it did this in two ways. The roughness of the frontier made Americans leave behind all European baggage, in terms of class manners and habits. Many settlers on the frontier ended up dressing and living like Indians, for practical, not romantic reasons. It was also remote terrain. The bonds of government were left behind. Many of the settlers who went across the country were Dissenting Protestants—Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists—people who had dissented from the Church of England. Dissenting Protestants believed that authority came directly from God and was to be internalized by the individual. The individual was to march forth like a Christian soldier, bearing the authority of God with him. He was not the subject of some unseen noble order.

A fascinating thing to me is the difference between the Western experience in the United States and in Canada. Both countries had rough primitive western frontiers. But in Canada there were no gunfights. In America, there have been six movies made about the shootout at the OK Corral alone. It is generally forgotten that this gunfight was the climax of the election for sheriff of Tombstone, Arizona. The incumbent was Johnny Behan. The challenger was Wyatt Earp. They settled the matter with guns. This was very much an American idea: that an individual, or an individual and his cronies, could establish authority on the frontier.

In Dawson, Canada, about the same time, an American gunfighter from Dodge City, One-Eyed Jack Slade (I believe), was thrown out of a saloon for talking too loud. Dawson was just as primitive a town as Tombstone, just as full of mud and animals and everything else, but he was thrown out for talking too loud. Now he is out on the street, very sore at the world. He's got this six-shooter strapped to his hip, and along comes a Mountie. This Mountie is 22 years old, practically beardless, wearing the red coat, the tan jodhpurs, the black riding boots. He has on the black hat with the straight brim. He says, "Hey, you there, you, come here. You can't walk around here carrying a revolver. Give that to me." To which One-Eyed Jack Slade said, "I reckon you don't know who I am. The name is Slade. The man who could take a gun away from me ain't been born yet. Them that's tried ain't breathing now." So you have the classic American western confrontation. Jack Slade has his hands out; he has assumed the dueling position. They are out in the middle of the street, and he is taking on Gary Cooper, only he happens to be a Mountie. The arena is set. To this, the Mountie says, "Will you kindly not make a spectacle of yourself? Now hand me that gun and get out of the middle of the street. There's a coal wagon coming down here with a team of four, and you're liable to get hurt." At this, One-Eyed Jack Slade absolutely wilted. He just wilted. He was being treated like a little boy who had brought his water pistol into the house. And he somehow realized at that moment that this was not an American confrontation, with two barrels of machismo out in the middle of the street on the edge of the void about to blow each other to smithereens. He was not dealing with another man on the frontier. He was dealing with an institution, and if he shot this one, another red coat would take its place; and if he shot that one, another red coat would come; if he shot 20 of them, they would send enough red coats until they obliterated One-Eyed Jack Slade. So he gave up, and he sheepishly handed over the revolver, and he went back to Dodge City. The Canadian West was settled by the Hudson's Bay Company, which was chartered by the British government. If you didn't work for the Hudson's Bay Company and take orders from the Royal Mounted Police, you couldn't survive. The Turner thesis did not translate into the Canadian experience.

The Turner thesis was amended by the Webb thesis. In *The Great Frontier* the historian Walter Webb said that long before the land had run out, Americans had stopped going to the frontier, because they had discovered something that better achieved this third freedom, the freedom to prosper. And that was the city. People who might have headed to the frontier now headed to the cities. Did the cities fulfill the promise? The fact of the matter is, they did. It seems like only yesterday, in reading the history books, that the Irish and the Germans, two of the first great waves of immigrants, were coming into New York City. Today there are only a few pockets of Irish-Americans in New York City, and the Germans are long gone. What has happened to all of these Irish-Americans and German-Americans who used to dominate New York? They bettered themselves, as promised. They may have jobs in New York, but they live in Dobbs Ferry, Dix Hills, Westbury. Likewise, the immigrants who followed them, namely the Jews and the Italians, are moving out, leaving New York City. They have not necessarily moved up the social ladder, however. Many of them are still the air-conditioning mechanics, the burglar alarm repairmen, the cablevision linemen, to cite some typical members of the mid-1980s working class—although they think of themselves as middle class because of all the money they make. They commute from Dobbs Ferry in their Cadillac Eldorados. That has become the typical proletarian vehicle of the United States. Climate control, cruise control, electric locks, power steering, power windows—it is amazing, absolutely amazing! They go home, and before dinner they have a little designer water, play with the baby, watch the VCR. This is the American working class. Amazing. The promise has been fulfilled, and people are still coming to this country from all over the world. The great new wave is Asian, and the Asians have fared well. The dream has come true for them very rapidly.

This third phase of freedom was new to history. Toward the end of the Second World War, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued a famous pronouncement in which he said that henceforth all mankind should be guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from fear, and freedom from want. The first three were one thing; but for anyone to say that from now on "freedom from want" was a basic human freedom was a bizarre notion to Europeans and Asians. Only an American could have taken that seriously.

But, as I say, we are today in the fourth phase of American freedom, and it is the strangest of all. The fourth phase is freedom from religion. It is not freedom *of* religion; it is freedom *from* religion.

De Tocqueville. Who can speak about the United States and freedom without mentioning de Tocqueville at least once? Forgive me. De Tocqueville said, in 1835, that American democracy was the freest form of government in the world, by which he also meant the most libertine; so free,

in fact, that American society would have come apart had it not been for the internal discipline of the American people. This internal discipline, he said, was rooted in their profound devotion to religion. What we are now seeing is the earnest rejection of the constraints of religion in the second half of the 20th century; not just the rules of morality but even simple rules of conduct and ethics. That is what fascinates me.

The first time I saw this up close was when I was working on my book *The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test*. I went to San Francisco to see what was known as the great hippie migration. Tens of thousands of young men and women were living together in communes dedicated to the idea that all bourgeois constraints should be swept away. Start from zero. That was the idea. It was at that time that I came across the remarkable Haight-Ashbury Free Clinic, a medical clinic that had been set up to minister to the needs of these young people who had arrived in such numbers. The doctors in this clinic were seeing diseases that no living doctor had ever seen, diseases that had been thought to have disappeared from the face of the earth so long ago they had never even picked up Latin names, diseases such as the thrush, the itch, the twitch, the grunge, the mange, the rot, the scroff. Why were they seeing these diseases? Well, because in the compulsion to get rid of bourgeois standards, the young people living together in these communes had decided to abandon such old rules as the ones that say that two people should not use the same toothbrush, that two people should not use the same mattress without changing the sheets or, more often the case, without putting on sheets at all; two people shouldn't use the same glass or Coca-Cola bottle or take tokes from the same cigarette. These rules were simply swept aside. What we are talking about are the rules of hygiene. The idea was: we now have the freedom to rid ourselves of these onerous constraints, the rules of hygiene. So now they were laboriously relearning the reason for the rules of hygiene by getting . . . the grunge, the mange, the itch, the twitch, the thrush, the rot, the scroff.

In that same period, I happened to go to Italy on a lecture tour, and I found that Italian students were absolutely mesmerized by the subject of the hippies. They wanted to know all about them. The thing that most amazed them was the fact that young people were able to leave home, move in together, and somehow survive, subsist in communes. Because even the most violent, radical Italian students, those who spent the day on the barricades throwing bombs and glass and bricks at the police, were home by 8:30 at night. They were always at home, having dinner, having a little gnocchi and cappellini with mom and dad and the unmarried sisters, because the only way to get out of the house was to get married. There was no other way. Nobody would think of leaving home without getting married. The old order, even among people who thought they were so radical, so liberated, had such a grip that they couldn't think of breaking free.

Just think of what has gone on in America in the last 15 years in the sexual arena. Just 15 years ago, if any public figure had suggested that there should be in this country an institution known as the coed dorm, in which young women, nubile and downy, would live not only in the same building, but on the same corridors with young men in the season of the rising sap, such an individual would have been looked at as if his eyebrows were being eaten away by weevils. And if he had suggested coed barracks, he would have been stoned. Today, the coed dorm and the coed barracks are just part of the backdrop of American life. They are like I-95, the interstate highway. It's there, it's big, you occasionally hear the hum in the background, but that's all. It's just part of the backdrop.

Or think of the institution that has grown up all over this country, even in the part of the country I hail from, the South, even in the so-called Bible Belt. I am thinking of the institution of the village brothel. Today at any crossroads in the South, in the old Bible Belt, in addition to the First Methodist Church, the Second Baptist, and the UB—that's the United Brethren—in addition to the Arby's fast food drive-in and the hot-wax car wash and the general store with the Mountain Dew soda pop medallions on either side, you're likely to find the village brothel. It's a one-story building, black or maroon in color, with either no windows or windows boarded over. Out front is a back-lit plastic sign which says "Totally all-nude girls, sauna, massage, and marathon encounter sessions inside." It's a house of prostitution. Nobody arches his eyebrows at it any longer. It's an institution by the side of the road. It's in the yellow pages; it's advertised in the newspaper.

Think of the so-called adult or X-rated movie. Fascinating. They are nothing but the old men's stag movies, only now done in 35mm or 70mm high-resolution technicolor photography. In any small city in the United States, 200,000 souls, let's say, up until just a couple of years ago you would find the following lineup. There would be about 14 movie theaters. One would be showing a movie such as *Back to the Future*. One would be showing a movie such as *Amadeus*, because it won all those Academy Awards. Nobody goes to see it, but they show it because it won the Academy Awards. A third would be showing *The Vein Strippers* or some other teenage hemorrhage movie. Eleven would be showing X-rated or adult films. Of those eleven, two would be outdoor drive-ins, with screens, five, seven, eight stories high, the better to beam all those moistened folds and glistening nodes and stiffened giblets to a panting American countryside. Absolutely amazing.

At the same time that this was going on, the divorce rate was really taking off. Last year it finally passed the 50-percent mark. Today the natural outcome of marriage in the United States is divorce.

The aforesaid burglar alarm repairman and the electrician, the air-conditioning mechanic, in addition to the chief executive officers of the

corporations, would begin to indulge in the whims of caliphs, one of the whims being an endless succession of young things at your beck and call. That is why to me one of the most interesting figures of the 1980s is someone I think of as the new cookie. This is the young woman, usually in her 20s, for whom the American male now customarily shucks his wife of two to three decades' standing once the electrolysis lines form above her upper lip. The thing that intrigued me most about these discotheques, such as Studio 54 or Xenon, was the sight of the Chief Executive Officer of the corporation out there on the dance floor with his new cookie. He is wearing his chalk-striped suit, his medium-point F. Tripler white shirt, and his shepherd's-check necktie. He's got his hair combed back over his ears in little sloops in the 57th Street Biggie look. His new cookie is out there on the dance floor with him, and she is wearing a pair of Everlast boxing trunks and a man's strap undershirt. She has a hairdo that looks as if a Snapper lawn mower just went over her head. He is staring at her with these red eyes through walnut-shelled eyelids, breathing stertorously, desperately trying to do the Eel, the Robot, or the Sado-macho, until the onset of dawn, saline depletion, or myocardial infarction, whichever comes first. And why shouldn't he? Because after all, what are Mom and the Cutlass Ciera and Buddy and Sis up against a love like this? That first night on the disco floor she wore a pair of boxing trunks, while leather punks and painted lulus, African queens and Sado-Zulus paid her court. I grow old, the 1980s way, deaf, but from a max-q-octaphonic beat, stroked out, but on my own two feet, disco macho for you, my new cookie.

I want to give one final example of this strange fourth phase of freedom. And now we move from the moral terrain onto the shifting sands of mere ethics. I am now talking about what used to be known as amateur athletics. Remember amateur athletics? Amateur athletics came to an official end in May of last year when the Boston Marathon became professional. For the marathon, of all events, to become professional, was astounding. Yet in the midst of this strange fourth phase of freedom, the change was scarcely even noticed. When the star basketball player for the University of Maryland, Len Bias, died of a cocaine overdose, this was considered an aberration in the career of an exemplary young man. I submit that it was not an aberration at all; taking drugs is a standard practice of those who aspire to be great athletes in America. I have been interested in this subject and would like to do a book about it. I have been talking to high school athletes. Many young high school athletes today will take drugs because they feel that's one of the steps you take to become a pro. That is why one tries to excel in sports: to become a professional.

I would submit—although I cannot prove it—that 90 percent of American professional athletes today play hungover. About 65 percent of big-time college athletes play their sports hungover. I think that the reason that the Soviet ice hockey team sweeps through the National Hockey League

like a knife through water is that the KGB will not let the players drink vodka in the United States or Canada when they come here for these games. I remember talking to a stewardess in Canada who had been on charter flights of the Soviet hockey team. She says, "I know these are not hockey players. I think they are spies; they are certainly not hockey players. They don't fall down, stumble, grope, stagger, throw up; they don't grab your leg and say, 'Nice material, honey.' They cannot possibly be hockey players."

If you ever have the chance to go to Columbus, Ohio, to Ohio State University, watch the football team come across the campus at about eleven o'clock in the morning. They are not in uniform; they are just walking across the campus in a group. You can spot them immediately, not only because they are bigger than other people, which they should be, but also because they are put together differently. Today, in the day and age of the Pectoflex machine and the Nautilus and the Universal Bulker, they have the sternocleidomastoid muscles that start at the lower part of the ear, and they merge with the trapezii which in turn merge with the deltoids. So they look unit-welded, like a Well-McLain oil burner. But more interesting than that is the fact that they always travel in clumps. At 11:30 in the morning, they look like Stonehenge during an earthquake. And that is because at universities with big-time sports programs, the athletes are encouraged to live together, apart from the rest of the student body. They have their own cybernetic diets. They have line-ups of officially sanctioned drugs by their plates: vitamin B12, to make the arteries writhe like king snakes; calcium lithosilicate, to make the teeth sharper, more pointed, harder. They have separate courses. They major in campground management and muscle bulking. They have just changed the rules for taking an IQ test among athletes in the Big Ten. Up until this year, they used to have to sit down at a table like other students, and mark little boxes on sheets of paper. As of this year, that is no longer required. Today they take the test with a truck tire gauge. They put one end of the tire gauge in the ear, and it goes shhhhhh . . . 72, 73, 74 . . .

Think of the difference between that and the old ethos of Dink Stover at Yale. I suppose no one reads the Dink Stover stories any longer. Dink Stover was the captain of the Yale football team. He considered it his obligation to be an exemplar of the core values of Yale. Many of the Dink Stover stories turn on situations such as the following. Dink Stover is going out with a young lady who is obviously in love with him, but Dink Stover is worried that she doesn't love him for himself but for his status as captain of the Yale football team. Is he taking advantage of her? This goes on page after page after page.

Today, what happens in the big universities? Never mind "take advantage of." The motto today is: TAKE! Think of the cases over the past five years of outstanding college athletes at major universities being brought up on charges of molesting or raping of coeds. The entire administration of

the university turns against the young woman in question, with statements such as: "These boys are under a lot of pressure." "You have to make allowances." "They have to let off steam somehow." "What are you trying to do, ruin him?"

Why, we begin to ask, were sports ever amateur? We have forgotten. I think it is part of the social amnesia of the times. Sports, particularly organized sports, are a charade for war. The purpose of amateur athletics has always been to have a relatively harmless way of preparing young men for fighting in combat. It was well understood by military men that you may have a good mercenary warrior, but you are not going to have a great mercenary warrior. The great warrior is the warrior who fights only for duty, honor, and country, to quote a famous Superintendent of West Point; that is, the amateur. He who fights for honor, for home and hearth, will fight to the last drop of blood and the last unbroken hyoid bone for the principles of a people. If you train young men, through athletics, to be mercenaries instead, then they will act like mercenaries. They will look for the rewards of mercenaries. Which are what? Pillage, loot, rape, and a little dope on the side.

Now, when I was working on my book *The Right Stuff* I came across the extraordinary figure of Chuck Yeager. At the time, he was a brigadier general in the Air Safety Command in California, toward the end of his career. I got on the subject of the astronauts with him, and he said an interesting thing. He said, "The biggest mistake that NASA ever made was allowing astronauts to take money from *Life* magazine. That was the first bite out of the apple." "Bite out of the apple" is a phrase referring to the Garden of Eden. What was the Eden that Chuck Yeager was talking about?

That I discovered by accident, through Yeager's voice. I was out at Edwards Air Force Base, where many of the astronauts had been trained, and I met a pilot from New York City. That caught my attention because, for whatever reason, you meet very few pilots in the military from New York City. This fellow's name was Fahey, as I recall, and he was from Sunnyside, Queens, and he had an absolutely Sunnyside, Queens, New York street voice. It was unmistakable. There are two words that give away people from New York no matter how much they try to renovate their accents: "electricity" and "frankfurter." This Fahey and I were chatting. He said, "This morning I was in my apartment, back in the kitchen 'eh'—in New York the word "there" following a consonant has no "th"; it's spelled 'eh—"and the eleg-drizzidy went out while I was trying to cook a frank-fudda." Well, you'll notice that in New York the word electricity has no c's and t's. It's all g's, d's, dr's, and z's. "Eleg-drizzidy." And the term "hot dog" is never used. A hot dog is a frankfurter. And the word "frankfurter" has two d's and no t's in it: "frankfudda." So this guy was pure Sunnyside, Queens.

Well, that afternoon I was up in the control tower at Edwards—they were letting me see some of the routine operations—and this voice comes in from way out there somewhere, and it says “Edwards Tower, this is Air Force jet niner niner five, proceeding through altitude two, zero, zero, approaching Edwards tacan, air speed, two, seven, oh. Got me a little ’ol flame-out up here. Request permission to put her down on Roger’s Dry Lake.” You can immediately see the tension building up in this control tower. It is well known that Air Force 995 is an F104. An F104 is an aircraft that is capable of going in excess of Mach 2.5 but which under the speed of 250 knots has the glide characteristics of a set of car keys, and this aircraft was already down to 270 knots. So this controller starts screaming into the microphone. “Air Force niner niner five, Air Force niner niner five, what are your intentions? What are your intentions? Are you declaring an emergency? Are you declaring an emergency?” And the voice comes back, “This is Air Force jet niner niner five. Negative, I am not declaring an emergency. I am not declaring an emergency. Merely requesting permission to put her down on Roger’s Dry Lake, you pud-knocker!” And I said, “Who is this guy? Who is this guy?” And they said, “It’s this guy Fahey. He’s from your part of the world. He’s from New York City.” I said, “Wait a minute, I was talking to Fahey this morning. He has a stone Sunnyside, Queens, New York voice. But this voice I am listening to now is from somewhere in the Appalachians.” And the controller said, “Oh, that’s that Yeager voice. They can come from Sunnyside, Queens, Bangor, Maine, Long Beach, California, or Portland, Oregon. You let them up in the skies over Edwards Air Force Base, and they are all going to talk like Chuck Yeager.”

Now I had never heard, I must confess, the name Chuck Yeager before. Because the Edwards pilots were considered the pick of the litter in the Air Force at that time, all the test pilots and military pilots began to adopt the Chuck Yeager voice and, finally, all the airline pilots began to adopt that voice, and for a time that was all you could hear in the skies over America: the voice of Chuck Yeager. Through this voice, I discovered what I later came to call the Brotherhood of the Right Stuff. I discovered that there was within the flying fraternity, particularly military flying, a brotherhood based on the idea that all that counted in life was the excellent performance of routine duties, which consisted of defying death daily in the air. Rank meant nothing. Money meant nothing. Yeager, when he ascended to the top of this pyramid, was a captain in the Air Force. Excellent performance of your duty as a military officer was everything; to Chuck Yeager, this was all that mattered. He told me at that time, “Everything I ever did I did for this blue suit,” and he grasped the lapel of his blue Air Force officer’s uniform.

Well it so happens, ironically, that today Chuck Yeager probably makes more than a million dollars a year through commercials, public

appearances, and his book, which is one of the great best sellers of the last ten years. So when I ran into him recently, I said, "Chuck, what are you going to do with all your money?" He said, "I don't know. I think maybe I'll give it to my children," which apparently he has done through a trust. He said, "You know when I left the Air Force, I built my dream house." Which he did; he built a log cabin, considerably glorified but nevertheless a log cabin, in the foothills of the Sierras. He loves to hunt; he loves to fish. This was the life he wanted. And he said, "What do you do after you have built your dream house?"

That always stuck in my mind. Today, you in the military are going to have to confront, in this really quite marvelous manic fourth phase of freedom in America, the most amazing magnetic pulls upon your motivation—as you see the money, the freedom, the luxuries that are so easily available. You are going to realize that everyone else—not you—is living in the age of Everyman an Aristocrat. That is the fourth phase of freedom in America. For the first time in the history of mankind, everyone, every man and woman, now has the capability of availing himself or herself of the luxuries of the aristocrat, whether it be a constant string of young sexual partners or whether it be the easy access to anything that stimulates or soothes the mind or the nervous system or simply the easy disregard of rules of various sorts. And I must say there is something marvelous about it. For the first time in the history of man, it is possible for every man to live the life of an aristocrat. I marvel at it, and I wonder at it, and I write about it. But you will have to deal with it. You are going to find yourselves required to be sentinels at the bacchanal. You are going to find yourself required to stand guard at the Lucullan feast against the Huns approaching from outside. You will have to be armed monks at the orgy.

If I use religious terminology, I use it on purpose. One of the most famous addresses ever delivered in this century by an American was the address on 12 May 1962, by Douglas MacArthur at West Point, in which he enunciated the watchwords of duty, honor, and country. The rest of that speech is less well remembered. He said that the soldier, above all other men, is expected to practice the greatest act of religion: sacrifice. Now as I say, I love the age of Everyman an Aristocrat. I think there is something Nietzschean about a country that has taken freedom to the point of getting rid of the constraints of the most ordinary rules. For better or for worse, there is something marvelous about it. But I submit that there is something equally marvelous about the possibility of leading your life in such a way that even should your ship come in, even should you have the hoards of gold far beyond your wildest dreams, that you might be able to say in all sincerity and with great aplomb: "What difference does it make? I have already built my dream house." □

Old Myths, New Myths: Renewing American Military Thought

A. J. BACEVICH

Our Army is worn-out. Not in the ordinary sense of being physically tired: on the contrary, units in the field are making it happen with an astonishing energy that comes from having good troops and dedicated, well-intentioned leaders. Rather, what's worn-out is our thinking—the fundamental ideas that give the Army its character and inform its basic policies.

As used here, the phrase “fundamental ideas” suggests nothing so transitory as doctrine or organization or management systems. It refers to the assumptions or beliefs that define the constants in the Army's style of managing its peacetime affairs or fighting its wars. These beliefs do little to explain the differences between the Active Defense of the 1970s and the AirLand Battle of the 1980s. Of far greater importance, however, they help us understand why such doctrinal change, supposedly so far-reaching, has had such a negligible effect on the Army—why, in the eyes of those of us tracing our service back to the 1960s, when so much has supposedly changed, so much remains the same.

The historian William A. McNeill has labeled such fundamental ideas “myths,” emphasizing their elusiveness as well as their persuasive power. According to Professor McNeill, myths play a large role in determining the behavior of any complex institution.¹ In referring to such ideas as mythic, McNeill is not suggesting that they are false or mistaken. Instead, he is acknowledging that such myths are not subject to empirical proof. Seldom factual, such myths nonetheless reflect in broad terms what a majority of the institution's members “know” to be true.²

According to Professor McNeill, institutions abandon or revise myths only infrequently. Doing so is difficult and often painful, usually marking an abrupt historical discontinuity. Even so, Professor McNeill tells us, some capacity for myth renewal is essential to the health of any organization or society. For to carry on, no matter how vigorously, with myths that have become obsolete undermines the relevance of all institutional activity.

Throughout its history, the Army has acted with reference to its own myths. Often at variance with the myths of the nation as a whole, they have provided the Army with an independent balance wheel. The Army's myths have given it a direction transcending political imperatives. At crucial moments in its history, moreover, the Army has been able to discard myths that have lost their usefulness and replace them with myths pertinent to the service's real needs.

Today, that balance wheel is badly out of kilter. Our current myths are obsolete and need replacement. To understand how we got here and what to do about it calls for a quick review of the Army's myth-history.

That history begins in 1792 with the founding of the Legion of the United States, representing the renamed, reorganized, retrained, and reinvigorated version of what had previously passed for a standing army. To state the matter plainly, the creation of the Legion marks the birth of the United States Army. Although the service traditionally traces its origins back to the Continental Army (1775-1783), doing so requires that we turn a blind eye to history.

The truth is that the Continental Army existed in a unique relationship with both Congress and people. It was created for a single purpose: to win American independence. Having achieved that end, the Continental Army was dissolved, most leaders of the Revolution opposing on principle the maintenance of a standing military force.¹

Such naivete soon wore thin. By 1792, Americans had come to accept the need for force to protect national interests and accomplish national objectives. Thus, the specific reason for the Legion's creation was the Indian threat south of the Great Lakes. General "Mad Anthony" Wayne, the Legion's first commander, disposed of that threat at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. Although the Legion itself was subsequently

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The Legion of the United States, under General "Mad Anthony" Wayne, routed its Indian foe in Ohio on 20 August 1794. The action is depicted here from the US War Department print "The Road to Fallen Timbers."

disbanded, henceforth the nation would always retain an army as a permanent instrument of state power.⁴ The tasks assigned to that instrument were many. Yet its primary role remained constant from Fallen Timbers all the way to the slaughter of 500 Moros on Jolo in 1913 by forces under the command of John J. Pershing: to secure territory for exploitation by white Americans, suppressing (and if need be exterminating) any elements (almost always non-white) with competing claims to the same territory.

Two myths sustained the Army through this era of conquest and pacification. The first stemmed from the need to explain the soldier's low esteem among Americans and the Congress's niggardly support of things military. The essence of this myth was that the young American republic was a uniquely antimilitary state. According to this conceit the United States, unlike the bellicose nations of Europe, sought no empire and expected no quarrels with others. The soldiers of such a peaceful nation would necessarily be underemployed, their resulting idleness tempting them into all sorts of mischief. Loaded down with what one historian has called their "anti-army intellectual baggage," Americans were forever worrying nervously about military conspiracies and military threats to hard-won American liberty.⁵

Embraced by American soldiers, this myth bestowed on the Army a largely imagined but in some ways useful sense of isolation from society.⁶ The architects of 19th-century American military thought—above all Emory Upton—viewed the Army as a maligned and misunderstood institution that fulfilled its role despite having to exist within a hostile national environment. However quirkish and farfetched, this sense of separateness served as a spur to professionalization, enabling the Army to mature in time for its great responsibilities of the 20th century. The myth, in other words, served some purpose.

The second myth, by no means consistent with the first, depicted the Army as the righteous instrument for spreading American values, a strange amalgam of freedom, Christianity, Western manners, and economic progress.⁷ This myth was essential to the Army's retention of a positive self-image. Assertions of America's peace-loving nature notwithstanding, the Army found itself throughout most of the 19th century engaged in hostilities—acting in most cases as the aggressor.

Perhaps this triumphant procession was inevitable. Certainly it served the interests of the American polity and led directly to the nation's rise to great-power status. At the sharp end of the saber, however, the process was not pretty, relying on coercion and brutality. For American soldiers to view their service in such terms was anathema. Instead of dwelling on the dark side of their mission, 19th-century soldiers devised (or adopted from contemporary public discourse) justifications that explained American military conquest in lofty terms. Such justifications applied not only to the Indian campaigns but to other adventures as well: the invasions of Canada and Mexico, the wresting of Cuba and the Philippines from Spain, and even the Civil War. American soldiers fought not to conquer but to achieve the nation's Manifest Destiny, protect the settler on the frontier, free slaves, liberate the victims of Spanish colonial oppression, or uplift Little Brown Brother. At least it was nice to think so.

However useful in sustaining the Army through the 19th century, these twin myths barely survived that century's close. After 1898, expansionism came to an abrupt end. Empire-building acquired a bad name. No longer were there Indians to tame (although restive Filipinos provided an occasional substitute). No longer did Americans covet the territory of unruly neighbors. For the Army to depict itself as the righteous purveyor of American values no longer made sense. Nor did soldiers any longer find solace in seeing themselves as a gallant band of brothers set apart from the rest of society.

As the new century opened, the Army needed a new purpose as well as a niche in the mainstream of American life. Although Upton remained a revered figure, a new generation of leaders rising to prominence after the war with Spain chose the unity of Army and people as their essential theme. Foremost among this generation were Leonard Wood,

Pershing, and George C. Marshall. Standing in the shadows behind each of these titans was John McAuley Palmer, the 20th century's antithesis of Upton and chief purveyor of the new myth—that of a popular Army and the citizen soldier.

What threat to American interests would give the Army its new purpose? This was the question that the Army's leaders pondered through the early years of the 20th century. They found their answer in the prospect of war against other great powers—war stemming from threats to America's Pacific possessions, from the strategic importance of the Panama Canal, or from the spread of European militarism. Such a war would be fought on an immense scale, unprecedented both in the material it would consume and the soldiers it would devour. Assuring victory required, among other things, a mass army, comprising hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

The Army's post-Civil War establishment, a standing force of less than 30,000 backed up by a ragged militia, would never suffice for such a war. What the United States needed was a much larger force, one necessarily composed largely of reservists. These reservists would differ from their predecessors by maintaining a high degree of readiness, permitting their employment soon after mobilization.

So the Army that in Upton's day had despised the citizen soldier now embraced him as the keystone of the nation's military policy. This change of heart on the part of the regulars had far-reaching implications.

On one level, the new myth released an outpouring of propaganda designed to convince the American people and their soldiers that they were one. Throughout the period encompassing the World Wars, Palmer served as the most energetic and effective promoter of this viewpoint. In *An Army of the People* (1916) and other books, Palmer argued that the Regular Army's principal peacetime role was to train the ranks of the citizen soldiers on whom the nation would rely when war began. Such a people's army would not only provide the fodder for a great-power war, but would be better suited "to the genius of a democratic people" than would a force composed largely of regulars.¹

More substantively, the belief that the United States must rely on the citizen soldier led to a series of initiatives aimed at establishing that people's army. None of these schemes—Leonard Wood's Plattsburg Movement, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison's ill-fated Continental Army of 1915, the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920, or the Citizens Military Training Corps—succeeded. Indeed, as the basis for a realistic military policy, each was hardly better than a bad joke. However enthusiastic the Army's leadership, the Congress during peacetime would not pay for a citizen's army, and the American people would not support it with their sons. In practice, the citizen soldier remained no readier for war than had been his counterpart in the 19th-century militia.

Obscuring the citizen army's failure as a military policy was the American experience in the World Wars. Won by huge draftee armies, the wars seemed to vindicate the popular faith in the citizen soldier who marched from farm or factory into battle and returned victorious. As such, the wars sustained the myth of the people's army long after it might otherwise have died.

This notion that the World Wars vindicated the citizen army concept is hokum, the product of historical anomaly that twice—from 1914 to 1917 and again from 1939 to 1941—allowed the United States a grace period during which it could gird for war while the other powers furiously waged it. Providence thus preserved the United States from the certain disaster that would have occurred had it sent hastily mobilized forces directly into combat. In both wars, citizen soldiers required lengthy and intensive training after coming on active status before being considered even marginally battle-ready.

In the mind of many a World War II veteran, that myth survives intact. Although senior leaders have been obliged to pay it continuing lip-service, most regulars gave up on the concept of the citizen soldier soon after 1945. Three factors accounted for the myth's demise. First was the atomic bomb, the mere existence of which seemed to subvert all previous concepts of land combat. Second was General Marshall's inability to muster congressional support for Universal Military Training after World War II. Ill-considered, even quixotic, Universal Military Training was the Army's last-ditch effort to institutionalize the concept of the citizen soldier. Third was the Korean War, bursting with terrifying unexpectedness upon an ill-prepared Army in the summer of 1950. Korea taught the Army that it could no longer count on a period of extended preparation before being committed to combat. Units had to be ready to fight without warning, implying a level of readiness that none but regulars could hope to achieve.

Once these developments had demonstrated the unworkability of the myth of the citizen soldier, the Army discarded it.⁹ In its place the service substituted a powerful new series of myths that blended Cold War ideology, expediency, and the conventional wisdom of the day. No more subject to proof than their predecessors, these myths remain very much alive. They are three in number:

- The chief threat to American security is Soviet expansionism, above all the Soviet determination to control Western Europe. For the Army, therefore, Europe is the priority theater.
- Offsetting the Soviet bloc's huge numerical advantage requires the Army to capitalize on American technological superiority. This explicitly includes the integration of nuclear weapons into ground forces.
- Since the actual use of nuclear weapons is unthinkable and the

*This notion that the World Wars vindicated
the citizen army concept is hokum.*

consequences of even a conventional European war are horrifying to contemplate, the Army exists less to fight wars than to deter them.¹⁰

These myths have played a crucial role in making the Army what it has been for the past forty years. They account for the primacy enjoyed by US Army Europe in manning and equipment. They explain our doctrinal preoccupation with high-intensity conflict against the Warsaw Pact (as exemplified by the perennial use of the Fulda Gap in tactical problems). Most significantly, these myths underlie the proliferation of nuclear weapons down to the Army's lowest tactical echelons.

During the early years of the Cold War, these myths served the Army well. Faced with the consolidation of Stalin's grip on Eastern Europe and lacking a German army to serve as a counterweight to the Russians, Americans acted prudently in assigning military priority to Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Anxious to retain a role in the radically changed postwar military order (and to preserve its institutional well-being), the Army could hardly be blamed for embracing new missions such as continental air defense and for incorporating fashionable nuclear weapons into its arsenal. In the 1950s such a course seemed to make sense.

Yet whatever their validity when first devised, these Cold War myths have lost their relevance. Indeed, they are the source of our present stagnation. Nothing demonstrates their irrelevance more clearly than the history of the postwar era.

The myths fail whether considered against what has not happened or against what has. What has not happened, and seems increasingly improbable, is a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The images that once gave the Army's Cold War myths a certain plausibility—monolithic communism hell-bent on achieving world domination through outright military aggression—lack their former persuasiveness. In the 1980s we see the Soviets differently, not benign surely, but cautious, burdened with a discredited ideology, beset with economic problems, and hard-pressed to keep their existing empire from unraveling. It is difficult to conceive of the

Soviets today summoning up the appetite to consume Western Europe. To the extent that land forces help convince the Soviets to leave Western Europe alone, it is likely the formidable new German army as much as the American one that gives them pause.

The Cold War myths preparing the Army for a European war that has not come left it ill-prepared for conflicts elsewhere that did occur. Surely, this is the central irony of our post-World War II military experience: an Army preoccupied with deterring the Soviets found itself instead actually fighting people other than Russians in far-off places like Korea and Vietnam, each time in circumstances far different from those that our soldiers had been led to expect. In other words, the overarching myths guiding our postwar military thought have not pertained to what the nation has called upon the Army to do. Soldiers lulled by the comforting logic of deterrence found themselves fighting desperately—at times virtually without warning. Conditioned to view the Soviets as their enemy, American troops instead battled Chinese communists, Vietnamese peasants, Dominican leftists, and Cuban construction workers. Coached into believing that nuclear weapons had changed warfare irrevocably, they fought wars where such weapons had no place. Here, certainly, lies one explanation for the shortcomings of the Army's performance in those conflicts.

So the service needs to replace its Cold War mythology. The Army needs myths that support the requirements it can expect to face during the closing years of this century. Where will these myths come from? Myth formulation in the past has not resulted from rational calculation. What we believe fundamentally as an institution derives instead from a host of sources—from intellectual currents inside the military and without, from international trends and technological developments, from great leaders with all their insights and idiosyncrasies.

Still, we can hazard a guess as to some myths that might carry the Army into the next century. Certainly, we can nudge ourselves in the direction of myths that take account of the climate in which the Army finds itself. Certain aspects of that climate are key.

First, the economic and military dominance that the United States enjoyed immediately following World War II is gone forever. The rise of other nations to economic prominence has come, at least to some extent, at American expense. Although the United States remains the West's preeminent power, its position relative to its friends has deteriorated. Important American allies each have their own world view, making it extremely difficult for Washington to line up even friendly governments in support of American objectives.

Further complicating things has been the diffusion of military power over the past three decades. Nuclear proliferation, the booming

traffic in arms to the Third World, and the perplexing riddles of terrorism and revolutionary warfare have contributed to the rise of military powers that the United States might once have ignored. Today we ignore them at our peril. Although the United States need not fear nations like Cuba or Iran, it must reckon seriously with their military capabilities.

Some Americans find reassurance in being told that it is still "morning in America." As a metaphor for the nation's strategic predicament, however, such rhetoric fails. We have reached the late afternoon of America's day. Our situation compares to that of Great Britain in the latter part of the 19th century: still the world's greatest power, but forced to recognize that its obligations were fast outstripping its resources; unable to preclude change, but retaining the capacity to deflect it so that the outcome favored British interests and preserved British influence.

From what sources will threats to American interests come? This is the second relevant aspect of the international climate. We can expect conflicts embroiling the United States to derive less from ideology than from disputes rooted in history, religion, and economic competition. And we can expect those disputes to erupt not in Western Europe, but on the periphery, where the forces for change are most active. The great need of American statecraft is for instrumentalities able to answer effectively the challenges to American interests from these rimlands. As for the military's role in such efforts, limited resources combined with limited domestic tolerance for war demand prompt and efficient mission accomplishment—without resorting to nuclear weapons.

What "myths," then, might prepare the Army for such circumstances? Here are three candidates, with speculation regarding the implications of each:

- *The Army exists to fight.* The American contribution to deterrence lies chiefly with its strategic nuclear forces. The business of deterring the Warsaw Pact belongs primarily to the Air Force and Navy, with the Army playing only a supporting part. This is not to say that the Army must accept an unimportant role in national defense. As a status-quo power in an unstable world, the United States has found again and again that its deterrent is unavailing, creating situations requiring the employment of American forces. This is the critical arena in which the Army, as so often in the past, will be called to appear. The scarceness of land forces militates against giving equal weight to both deterrence and fighting. The Army must direct the preponderance of its energies toward the battle that it will fight, not the one it would like to prevent. Nuclear weapons have no place in a fighting Army.

- *War occurs on the political periphery, not in the center.* Apart from the threat of terrorism, European security is likely to remain intact. Since 1962 the Soviets have carefully avoided direct confrontation with the United States and its NATO allies. Although US Army Europe should not

strike its tents and go home, no longer must it receive first claim to resources. Elsewhere in the world—in Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and perhaps Africa—events contrary to US interests are likely to entail the commitment of American forces. Priority of resourcing should go to units based in the continental United States, both light and heavy, that will bear the brunt of rimland fights.

- *Forces in being will conduct the fight.* Intervention by American ground forces will continue to occur on short notice, without a formal declaration of war. Because political support for deploying reserve components is doubtful, the Army must plan to get the job done using regulars alone. Engaged in dirty wars where moral certitude may be in short supply, these professionals will fight not for ideals but to advance the interests of the state. Their effectiveness will stem less from having the right cause or even the right hardware, than from the toughness, resilience, and cohesion of individual units.

True to the American national character, the Army views itself as a dynamic institution. Change abounds, with new weapons entering the field, doctrine undergoing revision, units reorganizing, and new policies being promulgated on everything from counting blankets to measuring body fat. We spare nothing in our efforts to shape tomorrow's Army: we will make things better.

Yet despite all this profligate expenditure of energy, in the trenches things remain much as they were. Captain Nathan Brittles, the character played by John Wayne in the movie "She Wore a Yellow Ribbon," had it right when he observed that "The Army is *always* the same."¹¹ Reforms announced with great fanfare are absorbed without having their promised effect. The Army's essential character endures.

As Americans, we are uncomfortable with the thought that the core of the Army's identity is mythic—that it cannot be counted or boxed and certainly cannot be fine-tuned. We bridle at the notion that critical determinants of the Army's performance lie beyond the reach of regulations or orders or white papers.

Yet if Professor McNeill's insights have merit—something impossible to prove conclusively—current efforts to reform the Army may fail.¹² If McNeill is correct, the details of doctrine, weapons, and organization will avail us little unless they have their basis in myths that are right for our time. In that case, an urgent priority for those who care about the Army and for those who would guide its destiny must be to insure that our myths are in good repair. In that regard, much remains to be done.

NOTES

1. William H. McNeill, "The Care and Repair of Public Myth," *Foreign Affairs*, 61 (Fall 1982), pp. 1-13.

2. To illustrate the concept of myth, we can apply it to the case of post-World War II America. A list of myths that have guided US policy since 1945 would look something like this:

- Communism is inherently evil and its spread endangers American national security.
- The survival of the West requires the United States to play a preeminent role in world affairs.
- Democratic capitalism is the only system capable of bringing about economic development while maintaining a balance between individual freedom and equality of condition.

Such concepts lie beyond proof. Since 1945, however, they have been deeply felt by most Americans and by virtually all national political leaders. These myths of postwar America connect Harry Truman with Ronald Reagan.

3. Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and the American Character, 1775-1783* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 351.

4. Lawrence Delbert Cress, *Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 130-32.

5. Don Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition* (Athens, Ga.: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1985), p. 101.

6. William B. Shelton, "The Army in the Age of the Common Man, 1815-1845," in *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 98-99, 106.

7. Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. xiii-xiv, 8.

8. I. B. Holley, Jr., *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 714-21.

9. Increased attention recently paid to reserve components suggests an attempt to resurrect the citizen soldier myth. The aim is to escape from the bind caused by the decision to cap the Army's active-duty strength at 781,000. That decision has created a high-quality Army, but one that is too small for the Army's myriad missions. This imbalance between means and requirements has led to new interest in using reserves to make up the difference. Although publicly the Army leadership is unswerving in supporting what it calls the One Army concept, privately many officers express reservations about the ability of reserves to fight on short notice. See, for example, "General, His Real Opinion Asked, Faults Host of the Army's Ways," *The New York Times*, 21 September 1986, p. 19.

10. The lead sentence of FM 100-5 (1986 edition) states that "The overriding mission of US forces is to deter war." US Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: GPO, May 1986).

11. For a scholarly assessment that reinforces Captain Brittles, see "Introduction," in Hagan and Roberts, p. xxi.

12. The short history of the Army's light infantry initiative lends evidence to the need for new myths. The controversy provoked by that initiative illustrates the hostility facing any proposal for change when it lacks the support of appropriate myths. However imperfect as currently configured, light, rapidly deployable forces are absolutely essential for missions that the Army can expect to receive. The creation of light divisions testifies to the recognition among senior leaders that the Army has overemphasized its NATO-oriented strategy of deterrence. Yet despite four-star support, light infantry has provoked widespread opposition from within the service—especially from the armor/mechanized community. Opponents of light infantry have fashioned a devastating critique, citing problems of sustainability and defense against armor. Their conclusion: the concept is fatally flawed and should be discarded, thereby freeing more resources for the Army's *real* mission of deterring the Warsaw Pact. Although this dispute sounds like an old-fashioned turf battle, its roots are mythic: the depth of the armor/mechanized community's opposition to light infantry stems directly from its beliefs in the old myths. As long as those myths remain intact, any proposal failing to contribute directly to deterring war in Europe is likely to be shouted down. Replace the existing myths with others that establish the primacy of fighting on the rimlands, however, and the tenor of the light infantry debate changes. Critics would by no means be silent. But they would concentrate their efforts not on destroying the light infantry initiative but on making it work—a goal that can be achieved only with full support of the armor/mechanized brotherhood.

Competitive Strategies and Soviet Vulnerabilities

GARY L. GUERTNER

"By examining their military organization, their leadership . . . , and even the broader trends in their society such as . . . demographics, we will not only know our enemy better, we will be able to attend to his weaknesses more effectively."

—Caspar W. Weinberger¹

Scarcity is the midwife of good strategy. Scarcity also explains the new emphasis on "competitive strategy" in Secretary of Defense Weinberger's recent Annual Reports to the Congress (FY 1987-88). Recognizing the economic impracticality of returning to the dominant position enjoyed by the United States in the 1950s and early 1960s, Weinberger's competitive strategies initiative seeks to align enduring US strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses. It is a call to use strategy more effectively, offsetting deficit-driven budget constraints through the efficient use of resources. The concept promises to be just as relevant under Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, who will operate in an even more resource-constrained environment than Weinberger.

Strategy, by definition, is competitive. Revisiting fundamentals can, nevertheless, open useful avenues to new strategic thinking provided that our approach goes beyond short-term issues such as the military balance, technology, and order of battle. Only when we know our enemy completely—historically, geographically, culturally, economically, psychologically, politically—can we attend his weaknesses effectively. This article identifies a significant Soviet vulnerability through an examination of Soviet geopolitics. Assessing the geopolitical order reveals enduring Soviet political liabilities that strengthen the credibility of US nuclear deterrence—even in a world where the Soviets may enjoy numerical superiority.

The strategic debate has been dominated by the visible indicators of military power—delivery vehicles, warheads, throw-weight, and accuracy, for example. These quantifiable threats have been cast in scenarios

illustrating US vulnerability and Soviet first-strike capabilities. Both the arms competition and the limited attempts to contain it through arms control negotiations have been dominated by technical issues and their relationship to strategy. Strategy and the stability of our nuclear deterrent must be viewed across a wider spectrum of variables if destabilizing trends in either force structure or strategy are to be avoided and the arms competition they foster is to be checked. Technical capabilities must be linked more precisely with the full range of threats faced by each country. These include the geopolitical, economic, ethnographic, and even the historical variables that influence the calculus of Soviet strategic planning. Soviet sensitivity to homeland defense is far more complex than is generally recognized in Western discussion of nuclear deterrence and war.

Homeland defense requires more than a robust capability to guard Soviet borders and maintain territorial integrity. In Soviet eyes, a credible homeland defense must also:

- Maintain ethnic Russian domination of a multinational state.
- Maintain Communist Party control of both the ethnic Russian heartland and the strategically located, non-Russian union republics which make up the USSR.
- Maintain the current political elite's personal control of the Communist Party.
- Provide the military forces which give the Soviet Union superpower status.

The first two of these four interrelated security objectives are unique to the Soviet state. They are unique by virtue of the anachronistic style of Soviet communism—a relic of 19th-century Western political thought that has fastened tenaciously onto the 20th century's last remaining empire. This empire was forged over several centuries under the Russian czardom, which successfully acquired power to take the offensive against waves of invaders who had repeatedly subjugated Russia. Centered in a vast geographic area which lacked natural frontiers or defensive barriers, the czars both defended the state and satisfied personal ambitions for power by expanding Russian frontiers. The results of this expansion are seen today in the administrative structure of the USSR. Its 15 union republics are organized around the Soviet Union's dominant ethnic and cultural groupings—the “nationalities” as Soviet officials describe them.

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**Projected Ethnic Makeup of
Soviet Draft-Age Males, by Percentage**

	1985	1990	2000	2010	2050
Russians	47	46.9	43.9	40.3	37.7
All Others	53	53.1	56.1	59.7	62.3

Source: W. Ward Kingade, "Estimates and Projections of the USSR by Major Nationality: 1979 to 2050," CIR Staff Paper, Center for International Research, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., January 1986, p. 40.

Maintaining ethnic Russian control of the nationalities is one of the most serious strategic challenges to Soviet leaders in both war and peace. Yet geopolitical vulnerabilities to societal disruption and political fragmentation are among the least-examined variables in the assessments of Soviet military power and risk-taking. Western strategic literature treats the Soviet Union as a unitary state, powerful in its military and political potential to threaten the United States and its allies. Little has been done to examine the multinational character of the Soviet state and its potential effect on Soviet-American mutual deterrence.

Ethnic Russians soon will comprise a minority of the Soviet population.² They are concentrated in the center of the USSR (the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic or RSFSR, one of the 15 Soviet republics), and are buffered from neighboring countries by union republics populated predominantly by non-Russian ethnic groups. Most important, many of these ethnic minorities have long histories of political independence. How Soviet leaders have managed pressures for autonomy or independence by these groups during periods of crisis or national stress tells us a great deal about Soviet perceptions and sensitivity toward these points of vulnerability. World War I and the Bolshevik revolution, for example, led to temporary independence for some ethnic groups, which later had to be forcibly reintegrated by the Red Army. Similarly, during World War II Stalin relocated entire ethnic populations to the interior of the country for fear that they might collaborate with the Germans. Nor was this fear unwarranted. Many groups did defect in large numbers, taking up arms on the German side. As the German armies moved through the Ukraine and Byelorussia, they were conquering regions that had been most cruelly hit during the 1930s by forced collectivization, famine, and Stalin's Russification policies. Had the Germans given humane and moderate treatment to the Soviet nationalities in these areas, their occupation could have become a danger to the Soviet system even after the German retreat. One can only speculate as to what additional problems the Soviets would have encountered had Hitler in 1941 proclaimed the independence of the

Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic states. According to Adam Ulam, the Soviets' continuous demands for a second front in Europe, even when the Germans could no longer win in the east, were prompted by the urgent necessity of reconquering Soviet territories before any form of anti-Soviet organization could take root.³ As it was, pockets of anti-Soviet partisans in these areas resisted the Soviet army for several years following the German surrender in 1945.⁴

More recently the resurgence of Islam in combination with increased ethnic nationalism on or near the Soviet border has increased the possibility that the Soviet Union's own Islamic and minority populations in the areas bordering Iran and Afghanistan may in the future press for greater autonomy. Once set in motion, the pressures of nationalism could start several ethnic dominoes falling out of control.

Parallels can be drawn between the Soviet invasions of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia. Soviet sensitivity to events in Iran and Afghanistan is undoubtedly heightened by the potential impact of political and religious ferment in these areas upon Soviet Islamic citizens in Central Asia. A similar situation existed in Czechoslovakia where reforms had an unsettling effect on autonomy-minded Ukrainian nationalists.⁵ The Ukraine had developed close cultural and economic links with Czechoslovakia. This, in combination with a small Ukrainian population in Slovakia,⁶ resulted in greater Ukrainian exposure to the reformist and nationalistic ideas expressed in Czechoslovakia. This exposure, superimposed upon indigenous nationalism, resulted in a breakdown of the official Soviet monopoly of the means of public communication and political indoctrination. According to the "Ukrainian hypothesis," no "mental frontier" separated the Czechoslovak crisis from the Ukrainian problem in the thinking of Soviet officials.⁷ The nationality problem played a dominant role in shaping the Soviet decision to invade and crush the "Prague Spring," and these same perceptions may also have influenced Soviet decisions toward Polish dissent. According to this thesis,

Czechoslovakia would have appeared in the mind's eye of the Soviet leadership as a union republic in which the "bourgeois nationalists" were actually getting away with what "they" were trying to do in the Ukraine The definition of and response to the Czechoslovak situation . . . would be considered from *this* perspective as a projection outward of a campaign underway already in the Ukraine and other national republics to combat local nationalism and anti-Russianism. The critical factor here would be the cognitive impact that Ukrainian dissent had presumably already made upon the Soviet leadership.⁸

The precise relationship between contemporary Soviet domestic and foreign policies cannot be stated without firsthand knowledge of Soviet

decisionmaking. Whatever the linkage may prove to be, there is little doubt that Soviet domestic vulnerabilities are taken into account during times of crisis and play a role in Soviet assessments of both their conventional and strategic force requirements. The nationalities issue is especially significant in assessing Soviet vulnerability to nuclear war.

Strategic Implications of the Nationalities

Nationalism in the union republics remains a problem for Soviet leaders much as it was for their czarist predecessors. Marxist-Leninism has not produced a melting pot for proletarian internationalism even within the borders of the USSR. Under Stalin, the rhetoric of "friendship of peoples" characterized the federal structure of the USSR, masking both his ability and willingness to deal harshly with troublesome and untrustworthy non-Russians in the Soviet borderlands. Khrushchev reopened the "nationalities problem" by emphasizing the need to equalize rates of economic development and provide equal opportunities for all Soviet nationalities. His "affirmative action" policies stressed building communism and *merging* all Soviet nations into a higher community—"the Soviet People." Under Brezhnev, less ambitious attitudes emerged in discussions of the new Soviet constitution. For example, in a remarkably candid public confession published in 1977, Brezhnev admitted that the "merging" of the Soviet nationalities had given way to "rapprochement" and declared that "we would be entering a dangerous path if we were to artificially force the objective process of the rapprochement of nations." Instead, he foresaw a long-range process of "nations drawing together."⁹

Yuri Andropov displayed great sensitivity to the nationalities question during his brief tenure. He reasserted the Leninist idea of a merger of nationalities as the long-term goal, but emphasized economic integration and equality rather than ideology as the primary vehicle for national cohesion. Thus national distinctions would exist longer than class distinctions. Moreover, Andropov warned that economic progress among the various nationalities would inevitably be accompanied by the growth of national self-awareness. Ethnic pride, he cautioned, should not degenerate into ethnic or regional arrogance. Economic progress and the migration of population required for labor mobility (and control) have made each republic more multinational. This means the party and government "must carry forward lofty principles" to ensure harmonious and fraternal relations among ethnic groups.¹⁰

Mikhail Gorbachev has not addressed the nationalities question in a way suggesting that the issue is at the forefront of his concerns. The problem has been secondary to his broader goals of economic reforms and progress. In his drive for economic efficiency, Gorbachev has shown impatience with the "parasitic attitudes" of some republics.¹¹ This impatience

could be seen in his sacking of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, the local party chief and full Politburo member from the republic Kazakhstan. Riots followed in the capital city of Alma Ata after Kunaev was replaced by an ethnic Russian.

There is evidence that the riots were encouraged by local party members who feared with good reason that the fall of their patron would cost them their positions.¹² Local resentment, however extensive, seems to have been effectively dissipated by the new leadership's ability to quickly get meat and vegetables in state stores. Previously, one-third of Alma Ata's food supply and 80 percent of its housing had been siphoned off for the party and state elite. An honest Russian who can show results may be preferable to a corrupt ethnic kinsman. Gorbachev has clearly stated his preference for economic efficiency even at the cost of local ethnic resentment at reforms which sweep local leadership away. Nevertheless, there are risks, and, as the riots demonstrate, ethnic sensitivities can be easily manipulated. *Glasnost*, or greater openness, may lead to greater ethnic identification and assertiveness—a trend not welcomed by hard-liners concerned with maintaining Russian control.¹³

Changes in economic and social conditions may, as Andropov feared, increase ethnic identification and resentment of assimilationist pressures from central authority. Increases in ethnic tensions seem more probable than wishful Soviet predictions of "nations drawing together" unless Soviet leaders are skillful enough to avoid the tensions produced by ethnic Russian domination of political and economic institutions.

From the Soviet perspective there are additional unsettling precedents in their foreign policy which inadvertently foster nationalism among their own minorities. Support for the Arabs after the 1967 war against Israel, for instance, was a significant factor in provoking a resurgence of Jewish nationalism and the desire for increased emigration. By the same token, success of Jews in establishing their right to emigrate (however limited) has stimulated a similar cause among Baltic Germans.¹⁴ Confronted by a pattern of non-Russian self-assertiveness, assisted perhaps by the US human rights campaign, Soviet officials may well speculate that today's emigrant could be tomorrow's separatist. Similarly, Moscow's support for national liberation movements has also boomeranged to some extent. Many nationalist writings have pointed to the incongruity between Soviet foreign and domestic policies.¹⁵ There is no small irony in the world's largest multinational state—or, more accurately, empire-state—being the leading spokesman for national liberation movements.

None of these indicators proves that the disintegration of the Soviet Union is an immediate or even long-term prospect. The Soviet government shows every indication of being able to deal with its internal problems. But how these problems would pose themselves during periods of crisis and convulsive societal disruption are an entirely different matter.

War, and most particularly nuclear war and its aftermath, require a unity of effort that some fear might be lacking even in the United States. The Soviet problem would be far more complex and uncertain.

The military aspects of Soviet integration policy (i.e. Russification) provide clues about doubts Soviet officials may harbor concerning the loyalty of their nationalities during crisis. Major combat units of the army are dominated numerically and administratively by ethnic Russians. Less-skilled minority recruits are more likely to be assigned to support roles. In most instances, the latter are garrisoned at bases outside their homelands.¹⁶ No nationality group has large concentrations of native troops stationed on its own soil. This was common practice even before the new Soviet constitution formally dropped the union republics' right to possess their own armed forces. In short, the ethnic dispersal of the Soviet army often results in colonial-like occupation patterns in many areas where troops find themselves in a social milieu, climate, and culture sharply at variance with their own. In turn, they are sometimes regarded with disdain by the people whose territories they occupy—even within the USSR.¹⁷

Party-government administrative control in non-Russian areas is also structured to check the emergence of autonomy-minded local bureaucrats. First or second party secretaries are nearly always ethnic Russians in whose hands resides ultimate decisionmaking power, as well as control over recruitment of local administrators.¹⁸ Russian-dominated local bureaucracies have been accompanied by large influxes of Great Russians into urban areas where they have dominated the process of modernization and industrialization, and have benefited disproportionately from the higher living standards that result.¹⁹ These patterns seem likely to increase ethnic tensions, especially in the immediate future, as the Soviets are forced to deal with a declining labor force in the RSFSR. Their choices include expanding industry in non-Russian republics where labor is more plentiful, as against bringing more minority labor into the predominately Great Russian RSFSR. Either option risks increasing domestic tensions in a nation that has always seen a close relationship between domestic stability and military power.

Implications for US Strategy

Conducting offensive operations while maintaining a stable home front may place unique pressures on the Soviet Communist Party and the general staff. Surely any responsible leadership would harbor the gravest doubts as to the adequacy of Soviet strategic and conventional forces to underwrite the enormous wartime demands placed on them by Soviet doctrine. As Benjamin Lambeth has pointed out, "Because . . . obligations place open-ended demands on Soviet force availability, performance, and durability, the Soviet leaders can never feel so complacent about the

adequacy of their preparedness efforts as to permit any prolonged resting on their strategic oars."²⁰ Lambeth's observations are in sharp contrast with the often-repeated belief that Soviet military preparedness goes far beyond legitimate defense requirements. If correct, Soviet notions of "sufficiency" and "homeland defense" are inevitably going to be considerably more ambitious than their American counterparts. "Mother Russia" (the RSFSR) is surrounded by non-Russian republics, which are bordered by subservient but unreliable allies who are, in turn, surrounded by hostile neighbors and military alliances. These combined threats to Soviet security may do more to strengthen the credibility of US deterrence while undermining the Soviet appetite for risk-taking than any variant of military hardware or technical capability. At best, nuclear weapons and large conventional forces are an imperfect means of compensating for the geopolitical liabilities unique to the Soviet state. These liabilities place serious constraints on the use of Soviet strategic forces as tools that can be employed in planned ways to coerce concessions from an adversary, or that might tempt Soviet leaders to reckless and inflexible positions during crises.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the Soviet strategic buildup since the 1960s has contributed to important changes in US strategic doctrine and force structure. The size and characteristics of US strategic forces have been determined by the requirements for putting at risk specific Soviet target categories. What those targets should be is often the subject of vigorous debate. One reasonable objective presumably agreed on by all participants is the erosion or elimination of Soviet confidence in military solutions to crisis. As Colin Gray has put it, "One of the essential tasks of the American defense community is to help ensure that in moments of acute crisis the Soviet general staff cannot brief the Politburo with a plausible theory of victory."²¹

In sum, a Soviet decision to go to war requires much more than the military confidence of the general staff. The Soviet calculus requires political, social, and economic confidence as well. This presents US strategists with a broad deterrence spectrum in threatening those interrelated values that will most credibly prevent Gray's "victory" briefing from becoming plausible. What kinds of threats would have the most deterring effect on the Soviet leadership? The Soviets' nationalities problem is relevant to US strategy. The non-Russian populations are a political center of gravity for the cohesion and integrity of the state. They are also a center of gravity in any Western pre-war deterrence or wartime strategy aimed at disrupting the Soviet rear. There are parallels here with counterinsurgency. Insurgents depend on the population for their long-term success. A besieged government must draw support from that same population if it is to survive and defeat an insurgency. Thus insurgents and government have the same center of gravity. In both counterinsurgency and strategic nuclear war, a

common dilemma in formulating strategy is how to attack an enemy without threatening a center of gravity which is important to your own success. In the present case, the Baltic natives, Ukrainians, Central Asians, Georgians, and other ethnic groups are not the enemy. Indeed, they are the potential vehicles for disrupting the Soviet rear. Attacking them directly would be as counterproductive as inflicting widespread and indiscriminate civilian casualties in counterinsurgency operations.

The military-economic center of gravity in the USSR is that section of the RSFSR from its Western boundaries to the Urals. Here is concentrated the largest percentage of ethnic Russians, ICBM installations, naval facilities, bomber bases, heavy industry, communications, and transportation facilities. The threat of assured and concentrated retaliation against the RSFSR confronts Soviet leaders with the prospects of a radically altered domestic and international balance of power.

For the Soviets, recovery would be complicated by political problems they would confront in the presumably less-damaged non-Russian republics. Could the economically linked but physically less-damaged zones be counted on for recovery assistance as in the case of other localized disaster recovery efforts? Or would scarcity and chaos further stimulate the centrifugal forces of nationalism and separatism? Many of the outlying union republics served their buffer functions well in World War II, absorbing the initial damage and destruction by the German army. In a nuclear war, the reverse may be true. The central Great Russian zones (RSFSR) could receive immediate and highly concentrated levels of damage.

The evolution of US nuclear strategy toward flexibility, proportionality, and controlled responses has produced a force structure that is capable of some level of political discrimination.²² This does not mean that credible deterrence demands extensive threats to Soviet industry or Russian population centers. The destruction of essential choke-points in a highly interdependent economic system would effectively shut down industrial production, even if many plants and industrial centers survived. Soviet sensitivity to threats aimed at the industrial infrastructure which supports its superpower status, combined with its strategic perception that long wars require a stable political and economic base, suggests that limited nuclear threats may be an effective (but, thus far, insufficiently explored) means for achieving both stable and credible deterrence and strategic arms reductions.

The Soviets, understandably, do not openly discuss the link between the nationalities question and strategic vulnerability in war. Their actions, however, indicate that the leadership harbors serious misgivings about the crisis loyalty of many Soviet minorities. If so, these doubts contribute to Soviet self-deterrence and a preference for low risk-taking in crises involving the threat of confrontation with US strategic forces.²³ It is not in the American interest to shine too bright a light on Soviet nationality

problems. There would be a significant danger and probable Soviet backlash if American officials initiated widespread discussion of Soviet ethnic vulnerabilities with no accompanying restraints in the form of offensive arms control and general improvements in Soviet-American relations. Their heightened perception of US hostility could easily prompt countermeasures and an escalation of the arms race. Competitive strategy should not lock the United States into futile action-reaction spirals that do little to increase security.

Recognition of Soviet weaknesses and their impact on Soviet homeland defense serves to strengthen confidence in and the credibility of existing US strategic doctrine and force structure. If and when that force structure declines as the result of arms control agreements, greater efforts will be required to maintain deterrence and economy of force. This will require a more precise definition of the Soviet centers of gravity. Linking deterrence strategies and Soviet multinationalism is one possible approach under the Administration's competitive strategies initiative.

The Soviets are fully aware of their enduring political liabilities. These liabilities provide a considerable Soviet incentive for superpower stability (peaceful coexistence). If and when the Soviet leadership shows a preference for conflict, the preference would most likely flow from perceptions of conventional superiority. The most productive arena for competitive strategies, therefore, is at the conventional force level, where Soviet advantages reduce the self-detering pressure found in Soviet nuclear risk-taking behavior.

Competitive strategies against Soviet conventional forces require long-range perspectives that integrate military and diplomatic objectives. Arms control agreements, for example, may radically alter force structures on both sides. If the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty is followed by negotiations to reduce conventional forces, competitive strategies should play a central role in the formulation of the US negotiating position.

The USSR's most enduring weakness is its political and economic structure. The Gorbachev domestic agenda may signal a new, more cooperative phase in Soviet-American relations and ultimately a stronger, more competitive Soviet industrial base. No one can say whether a rehabilitated Soviet socioeconomic system would spawn a more assertive foreign policy or a status-quo mentality anxious to preserve the benefits of reduced tensions abroad and higher living standards at home. In a world of uncertainties, competitive strategy for the United States ultimately means the patient but long-term maintenance of credible military forces and aggressive political efforts to improve Soviet-American relations on all fronts. Success in both is the surest and perhaps the only road to affordable deterrence, strategic stability, and a world that is more secure for both nuclear superpowers.

NOTES

1. *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1987* (Washington: GPO, 1986), pp. 86-87.
2. Some experts had predicted that the 1979 census would show ethnic Russians to be a minority. The published Soviet statistics showed ethnic Russians as 52.4 percent of the population. Murray Feshbach of Georgetown University's Center for Population Research predicts that figure will fall to 48 percent by the year 2000.
3. Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73* (2nd ed.; New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 326-27.
4. Reported in *The New York Times*, 19 April 1946, p. 19; 15 May 1949, p. 1; 26 July 1949, p. 9; and 1 May 1950, p. 10.
5. Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyi, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis* (Canberra, Australia: Australian National Univ., 1970). For a more recent study of the Ukraine as pivotal to Soviet ethnic policies, see Alexander J. Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel?* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987).
6. The number would be greater had Stalin not annexed Polish territory in 1939 and the Carpatho-Ukraine in 1945, thereby extending the Soviet border to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, thus facilitating the projection of military power into those countries and minimizing future conflicts that might arise between Ukrainians and Eastern Europeans.
7. Hodnett and Potichnyi, pp. 121-25.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25.
9. Quoted in A. Shtromas, "The Legal Position of Soviet Nationalities and their Territorial Units According to the 1977 Constitution of the USSR," *Russian Review*, 37 (July 1978), 272.
10. Extensive treatment of the nationalities was given during his speech before the Supreme Soviet celebrating the 60th anniversary of the USSR. Reprinted in *Reprints from the Soviet Press*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (15 January 1983), 8-18.
11. For an assessment of Gorbachev's policies toward the nationalities, see the analysis of his speech before the 27th Party Congress by Roman Solchanyk ("Does Gorbachev Have a Nationalities Policy?" *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty* RL 112/86, 7 March 1986).
12. *The Washington Post*, 22 February 1987, p. A1.
13. There may be good reasons for Soviet concern. Riots in Alma Ata were followed by protesting Crimean Tatars in Moscow who called on Gorbachev to restore the Crimean homeland from which they were deported by Stalin in the 1940s. Thousands of demonstrators also poured into the streets of capital cities in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia protesting the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact that permitted a Soviet takeover of the region. See *The Washington Post*, 9 August 1987, pp. A1, A24; 27 August 1987, p. A1.
14. Julian Birch, "The Persistence of Nationalism in the USSR," *Journal of Social and Political Affairs*, 1 (January 1976), 75.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
16. Jeremy Azrael, *Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR*, R-2172-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, September 1977), pp. 16-22; and Sig Mickelson, "USSR Muslim Population Explosion Poses Possible Threat to Soviet Military," *Military Review*, 58 (November 1978), 39. See also Susan Curran and Dmitry Ponomareff, *Managing the Ethnic Factor in The Russian and Soviet Armed Forces* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1982).
17. Mickelson, p. 39.
18. John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies*, 29 (January 1977), 8, 12, 18.
19. Robert Lewis and Richard Rowland, "East is West and West is East . . . Population Redistribution in the Soviet Union and its Impact on Soviet Nationalities," *International Migration Review*, 11 (Spring 1977), 6, 11.
20. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," *International Security*, 4 (Fall 1979), 37.
21. Colin Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory," *International Security*, 4 (Summer 1979), 56.
22. For a summary of US doctrinal evolution, see Leon Sloss and Marc Millot, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution," *Strategic Review*, 12 (Winter 1984), 19-28. A more detailed history is provided in Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) and Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., *Strategic Nuclear Targeting* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986).
23. There is nothing in the public record that shows the Soviets have ever placed their strategic nuclear forces on alert during a crisis.

The Military Professional as Successful Politician

RICHARD THOMAS MATTINGLY, JR., and
WALLACE EARL WALKER

The world of national security policymaking is bewildering to purposeful military professionals. Socialized as they have been in field units where norms of rationality, efficiency, and undiluted authority are predominant, professionals find Washington politics, if not repugnant, at least disorienting. The environment there is enormously complex, formed by a mind-boggling array of political institutions, public agencies, interest groups, and powerful individuals both inside and outside the government pursuing a variety of goals.

For the professional in this realm of national security policymaking, success is a matter of passionate concern. "Success" is perceived in many different ways.¹ For some professionals, it is defined in their own self-interest, that is, as promotion, prestige, higher income, and prospects for later employment outside the service. For others, it is the recognition that comes from advancing the interests of their organization. For still others, success is a sense of gratification that occurs with the promotion of the national interest, however that may be defined. Finally, many professionals are likely to perceive success as the happy coincidence of all these goals.

What follows is a description of the environment in which national security policymaking occurs and some of the successful strategies employed by military professionals in this realm. Our intent is to stimulate national security professionals to think creatively about success and about strategies for achieving it.

The National Security Policymaking Environment

National security issues focus on the creation of national and international political conditions that will protect and extend vital national values. These issues encompass economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions and involve those measures taken by a country to safeguard its interests and objectives against hostile interests, foreign or domestic. One must be careful not to view any single policy as tied to only one dimension of national security affairs.² Most policies operate in more than one dimension. Military aid, such as the shipment of US weapons to Israel, is an example of the economic dimension of national security policy. Since these arms transfers can also affect the readiness of the US armed forces, they have an effect on the military dimension of US national security as well. Furthermore, arms shipments to Israel impinge on other nations in the Middle East and thereby affect US diplomatic concerns abroad. Such ripple effects between the various dimensions of national security are inevitable.

No one political institution or agency has the authority or reach to coordinate and oversee all the relevant activities within the various dimensions of national security policy. The Congress, the President, and the large number of national security agencies involved in the process attempt to develop national policies that provide, from their perspective, the all-encompassing answer to national security problems. The result is a series of US policies characterized by discontinuity, contradiction, and inconsistency; such policies fall short of the nation's security needs. No cohesive, coherent, and integrated national security strategy is possible. Such a state should not be surprising. After all, each organization in the national security policymaking process has different responsibilities, outlooks, and horizons.

The foregoing survey of national security dynamics is greatly at odds with the view that security planning is dominated by a rational process. In the rationalist view, our planners respond to international threats through a careful delineation of courses of action and comparison of those courses of action against predetermined criteria for choice. This rationalist perspective fails to discern the predominance of domestic and

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bureaucratic politics in national security affairs. Presidents and members of Congress care more about domestic constituencies than Third World debt, the sensitivities of neutral, emerging nations, or, for that matter, allied reactions to US initiatives. One need only consider the lackadaisical US response to the debilitating levels of debt piled up by Latin American nations or to our annual reductions in foreign economic aid to confirm this point. Some professionals in some organizations may care about promoting rational processes, but public agencies and organizational leaders value other things much more highly, such as institutional prowess and individual advancement. In such a contest over values, rationality rarely prevails.

The many and varied participants in the policy process are each influenced by their own definitions of successful policy outcomes and colored by particularistic, organizational, professional, and political perspectives. Samuel Huntington has observed: "Policy is not the result of deductions from a clear statement of national objectives. It is the product of the competition of purposes within individuals and groups and among individuals and groups. It is the result of politics, not logic, more an area than a unity."³ This competition, or game, as it has been referred to, determines who participates in policy decisions, what information is considered, which options are examined, and how decisions are implemented. Apparent discontinuities between the interested players in the game and a final policy often have their source in the structures and processes of the national security system. Thus outcomes are seldom what any single player, or any group of players, would have expected. Indeed, the final product in national security policymaking emphasizes the dynamics of the decision-making process and its central features of compromise, negotiation, and coalition-building among the players. As President John Kennedy observed, "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself."⁴

The great virtue of this system is that it produces policies that are tolerable to all the forces that have a stake in the outcome.⁵ The interests and ideological assumptions of bureaucracies, governmental officials, interest groups, Congress, the mass media, the public, and the President and his national security advisors all play some role in the making of national security policy.⁶ However, the emphasis on producing policies that reflect a consensus, irrespective of the substantive content of the outcome, has tended to result in particular kinds of policies. Typically, they focus on short-range objectives, are of limited scope, and tend to be much like their predecessors. Such incrementalist policies are capable of only slow and marginal adaptation to new conditions. They are primarily effective in handling issues that are very much like earlier issues. Even with dramatic, unforeseen initiatives, such as the Nixon Administration's opening to China or the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative, ultimate success means acceptance by national security professionals and the

majority of Congress. Indeed, the policies that emerge often reflect the extraordinary complexities of a process that includes international issues and events, domestic concerns, and the nearly constant penetration of the American political system by global issues and forces. These external forces can range from the price of petroleum or the rate of inflation to questions of global survival.

Organizational Parochialism. An understanding of the parochial nature of organizations participating in national security policymaking is essential to recognizing the actions of the players in the process. Each agency in the national security structure shares three characteristics: it seeks to pursue its own goals, to enhance its own power, and to promote its own position in the government hierarchy. National security organizations are motivated by the desire to protect their own self-interests, and they define issues and take stands on them in a manner perceived to promote those interests.⁷ This parochial tendency is natural, pervasive, and insures that the world and the issues of the day are seen from different perspectives.

Even within a given cabinet department there are natural rivals for claims on policy. For example, within the Department of Defense each of the armed services quite naturally values its contribution to the defense and security of the United States as the most essential and, therefore, seeks a larger share of the budget in order to best equip itself for any missions it might be called on to carry out.⁸ Within the State Department this same parochial rivalry can be seen in the competition among the regional and functional bureaus for budget, personnel resources, and influence. Between cabinet departments, for example the State and Defense Departments, parochialism breeds competition. Far from being neutral or impartial administrators desiring only to carry out orders or maximize national interests, these organizations frequently take policy positions designed to maximize their own influence relative to that of other agencies. In Vietnam, especially after 1961, most Defense Department officials sought a military solution, while most State Department officials, especially Far East specialists, sought to subordinate military measures to political and social programs.⁹ What results then is an undeclared but understood competition between agencies for scarce resources, influence, and, ultimately, power.¹⁰

The Dominance of Professionals. The professional executives and administrators who participate in the game of bureaucratic politics are late-career military, foreign service, and intelligence officers as well as policy analysts. It is the skills of these professionals which give national security organizations their problem-recognition and problem-solving capacities as well as their lore about prospects for policy success and future developments.¹¹

Professionals provide ideas on policy alternatives and make recommendations that the principal decisionmakers can discuss and act on.

It is at the senior professional level of national security organizations that day-to-day decisions are made and programs carried out. Professionals also play a direct role in crisis decisionmaking and in most major policy decisions through analysis of information and formulation of alternatives for the principal decisionmakers to act on.¹²

The role of these senior professionals is extensive and decisive in the formulation and implementation of national security policy for four reasons. First, most routine decisions are delegated to senior professionals. Second, new issues within the organizational hierarchy take shape as they move up through succeeding levels of more senior professionals and are not drastically revised by the political executives, who are disposed to give their imprimatur to what professionals have already worked out. Third, political executives need reliable and specific information that has been processed, verified, analyzed, and evaluated by senior professionals who can draw on long experience and accumulated knowledge.¹³ Finally, decisions must be implemented by these same professionals.

Therefore, in the end, professionals concerned with foreign affairs and defense policy have a profound impact on policy outcomes. They generally develop their positions on national security issues and policies largely by calculating the national interest in terms of the organizational interests of the career services to which they belong, be it the branches of military service, the State Department, or the CIA. This is not to discount the influence of individual self-interest and personal motivations for job performance such as power, promotion, prestige, and money. However, the world view of national security professionals is more strongly dominated by their particular organization, which has socialized and trained them to adopt certain views and expectations about the world, the nation, and the role of politics. Thus their primary loyalty remains to their own career profession and to their organizations. Where several professions exist within one organization, the needs of the dominant profession are more salient.

For example, in the Department of Defense, career Army officers agree that the essence of their profession is ground combat capability, whereas Navy officers generally see their principal mission as maintaining combat ships to control the seas against potential enemies. Although professionals at all levels of both these branches of the armed services have an unquestionable devotion to national security, there is an inherent conflict between the two when faced with limited budgetary and personnel resources that both must share.¹⁴ Their definition of national security rests with skills and knowledge they have achieved through a lengthy process of training and socialization.

It is thus apparent that national security policymaking involves a struggle for power to control, and to influence those who control, national security decisions. It is the "art of the possible," the process by which the conflicting demands of various individuals and subunits in the national

security apparatus are satisfied through compromise. Indeed, the use of the word "politics" in such a context reflects the fact that national security policy emerges from a process of simultaneous conflict and accommodation among the multitude of participating professional groups, each with its own competing viewpoint. Policymaking means bargaining; negotiations are required and deals must be struck. Negotiations occur throughout the executive branch as political executives and professionals in one department seek support for their position in another. Since no one participant is powerful enough to force a decision when disagreement exists among the participants, the eventual decision is a result of compromises and consensus. Jerel Rosati points out in his discussion of the participants in the SALT I policymaking process that national security policies are "political resultants" in the sense "that what happens is not chosen as a solution to the problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government."¹¹ Thus decisions are the result of the pushing and pulling among the various participants as they attempt to advance their concepts of personal, group, organizational, and national interests. Further, as we saw earlier, such decisions tend to be incremental.

Since national security decisionmakers operate under conditions of uncertainty with regard to future consequences of their actions, incremental decisions reduce the risks and costs of uncertainty. Incrementalism is also realistic, because it recognizes that decisionmakers lack time and other resources needed to engage in comprehensive, or rational, analysis of alternative approaches to the issues at hand. Moreover, all participants in national security policymaking are essentially pragmatic, seeking not always the single best way to deal with an issue but, more accurately, "something that will work." Incrementalism, in short, yields limited, practicable, acceptable decisions.

The consequences of such a national security policy process should not be alarming. The overwhelming complexity of the national security

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machinery limits what members of various organizations can do and inhibits the disposition of political appointees to act hastily in circumstances where action may not be appropriate. Expeditionary, even impulsive initiatives by presidents and senior political executives in noncrisis situations are seldom acceptable to Congress; the dominant rule in American politics is that consensus must be carefully built if initiatives are to be sustained. The fact that policy is formulated and implemented by a large number of individuals in a complex institutional arrangement reduces the probability of taking decisive action. Political executives and professionals within different agencies usually disagree: they want different policies, and they define the situation differently because of their differing vantage points. The result is that policy formulation often boils down to a tug of war among competing agencies.¹⁶ National security decisionmaking is a political game with high stakes, in which differences are usually settled with minimum costs to the participants.

Strategies for Success

Because of the variety of purposes among subordinate national security professionals and especially among career military officers, the game of politics remains intense, marked always by the presence of vested interests, interorganizational conflict, intraorganizational rivalry, and the elusiveness of a "best" national security policy. Nevertheless, senior professionals have developed multiple strategies for playing the game of bureaucratic politics in national security policymaking. Participants report that these strategies will enhance prospects for individual success while at the same time advancing the purposes of their organizations.

Accepting Environmental Constraints. It is a simple fact that there exist certain boundaries within which individuals in the national security arena will have to operate during their careers. These boundaries will not change, so that successful national security professionals find it better not to waste time and energy objecting to them. Rather, such professionals take them as a given and go on from there.

The most fundamental of such constraints is, of course, the Constitution, which quite deliberately divides the making and implementation of national security policy among the different branches of government. One cannot lightly dismiss the abiding concern within the American body politic over the potential for abuse of power by any centralized authority. American national security policy is profoundly influenced by such values and ideals, which the majority of American people hold. Successful professionals accept the fact that the American national security policymaking system is based upon constitutionally mandated and publicly supported limitations that encourage deliberate program development.

The concept of "rule of law" is another fundamental of American government. It means, quite simply, that national security professionals are constrained by law in the actions they can take to defend the country. The law takes precedence over military expediency. The investigation of the unauthorized sale of weapons to Iran and the use of the profits for assistance to Contra rebels in Nicaragua, as arranged for by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North from 1982 to 1986, is an example of the fact that government officials are not above the law and that legally suspect behavior is not condoned.

Successful professionals also recognize other constraints. The ideological and policy predispositions of senior policymakers affect program development and implementation. Therefore, political executives within the agency and in superintending cabinet departments are worthy of careful study. Savvy professionals seek to understand the background and operating agendas of cabinet secretaries, under secretaries, and assistant secretaries who work in their area of responsibility. To be able to decipher the tea leaves, professionals should seek answers to such questions as: What is the official's educational background and professional training? Where has he or she been employed? What were his formative experiences? How does he think about problems? What historical experiences most likely influenced his outlook? Are there particular projects that the superior is a strong advocate for or against? From answers to these questions, one can infer likely reactions to proposed policies or programs and the best approaches for proposing new initiatives. In essence, gaining such knowledge is a boon to advocacy, a responsibility all professionals must undertake.

Professionals must also study and learn to accept the operating procedures of hierarchically senior staffs and executives. Thus, one might find frustrating the highly ritualistic methodologies of budget examiners in the Office of Management and Budget and staffers on the House Appropriations Committee, but wise professionals accept these groups and their methods as givens in the environment and find ways to work with them to achieve organizational goals.

In sum, national security professionals confront a number of immutable constraining forces in their daily activities. These forces define the setting in which each national security organization must operate. At times these forces help enlarge the role of a particular national security organization and at other times they limit the organization's activities. Professionals cannot view their organizations in isolation, but rather must understand them as being immersed in a total framework that not only imposes constraints, but also provides for opportunities—to those who learn and work within the system rather than fighting it.

Respecting the Process. Closely related to accepting the environmental constraints is respecting the process itself. The contrived nature

of national security organizations means that they contain inherent sources of conflict. The national security process can be more readily understood if relationships between national security organizations are viewed as an outcome of a continuing tug of war. The success of one organization in competition with another for greater influence and a larger share of the budgetary pie rests on its credibility, expertise, and effective and efficient use of resources on hand. Just as each side in a tug of war must carefully marshal its resources, national security organizations must position themselves to minimize weaknesses, capitalize on timing, coordinate internal activities, and maintain constant effort to enhance organizational prowess. Not unlike the losing team in a tug of war, an organization can lose its enthusiasm for innovative ideas or may make a strategic error and employ its resources at the wrong time. The implications of this analogy are that national security organizations are always subject to pressures for change. Thus, because processes are in flux, careful attention must be paid to them to assure that the directions of change are those desired.

For success, participants must accept the political nature of the national security policymaking process. Such acceptance will help the mid-level and senior professionals better accommodate to the diversity and seeming inconsistency of the goals that national security policy must pursue. Furthermore, such a recognition can save participants from excessive cynicism which cripples enthusiasm and fetters effectiveness. To be a successful player, one must jump into the game with both feet; he who hesitates loses his chance to play.

Conflict should not be perceived as solely dysfunctional to a national security organization. It can lead to heightened morale, and it can lead to solutions that are creative from both an organizational and national standpoint. In an analysis of the Air Force decision to purchase the A-7 aircraft, Richard Head points out that interservice conflict provided a powerful incentive to develop a better, more efficient, and more capable system.¹⁷ Thus the national security professional is better advised not to concern himself with the issue of how to eliminate disagreement or conflict, but rather how to channel the inevitable conflict so that wider organizational and national benefits may be attained.

Advancing the Organization. A national security professional, if he expects to succeed, must recognize that organizational advancement must be a central priority. Since national security professionals have a relatively narrow outlook compared to the President or even to cabinet heads, they are preoccupied with the unique importance of their organization to the overall national security mission. In their view, national security can be improved primarily through the recommendations provided by their organization. Thus, for example, professionals on the Department of the Army staff tend to take a jaundiced view of the sea mentality of the Navy staff.

This loyalty to organizational goals is significant for national policy, because, in the absence of such a feeling of commitment by organizational professionals, their organizations are less likely to have a significant effect on national policy outcomes. Since each organization represents distinct values judged to be crucial to national security decision-making, the failure of professionals to take energetic positions may mean that all sides of an issue are not adequately represented, thereby skewing the input on which decisionmakers must act and producing unfortunate results. For example, the failure of CIA professionals to argue forcefully that the Shah of Iran was in considerable political difficulty in the late 1970s led to the nearly complete surprise of US decisionmakers, who did not foresee the Shah's precipitous fall and the subsequent installation of the Khomeini regime. Had these professionals acted more aggressively in espousing their views, a CIA failure might have been a CIA success.¹⁸

Subordinate professionals are bounded significantly in their performance by the expectations of political executives. Demonstrated loyalty to the organization, its superiors, and its agenda frees professionals from unwanted constraints. When subordinate professionals come to establish a relationship of trust with political executives, a shared view of what needs to be done is developed. A relationship based on shared trust and loyalty reduces the need for detailed supervision and complicated machinery for approvals. It thus serves to simplify organizational operations and enhances professional scope and independence.

Developing Interpersonal Skills. Another essential skill professionals must possess to succeed in the game of bureaucratic politics is that of interpersonal dealings.¹⁹ Obviously, most activities in modern bureaucratic settings place a premium upon the ability to relate to and negotiate with other people, but in the world of defense politics such skills must be honed to an extraordinary sharpness.

Interpersonal skills include the abilities to work effectively as a member of a group—that is, to advance one's organizational interests in the face of competing interests, to achieve mutually agreeable compromises, and to preserve comity regardless of the result. Successful professionals recognize that national security organizations are staffed by people who bring many different attitudes, values, and personal characteristics with them and learn to work with diverse personalities to achieve results. Part and parcel of possessing these interpersonal skills is being aware of the existence and implications of informal groups. Organizational charts may specify the hierarchical chain of command as well as communications networks and formal rules; but human friendships and peer group support alter these formal structures. Informal groups, unofficial supportive ties, and carefully cultivated personal relationships can be beneficial to both the organization and the individual because they can bypass ineffective people

and augment a professional's influence so as to allow access to decision-making networks from which he or she might otherwise be excluded. Thus professionals learn to use these informal networks of associates to promote organizational purposes.

To build such networks, of course, professionals have learned that the directive, perhaps even authoritarian, style that served them so well in field units is no longer successful. Since no individual or agency is truly subordinate to another, decisions must flow from consensus and voluntary cooperation, which depend in turn upon friendly persuasion and mutual good will. One of the biggest shocks that a military professional can encounter is to sit on a high-level interagency group and learn that his rank and ribbons—and the rank and ribbons of his boss—are virtually meaningless. He is thrown instead upon the bare resources of competence, reputation, and his powers to convince.

In lieu of the directive style, a consensus-building, work-along-with style is necessary. Successful professionals resourcefully promote a team spirit among the group of nominal adversaries and competitors within which a decision is to be made or a position generated. Such team play with the opposition may at first strike professionals fresh from line duty as horribly inefficient and hypocritical, if not disloyal. Seemingly every detail must be hashed over and compromised. Yet the end results are invariably superior because more human judgment is involved in the decision, and, with agreement forthcoming by all members of the team, implementation is likely to be more successful.

Thus, successful professionals find they must act like politicians—a fate that many at first find abhorrent. Without blinking, they must learn to persuade, to coax, to cajole, to bargain, to listen, and, yes, to charm. They must learn the fine art of log-rolling, horse-trading, and mutual back-scratching. In essence, successful military professionals must learn another side of leadership, a side that most politicians have learned from the beginning. That side of leadership is more persuasive than directive, more receptive than responsive, more disposed to conciliation and negotiation than to insistence and demand, more inclined to warmth and humor than to aloof officiality.

Learning to Negotiate. As we have seen, in the national security policymaking arena conflict is endemic and inevitable. Such conflict can become intensely bitter as human egos become interfused with organizational pride and as human participants confuse legitimate organizational aspirations with their own individual need to win. Yet, in the absence of motivation that flows from strong emotional involvement in the issues at hand, participants risk ceding important organizational interests in the hope of maintaining what professionals are fond of calling "good working relationships."

One of the biggest shocks a military professional can encounter is to sit on a high-level interagency group and learn that his rank and ribbons are virtually meaningless.

Perhaps the best exit from this muddle is what Roger Fisher and William Ury call "principled negotiation."²⁰ The ground rule of such negotiation is that each participant's interest be protected rather than that a particular decision, solution, or course be adopted. In such a negotiation style, participants refuse to be drawn into bargaining over the various positions that parties to the negotiation take. Debating over whether the other side's position is sensible makes no sense, because what is truly most sensible is never objectively establishable and attempts to establish it are merely likely to endanger ongoing relationships. Thus principled negotiation seeks to separate professionals as people from the problem.

Once professionals recognize that interests and not positions are at the root of the conflict, inventing options in which all may gain becomes more feasible. In essence the ideal strategy for both sides is a "win-win" outcome in which both win, and not a "win-lose" or "lose-win" outcome, in which one side loses. If both sides gain in the negotiation by advancing the organizational interests of all concerned parties, then negotiations have been a success and personal relationships can flourish.

Skill in the art of negotiation is a crucial precursor to professional success in the national security community. All organizations and their members should take the long view, recognizing that issues can both divide and unify them over time. One issue may divide two organizations today, but tomorrow another issue is likely to unify them against others. Thus, though conflict is endemic, it must always be layered over by a spirit of comity so that consensus, compromise, and the accommodation of shifting alignments remain possible.

Communicating the Organizational Vision. Professionals must possess the ability to integrate within a transcendent vision the organization itself, its purposes, and the people within it. Intellectual and communications skills—developed by a broad liberal education, by intensive self-directed study, by carefully selected reading, and by studied practice in writing and speaking—are essential. Successful military professionals have a sure grasp of their own craft and of the wider world within which their craft has meaning. They have a thorough understanding of their own organization, acquired not by hook and by crook, but rather through deliberate

study. And they can express their ideas and convictions cogently and concisely, without lapsing into organizational jargon comprehensible only within the confines of their own organization. They also speak clearly and confidently; their presentations are articulate and well-rehearsed. Finally, these successful military professionals have learned to reason in a compelling way.

Vision is equally important in speaking for the organization. Vision is the ability to see the enterprise whole—its interconnections, the things that influence it, and the ways it influences others. It is the synthesizing faculty so sorely needed in the seemingly chaotic flux of security policymaking. This ability to see large things whole, to see them simultaneously and with discrimination, may be the most important skill of all.²¹

Maintaining Ethical Balance. Countless sermons have been preached on the ethics of public service. These sermons recognize that definitive policy decisions made by national security professionals often have at their base conflicting ethical issues, such as whether to give precedence to the public interest or to the narrower demands of profession, department, or self. Dealing effectively with such ethical ambiguity, that is, with the moral complexities national security organizations face, is a challenge to all military professionals.²²

The late Stephen K. Bailey detailed three ethical qualities which are applicable to professionals in national security policymaking: "optimism, courage, and fairness tempered by charity."²³ "Optimism" is the ability to deal with ethically ambiguous situations confidently and purposefully. "Courage" is the capacity to decide and act in the face of a wavering ethical beacon when inaction, indecision, or conformity with the herd would provide the easy solution. "Fairness tempered by charity" allows for the maintenance of standards of justice in decisions affecting the public interest. "The best solution," writes Bailey, "rarely is without its costs . . . And one mark of moral maturity is an appreciation of the inevitability of untoward and often malignant effects of benign moral choices."²⁴

The foregoing analytical approach should be reinforced by an "inner check"—the military professional's own internalized sense of responsibility to the public. We suggest that when decisionmakers are confronted with difficult ethical choices, they "talk to themselves" in terms of various standards or principles. Ethical awareness precedes ethical clarity. They may have to compromise particular values in a given situation (e.g. loyalty to superior or organization), but they can be reasonably comfortable in recognizing that other values (e.g. integrity and self-respect) are enhanced by so doing. This check reemphasizes that the national security professional is properly the public's servant, not its master. In the end, the national security community will prosper in effectiveness and public esteem only when its professionals police themselves.

Conclusion

We have portrayed the national security environment and the process of decisionmaking in security affairs as a complex milieu dominated by bureaucratic politics. Such politics is not of the electoral sort, but rather politics played according to the rules of bureaucratic dynamics, involving as actors elected public officials, appointed political executives, and highly trained professionals, all competing for power and influence. Given these harsh but inevitable realities, those military professionals called upon to enter the game must learn to play by the rules—whether they like it or not—lest they fail. Such rules, what we have called strategies, are calculated to yield success in national security affairs, whether success reflects individual self-interest, organizational advancement, or the promotion of the national interest.

By accepting environmental constraints and respecting national and organizational policy processes, military professionals not only advance their interests but avoid debilitating cynicism and frustration. Recognition that organizational purposes must be advanced if the national security decision process is to function effectively can provide professionals reassurance that their efforts need not be thought of as parochial. Interpersonal, negotiating, and communications skills—as reinforced by an ability to articulate the organizational vision—can promote effectiveness. Finally, the maintenance of ethical balance can sustain lifelong careers.

These strategies for success are far from novel. Democratic politicians have used them for centuries. In the final analysis, *we are calling for professionals to act more like politicians*, because, in fact, in the highly bureaucratized and politicized atmosphere of Washington, everyone who is a success is part politician, part bureaucrat, part specialist. Bureaucrats and politicians have a bad name. What we all forget too easily is that bureaucracy and complex government are virtually synonymous. We also forget that democratic politicians have sustained our nation for two centuries. In the process they have provided us more freedom than any other people at any time of history have ever enjoyed, economic prosperity that is the envy of the globe, and national security that has thwarted all enemies, be they foreign or domestic. National security professionals should set their sights by these achievements, not frowning on politicians, but rather seeking to be more political in the best sense of that term.

NOTES

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1. Richard Hackman, "A New Strategy for Job Enrichment," in *Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy*, ed. Fred Kramer (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1981), discusses motivations for individual

success. Robert Trice, "The Policy Making Process: Actors and Their Impact," in *American Defense Policy*, ed. John Reichart and Steven Sturm, 5th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1983), states that the focus of most national security professionals is the nation as a whole and that they base their policy positions and actions on "national interests."

2. On this point see George C. Edwards and Wallace Earl Walker, eds., *National Security and the U.S. Constitution: A Bicentennial Reappraisal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, forthcoming 1988); and Daniel J. Kaufman, Jeffrey S. McKittrick, and Thomas J. Leney, eds., *U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1985), chap. 1.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961), p. 1.

4. As quoted in Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. i.

5. Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986); and John Spanier and Eric Uslaner, *American Foreign Policymaking and the Democratic Dilemmas*, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1985).

6. There are others who play a role. The academic world, the world of research in universities, has an influence and participates in the process. Most of the more effective political actors on Capitol Hill have academic experts whom they regularly consult. Other institutions do research of all kinds on contract with the government; they are staffed by national security policy "experts" and include the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Brookings Institution, and the American Enterprise Institute. On this point, see Wallace Earl Walker and Andrew Krepinevich, "No First Use and Conventional Deterrence: The Politics of Defense Policymaking," in *The Presidency and National Security Policy*, ed. Gordon Hoxie (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1984). Also see Wallace Earl Walker, "Domesticating Foreign Policy: Congress and the Vietnam War," in *Democracy, Strategy and Vietnam*, ed. George Osborn et al. (Boston: Lexington Books, 1987).

7. Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1974). Also, Vincent Davis, "The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases," Monograph no. 3, in *World Affairs* (Denver: Univ. of Denver, 1967). For example, a Navy project officer's success in securing approval for a program to establish the Navy's role in strategic nuclear bombing was due primarily to the organizational environment and astute, parochial bureaucratic maneuvering by some of the participants.

8. For discussion of interservice rivalry see Halperin, pp. 26-62; Samuel Huntington, "Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (March 1961), 40-52; and John C. Ries, *The Management of Defense* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. 129-92.

9. Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 28-34.

10. Halperin, especially chaps. 2-4, 11, and 15; and Wallace Earl Walker, *Changing Organizational Culture* (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1986).

11. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 8-18.

12. Harry Wriston, "The Secretary and the Management of the Department," and Don K. Price, "The Secretary and Our Unwritten Constitution," in *The Secretary of State*, ed. Don K. Price (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 76-112 and 166-90, point out the importance of subordinate professionals in the analysis and implementation of a policy decision.

13. Frederick C. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968).

14. See Halperin, pp. 26-62, and Huntington, *The Common Defense*, pp. 123-96.

15. Jerel Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," *World Politics*, 33 (January 1981), 234-52.

16. See Charles Kegley, Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), chap. 13, re consequences of organizational decisionmaking.

17. Richard G. Head, "The A-7 Decisions," in *American Defense Policy*, pp. 613-25.

18. Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounters with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985), and William H. Sullivan, "Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken," *Foreign Policy*, 40 (Fall 1980), 175-86.

19. Amos Jordan and William Taylor, *American National Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1981), pp. 209-14.

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Terrorism, the Media, and the Government

L. PAUL BREMER III

It is 0622 hours on 23 October 1983 in the parking lot of Beirut International Airport in Lebanon. A large yellow Mercedes truck with a swarthy bearded man at the wheel is racing at high speed directly at the chain-link gate guarding the entrance to the 24th US Marine Amphibious Unit's headquarters compound. Passing through the gate before the guard can fire, it plunges on, finally stopping in the open atrium lobby of the commandeered terminal building where the Marines are quartered. Six tons of high explosives in the truck detonate, vaporizing the terrorist driver, collapsing the four-story steel and concrete building in a pile of rubble, killing 241 Marines, and injuring scores more.¹

Such terroristic acts present a direct threat to the interests of the American government and its personnel. From 1980 through 1986 the US military was the target of over 250 terrorist attacks. During the same period, American diplomats and diplomatic facilities worldwide were targets in 228 attacks. Close to 5000 international terrorist attacks occurred during that seven-year period, which means that during the decade to date, a US military or diplomatic establishment was attacked about every five days and a terrorist incident occurred every 12 hours. These statistics do not include the fatal attacks in October of last year on two US Air Force sergeants and one retired US Air Force sergeant outside Clark Air Base in the Philippines.² While many of these terrorist attacks amounted to little more than harassment, some, as in the case of the Marines, caused catastrophic loss of life. These numbers make it clear just how pervasive terrorism has become.

For me terrorism has a personal side. There are memorial plaques in the State Department lobby listing the names of American diplomats who have died in the line of duty since 1776. When I joined the Foreign Service 21 years ago, there were 81 names on those plaques. All but seven of those diplomats died from earthquakes, plagues, and other nature-induced

causes. But in the last 21 years, 73 additional names of Americans serving in US diplomatic missions have been added, Americans who died at the hands of terrorists. In other words, for the first 190 years of our nation's existence, the Foreign Service lost a member to violent death by human agents about once every 27 years. Since I joined, we have averaged one such loss about every 90 days.

But not just diplomats and not just military and not just Americans suffer. Terrorism occurs in most parts of the world, but it is the world's democracies that suffer most. For example, in 1986, 64 percent of all international terrorist attacks were directed against only three countries—the United States, Israel, and France.

The moral values upon which democracy is based—individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press—all stand in the way of those who seek to impose their will or their ideology by terror. The challenge to democracies is to combat terrorism while preserving these deep democratic values. A particularly sensitive issue is the relation of the media to terrorism. While virtually all players on the international stage vie for attention and public support, terrorists are unique in the way they use violence against innocents to draw attention to a cause.

Terrorism and the Media

Terrorist threats—to our people, to friendly countries, and to democracy itself—are all made more complex by the interplay among media, governments, and terrorists. The very nature of terrorism, its desire to gain the widest possible publicity for its act, makes this complexity inevitable. Terrorists have always understood that the target was not the physical victim, but the wider audience. Their goal is to terrorize citizens in an apparently random way, so that people lose confidence in their governments' policies. Nineteenth-century Russian terrorists spoke of "propaganda of the deed." Terrorists then could not imagine the power terrorist acts would have in the day of worldwide live television broadcasts.

Many of us can remember the horror of seeing the 1972 Olympic Games disintegrate into kidnapping, flames, and murder. No doubt the Black September faction of the PLO chose to attack the Israelis at the

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Munich Olympics precisely because it guaranteed them a worldwide audience. How many times since then have we all been riveted to our television sets to watch some new act of barbarism unfold? But we must not fall into the trap of confusing technology with people. The medium is *not* the message. The message is what reporters and editors decide should be aired or printed. What you and I see, hear, and read about terrorism in mass media is the result of multiple decisions made by cameramen, reporters, producers, copywriters, and editors throughout the news industry. When we explore the role of media in terrorism, we are in fact exploring the judgments of dozens of individuals.

The most difficult issue involved is media coverage of a terrorist incident in progress. Because news organizations, especially electronic media, can directly affect the outcome of a terrorist incident, journalists must exercise special care and judgment. Innocent lives can be lost by even the slightest miscalculation on the part of the media. That is why it is so vital for journalists to keep certain specific points in mind as they cover ongoing terrorist incidents, the most fundamental being one borrowed from the Hippocratic oath: *First, do no harm.*

We have to assume that terrorists have access to any information published or broadcast about them and the attack they are carrying out. The hand-held television is a fact of life; any airport duty-free shop has excellent, battery-powered shortwave receivers the size of a paperback book; two-way radios are cheap and readily available. It is now possible to put a cellular telephone, a two-way radio, a shortwave receiver, and a television receiver in one ordinary briefcase.

The ability of terrorists to track outside responses to their actions in real or near-real time means that journalists are not just narrating the passing scene. They are players; like it or not, they are involved. This involvement imposes special responsibilities on journalists during a terrorist incident such as an airline hijacking. Just like those of us on the task force in the State Department's Operations Center, journalists are making decisions which can mean life or death for specific, identifiable individuals.

During hijackings and other incidents of hostage-taking, terrorists have—as during the Air France hijacking to Entebbe on 27 June 1976 and the TWA 847 hijacking on 14 June 1985—segregated victims by race, religion, nationality, or occupation. Indeed, people have been murdered on the basis of these distinctions. Obviously, news reports saying things like “22 of the 72 passengers are American citizens” provide information which can be useful to terrorists and deadly for hostages. Even revealing the exact number of hostages can be valuable to terrorists. Six of the American employees of the US Embassy in Teheran spent several weeks hiding with our Canadian friends. Had the terrorists realized their absence they, too, could have been seized. Several news organizations learned of this situation and—to their credit—did not report it.

A wide range of people have suggested ways in which the media might address the problems inherent in covering hijackings and other hostage situations. Some have suggested that there be no live coverage of an incident in progress. Others have proposed formal guidelines, perhaps offered by the government, perhaps voluntarily set up by news organizations, perhaps by the two working in concert.

After considerable reflection, I believe that US law and custom, our country's profound commitment to freedom of the press, and the widely varying circumstances of each terrorist incident make it impractical to develop universally accepted guidelines for the media's response to terrorism. Still, given the media's involvement in terrorist incidents, it seems to me that reporters and their editors should be asking themselves some tough questions as they cover terrorist incidents. Let me suggest eight such questions:

1. Have my competitive instincts run away with me?

Journalism is a competitive business. Everyone wants to cover the story better and, where possible, sooner than the competition. Occasionally, competitive instinct has overridden common sense. One need only look at the tapes of the Damascus "press conference" with the TWA 847 hostages to see how the pressures for a better camera angle or an answer to a question turned professional journalists quite literally into a mob.

2. What is the benefit in revealing the professional and personal history of a hostage before he or she is released?

Hostages have been known to misrepresent their marital status, professional responsibilities, career histories, and other material facts in their efforts to persuade their captors not to harm them. One former hostage is certain that the lies he told his captors saved his life. It is standard American journalistic practice to report information about victims, but in many other democratic countries that is not the case. In the unique circumstances of political terrorism, facts about hostages verified by family members or coworkers and announced publicly could have deadly consequences.

3. When reporting on the statements made by hostages and victims, have I given sufficient weight to the fact that *all* such statements are made under duress? If I decide to go ahead with the report, have I given my audience sufficient warning?

We have cases where hostages appear on television tapes making admissions or other statements in the terrorists' interests—all seemingly uncoerced and unrehearsed. Only later, after the hostages' return, did we learn that the statements had been extracted by force or threat.

4. Should I use statements, tapes, and the like provided by the terrorists? How reflective of actual conditions are the materials provided by the terrorists? How much analysis should I offer? How much speculation?



Rescue workers search the rubble of the US Marine headquarters in Beirut after the terrorist bombing of October 1983.

Former hostage David Jacobsen recounts the beatings he received when US media reported that messages made at the direction of his captors were said to contain "hidden messages."³

5. How often should I use live coverage? Should I put a terrorist on TV live? Should I run an unedited statement on the air or in print? To what extent will I serve the terrorists' purposes by so doing?

One of the things that distinguishes terrorism from other crimes is the use of real or threatened violence to amplify and advance a political position. Few news organizations run more than brief excerpts of statements by anyone but the President of the United States. Even then, reporting full texts of presidential remarks is limited to special occasions. Yet, ironically, when a terrorist speaks to the world, some news organizations have tended to air or print every word, every gesture, every inflection. Giving extensive coverage to terrorist statements may well encourage future acts of terrorism.

6. Am I judging sources as critically as I would at other times?

Devoting major chunks of space and time to a terrorist incident can create a situation in which it becomes difficult to generate enough solid material to "fill the hole." During terrorist incidents we have all seen reporting of what amounts to nothing more than rumor. Information based on sources responsible news organizations would not normally touch has

been given broad circulation during incidents. I have seen stories which should have read something like: "According to the reports of a wire service known to be careless, a newspaper noted for its irresponsibility has reported that anonymous sources in a rumor-plagued city have said . . ."

7. Should I even *try* to report on possible military means to rescue the hostages?

A particularly reprehensible practice by some news organizations is trying to discover and publish reports on the movements of military forces during a terrorist incident. Such reporting can only end up one of two ways: either the report is correct and the news organization runs the risk of having served as an intelligence source for the terrorists; or the report is wrong, in which case it may unduly complicate the resolution of the incident. This subject deserves special attention. Reports on military activities designed to surprise or thwart an armed foe should be just about as secret as things get.

8. What about honest consideration for the victims' families?

One former hostage recounts how his teenage son received a telephone call in the middle of the night. The journalist calling had a question: "The latest reports indicate that your father will be executed in two hours. Any response?"

It is encouraging to report that responsible journalists are paying increasing attention to the effects their actions have on terrorism. I know that some major news organizations have set up specific internal guidelines for handling terrorist incidents. It was gratifying also to note that major networks declined to broadcast a videotape made last spring by one of the hostages in Lebanon. The substance of what was said was reported, but the tape itself—obviously a cynical attempt by the kidnappers to advance their demands—was not aired.

Just as we in government must defend our Constitution without abandoning our traditional values, journalists must exercise their judgment in ways that do not jeopardize their traditional role as an independent watchdog. The media need no prompting to resist efforts at manipulation by government. One can only urge they exercise the same care at resisting manipulation by terrorists.

How then are we to thwart terrorism? What can we as citizens, as military members, as government officials do to protect ourselves from the multiple threats of terrorism?

Our Government's Strategy Against Terrorism

Our government has essentially turned to a commonsense strategy to combat terrorism. Despite some setbacks, this program is beginning to show successes. This strategy rests on three pillars:

- First is a policy of firmness toward terrorists;
- Second is pressure on terror-supporting states;

- Third is a series of practical measures designed to identify, track, apprehend, prosecute, and punish terrorists.

The first of these pillars, no concessions, is designed to avoid rewarding terrorists. Behavior rewarded is behavior repeated, as any parent can attest. This element of our policy is sometimes misstated or misunderstood. Some believe that this policy means we will not ever talk to terrorists. That is not correct. To be precise, our policy is that we will not make concessions to terrorists, nor will we negotiate with them. But we will talk to anyone, to any group, to any government about the safety and well-being of Americans held hostage.

The second pillar, maintaining pressure on terror-supporting states, is of real importance because of the special danger posed by the state-supported terrorist. Our aim is to raise the economic, diplomatic, and—if necessary—the military costs to such states to a level that they are unwilling to pay. The US air strike against Libya was in part intended to raise the costs to Libya of supporting terrorism. The withdrawal of our ambassador to Syria in the aftermath of proven official Syrian complicity in the attempted bombing of an El Al 747 in London demonstrated to Syria that we will not conduct business as usual with states that use terror as a foreign-policy tool.

Over the past year, there has been a growing political consensus among European governments that more has to be done to show states that supporting terrorism is unacceptable to the international community. In the late spring of 1986, several European nations imposed sanctions on Libya for supporting terrorism. Then Western European governments expelled more than 100 so-called Libyan "diplomats" and businessmen. This heavy blow to Libya's terrorist infrastructure in Europe, combined with the tightened security measures at airports and elsewhere, doubtless played a role in reducing sharply Libyan-related terrorist incidents after May of 1986. In the fall of that year, the Europeans announced a series of economic, political, diplomatic, and security-related measures against Syria, in response to which that nation has improved its behavior in several important ways.

We regard terrorists as criminals. They commit criminal acts. And this brings us to the third pillar of our strategy: our effort to find and implement practical measures to identify, apprehend, and punish terrorists. These measures involve improving cooperation among countries in intelligence, police, and law enforcement matters. For example, we are finding ways to improve the collection and sharing of information on terrorists' locations, movements, and affiliations. We are now working with key allies to develop agreed "lookout" lists of known or suspected terrorists. As terrorists are identified, we can begin to track them, especially as they attempt to cross international borders. Even democratic states can require detailed identification and conduct thorough searches at border points. This is a terrorist vulnerability we are trying to exploit with some success.

We have also developed an aggressive program of cooperating with our friends and allies in the apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of terrorists. Over the past year, our cooperation has gotten closer, and we are seeing results. European courts have convicted and sentenced terrorists to long prison terms. Attitudes among political leaders are changing.

Finally, we have dramatically upgraded our military capability to respond directly to terrorist activities in a wide variety of international settings. The US Special Operations Command, a unified command under the leadership of General James J. Lindsay, USA, was activated on 1 June of last year, with headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Designed to deal with low-intensity conflict, including terrorism, this command has components from each of the services, including the Army's 1st Special Operations Command headquartered at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. This Army command embraces a Special Forces group, Ranger regiment, Civil Affairs battalion, Psyop group, Military Intelligence battalion, the 160th Aviation Group (the "Night Stalkers"), and the highly secret Delta Force. The 160th Aviation Group's superspecialized helicopters have already proved their mettle in the Persian Gulf in operations against the Iranians. The Army component, in combination with elements from the Navy's SEAL teams and the Air Force's 2d Air Division, constitute a formidable counterterrorist capability indeed.⁴

In my many trips to Europe during the last year, both before and after the Iran/Contra revelations, I have encountered no diminution of enthusiasm for working together to counter terrorism. There is a palpable sense of dedication among the intelligence, police, airport security, customs, and immigration officials involved in fighting the terrorist threat. I believe that this growing cohesion in the world's democracies is having an effect, that we are in a position to carry out our strategy and reduce the level of terrorism around the world. No one, of course, can promise a world free of terrorism. History makes it clear that the use of violence to intimidate others is not likely to disappear. What we can confidently state, however, is that we have a concrete plan for dealing with terrorism and that we are seeing some heartening results.

NOTES

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2. Marc Lerner, "3 Americans murdered in Philippines," *The Washington Times*, 29 October 1987, pp. A1, A12.

3. Remarks by former hostage David Jacobsen, 4 March 1987, during conference titled "The Hostages—Family, Media, and Government," at Hotel Washington, Washington, D.C.

4. Ibid.

5. Kenneth Brooten, Jr., "U.S. Special Operations Command," *Journal of Defense & Diplomacy*, 5 (No. 10, 1987), 21-23; John M. Collins, *Green Berets, SEALs, and Spetsnaz* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), pp. 21-23, 32-37; Eric C. Ludvigsen, "The Army's 'Night Stalkers' in the Persian Gulf," *Army*, 37 (November 1987), 14, 16.

US Strategic Options in Nicaragua

ALDEN M. CUNNINGHAM

The Sandinistas are not harmless. They pose a clear threat to US interest in the creation of a stable environment for democratic and socio-economic development in Central America. And they continue to be confident of ultimate triumph in two wars: the present war against the insurgents and the prospective one they most fear—an invasion by the United States.

The Sandinistas are Marxist-Leninists closely tied to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the East bloc. Their military power is at least comparable to that of all the other Central American countries combined. They have gained a seductive revolutionary image by naming their movement after Augusto Sandino, an anti-US, nationalist Nicaraguan hero of the 1920s and 1930s, and by adapting to modern-day geopolitical realities. Yet they fit well the mold of Latin American revolutionary movements; their roots lie in a history of political violence, a Marxist subculture, Castro's example, and a powerful, visceral hatred of the United States.¹

The principal pillars upon which the Sandinistas' power rests are stronger than ever. The Popular Sandinista Army has improved steadily in the last three years, especially in its capacity to wage a counterinsurgent war. The state security apparatus is widely recognized as streamlined, efficient, and "on a roll" in terms of controlling and eliminating pro-resistance support and the internal opposition. And Soviet and East Bloc military and economic support continues. Military and military-associated cargo deliveries broke previous highs in 1986, making it a banner year, with roughly 23,000 metric tons provided. Substantial deliveries continued in 1987. Some two to three thousand Cuban military advisers assist in planning and training for both wars at all command levels from army headquarters down to battalion.²

Another reason for Sandinista confidence is the increasing fragility of the US bipartisan consensus forged in June 1986 to provide direct military and humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance. The ongoing Arias-initiated peace process has influenced the US Congress to suspend all but humanitarian supplies to the resistance, thus buying the Sandinistas more time and increasingly, as the months pass, affecting resistance capability to conduct aggressive guerrilla operations.

Sandinista Strategy—Defeat the Intervention Before It Occurs


The Sandinista's strategic objective is to endure—to consolidate as completely as possible their political and ideological hold on Nicaragua. They are using a combination of military, political, diplomatic, psycho-social, and economic devices and resources to achieve their goal.³

The Sandinistas must focus on both wars—an ongoing counterinsurgent war and a potential conventional conflict, phasing into an irregular war, in the event of a US military intervention. While the Sandinistas publicly declare that a US invasion is more likely as a result of resistance weakness, they understand that their army's success in the counterinsurgent war makes a US invasion less likely because the rebels would have failed to develop sufficient legitimacy to make the political costs of an invasion acceptable to the United States.

In the counterinsurgency effort now being waged in the mountains of northern Nicaragua, the marshes and jungles of Zelaya province (which constitutes virtually the entire eastern half of the country), and the hills 50 to 100 miles east of Managua, the army's strategy is to defend as far forward as possible. The idea is to make the rebels fight their way into Nicaragua, giving them no rest in Nicaragua itself or, for that matter, in their base camps. The strategy is to make it difficult for the resistance to mass effectively around important political, military, and economic targets.

The army took advantage of the two-year hiatus in US government military support from September 1984 to October 1986 to make major improvements in their force capability. The army's counterinsurgent force, some 35,000 to 45,000 strong, has improved considerably with the formation of 13-plus irregular warfare battalions, 12-plus light hunter battalions, and 5000 frontier guard troops. The irregulars operate from home

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base areas but can be sent anywhere in the national territory. With some 200 to 300 men each, the hunter battalions have probably half as many troops as those of the irregulars and are more lightly armed. They usually are assigned to a specific infantry brigade and thus have a more limited operational area to cover. The frontier guards, as their name implies, patrol the borders and try to pick up rebel forces as far forward as possible, although they may be used more deeply inside the national territory if the situation warrants.

Command and control has also improved with increasing use of infantry brigade headquarters to direct the principal battles. The chain of command runs from army headquarters in Managua to the military region commands in the war zone and down to the brigades. The brigades also control reserve and militia battalions and permanent territorial companies which have a static mission in defense of state farms, towns, bridges, and lines of communication.

Army firepower and mobility have also made progress over the last two years. With the approximate doubling of the helicopter force from six

HIND attack helicopters and 15 HIP assault transport helicopters to 10-12 HINDs and 35 HIPs and the addition of between 1000 and 2000 trucks in 1986-1987 alone, the Sandinista armed forces have gained increased mobility in the counterinsurgency war as well as in preparation for the conventional defense of the Pacific Coast and Managua. Increased numbers of air defense weapons, primarily ZU-23 and S-60 57mm towed antiaircraft guns, have improved conventional air defense capabilities, but in the counterinsurgent war did not have much, if any, success against resistance aerial resupply in 1987. Rumors of introduction of SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems and other missiles such as the SA-9 and SA-14 have been denied by high-ranking army officers. The use of women in air defense units, as shown at the SUBTIAVA 86 exercises in Military Region II near Somotillo along the Honduran border, also points to maximum use of personnel resources.⁴ Increased reliance on and better use of field artillery, especially the BM-21 multiple-launch rocket system, have also helped the Sandinistas on the battlefield.

Sandinista use of intelligence is excellent. Through traditional reconnaissance, infiltration of resistance ranks, and strategic and tactical signal intercepts, the army generally has a good idea of guerrilla plans, intentions, and targets, to include the location and timing of aerial resupply of guerrilla forces inside Nicaragua.

Nevertheless, as of this writing, the resistance—numbering roughly 18,000 men and women organized into three separate fronts—is beginning to come together as a political and a military entity. The army has not succeeded in neutralizing them, and the resistance, consistent with logistical support flows, continues to harass government forces and is beginning to attack increasingly important economic and military targets. Guerrilla operations in 1987 created a major strain on Sandinista attention and resources, as evidenced by the very successful pre-Christmas 1987 resistance attack on the mining towns of Siuna, Rosita, and Bonanza in western Military Region VII.

Sandinista Conventional Defense

With respect to the conventional defense of the Pacific Coast and Managua, the army has developed a "People's War" concept which relies heavily on the use of regular forces backed up by large reserves. In October 1985, the army converted the voluntary reserve system into a mandatory approach encompassing conscripts from the 25-to-40-year age group. There were at least 18 reserve light infantry brigades represented at the parade on 8 November 1986 marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of the *Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional* (FSLN) movement. Conservatively, there are probably 22,000 reservists organized and trained to defend the Pacific Coast and Managua (Military Regions II, III, and IV). There may be

considerably more reservists, but many of these forces are not highly motivated and receive only two weeks of training a year. Officers and NCOs supposedly train for longer periods of at least one month per year. Permanent forces would probably add another 10,000 to 20,000 tankers, mechanized infantry, artillerymen, and air defenders (along with appropriate support contingents and air and naval units) as the structure around which the reserve light infantry units would coalesce.

Local militia forces form the final component of the conventional defense concept. There may be some 40,000 militia organized to add depth to the battlefield, thus in theory requiring any invading US forces to fight for every square inch of Nicaraguan territory. The general plan would be to fight conventionally as long as possible, then fade into a guerrilla war, harassing occupying forces at every opportunity. Future plans call for a near-term doubling of this force to 80,000 organized into 100 battalions. Long-term plans somewhat unrealistically call for an additional 324,000 men by 1995.⁴

Without Soviet, East bloc, and Cuban military advisers and materiel support, the army would be far less effective in the conduct of the counterinsurgency and in their preparations to counter a US military intervention. The number of Cuban advisers remains high when compared with the US military advisory effort in El Salvador. By the Sandinista's own count, there are 500 purely military Cuban advisers in Nicaragua. The United States says there are far more, citing a figure of around 3000.⁵ And, as noted earlier, Soviet and East bloc materiel support reached record levels in 1986-1987. It is unrealistic to expect that if resistance pressure increases, Soviet support will decrease—in fact, the opposite is more likely. When the US House of Representatives reversed itself and passed the \$100 million aid package in June 1986, Soviet merchant ships delivered 8000 to 10,000 metric tons of supplies, including HIP and HIND helicopters, through the Port of Corinto in a four-month period from July to October 1986. Additional helicopter deliveries arrived in 1987 and more are expected in 1988 to replace helicopters shot down by the resistance.

The Ministry of Interior's General Directorate of State Security plays a crucial role in controlling insurgency. The security directorate effectively separated the resistance from the people through relocation of *campesinos* supportive of the guerrillas and through repression involving the arrests of thousands of Nicaraguans. Often those arrested remain detained for relatively short periods of time, but they get the message. Roughly half those arrested remain in special jails for periods ranging from several months to over a year. For example, 70 inhabitants, the entire population of a small town near El Chile in Military Region V, were arrested in the fall of 1986. The men were sent to "El Modelo" prison on the eastern outskirts of Managua, while the women were detained in the security directorate's

operations offices in Juigalpa, some 132 kilometers east of Managua. The charge was that the villagers had provided cattle to resistance forces in January 1986.

The security directorate tracks and periodically harasses internal opposition leadership of the church, private sector, independent labor unions, and political parties. Despite heroic efforts, these opposition groups are largely ineffective in opposing the Sandinista government. Suppression of all civil liberties in October 1985 gave the security directorate the necessary legal power to take any steps it deems necessary to protect the state, such as closing the Catholic radio station, barring Monsignor Carballo, head of the radio station, from returning to Nicaragua in June 1986, and forcibly removing Bishop Vega from Nicaragua in July 1986. As a result of the Arias peace plan, Father Carballo was allowed to return to Nicaragua and reopen the Catholic radio station, but Bishop Vega's status remains unchanged. In the event of a US invasion, the security directorate has lists of Nicaraguans who would be immediately killed as collaborators.

In a military and security sense, the Sandinistas have made progress. General Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Defense Minister, paraphrasing the famous Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, has observed that the greatest general is the one who wins without fighting. The Sandinistas' principal pillars of power—the army, the security directorate, and Soviet support—give them an excellent chance to do just that.

US Strategic Options

Among the options the United States might want to consider in dealing with the Nicaraguan situation are the following:

- *The No-War Option.* The United States would support a combined Arias (Esquipulas II) and Contadora solution⁷ which allows the Sandinistas to survive, perhaps along lines similar to a combined Yugoslavian-Mexican model. The focus would be upon achieving bona fide nonalignment. The political opposition within Nicaragua would be protected and US and regional security concerns would be met. In a fashion comparable to the bilateral nonaggression agreement offered Nicaragua by the United States in 1981, the United States might negotiate a separate and parallel security treaty with the Sandinistas which would require bipartisan US government approval and which would provide a basis for US action if the treaty were violated or if good-faith agreement on the treaty could not be achieved.⁸ The United States would also commit itself to supporting socioeconomic development and to building stronger democratic governments in the states on Nicaragua's periphery.

- *The Long-War Option.* The United States would settle down patiently for the long haul, providing long-term, reliable, substantial, and effective support to the insurgents. Actual US force involvement would not

be resorted to except under certain high-threat provocations such as those specifically detailed in press reports of the US diplomatic message delivered to the Sandinistas on 18 July 1985.⁹

- *The Short-War Option.* The United States would provide elevated levels of military and political support to the insurgents, using their movement as a legitimacy builder. At the appropriate time, the United States would recognize the movement as the legitimate heir to the revolution and support it by massive and decisive force.

To determine which of the three options holds most promise, let us start with three assumptions. First, the guerrillas cannot defeat the Sandinistas if left alone on the battlefield, regardless of what the United States provides in materiel, training, and advice. Second, no amount of negotiations or military pressure (short of a military defeat) will cause the Sandinistas to become democratic, i.e. they will not give up their internal revolutionary/ideological agenda. Third, there is no appreciable support in the United States for a military intervention in Nicaragua, nor is there likely to be in the foreseeable future.

If the above assumptions are correct, one is left with the no-war option. Are these assumptions valid?

Few would dispute the third assumption that there is little public support for direct US military intervention. Public opinion polls conducted by the media over the past two years tend to show that most people do not want to see US forces involved in Nicaragua. They simply cannot conceive of a country of only three million people as a threat to US interests. Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, put it well in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: "No one in the Administration is advocating [direct US military intervention] and no one of you or the American public would wish us to."¹⁰ The US military leadership also has no desire to get involved in Nicaragua with US combat forces, in large part precisely because of the lack of public support for American troop involvement in the Third World.¹¹

The second assumption appears valid considering Sandinista behavior to date. Numerous public pronouncements by Sandinista officials, the disappointing results of US-Nicaraguan negotiations at Manzanillo, Mexico, in 1984, and the tenacity of the Sandinista armed struggle from 1961 to 1979 all point to continued implacable Sandinista resistance to any significant changes in ideological orientation and internal political structures that might weaken FSLN control.

The first assumption can, of course, be challenged. Those disposed to believe in the prospects for guerrilla success on the battlefield note the existence of an increasingly well-organized guerrilla force and foresee it gaining even greater capabilities. A focused strategy would allow the rebels a chance to strike significant blows against the Sandinista army and security



Sandinista troops exit Soviet-supplied HIF assault transport helicopter.

directorates and perhaps even against the Soviet and Cuban presence in Nicaragua—that is, against the principal pillars of Sandinista support. They also believe that reported high army desertion rates reflect low army morale, which might be shattered with greater rebel capability and battlefield successes to the point where whole units might desert. The Sandinistas would then be forced to moderate their regime or flee.

Nevertheless, while desertion rates may be relatively high, many deserters are found and returned to their units. The Sandinistas have also shown that they can demobilize troops and recruit new ones, thus maintaining their force levels. As a function of leadership, morale in some units may be low, but in other units it is high, based upon reports to me by friends who have accompanied Sandinista units in the field and my own discussions with Sandinista soldiers. GI Bill-type benefits recently announced by the Sandinistas for active-duty soldiers completing two years of mandatory service should help morale. Finally, patriotic military service is viewed with progressively less fear as potential recruits see their predecessors demobilized. The war is obviously no picnic, but most survive it. Many of

these soldiers live better in the armed forces than they do at home. Being in the army also gives many an importance they would not otherwise have. It enhances their macho image.

Furthermore, while it is undeniable that US training, equipment, and advisers are making the guerrillas more effective, it is also likely that the army will continue to improve; consequently, all that would be accomplished by improved resistance capability is a higher intensity and tempo to the war on both sides, but still a continued stalemate.

Arturo Cruz, Jr., and Penn Kemble take the view that popular insurrection is not possible, given the totalitarian nature of the Sandinista system, and that a US invasion is not possible because of almost zero public support. They recommend a long-war strategy, seeing it as having a chance of success given the supposed unreliability of Soviet support, the almost paralyzed state of the Nicaraguan economy, the erosion of public support for the Sandinistas within Nicaragua, and the improved circumstances of guerrilla forces.¹²

However, the feasibility of a long war as portrayed by Cruz and Kemble is perhaps overstated. First of all, while neither the Soviets nor the Cubans will send combat troops to Nicaragua, they will not abandon the Sandinistas in the current crisis situation. If they did, Soviet prestige within the socialist world would be badly damaged. While recent signs involving possible cutbacks in Russian oil deliveries indicate that there are limits to Soviet economic support,¹³ the Soviets and Cubans are actually increasing their military support to offset US direct aid to the resistance.

Second, the idea that Nicaragua's disastrous economic condition will somehow polarize the people against the Sandinistas is only partially correct. Yes, the people are unhappy with the deteriorating state of the economy and generally blame the regime. This does not mean, however, that in a country like Nicaragua, with its tropical climate and agricultural potential, the people will freeze or starve to death. So far the food shortages have not been followed by health-threatening absence of basic food commodities. There is always something to eat in Nicaragua, and Nicaraguans are increasingly engaging in the illegal underground economy to help make ends meet.¹⁴ Many are also engaging in a growing barter economy. Nevertheless, Cruz and Kemble are correct that the resistance should try to place the blame for Nicaragua's increasing poverty on the Sandinistas.

Third, it is also true that public support for the Sandinistas has eroded. Still, considering the efficiency of the security directorate, combined with public fear and apathy, it will be very difficult to galvanize the Nicaraguan population to act against the Sandinistas. They will need to see a fuller and more persuasive communication of the rebel political agenda or they may continue to view them as portraying "the bad old past." Most important, they will need to see concrete and continuous Contra military

success before they commit themselves. This effort must go beyond attacks in the mountains or swamps on the Sandinista defense periphery, no matter how successful. The resistance can gain military credibility only by successful attacks on the gateway cities of Esteli, Matagalpa, and Juigalpa. Major attacks and acts of sabotage within the heartland (Military Regions II, III, and IV) would be most persuasive. Sandinista military strength may make such successes difficult to sustain more than momentarily. The resistance does have important popular support in the conflict zones (Military Regions I, V, VI, and VII), but their cause is less well known on the Pacific Coast, the locus of real political power.

Finally, the idea that the guerrillas' size, record, and strategic circumstances make them a force worth supporting does not square completely with reality. Size in a guerrilla war is not decisive, except perhaps in the final stage of the conflict. Fidel Castro descended from the Sierra Maestra in late 1958 with only 230 men.¹⁵ Far more crucial to insurgent victory than size are having great popular support for the guerrilla force and facing an incumbent government that has burned its bridges with the people.

The guerrillas have brave soldiers and have proved they can survive, but is this enough? They have few major military successes and, given already enumerated army strengths, they are unlikely to be able to obtain and sustain the number of military victories necessary to defeat the Sandinistas and take power.

Strategic circumstances would appear to favor the guerrillas, in view of the geopolitical realities of US proximity and supportive neighbors, except that ambivalency on the Nicaraguan issue within the United States and Latin America paralyzes effective action. For their part, the Sandinistas and their Soviet allies know exactly what they are doing and are prepared to continue the struggle to the end. Their ability to sustain the army, as shown by periodic demobilizations over the past two years, demonstrates Sandinista capacity to continue the war. In my view, long wars tend to favor Marxist forces whether they are insurgents or the government in power. Marxists have high ideological commitment, strong organizations, and numerous effective ways to mobilize the populace.

The short-war option is attractive because it achieves decisive results favorable to US interests quickly. It allows for proper planning, not only for the day before the battle and the day of the battle itself, but also for the critically important day after the battle. This last period needs careful planning because it would undoubtedly be complicated by a firestorm of international and domestic protest as well as by the actions of thousands of Sandinista militants. The unpredictable effect of Nicaraguan nationalism on a US force presence on Nicaraguan soil for the first time in over fifty years is also a factor to think about.

The short-war option depends on the resistance to achieve some military successes in the first phase to set the stage for US military

involvement. In the second phase, as a result of guerrilla military success, there would in all likelihood be spontaneous public demands for national reconciliation, which if rejected by the Sandinistas would give the introduction of US forces in the third phase a legitimacy otherwise absent.

The short-war option also requires taking considerable political risks in view of the reluctance of the US public to support intervention by US forces. This option might also be costly in terms of lives, time, and resources. It would probably require a US post-invasion involvement of three to five years to ensure that Nicaragua established a working democracy and recovered economically from the war itself and the predictable Sandinista-inspired insurgency in the first 12 to 18 months after their removal, not to mention long-term terrorism thereafter.

Another danger is that this option may diminish the resistance's desire to fight if its members think that the United States will do most of the dirty work. They would have to understand that as our allies their role is critical too, and that US force involvement would depend on their success in the first phase of the strategy. One thing is sure. We would get into Nicaragua quickly, but we would not get out quickly. While Nicaragua would not be another Vietnam, neither would it be another Grenada. Thus our strategic interest in maintaining minimal force commitments in the Western Hemisphere would be degraded to the extent that we got bogged down in Nicaragua in a big way.

The US government should at least consider the no-war option. This option could achieve more bipartisan support than the other two unless the Sandinistas do something to provoke more aggressive US involvement. The US government may be able to gain increased support for US policies by emphasizing realistic diplomatic approaches. The general public both at home and abroad does not want to see US forces intervene in Nicaragua, nor does it want to see Nicaragua engage in revolutionary socialist internationalism.

We also would have the problem of drawing down support for the resistance, whose members would feel betrayed. Pressures for immigration to the United States would be felt as unreconstructed members of the resistance sought a safe haven elsewhere. Since amnesty would be part of the agreement, some resistance members might wish to join the internal opposition in Nicaragua—an internal opposition which in theory would be protected by the agreement. Other members of the resistance might opt to fight on in Nicaragua without sponsor or succor, but their chances of survival would be poor. US government support to the resistance would be phased down only upon reaching specific area security objectives, such as the cessation of Sandinista-exported revolution to neighboring states; reduction of armaments, force levels, and Soviet/Cuban presence; and appropriate guarantees for the political safety and freedom of opposition parties.

Prospects and Reflections

Achieving a portion—perhaps a significant portion—of our objectives is better than achieving nothing by trying to have it all, i.e. full democracy in Nicaragua. Of course, that truism applies only if the American people through their elected officials muster the necessary unity, resolve, and staying power with respect to support for neighboring countries and vigilance regarding negotiated settlements. If the security agreement cannot be achieved, the President and Congress can always go back to a choice between the long- and short-war options. If the agreement is achieved and flagrantly broken, then the United States should find it much easier to gain bipartisan support for strong action, possibly under the Rio Treaty.

What the US government would be striving for with the no-war approach is to neutralize Nicaragua politically with regard to her future external political activities, while at the same time assuring the survival of democratic elements within Nicaragua even if they must operate in a less-than-perfect democratic environment. There are clear risks involved. We do not trust the Sandinistas, and they do not trust us. The US government is concerned that they will continue to export subversion regardless of any security agreement. As Elliot Abrams put it, "Pieces of paper alone are not going to stop the Sandinistas."¹⁶ What must be kept in mind, however, is that we do not have any real present alternative in view of the strong likelihood that the guerrillas cannot defeat the Sandinistas and in view of our own unwillingness to engage US forces. The resistance has in fact already achieved a great deal. The Sandinistas appear more willing to negotiate, and perhaps even to move to a more truly nonaligned status, to a less aggressively internationalist posture.¹⁷

We must also understand that diplomatic efforts which require for their success Nicaraguan democratization, i.e. loss of control, are doomed to failure. Past initiatives such as US-Nicaraguan bilateral talks at Manzanillo in 1984 failed precisely because Nicaragua held their internal political structure to be nonnegotiable. The current initiative of Costa Rican President Arias, which seeks to stop third-country support for insurgents and obtain over time Central American guerrilla/government cease-fires leading to dialogue, amnesty, and increasing democratization in conflict states, also will fail with regard to Nicaragua if the Sandinistas feel that it risks their hold on political power.¹⁸

At this crucial juncture, we might want to consider stepping back for a moment to review our progress to date. We may find we have been more successful than formerly realized. The time may be fast approaching when realistic diplomacy backed by increasingly effective force by the resistance will achieve, if not a perfect solution, then at least one protective of US interests—that is, stability in Central America based on maximum possible attainment of peace with freedom and justice. As Secretary of State

George Shultz put it, "The challenge we have always faced has been to forge policies that could combine morality and realism that would be in keeping with our ideals without doing damage to our national interests."¹⁹

NOTES

The author thanks Dr. Caesar D. Sereseres of the University of California, Irvine, for his valuable suggestions.

1. David Nolan, *The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Coral Gables, Fla.: Institute of InterAmerican Studies, Univ. of Miami, 1984), p. 13.

2. Information made public by well-placed Sandinista army defector Major Roger Miranda indicated that the number of Cuban military advisors may be approximately 500, still a substantial figure.

3. This article focuses only on security elements of the Sandinista strategy. For a fuller examination of the political side of their strategy, see "Sandinista Strategy: The Object is Survival" prepared for a Rand Corporation conference. This latter effort examines Sandinista strategy at the national level. Rand Corporation conference, 14 May 1987, Santa Monica, Calif.

4. Julia Preston, "Gringos Defeated in War Games," *The Washington Post*, 21 December 1986, pp. 1, 33.

5. Richard Halloran, "Sandinistas Seen as Badly Equipped," *The New York Times*, 20 December 1987, p. 20.

6. John Norton Moore, *The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order* (Frederick, Md.: Univ. Publications of America, 1987), p. 7.

7. "Contadora" is the name given to diplomatic efforts by Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela to find a political solution to Central American conflicts. The effort grew out of a meeting on the Isla de Contadora in January 1983.

8. US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Revolution Beyond Our Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Central America*, Special Report No. 132 (Washington: US Dept. of State, September 1985), p. 38. During diplomatic discussions with the Sandinistas from August to October 1981, the US government offered a bilateral nonaggression agreement and renewed economic assistance if Nicaragua would stop supporting the insurgency in El Salvador and limit its own military buildup. At that time, Nicaragua rejected the US offer. Now, as a result of US pressure, applied principally through the Nicaraguan guerrillas, the Sandinistas are ready to negotiate a security agreement. The guerrillas were originally organized to obtain the objectives sought during the 1981 negotiations. They have helped the United States change the Sandinistas' mind regarding security-related negotiations. The guerrillas, however, cannot apply sufficient military pressure against Nicaragua to achieve significant internal political change. Only the United States can do that.

9. Charles Mohr, "U.S. in Warning to Nicaraguans on Terror Plans," *The New York Times*, 19 July 1985, pp. 1, 6.

10. Elliott Abrams, "Development of U.S.-Nicaraguan Policy," *US Department of State Current Policy*, No. 915 (Washington: US Dept. of State, 5 February 1987), p. 1.

11. Joanne Omang, "The Contra Commitment," *The Washington Post*, 1 January 1987, pp. 1, 24.

12. Penn Kemble and Arturo Cruz, Jr., "How the Nicaraguan Resistance Can Win," *Commentary*, 82 (December 1986), 19-29.

13. Georgie Anne Geyer, "New Deal in Nicaragua?" *Harrisburg Patriot*, 9 July 1987, p. A23. Later reports indicate that the Soviets have provided all necessary oil to Nicaragua. The report of Soviet cutbacks is thought to have been a Soviet effort to get others to help Nicaragua. When that did not happen, the Soviets ensured that the required oil deliveries were made. Clearly, however, the Soviets want the Sandinistas to operate more cost effectively.

14. Laura Lopez, "Coping with the Contras," *Time*, 30 March 1987, p. 39.

15. Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: William Morrow, 1986), p. 456.

16. Abrams, p. 1.

17. Geyer, p. A23. The United States would still need to be vigilant because the FSLN leadership is heavily biased on the Leninist internationalist side. Most nationalists like Eden Pastora are gone. Despite bombastic statements made by the Ortega brothers in the wake of the Miranda defection concerning increasing military force levels by the mid-1990s, later pronouncements indicate that force levels remain negotiable.

18. The Arias plan was signed by five Central American nations on 7 August in Guatemala City. For the complete text of the plan, see *The New York Times*, 12 August 1987, p. A7.

19. George Shultz, "Morality and Realism in American Foreign Policy," *US Department of State Current Policy*, No. 748 (Washington: US Dept. of State, 2 October 1985), p. 1.

Is it Ever Moral to Push the Button?

JAMES L. CARNEY

THE WHITE HOUSE, DECEMBER 31, 1997: "Mr. President, Mr. President, wake up!" The voice was low but urgent. Adam Cunningham, 42d President of the United States, roused himself slowly, leaning on one elbow as he stared bleary-eyed at his digital clock. Its numbers reported dutifully: "3:30 a.m." A cold wintry morning in Washington on the last day of 1997. "What is it, Ben?" he asked his military aide, Colonel Ben Thomas. "Sir, we've confirmed reports of a massive Soviet ICBM launching! We estimate about 1500 warheads are inbound right now. Our Space Defense System isn't fully operational yet. What's up there, though, should take out about 30 percent of their inbound missiles. An additional 600 missiles appear to be aimed at China. Sir, we expect initial detonations to generate a massive electromagnetic pulse in about 20 minutes, with the bulk of the attack coming five or ten minutes later. It looks like that main attack is aimed at our own missile silos and our air and submarine bases. Also, we got a message from Premier Leninsov on the Hot Line. Our strategic forces are being alerted now, Mr. President, and await your counterattack order."

Cunningham leaped to his feet, struggling to think rationally in a storm of thoughts and emotions. Forty-five seconds later he was in the White House Situation Room reading the Hot Line message from Moscow.

"Mr. President," it began. "We deeply regret that we have found it necessary to launch a preemptive strike against your country to protect our own nation against the preemptive strike which you planned to launch as soon as your strategic defenses were fully in place next year. However, we have targeted only your strategic military forces in this first strike."

Washington will not be hit. Nor will New York or your other major urban centers. If you withhold any counterstrike, we will not launch follow-up attacks against these important targets. But if you do respond, then our reserve rockets and our sea-launched ballistic missiles will be launched against the entire political and economic infrastructure of the United States. As you know, more than 150,000,000 Americans could die in such an assault. We will be watching our radar screens for your response. I assure you that we will be magnanimous in victory and will provide all necessary assistance to enable your great country to recover from this misfortune and to take its place as a full partner with the socialist nations of the world."

The Hot Line stood silent. President Cunningham gazed at it with a numb mixture of fury and horror. "Mr. President," Ben interrupted, "We must give the order to launch or it will be too late!" Cunningham stared at him. He thought of the inbound missiles and the millions of deaths and incalculable damage that were bound to result even if Lenintsov was not lying about the initial targeting. He realized that deterrence had failed; the great colossal gamble that the world had been safely betting on for over fifty years had failed! The nightmare had come true! Now he, one human being with no chance for meaningful consultations with any of his principal advisors, had to decide whether to double the ante for a post-nuclear world. He thought of his grandchildren and the Soviet children he had met on his summit visit in 1994. He recalled the tenets of his deep Christian faith and its proscriptions against unnecessary killing. Killing, slaughter, massive annihilation—no words seemed nearly adequate to describe the Death which was on its way. But he also thought of the Soviet treachery. He remembered the Iron Curtain and the repressive puppet regimes which sprouted up everywhere the Soviets achieved power. He grimly contemplated a future stretching endlessly forward in which the dreams of democratic freedoms throughout the world would vanish inexorably in a stranglehold of gulags. Even the memory of the world's greatest experiment in democracy would fade as Soviet revisionist historians rewrote the events of the 20th century to exalt the achievements and innocence of the USSR and denounce the perfidy and aggression of the Western democracies. It also occurred to him that Lenintsov might be lying, that the major urban centers of the United States were indeed targeted in this first strike.

It was now 3:35 a.m. Colonel Thomas announced that the President's helicopter was ready and pressed him again for the decision to

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launch a retaliatory strike. President Cunningham paused for a silent prayer requesting guidance and turned to his aide with his decision. (To be continued.)

The Nuclear Dilemma and Just War

The foregoing scenario is fictional and perhaps highly improbable. But it could happen. It is possible that one human being will someday find himself confronting the failure of nuclear deterrence in one awful moment of decision. Could he morally elect to respond with a nuclear counterstrike? Although the policy of nuclear deterrence which has formed a military shield for the Western world (as well as the Eastern world) for the past forty years has rested upon the mutual belief that the retaliatory threat would be carried out, nearly all analysts of just-war tradition would say that the President may not justly respond with a nuclear counterstrike against Soviet population centers under the circumstances presented above.¹ In their view, the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction is immoral.

But today's nuclear moralists, while quite correct in their conclusion that modern total war is incompatible with any reasonable philosophy of ethics and morality, can provide us with no key to escape this trap we have built. No sane person would hesitate to condemn modern total war, much less nuclear war, as an abomination against humanity. Yet this kind of war remains a very real possibility.

A fundamental premise underlies the just-war tradition: the unchanging nature of mankind, a nature in which good and evil always coexist. All human beings commit immoral, wrong, unethical, sinful, or otherwise dubious acts during their lives here on earth. These acts include killing other human beings. Because of this unfortunate propensity, it has been necessary for man to defend himself from aggression if he would prolong his stay on this planet for any appreciable time. This requirement, in turn, has led to the development of rules of conduct—the principles of just war—for the management of such mortal conflicts so that the moral fabric of society would not be lost in the struggle.

Perhaps unfortunately, our technological skill has steadily advanced, despite the almost complete lack of corresponding moral progress in humanity as a whole. As a consequence, wars have become more and more brutal and destructive as man's tools of war have become more and more efficient. In 1945, human beings achieved the power to cause incomprehensible destruction and loss of life and perhaps severed for all time any rational connection between all-out war and international politics.² Yet the need for self-defense has not diminished and is not likely to do so in the future. After eons of bloodshed, there is no reason to hope that mankind will evolve in this life into a more benevolent creature who does not resort to aggression to obtain unjust ends.

The principles of just war are divided into two sections. The first, *jus ad bellum*, refers to the justice of deciding to participate in a war; the second, *jus in bello*, refers to the rules of morality which govern the way any war may be conducted.

Principles of Just War

Jus Ad Bellum (Just Recourse to War)

Just Cause
Legitimate Authority
Just Intentions
Public Declaration (Of Causes and Intentions)
Proportionality (More Good than Evil Results)
Last Resort
Reasonable Hope of Success

Jus In Bello (Just Conduct in War)

Discrimination (Noncombatant Immunity)
Proportionality (Amount and Type of Force Used)

Each of these principles merits elaboration.

- *Just cause.* Just cause means having right on your side. In general, just cause embraces four types of situations. First, and most important for this discussion, is self-defense against unjustified aggressive actions. Self-defense is the only just cause formally recognized in modern international law.¹ Three other types of just cause are the right to intervene to protect one's "neighbor," the right to punish wrongdoers, and the right of the state to protect its fundamental ideology.⁴

- *Legitimate authority.* Legitimate authority refers to the lawfully constituted government of a sovereign state. Only the primary authority of the state has the power to commit its citizens to war.

In the nuclear age, the problem of legitimate authority has taken on a new dimension and may now be said to be more vitally concerned with the conduct of war than with the decision to participate at all. This is because the only slim hope mankind has for achieving some reasonable balance between the aims and consequences of a nuclear war is to keep it limited. But keeping it limited requires controlling it, which in turn requires effective command, control, communications, and intelligence systems on both sides of the conflict. This is incompatible with a decapitation targeting policy, which aims to remove a hostile nation's leadership at an early stage

in hopes of curtailing its ability and willingness to continue the fight. Decapitation is not only of dubious validity in light of contemporary nuclear weapon control procedures but also gambles away any possibility of controlling escalation within a nuclear conflict.

- *Just intentions.* This element of *jus ad bellum* in Western thought was first articulated at length by St. Thomas Aquinas, who based it upon natural law.⁷ It may also be said to derive from the Judeo-Christian "love thy neighbor" ethic. This obligation does not cease in wartime. We are not permitted to forget that our enemy is also our neighbor, even though most neighborly obligations are suspended for the duration of hostilities. Revenge is not a morally acceptable basis for conducting war. Although it is permissible to intervene to prevent your neighbor's cheek from being struck, the war must be prosecuted with reluctance, restraint, and a willingness to accept peace when the security objectives which justified the war in the first place have been achieved. Although classified under the *jus ad bellum* section of the principles, "just intentions" has even greater significance for the individual soldier in the conduct of war, philosophically underlying the rules of war which protect noncombatants and require acceptance of surrender and humane treatment of prisoners of war.⁸

Aquinas also developed the theory of "double effect." This theory was originally formulated to reconcile an evil (killing) with a good (resisting aggression). So long as the killing itself was not desired, but was merely an unavoidable consequence of achieving the lawful objective, it was permitted. Later, "double effect" was extended to permit military actions which, while justified in themselves by necessity and the other principles of just war, caused collateral harm to civilians and their property. Basically, it is now a rationale for violating the principle of noncombatant immunity.⁹ The principle has many safeguards, including that the evil effects not be intended, that all reasonable efforts be made to achieve the desired military goal without the undesired noncombatant effects, and that the good achieved outweigh the evil which incidentally occurs.⁹

- *Public declaration.* The purpose of this requirement is to state clearly the *casus belli* and the terms under which peace might be restored. It also serves to inform a state's citizenry of the cause which requires resort to arms and the ensuing risk to life and limb of those who will participate in the conflict.⁹

- *Proportionality.* In terms of *jus ad bellum*, or justification for going to war, proportionality means having a reasonable relationship between the goals and objectives to be achieved and the war means being used to achieve them.¹⁰

- *Last resort.* This principle recognizes the destructive consequences of war and insists that it be avoided if at all possible, consistent with the legitimate interests of the state. It means that negotiations, compromise, economic sanctions, appeals to higher authority (the United

Nations, for example), and the like must be pursued to redress grievances, if possible, before resort to war is justified.¹¹

- *Reasonable hope of success.* The state must not squander the lives and property of its citizens in a hopeless effort.

Nuclear weapons have had at least one positive effect in terms of just-war tradition. Their existence causes nations to be much more cautious about initiating hostilities against any nation that might employ them. In other words, they raise the threshold for war. This has resulted in a period of almost unprecedented peace between the major powers since the end of World War II. That is not to say that there have been no wars. There have obviously been many, some of which continue today. But the great powers have not been direct participants against each other, and consequently the level of death and destruction has been minuscule compared to the scale of the two World Wars.

Nuclear weapons have created serious complications for any reasonable prosecution of war, however. The two *jus in bello* principles, discrimination (or noncombatant immunity) and proportionality, are both casualties when megatonnage is exploded anywhere in the vicinity of large population centers. Thus, the swirl of debate since 1945 over acceptable war modes has focused on these two *jus in bello* principles.

- *Discrimination.* Army Chaplain Donald Davidson has written on this aspect:

Virtually every moral commentary on war since World War II, whether focused on the air battle or ground combat, has discussed the problem of noncombatant immunity. The issue is not whether noncombatants should be immune to attack; there has been general agreement on this point since classical times. Rather, the problem is deciding "who" is a noncombatant; that is, the problem of discrimination. The difficulty of differentiating between combatants and noncombatants has escalated with each stage in the development of modern warfare: the advent of conscript armies and large standing armies in Napoleon's era, new weaponry developed in the industrial revolution, the mobilization of whole societies in major wars, the large-scale employment of guerrilla or insurgency war and terrorism, and the invention of weapons of mass destruction.¹²

Davidson goes on to explain that noncombatants have traditionally been divided into two groups, based on class and function. The "class" of noncombatants refers to persons who have been defined as not acceptable as military targets, including medical personnel and clergy, whether in uniform or not, infants and small children (normally all children), the infirm, aged, wounded, or sick, and those otherwise helpless to protect themselves. Those who are noncombatants by "function" include farmers,

merchants, and others not directly involved in the war effort. Davidson continues:

Among civilians, those who make war decisions or produce war materials are generally considered as direct contributors to the war effort and, thus, are combatants. Those who perform services or produce goods necessary for living are noncombatants, even though their services or goods may be used by military personnel. This line of reasoning, for example, allows bombardment of munitions factories, but not canneries.¹¹

- *Proportionality.* Just as proportionality is one of the *jus ad bellum* principles, so does moral proportionality apply to the means by which war is waged. With respect to *jus in bello*, proportionality means that the amount and type of force used must be such that the unjust consequences do not exceed the legitimate objectives. Compliance with this principle requires an affirmative answer to the question: "If I take this military action, will more good than harm result from it?" The problem, of course, is often in defining what is meant by "good" and what is meant by "harm." Are human lives to be regarded as equally valuable, for instance? How many villagers may be killed in an air strike to eliminate a sniper—or a machine gun emplacement? And is the policy to be evaluated by a single engagement or from the perspective of the whole war?

Just-War Tradition in Modern Total War

The principles of noncombatant immunity, as historically defined, and proportionality, measured by political goals versus the cost in lives and destruction, no longer seem at all compatible with any conceivable war between the world's great powers.

In simpler times, wars were fought by monarchs almost as personal struggles, using small armies of professionals and mercenaries; noncombatants had almost nothing to do with combat. Killing them was not only murder without military justification but unwise as well since they were the source of the state's peacetime wealth. This state of affairs remained until the Napoleonic wars in the 18th century. With the French and industrial revolutions, however, the entire citizenry of a nation became involved in these struggles.¹² Soldiers were drawn from a conscript base consisting of all able-bodied young men. War materiel was produced nationwide. The war was propagandized and supported throughout the body politic. During World War I, the areas away from the fighting sectors became known as the "home front."¹³ The distinction between combatant and noncombatant began to blur, especially in the face of arguments that the sources of support (psychological and material) for the enemy were legitimate targets to force him to terminate hostilities.

By the time World War II arrived, no one doubted that total war included attacks upon the economic and industrial capacity of the enemy. "Rosie the Riveter" was an acknowledged part of the war effort and proud of it. Bombing runs on munitions factories, transportation facilities, and industrial plants in Nazi Germany were generally acceptable military activities under the moral principle of double effect, which legitimized collateral damage to the civilian sector. Even the use of nighttime area bombing by the British Bomber Command against German cities produced no popular outcry against the obvious violation of noncombatant immunity.¹⁶ Both sides perceived the struggle to be between the opposing states, not merely those in uniform.¹⁷ The distinction between combatant and noncombatant was substantially dissolved, erased by the harsh realities of total war in the 20th century. The experience of World War II illustrates the difficulty of implementing a moral strategy based upon a distinction between those citizens holding the guns and those citizens stretching back through the chain of support all the way to the miners excavating the ore which will be fashioned into the bullets fired by those guns.

This does not mean just-war principles should be abandoned. Clearly such principles should be preserved to the maximum extent possible. But the essential point remains that all the brilliant articulations of highly desirable moral principles in warfare are of no practical value unless they can be applied in the world of flesh and blood. If notions of noncombatant immunity and proportionality are to be accepted as requiring a nonstrategic or nonnuclear response to an overt nuclear attack by an aggressor nation, then proponents for this moral position must also bear the burden of resolving the paradox of allowing evil to triumph rather than permitting the only effective means of counterattack. Until a satisfactory solution to this most fundamental of just-war issues is offered, the moralists' condemnation of the inevitable slaughter inherent in nuclear war places them ultimately in the camp of nuclear pacifism. If the equation Defense = Excessive Destruction is unassailable, we may all mourn the terrible fate that has placed such fearsome technical prowess in such morally infirm vessels as

In World War II, the distinction between combatant and noncombatant was substantially dissolved.

mankind, but there is no realistic choice except to play out the hand as best we can and strive in the meantime for a more effective means of control.

The two just-war principles most jeopardized by the existence of nuclear weapons are discrimination (noncombatant immunity) and proportionality. Morally legitimate targets in modern total war include a nation's industrial sinews and military installations and facilities. But even if only these targets are attacked in a strategic nuclear assault, the death and destruction from fire, blast, radioactivity, and possible "nuclear-winter" effects would cause staggering losses for the entire nation and probably bystander nations as well.¹⁸ Although millions of noncombatants would lose their lives as a result of these attacks, the principle of double effect would appear to excuse this as an unavoidable consequence of legitimate targeting.¹⁹ If so, then the distinction between combatant and non-combatant becomes almost meaningless in such a strategic nuclear barrage. But double effect does not apply if the collateral damage is disproportionate to the permitted objective.

Would the nuclear attack described above be disproportionate? To answer this, one has to first decide, disproportionate to what? If one looks only at the physical consequences of the attack, then it seems clearly disproportionate. But if survival of the state is at stake, and no other means of effective defeat-avoiding warfare are available, then it seems the principle of proportionality would not be violated. In any case, it is not only nuclear weapons that are threats to proportionality. In World War II, the fire bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 caused between 80,000 and 120,000 deaths, with the latter figure more likely closer to the actual toll.²⁰ The bombing of Hamburg from 24 July to 3 August 1943, also with incendiaries, caused 50,000 deaths and 50,000 injuries, and left 800,000 homeless.²¹ The firestorms caused by the Dresden bombings of February 1945 left approximately 70,000 dead in a city with almost no military value.²² By contrast, the nuclear explosion over Nagasaki on 8 August 1945 caused around 40,000 deaths.²³ The world's first hostile nuclear explosion, at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, destroyed 60 percent of the city and killed about 80,000.²⁴

Even if conventional munitions can cause as many casualties and as much damage as nuclear weapons, however, they do have two comparative virtues: it takes longer to apply them, with less resulting chance of the atmospheric effects predicted by nuclear-winter theorists; and they do not leave behind a lingering curse of radioactivity. Is it therefore better not to use nuclear weapons? Yes. Are their effects always disproportionate? Not if their use is necessary to avoid losing the war and if the user has satisfied all the other just-war principles, including just cause (which, one notes, is not available to an aggressor nation).²⁵

Since the destruction and death in a modern total war between the great military powers are certain to be disproportionate to any political

cause other than survival of the state—whether nuclear weapons are used or not—the only solution to the problem is to avoid total war between these powers.

The Logic of Armageddon

The present solution to avoiding war is called deterrence. Although nuclear deterrence has taken a beating from many moralists, no one has yet come up with a better solution. In actuality, the theory of deterrence is as old as armed conflict. It means nothing more than doing those things, whether constructing fortifications, raising armies, taking hostages, or building nuclear bombs, that will discourage attack by an enemy force. What moralists dislike about nuclear deterrence is its implicit threat to actually use the weapons.²⁶ This is quite the ultimate paradox, however, because only the threat of nuclear weapons can offset the threat of other nuclear weapons (in the present state of technology). There is no other defense available. It is difficult to see how this is immoral in any easily understood sense of the term, considering that the alternative is to leave one's nation defenseless.

The real problem with deterrence is not in having nuclear weapons to back up the threat, but in having the will to use them in appropriate circumstances. It should be clear that "appropriate circumstances" are only the direst of national emergencies, but they must include retaliation for a first-strike nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. Without at least the opponent's perception of one's willingness to make good on the deterrent threat, there can be no deterrent effect from those forces. This is merely stating the obvious. To resolve the dilemma of maintaining a deterrent effect—which is good because it preserves the peace—while at the same time avoiding the immorality of intending to use nuclear weapons in an immoral way (note that almost any strategic use of nuclear weapons is going to produce harm disproportionate to any reasonable sense of conducting war as a "continuation of politics"²⁷), some moralists have suggested that we either bluff or simply not declare our actual intent.

There are three problems with this approach. First, bluffing involves lying in one form or another. Second, the people who will actually fire these weapons are scattered all over the globe and they are carefully selected to ensure that they will be willing to push their respective buttons when the time comes. Further, contingency plans must be made to respond to various war scenarios. If, in fact, the United States intended under no circumstances to launch a strategic nuclear attack, it would not be long before the secret would be out and the deterrent effect would be eliminated. Third, an unresolved intent does not resolve the moral dilemma for the decisionmakers—the President of the United States and those military officers who will be involved in launching a nuclear response. These officials

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Hiroshima. This shot of the damage done by the atomic bomb was taken about one mile from ground zero.

are entitled to feel comfortable in their own minds with the awesome responsibility which the nuclear balance of terror imposes upon them. On the other hand, a secret intent not to fire raises the opposite problem. The President is charged by the Constitution of the United States to defend the country. He cannot do this by idle threats. Similarly, American military officers take an oath to uphold the defense of their nation. Consider, then, the following "logic tree":

- Defending the nation is a moral obligation of the highest order for soldiers.
- At present, nuclear deterrence is required for national defense.
- Deterrence requires credibility to be effective.
- There can be no lasting credibility without the will to implement a threat.
- Therefore, it is moral to respond to nuclear aggression with a nuclear attack which is as limited as circumstances permit to defend the United States.

Despite this argument, the consequences of the actual use of nuclear weapons would be so severe as to give any moral person great pause. What is the choice facing our President Cunningham? He can do nothing

and accept the victory of the Soviet Union with all the dreadful consequences which might follow from that, including pogroms, gulags, suppression of individual freedoms, extermination of the great heritage of the United States, and world domination by an atheistic Communist Party. Or, he can push his own button, in which case millions of Soviet citizens will die, the threshold for nuclear winter will be considerably lowered, and he will risk a second, more massive attack by the Soviet Union against the United States. What a choice! Is either one moral in any reasonable sense? Not in my opinion. So what should he do?

Three Possible Solutions

There appear to be only three ways out of this box we have created for ourselves. One is to find another means of defense. The Strategic Defense Initiative offers a glimmer of hope, but only a glimmer. Any effective defensive shield must be cheaper to maintain and expand than it would be to construct offensive systems to overcome it. It must be comprehensive enough to counter both ballistic systems and air-breathing systems, such as cruise missiles. It must be within the nation's fiscal capability to construct and operate. And it must be reliable. SDI is a long way from meeting any of these tests.

A second way out of our nuclear dilemma is arms control. But arms control has never resulted in major reductions from either power's strategic nuclear stockpiles, and not even the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces agreement signed by President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev last December alters this reality. All that such agreements have accomplished is to set limits on the expansion of each side's nuclear arsenal or reduce medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Maintaining the status quo or improving it at the margins will not resolve our quandary. Unless there is a more substantial breakthrough in verification procedures, arms control offers little hope of ever eliminating the strategic nuclear threat completely. Further, many thinkers have reservations about the risks of eliminating nuclear weapons, because that throws us back to reliance on conventional arms and armies. They fear that this will lower the threshold for war between the great powers. We got rid of Hitler, Tojo, and their henchmen in World War II, but beyond that not much good was accomplished for the fifty *million* deaths.²⁸ In any event, no one wants to pay such a price again, no matter what the weapon of choice. Therefore, arms control seems an unlikely cure for our total war fears.

Yet another problem with arms control is that it does not stop the technological race. Whenever any new weapon breakthrough occurs, it may be outside the scope of existing agreements, or it may induce the discoverer to renounce the restrictive agreement. Renunciation could be appealing to the discoverer because of the temptation to reap the fruits via a new strategic

advantage or because it feared the other side would make the same discovery and secretly exploit it. SDI seems to fit both categories but is perhaps entitled to a more benevolent view because it is purely a defensive system.

A third way, the most radical but also the most promising as a *long-term* solution, is the establishment of some sort of world authority with enough power to enforce the renunciation-of-force doctrine in the United Nations Charter.²⁹ As the Catholic bishops noted in their pastoral letter, we have entered "an era of new, global interdependencies requiring global systems of governance to manage the resulting conflicts and ensure our common security."³⁰

Whether we like it or not, the time is approaching when we must move on to a more effective, less dangerous governance than that embodied in the nation-state system which has served us since feudal times. We need not surrender all sovereignty. That is obviously unworkable. But we need to begin to explore ways to create an international body capable of at least enforcing the peace, an international sheriff's office complete with posse. Under this concept, military forces would no longer exist to implement state policy. Rather, their function would be to preserve international peace, much in the nature of a domestic police force.³¹ To the extent that the impulse for war represents valid grievances, then an international enforcement authority must also include means of hearing and resolving such disputes. The political challenges inherent in linking disparate cultures, races, ideologies, and religions in a worldwide governing body, with merely a limited charter to prevent wars, are enormous. But we have made progress in that direction. Each of the World Wars of this century led to the creation of a world body intended to prevent future wars. The League of Nations was a dismal failure, perhaps primarily because the United States refused to participate. The United Nations is a significant improvement, but is impotent in the face of a Security Council veto. The potential tragedy facing us is that we may have to undergo one more worldwide trauma, one which will dwarf all those that have gone before, to make us realize we cannot have it both ways: we cannot have full independence and a world organization capable of enforcing the peace.

PRESIDENT CUNNINGHAM'S DECISION: . . . "All right, Ben," the President said. "God help us, and especially me when I face Him if I am wrong, but I don't think the Russians will launch their second attack if we respond against their forces only. In any event, I swore to uphold the Constitution, which lays responsibility for defending this country squarely on my shoulders. If we don't strike back, we've surrendered. I doubt the American people would forgive me for that. Hand me the 'football.' I am going to initiate Attack Option Amber—1000 missiles targeted only on Russian soil and only at their strategic nuclear weapon systems. No industrial centers and no major cities, especially Moscow, will be directly

targeted. I want to make maximum use of our ICBMs and reserve our SLBMs, our nuke-capable aircraft in Europe, and our surviving strategic bomber force for any counterresponse that may yet be necessary. Get a message out to Leninsov on the Hot Line five minutes before we launch, explaining what we are doing and warning the S.O.B. that if he launches his second wave he can kiss his country goodbye. And, Ben?" "Yes, sir?" replied Colonel Thomas, caught in midstride. "I won't be needing that helicopter. The Vice President should be airborne soon in his command center and he can handle any subsequent actions if I've guessed wrong. If Leninsov launches a second wave, it's only right that I should pay the price I will have charged to the entire nation."

NOTES

1. See, for example, James Turner Johnson, *Can Modern War Be Just?* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1984), p. 193; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 269, 282-83; National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* (Washington: US Catholic Conference, 1983), Art. 148, p. 47; Paul Ramsey, *The Just War* (New York: Scribner, 1968), p. 247; William V. O'Brien, "The Failure of Deterrence and the Conduct of War," in *The Nuclear Dilemma and the Just War Tradition*, ed. William V. O'Brien and John Langan (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 158, 176; Albert Carnesale et al., *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), p. 157.
2. Perhaps never was an utterance more perfectly attuned to its occasion than J. Robert Oppenheimer's quote from the Bhagavad Gita, 94:15, on 16 July 1945 at the explosion of the first atom bomb: "I am become death, the destroyer of worlds."
3. Compare the League of Nations Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris, 1928), and Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter; Johnson, *Can Modern War Be Just?* p. 19; and James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), p. 30.
4. Johnson, *Can Modern War Be Just?* pp. 19, 176. See also Abbott A. Brayton and Stephana J. Landwehr, *The Politics of War and Peace: A Survey of Thought* (Washington: Univ. Press of America, 1981), pp. 64-66.
5. Donald L. Davidson, *Nuclear Weapons and the American Churches: Ethical Positions on Modern Warfare* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 5-7.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-28; compare *The Challenge of Peace*, Art. 313, p. 94.
7. Davidson, pp. 6-7.
8. Walzer, pp. 151-59.
9. Davidson, p. 28; US Department of the Army, *The Law of Land Warfare*, Field Manual 27-10 (Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 15-16. Paragraphs 20-27 present the formal treaty rules for the commencement of hostilities.
10. Davidson, pp. 29-31.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Johnson, *Can Modern War Be Just?* pp. 129-30.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
16. See B. H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: Putnam, 1972), pp. 594-97. Hart openly characterizes this policy as "terrorisation" (pp. 596-97). Walzer, however, says it was a justified overriding of those restraints on the grounds of "supreme emergency," based upon reasonable perceptions of the British government at the time (Walzer, pp. 259-61).
17. Martin van Creveld, *Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975), p. 49: "It is one of the clichés of our time that, under modern conditions, war-making capability and the other constituents of society—its demographic, economic, and political power—are inescapably linked together as never before; hence, that it is the totality of the state's forces and not its military instrument alone that wins or loses wars."
18. Philip J. Romero, *Nuclear Winter: Implications for U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Strategy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1984), pp. 1, 3, 8.

19. Davidson (p. 7) lists four conditions which are required before unjustifiable collateral effects may be permitted as a result of an otherwise lawful military action: (1) the effect must be unavoidable; (2) the actor's intention must be right—he does not intend to cause the collateral damage; (3) the unintended effect may not be a means to the intended effect; and (4) the unintended effect is not disproportionate to the intended effect.

20. Peter Young, ed., *World Almanac Book of World War II* (New York: World Almanac Publications, 1981), p. 330.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 352-53.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 352.

25. Compare Walzer's "supreme emergency" theory, which he posits as a basic survival interest of the state which overrides normal application of just-war principles (Walzer, pp. 252-68). For an excellent critique of Walzer's theory, see David Hollenbach, "Ethics in Distress: Can There Be Just Wars in the Nuclear Age?" in O'Brien and Langan, pp. 15-17.

26. "But the unavoidable truth is that all these policies rest ultimately on immoral threats. Unless we give up nuclear deterrence, we cannot give up such threats, and it is best if we straightforwardly acknowledge what it is we are doing" (Walzer, p. 282).

27. From Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum: "We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 87.

28. According to David Wood ("Conflict in the Twentieth Century," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 48, p. 26), 17 million military and 34,305,000 civilian personnel were killed or died of injuries in World War II. Demonstrating that a war without disproportionate civilian casualties and without the horrors of obliteration bombing can still be an affront to just-war principles was the killing of 8½ million soldiers during World War I (Wood, p. 24), a conflict which accomplished nothing other than to set the stage for World War II's far worse carnage.

29. Article 2(4), UN Charter, provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Note, also, Article 51. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

30. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace*, p. 75.

31. See *ibid.*, Art. 310, p. 94: "The purpose of defense policy is to defend the peace; military professionals should understand their vocation this way."

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SDI and the Prisoner's Dilemma

DAVID P. KIRBY

On 23 March 1983, President Reagan announced his intention to launch "an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history."¹ The effort he referred to is the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also referred to as Star Wars by some in the news media and those who generally oppose the program. SDI is a research program designed to examine the possibility of effective strategic defenses against ballistic missiles based on new technologies such as directed-energy weapons, super computers, and tracking/detection systems. In outlining the necessity for SDI, the President made the following points:

[My] predecessors in the Oval Office have appeared before [the American public] on other occasions to describe the threat posed by Soviet power and have proposed steps to address that threat. But since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps have been increasingly directed toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?²

Response to the President's SDI proposal has run the full spectrum from unquestioned endorsement to outright rejection. Few subjects have stirred more or wider debate seven years into the Reagan presidency, and the

attention is clearly deserved. The technical, political, and strategic implications are immense; and if SDI were to meet President Reagan's vision, the course of human history could indeed be changed as the nuclear superpowers could deal with each other based on mutual security, in lieu of the existing situation where fear of nuclear confrontation continues to cast an ominous shadow.

Technical experts, politicians, strategists, and academicians of all persuasions have written extensively about SDI. My intent in this essay is not to repeat the technical assessments, political arguments, or learned opinions. Rather, I intend to pose the Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory as a model of the extraordinarily complex strategic issues involved in SDI; address the nuclear weapons background leading to the Prisoner's Dilemma; assess the alternatives associated with deployment of SDI; and draw conclusions with regard to the prospects for the success of SDI.

What Is the Prisoner's Dilemma?

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a model used by game theoreticians and psychologists to assess certain situations where individuals or competitors have choices to make, the payoffs of which conform to a characteristic pattern. The following illustrates the theory of the model.

Two prisoners, held incommunicado, are charged with the same crime. They can be convicted only if either confesses. Designate by -1 the payoff associated with conviction on the basis of confessions by both prisoners and by +1 the payoff associated with acquittal. Further, if only one confesses, he is set free for having turned state's evidence and is given a reward to boot. Call his payoff under these circumstances +2. The prisoner who has held out is convicted on the strength of the other's testimony and is given a more severe sentence than if he had also confessed. Call his payoff -2. The game so defined is . . . represented by [the following matrix where C represents "Confess," D "Do not confess," the subscripts a and b the two prisoners, a's payoff the left number of each pair, and b's payoff the right number].

	D _b	C _b
D _a	1,1	-2,2
C _a	2,-2	-1,-1

Prisoner's Payoff Matrix

Of all the possible outcomes, with the prisoners consulting between themselves, both players would prefer outcome $D_a D_b$, with neither confessing and both being set free, over $C_a C_b$, with both confessing and both going to jail. Since the prisoners cannot consult, however, strategy C from a single prisoner's vantage will appear better than strategy D because at worst he will receive his just sentence and at best he will go free and receive a reward, whereas if he selects strategy D he might go to jail with an extended sentence. But this logic applies to both prisoners, so that when both choose strategy C both will inevitably go to jail. Result: the Prisoner's Dilemma.¹

Today, nuclear weapons present what effectively amounts to a Prisoner's Dilemma for the superpowers, but instead of confessions and jail, the issues are nuclear arsenals and national survival. Following the model of the two prisoners, the most desirable option would be for both superpowers to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and adopt strategies which do not rely on such weapons. Both superpowers survive or at least neither will succumb to nuclear annihilation (very positive inducements), but neither can they use the threat of nuclear weapons as leverage in pursuing national interests (a negative inducement). Thus, this option has a medium payoff for both superpowers, for illustrative purposes say 1.

A second option would be for the United States to eliminate its nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union retains its nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union would show strong preference for this option (payoff value of 2) relative to option one because it could use the threat of nuclear attack to coerce the United States without fear of retaliation. The United States, being subject to nuclear coercion or even a nuclear attack (a threat to national survival) with no capability to respond in kind, would strongly reject this option (payoff value of -2). The third option, leaving the United States with a nuclear arsenal and the Soviet Union without, would yield identical but reversed preferences and payoffs.

In the fourth option, both superpowers have nuclear arsenals. Assuming relative balance of weapons, neither is subject to nuclear blackmail (positive), but both are subject to the possibility of massive nuclear strikes which threaten national survival (very negative). Consequently, the payoff for both superpowers is negative although not as negative as when one or the other of the superpowers is subject to both nuclear coercion and nuclear attack without a means for nuclear retaliation. Relative to the other possibilities, this alternative would have a -1 value for

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both the United States and the Soviet Union. The four options are tabulated below:

	USSR without nuclear arsenal	USSR with nuclear arsenal
US without nuclear arsenal	1, 1	-2, 2
US with nuclear arsenal	2, -2	-1, -1

Nuclear Arsenal Payoff Matrix

Of the four options, the most desirable (positive payoff for both superpowers) is the first, which would leave both superpowers without strategic nuclear weapons. Achieving this option, however, would require both superpowers to trust each other to eliminate their nuclear weapons (verification being judged inadequate). For the past 40 years, rather than pursue an option that was dependent on compliance by the other side, both the United States and the Soviet Union have followed a more independent course, that is, a course which calls for retention of a nuclear arsenal to ensure against attack. Possession of nuclear weapons is the dominant strategy because it has the better payoff whether the other side pursues a similar course (has nuclear weapons) or a different course (does not have nuclear weapons).

For the United States, and for that matter the Soviet Union, the great challenge is escaping the dilemma of the nuclear arsenals and moving to a military strategy which allows each of the superpowers to guard its own national interests without having to threaten to use nuclear weapons or to endure such threats from the other superpower. The question I now intend to examine is whether SDI offers an escape from the Prisoner's Dilemma of nuclear weapons and the strategy of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction.


What Are the Implications for SDI?

Continuing with the basic Prisoner's Dilemma model, we find four options with respect to deployment of SDI. Since the Soviets do not call their system SDI, let us use the generic term "ballistic missile defense," or BMD, to cover both systems. The four options: neither has BMD; one has BMD while the other does not (two possibilities); and both have BMD. The first, in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union deploys BMD, amounts in actuality to continuation of the situation existing today under the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Admittedly, the Soviet Union has

an operational ABM system around Moscow, but no one truly believes the system could counter a concerted attack. Obviously this option does nothing to change the precarious position of the two superpowers as they contemplate the destructive potential of the other side's nuclear ballistic missiles. The major implications are that the status quo, which the world has lived with for the past decade, is maintained and both superpowers avoid the expense of a BMD arms race.

But it is the status quo that President Reagan does not want to leave as a legacy for future generations. Who could fault him or any national leader for seeking an effective strategy of deterrence not based on the specter of mutual nuclear incineration. As former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski observed, "A strategic posture that safeguards peace by the threat of annihilation, one that bases national defense on the threat of killing scores of millions of people, is ethically troubling, morally corrosive, and dehumanizing."

The second possibility would have the United States with a deployed, comprehensive BMD system while the Soviet Union lacked one. This possibility, on the surface, might seem appealing to Americans—the United States would return to a preeminent position—but actually such a



"Pending . . . a change in the mutual distrust between the superpowers, both will pursue ballistic missile defense." Here, an artist's depiction of US ground-launched, non-nuclear vehicle en route to intercept and destroy an incoming enemy warhead.

course (as well as the obverse course in which only the USSR is defended) could well prove to be the most dangerous of all the possibilities because it might tempt the superpower not building or owning BMD to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the other superpower before the latter's BMD could be deployed.

While the United States might see the mix of an offensive and defensive posture as a means of preventing a disabling first strike against it, the opponent is likely to see that mix as a first-strike capability. The United States could launch a massive nuclear strike with the aim of destroying Soviet nuclear capability knowing that what Soviet ballistic missiles survived for use in a retaliatory strike could be countered by the deployed SDI system. US pronouncements that it would never undertake such an attack would have little influence. From a Soviet perspective, there is no incentive to entrust its security to the goodwill or gratuitous restraint of the United States. The Soviet Union learned a painful lesson in World War II when it sought security by signing a peace treaty with Hitler, only to be invaded later by hundreds of *Wehrmacht* divisions.

Even in the absence of a Soviet preemptive strike, however, the option that would have the United States with a BMD capability and none for the Soviet Union ignores the reality of Soviet military doctrine, defensive systems, and research and development over the past four decades. Soviet military doctrine has consistently stressed the importance of balance between offense and defense, even in the nuclear age. In his 1962 treatise on military strategy, Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii stated that "one of the cardinal problems for Soviet military strategy is the reliable defense of the rear from nuclear strikes."

Soviet deployment of defensive systems proves Sokolovskii's words have been taken seriously. The Soviet Union has spent more than \$50 billion over the past 25 years to develop relocation sites (passive defense) for political leaders. The Soviets have the most extensive, most sophisticated air defense system in the world, and have an extensive civil defense program to protect a large segment of their population. Over the past decade, the Soviet Union has spent more on strategic defense than on strategic offense. While the United States has viewed deterrence as being based on mutual vulnerability, the Soviet Union has sought to reduce its vulnerability by development and deployment of defensive systems. In essence, the Soviets have been pursuing a strategy such that if deterrence should fail it would be in a superior position for engaging in nuclear war.⁶

The US-only option also ignores the long history of Soviet efforts to develop a BMD capability. The evidence indicates that the Soviet Union began developing ballistic missile defenses almost concurrently with their development of ballistic missiles. The Soviets have been conducting research in lasers, other directed-energy weapons, tracking systems, and subsidiary BMD technologies for nearly two decades. Some of this research has led to

the ongoing upgrade of the existing ABM system around Moscow.⁷ On 30 November of last year, in an interview with NBC correspondent Tom Brokaw, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev admitted publicly for the first time that Soviet scientists were engaged in research on space-based strategic missile defenses.⁸ Given this history, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept a situation that left it undefended while the United States planned or actually deployed a defensive capability such as contemplated under SDI. Soviet actions during and after the October 1986 Reykjavik summit between President Reagan and Premier Gorbachev give even stronger indications that the Soviet Union will not tolerate a BMD imbalance which yields a higher payoff for the United States. Furthermore, the third option—leaving the Soviet Union defended while the United States was not—would obviously be as untenable for the United States as option two would be for the Soviet Union.

If alternative one does little to resolve the current conundrum of nuclear arms, and alternatives two and three would be unacceptable to both the superpowers, how about the fourth option, one that leaves both superpowers with ballistic missile defense? On close inspection, even this alternative has serious shortcomings. First, the concept of a strategic defensive system that could protect military targets and population centers from all ballistic missiles is utopian. The Fletcher Panel, appointed by President Reagan to investigate the feasibility of ballistic missile defense, concluded that chances were slim for a defensive system able to protect the United States' population without constraints on Soviet forces. A study by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment reached the same conclusion.⁹ This is not to say that a less-than-perfect BMD system is without value. Deterrence would be strengthened to the extent that a BMD system added uncertainty to the adversary's analysis of prospects for achieving his objectives in a nuclear strike. Still, the less-than-perfect BMD system would not make ballistic missiles impotent, nor would it protect the United States from the fear of a ballistic missile attack.

A second serious concern for the United States is the possible effect on the NATO alliance should the United States and the Soviet Union deploy BMD systems. The NATO alliance, which is the only alliance which assumes the ability to initiate limited nuclear war, loses credibility when the Soviet Union deploys missile elements of such attacks. Much of Western Europe open to the superpower competition. British and French would seem to be degraded, for their territories would be the Soviet Union would defend.

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
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incentives for offensive arms control. Allies also voice concern that a safely defended United States might dissociate itself from the defense of NATO. West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner has warned that a "defended America could become a fortress America."¹¹ French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson expressed the same theme in his assertion that an SDI-defended United States could "lead to an isolationist America unconcerned about European security."¹²

A third danger in mutual BMD is the possible emergence of instability as the superpowers work to perfect and deploy their systems. Even the most optimistic proponents of SDI acknowledge that deployment of an effective system would take a minimum of ten years. But a technological breakthrough by one side allowing it to achieve an early BMD capability would create the same circumstance as alternatives two and three. The side that perceived it was falling behind would likely take steps to strengthen its offensive capability as a hedge (or, as we have noted, it might take more drastic steps). It is thus conceivable that there would be two arms races, one offensive and one defensive. Given the distrust between the two superpowers, the propensity to hedge against the other side's technological breakthroughs, and the uncertainty regarding the full extent of the other's offensive and defensive capabilities, the transition to mutual BMD would be fraught with potential for instability and even peril. Consequently, alternative four yields a payoff that is less than optimum for both superpowers, but it is also more desirable than alternatives two and three, which leave one of the superpowers at a distinct disadvantage. In essence, the Prisoner's Dilemma continues.

How Do We Break Out of the Dilemma?

The debate on SDI and the desirability of deploying a BMD capability will undoubtedly continue for years. The issues are many and are extremely complex. They include unforeseeable repercussions on other elements of national military strategy, the question of affordability, impacts on alliance relationships, and perhaps even the possibility of dramatic change in the concept of world power. If SDI can meet the goals that President Reagan outlined in March 1983, resolution of these many issues would be less problematic. But until such time as the technologies of SDI emerge from the laboratories and are shown to be affordably feasible, much of the debate will be based on assumptions, conjectures, and ideological predispositions that have little to do with the intrinsic merits of BMD.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, the facts of the matter remain—in an atmosphere of mutual distrust each of the superpowers is driven to pursue a strategy that is putatively in its own best interest, and one that is independent of the actions taken by the other superpower. As long as the superpowers remain figuratively incommunicado with regard to their

strategic intentions and incapable of trust-based cooperation, they will remain locked in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Perhaps the greatest potential for BMD lies in making both superpowers and the world community aware that there is no single solution to the danger posed by nuclear weapons. While BMD might provide a partially effective counter to ballistic missiles, the superpowers and their allies would face different and formidable challenges in other nuclear delivery systems such as air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The fact that BMD at best is only a limited solution might be the catalyst which causes the superpowers to reexamine the utility of nuclear weapons in general. The recent Reagan-Gorbachev summit agreement to undertake Strategic Arms Reduction Talks this year is a step in the right direction.

Pending a significant shift in thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons and a change in the mutual distrust between the superpowers, both superpowers will pursue ballistic missile defense. Just as the two prisoners end in jail despite their hypothetical ability to avoid it, both superpowers will pursue a dominant strategy—deployment of ballistic missile defense—knowing that such does not necessarily provide an escape from the dilemma of nuclear arsenals. One of the great challenges of the coming decades for both the United States and the Soviet Union will be to achieve mutual security based on strategic defense in such a way that reliance upon nuclear weapons is lessened and overall world security is increased.

NOTES

This article is an abridged adaptation of an essay titled "The Strategic Defense Initiative and the Prisoner's Dilemma" on file at the US Army War College and the Defense Technical Information Center.

1. Speech made by President Reagan 23 March 1983, and partially reproduced by Daniel O. Graham and Gregory A. Fossedal, *A Defense that Defends* (Greenwich, Conn.: Devin, 1984), p. 145. See also Sidney D. Drell et al., *The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985), pp. 101-03.

2. Quoted in Graham and Fossedal, pp. 143-45.

3. Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, *Prisoner's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 24-25. The notation has been adjusted for clarity.

4. Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., *Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defense Initiative* (Washington: Ethics & Public Policy Center, 1986), p. x.

5. Cited in Drell et al., p. 13.

6. Keith B. Payne, *Strategic Defense: Star Wars in Perspective* (Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1986), pp. 46-50.

7. Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington: GPO, 1987), pp. 74-76. See also Payne, pp. 52-57.

8. Celestine Bohlen, "Gorbachev Sees Cuts Without SDI Ban," *The Washington Post*, 1 December 1987, p. A1.

9. See Alex Gliksmann, in *Strategic Defense in the 21st Century*, ed. Hans Binnendijk et al. (Washington: GPO, 1986), pp. 15-16.

10. Binnendijk et al., pp. 85-101. See also Keith Dunn and William Staudenmaier, eds., *Alternative Military Strategies for the Future* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 33-34, 37.

11. Payne, p. 194.

12. Ibid., p. 201. See also Gary L. Guertner and Donald M. Snow, *The Last Frontier* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 93.

The Botched Air Support of Operation Cobra

JOHN J. SULLIVAN

In the early morning of 25 July 1944, General Omar Bradley studied the broken cloud cover in the skies over Normandy and prayed that the force of 1500 heavy bombers approaching the French coast would find weather conditions clear enough to bomb German positions near St. Lo. Throughout First Army and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), hopes were high for the operation. It would begin with a carpet bombing followed closely by a ground offensive spearheaded by VII Corps. Allied forces needed a successful offensive. Since D-Day, General Bradley's First Army had been mired in a slugging match with German forces among the marshes and hedgerows of Normandy's bocage. The virtual stalemate brought to mind the costly trench warfare of World War I. Allied forces pushed slowly south from the invasion beaches, paying a high price for each yard. Infantry companies sustained 90 percent of the casualties.¹

Allied planners had not fully anticipated the difficulties the country presented to an invading army. The hedgerows were walls of earth supporting a tangled growth of bushes, vines, brambles, and trees. They enclosed small pastures which became virtual citadels when defended skillfully. Laced with twisted, toughly rooted trees, they made formidable barriers for tanks. German soldiers dug tunnels in the hedgerows to establish defensive positions in depth. Marshes, ditches, pools, and canals made movement difficult and dangerous. Eroded, sunken lanes were mined and covered by artillery or mortars.²

There were other complications as well. Stormy weather in June and July handicapped Allied air forces. The constricted lodgement area lacked space for ground and air units waiting in the United States and England for employment in France. And supply channels were choked by a shortage of working ports.³

As the difficulties increased, Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower and his chief subordinates became targets for increasingly sharp criticism. US Secretary of War Henry Stimson returned from a visit to Normandy deeply disturbed about the slow pace of operations. Newspapers started criticizing the performance of the Allied armies.⁴

Eisenhower's lieutenants reacted to the complaints by striking at each other. The Deputy Supreme Commander, Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, charged Ground Forces Commander Bernard Montgomery with timidity and a lack of drive. Tedder feared that Montgomery's excessive caution would permit the Germans to recover from the devastation rained on the French transportation system, at heavy cost, by Allied air forces.⁵ Given enough time, the Germans might build an impenetrable cordon around the lodgement area.

Tedder's low opinion of Montgomery was reciprocated. Montgomery told associates that his "main anxiety these days is the possibility that we should not get the full value from our great air power The man who ought to keep the whole show on the rails is Tedder; but he is weak and does nothing about it."⁶

Nor was General Bradley free from criticism. General George S. Patton, Jr., who waited impatiently in Normandy for a chance to command an army in battle, made it known that he could break through in three days if he commanded First Army.⁷

Montgomery's anxiety about air power was shared by Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz, who commanded the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). Early in June he had warned Ike that ground commanders did not understand how to employ the air power available to them. They could imagine no better use for heavy bombers than to "plow up several square miles of terrain in front of ground forces to obtain a few miles of advance."⁸ Spaatz's complaint referred to a plan circulating within SHAEF calling for heavy bombers to lay a carpet of bombs along a small section of the line, followed by a powerful ground attack designed to break through the German front.


John J. Sullivan was an aviation radioman with the 3rd Marine Air Wing during World War II, and a rifleman with the Army's 38th Infantry Regiment during the Korean War. He received B.A. and M.A. degrees from the New York State College for Teachers (Albany) and then taught mathematics and history in New York schools. He also has done postgraduate work in historical research at New York University.

The proposed carpet bombing would require the closest possible cooperation between air and ground forces, but the tangled state of Eisenhower's air organization made such cooperation far from certain. Bitter, protracted arguments at the highest Allied levels about the extent of Eisenhower's authority over air forces had resulted in compromises which failed to establish clear lines of command. At the center of the controversy was the reluctance of airmen to relinquish strategic bombers to Eisenhower for support of the invasion of France. The heavy bombers had their independent mission designed to make a decisive contribution to victory. Many airmen considered their diversion to ground support to be tragically wasteful.

Eisenhower did not agree with the airmen and held stubbornly to his conviction that he must command all available air power that could make the invasion less hazardous. After months of wrangling, Ike was given the strategic air forces, but he had to agree that they would not be commanded by his air commander, Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, an airman considered by many to be unqualified to direct strategic air forces. Deputy Supreme Commander Tedder was assigned the responsibility for directing all air forces participating in the invasion. Leigh-Mallory would command only the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), which were equipped for tactical use alone.⁹

A bad situation was worsened by personality conflicts. General Spaatz had opposed Leigh-Mallory's directives repeatedly and had lost confidence in the AEAF commander's judgment. Despite the criticism that swirled around him, however, the air marshal retained Eisenhower's support. Ike appreciated Leigh-Mallory's dedicated efforts to use the full weight of Allied air power in support of ground forces. Leigh-Mallory became the leading proponent of carpet bombing. In his diary he recorded: "When I first propounded the scheme of full air support to the Army, Air Chief Marshal Tedder was not present, but General Marshall was. He thoroughly agreed with it . . . I believe that Ike will back me."¹⁰ On 10 July he vowed: "Either I am to be allowed to direct, if necessary, the whole Air Forces available to the full and immediate support of the Army, or I shall resign on that issue. If Tedder does not like it, then he or I will go."¹¹

As ground progress lagged, Leigh-Mallory's position strengthened. He advised and encouraged General Bradley to plan an operation employing carpet bombing. Bradley had received a promise of 1200 heavy bombers from Spaatz if the situation required them. After VIII Corps' attack in early July bogged down, Bradley searched for a section of his front on which to lay a bomb carpet.¹² He focused on St. Lo, with its network of roads that could support mobile operations. A straight stretch of highway northwest of St. Lo could serve as a checkline for high-altitude bombers. As First Army neared this highway, Bradley ordered planning intensified for just such an operation, to be code-named Cobra.¹³



Map by Jim Kistler, USA MC

First Army sustained 40,000 casualties as it pushed south to St. Lo, capturing that flattened city on 18 July. It was time to activate Cobra. After a meeting with his corps commanders on 19 July, Bradley flew to AEF headquarters at Stanmore, north of London, to explain Cobra to the air commanders and win their cooperation.¹⁴

Bradley asked for a force of heavy bombers unprecedented in number, wielding devastating power. Their bombs would saturate a rectangular area approximately one mile by five miles, located just south of the St. Lo-Perriers road (see map). To insure a tremendous blast effect which would stun German defenders, bombing would be completed in one hour. To avoid cratering which could slow the attack, Bradley wanted only light bombs used.¹⁵

Airmen at the Stanmore meeting listened patiently as Bradley dealt with matters more within their field than his. No one really knew much about carpet bombing. Eighth Air Force had little experience with it. The size of the safety zone evoked considerable discussion. The Eighth Air Force representative advised a troop withdrawal from current positions of 3000 yards. Even this distance, he warned, would not preclude the possibility of gross errors of bombing that could cause bombs to fall on First Army positions.¹⁶

While Bradley may not have known much about the operations of heavy bombers, he did know that a bombardment preliminary to an attack had to be followed up quickly by the assault troops. He proposed a withdrawal of only 800 yards. A compromise withdrawal of 1250 yards was adopted. This zone, added to a strip 250 yards wide assigned to Ninth Air Force fighter-bombers, meant the assault troops would be at least 1500 yards north of the target area for the heavy bombers.¹⁷

General Bradley had given much thought to the heavy bombers' approach to the target area. He wanted them to fly parallel to the St. Lo-Periers highway, and south of it. If they did not fly over his troops, he reasoned, they could not bomb them accidentally.¹⁸ To the First Army commander, the St. Lo road was an outstanding terrain feature, but to airmen at 15,000 feet, it was not so prominent. Moreover, airmen recognized at once that a parallel approach to the target was not feasible; 1500 heavy bombers could not be flown through a chute one mile wide in an hour.¹⁹ A north-south approach was the best way to fly the mission in the opinion of the airmen. It offered a checkpoint in the Normandy coastline, while the St. Lo road, north of the target area, would serve as a line on which bombardiers could make accurate range sightings. No other approach allowed this. If bombardiers judged range correctly on a perpendicular path, errors of deflection would merely cause bombs to fall on German-held terrain. Further, the perpendicular approach minimized exposure of bomb-laden aircraft to antiaircraft fire.²⁰

An unfortunate misunderstanding developed at the Stanmore meeting. Bradley failed to comprehend that a perpendicular approach was necessary. He assumed airmen would try to send the bombers on a path parallel to the front line. He left the meeting pleased with what he believed had been promised. Airmen had been unusually cooperative, not voicing their customary doubts about the wisdom of using strategic bombers in close support of ground troops.²¹

Operation Cobra was scheduled to begin on 21 July. Orders went out to all concerned air and ground force headquarters. VII Corps field orders urged assault troops to "vigorously push the attack across the highway to insure annihilation of any remaining enemy."²² These words hint at what was a general hope, that the attack would meet little resistance after such a cataclysmic bombing. Infantry troops hated to give up ground they had fought for; 30th Division soldiers were directed to make their withdrawal to create a safety zone "at the last practicable moment."²³ AEF's field order left "routing and altitudes of air formations to be coordinated directly between commands." This same order urged bombardiers not to bomb short, implying a perpendicular approach.²⁴ Eighth Air Force field orders made the point specific. Bombardiers were cautioned to avoid bombing short "because the penetration route is directly over friendly troops."²⁵

Cobra called for a maximum effort from American air forces. Fighter-bombers of the two tactical air commands, IX TAC and XIX TAC, would start the operation by glide-bombing a strip along the St. Lo-Periers road. As the fighter-bombers completed their attack, the lead formation of 1586 heavy bombers would arrive, flying a north-south route at not more than 15,000 feet. Eighth Air Force would attack in three waves, each wave taking 15 minutes, with five minutes between waves. The target area would be pounded with elemental fury—saturated with 50,000 general purpose and fragmentation bombs, most of them of the 100-pound size, with a few 500-pound general purpose bombs and some 260-pound and 120-pound fragmentation bombs. Special enemy strongpoints would be marked with red smoke by artillery shells. Formations of 12 to 14 aircraft would drop their bombs when signaled to do so by a lead bombardier. Medium bombers of Ninth Air Force would attack targets in the German rear after the heavies had finished. Eighth Fighter Command would provide area cover.²⁶

Weather caused several postponements of Cobra. During the respite, at the urging of Leigh-Mallory, Major General Hoyt Vandenberg, AEAf Deputy Commander, questioned Eighth Air Force operations officers closely about the bombers' approach to the target area. He was told that a parallel approach was impossible in the time permitted for bombing. Soon after this query, Vandenberg was contacted by Major General Fred Anderson, Deputy Commander for Operations for USSTAF. Anderson, who had commanded Eighth Bomber Command, was an authority on daylight heavy bomber operations. He told Vandenberg "he was worried about the repercussions that might arise and that he wanted it clarified that the time factor which was set by AEAf was the controlling one for their direction of attack." Vandenberg promised to explain this to Leigh-Mallory: "I called him," Vandenberg recorded, "and suggested that perhaps Bradley might prefer to extend the time . . . and thus allow parallel bombing . . . [He] assured me that he had just spoken to Bradley and that the additional time to deliver the bombing attack was too great for Bradley to accept and that, therefore, he [Bradley] had decided to accept the additional risk of perpendicular to the road bombing."²⁷

Normandy weather continued foul through 23 July. Weather experts predicted very questionable conditions for Cobra on 24 July, but much improved on the 25th. Leigh-Mallory turned down an Eighth Air Force request for a postponement and ordered the Cobra bombing to begin at 1000 hours on 24 July.²⁸

In his postwar memoir, General Bradley described the tension in Eisenhower's command on the eve of Cobra:

Cobra thus assumed vast importance in my mind. If it succeeded, I was certain it would give everybody a much-needed shot in the arm. It would help eliminate the back-stabbing. It would put such momentum in the war that the

very speed of it would heal the seams in our rupturing alliance. Conversely, if it failed, it could develop into much more than another military setback. It could bring on dangerous open warfare in the alliance that might lead to Monty's relief and perhaps Ike's and my own.²⁹

Early in the morning of 24 July, Cobra was postponed to 1200 hours because of heavy cloud cover over the target. Leigh-Mallory arrived at Bradley's headquarters at 1120, where he hoped to see improvement in the weather.³⁰ The weather forecasters had been accurate. A thick overcast ruled out precision bombing. Leigh-Mallory's order to postpone Cobra reached the Eighth Air Force commander, General James H. Doolittle, too late to recall most of his heavy bombers before takeoff.

The lead bomber division, the 2nd Bomb Division of Eighth Air Force, found too much cloud cover over the target and did not attack. Mission orders warned that aiming points had to be visually identified before bombing. A single bomber released its bombs on an Allied airstrip when its bombardier accidentally flipped a toggle switch. The 3rd Bomb Division encountered great difficulty identifying its targets through the clouds. Only three tactical units, each composed of 12 to 14 aircraft, attacked their primary target.

Cloud conditions had improved when the 1st Bomb Division reached the target area, although visibility was still poor. Some of its aircraft received the recall message, but 317 heavy bombers dropped 10,124 high-explosive bombs and 1822 fragmentation bombs. Some fell short. A lead bombardier had difficulty with his bomb release mechanism, and part of the bomb load was released unintentionally. Other aircraft in the unit salvoed their bombs when the lead ship was seen to do so.³¹

On the ground below, Major Chester Hansen, an aide to General Bradley, waited for the heavy bombers. His diary recorded his feelings:

Soon the heavies came in, we heard them long before seeing them. Heavy roar up above the clouds which were now about 8000 feet with small patches of blue beginning to show through. Ground grunted and heaved as the first cascade of bombs came down, horrible noise and the shuddering thunder that makes the sound of a bomb so different from that of artillery. Suddenly when the next flight came over there was a sharp deadly screaming whistle . . . We dove to the ground . . . The ground shook and 500 yards in front the angry black spirals of dirt boiled out of the ground. Doughboys on the road had taken cover in ditches.³²

The gross errors in bombing had a deadly impact on units of the 30th Division, killing 25 soldiers and wounding 131.³³

In his anger Bradley sought reasons for the tragedy and grasped one when he learned that the bombers had approached the target area from the north—a perpendicular approach. He collared Leigh-Mallory, demanding to know why the bombers had flown over his troops. Pleading ignorance, Leigh-Mallory promised to check with Eighth Air Force and report back.³⁴ This response, reported by Bradley, was exceedingly strange. It contradicted Vandenberg's statements, and indicated, if true, that the AEA command did not know a primary fact about the operation he was coordinating.

Major General J. Lawton Collins, commander of VII Corps, worried about the safety zone his troops had relinquished. Soon after news of the postponement reached him, he made a difficult decision; he ordered the 30th, 4th, and 9th Divisions to advance at 1300 hours to retake the safety zone.³⁵ The infantry encountered sharp fighting but regained the key highway and misled some German commanders into thinking an American attack had been repulsed.³⁶

Bradley spent a miserable day pondering the fate of Cobra. Leigh-Mallory reported tardily at 2340 that the bombing could be executed next day, but only on a perpendicular approach. The physical facts of time and space had not altered. Seeing no alternative, Bradley accepted the condition. Cobra was rescheduled for 0900 on 25 July, with some precautions hastily added by Eighth Air Force to reduce the chance of gross bombing errors.³⁷

Eighth Air Force ground crews worked through the night, preparing bombers for the mission. At 0614 on 25 July, aircraft of the lead division began to assemble over England. A weather aircraft carrying an air commander, a meteorologist, and a bombardier flew to Normandy to reconnoiter the target. At 0800 hours the air commander reported that the target area was clear, but cloud cover with a base of 14,000 feet along the route would force many bomb units to descend from planned altitudes. Bombardiers would have to recalculate bombing data hurriedly and reset their bombsights.³⁸ These adjustments would loosen the formation, with consequent spreading of bomb patterns.³⁹

At 0939, as fighter-bombers flashed over the highway in their bombing attack, B-17s and B-24s of Eighth Air Force approached the St. Lo-Periers road. Bombardiers searched for landmarks that would identify targets. Great clouds of dust and smoke billowed up from the ground. Red smoke from marker shells blended with bomb bursts and muzzle flashes of artillery.⁴⁰ A breeze from the south wafted a dense pall of smoke northward, obscuring parts of the road. The urgent requirement to concentrate the bombing into an hour meant that smoke did not clear between attacks by successive waves of bombers.⁴¹ Some planes bombed from 12,000 feet, which brought them closer to enemy antiaircraft fire.⁴²

By Eighth Air Force standards the bombing of 25 July was good. All three bomb divisions covered their targets well.⁴³ A total of 1495 heavy

bombers attacked their primary targets, dropping 2060 tons of high-explosive bombs and 2346 tons of fragmentation bombs.⁴⁴

Gross errors in bombardment had been anticipated. It was unlikely that they could be entirely avoided in such a massive operation, especially with new bombing methods involving many thousands of fallible airmen and an enormous quantity of complicated equipment.⁴⁵ Bombs fell within the confines of First Army positions because of human errors. Two lead bombardiers released bombs without making positive identification of their targets. A command pilot caused short bombing when he mistakenly assumed his wing was supposed to bomb as a unit.⁴⁶

The 30th Infantry Division was hit again and suffered staggering losses: 61 killed, 374 wounded, 60 missing, and 164 cases of shock (euphemistically labeled combat fatigue). These casualties exceeded those of any other single day in combat in the history of this renowned division.⁴⁷ The regimental history of the 120th Infantry describes some of the terrible events:

Huge flights of planes [arrived] in seemingly endless numbers Fascinated, we stood and watched this mighty drama Then came that awful rush of wind—that awful sound like the “rattling of seeds in a dry gourd,” The earth trembled and shook. Whole hedgerows disappeared and entire platoons were struck, huge geysers of earth erupted and subsided leaving gaping craters ⁴⁸

In all, 111 men of the VII Corps were killed by Eighth Air Force bombs on 25 July. General Leslie McNair, former commander of the Army Ground Forces, was with the assault troops to observe the performance of units whose organization and training he had profoundly influenced. He died when a bomb obliterated his trench.⁴⁹

Despite the bombing errors, American infantry units attacked with only minor delays. Resistance was surprisingly firm. German soldiers had learned to protect themselves from air attack as they coped with overwhelming Allied air supremacy. Sheltered in tunnels, trenches, and dug-in armored vehicles, many German soldiers survived bombs that fell near them.

The surprisingly tough defense put up by German troops is explained in a report on Operation Cobra by Major Kenneth Hechler of the US Army Historical Division, based on a thorough investigation in 1944:

The bombing caused an estimated 700 German casualties and 601 reported American casualties. In view of the fact that only 37 planes bombed north of the bomb safety line, it seems safe to assume that the disproportionately small number of German casualties was due to the fact that they were well dug in, whereas only a small fraction of the American troops had dug foxholes.⁵⁰



National Archives

Soldiers of US VII Corps dig out after the Cobra bombardment.

Not all German units escaped heavy losses. Panzer Lehr Division occupied a section of the line attacked in the Cobra bombing. Its commander, Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, testified:

The bombings completely destroyed our forward positions. That the attacking US infantry nevertheless encountered resistance is due to the fact that the reserves at battalion, regiment, and division levels had been held in position immediately behind the line of resistance Particularly tenacious resistance was offered by antiaircraft and other artillery batteries which had escaped destruction and were employed in infantry action.³¹

Heavy fighting continued throughout the afternoon of the 25th. It appeared that First Army had failed to break through the German lines.³² Anger about the performance of Eighth Air Force spread through SHAEF. Ike's Chief of Staff stung General Doolittle by charging that the bombing mishaps occurred because airmen had a lack of enthusiasm for ground support.³³ General Spaatz told Eisenhower that Bradley had been warned there would be casualties: "We were attempting to place too heavy a concentration in too small an area."³⁴

In its diary entry for 25 July, First Army recorded, "This day, a day to remember for more than one reason, did not bring the breakthrough for which we had all hoped."⁵⁵ Pessimism widely prevailed. Yet that pessimism did not influence General Collins, who remained close to the attacking troops, seeking clues to German intentions and capabilities. Although his infantry divisions had met unexpectedly stubborn resistance and had failed to capture their primary objectives, Collins sensed a lack of consistency in the enemy's defense. Should he commit his armored divisions? On the afternoon of 25 July, Collins ordered his armor to attack the following morning.⁵⁶ That decision led to the breakthrough that Cobra planners had hoped for. By late afternoon of 26 July, American forces had broken entirely through the German front. The bombing had disrupted German defenses more than Allied commanders had at first perceived.

On 25 July, one of the most significant days of the European campaign, General Bradley dictated a memorandum leveling charges against airmen, particularly Eighth Air Force, charges he repeated emphatically in books he wrote after the war.⁵⁷ He condemned the perpendicular approach of the bombers to the target, calling it a primary cause of the bombing casualties. He claimed that airmen had promised him to make the bomb run parallel to the road and south of it. "It was duplicity," he wrote, "a shocking breach of good faith."⁵⁸

This claim is false. Many airmen told Bradley that a parallel approach was impossible given the size of the target area, the number of bombers, and the time permitted for bombing.

Bradley suggested that a parallel approach would have made it impossible to spill bombs on First Army positions. This too is false. Errors of deflection could have caused bombs to fall on American positions. Regardless of approach, smoke and dust would have obscured parts of the St. Lo road, making it difficult for air crews to identify aiming points. As Spaatz explained to Ike, airmen were trying to drop too many bombs on too small a target in too short a time. They were trying to meet Bradley's requirements during a desperate crisis for First Army.

General Bradley and his subordinate commanders bore full responsibility for any failures to disperse troops in trenches, foxholes, and shelters as safeguards against bombing accidents. Dispersed troops consume precious time to move into assault formations after a preliminary bombardment ends. Lives saved by measures taken to avoid bomb casualties might have been lost by giving the enemy time to recover from the bombing before the assault troops could reach him. Bradley decided that the swift assault was the more important need.

Others also share some of the blame for the operation's Pyrrhic success. Deputy Supreme Commander Tedder failed to exercise close

supervision of Cobra's air operations as he was charged to do. It was unwise to assign Leigh-Mallory to coordinate the efforts of air and ground units participating in Cobra. The AEF commander lacked experience directing heavy bombers, and his relations with American airmen were severely strained. A British officer assigned to SHAEF described his amazement over the role of Leigh-Mallory: "Tedder still delegates the planning and conduct of air operations to this man in whom nobody has any confidence, a man who in addition to a widespread reputation for incompetence, has a peculiar knack of rubbing everybody up the wrong way with his pompous, arrogant attitude."³⁹

And indeed, a large share of the responsibility for the waste and losses incurred in the botched operation on 24 July must be assigned to Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory. He overruled experienced weather and operational personnel at Eighth Air Force who strongly recommended postponement of Cobra to the 25th. He failed to position himself on the 24th to receive timely, accurate data about weather so that if necessary he could postpone the operation before it started. A recall of so many loaded bombers presented enormous difficulties. The start-and-stop orders to bomb meant that American infantry divisions had to retake the safety zone, suffering heavy casualties in doing so.

Further, Eighth Air Force bomber crews found their task complicated by smoke from bomb blasts and artillery shells. In view of the importance of the St. Lo-Periers road as an aiming checkpoint for bombers at high altitude, the decision to send fighter-bombers to bomb first was unwise, another example of the poor supervision of Cobra.

The failures of coordination in Eisenhower's command should not surprise anyone who appreciates the complexities always associated with command of combined and joint forces. In 1944 the air forces were still part of the Army, of course, but in effect had achieved virtual autonomy. Thirty years of interservice squabbles about the role of air power had left Army air and ground officers deeply suspicious of each other. General Bradley was typical of many ground officers in his opinion that airmen were overpaid, overpromoted, overdecorated, and incorrigible publicity-seekers who invariably claimed for themselves a far greater importance in the nation's military establishment than their battlefield record warranted. Even forty years after the war, Bradley's memoirs failed to acknowledge the great benefits that air supremacy gave his forces in France—supremacy that had been won by Eighth, Ninth, and Fifteenth Air Forces in fierce air battles over Germany.

With regard to allied cooperation, General Eisenhower was determined to go the last mile in achieving and maintaining it. Also, he was loyal to his subordinates to a fault, especially to those who were British. His attitude on allied cooperation is well known, but most of his American commanders believed he held them to a higher standard than he did their

British counterparts. It is perhaps Ike's determination to foster harmonious relations with allies, and his loyalty to subordinates, that explain his patient, unwavering support of Leigh-Mallory in the face of the constant criticism. This raises an important question, as pertinent today as it was then: how much command failure should be tolerated in the cause of allied harmony?

These issues of alliance discord, interservice disagreement, and personality conflicts among commanders can be considered constants, deserving as much and perhaps even more attention today than they did in 1944. Without a doubt the problems attending Operation Cobra dramatized such enduring questions as whether the theater commander should command all the assets, including strategic air, brought to bear in his theater; whether strategic employment of air assets in a given instance is ultimately more efficacious than tactical employment; and whether combined and joint doctrine for close air support of ground operations in high-intensity war can ever be truly perfected and successfully implemented.

It was the courage, skill, and determination of soldiers and airmen, and the leadership of commanders such as General Collins, that made Operation Cobra succeed in the end despite the technical mishaps in the bombing support. Journalist Ernie Pyle was present during the Cobra bombing. Later he evaluated the operation:

I have a hunch that July 25 of the year 1944 will be one of the great historic pinnacles of this war. It was the day we began a mighty surge out of our confined Normandy spaces, the day we stopped calling our area the beachhead and knew we were fighting a war across the whole expanse of France.⁶⁰

Pyle's hunch was right.

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View From The Fourth Estate _____

Back To The Front

ARTHUR T. HADLEY

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Thirty-five thousand American troops, the largest number to move from the United States to Europe since D-day, have returned home from tank and helicopter maneuvers in north Germany. Exercise Certain Strike [conducted 14-24 September 1987], the biggest NATO war game ever, brought some surprisingly good news. The Army, which has by no means received the lion's share of the massive Reagan military buildup, is in good shape. Its personnel and equipment show marked improvement.

Gone are the days of the late 1970s when a major feature of NATO exercises was broken-down American tanks with lackadaisical soldiers sprawled beside them sneaking a joint. Now the 2nd Armored Division I watched—and “fought” with—had all its new M-1 tanks still in operation at the end of the first week. The tanks maneuvered correctly, were usually well spaced, using the ground to hide and advance, avoiding both their theoretical enemies and the unharvested crops of local farmers. The tankers tell me that the M-1 tanks, the Abrams, now run better and are easier to maintain than the M-60s they replaced. This year [1987] the US forces won the Canadian Cup, the annual competition to determine the best-shooting tank platoon in Europe. In 1986 they tied. In the lean years of the mid-'70s to the early '80s, the United States finished last or next to last.

Some of the new equipment is quite impressive, particularly the new electronic intelligence equipment. Four years ago there could be no doubt that the Russians controlled the electronic battlefield. Two years ago some new systems were arriving; but they were hard to operate and fix and were viewed as exotic artifacts rather than useful parts of combat. This year new, highly sophisticated electronic black boxes arrived, about the size of several 18-inch TV sets hooked together, helicopter- and jeep-borne, able to probe for the enemy. This equipment could eavesdrop, locate a target, or jam, with a few simple adjustments. Helicopter-borne radar watched the battlefield by day, infrared watched by night. And the new equipment kept working. To handle these new riches the Army deployed the largest combat intelligence forces ever, including World War II.

And most of the commanders, now more knowledgeable, fully exploited the new intelligence strengths. The little orange symbols representing "enemy" units on the headquarters wall maps were numerous and accurate. At the same time blue force electronic jamming had hidden the 2nd Armored from its orange enemy.

Certain Strike also showed on the ground the real-world meaning of statistical studies on increasing troop proficiency. The Army is proud of the intelligence of its new recruits and junior sergeants. Over 95 percent of them are high school graduates, some even have several years of college. But they also point out that this has created a new problem, not as pressing as the old problems of discipline, but still unsettling. The new, younger soldiers and junior sergeants are much brighter and more highly motivated than the senior sergeants who were recruited into the service back in the '70s. Corporals and junior sergeants average over 55 points on the Army Qualification tests, the more senior sergeants 47 points, leaving an acute generational problem. How does one retain the juniors in the service? And what does one do about the loyal but limited seniors?

These statistics take on a tangible meaning in action. That weapons become less efficient and more expensive because of the now-feast-now-famine cycles in which we fund our armed forces is relatively common knowledge. But the same cycle also debilitates personnel. At the forward headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division, I watched the battle staff prepare a six-helicopter attack behind the enemy lines to seize a bridge. Then with the attack set I jumped into my "tactical Mercedes" (a military vehicle free to travel in the maneuver area courtesy of a bumper sticker from an anonymous source) and raced across blue lines to the orange (enemy) side to see if the attack came off as planned. On time, well-spaced, and hugging the tree line, the six helicopters arrived. There were two possible fields. They correctly picked the harvested one. The troops were out of the helicopters, charging into firing positions, and the choppers airborne again in 42 seconds, good time even "for real" in Vietnam. But then as they disappeared into the trees at the river's edge the master sergeant in command of the point patrol read his map incorrectly. Followed by his protesting junior NCOs he led the patrol rapidly in the wrong direction.

But the action also signaled some good news. Take the apparently minor point that the lead helicopter selected the field that would do the least damage to the farmer's crops. As late as two years ago one of the helicopters I flew in was having a great time "beating up" herds of cows to see them on the run. Earlier in the

In each issue, Parameters features "View From the Fourth Estate," consisting of a stimulating and often controversial article on military affairs previously appearing in the civilian printed media. Members of the military may or may not like what is said in the civilian press of their activities, but in a democratic society they must remain abreast of what the citizen is reading and thinking if they are to execute their missions successfully.

maneuver, however, I heard over a helicopter intercom the co-pilot warn his pilot, "Break left, break left, there's a herd of cows there," and we pitched to the left to let the cows graze in peace. And both times the pilots were acting as good neighbors on their own, with no senior officer in sight.

Such improvements have led to a new welcome for American troops in Germany. This is particularly important in 1987, when in certain political quarters the INF agreement has raised fears that the US resolve to defend Europe may be weakening. No longer are farmers waving pitchforks at American tanks that have driven over their sugar beets, nor the women rushing indoors when American soldiers drive through their small towns. The hostility of the local population seemed reserved for the Belgians.

But deep problems remain. As with its sister services, the Army, like some freakish prehistoric monster, suffers from hugely overdeveloped hindquarters. Corps headquarters have grown to three to four acres of enormous trucks, vans, and trailers parked hub to hub, pretending they are camouflaged because a few wisps of green netting have been hoisted over them. Behind most trucks great generators blast an infrared signature into the sky; and powerful radio transmitters scream "Notice me, notice me" to searching electronic ears. These headquarters employ hundreds of senior and non-commissioned officers in the endless coordination tri-service warfare requires. They serve on committees that waste the talents of the able, dull the edge of the keen, and shackle the aggressive to mounds of paper.

Instead of using the computer's ability to shrink headquarters' size—or perhaps eliminate a layer of headquarters altogether—the computer is used to produce ever more paper and streams of forms. In any major war these lavish headquarters will be found and destroyed within 24 hours. In a minor war they are too big to transport to the scene of the action. It took two days to move the US Third Corps main headquarters less than 100 miles. A happy entrepreneur from Bermuda has become a millionaire several times over merely by removing the excrement produced by these headquarters during their mock battles.

On Certain Strike the coordination between Army and Air Force was not as effective as it was two years previously. "I've got planes sitting on the ground and no one is using them," complained the British maneuver commander, General Sir Martin Farndale, to the US Third Corps commander. But I had been standing beside Air Force air-ground liaison officers in the maneuver area who were frantically pleading into their radios for planes that never came.

One giant backward step should also be recorded. There had always been an unwritten hope that if desperate battle broke out along the inner German border, US Naval air could arrive in a short time to help out. Unfortunately, starting in the early '80s, the refueling systems on Navy fighters have been changed so they can no longer be refueled by Air Force tanker aircraft, only by Navy tanker aircraft. In effect this locks the new Naval air squadrons created by the massive funding given the Navy under President Reagan and Secretary John Lehman into purely Naval roles. The ability of Army commando helicopters to fly off Navy ships has brought a measure of victory over mines in the Persian Gulf. The new inability of the Navy to support the land battle in East Germany sends a different message.

But the new face of the personnel is perhaps the Army's most significant change. Owing to the declining birthrates of the early '60s, the number of recruits available to enter the armed services has already started to shrink. Roughly 29,462,000 will be available in the 1980s vs. only 25,148,000 projected for the 1990s. This has had one major effect: since 1972 the number of women has risen, and they have grown from 1.6 percent of the armed services to ten percent today. Yet by law—the 1948 Combat Exclusion Act—the armed forces cannot use women in positions of combat. In response, the armed services, particularly the Army and Air Force, are simply dissembling about whether they have women in combat positions. They are doing this because Congress has sent a clear message that it wishes this issue to be fudged. Today the armed services cannot run on the present volunteer basis without women in combat positions.

To be accurate, we do not have a "volunteer" armed force anyway. We have a "recruited" armed force, an important distinction. While a few still walk in off the street, most service men and women have been sought out by recruiters and then join up for monetary and educational rewards. This is what lies behind the improved intelligence test scores. The women entering the armed services decisively outscore the men on intelligence tests. For example, of the women entering the Army in 1983, 44 percent scored in the top two categories in the entrance test, compared with 35 percent of the men. And 18 percent of the women had some college, compared with eight percent of the men. In the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence battalion I visited, over 20 percent of the officers were female, as were an equally high proportion of the enlisted ranks. And, according to their commanding officer, the number climbs each month. Today, because of their location in key combat jobs, in proportion to their numbers, more females than males probably will die in the opening moments of a serious conflict, bringing about some interesting political and military consequences. What, for example, would have been the public reaction if a large number of those killed in Beirut had been women? What would have been the American reaction if there had been several women among the pilots being tortured in the Hanoi Hilton? Bring the women back to the rear?

—Arthur T. Hadley is the author of The Straw Giant: Triumph & Failure: America's Armed Forces (Random House). The present article appeared in The New Republic, 16 November 1987, pp. 16-18.

Commentary & Reply

OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE FOR DEFEAT?

To the Editor:

In his article "An Operational Doctrine for Intervention" (December 1987), William Lind's thinking, as always, combines insight, confusion, and countless unstated assumptions which he accepts quickly as fact. Lind is a bright fellow, genuinely committed to bettering the Army, well equipped to be a social critic or philosopher, and could be useful to the military—if he would only learn a little more. Unfortunately he just doesn't know what he doesn't know, and he is too self-assured to suspect that he may have missed something.

For example, he says we ignore at our peril a lesson of Vietnam, namely, that "we have not been very good at equipping and training foreign armies." The assertion is a tad sweeping: I am under the impression that we trained and equipped the Koreans, for example, but Lind does not think in semi-tones. Having said that we *must not* ignore the lesson of Vietnam, he then proceeds to assume that we *will* ignore it. It therefore follows that, since we can't train the locals, we necessarily must try something else.

But I'm less sure than Lind (it is impossible to be more sure than Lind) that we haven't learned. The war in Vietnam was in my estimation conducted about as stupidly as it is possible to conduct a war. Like Lind, I didn't think we would learn anything from it. However, I have been to El Salvador several times, talking to our military and diplomatic people, and going into the bush with the Salvadoran troops. As a product of the Vietnam era I still can't quite believe it, but—well, our people seem to know what they are doing. For example, the generals (e.g. General Jack Galvin, General Fred Woerner, and Major General Bernie Loeffke) spoke Spanish, had massive experience in the region, understood perfectly that the war was really about economic conditions, and were pushing for a light-infantry, root'em-out war. And it seemed to be working.

Lind is entirely correct, however, in saying that the United States lacks the resolve, the attention span, the public understanding, and the focused authority to fight a lengthy insurgency. The public is fantastically ignorant of the world, even of its geography. Most today could not find Vietnam on an outline map of the world, and one reads of a high proportion of college seniors who think El Salvador is in Africa. Whether a war is wise or foolish, we can't fight it unless the President can finish it over the weekend.

It appears that Lind, with his 3-3-3 formula, is doing the best he can to solve a problem that has no solution. He knows we can't defeat guerrillas in a long war with our own troops, and he assumes that we can't win by training the locals. The only hope, then, is to let the guerrillas form a government, which at least gives us a target suited to a short campaign. The idea is a desperate one, but at least it is an idea.

The problem is that it obviously won't work. For example, the sudden decapitation of a government in three days is an idea that might succeed well,

once—unless of course it has been published in *Parameters*. But it is so easy to prevent. How do you put a lot of light infantry on an inland capital suddenly? By parachute or helicopter. What do the bad guys do? Put in dense networks of missiles and guns that have to be taken out, ending surprise, before the infantry comes. Meanwhile, the leaders, knowing about the idea of decapitation, have either used prepared escape routes or taken to meeting at changing locations in the suburbs. Further, the bad guys can station more infantry around the capital than we can suddenly drop. What do we do if our troops begin to be overpowered? I'm not sure Lind quite understands how much trouble mean, experienced guerrillas can make in fighting green infantry who don't know the terrain.

Lind says, "In three weeks we would bring the hostile armed forces to action and crush them." This reminds me of the simple recipe for making Russia into a democracy: "First defeat the Red Army, then . . ." The idea, he says, is to encircle the enemy before they can disperse to become guerrillas. In the open spaces of Libya, sure. But in the canopied jungles of South or Central America?

Note Lind's phrase "light-infantry blitzkrieg." Lind is a passionate admirer of the *Wehrmacht* (not of the Nazis), and seeks to apply everywhere the sweeping, rapid movements the Germans used in their failure to capture Leningrad, Moscow, and the Caucasus, and later in their more successful advance on Berlin. (Maybe I shouldn't be ironic, but I think the *Wehrmacht* is greatly overrated.) But there is a remarkable difference between the open steppe and, say, the inside of a city or the mountains of Honduras. I sometimes think Lind's tactical doctrine would change sharply if he walked about three feet through some really nice triple canopy, maybe on a 30-degree slope, in, say, 100-percent humidity, while trying to find a sniper.

Lind then says, "Within three months . . . a framework for pacification would be established by integrating the Combined Action Program (CAP) the Marines used so successfully in Vietnam with mobile operational reserves." For one thing, in 1967 I was with the Marines in Danang (and for that matter volunteered unsuccessfully for CAP work), and we didn't think we were having much success. For another, I don't think Lind has the foggiest idea how cultures work in the concrete, as distinct from the abstract. Several thousand GIs show up in Sumatra, speaking not a word of the language, waving guns, acting as GIs always do—and in three months, after a bit of messiness killing the Sumatrans' brothers and fathers in the bush, we win their hearts and minds? *Who* hasn't learned the lessons of Vietnam?

There is something to be said for a little experience of what one is talking about. I have been through Marine boot and know somewhat of a steep upslope, three hours of sleep, wet red clay, and a heavy pack. Big deal: everybody in the Army knows this—but Lind doesn't. Like every science major in the United States, I have a pretty fair grasp of computers, technology, and suchlike, useful in considering weaponry—but Lind doesn't. I've spent maybe four years in the Third World, almost all of it in slums and villages—again, no big deal, but Lind hasn't. Like half the reporters in Washington, I have been through all sorts of rotten terrain in various wars—but Lind hasn't. I've fired, played with, or read the manuals of most of the weapons Lind, a categorical technophobe, passes judgment on—but Lind hasn't.

Why is it that things that seem so practical and easy to Lind look like smoke and mirrors to me?

Fred Reed

(Mr. Reed is a journalist and syndicated columnist covering military affairs.)

To the Editor:

As a student of doctrine and the operational level of war at the US Army Command and General Staff College, I found William Lind's article very interesting. I don't always agree with Lind's ideas, but his contributions are, at the very least, stimulating and worthy of comment.

In this article I found it difficult to disagree with Lind's view that military intervention is a viable mission for US forces and that such operations conducted in support of clear foreign policy objectives against hostile insurgencies require a sound doctrinal base. I think he'll find few military professionals willing to defend the way we have conducted intervention operations in the past (except perhaps for the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Grenada in 1983) and even fewer who can clearly articulate current doctrine in this area. However, like many of Lind's writings, this one suggests some pretty farfetched notions. One can only guess that his proposals are intended to draw fire and thereby generate serious thought on the subject. For that reason I would like to comment on two aspects of his argument.

First, it is very difficult to accept the notion that in an insurgency the United States should wait until the rebels have seized power and institutionalized themselves instead of defeating them early during the guerrilla phase of the conflict. It is inconceivable under the circumstances Lind lays out that we would simply write off a friendly regime and permit a hostile government to legitimize itself just so we would have a clear target for military intervention. With that kind of thinking in this country no wonder so many of our friends worldwide question US reliability as an ally. We might as well encourage the Soviets to attack Western Europe so we would have a clearly defined reason for stationing so many US troops there! Further, most of the insurgencies the United States opposes are communist-backed if not communist-led. It is just plain naive not to recognize the negative implications of Soviet recognition of a newly installed leftist regime or the international political fallout that would emerge from an armed attack on a "legitimate" government. Would military intervention in Nicaragua or Iran in 1979-80 under Lind's scenario have worked? I doubt it.

Second, while Lind's plan to execute intervention operations on a predetermined timetable may make good military sense (all good military operations rely on seizing objectives on a certain schedule), it doesn't recognize political realities. If our operational planning were based on a doctrine that dictated completion of an intervention within a fixed period (three days, three weeks, and three months—the author's "3-3-3" rule), who's to say that the old insurgents who do manage to escape a governmental decapitation coup de main won't just lay low until the US forces leave? And to say that "our operational answer should be: if he comes back, so can we" is flat politically ludicrous. The President might get tacit congressional approval for the initial intervention but

not for a follow-up operation. Even though he doesn't actually say so, it is clear that by proposing a timetable Lind is conscious of the time limitations outlined in the War Powers Act. In that connection I would say that the provisions of the law are already a de facto "3-3-3" rule for operational planning.

All of this is not to say that Lind hasn't raised some good points. There is a great need for clearer doctrine at the low end of the spectrum of war. Further study of low-intensity conflict and how to deal with hostile insurgencies threatening friendly governments is certainly warranted and is in fact continuing. As Bill Lind asserts, the Army's emphasis on the operational art and the current edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*, are sound springboards for that study. And even if his argument is flawed, his article will keep attention focused on the problem.

Major Guy C. Swan III, USA

To the Editor:

A plausible explanation of William Lind's article is that he put it in the wrong envelope. It was really intended for *Soldier of Fortune*. It would not merit comment but for the Army War College imprimatur.

Lind argues that we cannot defeat an insurgency, so we should allow it to succeed, then fight the resulting government. By that logic, we should surrender to the Soviet Union, then employ the irresistible method of insurgency to overthrow its government of occupation.

Lind advocates a *coup de main* to capture the enemy government in three days. What does he think they would be doing in the meantime? The Duchy of Grand Fenwick could hold out for three days. An insurgency succeeds only because it has mobilized popular support within a country by political means. The people and their army support the government and will defend it; otherwise, the government would not exist. Lind admits that "it is extraordinarily difficult to defeat a people." His reference to Afghanistan is exactly on point. The smaller islands of the Caribbean might worry about Lind's strategy, but any country that can raise more than a platoon might smile in anticipation.

Insurgency is a contest for legitimacy, employing political, economic, informational, and military elements of national power. The United States has the ability to wage it successfully and must develop the will.

Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, USA Ret.

To the Editor:

William Lind has contributed an altogether superfluous article to the study of intervention based on a number of mistaken premises.

First, the notion that foreign intervention leads inevitably to a discontented electorate and failed presidencies is demonstrably false. Throughout the 20th century American presidents and legislators have resorted to intervention in a number of locations around the world and have only rarely been rebuked on election day. Presidents Truman and Johnson, it can be argued, abandoned the

Oval Office not because intervention in and of itself was unpopular, but because they had led the country into an impasse. It can also be argued that President Carter's failure in the 1980 election was at least partly attributable to his consistent inability or unwillingness to intervene.

American wars, to include the Second World War, have never sustained public approval for long. But to blindly follow the dictates of the ubiquitous and dubious opinion polls is to court national disaster. The republic would have been forever torn asunder had Abraham Lincoln knuckled under to such pressures. It should be the duty of the nation's civilian and military leaders to cultivate public opinion—to translate the often abstruse ends and means of foreign policy into everyday language. Truman's and Johnson's unpopularity reflected their failure to do this, and the citizenry responded sensibly.

Aside from this mistaken premise, the doctrine itself contains a number of weaknesses. To suggest, for example, that the United States allow threatening guerrilla movements to win and become institutionalized is tantamount to a declaration of non-intervention anywhere. A perfect case in point is Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas have consolidated their *coup d'état* (there was no "revolution") and now pose a clear and present danger to the stability of America's allies in the region. Despite well-documented human rights abuses and Warsaw Pact influence in Nicaragua, America, led by the foreign policy czars in the Imperial Congress, is paralyzed. Simply put, Nicaragua has not the power to bomb Pearl Harbor and create public outrage; thus we cannot intervene. I feel I speak for a lot of infantrymen who would rather face a small, albeit deadly, guerrilla army than a large, well-trained, well-armed, modern army like the current force in Nicaragua. Our history, including (yes) the war in Vietnam, indicates that we can handle guerrillas fairly well.

I was equally astonished by Mr. Lind's self-imposed 3-3-3 constraints, which amount to a doctrinal endorsement of the questionable War Powers Act. Is it wise to inform our enemies that they need only tolerate our presence for three months before resuming the initiative? Can we really do all we need to do in so short a time? I think not, and to tie our policy so slavishly to a clock is more dogma than doctrine. It is not simply a matter of installing the "opposition," training a few peace officers, and leaving. Suggesting, as Mr. Lind does, that we could always return again and again is disingenuous and reckless. Both the American people and their elected representatives would soon rightly tire of such an expensive and time-consuming charade.

Most of Mr. Lind's argumentative weaknesses probably stem from his naive ideas about military operations. His ill-informed assumption that encirclements are universally practical and decisive, and generate fewer casualties, is pure fantasy. Although laudable in principle, the belief that conventional military operations can retain such a high degree of surgical precision is wishful thinking; it reveals our continued national obsession with the subject of employing armed force. Since Vietnam, we have placed so many caveats, exceptions, and stipulations on its use that it has become something of an empty promise to our friends and an empty threat to our enemies.

Finally, Mr. Lind's fear of a coalescing swell of nationalism in the Third World is, I feel, misplaced. In the first place, it does not always take a virulently

anti-American form; and to the extent that it does, one should not assume that it will seriously hamper attainment of our objectives. Any statesman worth his salt should be able to convert it into a tangible force to complement our foreign policy goals.

First Lieutenant David A. Crowe, USA

The Author Replies:

Fred Reed's comments on my article combine his customary personal attacks with his equally customary disregard for facts. For example, he cites Korea as a case where American military advice has worked well. As Steven Canby and Edward Luttwak demonstrated in their 1978 study, *The Defense of Korea: New Approaches*, American advice in fact led to some serious weaknesses in South Korea's defenses. He denies the possibility of a rapid light infantry advance in tropical terrain; evidently, he is unfamiliar with the Japanese campaign in Malaya. Based on personal observations as an enlisted Marine, he denies the success of the CAP program in Vietnam; virtually all analytical accounts agree it was successful.

After attacking me for too much certainty, Mr. Reed says my proposal "obviously won't work." I suggest its chances of success are highly situational. The specific counters Mr. Reed proposes to the initial *coup de main* can only be sustained for a short time, while one would hope the intervening force would not publish a timetable announcing the date it would arrive.

But in reality, Mr. Reed's objections are none of the above. They are merely bad logic attempting to cover an emotional argument: I have not been in the service; therefore I cannot understand war. Hogwash. One of the basic premises of civilization is that one can learn by means other than direct personal experience. Of course experience can be useful—or it can, as in Mr. Reed's case, simply serve as blinders—but one need not have been an astronaut to be an astronomer.

Colonel Hunt and Major Swan fall into the trap my article warns against at the outset: planning to fight a counterinsurgency, "low intensity" war. As I noted, such wars are by their nature prolonged, and this country cannot sustain a prolonged conflict unless it is an all-out fight for national survival. To Colonel Hunt, Major Swan, and others who disagree with specifics I have proposed—and I freely admit others may come up with better answers, my purpose having been to get the discussion started—let me pose the relevant question: once one recognizes that we cannot fight a low intensity, limited war, what kind of doctrine can we devise to guide interventions? Discussions of how to fight a low intensity war are *not* an answer.

Lieutenant Crowe also implies that we can carry on counterinsurgency wars, apparently believing that fancy footwork on the part of politicians can keep the American public quiescent. In the face of the power of the television news to make every casualty a national trauma, such faith in political rhetoric is naive. More dangerously, he pooh-poohs the power of aroused nationalism, arguing it will not "seriously hamper attainment of our objectives." This suggests he has studied little of the world's history since 1789, and still less of

current events in places like Afghanistan, Cambodia, Poland, and Gaza. Nationalism is the single toughest opponent we can take on, and we will seldom find a case where we can defeat it within the bounds of a limited war. To say "any statesman worth his salt" can magically transform it into a pro-American force suggests the author is not serious.

William S. Lind

ON THE GHOST OF PATTON: A FRIENDLY TÊTE-À-TÊTE

To the Editor:

Your tome hit new depths with David Hackworth's "Bring Back Blood-and-Guts Patton" diatribe ("View From the Fourth Estate," September 1987).

You do your readership a disservice with such biased drivel. Moreover, you positively insult the Fourth Estate in this section reserved as their forum. Certainly you can find a host of more meritorious material, with very little effort, in the nation's press on any given day. Many past articles have been excellent. For example, I personally enjoyed the recent Richard Halloran piece and resulting commentary. But your loyal readers certainly deserve better than Hackworth.

Dave Hackworth is a great field soldier. He may very well have been the Army's best in Vietnam, where he earned legendary status. But an analytical and balanced military writer he is not.

Please spare us, and change your editorial policy that led to such a poor choice.

Colonel Gerald C. Brown, USA

The Author Replies:

I wish my piece contained nothing but "biased drivel" as Colonel Gerald Brown so passionately claims. I was similarly accused in 1971 when I said we had lost the war in Vietnam and that the North Viet flag would fly over Saigon in four years. I wish I had been wrong that time around also.

Colonel Brown's self-righteous indignation is that of a man blindly following a "My Army right or wrong" party line. Such lack of introspection does a terrible disservice to the nation he has sworn to defend, and only reinforces the opinions I expressed in my piece.

Colonel David H. Hackworth, USA Ret.

DIGESTING DOD REORGANIZATION: A FEW BURLS

To the Editor:

I have read your September 1987 issue and note that the article "DOD Reorganization: Part I, New Imperatives" by Colonel Don M. Snider has several errors that should be brought to the attention of your readers.

First, the author states that the "1987 DOD Appropriations Act provided for the creation of . . . a unified command for strategic mobility forces." He seems to imply that the authorization for the new unified transportation command has its roots in the 1987 Appropriations Act. This is wrong. NSDD 219, issued by the President on 1 April 1986, states, "We also support the recommendation of the Commission (Packard) that the current statutory prohibition on the establishment of a single unified command for transportation be repealed. Assuming this provision of the law will be repealed, the SECDEF will take those steps necessary to establish a single unified command." As the President requested, the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act repealed the prohibition against establishing a unified transportation command. I have found no reference in the '87 Appropriations Act that influenced the decision to establish such a command or repealed its prohibition.

Second, the author correctly states that "at least one thousand JDAs must be designated by the Secretary as 'critical,' " but he is incorrect in stating that "these plus up to one half of the JDA at any one time 'shall be held only by an officer with a joint specialty or a nominee for such specialty.' " The law states that "approximately one-half of the joint duty assignment positions . . . are filled at any time by officers who have (or have been nominated for) the joint specialty." The 1000 critical billets are part of "that approximately one-half" and they must be filled by an officer holding the specialty, not just nominated for it.

Third, perhaps the most significant error in terms of impact on your readers is the statement that the legislation "makes successful performance for a full tour in a JDA as a criterion for promotion to general or flag officer starting in 1992." That is not what the law says. The 1992 date refers to 1 January 1992, which is the expiration date for a SECDEF waiver allowed under special circumstances. No one who is now, or about to be, eligible for promotion consideration to general should assume that a joint duty assignment is not necessary until 1992. Except for the specific circumstances allowed by the law, a joint duty assignment is required now!

Also, I have a couple of comments on Colonel Snider's sequel, "DOD Reorganization: Part II, New Opportunities," appearing in the December 1987 issue.

Under the heading "US Services' Roles and Missions" (p. 53), the first sentence seems to imply a strong tie between this subject and JCS Pub 2. Chapter 2 of Pub 2 lists functions of the three departments, but this document does not address "roles and missions." The formal review of roles and missions commenced in January 1988.

Regarding the allegation that the location of work to fill the "joint doctrine void" will shift "away from the service staffs in Washington" (p. 55), there is no doubt the CINCs will play a greater role in the development of joint doctrine. But we should remember that most CINCs will generally look at doctrine from a theater-specific perspective instead of a worldwide perspective. Additionally, they have very few assets to dedicate to the development of joint doctrine. Thus the notion that the work will shift away from service staffs, who have significant in-place resources to devote to the task, is perhaps premature. At

least in the near term we would expect the services to keep the lead with all final decisions made by CJCS. The Joint Doctrine Master Plan has 25 new projects identified, but the CINCs have agreed to lead only four!

Colonel James A. Moss, Jr., USAF
Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy, OJCS

The Author Replies:

Experience has taught me that errors are seen most clearly in the eye of the beholder. If all of the September article communicated well except three points, then this infantryman is proud. But I would like to offer some observations. Colonel Moss questions whether "the 1987 DOD Appropriations Act provides for the creation . . . of a strategic mobility command" as I stated. He is correct, it did not, if one looks for explicit language in the legislation. However, it is common for major pieces of legislation to "provide for" certain things by other means—usually by the deals cut between administrations and Congress that are conspicuously absent from the text of subsequent legislation. That was the context in which I used "provided for." Clearly, NSDD 219 was an executive action taken with full knowledge of the trade-offs involved in shaping the final provisions of the DOD Reorganization Act and other pieces of annual legislation. This is not the first time an executive has attempted to head off a piece of legislation—or part of one—by executive action.

On points two and three I defer to Colonel Moss. Honestly, I found the whole provision for joint specialties rather troublesome. I really don't understand his second point (I think we may be saying the same thing), and was only noting in the third point that the SECDEF has some promotion waiver authority until January 1992. I do disagree, however, that this is "the most significant error in terms of impact on your readers." The Army ethos maintains that we should be much more concerned with the future of the institution and the men and women serving in it than in qualifying individuals for future promotion to general officer. On the larger landscape of service, my "error" is a minor point indeed.

With respect to part two of the article, I remain confident that the opportunities for the Army will evolve in a manner close to my discussion, particularly in an era of budget decrements as we have now. One need only note the institutional actions of DOD when starting the decrement process—convene a Defense Resources Board and bring in the CINCs from around the world for their opinions before dealing specifically with the reductions for each service. The actions of Congress as it authorizes and appropriates the FY89 budget will, I believe, continue to support my thesis. As an institution, we ignore this trend at our own peril. The whole impetus for preparing the article was my strong belief in this central point. I see nothing on the horizon to indicate that this trend is either transitory or incorrect.

Colonel Don M. Snider, USA
Staff, National Security Council

Book Reviews

The Mask of Command. By John Keegan. 351 pages. Viking Press, New York, 1987. \$18.95. Reviewed by General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA Ret.

John Keegan, the respected British military historian, is best known for his masterful work *The Face of Battle*, which is about ground combat as sensed physically and psychologically by the soldier. Since *The Mask of Command* deals with the opposite end of the pyramid of rank—top commanders and their generalship in battle—it complements his earlier book. Both span many centuries of warfare and both focus on Western civilization, especially in continental Europe and England. In attempting to cover the 24 centuries purportedly surveyed in *The Mask of Command*, however, the author may have bitten off more than he can chew.

Essentially biographic in nature, *The Mask of Command* analyzes the character, qualities, and leadership style of four leaders who have left their mark on world history: the "heroic" Alexander the Great; the "anti-heroic" Duke of Wellington; the "unheroic" Ulysses S. Grant; and the "false heroic" Adolf Hitler. Keegan stresses that the great leaders were usually great actors, showing only those attributes that inspire men in battle and concealing any weaknesses in their makeup. From this observation stems his provocative title, *The Mask of Command*. (In the present age of the ubiquitous TV camera and investigative press, this technique of leadership may no longer have the same validity.)

Although Keegan finds some commonality with respect to the traditional measures of leadership (what he terms "traits and behavior") among great military leaders of the past, he argues that generalship necessarily reflects the nature of contemporary societies and their concepts of warfare. To thoughtful professional soldiers and military historians, this is hardly a new proposition. But Keegan uses it skillfully to describe and explain, at least in part, how generalship has been shaped, not merely by technological change, but by cultural and societal changes.

Keegan's choice of Hitler as an all-time great military leader is puzzling. Alexander the Great, both head of state and military chieftain, who fought at the head of his men in primitive battle, is an outstanding choice as are the "Iron Duke" and "Unconditional Surrender" Grant. But Hitler presents a much different portrait. Keegan's rationale is that Hitler served as a private soldier for four years in World War I (although not in a position of leadership), was wounded three times, and considered himself an experienced military man blooded in combat. Hitler appointed himself as the commander of the German army in December 1941 and thereafter directly controlled the German armies in the field. But this is not the same as having led men in battle and having earned high rank as a professional at various levels of command.

With respect to World War I, Keegan heaps scorn, and rightfully so, on the "chateau generalship" which decreed that the high command and staffs on both sides (referring to the British and the French on the Allied side and their German

opponents) distance themselves from the ghastly sights, the deafening sounds as well as eerie silence, and the noxious stench of the battlefield. Keegan's discussion of this syndrome, and its possible connection to why both sides continued the dreadful slaughter, the relentless suicidal offensives, and the stalemated trench warfare, is one of the most fascinating parts of his book. A curious, perhaps significant, omission, however, struck me at this point—Keegan makes no mention of the US entry into the war, when General John J. Pershing and fresh American troops with their own ideas on how to fight the war helped to hasten the German capitulation. Overall, the US effort was relatively small and short, but it was no doubt decisive in nature. Was this omission deliberate?

Likewise, with respect to Keegan's treatment of World War II, there is a striking omission. Except for a passing reference to Eisenhower as a talented diplomat, Keegan makes no mention of American leaders or troops in the European and North African theaters of war. (MacArthur is mentioned briefly in connection with his campaign in the southwest Pacific in the same breath with "Margaret Thatcher's Falklands campaign"—a true flight of fancy!) Keegan's focus is on Europe and European (particularly British) leaders and troops. Montgomery is mentioned several times, all in a favorable context, although Keegan admits that Montgomery's contemporaries (referring apparently only to Britishers) disliked him. And so I must confess to some parochial irritation, feeling that Keegan's overall approach to his subject deliberately downplays American leadership in any European context—only a bit of condescension, perhaps, but there nevertheless. True, he selected Grant as a prime example of a military leader, but Grant fought in the *American* Civil War against fellow *Americans* and on the *American* continent, thousands of miles from the Old World. By choosing Hitler in his World War II role, Keegan could portray the enormity of the Eastern Front, where the Russians destroyed the flower of the German army, and could downplay the west European front, where the British played only a minor role and the French virtually none. (The vast global nature of the war and the role of air and naval power were likewise ignored.) Thus for the World War II portion of his book, Marshall, MacArthur, Bradley, Patton, Nimitz, Arnold, Spaatz, Halsey, Truscott—any number of American leaders—would have made far better subjects than Hitler within Keegan's chosen sociological and cultural context and would have been better worth the while of students of leadership.

Despite the foregoing reservations, however, Keegan's first chapters on Alexander the Great, Wellington, and Grant are outstanding in concept, description, narrative, and analysis, reflecting meticulous research and study. In my opinion, the chapter on Grant is perhaps the best brief of Grant's character and intellect yet written. In short, Keegan does have a flair for cutting to the heart of his subject.

Keegan's concluding segment, titled "Post-Heroic: Command in the Nuclear World," is the weakest part of his book. In the first place, it is incomplete because it fails to discuss high-level leadership in the nuclear age during conflicts fought without nuclear weapons. Such conflicts encompass a wide variety: major conventional war; small wars over regional issues; unconventional warfare of varying degrees of intensity; wars of national liberation, large and small; wars by proxy; religious wars; terrorist actions; special operations; and so on. Among his examples,

Keegan fails to mention the Korean War, the first major war during the era of nuclear superpowers; the Islamic jihads waged by the Iranian fundamentalists against the rest of the world; Great Britain's "Irish problem"; the penetration of Africa by Cuban surrogates of the Soviet Union; the Arab-Israeli wars; the longest and biggest war of national liberation—the Vietnam War; and the Iran-Iraq War, now in its eighth year. (Keegan writes principally about conflicts among Western states, taking little note of the sharply different values and attitudes of Middle and Far Eastern nations toward war, and thus overlooking the complexities growing out of conflicts between occidental and oriental.) In other words, Keegan's brief dissertation on conflict in the nuclear age concerns only the aim of avoiding a nuclear war and ducks the real-world problem of fighting conventionally under the ever-present possibility of escalating to nuclear conflict. These are two distinct cases, sharply separated by the nuclear firebreak, but Keegan discusses only the nuclear.

Further detracting from the concluding section is his description of the October 1962 missile crisis in Cuba as an example of a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is a fallacious illustration because the showdown was basically a conventional one, albeit taking place under an umbrella of nuclear deterrence. Although the United States placed its nuclear forces on a high state of alert, it was the obvious massive US preparations for a conventional invasion of Cuba that actually caused the Soviets to withdraw their missiles. Six US divisions (including airborne, infantry, and Marine) and over 1000 tactical aircraft were concentrated in the southeastern part of the United States, while a large US fleet gathered in the Caribbean. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had the slightest intention of going to nuclear war over Cuba—whose existence was not a matter of survival to either superpower. The Soviets could not possibly cope with the overwhelming conventional forces assembled in our own backyard. Ultimately, the US naval quarantine (another aspect of conventional war) ended the showdown—a logical alternative to a US invasion. Khrushchev had no choice but to throw in the towel, the attempt to establish a missile base in Cuba being a case of bad judgment on his part that led to his undoing.

Probably the most objective and balanced account of the episode appears in the late General Maxwell D. Taylor's book *Swords and Plowshares* (1972), which makes it clear that a nuclear confrontation was not involved. I must state that Keegan's research in this instance was inadequate and his analysis faulty. On the other hand, his praise for the Kennedy Administration's handling of the crisis is well taken. It was a commendable performance under extremely trying circumstances.

My foregoing critical remarks notwithstanding, Keegan's prescription for quiet, prudent, and rational "Post-Heroic" leadership in a nuclear crisis is good solid advice for any statesman of a nation possessing nuclear weapons. Keegan, however, seems to imply that active leadership of a heroic mold no longer has a place in this world. But such a conclusion flies in the face of abundant evidence that conventional conflicts involving rival states, whether nuclear powers or not, will remain part of the world scene indefinitely and thus provide an ample stage for the display of heroic leadership. At any rate, the author's intent strikes me as obscure, appearing in direct contradiction of his adjacent remarks applauding heroic leadership in today's armies and singling out the 1982 British victory in the Falklands as "a triumph of heroic leadership against odds."

After reading *The Mask of Command*, I conclude that John Keegan is deeply ambivalent in his attitude to war. Before reading this book, one should go back and read the last segment of *The Face of Battle*. There, he argues that "the usefulness of future battle is widely doubted" and "the suspicion grows that battle has already abolished itself." He is speaking of conventional warfare fought by the forces of Western democracies. In *The Mask of Command*, he concludes with these words: "For all is changed, utterly changed. Passing brave it may have once been to ride in triumph through Persepolis. Today the best must find conviction to play the hero no more." This time he is speaking of all societies and the specter of nuclear war. In both books, however, he seems at the end to deny all that went before. Is he saying that no cause is worth fighting for? If that is the case, can Western democracies survive in the 21st century? Keegan does not attempt to prophesy the future, but wisely rests his case.

In sum, I have mixed feelings about *The Mask of Command*. It is thought-provoking and well-crafted, and it makes rewarding reading. In some ways, however, it may serve to confuse rather than enlighten. On balance, I find that its virtues outweigh its shortcomings. Read it and make up your own mind!

The Korean War. By Max Hastings. 389 pages. Simon & Schuster, New York, N.Y., 1987. \$22.95. Reviewed by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA Ret. Colonel Summers was an infantry squad leader in the Korean War. His latest work, *The Korean War Almanac*, is scheduled for publication later this year.

Much was expected of Max Hastings' latest book, *The Korean War*. His earlier account of the battle for the Falklands (which he coauthored with Simon Jenkins) was particularly well done, as was his *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*. It was hoped that he would turn those analytical skills to an equally lucid explanation of the war in Korea.

God knows such an account is sorely needed. Except for T. R. Fehrenbach's impressionistic *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* published a quarter-century ago, this war has been sadly neglected, even by the Army's Center of Military History. Over a generation after the events, the second volume of their official Korean War history, *Ebb and Flow*—covering the Chinese intervention, the retreat from the Yalu, General Matthew Ridgway's magnificent revitalization of Eighth Army, and the relief of General Douglas MacArthur—has yet to be published.

Sad to say, Hastings' *The Korean War* does not fill the void. While he sketches the major events of the war, he does not provide the kind of detailed and dispassionate analysis that one would expect of such a distinguished historian. Instead it appears more of a "quickie" work written to take advantage of the attention on Korea which will be created by the upcoming 1988 summer Olympics in Seoul. Much of it is derived from secondary sources—not necessarily fatal, except that in this case the secondary sources themselves are second-rate.

Instead of D. Clayton James's authoritative three-volume *Years of MacArthur*, he uses William Manchester's *American Caesar* (much of which, it has been charged, cribbed from James). Instead of Roy Appleman's detailed official

Army history, *South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu*, he uses Edwin Hoyt's condensations. His account of the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir follows the parochial Marine Corps version, virtually ignoring the Army's role in that action described so eloquently in Roy Appleman's recent *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950* (Texas A&M University Press, 1987).

Hastings claims to have met with over 200 American, Canadian, British, and Korean veterans of the war, but his text leans heavily on the war stories of former 27th Infantry Regiment commander Mike Michaelis, known among Korean War veterans as a tireless self-promoter. And he uses Michaelis to validate his ugly and vicious vilification of the fighting qualities of American infantrymen. "If it sometimes appears, in the course of this narrative," he writes, "that a British author is adopting too critical an attitude toward the professional conduct of the US Army in Korea, it is worth recalling the brutal professional strictures of Michaelis, echoed by other objectively-minded observers."

Putting aside the matter of whether Michaelis qualifies as an "objectively-minded observer," the fact is that Hastings began this vilification in *Overlord*, his account of the Normandy invasion. As he notes, "A problem that was already familiar from World War II reasserted itself in Korea, as it would again in Vietnam: the disproportionately low percentage of the nation's best manhood that served in the infantry regiments of the United States."

Tell that to infantry veterans of those wars, such as World War II veterans Daniel Inouye and Robert Dole, now United States senators. Or tell it to Korean War 9th Infantry Regiment platoon leader Julius Becton, now a retired Lieutenant General and the head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Or try Vietnam War 7th Cavalry Regiment rifleman Jack Smith, now Chief ABC News White House correspondent, or Marine rifle platoon leader James Webb, now Secretary of the Navy. As an infantry veteran of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, it was my firm conviction that the "best manhood" America had to offer was serving next to me on the line. It was the wimps, the wonks, and the wurfels that were skulking back at home.

Hastings tells us more about his British class prejudices (prejudices especially apparent in his wholesale condemnation of American black soldiers in Korea) than he does about American infantrymen in Korea. These prejudices were compounded by jealousy. As Hastings admits, "Many of the British of the World War II generation, serving as infinitely junior partners to the Americans in Korea, found the experience of decline too recent not to gaze somewhat sidelong at the new dominant force on the globe and cherish unworthy thoughts about how much better the old team had done it." (Here he is obviously not referring to the British debacle at Crete in the early days of World War II. As described in Evelyn Waugh's *Officers and Gentlemen*, it made American reverses in the Korean War look like model military exercises.)

The worst thing about *The Korean War*, paradoxical as it may sound, is that Hastings is a particularly persuasive writer. For those ignorant of the realities of the Korean War, his account could well prove convincing. And that would be a terrible disservice to all who served there.

Fortunately, a corrective is at hand. Clay Blair's *The Forgotten War*, just recently off the press, is everything that Hastings' book is not. If you would know

about the Korean War, this authoritative one-volume history, not Hastings' *The Korean War*, is the one to read.

(Editor's Note: *The Forgotten War* will be reviewed in the June 1988 issue of *Parameters*.)

Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him. By Merle Miller. 859 pages. Putnam's, New York, 1987. \$24.95. *Reviewed by Martin Blumenson.*

In this, his last book, completed just before his death, Merle Miller wrote what he called "an impartial biography" of Dwight D. Eisenhower, from his boyhood to the end of World War II in Europe. It was Miller's intent to show "what kind of man" Eisenhower was and "how he got that way"—questions which presumably had been settled by that time.

As biographers are wont to do, Miller admired his subject. His account of Eisenhower's life and career is favorable. In his short introduction, which is really his conclusion, Miller found Eisenhower to be a complex rather than a simple man, one who "could and did outsmart, outthink, outmaneuver, outgovern, and outcommand almost anybody you'd care to name, including Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, and, yes, even Franklin Roosevelt." What distinguished Eisenhower, according to Miller, was taking "lots of trouble to appear average, to seem ordinary, to appear guileless. And he fooled most people most of the time, including most of his biographers."

I quote Miller's words to give not only a measure of his thought but also a sample of his style. He wrote in a folksy way, person to person, and his prose is easy to read. The narrative was designed for the general reader, and it hits the mark. It is always entertaining.

Despite its popular nature, an enormous amount of research went into the preparation of the book. Primary and secondary sources, interviews and oral transcripts, personal letters and official correspondence were consulted. The result is an accurate and sound presentation of Ike as others dealt with, saw, and considered him. The events are faithfully rendered.

Merle Miller was essentially a storyteller, and he made good use of the tales that have arisen around Ike. Many are old and well-known, some are new. They all seem fresh in Miller's hands. The conventional bias he displayed in favor of Omar Bradley and against Mark Clark and George Patton, Jr., mars the pages on occasion but hardly seriously.

Of particular interest to me was Miller's treatment of three episodes. He drew a lucid picture of General Fox Connor's contribution to Eisenhower's education, especially in Panama. He sought to sum up, it is difficult to judge how successfully, Ike's relationship with Kay Summersby, his driver, secretary, and confidante. He made clear Ike's role in the execution of Private Eddie Slovik, charged with desertion.

What accounts for Eisenhower's glory and fame, so far as I am concerned, was his ability to know exactly what his boss wanted and to produce exactly that. This shines forth in Merle Miller's pleasant armchair read.

The Strategic Dimension of Military Manpower. Edited by Gregory D. Foster, Alan Ned Sabrosky, and William J. Taylor, Jr. 256 pages. Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1987. \$24.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant General Robert M. Elton, USA Ret., formerly the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel.

Manpower clearly should be a major factor in developing credible strategy. Unfortunately, as this collection of papers from distinguished authorities demonstrates, no one really has given manpower any priority, with the exception of the Pentagon, and the priority has been low even there. One would think that in this country, where the impositions of military service upon the individual and his freedom are taken so seriously, manpower would be calibrated to military needs with a fine degree of precision. Not so; and as a result the magic promises of technology have until recently driven all service hardware acquisition programs with little regard for the resultant implications for the force profile.

This compendium was developed from papers submitted for a conference held in May 1985 at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. Hence the data is of 1983-84 vintage. The book was not published until the middle of last year, and since the people business is highly dynamic, much of the material is somewhat dated. Still, the chapters reflect good, solid perspectives—some biased, but most very objective.

The idea for the conference developed from a review of recent military performance and the realization that neither strategic planning nor military manpower policy adequately appreciated the other. The chapters are sequentially laid out to provide the reader with a conceptual foundation for linking manpower and strategy. Gregory Foster, a Virginia-based consultant on international security affairs, reminds us that while manpower is clearly an essential element of military power, the strategic dimension of such power involves the effective management of "perceptions"—principally external. The American military is a reflection of our society, and the continuing internal battles over light versus heavy forces, tooth-to-tail ratios, active versus reserve forces, elite versus regular, volunteerism versus conscription, and gender/racial/ethnic composition all have major perceptual impact on external observers, including our enemies. Such debates, depending upon how they are conducted and their outcomes, can thus have significant impacts upon our prime strategic mission—deterrence.

Bob Pirie, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, speaks tellingly of current US strategic planning and the consistent failure of manpower to figure prominently, if at all, in the formulation of national strategy. He lays out the reasons why the system submerges manpower by forcing consideration of dollars instead of people as the binding constraint in the resource-allocation process. The Army's extensive shifts of today's operational missions from active forces to the reserve components are used as a case in point. I do not argue the wisdom of the strategy, only the fact that manpower factors should have been major determinants of that strategic move, not a by-product of it.

Sam Sarkesian, Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, cautions us to shape our strategic perspective in light of the conflict spectrum, which suggests that unconventional conflicts require considerably dif-

ferent responses than do conventional ones or nuclear ones. The differences in terms of manpower go far beyond quantity and quality of personnel. Strategy conceived in conventional terms may have to be revised to correspond to the nature of contemporary conflicts. This revision may well require sweeping change in our force structure. The adoption of a Joint Special Operations Forces Command is but one example. As a result, old manpower questions will need vastly different answers focusing on recruiting and retention of particular kinds of individuals needed for specific unconventional combat situations.

As the complexity of modern systems of war increases, so does the requirement for brighter soldiers to operate and maintain them. MANPRINT (Manpower and Personnel Integration Program, which encompasses the six domains of manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, system safety, and health hazard assessment) is the Army's recent initiative to improve fundamentally the acquisition equation by considering human beings, with all their vagaries, up front. It is a giant leap forward in confronting demographic realities as well as mobilization requirements. New concepts of embedded training and maintenance will keep the human with the machine longer and more efficiently. American industry will have to meet the requirements now being stipulated in detail in each new acquisition. Finally, in this program we have done something to cope with the realization that quality is finite and must be precisely utilized. General Max Thurman, Commander of Training and Doctrine Command, and General Lou Wagner, Commander of Army Materiel Command, are both MANPRINT enthusiasts. They will do this program right.

Colonel Bill Hauser, USA Ret., now Director of Career Development for Pfizer, Inc., provides interesting comments and recommendations concerning the officer and enlisted personnel systems of the Army, but there is nothing new here. Many of the aspects he viewed as major shortcomings in 1983-84 are now gone. Recruiting is no longer a captive of unemployment. High-quality NCOs, resulting from six great recruiting years, are making the difference. Average officer career span has risen from 9½ years in 1978 to 13½ years in 1987. A new transition program is set to fill both National Guard and Army Reserve units with top-quality young NCOs from the active Army. The COHORT program for unit rotation is maturing and now encompasses the new Wartime Replacement System, which provides replacements in packets rather than individually. I believe that we learned two personnel management laws in Vietnam: (1) Allow no more one-year tours or six-month commands; and (2) Replace people in cohesive groups. I doubt we need further reform of the Officer Personnel Management System on top of the requirements of Title IV of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, correctly conceived yet in need of fine-tuning. This act catapults joint service and an understanding of joint warfighting into the prominent position they deserve. I would say to Bill Hauser, who is a close friend of mine, that without a mobilization we simply do not need a draft—especially the sort of administrative nightmare we dumped 15 years ago. We do need a solid registration program with the ability and will to mobilize quickly.

Like Sam Sarkesian, Jeff Record, who taught military history at Georgetown University and is now at the Hudson Institute, explores the implications of likely future conflicts for US military manpower policies. Future conflicts, in his view, will

be at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. In addition to the requirement for superb training and unexcelled levels of small-unit cohesion, he emphasizes decentralized operations, junior leader initiative, and the traditional warrior values. In closing, he credits ongoing Army initiatives.

General Paul Gorman, USA Ret., admitted during a roundtable discussion that even the Joint Chiefs had not been very active in manpower policy. We never have been able to consider manpower needs on a joint basis. From the standpoint of realistic, comprehensive threat assessment, we should be able to develop the size and character of the forces needed to meet the threat. This assessment would give manpower planners an idea of what various manpower strategies might cost and a better feel for our current inadequacies in force structure. Now that the Joint Staff and worldwide CINCs have a new charter, we have the potential to make this happen.

In the meanwhile, however, the discussion rages, and manpower still does not take its proper place as a major dimension of strategy. Some of this is the result of a passive manpower community, one that until MANPRINT had never tried to get out in front of the planners and drive the equation. Certainly, the conference leading to the present book was needed. I suggest another in 1988. Let's see what changes have been made. Let's get the military manpower and strategy planners up on the podium to tell it like it is. Manpower planners, get tough!

Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939. By Alvin D. Coox. Two volumes, 1253 pages. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1985. \$95.00. Reviewed by Dr. Edward J. Drea.

Professor Alvin D. Coox's two-volume *Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939* is the result of more than 30 years' research, writing, and scholarship about the multidivision border war between the Imperial Japanese Kwantung Army and the Soviet Red Army forces led by Georgi K. Zhukov. This five-month armed struggle cost perhaps as many as 65,000 casualties on both sides and serves as the centerpiece for Coox's masterful narrative and analysis of the Imperial Japanese army in battle.

This ambitious work is more than a battle history of Nomonhan (Soviet name, Khalkhin Gol), although Coox's vivid prose, enthusiasm, and exhaustive detail do illustrate the best qualities of comprehensive military history. Beyond this, he provides the reader with a detailed history of the Kwantung Army, which in 1939 was one of the most powerful world armies. The origins, development, and ultimate demise of this army, whose name became synonymous with insubordination and unilateral action, serve to set the scene for the Nomonhan Campaign and then draw the curtain in August 1945. Coox wisely blends the foreshadowing and eclipse of this great army to create a context of events for the reader. In between, and the focal point of these volumes, are the Nomonhan operations.

Drawing on enormous quantities of primary-source, Japanese-language materials, Coox supplements his work with extensive interviews with surviving Japanese veterans of Nomonhan as well as Western and Soviet secondary materials. His narrative offers insights into the nature of the Imperial Japanese army, its decisionmaking process in Tokyo and in the field, and its tactics, doctrine, strategy,

and personalities from army commanders down to private riflemen moving forward against Soviet positions.

The battles during the summer of 1939 at Nomonhan exposed both the Japanese and the Soviets to modern mechanized warfare. The Soviet victory made careers for officers like Zhukov, just as it wrecked the professional ambitions of scores of Japanese officers like Lieutenant General Komatsubara Michitaro, commander of the ill-fated 23d Infantry Division. The two-volume set analyzing the outbreak, escalation, and ultimate Japanese military disaster at Nomonhan is for both specialists in modern Japanese history and for those readers with interests in military history.

In this fascinating work, the general reader might want to begin with Coox's salient observations on lessons learned and afterthoughts on Nomonhan before tackling the main narrative. For the officer, the tactical detail at company level should provide numerous insights, and at the operational level as well as at the strategic level, the work should stimulate much thought. The entire Japanese army reaction to defeat also is instructive. Extensive appendices and the best single bibliography anywhere on Nomonhan are features of volume two.

There is a minor problem with maps. The operational- or strategic-level maps included in the two volumes are too small in scale to enable the reader to follow the tactical progress of the battles. Additionally, the index contains only personal names. Also, *Nomonhan* presents primarily a Japanese view of Khalkin Gol, with the Soviet input based mainly on materials already translated into English.

Despite such minor reservations, these two volumes are surely the best work to date on Nomonhan and can serve as standard reference works on the functioning of the Imperial Japanese army in peace and war. As such they belong in military staff and war college libraries. Professor Coox is to be complimented for his diligence and scholarship.

Strategic Defenses and Arms Control. Edited by Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus. 263 pages. Paragon House Publishers, New York, 1988. \$24.95. *Reviewed by Colonel Edward A. Hamilton, USA.*

Now that the INF Treaty has been signed, public attention is shifting to strategic arms limitation. As we approach the next US-Soviet summit meeting in 1988, pressures to conclude a strategic arms control agreement will continue to mount. Much of that pressure will be focused on agreement to limit research and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, seen by many as the major obstacle to strategic arms limitation. For most people, strategic defense and arms control exist in an antagonistic relationship: it's an either-or proposition. We can have either strategic defense or we can have arms control, but we can't have both. Yet others, including some in the Reagan Administration such as Ambassador Paul Nitze, have concluded that deployment of a space-based defense against ballistic missiles will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without some limits on the strategic offensive arsenals of the two sides. This book, consisting of ten essays, comes at the right time to assist readers in dealing with this issue.

Much as "contrarian" investors in the stock market buy stocks when others are selling and sell when others are buying, Alvin Weinberg and Jack Barkenbus have devised a "contrarian" approach to strategic defense deployment that places strategic defense and arms control in a synergistic, rather than antagonistic, relationship. Labeled Defense-Protected Build-Down (DPB), their concept takes as its starting point the somewhat controversial supposition that a strategic relationship based on defense dominance is preferable to one dominated by offensive weapons, as embodied in the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction. The primary focus of DPB is on the *transition* from offense- to defense-dominance—how do we get there from here? It involves the simultaneous and commensurate build-up of missile defenses with the build-down of offensive nuclear weapons.

The idea is not new; many analysts have written about the need to limit offensive nuclear arsenals while deploying defensive systems in some controlled manner. What is new about DPB is the requirement to maintain rough superpower parity while making the transition and the way in which it is done. As the editors state in the introductory essay, "each adversary's strength should be measured not by the number of warheads on the launch pad ('launch' strength) but by the number of warheads that can penetrate ('effective' strength). 'Effective' parity is achieved when the 'effective' strengths of both sides are matched."

DPB does not require formal arms control agreements for its implementation; one side can begin the process unilaterally by deploying the first phase of a defensive system while simultaneously dismantling offensive weapons to maintain its "effective" strength at the same level. The other side would have no incentive to deploy additional offensive systems to counter the defensive deployment since the offensive threat to it would have been reduced at the same time. In other words, the "effective" strength of both sides, measured in penetrating warheads, would remain essentially undisturbed. In order to maintain stability, early defensive deployments would have to be restricted to hard-point defense. Obviously this concept requires the complete abandonment of the quest for strategic superiority, and for this reason there will be some who will reject the idea.

To their credit, the editors did not solicit contributions to the volume only from those who supported their idea. For example, Steven Miller in his essay argues that a disarmed defensive world is less stable and therefore less safe than is a world depending for its safety on invulnerable second-strike offensive missiles. Don Snow takes a rather pessimistic view of the possibility of moving to a defense-dominant world. In addition, he raises the fundamental criticism that DPB, like SDI, arms control, and other attempts to lower the likelihood of war, treats the symptom rather than the cause of the animosity between the superpowers. In his words, "Until trust and agreement replace distrust and disagreement, fear remains the great leavener . . . Deterrence may best be served by no defenses at all . . . At the same time, if the political differences fueling the current situation are solved, one can have defenses that dominate the offenses—but one does not need them."

This book is not a blanket endorsement of SDI, for the authors' approach depends on dramatic reductions in offensive weapons to make the defense viable rather than some technological "miracle." Weinberg and Barkenbus admit that their concept is nothing more than that; it is not a blueprint for a stable transition to a stable defensive world, and it was not intended to be. It was their modest intention

to "encourage other, more experienced arms controllers to seek new and ingenious practical actions that can take the world safely into this new, and we hope, morally superior defensive regime." For those who are concerned with stability, strategic defense, and arms control, this book is well worth reading.

American Defense Annual 1987-1988. Edited by Joseph Kruzell. 386 pages. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1987. \$13.95.

Global Security: A Review of Strategic and Economic Issues. Edited by Barry M. Blechman and Edward N. Luttwak. 258 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1987. \$29.95. *Reviewed by Colonel David G. Hansen, USA.*

I seem to be reading a lot of "annuals" about national and international security affairs lately. Two examples published during 1987 are the *American Defense Annual 1987-1988* and *Global Security: A Review of Strategic and Economic Issues*.

American Defense Annual 1987-1988 is the third in a series edited by Joseph Kruzell. Each has chapters on defense strategy and the budget, programmatic chapters on strategic forces, theater forces, seapower, and projection forces, as well as chapters on manpower, organization and management, and arms control. Kruzell and his colleagues have commissioned different authors to write the chapters each year so that a variety of views on defense issues is presented. All three editions have useful appendices and a current bibliography of US national security affairs.

Kruzell admits that overseeing an "annual" every year is a formidable task. The current edition reflects why he is concerned. Several of the chapters do not measure up to their predecessors; in fact, I was embarrassed by the shallowness of the "Seapower" chapter. Many of the other chapters are rife with acronyms and too brief to be meaningful. The details of weapon systems become tedious. This suggests that *American Defense Annual* is not for the faint-hearted or uninformed. There is not much there that could not be found in other writings by the contributing authors, or that is substantially different from chapters in earlier editions.

A couple of years ago Blechman and Luttwak must have experienced a dilemma similar to Kruzell's. In 1984 and 1985, they edited two editions of the *International Security Yearbook*. A third yearbook was not published. Instead, in 1987 they published *Global Security: A Review of Strategic and Economic Issues*, which implies in its foreword that it will be a yearly publication (but not an "annual"). It also suggests that *Global Security* will continue *International Security Yearbook's* practice of examining "key" regions plus reviewing different international security concerns each year.

Where *American Defense Annual* is a collection of essays for readers who have a general interest in defense issues, *Global Security* is more specialized. The major portion of *Global Security* is a detailed but commendable survey of the East-West military balance. True to its subtitle, there are three very good chapters which address international economic issues. One essay is a scholarly and succinct discussion of how the current international economic dilemma came about. Another is a nation-by-nation summary of Latin America's 1986 year-end economic

situation. The third economic chapter is a superb analysis of the Soviet economy with projections for growth in the near future. The remainder of *Global Security* discusses key regions (southern Africa, NATO's southern flank, and south Asia). Of all the regions in the world to choose from, why the editors chose these particular regions as "key" is not explained.

Kruzel gives wise advice to those who are thinking about editing an annual: consider an "occasional study" instead. He might have added a similar caution for those of us who courageously read annuals. The problem with referring to annuals for analysis of issues, or as a source of data, is that the reader will pay a price for having all that information in one place, gleaned from secondary sources. The first cost is that the information they contain will be outdated. The second is that the editing of most annuals is spotty and always dependent upon the resources, quality of the contributing authors, and the time the editors have to do their job.

Annuals are simply not able to provide timely force structure and positioning information or the status of current arms balances. The Secretary of Defense's annual *Report to Congress*, available at most libraries, is far better, and there is always the good old standby *The Military Balance*, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Granted, annuals do have reviews of current issues, but so do many of our professional journals.

If you have just returned from an isolated tour where there was no news, and you have no idea what transpired during your absence, you might want to scan the two annuals reviewed here. A regional specialist or subject-area expert might want to look at specific chapters. But for the rest of us, we'd do just as well to settle back to a regular reading of our favorite military journals.

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From the Archives _____

Appointment in Saigon: A Parable

There was a Special Forces lieutenant outside Tay Ninh City who sent his driver to market to buy provisions for his detachment. In a little while the driver came back, white and trembling, and said, "Lieutenant, just now when I was in the market-place I was jostled by a woman in the crowd and when I turned I saw it was Death that jostled me. She looked at me and made a threatening gesture; now, lend me the jeep, and I will drive away from this city and avoid my fate. I will go to Saigon and there Death will not find me." The lieutenant lent him the jeep, and the driver mounted it, and he pressed the pedal to the floor and as fast as the jeep could travel he went. Then the lieutenant went down to the market-place and he saw Death standing in the crowd and he went to her and said, "Why did you make a threatening gesture to my driver when you saw him this morning?" "That was not a threatening gesture," Death said, "it was only a start of surprise. I was astonished to see him in Tay Ninh City, for I had an appointment with him tonight in Saigon."

Source: Adapted from W. Somerset Maugham, *Sheppey* (Wm. Heinemann Ltd., 1933).

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