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
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
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COHESION BUILDING IN THE TRAINING BASE: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD R. HOLZWARTH

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The excellence of soldiers coming from the training base is well recognized throughout the U. S. Army. Not only are the soldiers well trained in their individual combat and military occupational specialty (MOS) skills, they also have learned "how to be cohesive." The Army recognized the value of this experience and moved to capture it with the COHOPF initiative. This evolved to the Unit Manning System (UMS) and is still in a period of decision regarding the final form. Intensive study and analysis of COHOPF units reveal that some leaders capture and retain cohesion better than others. The UMS is a necessary but not sufficient condition for developing more cohesive units. Leader training must be geared to develop the bonding and team-building skills which lead to cohesive units. Senior leaders must provide the command climate to promote and reward cohesion building. Leaders from throughout the Army could benefit by learning from the "Leadership Lab" at Infantry Center Training (ICT). Leaders need to understand and appreciate what their soldiers have experienced in One Station Unit Training (OSUT). More contact between the field and training unit leaders will facilitate a sharing of insights and promote better cohesion in small units. The UMS in a package development mode is the perfect vehicle to accomplish this. Better leader training and changes in command climate, such as the initiatives in "Leadership for the Nineties", can provide the necessary ingredients to insure the success of the UMS and better cohesion in the U. S. Army.

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COHESION BUILDING IN THE TRAINING BASE: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Holzwarth (Author)

Colonel Edmund J. Glabus, IN
Project Adviser

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U. S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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INTRODUCTION

The value of unit cohesion and esprit to an Army's success has been recognized throughout history. Clausewitz writes:

Military spirit, then, is one of the most important moral elements in war. ...How much has been accomplished by this spirit, this sterling quality, this refinement of base ore into precious metal, is demonstrated by the Macedonians under Alexander, the Roman legions under Caesar, the Spanish infantry under Alexander Fomese, the Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII, the Prussians under Frederick the Great, and the French under Bonaparte.¹

In modern times, we see many similar results. Shils and Janowitz correlate the success of the German Army in World War II with their superior small unit cohesion.² The dismal experiences of the first U.S. Army units thrown into the Korean War certainly demonstrated disastrous results when small unit cohesion was one of the missing elements.³ Colonel Wm. Darryl Henderson has shown that much of the success of the North Vietnamese and Israeli Armies can be linked with their unusually cohesive small units.⁴

If there is general agreement that cohesion is a key to success in battle, there is not universal acceptance of how to build highly cohesive units. In fact the value of cohesion and its attainability and necessity in a peacetime Army have been open to question. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the cohesion building process in the U.S. Army today from the perspective of Initial Entry Training (IET).

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Cohesion is the glue that holds soldiers together in units so they accomplish missions under even the most trying circumstances. It is difficult to measure but none-the-less a real phenomenon that bonds soldiers to each other and their leaders. The thoughts which follow are reflections following command of a One Station Unit Training (OSUT)⁵ combat engineer battalion. This assignment had been preceded by a three year tour as an operations officer and executive officer in a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) combat engineer battalion. The combination of these two assignments provided for a profoundly different outlook on soldiers and the cohesion building process.

The thesis of this paper is that soldiers first learn how to be cohesive in the training base. OSUT is the IET mode which teaches this best since the soldiers are together longer while their foundational military values are formed. An integral part of what the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) calls "soldierization" is in effect the socialization process which builds cohesive units. Further, many Army leaders do not know or appreciate what the soldiers have experienced in IET. Because the OSUT graduate has learned bonding skills, his expectations are higher than if he had been trained as a human "spare part." He truly hopes to find in his "second" unit the same kind of challenge, excitement, and close bonding. The sad fact that he does not always find these has been well established by researchers and acknowledged by Army leaders. In fact, this situation contributed to the decision to implement the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) system in 1981.

Then Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, in mentioning the many factors of cohesion which were being violated in our Army, quoted a report on why soldiers left the Army: "For the vast majority of those interviewed, basic combat training was the highlight of their service. Hours were reported to be long, and the drill instructors tough, but most said they liked the structure imposed, knowing what was expected of them every minute, the organization and obvious good planning, and the feelings of accomplishment and camaraderie they had felt. Another often mentioned [attribute] of basic training was the concern of drill instructors that training be effective and that personal problems receive immediate attention."⁶

Soldiers were often disappointed with their first TOE units. General Meyer concluded that at least part of the answer was to implement a replacement system which could capture the many positive aspects built in the training base. The first COHORT package was formed in March 1981 and after Basic Training was sent to Fort Carson and the 4th Mech Division for completion of training in their TOE unit.⁷ Since that time, COHORT has evolved into the Unit Manning System (UMS). The UMS consists of COHORT - the unit replacement and deployment system, and the Regimental System - pairing of like CONUS and OCUNUS battalions, to provide soldiers associations within a regiment during their careers. [In this paper I will refer to COHORT and the UMS interchangeably while emphasizing the unit replacement part of the UMS]. COHORT has done much to highlight the potential benefits of carrying over OSUT-built cohesion to TOE units.

Adjustments have been made as the problems of sustaining the system have become evident. Smaller package replacements in various combinations are being considered.

The Army is at a critical decision point. Is the UMS achieving its full potential to enhance cohesion? Is a new personnel replacement system sufficient to improve cohesion? What other changes need to be made? How has OSUT contributed to the success (or failure) of the UMS? Where do we look for the answers to these and other questions? Army senior leaders had the foresight to anticipate these kind of questions and have employed two Army agencies to do evaluation and follow-up. The U. S. Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) have provided many insights in their extensive analysis of cohesion and research on the UMS. The next section will outline results of some of that research and attempt to answer some of the critical questions on cohesion and the UMS. The role of OSUT in the total equation should emerge and help clarify the value of understanding the soldier's first cohesion-building experience.

COHESION RESEARCH AND THE UMS EVALUATION

Researchers have made in-depth investigations into the basic nature of cohesion in military units and particularly the U. S. Army. Dr. Guy L. Siebold of ARI has produced particularly insightful writings on soldier bonding. His definitions help us to understand what cohesion really means. In comparing cohesion

with physical matter. he uses the dictionary definition of cohere: "the degree to which the entity holds together as parts of the same mass."⁸ He contrasts this simple definition with a more precise one which includes such jargon as "mechanisms of social control" and "structured patterns of social relationships between unit members individually and collectively, necessary to achieve the unit's purpose."⁹ Siebold feels that this latter meaning is useful because it helps to distinguish cohesion from the closely related terms "morale" and "esprit de corp." He relates the definition to three relevant areas: why men fight: first term service member life cycle; and the changing structure of the military.¹⁰

There is a very strong force in a highly cohesive unit motivating members to act because "I'll do it for my buddies." Siebold concludes that this "normative influence" of the group is one of the social control mechanisms which causes men to fight.¹¹ Research on the total experience of first term soldiers is a lucrative area for the study of cohesion. Siebold writes that: "Recent investigations show within a few months of arriving at their unit of assignment, the service member's attitudes, support for military values, and career intent decline significantly."¹² These researchers conclude three possible reasons: unreasonable initial expectations by the soldiers; lesser quality leadership in the TOE units; and too much freedom in the new units (compared to IET).¹³ Siebold theorizes as follows: The decline may be because the new soldiers are learning and growing but not being recognized and

not being given status and rights. This causes bad feelings and other negative reactions and the normative patterns aren't changing as the soldiers mature.¹⁴

My own research and experience reinforce Siebold's theory in the sense that many TOE leaders are unaware of the Soldiers' experiences in OSUT. The soldierization process (or "normative pattern") did change as they matured during the intense 13 week cycle. The soldiers learn to expect this continual recognition of their advancing maturity. TOE leaders sometimes think the soldiers are frustrated because they are not receiving the "close supervision" of IET. It may be more the recognition of growth soldiers are expecting and not receiving that is causing the frustration. When unit leaders recognize this, cohesion is higher and the first term decline is not as sharp. Another link with Siebold's definition is the normative influence which is such an important factor in OSUT. The combination of environment, leadership, and climate all combine to create ideal conditions for positive peer pressure which yields the strong soldier-to-soldier and soldier-to-leader bonding in OSUT. The soldiers then come to expect this as normal for an Army unit.

An incisive study was completed by students at the U.S. Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). Their report entitled Cohesion in the U. S. Military defines military cohesion as "the bonding together of members of an organization or unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and mission."¹⁵ This is very close to the simple concept we used in explaining cohesion as "glue" to

the soldiers in OSUT. The authors argue that two systemic factors - technology and ideas (or bureaucratic organization) have influenced cohesion. "Managers" have replaced leaders and "calculative commitment" has replaced the moral commitment of a calling.¹⁶ They conclude that U. S. Army leaders are not very aware of the systemic factors which have affected (negatively) cohesion in units. They make important recommendations to counter this and believe that cohesion needs to be explicitly sought: "The important point to be made is that each commander should develop and implement a written plan for developing cohesion in his organization. The plan must include provisions for program evaluation just as methodically as in training, maintenance, and similar functions."¹⁷

ARI and WRAIR are pioneers in efforts to describe and find ways to measure cohesion in the U.S. Army. Their social scientists are respected in their professional communities and have produced some useful products for Army leaders in the field. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) has engaged ARI and WRAIR's considerable expertise in monitoring and designing measures of effectiveness for the UMS.

WRAIR researchers have completed the fifth of a series of UMS technical reports in which they focused on the experiences of COHORT units in the Regimental system in both the Continental United States (CONUS) and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Field Evaluation Technical Report Number 5, completed in September 1987, shows results of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) over the past two to three years as COHORT units filled and then

matured. WRAIR published and distributed an insightful report "Evaluating the Unit Manning System: Lessons Learned to Date" in August 1987. ARI also has produced a number of illuminating reports on the subjects of bonding and cohesion. The conclusions which are most relevant to the thesis of this paper are summarized below.

A Close Look at the COHORT Experience

WRAIR researchers have found that horizontal bonding (that between the soldiers) has generally remained better in COHORT units than non-COHORT units. But vertical cohesion (that between soldiers and their leaders) has shown extreme variability and in general has decreased after a few years under COHORT.¹⁸ While there are many complex reasons for this, leaders who are familiar with the horizontal and vertical bonding the soldiers expect based on their OSUT experience are more likely to succeed.

Researchers also found:

(1). "COHORT is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite to unit cohesion and high human performance."¹⁹ COMMENT: In OSUT the systemic environment will not produce vertical bonding and superior unit results without the proper leadership and command climate. It takes more than "total control" to provide a highly cohesive environment.

(2). In the American Army, cohesion is presumed to be a byproduct, not a core goal leaders need to be trained to create and maintain.²⁰ COMMENT: Because it was pursued explicitly the constant push for better "soldierization" in OSUT really promoted and taught unit cohesion.

(3). The challenges to leaders were tremendous. "Very few leaders understood...they were dealing with a new and unfamiliar phenomena - soldiers who were self-motivated, who needed and wanted to be taught and guided, not driven."²¹ "His training has not prepared him for these spontaneously motivated soldiers dedicated to developing combat skills. He understood tactics but misunderstood group process."²² "In the first place, NCO's and officers were not prepared for the interested, self-motivated, horizontally bonded soldiers coming out of OSUT."²³ COMMENT: These research findings are in direct support of my thesis. Leaders need to become immersed in what happens to their soldiers in OSUT so they can better provide the leadership needed for retaining the same spirit and cohesion.

(4). In commenting on "what worked" in the 7th Infantry Division (Light), WRAIR researchers concluded: "Horizontal cohesion built upon the COHORT organizational principle and OSUT training program (emphasis added). Eager to learn, ready to help each other and prepared to accept the values of their new unit, the first-term soldiers were psychologically prepared for integration into their new unit. But vertical cohesion does not take place automatically. Those officers and NCOs who successfully integrated their first-term soldiers did so by meeting those soldiers' needs for competent leadership, focus on the mission and respect."²⁴

COMMENT: This is in perfect consonance with my thesis. WRAIR researchers seemed to observe the logical extension of the climate and tough, caring leadership of OSUT carried over in the best units. Significantly, OSUT soldiers not only experienced horizontal cohesion but also learned the skill of fitting into a vertically cohesive group. Knowing this is one of the secrets in re-capturing the OSUT spirit and leading a high performance unit.

(5). Regarding command climate, WRAIR researchers concluded: "Interviews and observations revealed little appreciation by battalion staff, and no appreciation on the part of company level leaders for the importance of military cohesion. The practice of training incoming replacements as individuals rather than as a cohesive group to be kept together suggests that the concept of military cohesion has not penetrated to the small unit level even now....Unless this mindset is changed -- that cohesion is the business of company leaders, not just HQDA -- the whole UMS experience will melt back into the individual replacement system it was designed to eliminate."²⁵

COMMENT: This finding was based on the cumulative experience of research on COHORT units and has

disturbing implications. Even given that WRAIR may present a slight "soldier bias" this finding is too significant to be ignored. It is a tougher challenge to integrate soldiers into the unit in teams and more threatening to a leader who isn't sure of himself. What these leaders do not appreciate is the tremendous combat multiplier that a highly cohesive unit has in its superior bonding.

(6). LTC Robert Schneider from WRAIR comments in a study of how replacements were integrated into COHORT companies. "The squads and sections did a surprisingly good job of accepting newcomers. Horizontal cohesion was established quickly. At the same time, the buddy team concept assured good mutual support to the replacement. On the other hand, small unit leaders did little to encourage the development of vertical cohesion. Most stated that given the choice, they would assign replacements individually, even if it meant breaking pre-formed groups (such as these buddy teams).²⁶ WRAIR researchers warned in Technical Report Number 4: "The whole UMS experiment is in jeopardy if battalion and company commanders cannot capitalize on the cohesion potential of replacement packets of soldiers who already know one another when they arrive at the company or battery."²⁷ COMMENT: Leaders who know how the strong cohesion bonds are developed in OSUT would be less likely to break up the buddy teams.

(7). Dr. Siebold from ARI, in a "Report on Bonding in Army Combat Units," described what junior soldiers thought was needed to build cohesion: "Junior enlisted soldiers saw their responsibility as one in which they supported one another, worked as a team, pushed one another to do things right to accomplish the mission, accepted orders without complaining. From leaders (team, squad and platoon) they expected: A good role model, an advocate for their subordinates, a communicator and translator of accurate information, and one who ensures soldiers are getting a fair deal. And from the company and battalion leaders: Setting appropriate climate of trust and openness, providing challenging training, establishing and following policies consistent with building cohesion, fixing any widespread problems diminishing the quality of unit leadership."²⁸ COMMENT: The perceptions of these soldiers is so closely aligned with the environment, leadership, and climate of OSUT that it cannot be mere coincidence. The soldiers longed to recapture the cohesiveness they experienced in OSUT.

The extensive research just touched on above does give us tentative answers to our tough questions. The UMS has improved

cohesion in combat arms units but the progress is not uniform and some disturbing trends are emerging. A package replacement system in whatever form is necessary but not enough by itself to improve cohesion. OSUT is a key ingredient in the success of the UMS because it is the starting point for better cohesion. Enlightened leadership and a positive command climate are the other critical elements that are needed.

Leadership and Cohesive Units

Close analysis of the UMS has also produced some potentially fruitful insights in the area of more effective leadership. WRAIR's LTC Larry Ingraham, who has studied soldiers and their environment in great depth, wrote an article "from the heart" in the December 1987 Military Review. The message entitled "Caring is not Enough: An Uninvited Talk to Army Leaders" is a jewel of condensed wisdom from the soldier's perspective. Ingraham's results are based on interviews of thousands of soldiers in more than a hundred companies and batteries by the WRAIR research team in their UMS evaluations over the last six years.²⁹ The bottom line is that real caring leadership means communicating with soldiers and their families. It means focusing enough of our leadership energy downward to make the unit a cohesive group and this entails listening -- to good and bad news. "Again, your success depends on your subordinates. If you are any good at all, your subordinates will not shield you from the unpleasant. When they

do it is because they are fearful. They have tested your courage to hear the truth, and found you wanting."³⁰ Overall from the WRAIR research results to date: "The chief influence on unit cohesion is leader behavior."³¹

So what are we doing to train leaders who will be skilled enough to build cohesive units? ARI has focused research in a project entitled "Leadership for the Nineties." The project, under the direction of Dr. Owen Jacobs and Major Larry Boice, has two major elements. They include a one week leadership training package for company chains of command "which focuses on replacement assimilation and integration."³² This training package includes the following modules:

- * Leader as a Person;
- * Communicate with Others;
- * Team Building (Soldier Team Development);
- * Leadership/Followership;
- * Role Clarification (By Position);
- * Unit Goal Setting;
- * Role Relationships;
- * Problem Solving;
- * Action Planning and Problem Solving; and
- * Goals Revisited/Review and Critique.³³

The first 40 hour course was given by six officers from ARI, Center for Army Leadership, and U. S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) to 25 leaders from a company chain of command in the 6th Infantry Division (Light). The cadre received the instruction in Alaska just before departing for their four week Light Leaders Course at Fort Benning. They were scheduled to receive their company fill from OSUT immediately after this. While this trial run was adapted to the COHORT unit, "its broader purpose was to provide the skill training needed for the rapid

assimilation of replacements, the bonding of replacements within the unit, and the efficient development of collective skills."³⁴

This course is the logical conclusion of what researchers have discovered from the extensive UMS studies. Leader training like this is a key ingredient needed to make UMS a success. "Leadership for the Nineties" supports the thesis that our Army can learn about cohesiveness from the training base. The kinds of skills in the course are closely related to leadership practiced in the OSUT environment. Leaders throughout the Army need to learn these kind of bonding and team-building skills.

"Leadership for the Nineties" also includes a focus on command climate issues and recommends a set of Division level policy changes. These include:

- * Stability Measures;
- * Unit Stabilization and Sustainment;
- * Senior-Subordinate Relationships;
- * Standards of Performance;
- * Cohesion Measurement; and
- * Second-in-Command Training.³⁵

If the policy changes test positive in a real world Division, "these policies can serve as a model for the following: modification of the USR Personnel Readiness Index, to reflect stability of small units and their leaders; replacement assimilation practices, to facilitate rapid bonding and skill development; and soldier assignments management within units, to stabilize membership and enhance technical and tactical proficiency. The implementation of these policies will enhance operational effectiveness in all Army units, not just COHORT."³⁶

In combination, the initiatives of "Leadership for the Nineties" offer an exciting possibility to materially improve

the way we harness our precious human resources -- our soldiers and their families. These kinds of dynamic new changes will insure the success of the UMS in improving cohesion in our Army. They also parallel closely the environment, leadership and climate which TRADOC has fostered in OSUT units.

A Comparative Analysis

It seems clear that for Army leaders to achieve better cohesion with the UMS, they have to build on the OSUT foundation. Why is OSUT so different than the TOE Army? What can Army leaders learn by studying the IET environment, leadership, and command climate? A great vehicle to answer these and related questions is hidden in the work of Colonel Wm. Darryl Henderson. Colonel Henderson, the current commander of ARI, presents an incisive analysis in his book Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat. He convincingly argues the significance of small unit cohesion to the success of an army and then explores how cohesion is built. The real importance of his work lies in a comparative analysis of small unit cohesion in four current day armies: the North Vietnamese, the United States, the Soviet, and the Israeli. Henderson rates each of these armies against elements his research has shown are accurate measures of small unit cohesion. The results offer a compelling argument that the successful armies achieved their success because of superior small unit cohesion. The U. S. Army is rated low in most of the parameters which measure cohesion.

Henderson's analysis is focused on TOE army units. I will outline his results in each category of analysis for the U. S. Army and contrast them with my own subjective ratings for a trainee soldier in an OSUT unit.

TABLE 1
UNIT ABILITY TO PROVIDE FOR SOLDIER'S PHYSICAL,
SECURITY AND SOCIAL AFFILIATION NEEDS³⁷

ELEMENT	U. S. ARMY (Henderson's Rating)	OSUT (My Rating)
Unit meets basic logistical requirements	++	++
Unit is primary social group	--	++
Unit is major source of esteem and recognition	-	++
Unit protects soldier from higher headquarters	+	+
Unit provides sense of control over events	+	++
Unit causes soldier to identify with leader and Army goals	-	++

LEGEND: Strong ++
 +
 -
Weak --

TABLE 2
SOLDIER'S PERCEPTIONS OF SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPING THE UNIT³⁸

Legal, moral, physical barriers separating him from society	--	++
Difficulty in obtaining discharge or transfer	-	+
Significance of "bad paper" discharge	-	--
Penalties for AWOL/discharge	-	--
Recognition/rewards for tour completion	+	++

TABLE 3
MAINTENANCE OF UNIT INTEGRITY AND STABILITY³⁹

Smallest unit under 5 soldiers and under positive control of leader	-	+
Replacement by unit rotation	--	++
Strong re-socialization process	-	++
High frequency of association through policies, facility design, and social functions	-	++
Unit boundaries established through tradition and long time affiliation	+	+
Control of soldier's affiliation with outside groups	-	++
Leave and pass policies controlled and	-	++
Control over rewards -- pay, passes, promotions, etc. at unit level	-	++

TABLE 4
UNIT MOTIVATION AND CONTROL⁴⁰

Members bonded to unit through norms and values	--	++
Personal approach to small-unit leadership, not managerial	-	+
Leader-soldier interaction on basis of trust, not contracts	-	++
Normative "service" motivation, not "economic man" utilitarian motivation limited	-	++

TABLE 10
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERSHIP⁴¹

Leadership priority focused on small units, platoon and company	-	++
Strict code of professional ethics requires leaders share danger/hardships	++	++
Leaders utilize effects of civic education or indoctrination to maximize leadership	-	+
Small-unit leaders have authority to control all events or actions in unit	-	++
Leader influence through power to reward or punish	+	++
Leader influence through expertise and as source of information	+	++
Leader influence through legitimate power	+	++
Leader influence through referent power	+	++

Colonel Henderson's parameters provide a fascinating comparison from the perspective of a cohesion building environment. That conditions can be so different in significant ways between OSUT and TOE units is not obvious unless this kind of comparison is made. Many Army leaders might conclude that superior cohesion in OSUT results almost entirely from the total control exerted over the soldiers who all live in mostly open-bay or eight man rooms. The outside influences on the modern American soldier in a typical TOE unit are certainly detractors from cohesion. But how many leaders have pursued cohesion as a goal and not just a byproduct of good training? An interview of a senior Defense official in the National Defense University study on cohesion addresses this point. "Times change. The Friday night GI party no longer makes sense if three-fourths of the people live out of the barracks. Besides, I question whether the barracks arrangement, whatever it is, affects unit cohesion anymore, one way or another.... We can still have a focus for unit and cohesion, but it will be elsewhere than in the barracks. After all, I don't think the married percent in the ranks will ever be what it was in the past. Instead of focusing on the barracks, then, let's give the company a central place to assemble each day with lockers, equipment, classrooms, orderly rooms, and arms rooms, which would be equally important to all, regardless of where they live."⁴² He suggested that we need innovative ideas on how to create cohesion in the military "as it is, not how we would like

it to be."⁴³ One place to look for these innovative ideas is the environment, leadership, and command climate in OSUT units.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS INSIGHTS FROM THE TRAINING BASE

My professional experience confirms what researchers discovered in their studies on cohesion: the OSUT graduate has been nurtured in a highly cohesive environment with effective small unit leadership and a positive command climate. ARI and WRAIR researchers have documented the soldier's longing to experience this kind of unit again. OSUT has been described by some leaders as a "leadership lab." This is in fact a highly accurate and useful description. The small unit leader essentially starts over three or four times every year. The overwhelming portion of leaders' efforts are invested in leading and caring for soldiers. Soldiers and leaders are stabilized during the cycle. Significant differences between OSUT and TOE units make the achievement of cohesion much more difficult in the field. But the current system does not promote and reward field leaders learning cohesion building ideas from OSUT.

The UMS has made major inroads into some of the most difficult challenges, but early results indicate that a replacement system alone will not insure that units are both horizontally and vertically bonded. Leadership and U. S. Army policies at high and low levels can still exert the primary influence. As in many aspects of Army life, the actions of leaders at the unit level (platoon, company, and battalion) can

have the greatest impact on the soldier and conditions for cohesiveness. The UMS will provide soldiers in packages already horizontally bonded and eager to be vertically bonded like they were in OSUT. Leaders who learn this secret can mold cohesive units even given the conditions which researchers like Colonel Henderson have described in U.S. Army TOE units. One place to look for insights is in the U.S. Army training base.

Recommendations

1. Training and Doctrine Command should pursue the goal of increasing the number of IET soldiers who train in an OSUT mode. The measure of success must be related to effectiveness as opposed to pure efficiency. Soldierization and learning individual skills in a team environment need to be included as discernible elements in all IET Programs of instruction. The authors of the TRADOC IET Strategy Study completed in 1987 recognized that OSUT works and recommended it for the IET mode of the future. The bottom line is that the current excellence which TRADOC has established should not be lost to the "efficiency experts" who seek to provide resources only for the strictly quantifiable elements of IET.

2. Headquarters Department of the Army should retain and spread the Unit Manning System to more units. A small unit (fireteam, squad, platoon) package replacement system offers the most advantages from the cohesion building viewpoint with a much lower cost than COHORT at the company or battalion level. This concept would allow many more active and even reserve component

units to benefit from the UMS. The insights from the research underway by ARI and WPAIR on unit cohesion and the UMS should be shared with small unit and senior Army leaders.

3. HQDA and TRADOC should implement the leadership improvement proposal "Leadership for the Nineties" which focuses on the skills and abilities needed to foster more cohesive units. This initiative has great potential for significant leader development and should be integrated in all leadership training in TRADOC. An exportable package should be designed for use by unit leaders. If the Army does not incorporate both the leadership training and significant climate changing policies, much of the value of the UMS will be lost.

4. TRADOC and HQDA should provide the structure for encouraging greater contact between small unit TOE leaders and the training base. This is an obvious incentive if a small package replacement system is implemented. TOE unit leaders, especially junior officers, can learn much about cohesion building from OSUT units. The vast potential of the IET "leadership lab" needs to be harnessed and spread to the whole Army.

5. TOE unit leaders at battalion level and below need to focus on the attainment of small unit cohesion as a specific goal, not just a byproduct. Reducing internal turbulence (that which never shows up on the Unit Status Report) can do much to foster cohesion. Leaders need to emphasize cohesion-building skills in their Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Programs. TOE leaders at brigade and above need to

establish command climates and policies which foster and reward cohesion building. Only when leaders value bonding as a combat multiplier more highly than they value the flexibility of treating soldiers like spare parts will the UMS meet its full potential. Senior leaders who nurture and reward innovative ideas for small unit cohesion in the environment of the eighties are critically needed.

We have explored cohesion and the cohesion building process in the U. S. Army from an OSUT commander's perspective. The soldiers who graduate from OSUT today are trained in individual skills but immersed in a total team environment. We can best motivate these soldiers by integrating them into cohesive teams in their TOE units. The bonding skills and cohesive climate they absorbed in OSUT will then be carried forward producing a maturing unit that learns together, trains to progressively higher standards, and becomes a more cohesive, combat ready team. The commander who understands this will be successful in harnessing the combat multiplier which Clausewitz called "precious metal."

ENDNOTES

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30. Ibid., p. 46.

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33. From notes and materials received during an interview with Major (P) Larry Brice, US Army Research Institute, Washington DC, 24 November, 1987.

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37. Henderson. p. 39.

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42. Johns. p. 97.

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