A Look at Deep Operations: The Option of Deep Maneuver
Abstract
The idea of interdicting lines of communications, restricting the employment of reserve forces, destroying supply bases, or cutting off routes of withdrawal has been the object of deep operations throughout the history of modern warfare. This paper seeks to address the implications of deep operations doctrine in regard to maneuver capability. It begins by exploring the concepts of deep operations through the analysis of military theorist like Carl von Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, Don Starry and Richard Simpkin. Next, it validates the deep operations concept by examining the theory's implementation by the Germans in Russia, 1941, the U.S. 4th Armored Division in Western Europe, 1944 and more recently by the Israelis in the Sinai, 1967. Finally the study reviews the evolution of contemporary deep operations doctrine. It explores the dynamic balance between firepower and maneuver and how the nature of battle continues to change as each takes the dominant role. It concludes with some considerations for the conduct of deep operations in contemporary battle. Keywords: Deep operations, Deep attack, Deep battle, Deep maneuver, Interdiction.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 31, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADA191405
Entities
People
- David C. Mock
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College