Battle in the Rear: Lessons from Korea,
Abstract
This monograph reviews the experiences of the US Army in planning and conducting rear operations during the Korean War and examines our current rear operations doctrine in light of these experiences. This review is significant because doctrine is developed based upon an army's war experiences or the wartime conditions it expects to encounter. During the Korean War the experiences of many leaders in the Army, and especially those of the Army staff in Washington, were grounded in the campaigns against the Wehrmacht in North Africa and Europe during World War II. It was natural to assume that these leaders' experiences would color their decisions regarding doctrine and force structure. In fighting the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) our army faced an enemy trained in the tactics of the Soviet Army and experienced what our current force may see in a future conflict. An analysis of these experiences may offer some insights into the requirements for an effective rear operations doctrine and its related tactics designed to fight Soviet deep operations. The study's analysis reviews both the US Army's and the NKPA's doctrines and tactics for rear operations and guerrilla warfare, respectively. The collision of these two doctrines is then reviewed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the US Army's doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 15, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA191779
Entities
People
- Paul D. Hughes
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College