

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NBS 1963-A

AD-A192 421

IMPACT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
REORGANIZATION ACT
ON THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE


BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT F. NORTON, IN-USAR

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release; distribution is unlimited.

29 MARCH 1988

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050



DTIC
ELECTE
MAY 1 1988
S O
OED

A199, 401

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act on the USAR		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Study
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC Robert F. Norton		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 29 March 1988
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 48
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is having far-reaching and profound effects on every aspect of the nation's defense establishment. This study addresses the question: what are the implications in the Act for the U.S. Army Reserve? A glib answer is, none. A closer look, however, reveals at least two areas for consideration. First, the study will examine the relationship of Army Reserve forces to the combatant commands. The Act requires that all forces, less designated exceptions, will be assigned to the unified and specified commands. Is U.S. FORSCOM's command and control of most of the Army Reserve force structure the best way to satisfy the statutory prescription? Second, the study will examine the imperatives of "jointness" for Army Reserve officers. To what extent should reserve officers be prepared to serve in the joint arena? Are joint assignments feasible for reserve officers? The underlying theme of the study is that the Army and Army Reserve should engage these and related issues in the interest of total force integration and warfighting readiness.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER



IMPACT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS REORGANIZATION ACT

ON

THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

LTC Robert F. Norton, IN-USAR

Colonel Robert Elmore
Project Adviser

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

29 March 1988

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Robert F. Norton, LTC, IN-USAR

TITLE: The Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act
on the United States Army Reserve

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 29 March 1988 PAGES: 45 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is having far-reaching and profound effects on every aspect of the nation's defense establishment. This study addresses the question: what are the implications in the Act for the U.S. Army Reserve? A glib answer is, none. A closer look, however, reveals at least two areas for consideration. First, the study will examine the relationship of Army Reserve forces to the combatant commands. The Act requires that all forces, less designated exceptions, will be assigned to the unified and specified commands. Is U.S. FORSCOM's command and control of most of the Army Reserve force structure the best way to satisfy the statutory prescription? Second, the study will examine the imperatives of "jointness" for Army Reserve officers. To what extent should reserve officers be prepared to serve in the joint arena? Are joint assignments feasible for reserve officers? The underlying theme of the study is that the Army and Army Reserve should engage these and related issues in the interest of total force integration and warfighting readiness.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT.	ii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.	1
Scope of the Study.	2
II. THE CINCS AND THE ARMY RESERVE.	6
Background.	6
Organizational Options -- Pro and Con	7
Conclusion.	17
III. RESERVE OFFICERS IN THE JOINT ARENA	22
Background on the Reserve Officer Provision	22
Policy Gap at the OSD Level	25
Joint Education, Experience: Practicability	27
Air Force Review of Reserve Joint Issues.	36
Conclusions	38
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	43

THE IMPACT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT
ON
THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On October 1, 1986 Congress enacted the "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act." The legislation was the culmination of nearly five years of research, testimony, and debate on a central thesis: "that the current organizational structure (of the Department of Defense) is an obstacle to performance of the national security mission."¹

Barely two years after enactment, Goldwater-Nichols is already having a profound and far-reaching effect on the nation's defense establishment: how military advice is provided to the National Command Authority; the organizational and operational control of the armed forces; contingency planning; management of the officer corps; and the formulation of strategy. On the face of it, none of these broad national-level issues have any direct relevance or application to the reserve forces of the United States and the Army Reserve in particular. A closer look, however, reveals that the Reorganization Act will have a significant and lasting effect on the Army's reserve forces. The linkage of the reserve forces to Goldwater-Nichols lies in the Total Force policy.

Since our republic cannot afford the cost in peacetime of a standing military force adequate to meet all our wartime needs, we are heirs to the Reserve tradition. Our national policy opts for a relatively small Regular Force that can be expanded in times of emergency by a larger body of trained Reserve soldiers. Thus, the Total Force is both a democratic choice and

an economic necessity.²

The interdependency of the active and reserve forces of the U.S. Army demonstrates the need to consider the implications of the Reorganization Act on the reserve components. Today, more than 50% of the combat forces and approximately 52% of the support forces of the Army are in the National Guard and Army Reserve.³ It is inconceivable that the provisions of the Act should be interpreted and applied only to the active component of the Army. An opposite view would give the lie to the nation's Total Force policy. Unfortunately, neither the Department of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor the Department of the Army has undertaken any systematic examination of reorganization issues with regard to reserve forces. This study will examine two reorganization issues that have relevance to the Army Reserve.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The legislative history of the Reorganization Act outlines six outcomes that form the purpose of the legislation. At least two of these have application to the Army Reserve. The first concerns the command and control relationships of the combatant commands over assigned forces. The Act was intended to "provide authority to the commanders of combatant commands commensurate with their responsibility."⁴ Title I of the Act

defines a series of command functions for the unified and specified commanders in chief (CINC) which in brief gives them authority, direction and control with respect to the commands and forces assigned to the commands. The bulk of all operational military forces are assigned to the combatant commands.⁵

The question simply is whether this mandate applies to the Army

Reserve? Is FORSCOM's stewardship of most of the Army Reserve troop structure responsive to the intent of the Act? Chapter II of the study will outline some of the broader organizational issues regarding the integration of the USAR chain of command into the wartime chain. It will suggest pros and cons for three organizational concepts. The underlying intent of the Chapter is to suggest that the Army should take a fresh look at how the Army Reserve ought to be organized so as to provide the most efficient support to the gaining wartime commander.

The study will also explore the preparation and assignment of reserve officers to serve in the joint arena. Title IV of the Reorganization Act directs the Secretary of Defense to establish policies, procedures, and practices to qualify officers on active duty in joint matters. Joint matters are defined in the Act to mean matters

relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to -- (1) national military strategy; strategic planning and contingency planning; and (3) command and control of combat operations under unified command.⁶

Chapter III of the study will examine the ramifications of the reserve officer provision, Section 666, of Title IV. That provision permits the Secretary of Defense to implement the joint officer management sections of Title IV to the extent that he deems them "practicable" in the reserve components. Chapter III will consider what is practicable for the Army Reserve. It will recommend a systematic policy and procedural approach to the question of reserve joint specialists based on a needs

assessment. It will suggest that the integration of reserve forces in the operational chain of command in wartime requires the specialization of some senior reserve officers in joint matters. The study will not, however, attempt to unravel the specific joint assignment procedures of Title IV, as amended, since the author assumes that these will not be applicable to reserve officers.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Congress, Senate. Senate Print 99-86, Defense Organization: The Need For Change, 99th Congress, 15 October 1985, p. 15.
2. William F. Ward, MG, USA, The Posture of the Army Reserve, FY 1988, Statement Before the Committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, 100th Congress, p. 1.
3. Ibid., p. 4.
4. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, House Report 99-700, Bill Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 99th Congress, 21 July 1986, p. 20 (hereafter referred to as "HR 99-700").
5. Association of the United States Army, Fact Sheet: Reorganization Act of 1986 -- A Primer, 1987, p. 13.
6. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., Public Law 99-433, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," 99th Congress, 1 October 1986, Section 668 (hereafter referred to as "G-N").

CHAPTER II

THE CINCS AND THE ARMY RESERVE

BACKGROUND

Title II of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act raises intriguing issues with regard to the command and control of Army Reserve forces. Congress changed the United States' Code because "the authority and influence of commanders of the unified and specified commands is not commensurate with their responsibilities.¹ Goldwater-Nichols added a new Chapter (Six) in Title 10 of the Code to expand the commander's authority over assigned forces. Section 162(a) states:

Assignment of Forces - (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands.²

(Paragraph (2) concerns the excepted forces -- recruiting, organizing, training, and supplying -- which remain under the control of the Secretary concerned.)

The legislative history elucidates the intent of Congress:

This new wording is intended to make clear that all personnel, units, and other military entities that have received the preparation necessary to equip them to perform the missions or functions that they are assigned shall be placed under the unified and specified commands.

The committee has worded the new provision to ensure that the services have the personnel necessary to accomplish their missions -- that is, that the services have the 'forces assigned to recruiting, organizing, training, and supplying the armed forces', unless the Secretary of Defense directs otherwise. But the committee intends that all other forces, the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, shall be

assigned to the unified and specified commands.³

The genesis of this thinking may be found in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, which classified U.S. forces under two broad functions, maintaining and employing. All "maintaining" functions, that is, organizing, training, and equipping forces for combat, along with associated administration, maintenance, and construction, were to be under the control of the military departments subject to the overall authority of the Secretary of Defense. The "employing" functions were to be assigned to the the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the unified and specified commands under the strategic direction and overall authority of the Secretary of Defense.⁴ The legislative history points out emphatically that over time the military organization of the Department of Defense deviated from the structure envisioned in the National Security Act.

The fundamental problem of defense organization is the dichotomy between the de jure and the de facto organization of the department. . . the joint or unified side of the Department of Defense -- the unified and specified commands, the JCS, and the Joint Staff -- is weak, stunted in its organizational development . . . the strength of the services is such that their influence far transcends the maintaining functions -- organizing, training, and equipping forces -- and that, in fact, the services dominate almost all aspects of the employment side of the Department of Defense structure.⁵

ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS -- PRO AND CON

In what way do such national level matters pertain to the Army Reserve? In his succinct article "DOD Reorganization: Part I, New Imperatives" Don M. Snider asks:

. . .can the Army prudently assign 'all' combat forces to the combatant commands in time of peace, even our Reserve forces. . .? How will the combatant commanders

exercise their new authority to organize assigned forces and oversee their joint training and logistics, and what will be the resultant role of Army component commands?⁶

Except for organizational changes mandated largely from the outside, the Army appears to be avoiding these questions. In terms of the Army Reserve, how should the Army examine these questions? Three alternatives come to mind. Broad lines of argument will be suggested for each. However, more detailed study of these concepts, including resource analysis, CINC input, and political assessment may need to be undertaken.

Status Quo Option

The Status Quo Option postulates that the statutory intent of Goldwater-Nichols has already been satisfied with respect to Army Reserve forces. The lion's share of USAR force structure is assigned to Forces Command (FORSCOM), one of the new combatant commands created following enactment. As outlined by General Palastra, Commander in Chief, FORSCOM in his article, "Forces Command: The Strategic Land Force Reserve," a primary mission of the command is to "provide a general reserve of combat-ready ground forces to reinforce other unified or specified commands as directed, including readiness and related deployment planning."⁷ This arrangement ensures the "status quo ante": most of the USAR force structure remains assigned to FORSCOM, as before -- and satisfies the statutory provision directing each Secretary to assign all forces, less authorized exceptions, to a combatant command. The status quo option is attractive because it incurs no new costs. Except for USAR elements assigned to

WESTCOM, an Army Component Command in U.S. Pacific Command; and, now, USAR Special Operations Forces (SOF) under Army First Special Operations Command; and the "Seventh Army Reserve Command" in Europe, FORSCOM continues to command the Army Reserve.⁸ Major subordinate USAR elements include: 20 Army Reserve Commands, 2 Maneuver commands, 12 Training Divisions, 30 General Officer Commands, 3 Separate Infantry Brigades, and approximately 1700 other smaller units.⁹

Although there are advantages to the Status Quo Option, there are significant disadvantages as well. First, is the present organization responsive to the CINCs (and, ultimately, to the National Command Authority)? The CINCs must operate through multiple layers of another "CINC-dom" to gain access to their USAR forces. In the Army Reserve, command layers include Headquarters, Department of Army, FORSCOM headquarters, the Continental Armies (CONUSAs), and the Major Army Reserve and General Officer commands.

By contrast, National Guard elements are able essentially to interact directly with their gaining wartime commands. Only one command layer, the State headquarters, lies between the National Guard unit and the operational chain of command. FORSCOM, of course, is responsible for supervising National Guard training and mobilization planning; however, the Constitution prohibits the federal Army from commanding the National Guard in peacetime. The 1986 successful deployment of a brigade of the Wisconsin Army National Guard to Europe is an example of a large-scale successful exercise supporting the gaining command. Despite the Army's

traditional ambivalence concerning State control of the Guard, it appears that the Guard's relative autonomy may be more efficient in responding to the wartime chain of command.

The Army Reserve's own increasing participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises around the world suggests that FORSCOM's supervisory responsibility, or "maintenance" role, of the Army Reserve may be out-of-date. Between 1983 and 1987 unit and unit cell participation in JCS sponsored exercises grew from 164 to 960. Over the same period, the number of individuals involved in such training increased from 2,267 to over 17,500.¹⁰

Another challenge to the Status Quo Option is the ongoing divestiture of USAR force structure from under FORSCOM's control. A case in point is the functional alignment of Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) elements under the 1st Special Operations Command which reports to CINC Special Operations. As reserve units forge closer ties to their supported wartime commands, the trend to divestiture from FORSCOM is likely to increase. The question is whether the Army shapes this process or waits in a reactive mode as Congress and OSD act.

Direct Control Option

The opposite pole to the Status Quo Option is Direct Control. This theory proceeds from an assumption that the Reorganization Act should be taken at face value. All USAR force elements, less authorized exceptions, would be assigned directly to their gaining wartime commands. Under this concept, major "employing" elements of the USAR force structure would be assigned either to the Army component command in the Unified and

Specified Command, or to a functional command, as for example, the new U.S. Transportation Command. USAR SOF units, as noted earlier, are being assigned to a functional command which is also the Army component command in U.S. Special Operations Command. USAR Training Divisions would be assigned to the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) since these are sustaining base elements. The major advantage of the Direct Control Option is that it establishes unity of command.

There are, however, serious practical difficulties with this approach that make it unworkable, except in unique circumstances, as indicated above. The major impediment to Direct Control is that most USAR units have multiple warplan affiliations. To accomplish a Direct Control organization, USAR units would have to be "sole-sourced" in the Army's operational priorities. A sole-source priority list, while desirable in many respects, would generate a need for increased force structure or acceptance by the Army and the nation of greater risks in lower priority theatres.

Further, in an era of belt-tightening, it is unrealistic to expect that additional resources would be directed to Army component commands or functional commands for the administration of their reserve forces. It is difficult to envision how Army component commanders within a unified command would be able to carry out "maintenance" functions for subordinate USAR commands. Substantial growth in staff and other resources would be needed at a time when the Army is facing severe budgetary cutbacks.

Another disadvantage of the Direct Control Option may be

the tendency to overdo functional alignment of supporting reserve forces. In the rush to streamline wartime chains of command, the Army might be tempted to create a series of stovepipes -- Signal, Aviation, Intelligence and so on -- which may look good on paper but bear little resemblance to their employment in wartime. However, certain functional alignments such as SOF and medical may be more effective due to the way such support is employed in a theatre of operations. For general purpose reserve forces, a direct chain of command to the gaining wartime headquarters would be extremely difficult to administer and would require shifts of significant assets overseas, not a likely prospect under Congressional troop ceilings.

In sum, the Direct Control Option is useful for the planner to consider since the principle of unity of command must be paramount in evaluating how reserve forces are to be integrated into the combatant commander's organization.

Modified Capstone Trace

A middle ground approach to the problem of assigning reserve forces to the Unified and Specified combatant commands is the Modified Capstone-Trace Option.

The CAPSTONE program integrates units of all components by mission and operational plans for Europe, Pacific, Central Command, and the continental United States. CAPSTONE allows Army Reserve units to focus their peacetime training on wartime missions and detailed mobilization planning.¹¹

Under this concept the Chief, Army Reserve would assume administrative command of the Army Reserve in peacetime. The Commander of Army Reserve forces would be responsible for ensuring the

readiness of the Army Reserve in peacetime for "employment" by the wartime commander. The CAPSTONE trace of USAR units would be the linch-pin connecting the reserve force structure to the combatant commands.

This option has a number of advantages. First, it addresses the knotty problem of peacetime versus wartime command and control of the Army Reserve by eliminating a number of layers between the reserve commander and his wartime chain. It enables the wartime chain to do "one-stop shopping" in terms of resource issues. The statutory authority of the Chief, Army Reserve as Appropriations Director for the reserve appropriations makes for a natural fit in this regard.

Resource Advocacy

One of the major criticisms of the Congress that led to the Reorganization Act was that the CINCs had little say about resource issues. Emerging analysis demonstrates an inability by the Army to balance limited resources adequately between the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve to the detriment primarily of the Army Reserve.¹² That analysis shows, for example, that the Army Reserve received disproportionately less equipment than the Army National Guard over the last five years despite a significantly larger growth rate than the Guard. As commander of USAR forces in peacetime, the Chief, Army Reserve would have a bigger voice in exposing essential funding disparities. Presumably, the Army component commanders in the Unified and Specified commands would endorse those programs that would reduce critical operational shortages, such as the

sustainment capabilities that the Army Reserve provides.

Strategic Linkage

As component commander in peacetime, the Chief, Army Reserve would be the focal point for resources vital to the integration of Army Reserve forces in the CINCs' land force operational concepts. Don Snider's second article on the Reorganization Act builds a convincing line of thought on the "linkages" that the Army should consummate between Army forces and the CINCs.¹³ His argument can be extended to the Army Reserve and National Guard. As major stockholders in Army and combatant command plans, the Army Reserve should explicitly link its roles, missions and forces to the CINCs' regional strategies. A more compelling rationale for (total) Army resource requirements would be one result of this process according to Snider. Army Reserve participation in the strategy-resource process is not as far-fetched as it may first appear. For example, U.S. Southern Command's strategy relies on the availability of Army Reserve and National Guard forces to train in the region, support nation-building and humanitarian objectives, and enhance deterrence in Central America.

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution System Linkage

The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBS) is the heart of the strategy-resource process. The Chief, Army Reserve's responsibility for developing the justification for the reserve appropriations' portion of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) is another reason for centralizing peacetime control of the Army Reserve in that office. Recent changes in

the Department of Defense's Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) are not inconsistent with this concept. Following enactment of the Reorganization Act, the Department of Defense issued the following change to its PPBS Instruction:

The primary interaction between the CINCs and the Military Departments shall be through component commanders. At a time specified by the Military Departments, each CINC shall identify his requirements to the Service commands responsible for providing programming support. The components shall be afforded every opportunity to resolve CINC concerns. In addition, direct communications between the CINCs and the Military Departments may be used to resolve CINC problems and concerns during Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development.¹⁴

Arguably, an efficient way by which the Army could implement this new policy for Army Reserve forces, is to designate the Chief, Army Reserve as the component commander.

Bill Payers

Snider predicts that the Army will experience zero-growth over the next five years.¹⁵ It appears, however, that the Army may undergo negative growth during this period, at least in the manpower and personnel authorization accounts. For the longer term, even gloomier forecasts have been made. On leaving his position as Under Secretary of the Army in February 1988, James Ambrose told The Washington Post that "if zero-growth defense budgets continue, as seems likely, he would rather let the Army have as few as 521,000 soldiers than try to field a large force without arms needed to combat the Soviet threat."¹⁶ In such a cost-conscious environment, Congress is liable to turn more eagerly than ever to the reserve components as the lower-cost alternative to maintaining the nation's deterrent posture.

Streamlining the USAR chain of command under the Chief, Army Reserve may enable the Army to find "bill payers" for major funding cuts. In fiscal year 1988, the Army must cut approximately 8400 personnel authorizations ("spaces") from its structure.¹⁷ The majority of those cuts will come from the "TDA Army" such as the Continental Army headquarters and similar organizations. Deeper cuts in the coming years can be anticipated if the next Administration, Congress, and the American people insist on the deficit reduction targets and an eventual balanced budget. Obviously, a major consolidation of the Army Reserve chain of command would incur some start-up costs. The Office of the Chief Army Reserve would have to be expanded along the lines, perhaps, of the National Guard Bureau's Washington-based Support Center. Essential reserve support assets in the CONUSA including active military, Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), and civilian assets would need to be transferred to the ARCOMs. Consolidation and elimination of certain ARCOMs may also be required. The CONUSAs would be scrutinized for retention in the force structure based on FORSCOM's strategic concept for land defense of the United States. Ultimately, these headquarters may evolve into small planning staffs with barebones assets. Fielding of the Congressionally mandated Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) in the early 1990's will generate certain economies and efficiencies in administration and database management that, over the long term, would compensate for some of the start-up costs for a leaner Army Reserve peacetime chain of command.

Drawbacks to CAPSTONE Trace Option

There are, of course, drawbacks to the CAPSTONE Trace Option. The Army underwent a sizeable reorganization of the Army Reserve chain of command in 1982. It may resist any overtures to revisit those decisions so soon after implementation. Further, the Army has habitually opposed any changes that would place greater authority for reserve readiness in the hands of reservists. Only as a result of external pressure from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress have significant increases in reserve responsibility occurred. In 1982-1983 Congress directed that the Army increase the role of the Chief, Army Reserve due to the expanded role of the Army Reserve in the national security. Congress also directed that the Department of Defense and the Army report on measures to reduce excessive management layers in the command and control structure of the Army Reserve.¹⁸ The latter resulted in elimination of one layer of supervision, the nine Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMRs) and the establishment of two new Continental U.S. Armies, the Second and Fourth.¹⁹ These changes were driven primarily by geographic and regional considerations rather than wartime planning imperatives. The Army may take the position, therefore, that the command and control of the USAR is a closed issue. Issues such as Army Reserve SOF reorganization may be interpreted as isolated questions unrelated to the larger dynamic.

CONCLUSION

It is an accepted fact in the business of managing the Army

that the greatest expenses lie in the personnel and base operations accounts. Congress is taking steps to reduce the size of the Army in order to realize savings in the manpower accounts. More difficult to achieve are savings in base operations. Part of the problem lies in the unwillingness of many Members of Congress to approve base closings and other reductions that would have an adverse political impact in the home district. Streamlining the management of the Army Reserve, however, has enjoyed some measure of political acceptance for a considerable period of time.²⁰ If Congress were willing to authorize the necessary restructuring costs, longer term benefits in cost-savings, efficiency, and readiness could be demonstrated.

More importantly, a peacetime Army Reserve chain of command has the potential of improving the responsiveness of reserve forces to the unified and specified CINCs. Such a result would clearly be consistent with the intent of the Reorganization Act to enhance the CINCs' authority over their total forces. In a recent address, the Honorable William D. Clark, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) envisioned an Army Reserve chain of command under the Chief, Army Reserve:

I'm not sure we really need a major FORSCOM role any longer. Their relationship with the Guard has always been tenuous and they no longer own all the mobilization stations. We've added more Reserve and Guard units to other MACOMs and overseas commands; and yet, we still turn to FORSCOM for total Army policy recommendations and implementation. Now that FORSCOM is a specified command with a mission of CONUS defense, their deep involvement in the components may not be practical. It might make more sense to further expand the Office, Chief Army Reserve: give him a third or

fourth star as the component commander and let him apportion the USAR forces to the CINCs including FORSCOM, as supported commands.²¹

ENDNOTES

1. HR 99-700, p. 50.
2. G-N, Section 211 (10 USC, Section 162).
3. HR 99-700, p. 52.
4. HR 99-400, p. 33.
5. HR 99-400, p. 33.
6. Don M. Snider, "DOD Reorganization: Part I, New Imperatives," Parameters, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1987, p. 94.
7. Joseph T. Palastra Jr., General U.S.A., "Forces Command: The Strategic Land Force Reserve," Defense 87, November-December 1987, p. 67.
8. William F. Ward, MG, USA, The Posture of the Army Reserve, FY 1989, Statement Before the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 2d Session, p. 3.
9. Palastra, p. 65.
10. Ward, p. 43.
11. Ward, p. 42.
12. David R. Ritterpusch, "Resourcing the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve During the Reagan Years: Striking Dissimilarities," unpublished paper, Pennsylvania State University, February 8, 1988 (Cited with permission of the author).
13. Don M. Snider, "DOD Reorganization: Part II, New Opportunities," Parameters, Vol 17, No 4, December 1987, p. 50.
14. U.S. Department of Defense, Instruction Number 7045.7, Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), Change 1, 9 April 1987, Enclosure 8.
15. Snider, "Part II," p. 50.
16. George C. Wilson, "Army Faces Deep Personnel Cuts to Pay For Arms," The Washington Post, 11 February 1988, p. A4.
17. Ibid.
18. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Senate Report 99-330, DOD Authorization Act for 1983, 13 April 1982, p. 131.

19. John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army, Letter to Chairman John G. Tower, Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 December 1982.

20. SR 99-330.

21. William D. Clark, "Remarks to the Reserve Component Students of the U.S. Army War College," 1 December 1987, pp. 6-7. (Cited with special permission of Mr. Clark).

CHAPTER III

RESERVE OFFICERS IN THE JOINT ARENA

One of few direct references to the reserve components in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act is Section 666 in Title IV, "Reserve Officers Not on the Active-Duty List."¹ Inevitably, the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army will have to come to grips with the provisions of this section. Until now only the Air Force has examined the implications of Section 666 to any extent.

This chapter will examine Section 666 with regard to the Army Reserve. It will consider the following questions: what, if any, are the requirements in the Army Reserve for officers with the joint specialty (JSOs)? How will officers receive joint professional military education and experience? What parameters should be established for assigning reserve officers to joint duty? Perhaps the key question concerns mobilization: how should reserve field grade officers be prepared to accomplish their wartime missions in the joint arena?

BACKGROUND ON THE RESERVE OFFICER PROVISION

Section 666 requires the Secretary of Defense to

establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers not on the active-duty list. Such policies shall, to the extent practicable for the reserve components, be similar to the policies provided by this chapter.²

Certainly, the operative words in the statute are "education,"

"experience," and "to the extent practicable." The original version of the Bill proposed by Congressman Bill Nichols (H.R. 4370, 21 July 1986), required the Secretary of Defense to establish policies emphasizing joint "training and experience" for reserve officers rather than "education and experience" in the enacted Bill.³ In other respects, the wording is identical.

The legislative history for the Nichols Bill states that the "Secretary of Defense would be required to establish a program emphasizing training and experience in joint matters for the Reserve components comparable to the joint specialty requirements" (for officers on the active duty list).⁴

In one respect, the shift in wording from "training" to "education" may appear to be insignificant. The change may have been made simply to align the language with the provisions of Section 661, "Management Policies for Joint Specialty Officers." Subsection (c) of that Section specifies in unusual detail that active component officers must complete an educational program and a joint duty assignment ("experience") in order to be awarded the joint specialty.⁵ Thus, joint education and joint experience are the prerequisites for an officer to become a JSO.

Another interpretation is that the difficulty of providing specialized joint "training" (skill acquisition) to the reserve officer posed an impractical burden. Therefore, "education" -- presumably more easily achieved in the reserve environment -- was substituted for "training." This interpretation does not pan out entirely because the term "experience" in subsection 661(c)

specifically refers to joint duty assignments where an officer would gain on-the-job experience in his joint specialty.

The most likely interpretation may be derived by examining Subsection 661(e), "Career Guidelines," which concludes the section on managing joint specialty officers. It requires the Secretary of Defense to establish career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty including guidelines for "(1) selection; (2) military education; (3) training; (4) types of duty assignments; and such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate."⁶ Clearly there is a distinction between "training" and "education" in preparing and managing joint specialty officers.

As implemented in Department of Defense policy, "training" means the acquisition of specific military competencies rather than the broad-based experience gained from a joint duty assignment. Courses such as the Joint Planning Orientation Course and the NATO Staff Officer Orientation Course are "supplemental joint training programs."⁷ Such specialized training is designed to "enhance officers' knowledge and understanding of joint duty assignments."⁸ So it appears likely that specialized joint training programs may be optional for reserve JSOs when Section 666 is implemented. Ironically, shorter-length training programs are more suitable to reserve officer schedules than lengthy (resident) education programs. This raises the question of "practicability" or, more precisely, the applicability of joint education requirements to reserve officers which will be discussed later in this chapter.

POLICY GAP AT THE OSD LEVEL

Although the law has been in effect for nearly a year and a half, little has been done to design policies for the reserve components that would implement the provisions of Title IV. The Office of the Secretary of Defense issued two memoranda on Title IV in 1987. Initial guidance on Title IV issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) 21 May 1987 contained no mention of Section 666.⁹ There were also no taskings, direct or implied, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), the Joint Staff, or the Military Departments to recommend or develop policies for reserve officers in joint matters. The second policy memorandum of 22 July 1987 identifies the critical occupational specialties (COS) for officers to be nominated for the joint specialty.¹⁰

The most recent guidance, in the form of a "for comment" draft directive, changed the Army COS as a result of amendments to the Reorganization Act contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for 1988 and 1989.¹¹ The first reference to the reserve officer provision appears in the draft directive. It tasks the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) to

advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in establishing personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers not on the active duty list in accordance with the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 666.¹²

Telephonic inquiries with Reserve Affairs in January and February 1988 revealed that no specific policies or procedures have been developed to implement Section 666.¹³

The amendments to Goldwater-Nichols limited the Army to

combat arms specialties for award of the joint specialty.¹⁴
The following table compares the original COS approved by the
DEPSECDEF and the revised listing that is now in effect.¹⁵

Army
Critical Occupational Specialties

<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988-1989</u>
Infantry	Infantry
Armor	Armor
Field Artillery	Field Artillery
Air Defense Artillery	Air Defense Artillery
Aviation	Aviation
Signal Corps	Special Forces
Military Intelligence	Combat Engineers
Ordnance	
Quartermaster Corps	
Transportation Corps	
Corps of Engineers	

Had the law not been amended to restrict the COS, there is no doubt that there would have been a significant requirement for joint specialists in the USAR. Nevertheless, the revised list has undoubted potential application to the Army Reserve, especially in fields such as Special Forces. It is also conceivable that the Secretary of Defense or his Deputy, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could devise a separate list of critical occupational specialties as "joint specialties" for the reserve forces. Such an action would appear to be permissible under the "in so far as practicable" language of Section 666. A legal opinion may be required to determine whether the combat arms limitation specified in the amendment to Section 661(c), Education and Experience Requirements for joint specialty officers is binding on the reserve components.¹⁶

JOINT EDUCATION, EXPERIENCE: PRACTICABILITY

So far this discussion has examined the legislative history of Section 666 and the implementing policy, or lack thereof, for the Army Reserve as promulgated by the OSD. It could be argued that the discussion has been premature since the initial question posed at the beginning of the chapter has not been addressed: what, if any, are the requirements in the Army Reserve for officers with the joint specialty? However, the question cannot be properly examined until the necessary background is established that anticipates the issue of reserve JSO requirements. Certainly, if Congress believed that the joint officer provisions were irrelevant to the reserve forces, it could have omitted Section 666 altogether. Instead, apparently recognizing the practical difficulty of applying the joint provisions to the reserve officer corps, it left the development of "rules of engagement" to the Secretary of Defense. As we have seen, that office has all but avoided the issue. Therefore, this section of the Chapter will consider a "bottoms-up" approach to the question of reserve joint officer requirements.

Reserve Joint Duty Assignment Requirements

Are there requirements for reserve officers educated and experienced through assignment in joint matters? Certain steps must be taken at the policy making level to answer this question in a logical and comprehensive manner. First, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) should establish a "Title IV Working Panel -- Reserve Officers." In organization and function it would be similar to its active component

counterpart in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel).¹⁷ Overall direction would be the responsibility of the DEPSECDEF.¹⁸ The Panel would be composed of action officers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and each of the Military Services. In the Army, the Panel representatives should include officers from the Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) and an observer from the Office of the Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG). The National Guard's role in joint duty assignments, if not joint education, is problematical and beyond the scope of this study.¹⁹ Therefore, the observer role on the Army sub-panel seems appropriate at this point for the National Guard. Appropriate representatives from the Army Staff, especially the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs should also be included.

Normally, the Working Panel could be expected to develop draft policy guidelines for reserve JSO management in the form of a directive, instruction, or memorandum. In this situation, however, the Panel should first identify joint duty assignment position requirements that are appropriate for reserve officer fill. (By contrast, the minimum "requirement" for critical joint duty assignment positions in the active forces is established in law.²⁰ The requirement, of course, does not necessarily correlate with what the military services believe to be the actual number required, but that is another subject outside the purview of this study.) The determination of reserve joint duty

assignment positions would set the stage for establishing broad education and experience criteria for reserve officers to fill these positions.

The unpublished (draft) Department of Defense directive for the management of active-duty officers in the joint arena defines a "joint duty assignment (JDA)" as

An assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service or multi-national command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of land, sea and air forces of at least two of the four Services. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine, and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command.²¹

Active component JDA positions are approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and published by the Director of the Joint Staff. The list excludes O-3 positions and medical, chaplain, and legal specialties as these are excluded from the "critical occupational specialty" designation in Section 661.²²

The analysis should identify candidate reserve JDA positions in two broad groups -- existing and potential-- and four types: general officer individual mobilization augmentee (IMA), other officer IMA, Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) officer, and Troop Unit officer. Army Regulation 140-145 defines an IMA as a member of the Selected Reserve who is preassigned to and trains with Active Army organizations during peacetime, so as to be immediately available for duty on mobilization.²³ As members of the Selected Reserve, IMAs are liable for recall to active duty under the "200K Authority" specified in Title 10,

U.S. Code.24 Early availability of IMAs in an emergency should be a significant factor for joint staffs in determining the need for new or additional reserve IMA joint duty assignment positions.

The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) IMA branch reports that there are presently 802 IMA positions in the grades of major (0-4) or higher in the joint arena.25 Information was not available for this study as to specialties and commands, agencies, and headquarters that comprise the joint IMA cohort. Of the 41 USAR general officer IMA positions, nearly one-third are in joint headquarters or agencies. The distribution is shown in the following table.26

ARMY RESERVE
GENERAL OFFICER JOINT IMA POSITIONS

<u>COMMAND/HEADQUARTERS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Office Asst SECDEF (Res Affairs)	1
Joint Chiefs of Staff	1
U.S. European Command	1
U.S. Southern Command	1
U.S. Forces Command	1
U.S. Central Command	1
Army 1st Spec Ops Command	1
Military Traffic Mgmt Cmd (U.S. Transportation Cmd)	3
Defense Logistics Agency	1
Depot Systems Command	1
TOTAL	12

Assignments of Reserve Officers in JDA Positions

As indicated earlier, Section 666 of Title IV permits the Secretary of Defense to establish policies and procedures for reserve officers in joint matters that conform with the

requirements of active-duty joint personnel policy "to the extent practicable." Therefore, once the reserve Working Panel has determined the requirements for JDA positions, its next step would be to develop workable and realistic policy guidelines for the education and assignment of reserve officers to JDA positions. Considerable latitude should be granted the Services to develop specific procedures for implementing the policy guidelines in recognition of Service-unique circumstances.

For active duty officers, "only officers who have been awarded the joint specialty may be assigned to positions designated as critical joint duty assignments."²⁷ This policy statement is somewhat circuitous since the draft directive defines a critical JDA as one "requiring previous joint duty experience and which must be filled with a Joint Specialty Officer."²⁸ Presumably, for active component officers this means assignment to joint duty fairly early in one's career in preparation for later formal designation as a joint specialty officer contingent on joint education and a joint duty assignment. It would seem prudent to exclude all reserve JDA positions from the critical category for the obvious reason that criticality demands full-time assignment.

It also follows that the statutory prescription defining a joint specialty officer (JSO) should be modified in recognition of the unique requirements of reserve service. The law stipulates that the award of the joint specialty is contingent upon "(1) successful completion of an appropriate program at a joint professional military education school and (2) successful

completion of a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment."29 Whereas active duty nominees for the joint specialty must attend a resident professional military education program, reserve officers should be permitted to complete an appropriate program through correspondence programs and/or attendance at a U.S. Army Reserve Forces (USARF) school.

The Army is now wrestling with the development of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programs for resident students at the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College (CGSC) and U.S. Army War College. That effort should be expanded to revise the corresponding studies and USARF programs to prepare reserve officers in "jointness." Consideration should also be given to the development of a corresponding studies department at the National War College in the National Defense University (NDU).

Reserve General Officers and Jointness

Active duty officers selected for general officer normally must attend a special CAPSTONE course designed to prepare them to "work with the other armed forces."30 This provision should be made applicable to Army Reserve general officers to the extent that it is "practicable" to do so. Certainly, the CAPSTONE course (eight weeks) could be adaptable to the Army's reserve components. Some modification in course duration or permission to complete the course in various modules of one to three week modules makes sense. However, care must be taken to examine the increasing demands for professional development in the reserve forces against the practical limits that constrain even the most

talented and dexterous reserve officers. Participation should focus on general officer nominees who are likely to serve in a joint IMA position, as discussed earlier, or in reserve joint specialties, when these are identified.

Exceptions to the rule concerning general officer attendance at the CAPSTONE course also make sense for the Army Reserve. The Secretary of Defense may waive attendance at the CAPSTONE course for general officer nominees: (a) whose immediately previous assignment was in a joint duty assignment; (b) when necessary for the good of the service; (c) whose selection is based primarily upon scientific and technical qualifications for which joint requirements do not exist; (d) who are medical, dental, veterinary, medical service, biomedical science, or nurse officers, or chaplains.³¹

Troop Program Unit (TPU) Officers and Jointness

Should Army Reserve field grade officers in the troop structure be required to complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programs? The answer to this question lies in examining the alignment of reserve component units with their gaining wartime commands. Chapter II of this study discusses the provisions of the Reorganization Act that require the Secretaries of the Military Departments to assign all forces under their jurisdiction, with certain exceptions, to unified and specified combatant commands to perform assigned missions. Prior to the Reorganization Act, the majority of Army Reserve units were assigned under the command of the Commander, Forces Command (FORSCOM). However, the USAR Special Operations units are now

being assigned to the Army's 1st Special Operations Command which supports the U.S. Special Operations Command. 1st SOCOM can expect to be tasked to prepare strategic and contingency plans for CINC Special Operations. It is very likely, therefore, that reserve special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations specialists in the USAR will participate in the preparation of joint plans and concepts in response to the CINC's strategic vision.

This example illustrates the need for the Army and Joint Staff planners to examine actual and anticipated requirements for reserve officers to be educated in joint matters and, perhaps, be attached to joint headquarters. The needs assessment for reserve joint specialists described earlier could begin with an analysis of reserve JDA requirements in U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. FORSCOM. The analysis should include an identification of assigned unit or headquarters staffs and IMA authorizations. Later, as concrete policies and procedures emerge, surveys of U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and the other combatant commands should be undertaken. The result is likely to be a recommendation to create a list of reserve-unique joint specialties that includes combat support and combat service support fields. This course of action appears to be consistent with the latitude given the Secretary of Defense in the "to the extent practicable" language of the reserve officer provision of Section 666. Legislation may be required to recognize a broader range of joint specialties to support the CINCS.³² It is ironic that Goldwater-Nichols

denies the CINCs the responsibility to identify joint specialty needs commensurate with the greater authority given them by the Act. There is little doubt that the Army would agree to sponsor corrective legislation on this matter to permit the Services in consultation with the combatant commands and with the approval of the Chairman, JCS and the DEPSECDEF to exercise greater latitude in the selection of critical specialties.

AGR Officers and Jointness

AGR officers who are programmed for assignments to joint staffs or headquarters should be required to meet the same educational criteria as their active component counterparts. It is debatable, however, that such AGR officers should be managed in a joint "track" (See, especially, Section 665, Procedures for Monitoring Careers of Joint Officers) or that they meet the elaborate joint duty assignment criteria specified in amended Section 664, Length of Joint Duty Assignments. The simple reason for this is that the law prescribes that AGR soldiers serve on active duty for the sole purpose of "organizing, managing, training, recruiting, and equipping the reserve forces".³³ It would be contrary to these specified purposes to manage certain AGRs in a joint track having no bearing on their designated reserve support function. Certainly, AGRs with the requisite education and experience gained on prior active duty or current active service should be identified as joint specialty officers (JSO). On mobilization, such officers could be quickly reassigned to joint warfighting staffs.

AIR FORCE REVIEW OF RESERVE JOINT ISSUES

Only the Department of the Air Force has examined the imperatives of "jointness" for its reserve component officers to any appreciable extent. In a memorandum to the Director, Air National Guard and Chief, Air Force Reserve dated 20 October 1986 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Reserve Affairs) requested comment on how the then newly enacted Reorganization Act might apply to the Air Force's reserve components.

(Therefore) I anticipate the DoD asking the Service Departments for their recommendations on how to best satisfy this mandated change (joint experience for officers of the reserve components). I would appreciate your suggestions on how we can fulfill this requirement with the least disruption on the individual, while still providing the best professionally qualified officer corps for the Guard and Reserve.³⁴

The memorandum recommended consideration of the "practicality of using changes to professional military education as an alternative" to joint assignments since these are "limited" for Guard and Reserve officers not on Extended Active Duty.³⁵

In response, the Air National Guard (ANG) offered a range of options to the "education and training problems" of the Act: Air Force PME correspondence courses to reflect joint matters; restructuring residence courses to allow attendance in two-week increments over two consecutive years; waiving the requirement for ANG officers. The ANG also pointed out that there were no authorized JDA positions for ANG officers and that "major changes" would be needed to release ANG officers from state control in order to serve in (federal) JDA positions.³⁶ Here,

too, the ANG recommended alternatives for satisfying joint assignment criteria (when developed). These included the use of short two to four week tours of annual training; recognition of National Guard Bureau assignments as joint duty tours; and waiving the requirement.³⁷

The reply of the Chief, Air Force Reserve to the Air Secretariat memorandum endorsed the use of "updated" resident and non-resident PME courses to reflect "emphasis on joint matters."³⁸ The memorandum also reported that the practice of screening "statutory tour" (i.e. AGR) officers for joint level assignments would be continued. It did not address educational pre-requisites or award of the joint specialty for such officers.

After reviewing these comments, Mr. Dennis Kenneally, DASAF(RA), requested that the Air Staff prepare a coordinated memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (Guard/Reserve Manpower and Personnel). The proposed memorandum stated:

We have concluded that the best approach is to require either resident or non-resident mandatory senior Professional Military Education (PME) as determined by the service Secretaries for screening and promotion to brigadier general. Any other joint criteria (i.e. training and assignments) should be seen as desirable only.³⁹

The draft memorandum concluded with a recommendation that the DASD (RA) (G/R M&P) adopt "our PME approach to develop DoD policy for Guard and Reserve joint officer requirements under the DoD Reorganization Act."⁴⁰

The memorandum was never transmitted to the OSD. However, the Air Force Secretariat's early interest in reserve officer

preparation in joint matters has helped to define some of the issues and sets the stage for further study and staff analysis.

CONCLUSIONS

Some conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion on joint education and experience for reserve officers.

- o Education and experience criteria must proceed from analysis of requirements for reserve officers in joint matters. Prompted by the Joint Staff and the OASD (Reserve Affairs), the combatant command headquarters should determine their needs for reserve joint specialists who will train in peacetime for their wartime roles.

- o In consultation with the Army and its reserve component chiefs, the Combatant Commands should recommend a list of reserve joint occupational specialties, based on the above needs determination, for approval by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

- o Non-resident courses need to be developed by the Army schools that will be authorized to conduct JPME programs.

- o Assignment criteria must reflect the practical limitations on reserve officers' time and competing responsibilities.

- o New joint educational requirements, where appropriate, should be traded-off with Army-specific PME for reserve officers with unique joint skills or experience.

- o Personnel procedures need to be developed that will permit highly competitive (general officer potential) reserve officers to transfer without penalty between troop unit assignments and joint IMA positions.

o Reserve general officer nominees should be required to attend an appropriately modified general officer CAPSTONE course as described in Section 663(a), CAPSTONE Course for New General and Flag Officers.

o Reserve and National Guard officers selected to attend the resident U.S. Army War College course should participate in the "Joint Warfighting Track" on a proportional basis, consistent with their specialty, previous experience and anticipated follow-on assignments.

o AGR officers scheduled for assignments in authorized AGR joint positions should receive resident JPME and, where appropriate, be nominated for the joint specialty. Appropriate procedures for JDA tour lengths, selection criteria (i.e. quality controls) and other criteria should be developed for such officers recognizing that they are managed under reserve officer statutes and personnel policy.

ENDNOTES

1. G-N, Section 401 (10 USC, Section 666).
2. G-N, Section 666.
3. G-N, Section 666.
4. HR 99-700, p. 66.
5. G-N, Section 661.
6. G-N, Section 661.
7. William H. Taft, IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments (and) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Career Guidelines and Oversight Procedures for Joint Specialty Officers and Other Officers Serving in Joint Duty Assignments," 22 July 1987, p. 3 (hereafter referred to as "JSO Career Guidelines, OSD").
8. JSO Career Guidelines, OSD, p. 3.
9. William H. Taft, IV, DEPSECDEF, "Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments (and) Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Title IV DoD Reorganization Act of 1986," 21 May 1987.
10. JSO Career Guidelines, OSD.
11. Department of Defense (draft) Directive, unnumbered, Subject: "Joint Officer Management" (hereafter referred to as "JO Mgmt Draft").
12. JO Mgmt Draft, para F.3.
13. Individuals contacted: LTC(P) Jim Carney, USAR-AGR and COL Dave Smith, USAFR.
14. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., National Defense Authorization Act for 1988-1989, Public Law 100-180, 100th Congress, 4 December 1987, Section 1301 (amending Section 661 of Title 10, U.S. Code), (hereafter referred to as "Amend. to G-N").
15. See Attachment 1, JSO Career Guidelines, OSD and Enclosure 3, JO Mgmt Draft.
16. Amend. to G-N, Section 1301.
17. JO Mgmt Draft, para. D.17.
18. Amend. to G-N, Section 1301.

19. See the Air National Guard comment on a proposed Air Force position on "jointness" for Air Reserve Forces officers in this Chapter.
20. Amend. to G-N, Section 1302.
21. Enclosure 2, JO Mgmt Draft.
22. Amend. to G-N, Section 1301.
23. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 140-145, 20 June 1985, Washington D.C.
24. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., United States Code, Title 10, Section 673b.
25. Source: Hqs, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center, Mobilization Support Division (DARP-MOB), St. Louis, Missouri.
26. Source: ARPERCEN (DARP-MOB).
27. JO Mgmt Draft, para D.5.
28. Ibid, Encl 2, Definitions.
29. G-N, Section 661(c).
30. G-N, Section 663.
31. Ibid.
32. See discussion of COS earlier in this Chapter.
33. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. United States Code, Title 10, Section 523(b)(1)(C).
34. Dennis M. Kenneally, DASAF (Reserve Affairs), "Memorandum for Director, Air National Guard (and) Chief, Air Force Reserve, Subject: Joint Assignments for Guard and Reserve Officers," 20 October 1986.
35. Ibid.
36. John F. McMerty, BG, Deputy Director, Air National Guard, "Memorandum for SAF/MIR, Subject: Joint Assignment for Guard and Reserve Officers," 26 November 1986.
37. Ibid.
38. Roger P. Scheer, MG, USAF, Chief of Air Force Reserve, "Memorandum for DASAF (Reserve Affairs), Subject: Joint Assignments for Guard and Reserve Officers," 14 November 1986.

39. Unsigned draft memorandum, Hqs., Department of the Air Force,
REPX.

40. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Association of the U.S. Army. Fact Sheep: Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 -- A Primer. Arlington, Virginia, 1987.
2. Clark, William D. "Remarks to the Reserve Component Students of the U.S. Army War College", Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1 December 1987. (Cited with special permission of Mr. Clark).
3. Kenneally, Dennis M., DASAF (Reserve Affairs). "Memorandum for Director Air National Guard (and) Chief Air Force Reserve, Subject: Joint Assignments for Guard and Reserve Officers," Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C., 20 October 1986.
4. McMerty, John F., BG, Dep Director, Air National Guard. "Memorandum for SAF/MIR, Subject: Joint Assignments for Guard and Reserve Officers", The National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., 26 November 1986.
5. Marsh, John O., Jr., Secretary of the Army. "Letter to Chairman John G. Tower, Senate Armed Services Committee," Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington D.C., 1 December 1982.
6. Palastra, Joseph T., Jr., General, USA. "Forces Command: The Strategic Land Force Reserve," Defense 87, Washington: Government Printing Office, Nov-Dec, 1987.
7. Reserve Forces Policy Board. Reserve Component Programs, FY 1987. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2 February 1988.
8. Ritterpusch, David R., "Resourcing the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve During the Reagan Years: Striking Dissimilarities." Unpublished paper, Pennsylvania State University, 8 February 1988. Cited with the author's permission.
9. Snider, Don M. "DoD Reorganization: Part I, New Imperatives," Parameters, Volume 17, No. 3. Washington: Government Printing Office, September 1987.
10. Snider, Don M. "DoD Reorganization: Part II, New Opportunities," Parameters, Volume 17, No. 4. Washington: Government Printing Office, December 1987.
11. Taft, William H., Deputy Secretary of Defense. "Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments (and) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Career Guidelines and Oversight Procedures for Joint Specialty Officers and Other Officers Serving in Joint Duty Assignment." Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 22 July 1987.

12. Taft, William H., DEPSECDEF. "Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments (and) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Title IV DoD Reorganization Act of 1986," Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 21 May 1987.

13. U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Armed Services, House Report 99-700, Bill Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Washington: Government Printing Office, 21 July 1986.

14. U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services, Senate Report 99-330: DoD Authorization Act for 1983. Washington: Government Printing Office, 13 April 1982.

15. U.S. Congress, Senate. Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. Defense Organization: the Need for Change, Senate Print 99-86, 99th Congress. Washington: Government Printing Office, 15 October 1985.

16. U.S. Department of the Army. Army Regulation 140-145.

17. U.S. Department of the Air Force. Unsigned Information Memorandum, Subject: Joint Officer Requirements -- DoD Reorganization Act. Washington D.C., 1987.

18. U.S. Department of Defense. Instruction Number 7045.7, Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, Washington D.C., 9 April 1987.

19. U.S. Department of Defense. "Joint Officer Management," unnumbered draft directive. Washington, D.C., 1987-1988.

20. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. United States Code, Title 10, as amended through 31 December 1984, Section 523(b)(1)(C). Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1985.

21. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. Public Law 99-433, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986", 99th Congress. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 October 1986.

22. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. Public Law 100-180, National Defense Authorization Act for 1988-1989, 100th Congress. Washington: Government Printing Office, 4 December 1987.

23. Ward, William F., MG, USA, Chief, Army Reserve. The Posture of the Army Reserve, FY 1988. Statement Before the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, First Session, 100th Congress. Washington, D.C.

24. Ward, William F., MG, USA, Chief, Army Reserve. The Posture of the Army Reserve, FY 1989. Statement Before the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, Second Session, 100th Congress. Washington D.C.

25. Wilson, George C. "Army Forces Deep Personnel Cuts to Pay for Arms," Washington Post, 11 February 1988, p. A4 ff. Washington, D.C.: Washington Post Corporation.

END

DATE

FILMED

DTIC

JULY 88