Operational Intelligence: Is It a Panacea?

Abstract

This study investigates the question that if valid operational intelligence is available, are there reasons or factors that preclude it from contributing to or providing operational success? Case studies utilizing intelligence indicators from Pearl Harbor, Midway, and the Battle of the Ardennes are cited for use in the study. Doctrinal requirements from FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, form the basis for the study along with considerations from FM 100-5, Operations. The study concludes that operational intelligence indicators were present in all three case studies. The paper presents the case that while Midway is considered an intelligence success and Pearl Harbor and the Ardennes an intelligence failure, the intelligence indicators were present in all three to varying degrees and therefore intelligence should have contributed to operational success. Keywords: Intelligence, Operational intelligence.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 21, 1987
Accession Number
ADA192576

Entities

People

  • Ronald L. Burgess

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Electronic Warfare
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Availability
  • Case Studies
  • Classification
  • Department Of Defense
  • Electronic Warfare
  • Indicators
  • International Relations
  • National Security
  • Naval Vessels
  • New York
  • Operational Intelligence
  • Second World War
  • Security
  • Surveillance
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • Education

Readers

  • Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Cyberspace Operations against Adversarial Threats.
  • Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering.
  • Systems Analysis and Design

Technology Areas

  • Microelectronics