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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

FY 1989

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

FOR FY 1989



Prepared by

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Reserve Affairs)

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Defense Agencies

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FY 1989 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1989 in compliance with Section 115(b)(3) of Title 10, United States Code. This report should be read and used along with the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1989 Budget.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT.

This report explains the Department of Defense manpower program incorporated in the amended President's Budget for FY 1989. The report is organized into two major parts and three annexes that are submitted separately. The annexes are sent to Congress at the same time as this report.

Defense Manpower Program (Chapters I through VII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1989 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain details on manpower programs for each of the military Services and the Defense Agencies.

Base Structure Annex. The Base Structure Annex relates our FY 1989 base structure to the force structure for that period and provides estimates of base operating support costs.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.

Officer Flow Annex. Section 115 (b)(3)(D) of Title 10, USC, requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in the Officer Flow Annex.

II. THE TOTAL FORCE.

The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to success. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components, civilian workforce, and retired military, host nation support, and DoD contractors.

A. Active Component Military.

The active component military are those men and women who serve in units that engage enemy forces, units that provide support in the combat theater, other support units, and those people who are in special accounts (transients, student, etc.). These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay. There are over 2.1 million active component military people.

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B. Reserve Component Military.

Reserve component military manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It has two principal elements: the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve includes three groups: (1) units organized, equipped, and trained to perform wartime missions; (2) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), who are highly trained, skilled people designated to provide wartime augmentation on or shortly after M-day and (3) the training pipeline, which is composed of members of the Selected Reserve who have not completed sufficient training to be awarded a military skill designation. Training pipeline people may not deploy overseas upon mobilization until minimum training is completed (12 weeks or its equivalent.) Selected Reservists assigned to units, and IMAs, train throughout the year and participate annually in active duty training. As many as 200,000 Selected Reservists may be involuntarily recalled by the President for up to 90 days, with an option for a 90 day extension, to augment active forces.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) consist of those Ready Reservists who are not in the Selected Reserve. Members of the IRR and ING have served recently in the active force or the Selected Reserve and have some period of their military service obligation remaining or have volunteered to remain beyond their statutory obligation. The majority of IRR and ING members do not participate regularly in organized training. All members of the IRR and ING are subject to being ordered to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress. An IRR screening program commenced during FY 1987, calling IRR members to active duty for one day during which their personal military records and physical condition will be reviewed.

The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who maintain their military affiliation, but are unable to remain in a Ready Reserve status, or who are determined to be critical mobilization assets. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of the active and reserve forces who have retired. Members of the Standby and Retired Reserve do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the military department concerned in the interest of national defense. However, standby and retired reservists who have not completed 20 years of active service may not be activated until it has been determined that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve. Retired reservists who have completed 20 or more years of active service may be ordered to active duty at any time.

The Reserve Component manpower requested by the Department of Defense is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress. The Selected Reserve strength is approximately 1.2 million people as of the end of FY 1987.

C. Civilian Component

Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of our active manpower. They occupy roles that do not require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes, ships, and tanks; provides research, medical communications, and logistical support; and operates and maintains military installations. They contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces. The civilian strength of the Department of Defense is expected to decrease by approximately one percent between FY 1988 and FY 1989 (from 1,112,102 to 1,102,240 full time equivalent end strength) as a result of decreased program fund availability for the Department as a whole.

D. Retirees.

Retired military manpower is a major portion of the Total Force. There are approximately 800,000 physically able retirees under age 60. These individuals are trained, highly motivated, and can be rapidly recalled to perform a wide variety of jobs. There are also large numbers of retirees age 60 and over who can make major contributions to our defense effort.

III. MANPOWER MIX.

I-1 → Each Service chapter explains why military manpower is assigned to either the Active or the Reserve components. This section communicates our overall policy toward Defense manpower in general.

Our policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit. Our overall military strategy dictates which missions must be performed by military persons. Our policy is to employ civilian employees and contractors wherever possible to free our military forces to perform military functions.

The least costly way we meet overseas peacetime and wartime requirements is to use host nation support (HNS). The agreements we have with the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Italy, and the BENELUX countries, to provide port operations, surface transportation and many other support functions are examples of this support. The same type of arrangements also exist in Japan and Korea. Increased reliance on HNS makes strategic warning and allied response even more important. It also allows our strategic lift to focus on the transport of reinforcements and sustainment to the theater of operations.

The primary criterion that must be satisfied in determining whether a military unit should be active or reserve is the responsiveness required to perform the mission. Strategic and overseas deployed units that must be immediately ready for combat operations must be manned with active component military manpower. Most Navy squadrons must be manned by active component military because they routinely deploy and remain at sea. In peacetime, we also authorize active component military manpower for training and military rotational purposes.

We have increased our reliance on Reserve Component units. The Army relies heavily on Reserve units to provide essential combat and tactical support to both active and reserve forces. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of most mission areas, including surface combatants, carrier air wings, maritime patrol, airlift, and medical support. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces equal to active force counterpart units. Air Force Reserve units bear considerable responsibility for many combat and support missions, including tactical fighter, airlift, continental air defense, and aerial refueling missions. Reserve Component units have demonstrated their capability to maintain high readiness levels. In general, however, high readiness levels increase the cost of maintaining these units because of the additional training and full time support required.

f, 5.1-3 IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER.

Mobilization manpower is the increased manpower we need above our current peacetime strength to mobilize and conduct wartime military operations. Additional military and civilian personnel are necessary to bring our current peacetime forces up to their full wartime strengths; to man activated units, ships, and squadrons; and to replace casualties. Chapter II and the individual Service chapters describe the wartime manpower requirements and the overall mobilization manpower situation in more detail.

V. MANPOWER COUNTING.

The discussion of manpower and personnel readiness in this report requires that the reader understand the terms describing manpower counting categories. For that reason, a glossary of defense manpower terms is provided in Appendix B. The basic distinction between "spaces", that is billets or positions, and "faces", people to fill the positions, must be kept clear. Our forces are made up of a variety of different types of units. Each unit has associated with it a collection of positions that must be filled by qualified people in order for the unit to perform its mission.

During peacetime, it is neither necessary nor desirable to fill all the positions in all the units. Some units may not be staffed at all, because there is inadequate funding or because we can form them in an expeditious manner following mobilization. Some units may be staffed with a combination of active and reserve people; as the unit is tasked to perform more in peacetime, the proportion of full-time people, whether active, reserve, or civilian, may be expected to increase.

The Department work force does not change overnight to match changes in the programmed force. As the program is being prepared, the manpower requirements structure must be adjusted to best balance the requirements of force changes, available inventory, accession and separation predictions, fiscal constraints, manpower ceilings, etc. The collection of positions authorized to be filled with personnel is termed the authorized or programmed manning.

VI. DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES.

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Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain the defense manpower program. All three types of Defense manpower are allocated to specific DPPCs, no position being counted more than once.

DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the eleven Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber program, but also the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, personnel support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for the management of resources; however, the DPPC system is used in this document. The DPPC structure used in this year's report is different than that previously used. The major difference is the creation of a "Joint Activities" account and the disaggregation of sub DPPC's that had been previously lumped together. Complete definitions are provided in Appendix C.

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.

The Department's basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international climate in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to deter potential enemies, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms compatible with US national security interests. To those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American national security policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1989.

Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military and civilian personnel. The manpower program is developed based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The force structure is based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to our success in wartime. In structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible to maintain as small an active component peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit. Service planning assumes that Selected Reserve units and pretrained military manpower will be made available for any contingency for which they are required to bring the total force to its required combat capability. Some reserve component units must also be responsive to call up for limited periods without a declaration of war or national emergency. Active component units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization, for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed, and for forward deployment in peacetime as a deterrent against major conflict.

Civilians are the third essential component of the Total Force. In addition to managing critical defense resources, Defense civilians repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communications systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analyses; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not specifically require military personnel. The Department constantly strives to make the most efficient use of its total work force. Programs for increasing productivity have a high priority in

the Department. Work is contracted out when it is economical and cost effective to do so. However, recent emphasis on increases in readiness and sustainability keeps the peacetime demand for in-house military and civilian manpower high.

The following table is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1989 compared to those that existed at the end of FY 1980 and FY 1987.

Table II-1

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FORCE ELEMENTS

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
<u>Strategic</u>				
ICBMs	1,054	995	996	1,000
Bombers (PAA) 1/	376	344	372	372
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) 1/				
Active	487	472	450	460
Guard/Reserve	128	124	134	134
<u>Strategic</u>				
Interceptor Squadrons/PAA				
Active	6/126	3/54	2/36	2/36
Guard/Reserve	10/164	11/192	12/216	12/216
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)	40	37	37	37
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>				
Land Forces				
Army Divisions				
Active	16	18	18	18
Guard	8	10	10	10
Army Separate Brigades				
Regiments				
Active 2/	9	9	9	9
Guard/Reserve 3/	28	25	25	25
Marine Corps Divisions				
Active	3	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces 4				
Air Force				
Ground Launched				
Cruise Missile (GLMC)	N/A	16/256	19/304	14/224
Flights/Missiles				

	ACTUAL		BUDGET	
	FY 1980	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Air Force Squadrons/PAA				
Active	104/2659	117/2194	124/2228	119/2162
Guard/Reserve	56/1106	59/1107	59/1091	58/1054
Navy Squadrons/PAA				
Active	84/888	94/925	91/900	91/904
Reserve	16/144	17/117	17/142	17/141
Carriers (active only)	13	14	14	14
Marine Corps Squadrons/PAA				
Active	29/435	30/450	30/453	30/454
Reserve	9/104	10/116	10/116	11/116
Naval Forces				
Attack Submarines				
(active only)	79	102	101	103
Surface Combatants				
Active	177	203	192	188
Reserve	16	20	25	25
Amphibious Assault Ships				
Active	63	61	62	65
Reserve	3	2	2	2
Patrol Ships (active only)	3	6	6	6
ASW and FAD Squadrons/PAA				
Active	52/474	63/536	62/565	63/580
Reserve	17/149	19/158	19/158	20/163
Mobility Forces				
Airlift Squadrons/PAA 5/				
Active	34/588	34/509	34/510	34/497
Guard/Reserve	54/382	54/335	54/343	55/336
Sealift Ships				
Nucleus Fleet 6/	78	200	215	232
Chartered Fleet (Longterm)	20	17	16	16

1/Primary aircraft authorized (PAA).

2/Includes the Berlin Brigade, three armored cavalry regiments and one ranger regiment. Also includes activation of the headquarters for one Armored Brigade delayed until FY 1988, the maneuver battalions for the Brigade are in the force structure in FY 1987. One air cavalry combat brigade converts to new structure in FY 1987 - not counted.

3/Includes five Reserve Component brigades that roundout active divisions, one infantry brigade for school support upon mobilization (FY 1986 and FY 1988 only), four theater defense brigades, one infantry group and four armored cavalry regiments (two become armored brigades in FY 1989).

4/Includes tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, special operations, tanker/cargo (KC-10) and tactical electronic warfare/tactical air control/tactical airborne command and control system squadrons, and GLCM flights. Excludes civil engineering heavy repair squadrons and tactical cryptographic squadrons.

5/Includes C7, C-123, C-130, C-131, C-141, C-5 and C-9s. Excludes rescue and weather.

6/Includes naval fleet auxiliary force, mobility enhancement (includes mobility enhancements, reduced operating status and ready reserve force), nucleus fleet and scientific support vessels operated by the Military Sealift Command. Mobility enhancement, reduced operating status, and ready reserve force categories are not reflected in FY 1980 figures.

II. MANPOWER REQUEST.

The United States Congress authorized the Department of Defense an active military end strength of 2,172.4 thousand for FY 1988. Because of Fiscal pressures, the Department will program only 2,138.3 thousand for FY 1988. The Departments asks congress to authorize the 2,138.3 thousand for FY 1989.

A. Active Component Military Strength

Active Component Military Personnel (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Army	776.5	780.8	772.3	772.3
Navy	527.2	586.8	593.2	593.2
Marine Corps	188.5	199.6	197.2	197.2
Air Force	558.0	607.0	575.6	575.6
Total	2,050.1	2,174.2	2,138.3	2,138.3

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

B. Selected Reserve Strength.

The following table shows the manpower request for the Selected Reserve, expressed in both average and corresponding end strengths. These figures include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and full time Active Guard/Reserve members.

Selected Reserve Military Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Army National Guard	366.6	451.9	457.3	457.3
Army Reserve	213.2	313.6	320.6	320.6
Naval Reserve	97.1	148.1	152.6	152.6
Marine Corps Reserve	35.5	42.3	43.6	43.6
Air National Guard	96.3	114.6	115.9	115.2
Air Force Reserve	59.8	80.4	82.4	83.6
DoD Total	868.6	1,150.9	1,172.4	1,172.9

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

All years include AGR/TARs and Cat.'D' IMAs.

The following table shows the number of personnel involved in full time support of the Reserve components. The Guard and Reserve military technicians, who are also DoD civilians, are included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report.

Full-Time Support to the Selected Reserve ^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Army National Guard		
Active Guard/Reserve	25.7	25.7
Military Technicians	26.0	26.0
Civilians <u>2/</u>	2.6	2.6
Active Component	.7	.7
Total	53.0	53.0
Army Reserve		
Active Guard/Reserve	13.3	13.3
Military technicians	7.5	7.1
Civilians	5.7	5.5
Active Component	1.2	1.2
Total	27.7	27.1
Naval Reserve		
Active Guard/Reserve	22.0	22.0
Civilians	3.1	3.0
Active Component	6.9	6.5
Total	32.0	31.5
Marine Corps Reserve		
Active Guard/Reserve	1.9	1.9
Civilians	0.4	0.4
Active Component	5.1	5.1
Total	7.4	7.4
Air National Guard		
Active Guard/Reserve	7.8	7.9
Military Technicians <u>3/</u>	23.1	23.1
Civilians <u>2/</u>	2.5	2.5
Active Component	0.6	0.6
Total	34.0	34.1
Air Force Reserve		
Active Guard/Reserve	0.7	0.7
Military Technicians	10.0	10.0
Civilians	4.6	4.6
Active Component	0.6	0.6
Total	15.9	15.9
DoD Total		
Active Guard/Reserve	71.5	71.6
Military Technicians	66.6	67.0
Civilians	18.8	18.7
Active Component	15.2	14.8
Total	172.1	171.1

1/Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are included in Selected Reserve strength throughout the report.

2/Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians and Army and Air Force Reserve status quo technicians.

3/Includes reimbursable military technicians.

C. Civilians

Civilian Employment Plan ^{1/}

Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions End Fiscal Year Strength

	<u>FY 1980</u> ^{2/}	<u>FY 1987</u> ^{2/}	<u>FY 1988</u> ^{3/}	<u>FY 1989</u> ^{3/}
Total DoD	990,356	1,134,145	1,112,102	1,102,240

^{1/}Includes approximately 64,600 (FY 1987) and 66,600 (FY 1988) Guard and Reserve military technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

^{2/}As reported to OPM, does not adjust part time to full time equivalent.

^{3/}Full time equivalent.

These figures do not include anticipated reductions made possible by conversion of activities to contract under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76. Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs.

Excluded under this category are: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and worker trainee opportunity programs. Employment in these categories was 9,300 in FY 1987.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions.

Excluded are employees performing civil functions administered by DoD, including Corps of Engineer Civil Works, cemeterial activities, and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1988 and FY 1989 is planned to be about 30,000.

The composition of the total DoD civilian request for FY 1988 and FY 1989 is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire.

Composition of Civilian Employment Plan For FY 1988 and FY 1989 (Full Time Equivalent End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Direct Hire</u>		<u>Indirect Hire</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Army 1/	340.2	339.7	59.6	60.4	399.8	400.1
Navy	337.2	328.8	10.8	10.8	348.0	339.6
Marine Corps ^{2/}	(19.4)	(19.2)	(2.9)	(2.9)	(22.3)	(22.1)
Air Force 1/	252.2	250.4	13.2	13.3	265.4	263.7
Defense Agencies	97.2	97.2	-1.7	-1.7	98.9	98.8
Total DoD	1,026.8	1,016.8	85.3	86.2	1,112.1	1,102.2

- ^{1/} Includes military technicians in support of Guard and Reserve programs.
^{2/} Marine Corps civilians are included in Department of Navy strengths.
 Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

III. MANPOWER OVERVIEW.

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u>					<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military ^{1/}							
Active	2,687	3,547	2,050	2,151	2,174	2,138	2,138
Officer	(337)	(415)	(277)	(309)	(307)	(306)	(306)
Enlisted	(2,340)	(3,121)	(1,760)	(1,828)	(1,853)	(1,819)	(1,819)
Cadets/Midship-							
men	(10)	(11)	(13)	(14)	(14)	(14)	(14)
Selected Reserve	953	922	869	1,088	1,151	1,172	1,173
Civilian ^{2/}	1,175	1,406	990	1,129	1,124	1,123	1,125

^{1/} For purposes of this table, Navy Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) strengths are included in Active strength in FY 1964 and FY 1968; they are included in Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 and thereafter. Also, Category D Selected Reserves are included in Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 and thereafter.

^{2/} Full time equivalent (FTE) direct and indirect hires.

A. Military Manpower.

The FY 1989 authorization request for active component military personnel is 2,138,300. This represents a 34,100 authorization reduction from the FY 1988 congressionally authorized position. Selected Reserve end strength is programmed to increase slightly by 530 in FY 1989 over FY 1988 levels. Highlights of the military manpower programs by Service follow.

ARMY

As part of the amended FY 89 budget submission, the Army will reduce active end strength by 8600. The force structure actions, which will be effective in FY 1988, resulting from the end strength reduction and reflected in POM 90-94 are: FORSCOM will not activate two battalions in 6ID(L) and will inactivate one brigade of 9ID (MTZ) and roundout with an RC separate brigade; aviation spaces will be decremented by unit for a total of 2214 spaces; RDTE positions will be reduced by 764 spaces; FOAs will be reduced 461 spaces; ROTC will be reduced by 121 spaces; Morale, Welfare, and Recreation will be reduced by 200 spaces; and the individuals account will be reduced by 1158 spaces. Contained in this document are estimates, by DPPC, of the changes attributable to these reductions.

Specific changes continue to be negotiated with affected major commands to minimize the impact on mission performance. These specifics will be provided in the fall FYDP update.

The Army program continues emphasis on improved manning of combat forces, modernization, and strategic deployability during the period with the Army changing to more modern, lighter designs with more effective equipment within the reduced active component end strength. Force modernization and refinement of force structure to the Army of Excellence (AOE) design will continue to enhance combat capability. The deployability, capability, and flexibility of Army forces continue to improve as two Active Component light divisions (10th Mountain and 6th Infantry less the two battalions discussed above) complete activation. Key to offsetting Army support requirements are Host Nation Support and contingency contracts for logistical support in Southwest Asia. The Reserve Component (RC) continues to assume greater responsibilities as authorized strength increases by approximately 11,000 in FY 1988. The Army National Guard (ARNG) provided almost 40 percent of divisional force structure in four heavy divisions, one light infantry, and five standard infantry divisions. The Army Reserve emphasis on increasing readiness and trained strength in units exhibits continuing improvement. The Army continues to rely heavily on civilians and civilian contractors to provide critical management, quality of life, and logistics support to the active and reserve forces in accomplishing these changes.

NAVY

For the Navy, manpower adjustments have been made to accommodate the delay in the achievement of a 600 ship Navy. Ship growth in FY 1988 which was originally programmed for 582 will be reduced by 12 to 570. In FY 1989, the Navy will have a total of 580 ships vice the 605 originally envisioned during the FY 1988/1989 budget submission of January 1987.

Navy's Adjusted Budget Submit for FY 1989 requests end strength at the FY 1988 authorized level of 593,200. In effect, Navy is asking for 9,600 fewer active duty personnel in FY 1989 than it believed it would need one year ago (as reflected in the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget Submission of January 1987). Navy was, in part, able to accommodate these reductions by reducing force structure growth (decommissioning 16 Frigates (eight in FY 1988 and eight in FY 1989), decommissioning the 14th carrier airwing, and two SSBN's). Within an FY 1989 end strength limit of 593,200. Navy has increased manpower to fleet forces (i.e. areas of strategic, tactical/mobility, intelligence, and centrally managed communications) while reducing manpower to fleet support and other support activities. Navy has meshed the personnel and program adjustments to ensure balance and executability.

The Navy's FY 1989 strength request of 593,200 reflects reductions of 727 officers and 8873 enlisted (-9600) from the FY 1988/1989 Presidential Budget Submission. Additionally, Navy has complied with congressionally directed DoD-wide officer reductions. The one percent DoD officer reduction in FY 1987 and the follow-on one percent reduction in FY 1988 deleted 1,576 Navy billets in FY 1987 and 2,090 in FY 1988. This

precipitated a total loss of 2,817 officer billets in FY 1989 from the officer strength request presented in the FY 1988/1989 Biennial Budget of January 1987.

Navy's FY 1989 manpower request is balanced and continues a trend toward a more sea-going Navy while accommodating fiscal realities with the need for adequate shore support. Navy has preserved an adequate shore rotation base for careerists in enlisted ratings and supported strategic homeporting/TRIDENT base growth. Navy protected fleet force manpower from reduction and has continued to program growth to medical support. Meanwhile, Navy relies on contract support and civilian labor to the maximum extent. Navy Reserves (including full-time support) show no growth from FY 1988 to FY 1989.

Navy's commitments are increasing, not decreasing. The Navy has presented a tight, conservative budget request and requires congressional support in preventing further end strength erosion - especially to Navy's officer corps.

MARINE CORPS

Although Congress authorized the Marine Corps a FY 1988 end strength of 199,600, the Marine Corps' end strength goal for FY 1988 is 197,224, and the end strength request for FY 1989 is 197,200. Reductions to the budget in the FY 1988 Appropriation Act and the decrements necessary to meet the DoD reductions for FY 1989 placed the Marine Corps in the position of reducing programs essential to maintaining force quality, or reducing end strength. The Marine Corps opted to reduce end strength in order to maintain the programs essential to force quality.

The Marine Corps Selected Reserve contribution is one Division, one Aircraft Wing, and one Force Service Support Group and provides approximately 22% of Total Force manpower. The Selected Reserve manpower increase of 1350 from FY 1987 to FY 1989 will provide the manpower to implement the transition of three M198 155mm howitzer battalions (from M101A-1 105mm battalions) and the activation of three infantry platoons, a TOW missile section, one attack helicopter squadron, and one KC-130 aerial refueler squadron.

AIR FORCE

During preparation of the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget (PB), the Air Force recognized that fiscal restraints required dramatic programmatic reductions. Of the 8150 military manpower reductions associated with these programmatic changes, over 3000 were cut as a result of decisions to reduce tactical fighter wing equivalents (72 primary aircraft authorized) from 38 wings to 37 and to inactivate several small units effective in FY 1988. Congress reversed most of these decisions without reinstating the associated manpower.

In FY 1988, national budgetary decisions forced the Air Force to identify further programmatic reductions for FY 1988 as well as FY 1989. These changes will result in additional reductions of 23,097 (-3.9

percent) military authorizations in FY 1988 and 25,000 (-4.2 percent) in FY 1989. The Amended Budget Submission (ABS) reflects the results of many hard decisions made to reach the reduced fiscal guidance levels. The end strength requested is that required to perform the remaining missions and programs within the budget.

The reductions mentioned above include reductions to officer end strength. The officer strength does remain at the current Air Force officer strength ceiling of 105,538 in FY 1988 and FY 1989 in the ABS. However, comparing the end strength requested for FY 1988 in the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget and that requested for FY 1989 in the amended request, shows a total reduction of 23,100, of which 3500 are officers and 19,600 are enlisted. Comparing the two requests for FY 1989 shows a total reduction of 25,000 of which 4,100 are officers and 21,000 are enlisted. The Air Force was faced with increases for officers to meet wartime medical requirements, new space systems, special operations force increases, and to rebuild officer training capability. Through force structure decreases in the total tactical fighter force, reductions in communications command and control staffs and programs and reduced graduate education, the Air Force was able to offset the increased requirements.

The decisions to reduce programmed manpower for FY 1988 and 1989 were made well into FY 1988. Where reductions were relatable to programs, reductions were made to the appropriate DPPCs. However, the lateness of the budget decisions made a complete allocation of reductions to the manpower file impossible. The balance of the reductions are reflected as Undistributed, and reflect an undermanning of the force. Actual allocation to the appropriate DPPCs will occur in the year of execution.

B. Civilian Manpower

The fiscal year 1989 request for civilian personnel is 1,102,240 full time equivalent (FTE) end strength. This is a reduction of approximately one percent or 9,862 end strength from the FY 1988 level of 1,112,102. The FY 1989 level represents an end strength decrease of 30,884 (or 2.7 percent) compared to the actual FY 1987 year end level. The civilian employment estimates for FY 1988 and FY 1989 do not include the reductions required for Defense Agency implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. However, the estimates do implement Military Service reductions relative to this Act.

The FY 1989 civilian personnel estimate is predicated upon a variety of external factors aimed at reducing the size of DoD's civilian work force, including decreased program fund availability. But, in the absence of employment ceilings, DoD has developed procedures to balance work force levels to mission and workload changes.

We just completed our third and most successful year under ceiling-free management. In FY 1987, we exceeded our year end targeted FTE end strength by 9,271 (or .8 percent) and our civilian labor budget by only \$355 million (or 1.1 percent). This compares favorably to FY 1985 (our

first year of ceiling-free execution) when the Department exceeded its FTE end strength target by 41,256 (or 3.5 percent) and its civilian labor budget by \$800 million (or 2.5 percent).

C. Total Force Productivity

The Department employs a wide variety of tools and techniques to improve DoD productivity. Productivity improvements apply to both the military and civilian work force, and are reflected in the Department's programmed manpower structure. The focus of our efforts are on raising awareness, recognizing successes, and developing and refining those tools used to enhance individual and organizational performance.

The efforts of our "Task Force on Productivity in the Support Operations," established in 1986, paid off. Our Productivity Improvement Plan for FY 1989 includes over 437,000 military and civilian personnel managing DoD functions and programs valued at approximately \$46 billion. By 1992, this program will be expanded to include approximately one million DoD personnel, with the objective of improving their productivity by an average of 3 percent each year.

The FY 1989 Productivity Improvement Plan incorporates many of the Task Force initiatives. One of these, the Productivity and Quality Team (P&Q) concept, uses existing management structures to create interlocking teams of line managers at all levels. These teams work by taking quick action to remove barriers and impediments to productivity and quality improvement. The plan emphasizes the Efficiency Review (ER) process, directed at the continuing improvement of work processes and procedures, as a method to better define resource requirements. Over 92 efficiency reviews were completed in FY 1987, with a reduction of 1,419 personnel spaces and savings of \$84 million. DoD's Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI) program will continue to play a major role in contributing toward increased defense capability and efficiency through the use of modern technology. Investments planned for FY 1989 of \$234 million are expected to return approximately \$15 for each \$1 invested.

To increase productivity further, we use a "total quality management" approach. This approach combines work force motivation, achieved through such techniques as quality circles and participatory management, with statistical process control, which identifies and removes errors from the process in lieu of relying on final quality inspections. Application of total quality management at one Naval Aviation Depots (NAVDEPS) reduced rework time by 400 hours per aircraft. And, gain sharing systems within DoD are returning dollar rewards to employees who exceed preestablished efficiency and quality goals. The Defense Logistics Agency generated savings of \$659,000 as a result of employees exceeding established performance standards by 18 percent. Half of these savings were distributed to these employees.

On January 27, 1988, DoD held its Fifth Annual Productivity Excellence Award Ceremony, honoring 51 men and women whose combined efforts resulted in total first-year savings of nearly \$335 million. To date, the Department has recognized 774 individuals for their contributions to productivity improvements, resulting in savings exceeding \$1 billion.

D. Management Headquarters.

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) imposed manpower ceilings and reductions on all levels of the Defense Department's management headquarters activities. The Department of Defense has initiated efforts to implement these ceilings and Military Service reductions are reflected in the DoD Amended Budget Submission (ABS) for FY 1989. However, the ABS does not reflect the results of Defense Agency adjustments relative to this Act. Defense Agency adjustments for FY 1988 were allocated based upon the results of organizational studies, mandated by the Reorganization Act. Revised manpower levels, below those portrayed in the Department's ABS, have been assigned to Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities in the form of September 30, 1988 end strength ceilings. These ceilings result in an imbalance in work force levels in FY 1988 that will lead to inefficiencies and dis-economies throughout DoD. Consequently, the Department has proposed legislation that would forego the additional manpower reductions required by this Act in FY 1989.

E. European Troop Strength.

The Department of Defense has complied with the congressionally mandated troop strength ceiling (326,412) in FY 1987. Further, the Department intends to stay beneath the ceiling for FY 1988 and FY 1989. However, the ceiling has outlived its usefulness and will in fact, be a detriment, if the U.S. is to implement the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty. While the Department has no intention of significantly increasing forces (if for no other reason than fiscal constraints), DoD needs the flexibility during the transition years to make appropriate force structure changes.

F. Officer Reductions

The DoD is in the second year of execution of the officer reductions legislated by the FY 1987 DoD Authorization Act. This act originally mandated a 1, 2 and 3 percent reduction for FY 1987, FY 1988 and FY 1989 respectively. The 1 percent reduction was accomplished with an overall on board strength of 305,290, 418 below the number required by law.

The FY 1988/1989 DoD Authorization Act allowed for the rephasing of the remaining reduction to 1 percent in FY 1988, 2 percent in FY 1989 and, 2 percent in FY 1990. The FY 1988 reductions have been allocated to the Services.

The FY 1989 Amended Budget does not reflect reductions beyond FY 1988. However, to comply with section 403c of the FY 1987 DoD Authorization Act, DoD has reported to the Congress on its tentative plan

for the FY 1989 allocation. Further, DoD submitted an Officer Requirements Report on 1 March 1988, to Congress that describes the impacts of the FY 1988 through FY 1990 reductions. DoD did not submit the FY 1989 reductions in the budget because the Department believe the officer requirements Report satisfies Congressional concerns over officer growth.

The Officer Requirements Report addresses three main issues. First, it shows that the Service requirements determination processes, especially in regard to officers, are rigorous and accurate. Second, it shows that the majority of officer (77 percent) added during FYs 1980-1986 supported valid changes in force structure, doctrine, wartime shortfalls, and other critical requirements. Third, the impact of the remaining 4 percent reduction (2 percent in FY 1989 and 2 percent FY 1990) was reviewed with respect to readiness and combat capability and evidence was provided that further reductions would seriously degrade the defense posture. The report also describes the institution of a strengthened OSD oversight process over the various Service requirements determination processes and in particular, their officer requirements.

Subsequent to the report, the Department of Defense has identified an additional 4,000 officers that will be eliminated by FY 1990. These conversions and reductions are part of the ongoing Service efforts to continue the view of officer requirements.

The Department feels assured that the comprehensive officer report provides compelling evidence that should convince Congress to repeal the remaining 4 percent reductions (12,352). Congress should carefully consider the conclusions of that officer report. The DoD is concerned that no one has fully assessed the long term impacts on force structure, combat capability, accessions, retention and readiness if the full reduction is absorbed.

IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

A. Requirements Determination.

The Department of Defense uses an analytic framework to estimate its wartime military and civilian requirements. The Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning System (WARMAPS) compiles all the manpower estimates (demand, supply, and shortfalls) by Service, by theater, and by manpower category over the time frame of the scenario.

The wartime force structure is designed to support our national strategy for mobilizing and prosecuting a war. The size and structure of that force and, in turn, the manpower to fill, fight, and sustain the force are developed in a sequential process. The components included in our calculations are:

- o more than 2.1 million military members of the Active force
- o almost 1.2 million military members of the Selected Reserve force
- o more than 550 thousand individual members of the Ready Reserve
- o about 700 thousand military retirees under age 60 and about 600,000 between 60 and 70 years of age

- o about 1.0 million U.S. civilian members of the DoD peacetime work force
- o more than 100 thousand foreign nationals in the work force
- o about 17 million potential draftees

B. Military Manpower Demand.

Trained military manpower demand is the sum of manpower to field the force and the cumulative casualty replacements to sustain the force. Peak demand occurs when the size and configuration of the force has stabilized and when cumulative replacement demand is at its highest point. The peak demand for trained military manpower is shown.

Wartime Trained Military Manpower: Peak Demand (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1989</u> <u>Demand</u>	<u>FY 1992</u> <u>Demand</u>
Army	2,090	2,140
Navy	1,000	960
Air Force	910	880
Marine Corps	390	340
Coast Guard	73	70

Military manpower demand peaks at about M+180 for all Services except the Air Force (M+120).

C. Civilian Manpower Demand.

The civilian manpower demand surges immediately upon mobilization when: active units are being fielded and deployed; reserve units are being mobilized, filled, trained, and deployed; and early logistical demands are straining our resources. By M+30, we need to increase our US direct hire civilian workforce by more than 300 thousand.

Wartime U.S. Civilian Manpower: New Hire Requirements (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Wartime</u> <u>Demand</u>	<u>New Hires</u> <u>Required</u>
Army	450	180
Navy	350	50
Air Force	220	60
Marine Corps	20	2
Defense Agencies	80	10

D. Military Manpower Supply.

By about M+60, existing active and mobilized reserve forces are brought to required wartime strength by the mobilization of individual reservists and military retirees. By about M+120 a significant number of

trained replacements become available to units. Thus, the peak shortfall of trained military manpower usually occurs between M+60 and M+120: after the available pretrained individual reserves and retirees have been mobilized; when no significant training output has occurred; and, while casualty replacement requirements are increasing.

DoD is moving to overcome the military manpower shortfalls with several initiatives:

- o We have increased the strength of the Selected Reserve.
- o We are increasing the size of the Individual Ready Reserve.
- o We are obtaining the medical resources necessary to: provide better medical treatment in the field; ensure prompt evacuation of casualties to medical facilities in the U.S.; and to enable their rapid return to duty.
- o We are improving the management of pretrained military manpower resources (retirees, IRR); continues reporting and address updates; peacetime refresher training; peacetime retraining into critical skills; peacetime preassignment; and, continuous screening.
- o We will continue our study on how to make better use of our pretrained manpower to meet skill shortfalls.
- o We are looking into ways of identifying inductees with skills in critical areas who would require only a bare minimum of military training to contribute to a work effort.

E. Civilian Manpower Supply

Our estimated supply of civilians is based on a reduction of the peacetime strengths to reflect the loss of civilian employees recalled to military duties and an assumption of full utilization of all available peacetime employees in wartime positions.

DoD is moving to overcome potential shortfalls in civilian manpower with several initiatives:

- o We are reviewing our demand for additional wartime civilian manpower to identify specific occupations, grades and locations.
- o We are improving the management of our US direct hire mobilization civilian manpower.
- o We plan to secure additional personnel through the concurrent use of multiple employment sources.
- o We plan to redistribute available civilian personnel assets, i.e., excesses at one location will be reassigned to a location where they are needed.
- o We plan to convert part-time personnel to full-time status.

- o We plan to rehire retired civilian personnel who volunteer.
- o Military retirees over age 60 could also be recalled to duty to temporarily fill civilian positions.
- o We have expanded our requirements determination process to begin identifying foreign national civilian manpower requirements.
- o We continue to examine our manpower requirements for functions that might be contracted.

F. Manpower Sustainability. Military manpower availability and sustainability have been greatly enhanced and actually exceed the estimated sustainability for munitions and spare parts.

Civilian manpower availability and sustainability remain to be resolved: we have some estimates of our requirement; we have identified sources of supply as well as areas of competition; we are testing these resources and conflicts at the local level in a series of mobilization exercises.

V. MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY.

The following tables summarize the FY 1988 and FY 1989 Defense manpower programs and compare them to the FY 1980 and FY 1987 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

TABLE II-2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES				
STRATEGIC	94.0	93.1	94.1	95.0
Offensive Strategic Forces	(72.7)	(73.3)	(75.1)	(76.2)
Defensive Strategic Forces	(8.6)	(6.9)	(4.0)	(4.0)
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	(12.7)	(12.8)	(15.0)	(14.8)
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	925.2	1,040.6	1,059.5	1,062.7
Land Forces	(545.1)	(572.3)	(577.9)	(580.7)
Tactical Air Forces	(167.1)	(211.2)	(217.8)	(218.1)
Naval Forces	(176.7)	(217.9)	(228.2)	(228.6)
Mobility Forces	(36.4)	(39.7)	(35.8)	(35.5)
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	66.2	71.5	72.1	72.7
Intelligence	(33.2)	(35.2)	(36.8)	(37.1)
Centrally Managed Comms	(33.0)	(36.3)	(35.3)	(35.6)
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	182.5	178.7	169.2	168.9
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	44.0	50.5	48.3	47.7
MEDICAL SUPPORT	87.2	83.1	84.3	84.9
JOINT ACTIVITIES	21.3	23.9	24.9	24.9
Int'l Military Org	(3.6)	(2.8)	(2.7)	(2.7)
Unified Commands	(1.9)	(3.1)	(3.6)	(3.6)
Federal Agency Support	(2.6)	(2.9)	(3.1)	(3.1)
Joint Chiefs of Staff	(2.6)	(3.8)	(3.8)	(3.9)
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	(10.5)	(11.3)	(11.9)	(11.8)
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	16.5	19.3	25.8	25.3
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	32.8	30.2	28.3	28.1
Combat Commands	(16.2)	(14.8)	(13.9)	(13.9)
Support Commands	(16.6)	(15.4)	(14.3)	(14.2)
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	31.6	32.5	26.5	27.3
Research and Development	(22.1)	(22.9)	(19.4)	(17.7)
Geophysical Activities	(9.5)	(9.6)	(9.1)	(9.6)
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	130.1	140.3	133.1	131.5
Personnel Support	(32.1)	(34.8)	(33.0)	(33.2)
Individual Training	(98.0)	(105.5)	(100.1)	(98.3)

TABLE II-2 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	107.7	128.3	124.7	123.8
Support Installations	(74.5)	(93.4)	(90.9)	(90.2)
Centralized Support Act'y	(33.2)	(34.8)	(33.8)	(33.7)
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	1,739.1	1,892.0	1,890.7	1,892.6
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0	-15.8	-12.9
INDIVIDUALS	311.0	282.1	263.4	258.6
Transients:	(47.7)*	(61.9)	(57.8)	(58.5)
PPH	(8.4)*	(10.8)	(10.0)	(9.9)
Trainees and Students	(129.0)*	(195.8)	(182.1)	(176.6)
Cadets and Midshipman	(8.9)*	(13.6)	(13.7)	(13.7)
END-STRENGTH	2,050.1	2,174.2	2,138.3	2,138.3

*These subtotals do not include Army data, which was not available at this level of disaggregation for FY 1980.

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE II-3
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES				
STRATEGIC	23.3	19.8	20.7	20.5
Offensive Strategic Forces	(12.9)	(10.5)	(10.6)	(10.5)
Defensive Strategic Forces	(9.7)	(8.6)	(9.4)	(9.2)
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.8)
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	680.1	871.9	877.1	889.6
Land Forces	(519.5)	(650.6)	(658.8)	(670.2)
Tactical Air Forces	(57.9)	(80.1)	(82.3)	(82.3)
Naval Forces	(51.1)	(76.0)	(76.8)	(77.5)
Mobility Forces	(51.6)	(65.2)	(59.2)	(59.6)
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	16.7	18.6	18.5	18.2
Intelligence	(4.2)	(5.9)	(5.3)	(5.4)
Centrally Managed Comms	(12.5)	(12.7)	(13.2)	(12.8)
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	13.8	25.3	24.3	24.2
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.7	1.4	0.7	0.7
MEDICAL SUPPORT	11.2	27.6	33.2	33.3
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.8	4.3	1.1	1.1
Int'l Military Org	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Unified Commands	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Federal Agency Support	(0.2)	(3.5)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Joint Chiefs of Staff				
OSD and Defense Agencies/Activities				
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	3.7	8.6	7.5	7.4
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	3.3	4.1	3.8	3.9
Combat Commands	(1.7)	(2.3)	(2.0)	(2.0)
Support Commands	(1.6)	(1.8)	(1.8)	(1.9)
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.9
Research and Development	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.7)
Geophysical Activities	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.2)
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	48.6	66.4	70.0	69.8
Personnel Support	(2.5)	(4.2)	(1.5)	(1.5)
Individual Training	(46.1)	(62.2)	(68.5)	(68.3)

TABLE II-3 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	31.1	60.6	58.2	59.2
Support Installations	(23.8)	(35.4)	(37.0)	(37.4)
Centralized Support Act'y	(7.3)	(25.2)	(21.2)	(21.8)
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	834.7	1109.6	1117.4	1129.4
UNDISTRIBUTED		-32.6	-28.0	-29.3
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	15.2	27.6	29.2	30.0
INDIVIDUALS	56.1	91.5	88.6	78.4
END-STRENGTH	857.5*	1,150.9	1,172.4	1,172.9

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Excludes 10.1 Navy TARs and .2 USMCR and .9 USAFR Cat. 'D' IMAS.

TABLE II-4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES				
STRATEGIC	9.4	11.9	13.0	13.3
Offensive Strategic Forces	(4.8)	(6.5)	(7.3)	(7.6)
Defensive Strategic Forces	(3.4)	(3.4)	(3.6)	(3.6)
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	(1.2)	(2.0)	(2.1)	(2.1)
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	57.2	67.5	66.2	66.8
Land Forces	(23.0)	(28.9)	(26.4)	(26.7)
Tactical Air Forces	(14.4)	(16.5)	(16.3)	(16.3)
Naval Forces	(0.7)	(1.3)	(1.6)	(1.6)
Mobility Forces	(19.1)	(20.6)	(22.0)	(22.2)
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	17.6	21.2	22.7	22.5
Intelligence	(6.7)	(9.6)	(10.6)	(10.8)
Centrally Managed Comms	(10.9)	(11.6)	(12.1)	(11.7)
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	169.2	183.2	175.9	174.5
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	4.6	5.6	6.3	6.3
MEDICAL SUPPORT	37.0	40.6	39.4	39.6
JOINT ACTIVITIES	4.2	7.7	8.2	8.4
Int'l Military Org	(1.4)	(2.6)	(2.8)	(2.8)
Unified Commands	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.6)
Joint Chiefs of Staff	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
OSD and Defense Activity	(2.3)	(4.3)	(4.6)	(4.9)
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	333.5	384.9	384.4	375.7
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	31.5	36.0	36.0	34.8
Combat Commands	(6.9)	(8.7)	(7.6)	(7.6)
Support Commands	(24.6)	(27.3)	(28.3)	(27.2)
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	78.2	83.0	74.5	74.5
Research and Development	(68.1)	(72.3)	(63.9)	(63.9)
Geophysical Activities	(10.1)	(10.7)	(10.5)	(10.5)
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	42.5	53.6	53.1	53.9
Personnel Support	(21.1)	(28.1)	(28.0)	(29.1)
Individual Training	(21.4)	(25.5)	(25.0)	(24.8)

TABLE II-4 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
 (Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	205.6	238.6	232.6	232.3
Support Installations	(156.2)	(158.1)	(152.2)	(151.3)
Centralized Support Act'y	(49.4)	(80.5)	(80.4)	(81.0)
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	990.4	1,134.1	1,112.1	1,102.2
END-STRENGTH	990.4	1,134.1	1,112.1	1,102.2

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER III

ARMY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. General.

This chapter describes the Army's manpower program for the active military, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and civilian components as requested in the Amended Budget Submission (ABS) for FY 1989. It outlines causes for major changes in the manpower program, discusses peacetime manpower readiness, and explains efforts to develop and maintain a highly qualified, efficient, and dedicated military and civilian work force.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements.

Army wartime forces are designed to defend our national interests and yet remain within available resources. With the advent of the two year budget cycle and Program Objective Memorandum, OSD now requires the Services to submit their wartime manpower requirements on a two year cycle. The FY 88/92 data is the most recent information available. FY 90/94 data will be provided next year.

1. Military Manpower.

- o The programmed combat force is prescribed annually in conceptual form by the Defense Guidance, which establishes the planning scenario and specifies such parameters as warning time and theaters of operation.
- o Support forces needed to sustain combat units are determined by computer-assisted analysis.

This process results in a wartime force structure that varies in strength from about 1.60 million soldiers in FY 1988 to about 1.63 million in 1992. Casualty replacements needed to maintain units at fighting strength are then estimated using a warfighting computer simulation. The number of personnel in trainee, transient, prisoner, patient or student status is also estimated.

This establishes a total peak demand for trained military manpower at M+180 as shown below:

Wartime Military Manpower Peak Demand (Trained Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 92</u>
Time at which peak demand occurs	(M+150)	(M+180)
Peak demand	2,091.3	2,135.3

2. Civilian Manpower.

The Army's civilian work force provides overseas and U.S.-based support to sustain deployed and deployable military forces. Civilian manpower is based on the number of people needed to ready, deploy and then sustain these military forces. The majority of civilians would perform logistics activities, such as maintenance, transportation, supply, engineering, and operation of installations.

With the sudden increase in workload that would occur in wartime, the Army's civilian work force must grow immediately in order to provide the support that will enable the military forces to accomplish their mission. Thus, the demand for civilian manpower peaks earlier than the demand for military manpower. The total estimated peak demand for U.S. direct hire civilian manpower is about 448,000 on M-day.

There are projected shortfalls in the supply of both military and civilian manpower. These shortfalls and plans to offset them are discussed beginning on page XXX-XX.

C. Strength Request.

Requested strengths for the Active and Reserve components and the Civilian Employment Plan are shown below:

Army Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Active Military	772.3	772.3
Selected Reserve		
Army Reserve*	320.6	320.6
Army National Guard	457.3	457.3
Civilians**	399.8	400.1

(*Includes 14,680 Individual Mobilization Augmentees in FY 1988 and 14,671 in FY 1989).

(**Includes Civilian Technicians)

Strengths requested for active forces are based primarily on peacetime missions and budgetary constraints, and do not include the significant increase in manpower which would be needed under full mobilization. Moreover, they do not reflect potential (FY 1989 and FY 1990) officer end strength reduction and concomitant capability impact.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program.

1. Overview.

Force structure/manpower plans for FY 1988 - FY 1992 are designed to improve the Total Army's deterrent capability by enhancing combat unit readiness, continuing the modernization program, improving the equipment posture of the Army, increasing productivity program, improving the readiness of the Reserve Components, and expanding Special Operations Forces. The Army will increase its reliance on our Allies

and on the Reserve Component for wartime logistics support of combat forces. The following tables display the strength changes which will result, by major Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), for the active, Selected Reserve, and civilian components. (Note: Due to rounding, detail in the tables may not add to the totals shown.)

Army Active Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	.5	.6	.5	.5
Tactical/Mobility	462.1	474.8	479.7	481.2
Commum/Intel	18.8	21.4	20.8	21.4
Combat Installation	27.6	26.4	16.7	15.9
Force Spt Tng	2.3	5.1	4.6	4.0
Medical Spt	32.3	33.6	33.4	33.4
Joint Activities	7.2	8.1	8.4	8.5
Central Logistics	6.3	7.3	7.9	7.9
Svc Mgt Hdqtrs	7.3	7.0	7.0	6.8
Research/Devel	5.6	5.0	4.3	4.5
Tng/Personnel	53.2	60.0	55.4	54.9
Spt Activities	36.4	36.5	33.3	33.4
Undistributed Manning	0.0		4.6	8.0
Individuals	117.0	94.9	95.7	91.9
TOTALS	776.5	780.8	772.3	772.3

U.S. Army Reserve Manpower Program by DPPC.
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	0	0	0	0
Tactical/Mobility	151.2	208.9	228.2	228.6
Communications/Intell	.3	1.0	1.1	1.0
Combat Installations	0	0	0	0
Force Support Tng	0	0	0	0
Medical Support	6.6	7.0	6.9	6.9
Joint Activities	0.2	3.5	3.3	3.4
Central Logistics	0	0	0	0
Service Mgt Hdqtrs	0.1	0	0	0
Research & Dev	0	0	0	0
Tng & Personnel	42.3	55.2	41.2	39.7
Spt Activities	5.5	24.3	25.3	26.5
Undistributed Manning	0	0	-28.0	-29.3
Individuals	14.4	42.3	35.4	25.3
Indiv Mob Aug	6.6	13.1	14.7	14.7
TOTALS	213.2	313.6	320.6	320.6

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Army National Guard Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Tactical/Mobility	342.8	420.7	425.7	425.7
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Support Activities	20.1	24.8	25.2	25.2
Central Supt Act	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.4
Spt Installations	19.1	23.5	23.7	23.8
Trng & Personnel	5.1	6.2	6.2	6.2
Undistributed Manning	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Individuals	33.1	36.0	39.1	39.4
TOTALS	368.3	451.9	457.3	457.3

Army Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)
Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	0.1	.2	.2	.2
Tactical/Mobility	24.3	31.1	28.3	28.7
Commun/Intel	5.9	4.9	5.0	5.1
Combat Installation	78.0	83.4	77.8	76.8
Force Spt Tng	1.1	2.0	2.4	2.4
Medical Spt	25.6	27.0	25.6	25.9
Joint Activities	1.3	2.7	2.8	3.1
Central Logistics	73.4	85.9	86.8	87.1
Svc Mgtr Hqtrs	12.8	14.1	14.2	12.9
Research/Devel	24.8	19.3	19.3	19.6
Tng/Personnel	19.6	24.3	22.9	23.0
Spt Activities	93.7	117.2	114.6	115.4
TOTALS	360.5	412.2	399.8	400.1

* Numbers may not add due to rounding.

2. The FY 1988 and 1989 Program.

FY 1988 and 1989 changes, as in FY 1987, are designed to continue refining the structure of combat forces, improve manning of the Reserve Component units, continue modernization, and improve strategic deployability. Heavy divisions (armored and mechanized infantry) will continue conversion to a streamlined Army of Excellence (AOE) design as they field modern, more effective equipment. Modernization and structural changes will enhance the combat capability of heavy divisions, while light divisions complete transition to a lighter design. The resulting force structure improves the deployability and combat capability of the Army. Additionally, when more and smaller units were created, there was an increased need for cadre (commissioned and non-commissioned officers). This growth was programmed for officers and NCOs from 1980-1988. NCO growth continues through 1987. However, with congressional reductions to the FY 1989 budget, the Army's end strength was reduced

from the budgeted level of 780.9 to 772.3 effective end FY88. The NCO Corps was reduced to below the FY 1986 end strength level in both FY 1988 and 1989. NCOs are programmed to grow to meet requirements in the FY 1990/1991 time frame and are then straight-lined.

In response to Congressional reductions to the Military Personnel, Army Appropriation, the Army reduced the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps from the FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget submission levels to below the FY 1986 end strength of 279,322. This reduction will be accomplished via a promotion slowdown i.e. losses are not replaced. The NCO reduction is in spite of the need for additional NCOs at the unit level caused by modernization; Army of Excellence (AOE) initiatives which created more units and NCO cadre from existing units by decreasing the number of soldiers in selected teams, squads, sections and platoons; and from doctrinal changes which demand more unit cohesion, individual initiative, effective leadership and experience at small-unit levels. This change will cause a degradation in the ability of the Army to fill units at the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO). This will lead to increased grade substitutions as the higher grade NCOs are not available for assignment.

The Department of Defense ordered a cut in the end strength by 8,600 personnel beginning in FY 1989. This will be accomplished as a decreased accession mission. This reduction impact on the NCO Corps and specifically on the grades E9 and E8, whose maximum strength is driven by a Congressionally directed cap of one percent of the enlisted force can be E9 and three percent can be E8 or E9.

In order to save the required funding the Army will initiate an early release program in both FY 1988 and FY 1989. Under this program, similar to the programs run in FY 1986 and FY 1987, soldiers will be released up to three months prior to their scheduled separation dates. The only exceptions to this program are those soldiers in selected MOS, those with hardships, or those assigned to COHORT units. This program will affect 28,000 soldiers in FY 1988 and 48,000 soldiers in FY 1989.

As another cost savings option, the Army will move the pin-on-point for promotion to the grades E3 and E4 (12 to 13 months for E3; 26 to 28 months for E4).

The above actions will cause the Army to underman the enlisted force by 5,600 manyears in FY 1988 and 2,200 manyears in FY 1989. It will also cause the Operating Strength Deviation to grow from +1,800 manyears in FY 1988 to -9,400 manyears in FY 1989.

In 1986, the Congress directed the Department of Defense to absorb an officer reduction which, when apportioned by the Secretary of Defense, caused the Army to eliminate 1635 officers (1.51 percent) in FY87 and another 1514 (1.40 percent) by the end of FY88. Additionally, the Army has been directed to plan for the elimination of another 4446 officers (4.12 percent) by the end of FY90. This equates to a total reduction of 7595 officers (7.04 percent) between FY87 and FY90, if the FY 89-90 reductions take place as currently scheduled.

Officer reductions for FY88 (1514) will be accomplished through lower accessions, forcing out promotion passovers and forcibly retiring senior officers with combat experience. The Army was able to avoid a reduction in force (RIF) in both FY87 and FY88, but will have to resort to this method for FY89 and FY90 if the scheduled reductions do take place. In addition to RIFs, the Army will have to forcibly retire many experienced officers in order to eliminate the large number required by law. This will have a deleterious effect upon our fighting force and combat readiness.

In FY87 1,635 officer positions were eliminated from the Active Army. The Army's non-tactical or supporting base absorbed these reductions. The non-tactical base of the Active Army is the sustaining, training, mobilization, and transition-to-war capability of the total Army. Both the National Guard and the US Army Reserve rely on the Active Army to maintain the non-tactical base. Therefore, officer cuts in this area have a significant rippling affect throughout the total Army. For example, 896 officer positions were removed from the installation management function. The Army places the major wartime mission of mobilizing the Reserve Components on installations managers. Thus, the risk of being able to execute mobilization plans has been raised significantly.

FY88 end strength reductions in the Active Army will inactivate one infantry maneuver brigade and not activate two infantry battalions. This structure reduction decreases U.S. capability to protect vital interests worldwide by increasing the deployment time to build a full division. Included within the FY88 end strength reduction is the elimination of 1,514 officer positions. Officer positions totaling 295 will be removed in conjunction with the elimination of the above mentioned infantry units. Additional areas with significant officer reductions are Army Aviation, HQ, field operating agencies, and the Reserve Officers Training Corps. As a result of these reductions readiness, command and control, HQ, management, and the ability to recruit quality lieutenants will be jeopardized. FY1989 will show an increase in officers allocated to the force structure since the Army is putting back into the force structure approximately 1,600 platoon leader positions previously taken out. This increase is accomplished within our commissioned officer ceiling of 104,813, and within overall Army end strength.

Reserve Component (RC) responsibilities will continue to increase as their strength increases. The Army National Guard (ARNG) will increase manning of its combat units; the 29th Infantry Division (Light), activated in FY 1986, will complete its formation. The U.S. Army Reserve will continue to provide the majority of the tactical support for the Total Force in any conflict. Total Army support structure, constrained by resources and the decision to reduce active component end strength, will continue to remain below current estimates of Total Army needs. The Army continues to modernize and "scrub" its support structure by increasing the productivity of support units, and increasing reliance on civilian, contingency contracting, and Host Nation Support (HNS). An integral part of the capability of Army force structure rests with its Full-Time Support (AGR, technicians, DA civilians and Active Component in support of RC units) which provides both wartime and peacetime support for base operations, force modernization, and improved family support, thus releasing military personnel for duty in tactical units.

The FY 1988 and 1989 Program reflects civilian strength reductions associated with lower funding levels contained in the Army Operation and Maintenance Amended Budget Submission (ABS) and OSD directed force structure reductions. A total of -11,690 authorizations were reduced in FY 1988 and -12,216 in FY 1989. While the final impacts of these reductions on current mission requirements have not been fully assessed, analysis of programmed levels show significant reductions in the Army's manning levels associated with: support to installations (both combat and support installations), training support; logistics support; information management; Europe-MTOE unit support; POMCUS support; family and community programs; and, the Army food service program.

3. Active Component.

FY 1989 active force structure changes occur in the Continental United States (CONUS), Europe, and the Pacific regions. New Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) will be implemented in the combat structure of many divisions.

a. Continental United States.

(1) The 10th Mountain Division (LI), activated in FY 1985 at Ft Drum, New York, will complete the activation of subordinate units by FY 1989. The 6th Infantry Division (L) in Alaska, activated in FY 1986, will not complete its activation during FY 1989 as previously programmed. The OSD directed active military strength reduction of 8,600 will result in the division activating with two less infantry battalions than had been originally planned. Other CONUS activations include one Corps assault helicopter battalion, two Chaparral battalions, one Corps Chaparral battalion, one Patriot battalion, and six Patriot air defense batteries. Conversions include eleven 155 mm field artillery battalions changing to 3X8 design, one EAD signal company, seven medium truck companies (container/cargo), two medium truck companies (petroleum, five terminal service companies, three Corps Military Police brigades, two air defense battalions to interim FAAD design, Chap/Vul battalion to a Corps Chaparral battalion and six convert to a modernized design. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 2d Armored Division will be the first units to receive the new Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) communications equipment.

(2) Increased readiness and modernization of Special Operation Forces (SOF) units will continue to be a high priority. All AC Special Forces Groups will be structured at Authorized Levels of Organization One (ALO 1) by FY88 Special Forces, Ranger, and AC Psychological Operations units will convert to new TOEs as part of the revitalization.

b. Europe

The Army continues to refine force structure to the Army of Excellence (AOE) design. Major force structure initiatives for FY 1989 include activation of three Corps AH-64 attack helicopter battalions, one movement control battalion, one command aviation battalion, three military police companies, three Patriot air defense batteries, one transportation movement battalion, and one CH47 medium helicopter company. Conversion will be made to modernized configuration of two division cavalry squadrons, three divisional AH-64 battalions, two 155 mm FA

battalions to 3X8 design, five 8 IN FA battalions to 3X8 design, four Corps engineer battalions, and three general support hospitals. Sixteen medium truck (container/cargo) companies, two medium truck companies (petroleum), two Corps aviation companies, and three Warhead Support Detachments will be inactivated. These major force changes will be accomplished within the end strength constraints prescribed for military personnel in European NATO countries. Host Nation Support will continue to be a vital ingredient for wartime tactical support of Army Forces in Europe.

c. Pacific.

In Korea, the 2nd Infantry Division will activate an attack helicopter battalion. The 25th Infantry Division completed its conversion to the light infantry design in November 1986. Conversions include two medium truck companies (container/cargo).

4. Reserve Component.

a. Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Mix.

The Total Army must be prepared for a broad spectrum of conflict. The mix of active and reserve forces is predicated on several factors, the most important of which are the potential mission and required responsiveness. Other factors include the number and type of skills required, recruiting ability, and overall costs. Recruiting is discussed in more detail in later sections. Affordability is achieved by increasing reliance on the ARNG and USAR as essential elements of the national defense. Reserve Component soldiers have been an integral part of the Total Army team. They provide a cost effective way to meet increasing world-wide contingencies while the Active Component maintains a fixed end strength. Approximately 53 percent of the Total Army force structure and 68 percent of the non-divisional combat service support force are in the Reserve Component. This integrated Active/Reserve Component force is essential and is being achieved through a variety of programs:

(1) Modernization/Unit Conversions. In FY 1988, Reserve Component heavy units will continue to refine force structure to the AOE design. These conversions will allow Reserve Component units to adopt the latest TOEs compatible with Active Component unit designs. Scheduled FY 1988 Reserve Component conversions include six brigade/division headquarters, seventeen infantry and armor battalions, three cavalry squadrons, one attack helicopter battalion, thirty-two maintenance companies and nine combat support battalions.

(2) Equipment modernization. The Army will continue to distribute new and modernized systems to the Reserve Component. The tank modernization effort will continue as additional Reserve Component units receive upgraded M60 tanks (M60A3). In addition, by FY 1987, four Reserve Component battalions will have been equipped with the M1 tank. Other equipment planned for FY 1987 distribution to Reserve Component units includes communication systems, helicopters, artillery, radar, automatic data processing systems, and trucks. This new equipment, when provided during the mid-1990s, will provide the Reserve Component with modern systems compatible with those in Active Component units.

(3) Training. Reserve Component units will continue to achieve substantial training experiences through Active/Reserve Components combined training efforts both in local training and in field exercises such as BOLD EAGLE, GALLANT EAGLE, REFORGER, etc. In FY 1988, the Reserve Component will send one maneuver battalion and one brigade to field exercises at the National Training Center. Regional maintenance training sites were established at Fort Bragg, NC, and Camp Shelby, MS, during FY 1986. These two sites plus four others which were implemented in FY 1987, along with fifteen others planned in the future, bring the total to twenty-one. Training simulation devices will continue to be provided to Reserve Component units. Mobilization Army Training Center (MATC) exercises will be conducted at selected TRADOC and FORSCOM installations to assess the capability of USAR Training Divisions to augment or establish training centers.

(4) Roundout Program. This is a program in which Reserve Component maneuver battalions and brigades are integrated into Active Component divisions and separate brigades to alleviate structure shortfalls in Active Component organizations. Six Reserve Component brigades and eight maneuver battalions will round out the Active Component units in FY 1989. Nine of eighteen Active Component divisions, including two light divisions, will have roundout units. The Roundout program improves Reserve Component capability by allocating resources to the roundout unit consistent with those provided to their affiliated Active Component unit and by establishing closer planning and training relationships.

b. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

(1) Improvement of force readiness and force modernization continue to be the focus of the USAR in FY 1988 and FY 1989. USAR units will continue their conversion to modernized structures with modern equipment compatible with the Active Component or ARNG units they support; participation in joint and combined training exercises; and assumption of responsibility and training for new missions. The total Full Time Support Program however will not increase from FY 1988 to FY 1989. This lack of growth is detrimental to improving the readiness of USAR units.

(2) In FY 1988 and FY 1989 the USAR will activate 230 and convert 257 units. These activations by major functional area will include three AH-1 attack helicopter battalions, six corps aviation companies/headquarters, four chemical battalion headquarters, eight chemical companies, seven medical hospitals, six CEWI battalions, twenty CEWI companies, fourteen maintenance companies and several rear area operations centers and augmentation cells. The following units by functional areas will be converted to a more modern design as result of updated TOEs: sixty four Adjutant General and Finance units, twenty one quartermaster companies, twelve CEWI units, and fifteen maintenance units. All 205th Infantry Brigade units, which roundout the Active Component 6th Infantry Division (Light), will convert to the light infantry design TOEs.

c. Army National Guard (ARNG).

(1) The ARNG will continue in FY 1988-89 to improve force readiness by increasing combat unit manning, activating new combat units, and modernizing equipment and organizations. The Full-time Support Force, however, is not programmed to increase from FY 1988 to FY 1989. This lack of growth is detrimental to improving the readiness of the ARNG to carry out new missions requiring rapid mobilization, without the necessity of intensive training or equipping prior to deployment. The Full-time Support force, the backbone of efforts being made to achieve readiness objectives, supports the increased tempo of training by providing Full-time personnel in units to plan, develop, coordinate, and conduct required training. It also supports the increased tempo in supply management, equipment maintenance and administration by providing Full-time trained and qualified personnel to perform and assume these functions that are critical to the achievement of mobilization objectives. ARNG units will also continue conversion to Army of Excellence Division 86 design as the Total Army standardizes its organizational structure and equipment. Where appropriate, additional missions will be transferred from the Active Component to the ARNG.

(2) In FY 1988 the ARNG will activate five aviation headquarters, two hospitals and one multiple launch rocket system battalion in support of the corps structure. The 42nd Infantry Division will activate one infantry battalion upon the transfer of the 27th Infantry Brigade (Light) to the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). Modernization will occur in the conversion of one attack helicopter battalion to the AH-64 helicopter and one armor battalion to the M1 tank. Also, the M-60A3 tank will be issued to twelve armor battalions, three divisional cavalry squadrons and three separate brigade cavalry troops. In FY 1989, five additional aviation headquarters and four attack helicopter battalions will be activated as part of the corps-level aviation structure. Preliminary actions will be initiated to convert two armored cavalry regiments to separate armor brigades. The 18 Rear Area Operations Centers will be expanded and converted to fifty separate units as part of the Army of Excellence design.

5. Civilian Component.

To comply with OSD directives, the FY 1988 and 1989 Army goal is to reduce civilian force structure levels and reevaluate current and programmed mission requirements and to realign constrained resources to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Reduced civilian strength levels will be assessed to determine their impact on unit readiness, mobilization requirements, and peacetime operations.

E. Key Manpower Issues.

FY 1988-89 Army manpower initiatives seek to improve the quality and stability of the Army's force.

1. Quality:

The quality of manpower has significantly improved in recent years and has resulted in better training, higher quality reenlistments, and improved readiness. The success of modernization programs will depend heavily on maintaining this quality as national economic conditions create an environment less favorable to recruiting and retaining soldiers. Enlistment bonuses, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, special incentives, competitive compensation, and family quality of life programs will need continued Congressional support as the Army seeks to recruit and retain soldiers with the required skills.

2. Stability:

Stability will continue to be emphasized in FY 1988-89, as the Army force structure adjusts to the recent light division initiatives and other extensive changes due to modernization and restructuring of heavy divisions. A fair and competitive level of compensation will help support the personnel stability the Army needs, as will the Unit Manning system, which enables soldiers to train, deploy and remain with the same units under the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) system. While the continued absence of statutory civilian end strength helps to enhance stability, it does not compensate for the impact of dollar reductions on civilian hiring levels. Beginning in FY 1988, Operations & Maintenance Army (OMA) dollar reductions and directed force structure reductions necessitated the identification of an -11,690 civilian strength decrement bringing the FY 1988 civilian manpower program from 411,530 to 399,840. Reduction of this magnitude offsets any flexibility gained by the elimination of end strength ceilings, causing skill and location imbalances and disruption of functions currently being performed by military. Instability attendant upon proposed officer end strength reductions, if enacted, will disrupt the continuity of past years programs both in terms of personnel hardship and residual adverse impact on remaining soldiers, but more importantly in terms of degraded capability, direct and consequential. Absorption of Congressionally directed programs, not funded in PB87, required dollar cuts in Bonus programs, NCO promotions, and accessions.

3. European Troops Strength:

The Congressionally imposed ETS ceiling continues to limit CINCEUR's flexibility to structure his forces to meet the threat as he sees it. The Army strongly supports removal of the ceiling.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS.

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General.

The active Army entered FY 1987 with an authorized strength of 780,800 and finished with an actual end strength of 780,815. This is the result of the success in meeting recruiting and retention goals, and ability to promote soldiers to the grade in which they were serving. Heretofore, numerous E4 and E5 were performing duties at E5/6 level

respectively without pay. Another success story was the reduction of critically imbalanced MOS/Grades from 55% to 22%, thereby placing two divisions worth of soldiers with the right grade and MOS into the right job. This force alignment capability is dependent upon MPA % and directly affects unit readiness. Active Army military end strength is programmed to continue at 772,300 through FY 1992 as the Army modernizes its forces and improves readiness without increasing active military end strength. This will be achieved while restructuring the force. This restructuring includes light divisions completing transition to lighter, more modernized designs; heavy divisions continue conversions to a streamlined Army of Excellence (AOE) design; increased emphasis on medical and special operations forces; and integration of Reserve Component units with the active force.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

Table III-I shows that between FY80 and FY87 significant strides were made in reducing individuals accounts and increasing force structure manning. Further, between 1980 and 1987 force structure manning increased 12,700 in tactical/mobility forces representing 48% of the force structure increase during that time period. The next largest increase occurred in individual training (22%) which continues to demonstrate an emphasis on combat readiness.

Table III-I shows that in FY 1988 the Army plans to man 672,000 of the total 750,400 programmed manpower structure, leaving over 78,000 spaces unmanned. In FY 1989 the Army plans to man 672,500 of the total 753,300 programmed manpower structure, leaving 80,800 spaces unmanned. Even with these unmanned requirements in FY 1988-1989, the Army has maintained its tactical and mobility forces at 93 percent of its total force structure authorizations.

Table III-1
Active Army Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End
Strength (Thousands)

TOTAL Active Military DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 80			FY 87			FY 88			FY 89		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG RQMT	AUTH	PROG RQMT	% MNG	AUTH	PROG RQMT	% MNG
STRATEGIC	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	83.3%	0.5	0.6	89.2%
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	83.3%	0.5	0.6	89.2%
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	479.5	462.1	477.5	474.8	517.5	517.5	479.7	519.0	92.7%	481.2	519.0	92.7%
Land Forces	479.3	461.9	477.3	474.5	517.3	517.3	479.5	518.8	92.7%	481.0	518.8	92.7%
Division Forces	440.3	423.4	443.1	438.3	472.3	472.3	443.6	472.5	93.9%	445.5	472.5	94.3%
(Divisional Increment)	245.4	237.8	241.4	243.7	243.5	243.5	245.0	243.9	100.6%	246.4	243.9	101.0%
(Non-div Cbt Increment)	83.8	79.9	82.2	81.1	93.5	93.5	84.4	93.7	90.3%	87.3	93.7	93.2%
(Tactical Support Increment)	111.1	105.8	119.6	113.6	134.9	134.9	114.2	134.9	84.7%	111.7	134.9	82.8%
Theater Forces	39.0	38.5	34.3	36.2	45.0	45.0	35.9	46.3	79.8%	35.5	46.3	76.7%
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	132.0%	0.3	0.2	132.0%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	18.4	18.8	21.0	21.4	26.1	26.1	20.8	26.4	79.8%	21.4	26.4	81.1%
Intelligence	8.5	8.5	9.7	9.3	10.3	10.3	9.8	10.4	95.4%	9.9	10.4	95.2%
Centrally Managed Comm	9.9	10.4	11.3	12.0	15.8	15.8	11.0	16.0	69.6%	11.5	16.0	71.9%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	26.4	27.6	18.2	26.4	17.0	17.0	16.7	17.0	98.2%	15.9	17.0	93.5%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	2.3	2.3	5.1	5.1	5.5	5.5	4.6	5.5	83.6%	4.0	5.5	73.6%
MEDICAL SUPPORT	31.1	32.3	33.4	33.6	39.2	39.2	33.4	39.6	85.2%	33.4	39.6	84.3%
JOINT ACTIVITIES	7.4	7.2	8.5	8.1	8.6	8.6	8.4	8.6	97.9%	8.5	8.6	99.0%
Int'l Military Org	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	100.6%	1.3	1.3	100.6%
Unified Commands	0.6	0.6	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.1	81.8%	1.0	1.1	90.9%
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	104.5%	0.2	0.2	104.5%
JCS Support	0.6	0.7	1.0	0.9	1.6	1.6	0.9	1.6	56.3%	1.0	1.6	62.5%
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	4.4	4.0	5.0	4.7	4.4	4.4	5.0	4.4	113.6%	5.1	4.4	115.9%
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	8.1	6.3	11.3	7.3	9.7	9.7	7.9	9.7	81.4%	7.9	9.7	81.4%
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	7.1	7.3	6.9	7.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	8.0	87.5%	6.8	8.0	85.0%
Combat Commands	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	95.7%	2.2	2.3	95.7%
Support Commands	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.9	5.7	5.7	4.8	5.7	84.2%	4.6	5.7	80.7%

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	7.3	5.6	5.1	5.0	5.8	4.3	74.1%	5.9	4.5	76.3%
Research and Development	7.3	5.6	5.1	5.0	5.8	4.3	74.1%	5.9	4.5	76.3%
Geophysical Activities	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	52.6	53.2	58.0	60.0	62.3	55.4	88.9%	62.7	54.9	87.6%
Personnel Support	12.5	13.2	13.2	14.3	13.4	12.8	95.5%	13.7	12.8	93.4%
Individual Training	40.1	40.0	44.8	45.7	48.9	42.6	87.1%	49.0	42.1	85.9%
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	32.8	36.4	33.2	36.5	50.1	33.3	66.5%	49.4	33.4	67.6%
Support Installations	16.2	20.2	16.3	18.6	23.4	16.2	69.2%	23.1	16.3	70.6%
Centralized Support Act'y	16.6	16.2	16.9	17.9	26.7	17.1	64.0%	27.3	17.2	63.0%
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	673.6	659.6	678.7	685.9	750.4	672.0	89.6%	753.3	672.5	89.3%
Undistributed Manning	-15.9		3.5			4.6			8.0	
(Manyyears)			(5.0)			2.0			(-4.2)	
INDIVIDUALS	116.4	117.0	98.6	94.9		95.7			91.9	
(Manyyears)		(108.6)	(99.1)	(94.0)		(89.9)			(96.2)	
Transients			17.5	15.5		16.9			17.8	
Holdees			6.0	4.9		4.0			3.9	
Trainees/Students			70.5	70.1		70.3			65.7	
Cadets			4.6	4.4		4.5			4.5	
TOTAL END STRENGTH	774.0	776.5	780.8	780.8		772.3			772.3	

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Table III-1A
Active Army Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End
Strength (Thousands)

OFFICERS	FY 80			FY 87			FY 88			FY 89		
	DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES			DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES			DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES			DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH
STRATEGIC	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	58.0%	0.2	0.1	58.0%	0.2	0.1
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	58.0%	0.2	0.1	58.0%	0.2	0.1
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	38.4	35.9	43.9	43.5	51.0	44.7	87.7%	51.0	45.9	90.0%	51.0	45.9
Land Forces	38.3	35.8	43.8	43.4	50.9	44.6	87.6%	50.9	45.8	90.0%	50.9	45.8
Division Forces	34.7	32.4	39.7	39.3	46.2	40.2	87.0%	46.2	41.4	89.6%	46.2	41.4
(Divisional Increment)	19.3	18.2	21.3	23.5	23.5	22.2	94.5%	23.4	23.2	99.1%	23.4	23.2
(Non-div Gbt Increment)	5.8	5.3	7.1	6.6	8.1	7.3	90.1%	8.2	8.0	97.6%	8.2	8.0
(Tactical Support Increm)	9.6	8.9	11.3	10.0	14.6	10.7	73.5%	14.6	10.2	69.9%	14.6	10.2
Theater Forces	3.6	3.4	4.2	4.1	4.7	4.4	93.6%	4.7	4.4	93.6%	4.7	4.4
Mobility Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	118.0%	0.1	0.1	118.0%	0.1	0.1
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	2.4	2.4	3.1	2.8	3.9	3.0	77.5%	3.9	3.0	77.4%	3.9	3.0
Intelligence	1.6	1.6	2.1	1.9	2.7	2.1	77.8%	2.7	2.1	77.8%	2.7	2.1
Centrally Managed Comm	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.2	0.9	76.8%	1.2	0.9	76.5%	1.2	0.9
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	3.5	3.4	2.4	3.4	2.4	1.6	66.7%	2.4	1.6	66.7%	2.4	1.6
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.7	70.0%	1.0	0.8	75.0%	1.0	0.8
MEDICAL SUPPORT	10.7	11.7	11.9	11.7	14.3	12.1	84.6%	14.5	12.1	83.4%	14.5	12.1
JOINT ACTIVITIES	3.1	3.0	3.5	3.3	3.9	3.4	85.9%	3.9	3.5	88.5%	3.9	3.5
Int'l Military Org	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	101.0%	0.5	0.5	101.0%	0.5	0.5
Unified Commands	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.6	75.0%	0.8	0.6	75.0%	0.8	0.6
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	146.0%	0.1	0.1	146.0%	0.1	0.1
JCS Support	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.4	50.0%	0.8	0.4	50.0%	0.8	0.4
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	100.0%	1.7	1.7	100.0%	1.7	1.7
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	2.0	1.5	2.3	1.7	2.5	2.0	80.0%	2.5	1.9	76.0%	2.5	1.9
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	100.0%	4.9	4.7	95.9%	4.9	4.7
Combat Commands	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.4	116.7%	1.2	1.4	116.7%	1.2	1.4
Support Commands	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.5	94.6%	3.7	3.3	89.2%	3.7	3.3

Table III-1B
Active Army Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End
Strength (Thousands)

ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 80			FY 87			FY 88			FY 89		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
STRATEGIC	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	104.7%	0.4	0.4	104.7%
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	104.7%	0.4	0.4	104.7%
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	443.1	426.2	443.6	431.3	443.6	431.3	446.5	435.0	93.3%	446.0	435.3	93.0%
Land Forces	443.1	426.2	443.6	431.3	443.6	431.3	446.5	435.0	93.3%	446.0	435.3	93.0%
Division Forces	443.1	426.2	443.6	431.3	443.6	431.3	446.5	435.0	93.3%	446.0	435.3	93.0%
(Divisional Incrment)	443.1	426.2	443.6	431.3	443.6	431.3	446.5	435.0	93.3%	446.0	435.3	93.0%
(Non-div Cbt Increment)	443.1	426.2	443.6	431.3	443.6	431.3	446.5	435.0	93.3%	446.0	435.3	93.0%
(Tactical Support Incrment)	443.1	426.2	443.6	431.3	443.6	431.3	446.5	435.0	93.3%	446.0	435.3	93.0%
Theater Forces	443.1	426.2	443.6	431.3	443.6	431.3	446.5	435.0	93.3%	446.0	435.3	93.0%
Mobility Forces	443.1	426.2	443.6	431.3	443.6	431.3	446.5	435.0	93.3%	446.0	435.3	93.0%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	16.0	16.4	17.9	18.6	17.9	18.6	22.2	17.8	80.0%	22.5	18.4	81.8%
Intelligence	16.0	16.4	17.9	18.6	17.9	18.6	22.2	17.8	80.0%	22.5	18.4	81.8%
Centrally Managed Comm	16.0	16.4	17.9	18.6	17.9	18.6	22.2	17.8	80.0%	22.5	18.4	81.8%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
MEDICAL SUPPORT	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
JOINT ACTIVITIES	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
Int'l Military Org	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
Unified Commands	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
Federal Agency Support	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
JCS Support	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	9.1	9.5	10.3	11.1	10.3	11.1	14.2	10.1	71.1%	14.8	10.6	71.6%
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	2.6	2.6	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.1	2.7	3.3	122.2%	2.7	3.3	122.2%
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	2.6	2.6	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.1	2.7	3.3	122.2%	2.7	3.3	122.2%
Combat Commands	2.6	2.6	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.1	2.7	3.3	122.2%	2.7	3.3	122.2%
Support Commands	2.6	2.6	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.1	2.7	3.3	122.2%	2.7	3.3	122.2%

3. Skill and Grade.

The data in Table III-2 outlines the alignment of the Army by skill and grade.

a. Enlisted.

An integrated Enlisted Force Alignment Plan (FAPI) implemented in January 1985 continues to significantly improve the balance of the enlisted force, particularly grades E5-E9, by reducing overages and shortages.

The table below compares the actual data at the end of FY 1986 (as published in the FY 1988 DMRR) with the actual historical data at the end of FY 1987 (from Table III-2):

<u>Enlisted Imbalances</u>				
	FY86		FY87	
	<u># Over/Short</u> (Thousands)	<u>% Imb *</u>	<u># Over/Short</u> (Thousands)	<u>% Imb *</u>
E1-4	34.1	8.8	28.1	7.6
E5-9	24.9	8.9	11.0	3.9
TOT E1-9	45.8	6.9	28.8	4.4

* (Over/Short) divided by (Total Programmed Manning plus Individuals)

Each enlisted grade group experienced reduced overages and shortages (i.e., imbalances), both in absolute numbers of imbalances and as a percent of the Programmed Manning plus Individuals (PMI). E8 and E9 authorizations were scrubbed and, where appropriate, were downgraded to lower grades to better align authorizations with legally constrained limits on the allowable E8/E9 inventory (3% of Total Enlisted Force).

TABLE III-2
Active Army Skill and Grade
Actual and Projected Inventory Versus Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
MOSLS ALT M945002X

	ACTUAL FY 1987				PROGRAMMED FY 1988				PROGRAMMED FY 1989			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	105	81	81	267	116	102	44	262	70	168	42	259
PMI	158,282	160,599	52,864	371,745	217,727	122,714	21,311	365,752	89,956	263,073	20,408	373,437
Inventory	178,337	162,280	44,816	385,433	237,625	123,715	22,229	383,569	98,839	264,379	17,911	381,129
Over/Short	20,055	1,681	-8,048	13,688	19,898	1,001	-3,082	17,817	8,883	1,306	-2,497	7,692
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	96	200	43	339	57	200	80	337	41	203	93	337
PMI	36,322	209,801	36,166	282,289	15,519	190,891	78,827	285,237	15,518	195,974	75,927	287,419
Inventory	42,159	209,396	31,000	282,555	18,513	187,495	71,060	277,068	18,050	191,961	68,571	278,582
Over/Short	5,837	-405	-5,166	266	2,994	-3,396	-7,767	-8,169	2,532	-4,013	-7,356	-8,837
TOTAL E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	102	171	66	339	78	202	58	338	46	232	59	337
PMI	173,051	394,875	86,108	654,034	96,597	469,753	84,639	650,989	69,449	521,047	70,360	660,856
Inventory	192,342	399,016	76,630	667,988	108,720	475,260	76,657	660,637	77,545	518,997	63,149	659,711
Over/Short	19,291	4,141	-9,478	13,954	12,123	5,507	-7,982	9,648	8,096	2,050	-7,191	-1,145
Warrant Officer												
Number of Skills	0	27	31	58	0	26	32	58	4	36	9	49
PMI	0	3,152	14,240	17,392	0	2,525	15,376	17,901	1,136	13,484	1,571	16,191
Inventory	0	3,069	12,026	15,095	0	2,465	12,865	15,330	1,363	12,707	1,260	15,330
Over/Short	0	-83	-2,214	-2,297	0	-60	-2,511	-2,571	+227	-777	-311	-861
01 - 03												
Number of Skills	12	19	10	41	19	13	9	41	19	14	8	41
PMI	27.4	13.3	17.5	58.2	27.4	15.3	15.8	58.6	28.4	17.2	11.9	57.6
Inventory	30.4	13.6	15.6	59.7	30.5	15.5	13.9	59.9	31.6	17.4	10.1	59.1
Over/Short	3.0	0.3	-1.9	1.5	3.1	0.2	-2.0	1.4	3.2	0.1	-1.8	1.5

04 - 06		14		24		41		3		6		32		41		3		15		23		41	
Number of Skills		3																					
PMI		2.6	11.0	22.7	36.3				2.6	6.0		28.0			36.6	2.6		12.9		20.6		36.1	
Inventory		3.0	11.0	19.2	33.1				2.9	5.9		23.4			32.1	3.0		12.8		17.6		33.4	
Over/Short		0.4	-0.1	-3.5	-3.2				0.3	-0.1		-4.6			-4.5	0.4		-0.1		-0.3		-2.7	
TOTAL 01 - 06																							
Number of Skills		10	15	16	41				8	16		17			41	10		16		15		41	
PMI		24.3	42.3	27.9	94.5				17.6	43.0		34.6			95.2	20.8		45.8		27.1		93.7	
Inventory		26.6	42.2	24.0	92.8				19.1	43.0		29.9			92.0	22.9		46.0		23.6		92.5	
Over/Short		2.2	-0.1	-3.9	-1.7				1.5	0.0		-4.7			-3.2	2.1		0.2		-3.5		-1.2	

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

Actions and programs now in effect or planned to provide improved officer grade balances include:

- (1) The Army accesses to meet all Lieutenant requirements plus combat arms company grade requirements. These inventories are aligned at the 3-4 years of service (YOS) by reassigning combat arms officers to combat support and combat service support branches.
- (2) Officer and warrant officer authorization scrub of MTOE and TDA units to better align authorizations with inventory and accommodate congressionally mandated reductions.

4. Experience.

The data in Table III-3 indicate that the Army has a seasoned leadership cadre. No significant changes are projected.

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSIS ALTERNATIVE: M945002X

	ACTUAL FY 1987			PROGRAMMED FY 1988			PROGRAMMED FY 1989			PROGRAMMED FY 1990		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS
E1-E4												
PMI**	371,745			365,752			373,437			372,834		
Inventry	385,433	47,494	2.182	383,569	50,324	2.261	381,129	45,010	2.158	378,603	42,950	2.106
E5-E9												
PMI	282,289			285,237			287,419			289,242		
Inventry	282,555	262,580	10.858	277,068	263,884	11.222	278,582	261,571	11.290	281,175	262,168	11.370
TOTAL E1-E9												
PMI	654,034			650,989			660,856			662,076		
Inventry	667,988	310,074	5.852	660,637	314,208	6.020	659,711	306,581	6.014	659,778	305,118	6.054
WARRANT OFFICER												
PMI	17.4			17.9			16.2			16.4		
Inventry	15.1	14.1	15.5	15.3	13.9	15.3	15.3	13.9	15.2	15.3	13.9	15.1
01 - 03												
PMI	58.2			58.6			57.6			57.6		
Inventry	59.7	30.3	4.5	59.9	31.2	4.9	59.1	30.2	4.6	58.9	30.5	4.6
04 - 06												
PMI	36.3			36.6			36.1			36.1		
Inventry	33.1	32.6	17.0	32.1	31.7	16.8	33.4	33.0	16.5	33.3	32.9	16.6
TOTAL 01 - 06												
PMI	94.5			95.2			93.7			93.7		
Inventry	92.8	62.9	9.6	92.0	62.9	9.4	92.5	63.2	9.2	92.2	63.4	9.2

*Detail may not add to totals due to rounding. Excludes US Military Academy Cadets.

**Programmed Manning plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management.

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting.

(a) Overview. The Army maintained its end strength and met its overall recruiting objective in FY 1987 and again improved the overall quality of its accessions. The active Army recruited 91.1 percent high school graduates and 3.9 percent AFQT Test Category IV personnel. The significant quality improvement came in the increase of Test Category I-III A recruits from 63.0 percent to 66.7 percent. Force modernization requires that the Army continue to emphasize the need for high quality enlistees. In order to achieve this goal in an increasingly competitive recruiting environment (declining youth labor pool, improving economy, decreased unemployment), the Army must rely on such incentives as fair and competitive compensation, educational incentives and Army College Fund Programs, and enlistment cash bonuses.

Enlisted Accession Plan (In thousands)

<u>Category</u>	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	12.5	12.5	9.5	10.0
Non-Prior Service	119.5	120.5	105.5	124.0
Male	103.4	104.2	91.5	108.5
(Male I-III A)	66.2	69.0	57.9	68.3
(HSDG)	91.6	93.5	80.6	97.0
(HSDG I-III A)	54.3	58.5	48.1	56.9
Female	16.1	16.3	14.0	15.5
(Female I-III A)	10.6	11.3	8.7	10.0
(HSDG)	16.1	16.3	14.0	15.5
(HSDG I-III A)	10.6	11.3	8.7	10.0

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding

(b) Quality. In FY 1988 and beyond, the Army will continue its objective of recruiting the number of high school graduate and Test Category I-III A people required to build a more capable force. The Army accession goal is to recruit 63 percent Test Category I-III A soldiers each year, to recruit at least 90 percent High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG), and to limit Test Category IV accessions to less than 10 percent each year. These goals are well within the Congressional floor of 65 percent high school graduates and the ceiling of 20 percent Test Score Category IV. Failure to achieve the Army recruiting goals for

quality would adversely affect force readiness and modernization since non-high school graduates tend to have higher attrition rates and recruits from lower test categories tend to be more difficult to train. Failure to achieve quality goals therefore would result in decreased unit stability and cohesion, increased training requirements, added expense, and lower combat readiness.

(2) Retention. The Army achieved its aggregate reenlistment objective and continued to improve enlisted force alignment in FY 1986. Due to the improved quality of Army accessions over the last four years, the three year attrition of first term soldiers has declined. However, adequate compensation and Selective Reenlistment Bonus funding will be essential if we are to be successful in retaining these and other high quality soldiers in FY 1988, FY 1989, and beyond. Educational incentives which can be utilized while on active duty also assist in the retention of our career soldiers.

Reenlistments
(In thousands)

	<u>FY 86</u>		<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Initial Term	32.6	33.8	34.4	35.6	34.4	28.6
Mid Term	23.1	24.8	20.4	20.8	18.5	23.1
Career	21.4	21.6	21.4	21.9	22.0	28.3
Total	77.1	80.2	76.2	78.3	74.9	80.0

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

(1) Accessions.

(a) Accession Program. In FY 1986, the Army met its accession goal and achieved a budgeted officer end strength of 109,757. In FY 1987, the Army planned to access 9,013 commissioned and warrant officers into the active component to maintain a budgeted end strength objective of 109,757. The implementation of the Congressionally mandated officer strength reduction caused the Army to decrease its FY 1987 active component accessions. The revised accession goals and achievements by fiscal year are shown below: fiscal year are shown below:

Active Component Officer/Warrant Officer Accession Goals

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Programmed	9,013	9,500	9,500
Actual	8,139		

(b) Accession Trends.

[1] The primary source of officer accessions continues to be the ROTC units located in over 300 colleges across the Nation. Senior ROTC enrollment has increased slightly and the Army expects to graduate approximately 8,000 commissioned officers annually from ROTC in FY 1987, FY 1988, and FY 1989. While this will satisfy active component needs, the reserve components will suffer shortfalls.

[2] ROTC will increase the number of officer graduates in academic disciplines which meet Army skill needs. The 12,000 Army ROTC scholarships (covering 2, 3, or 4 years) currently in effect will continue to be used to attract high-quality students majoring in the fields of science and engineering.

(2) Retention. Officer retention in FY 1986 showed a slight upward shift compared to FY 1985. The Army's retention policy for FY 1987 and beyond is described as follows:

(a) The retention of a maximum number of new officer accessions, consistent with quality standards, will be emphasized.

(b) Retirement with immediate recall to active duty for commissioned officers in critical specialties will be considered; special consideration will be given to officers with expertise in procurement and acquisition management. Recall of retired Regular Army (RA) warrant officers in shortage military occupational specialties on a case-by-case basis will also be considered.

(c) The selective continuation program for captains twice nonselected for promotion will be continued on an extremely limited basis in FY 1988 and beyond. Regular Majors twice nonselected for promotion who are within six years of retirement, by DoD Directive 1320.8, normally will be selected for continuation until completion of 20 years of service. Reserve Majors on actual duty twice nonselected will be continued on a fully qualified basis until first eligible for retirement. For FY 1988 and beyond, it is estimated that continuation of all Majors (Regular and Reserve on active duty twice nonselected for promotion will be continued on a "fully qualified" (i.e., more limited) basis. Except for any extraordinary, "loss management" programs required to accomplish Congressionally mandated end strength cuts, it is anticipated that officer retention in FY 1988 and FY 1989 will continue to be high. This is due in large measure to the public's positive perception of military service as well as economic considerations. A fair and competitive personnel management system coupled with reasonably stable levels of compensation for both active and retired personnel are, and will continue to be, important factors in the retention of experienced and high quality officers.

6. Stability.

a. Aggregate Population Stability.

This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in service over the period of a year. Lower attrition, higher overall personnel quality, and greater job satisfaction have contributed to the relatively constant trend for both officer and enlisted stability from FY 1982 to FY 1987.

<u>Aggregate Population Stability</u>						
(Percent)						
	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officer	91.8	92.6	91.8	92.3	91.9	91.0
Enlisted	82.5	80.1	80.8	82.5	80.8	82.0

b. Unit Personnel Stability.

This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in the same unit over the course of a year. Unit stability for officers and enlisted personnel has been relatively constant from FY 1982 to FY 1986 and as expected increased for enlisted personnel in FY 1987 and FY 1988 due to both an expansion of the Army's Unit Manning System and extension of tour lengths. The increased stability also highly correlates to the drop in manyears in the Individuals Account from FY 1980 through FY 1987 -- 108.6K down to 99.1K (Table III-I). The largest share of change points to the enlisted force sub-account as shown in Table III-IA.

<u>Unit Personnel Stability</u>						
(Percent)						
	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officer	43.1	42.9	40.5	40.3	42.6	42.1
Enlisted	36.6	35.9	36.0	39.4	40.4	42.2

7. Readiness Assessment

a. During recent years, the Army has charted a steady path in developing and retaining a strong, combat ready force. Successful recruiting efforts have enabled us to meet our force structure requirements in terms of quality and quantity for both enlisted and officer personnel. The Army continually seeks to realign and balance the force by developing new methodologies to address skill requirements and support strength needs.

b. A banner effort is being made to ensure an organizational culture of attracting and preserving a quality force. Educational and enlistment incentives provided by the New GI Bill, the Army College Fund, and the Enlistment Cash Bonus are highly effective and need continued support. The Army recognizes the important link between education,

recruiting, and retention. Soldiers are encouraged to make education a life-long pursuit, however, current reductions in the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) funding will have a harmful impact on soldiers who try to follow this advice.

c. Although enlisted recruiting and officer accession programs have met quantity and quality goals, future needs offer an even greater challenge. Because of an improved economy, continued demand for quality youth in the private and public sectors, to include the other Services, and a decline in the youth population, the Army must continue to offer bonuses for selected skills and educational incentives for both the accession and retention programs.

d. With the continued support of Congress, the Army will succeed in its recruiting and retention efforts to sustain a quality force today for tomorrow's missions throughout the world.

8. Unit Manning System

a. UMS is a manning system based on the precepts of stabilization and unit replacements, operating within the framework of the regimental system.

b. The system is comprised of; Traditional Cohesion Operational Readiness and Training (COHORT) units, Sustained COHORT units, and Individual Replacement Units.

c. Specific characteristics of a Traditional COHORT unit that help distinguish it from other units include the following:

(1) Unit has fixed life cycle - usually 36 months, then disestablishes.

(2) Initial term soldiers normally enlisted under 3 or 4 year Variable Enlistment Legislation (VEL) contracts.

(3) Soldiers (both career and first term) are stabilized in unit for duration of unit life cycle.

d. Sustained COHORT units differ from Traditional COHORT units as indicated below.

(1) Units are usually initially established as Traditional COHORT units but are not given a fixed life cycle.

(2) Initial term soldiers may be assigned regardless of their term of enlistment, and providing they can otherwise meet OCONUS tour length requirements, and package replacement cycles, are not necessarily required to be VEL.

(3) Soldiers are stabilized based on tour length or other non-COHORT specific policies.

(4) Soldiers are assigned to and from the units as members of a package during a scheduled assignment window - which normally occurs every four months.

e. Package Replacement (PR) is a personnel management process developed to provide an improved method of sustaining manning levels in the Army versus that offered by the Individual Replacement (IR) process. When the full system is operational it will convert the Force from a predominately "Pull" system of personnel management to a "Push" system. PR will incorporate automation capabilities to project unit (battalion level) personnel needs sufficiently well enough in advance of the unit requirements to recruit, train, and move soldiers to arrive at their unit during one of its "3" annual assignment windows. Initial term soldiers will be packaged during One Station Unit Training (OSUT) and link up with career soldiers so all will arrive within a seven day period during the unit's assignment window. The concept is based on channeling all planned personnel turnover into a one month cycle each four months, and thereby freeing the unit up for mission training during the next three months. While PR does not eliminate turbulence it does allow us to manage it by channeling it into a predictable period.

f. As Traditional COHORT and Packaged Replacement Sustained COHORT units become more common place in the force we will become progressively less dependent on individual replacements. For TOE units IR will eventually serve only to supplement package replacement for emergency fill requirements.

g. Since 1981, 197 companies have been built and sustained in the COHORT program. Current plans call for the 364th COHORT type unit to be formed by the end of FY92. From the Army's perspective the COHORT program has been a success and is the cornerstone of the Unit Manning System.

h. Benefits derived from COHORT have been well documented during the continuous field evaluation process that has occurred since 1981. Field evaluations support the fact that by keeping soldiers together with their leaders in units longer, soldiers possess more horizontal cohesion, demonstrate more self-confidence, and are more psychologically ready for combat. COHORT soldiers also exhibit better teamwork and are generally more dedicated to unit service vice individual service.

i. During early 1987 a plan was coordinated between EUSA, FORSCOM, WESTCOM, and HQDA, in which up to 33 Traditional COHORT companies will be formed and deployed to the ROK each year for manning 2d Infantry Division combat units. Each company/battery will form and train 24 months in CONUS or Hawaii, then deploy to EUSA (2ID) for the remaining 12 months of their life cycle. The EUSA COHORT support mission is open ended at this time. This mission represents the major thrust of Traditional COHORT units in the future.

j. All four Infantry Divisions (Light) formed units using the Traditional COHORT methodology. On 24 Feb 1988 the CSA approved a

program which will allow the 25th and 6th ID(L) to convert to sustained COHORT units receiving replacements every four months and the 7th and 10th ID(L)'s to convert to Sustained COHORT receiving replacements once a year. Final approval will be based on a successful demonstration of how TAPA will be able to implement and manage package replacements to battalion level.

k. To alleviate problems with COHORT unit disestablishments, USAREUR has devised a plan (Otis Plan) whereby units will form under a COHORT methodology in CONUS, train to ARTEP standards, and after 12 months deploy to Europe to be sustained by Package Replacements every four months.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve:

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR).

(a) General. The USAR Selected Reserve grew to an end strength of 313,638 in FY 1987. This end strength includes Drill Strength 288,085 Active Guard Reserve (12,414), and Individual Mobilization Augmentees 13,139. High school graduates increased to an all-time high of 94.7 percent of non-prior service accessions in FY 1987. This achievement was a result of continued Congressional support of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program, increased use of full time personnel, and achievement of overall recruiting objectives.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. The Army Reserve structure shown in Table III-4 increases by 7,700 FY 1988, and 11,100 in FY 1989 to a total of 322,891. The number of positions authorized for fill in this structure increases 7,458 in FY 1988 and 11,979 in FY 1989 (excluding Individual Mobilization Augmentees, which do not man USAR structure), to a total of 306,794. The percentage of structure which is authorized for fill remains about 95 percent through the budget years.

(Strengths in thousands)

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Wartime Required	304.1	311.8	322.9
Programmed Force	287.4	294.8	306.8
Structure Allowance (FSA) ^{1/}			
Difference	16.7 (95%)	17.0 (95%)	16.1 (95%)

1/Excludes IMAs

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Trained in unit strength, shown in Table III-5, will improve in the current year, will continue to increase in the current and the budget years These improvements translate to increased readiness and the ability to execute wartime missions.

TABLE III-4
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (THOUSANDS)

TOTAL ARMY RESERVE DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 80		FY 87		FY 88			FY 89		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
STRATEGIC										
Offensive Strategic Forces					0.4	0.4	100.0	0.4	0.4	100.0
Defensive Strategic Forces					(0.4)	(0.4)	100.0	(0.4)	(0.4)	(100.0)
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces										
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	192.6	151.2								
Land Forces										
Division Forces	171.0	135.5	200.6	179.0	209.1	194.4	93.0	218.0	204.3	93.7
(Divisional Increment)	(1.0)	(1.4)	(6.8)	(6.1)	(7.7)	(6.4)	83.1	(7.4)	(6.9)	93.2
(Non-div Cbt Increment)	(129.1)	(21.7)	(39.9)	(47.0)	(45.3)	(42.2)	93.2	(47.4)	(44.3)	93.5
(Tactical Support Increment)	(140.9)	(112.4)	(148.4)	(125.9)	(156.2)	(145.8)	93.3	(163.3)	(153.0)	93.7
Theater Forces	20.1	14.9	7.8	22.0	9.7	8.7	99.7	11.3	10.1	89.4
Tactical Air Forces										
Naval Forces										
Warships and ASW										
Amphibious Forces										
Naval Support Forces	1.5	1.0	1.9	8.8	1.9	1.9	100.0	1.9	1.9	100.0
Mobility Forces										
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.4	0.3	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.6	100.0	0.6	0.6	100.0
Intelligence										
Centrally Managed Comm										
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS										
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING										
MEDICAL SUPPORT	8.2	6.6	8.9	7.0	8.9	8.9	100.0	8.9	8.9	100.0
JOINT ACTIVITIES (NOTE 1)										
Int'l Military Org										
Unified Commands										
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.3	3.5	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS										
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS										
Combat Commands										
Support Commands	0.1	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Research and Development
Geophysical Activities

TRAINING AND PERSONNEL

Personnel Support	0.0	1.7	0	2.6	0	0	0	0	0
Individual Training	48.1	40.6	56.7	52.6	59.2	59.1	99.8	59.1	59.0
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES									
Support Installations	4.2	3.1	5.3	5.3	5.5	5.3	96.4	5.6	5.6
Centralized Support Act'y	2.9	2.4	10.4	19.0	16.2	15.2	93.8	16.7	15.7
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	257.0	206.4	287.4	300.5	311.8	294.8	94.5	322.9	306.8
TOTAL MANNING									
UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING				-32.6		-28.0			-29.3
(Many years)									
INDIVIDUALS MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES		6.6		13.1		14.7			14.7
INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)		14.4		42.3		35.4			25.3
END-STRENGTH		213.2		313.6		320.6			320.6

0
99.8
100.0
94.0
95.0

NOTES/GUIDELINES:

- (1) Includes Centralized support PECs 01004/9/10/11, 02002, 13121/2, 21112/3/4/5/6/31/38, 35127/28, 33145, 91503/7/8/9, and other Joint/Defense 65904/6/7/8, 35801/6, 78110, and 84744.
- (2) Provide separate formats for officer, enlisted, civilian and aggregate programmed manpower structure and manning.
- (3) The term "Authorization" is synonymous with "Programmed Manning".
- (4) The term "Requirement" is synonymous with "Programmed Manpower Structure".
- (5) The term undistributed manning in the Army Reserve is the difference between programmed authorizations and trained in Unit strength (which includes AC and AGR).
- (6) FY80 authorized strength is not available from automated files and reflects estimate only based upon FY81 authorizations.
- (7) Numbers may not add due to rounding.

TABLE III-48
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (THOUSANDS)

ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 80			FY 87			FY 88			FY 89		
	AUTH	INV	INV	AUTH	INV	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
STRATEGIC	**			0.4	0		0.4	0.4	100.0	0.4	0.4	100.0
Offensive Strategic Forces												
Defensive Strategic Forces				(0.4)	0		(0.4)	(0.4)	100.0	(0.4)	(0.4)	100.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces												
TACTICAL/MOBILITY												
Land Forces												
Division Forces			114.4	170.7	156.0		179.2	166.3	92.8	188.1	174.7	92.9
(Divisional Increment)		(1.3)	(1.3)	(6.2)	(5.3)		(7.1)	(5.8)	81.7	(6.7)	(6.2)	92.5
(Mon-div Cbt Increment)		(20.0)	(20.0)	(37.1)	(43.8)		(42.1)	(39.0)	92.6	(43.9)	(40.8)	92.9
(Tactical Support Increment)		(93.1)	(93.1)	(123.0)	(106.9)		(131.1)	(121.5)	92.8	(137.6)	(127.6)	92.7
Theater Forces		13.5		7.1	18.6		8.7	7.8	89.7	10.1	8.9	88.1
Tactical Air Forces												
Naval Forces												
Warships and ASW												
Amphibious Forces												
Naval Support Forces												
Mobility Forces		0.6		1.3	*		1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3	100.0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL												
Intelligence		0.2		0.3	0.7		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3	100.0
Centrally Managed Comm												
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS												
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING												
MEDICAL SUPPORT		4.5		6.4	6.2		6.4	6.4		6.4	6.4	100.0
JOINT ACTIVITIES (NOTE 1)												
Int'l Military Org												
Unified Commands												
Federal Agency Support		0.2		0	3.5		0	0		0	0	0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS												
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS												
Combat Commands												
Support Commands		*										

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT										
Research and Development										
Geophysical Activities										
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL										
Personnel Support										
Individual Training	1.4	0	2.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	31.7	44.3	44.6	46.5	46.4	99.8	46.4	46.4	46.4	100.0
Support Installations	2.3	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.1	97.6	4.3	4.3	4.3	100.0
Centralized Support Act'y	1.0	7.0	14.5	10.7	9.9	92.5	11.1	10.4	93.7	
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	169.8	237.0		258.6	242.8	93.9	268.4	253.0	94.3	
TOTAL MANNING			250.3		-28.0			-29.3		
UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING	-32.6									
(Many years)										
INDIVIDUALS MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	0.2		4.9		4.8			4.8		
INDIVIDUALS (TRAINNESS)	14.4		42.3		35.4			25.3		
END-STRENGTH	170.1		255.2		260.4			260.4		

NOTES/GUIDELINES:

- (1) Includes Centralized support PECs 01004/9/10/11, 02002, 13121/2, 21112/3/4/5/6/31/38, 35127/28, 33145, 91503/7/8/9, and other Joint/Defense 65904/6/7/8, 35801/6, 78110, and 84744.
- (2) Provide separate formats for officer, enlisted, civilian and aggregate programmed manpower structure and manning.
- (3) The term "Authorization" is synonymous with "Programmed Manning".
- (4) The term "Requirement" is synonymous with "Programmed Manpower Structure".
- (5) Numbers may not add due to rounding.

* Less than 50

** Authorization data note available on automated files for FY80. However, an estimate was made for aggregate authorizations for FY80 based on FY81 authorizations.

TABLE III-4A
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (THOUSANDS)

OFFICERS	FY 80		FY 87		FY 88		FY 89	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG BOGT	PROG AUTH	PROG BOGT	PROG AUTH
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES								
STRATEGIC	**		*	*	*	*	*	*
Offensive Strategic Forces								
Defensive Strategic Forces			*	*	*	*	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces								
TACTICAL/MOBILITY								
Land Forces								
Division Forces		20.9	28.9	23.0	28.9	28.1	29.9	29.6
(Divisional Increment)		(0.1)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.7)
(Non-div Cbt Increment)		(1.5)	(2.8)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.5)	(3.5)
(Tactical Support Increment)		(19.3)	(25.4)	(19.6)	(25.1)	(24.2)	(25.7)	(25.4)
Theater Forces		1.4	0.7	3.4	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.2
Tactical Air Forces								
Naval Forces								
Warships and ASW								
Amphibious Forces								
Naval Support Forces		0.4	0.6	8.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Mobility Forces								
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL		0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Intelligence								
Centrally Managed Comm								
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS								
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING		2.1	2.5	0.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
MEDICAL SUPPORT								
JOINT ACTIVITIES (NOTE 1)								
Int'l Military Org								
Unified Commands		*	0.3	0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Federal Agency Support								
CENTRAL LOGISTICS								
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS								
Combat Commands		0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Support Commands								

TABLE III-5

US ARMY RESERVE
(THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>
End Strength	313.6	320.6	320.6	333.6
- Training Pipeline	42.3	35.4	25.3	23.9
- IMA	<u>13.1</u>	<u>14.7</u>	<u>14.7</u>	<u>14.7</u>
Operating Strength	258.2	270.5	280.6	295.0
Non Unit AGR	4.9	4.7	4.7	4.7
+ Unit AC Personnel	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>
Trained Unit Strength	254.6	266.9	277.0	291.4
Structure Requirements (Wartime)(Programmed Structure)	306.9	311.8	322.9	331.9
% Trained/Requirements	82.9%	85.5%	85.7%	87.8%

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

(d) Skill and Grade. The USAR skill and grade, actual and projected inventories are displayed in Table III-6. The principal shortages of trained non-commissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers continue in the medical, aviation, maintenance, and transportation specialties. Resolution of these shortages in the enlisted force continues through the use of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, continued recruitment of prior service soldiers who have critical skills needed in USAR units, and retention of prior service individuals. The shortage of NCOs, which will continue after 1987, will remain an area that adversely affects readiness. Warrant officers will be recruited from the reserve enlisted force and trained in the WO Pre-commissioning and Basic Course. A WO enlistment option for aviator in USAR units has been implemented. Until ROTC production increases in FY 1987 and beyond, officer shortages will continue. Relief of those shortages will be alleviated slightly by the involuntary direct assignment of obligated officers to units where they are needed.

TABLE III-6
U.S. ARMY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in 000s)**

	ACTUAL FY 87				PROGRAMMED FY 88				PROGRAMMED FY 89			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	202	104	125	431	202	104	125	431	202	104	125	431
PMI	63.2	57.7	39.2	160.1	66.3	73.6	20.5	160.4	70.5	67.1	21.2	158.8
Inventory	83.2	32.6	31.8	147.6	93.9	41.7	15.9	151.5	96.0	39.3	15.9	151.2
Over/Short	20.0	-25.1	-7.4	-12.5	27.6	-31.9	-4.6	-8.9	25.5	-27.8	-5.3	-7.6
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	114	120	169	403	114	120	169	403	114	120	169	403
PMI	13.9	40.9	71.5	126.3	22.6	36.5	68.1	127.2	23.7	35.1	70.3	129.1
Inventory	20.2	25.3	57.2	102.7	29.5	21.5	51.1	102.1	30.1	20.5	51.4	102.0
Over/Short	6.3	-15.6	-14.3	-23.6	6.9	-15.0	-17.0	25.1	6.4	-14.6	-18.9	-27.1
TOTAL E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	316	224	294	834	311	224	294	834	316	224	294	834
PMI	77.1	98.6	110.7	286.4	89.0	110.1	88.7	287.6	94.2	102.2	91.4	287.9
Inventory	103.4	57.9	89.0	250.3	123.4	63.2	67.0	253.6	126.1	59.8	67.3	253.2
Over/Short	26.3	-40.7	-21.7	-36.1	34.5	-46.9	-21.7	-34.0	31.9	-42.4	-24.1	-34.7
Warrant Officer												
Number of Skills	39	50	36	125	39	50	36	125	39	50	36	125
PMI	0.7	0.9	3.5	5.1	0.1	0.2	5.4	5.7	0.1	0.2	5.6	5.8
Inventory	1.4	0.9	2.1	4.4	1.5	1.3	2.9	5.7	1.6	1.0	3.2	5.8
Over/Short	0.7	0.0	-1.4	-0.7	1.4	1.1	-2.5	0.0	1.5	1.2	-2.7	0.0
01 - 03												
Number of Skills	25	22	14	61	25	22	14	61	25	22	14	61
PMI	5.3	10.4	12.0	27.6	3.6	13.8	11.7	29.1	3.8	14.3	12.0	30.1
Inventory	7.3	10.3	8.9	26.5	7.7	10.9	8.0	26.6	7.7	11.0	8.0	26.7
Over/Short	2.0	-0.1	-3.1	-1.1	4.1	-2.9	-3.7	-2.5	3.9	-3.3	-4.0	-3.4

(e) Experience. The data in Table III-7 indicate that the USAR will continue to experience shortages of senior enlisted soldiers through the budget years even though the total number of senior soldiers continues to increase.

TABLE III-7
USAR EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Strength in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1987			PROGRAMMED FY 1988			PROGRAMMED FY 1989		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
E1-E4 PMI** Inventory	160.1 147.6	NA 63.4	NA 2.6	160.4 151.5	NA 65.0	NA 2.6	158.8 151.2	NA 65.0	NA 2.6
E5-E9 PMI Inventory	126.3 102.7	NA 100.1	NA 17.0	127.2 102.1	NA 99.4	NA 7.0	129.1 102.0	NA 99.4	NA 7.0
TOTAL E1-E9 PMI Inventory	286.4 250.3	NA 163.5	NA 7.2	287.6 253.6	NA 165.6	NA 7.2	287.9 253.2	NA 165.3	NA 7.2
WARRANT OFFICER PMI Inventory	5.1 4.4	NA 4.4	NA 19.2	5.7 5.7	NA 5.6	NA 19.2	5.8 5.8	NA 5.7	NA 19.2
01 - 03 PMI Inventory	27.6 26.5	NA 20.0	NA 7.2	29.1 26.6	NA 20.0	NA 7.2	30.1 26.7	NA 20.0	NA 7.2
04 - 06 PMI Inventory	20.2 19.2	NA 18.9	NA 21.4	21.8 20.0	NA 19.7	NA 21.4	22.5 20.1	NA 19.7	NA 21.4
TOTAL 01 - 06 PMI Inventory	47.8 45.7	NA 38.9	NA 13.4	50.9 46.6	NA 39.7	NA 13.4	52.6 46.8	NA 39.7	NA 13.4

*Detail may not add to totals due to
**Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Accessions.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR recruiting performance and projected goals are shown in the following table:

USAR Enlisted Accessions

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service (PS)	52,312	42,742	51,773	45,802
Non Prior Service (NPS)	29,358	31,847	25,801	28,577
Male	22,079	23,032	19,286	20,402
(HSDG)	(19,164)	(21,008)	(16,736)	(17,708)
Female	7,279	8,815	6,519	8,175
(HSDG)	(7,279)	(8,815)	(6,519)	(8,175)
TOTAL	81,670	74,589	77,574	74,379

The USAR continues to implement higher recruiting standards for NPS personnel. The overall HSDG/NPS accession quality went to an all time high of 93.6 percent.

[b] Officer. Officer accessions for the USAR come primarily from ROTC, direct appointments, and transfers from the Active Component. In FY 1987, annual ROTC production for the USAR will be approximately 2160 officers against a requirement of 2160. For FY 1988 and FY 1989, annual ROTC production is projected to be 2,300 to 2,600 officers against requirements of 2,300 and 2,600. Actual USAR officer accession performance and goals from all sources are shown in the following table:

USAR Officer Accessions

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
	7,348	9,058	7,783	7,460

[2] Retention.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR retention performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table:

USAR Reenlistments

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	8,790	9,784	9,057	9,750
Career	20,109	22,486	18,407	20,000
TOTAL	28,899	32,270	27,464	29,750

[2] Losses.

[a] Enlisted

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Troop Program Enlisted Losses	79,197	74,718	74,370
Losses as a percentage of average enlisted troop program strength	33.0	30.8	30.9
Non-ETS Losses	60,396	60,683	58,816
Losses as a percentage of average enlisted strength	27.7	27.2	26.1

[b] Officer. Losses from the USAR may not be losses to the Army overall, as some USAR officers transfer to the active component or Army National Guard. However, these losses do create USAR vacancies which must be filled to maintain readiness. The actual and projected overall losses for the USAR is shown below. Achieving projections for both accessions and losses should assist in reducing personnel shortages.

USAR Officer Losses

<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
7,729	7,553	7,460

[3] Inventory Stability. Both USAR aggregate population stability and unit personnel stability were evaluated in the same manner as for the active force. Aggregate stability and unit stability declined slightly in FY 1987.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officers	87.2	86.9	87.7	87.2	86.9
Enlisted	75.0	76.8	79.4	76.0	75.9

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officers	66.7	71.2	69.6	69.4	67.7
Enlisted	57.3	65.7	68.7	64.7	62.2

(g) Readiness Assessment.

The personnel readiness of the USAR improved in FY 1987 when the USAR paid drill strength grew by 3,558 to 288,048. As a result of this increase, paid drill strength, operating strength and trained end strength have improved. Efforts to acquire and retain personnel with critical skills will be intensified through more selective

use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. Soldier quality will remain high, with accession and retention being focused on Category I-III A soldiers. Increasing the quality of USAR soldiers will continue to improve the capability of the USAR to meet its contingency and wartime missions.

(h) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program.

[1] The purpose of the IMA program is to pre-assign individual selected reservists in peacetime to active component units, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to train for their wartime duties. The Army adopted the program in October 1981 by transferring members of the Mobilization Designation (MORDES) program from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to the Selected Reserve. These soldiers fill active Army wartime required force structure and provide the resources for rapid expansion of the Army prior to and during mobilization.

[2] This change in the IMA program gave the active Army the necessary manpower resources to expand rapidly in periods of national emergency. Since its inception, approximately 27,000 positions have been identified in response to increased requirements to support the Active Army. Funding is programmed to support two weeks of annual training by each soldier assigned to the IMA program.

[3] Actual and projected strength is shown below:

<u>IMAs</u>		
<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
13,139	14,680	14,671

(i) Full Time Support Program.

[1] The Full Time Support Program assists Reserve Component units in achieving higher levels of readiness by providing drilling reservists the maximum available training time to prepare for the wartime mission. Full-time support personnel (Active Guard/Reserve personnel, civil service personnel, active Army members, and Military Technicians) improve readiness by assisting in training, supply, maintenance, administration, and mobilization planning.

[2] As shown in the following chart, the USAR is not requesting increases in the number of AGR personnel assigned to the Full-time Support Program. While growth is needed, sufficient funds are not available to pay for increases. Today, many Reserve Component units will deploy with or before active component units in case of war. These units must receive additional full time support to be capable of employing modernized equipment, conducting proper training and maintenance, planning for more complex missions, and reacting to shorter deployment times. Full time support personnel help Reserve Component

commanders to improve unit readiness and prepare for mobilization by training the drilling reservist in go-to-war skills and by performing many daily military tasks which previously detracted from mission accomplishment. AGR personnel are also assigned above the unit level in the functional areas of training, logistics, maintenance, mobilization planning, recruiting, retention, and management. Army Reserve Technicians are concentrated in the functional areas of maintenance and logistics, and administrative support. Legislation requiring all Army Reserve Technicians hired after 8 December 1983 to maintain membership in the troop program unit (TPU) in which employed, or, if other than a TPU, be a member of the Selected Reserve, also contributes to readiness. The Reserve Component is now assured of these individuals' expertise in the event of mobilization. The decrease in both Army Reserve Technicians and DA civilians is a result of reduced funding levels for FY 1989.

USAR Full-time Support

	<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
AGR	12,414	13,329	13,329
Army Reserve Techs	7,276	7,529	7,132
Active Army with			
USAR	1,230	1,299	1,299
DA Civilians	4,665	5,661	5,504

(2) Army National Guard.

(a) General. The aggregate ARNG FY 1987 Selected Reserve strength increased 5,664 from 446,194 to 451,858 or 1.3%. This still fell short of the FY 1987 end strength objective of 452,681. The ARNG strength growth trend is expected to continue into the future and should achieve the FY 1988 end strength objective of 454,564.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength. The ARNG structure increases 6,500 in FY 1988, and 7,100 in FY 1989, for a total of 13,600 as the ARNG consolidates existing ARNG units into two new divisions. Manning increased by 4,500 in FY 1987. Programmed manning increases by 5,412 in FY 1988, and 2,730 in FY 1989, for a total of 5,442, nearly all manning increases allocated to combat units. At the end of FY 1980, programmed manning was 8.8 percent of programmed authorized and 99.0 percent by end FY 1987. Programmed manning is expected to be 94.0 percent of programmed structure by end of FY 1988 and 93.0 percent by FY 1989 as shown in Table III-8. The programmed manning will largely depend on influences of the economy, population availability, propensity to enlist/reenlist, and resource funding. Table III-8C shows a shortfall of 44,600 in FY 1988 and 45,900 in FY 1989 of trained soldier strength in units compared to manning that is programmed.

TABLE III-8
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG)
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In thousands)

	FY 80			FY 87			FY 88			FY 89		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		PROG MPPAR REQ	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG MPPAR REQ	PROG AUTH	% MNG
TOTAL ARMY NATIONAL GUARD												
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
TACTICAL/MOBILITY												
Land Forces	391.8	342.8		426.1	420.7		452.5	425.7	94%	457.3	425.7	93%
Division Forces	391.8	342.8		426.1	420.7		452.5	425.7	94%	457.3	425.7	93%
(Divisional Increment)	372.8	332.2		405.4	400.3		430.6	405.1	94%	435.2	405.1	93%
(Non-div Cbt Increment)	160.5	140.7		174.5	173.3		185.3	174.4	94%	187.3	174.4	93%
(Tactical Support Increment)	115.2	94.8		125.2	123.6		133.0	125.1	94%	134.4	125.1	93%
Theater Forces	97.2	85.1		105.7	104.4		112.3	105.6	94%	113.5	105.6	93%
	19.0	13.7		20.6	19.4		21.9	20.6	94%	22.1	20.6	93%
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	99%
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	23.2	20.1		25.1	24.8		26.8	25.2	94%	27.1	25.2	93%
SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS	21.9	19.1		23.7	23.5		25.3	23.7	94%	25.6	23.8	93%
CENT SUPT ACT	1.3	1.0		1.4	1.4		1.5	1.4	93%	1.5	1.4	93%
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING	5.7	5.1		6.2	6.2		6.6	6.2	94%	6.7	6.2	92%
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	420.9	368.3		457.7	451.9		486.1	457.3	94%	491.3	457.3	93%
UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING		0			0			0			0	
OPERATING STRENGTH		335.2			415.9			418.2			417.9	
INDIVIDUALS		31.4			36.0			39.1			39.4	
END-STRENGTH		366.6			451.9			457.3			457.3	

TABLE III-8A
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG)
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In thousands)

OFFICERS	FY 80		FY 87		FY 88		FY 89	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	PROG AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES								
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	37.8	34.7	43.9	42.3	45.7	42.8	42.8	91%
Land Forces	37.8	34.7	43.9	42.3	45.7	42.8	42.8	91%
Division Forces	36.0	39.0	41.8	40.2	43.5	40.7	40.7	91%
(Divisional Increment)	15.5	14.3	18.0	18.3	18.7	17.5	17.5	91%
(Non-div Cbt Increment)	11.1	4.2	12.9	12.4	13.4	12.6	12.6	91%
(Tactical Support Increment)	9.4	8.6	10.9	10.5	11.3	10.6	10.6	91%
Theater Forces	1.8	1.4	2.1	1.0	2.2	2.1	2.1	91%
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	100%
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	2.2	1.9	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	90%
SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS	2.1	1.9	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.4	90%
CENT SUPT ACT	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL INDIVIDUAL TRAINING	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	94%
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	40.6	37.3	47.2	45.4	49.1	46.0	46.0	91%
UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING		0		0		0	0	
OPERATING STRENGTH		37.3		45.4		46.0	46.0	
INDIVIDUALS		0		0		0	0	
END-STRENGTH		37.3		45.4		46.0	46.0	

TABLE III-8B
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG)
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In thousands)

ENLISTED	FY 80		FY 87		FY 88		FY 89			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES										
TACTICAL/MOBILITY										
Land Forces	354.0	308.1	382.1	378.4	406.8	382.8	94%	410.4	382.9	93%
Division Forces	354.0	308.1	382.1	378.4	406.8	382.8	94%	410.4	382.9	93%
(Divisional Increment)	336.9	299.2	363.6	360.1	387.1	364.3	94%	390.6	364.3	93%
(Non-div Cbt Increment)	145.0	126.5	156.5	156.0	166.6	156.8	94%	168.1	156.8	93%
(Tactical Support Increment)	104.1	84.6	112.3	111.2	119.6	112.5	94%	120.6	112.5	93%
Theater Forces	87.8	76.4	94.8	93.9	100.9	95.0	94%	101.8	95.0	93%
	17.1	12.3	18.5	17.3	19.7	18.5	94%	19.9	18.5	93%
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	21.0	18.1	22.5	22.3	24.0	22.6	94%	24.2	22.6	93%
SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS	19.8	17.2	21.3	21.1	22.7	21.4	94%	22.9	21.4	94%
CENT SUPT ACT	1.2	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	93%	1.3	1.2	92%
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL										
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING	5.2	4.6	5.6	5.4	5.9	5.2	88%	6.0	5.6	93%
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	380.3	331.0	410.5	406.5	437.0	411.2	94%	440.9	411.3	93%
UNDISTRIBUTED M'NNG		0		0		0			0	
OPERATING STRENGTH		301.2		370.5		372.1			371.9	
INDIVIDUALS		29.8		36.0		39.1			39.4	
END-STRENGTH		331.0		406.5		411.2			411.3	

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table III-8A reflects the trained personnel assigned to units compared to the wartime unit structure. This table also reflects a positive ratio of operating strength to trained personnel.

TABLE III-8C
ARNG Trained In Unit Strength

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 92</u>
End Strength	450.5	451.9	457.3	457.3	462.8
-Training Pipeline	41.1	36.0	39.1	39.4	38.8
Operating Strength	409.4	415.9	413.2	417.9	424.0
-Non Unit AGR	5.7	5.0	6.6	6.6	6.6
+Unit AC Personnel	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Trained Unit Strength	403.9	397.8	412.7	411.4	417.5
Structure Requirements (Wartime)	470.2	476.6	486.1	491.3	500.4
Wartime Unit Structure	470.2	476.6	486.1	491.3	500.4
% Trained in Units	86.2%	85.2%	84.9	83.7	83.4

(d) Skill and Grade.

[1] The data on actual and projected inventory by skill and grade in Table III-9 show that the mismatch of NCO skill improves through FY 1987. A key contributor to this continuing mismatch is the location of existing ARNG structure compared with availability of personnel. Unlike the active Army, reassignment of ARNG personnel between units in different locations to fill structure is not practical because of the community orientation of the ARNG units. Enlistment bonuses under the Selected Reserve Incentive Program are targeted toward improving the ARNG fill in shortage skills and units. A promotion and reduction plan combined with application of revised tenure, maximum age, Service, and grade constraint criteria is also being evaluated as a partial solution.

[2] Critical shortages in the current fiscal year include Captains in all combat arms branches as well as the traditional shortages of medical doctors, nurses, and chaplains. Structure modernization continues to aggravate this problem. The greatest impact will be felt in aviator positions as Vietnam era aviators approach retirement and the requirement to replace them increases. Efforts for improving all shortages include the following: (1) continued screening (to be accomplished by the recently established Army National Guard Lieutenants Management Team) of the US Army Reserve (USAR) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to fill all basic branch company grade officer vacancies; and (2) selective retention of and special recruiting programs for critical warrant officers skills and professional branch officers through FY 1987.

(e) Experience. The average years of service of ARNG enlisted personnel shown in Table III-10 are projected to decrease

TABLE III-9
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PHI)
(Strength in 000s)

	FY 1987				FY 1988				FY 1989			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	16	17	30	63	16	17	30	63	16	17	30	63
PMI	15594	111833	139191	266618	15632	112134	139565	267335	15632	112105	139529	267267
Inventory	27550	102235	94398	224185	27905	103552	95614	227073	27907	103560	95621	227090
Over/Short	11956	-9598	-44793	-42433	12269	-8582	-43951	-40262	12275	-8545	-43909	-40177
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	27	17	21	65	27	17	21	65	27	17	21	65
PMI	9534	68370	85096	163000	9836	70536	87791	168163	10045	72032	89653	171729
Inventory	100833	35961	45504	182302	101865	36329	45970	184167	101872	36331	45973	184180
Over/Short	91299	-32409	-39591	19302	92029	-34207	-41821	16004	91827	-35700	-43680	12451
TOTAL E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	27	17	21	65	27	17	21	65	27	17	21	65
PMI	25126	180206	224286	429618	25470	182673	227356	435498	25674	184140	229182	438996
Inventory	128383	138196	139902	406487	129770	139881	141584	411241	129779	139891	141594	411270
Over/Short	103257	-42010	-84384	-23131	104300	-42792	-85772	-24257	104104	-44249	-87588	-27726
Warrant Officer												
Number of Skills	1	22	12	35	1	22	12	35	1	22	12	35
PMI	5	9595	1125	10725	5	9949	1167	11120	6	10161	1191	11357
Inventory	2	8674	908	9623	2	8801	921	9764	2	8801	921	9764
Over/Short	-3	-922	-217	-1102	-3	-1148	-246	-1356	-3	-1360	-270	-1593
O1 - O3												
Number of Skills	4	30	7	41	4	30	7	41	4	30	7	41
PMI	2365	12892	10515	25772	2389	13024	10623	26036	2420	13195	10762	26376
Inventory	2838	12933	9319	25090	2880	13120	9454	25454	2880	13120	9454	25454
Over/Short	474	40	-1197	-682	491	96	-1169	-582	460	-74	-1308	-922

PMI	3363
Inventory	4300
Over/Short	931

50	6	40
1059	1014	8800
10658	1482	8744
65	468	-57

54	6	42
26365	3403	21825
35748	4362	21864
-617	959	39

as a result of the projected increase in the ratio of non-prior to prior service accessions during FY 1988 and FY 1989. However, this trend should enable the ARNG to correct enlisted grade imbalances as shown in Table III-8. Currently, a disproportionate number of E5-E6 positions are filled by accession of prior service personnel, as opposed to progression of non-prior service members through the ranks. The ARNG is working to improve recruitment and retention of both officers and enlisted personnel.

TABLE III-10

ARNG EXPERIENCE

PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY* (Strength in thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1987</u>			<u>PROGRAMMED</u> <u>FY 1988</u>			<u>PROGRAMMED</u> <u>FY 1989</u>		
	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PEOPLE</u>	<u>PEOPLE</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG</u> <u>YOS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PEOPLE</u>	<u>PEOPLE</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG</u> <u>YOS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PEOPLE</u>	<u>PEOPLE</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG</u> <u>YOS</u>
E1-E4									
PMI**	266.6	NA	NA	267.3	NA	NA	267.3	NA	NA
Inventory	224.2	93.4	3.6	226.7	91.8	3.6	226.8	91.8	3.5
E5-E9									
PMI	163.0	NA	NA	168.2	NA	NA	171.8	NA	NA
Inventory	182.3	177.2	13.2	184.5	178.9	13.1	184.5	179.0	13.2
TOTAL E1-E9									
PMI	429.6	NA	NA	435.5	NA	NA	439.1	NA	NA
Inventory	406.5	270.6	7.8	411.2	270.8	7.9	411.3	270.8	7.9
WARRANT OFFICER									
PMI	10.7	NA	NA	11.4	NA	NA	11.4	NA	NA
Inventory	9.6	9.4	20.6	9.8	9.7	20.4	9.8	9.7	20.4
01 - 03									
PMI	25.7	NA	NA	26.0	NA	NA	26.4	NA	NA
Inventory	25.1	20.1	8.7	25.4	20.2	8.8	25.4	20.2	8.8
04 - 06									
PMI	10.6	NA	NA	10.8	NA	NA	11.6	NA	NA
Inventory	10.6	10.3	20.3	10.9	10.9	20.3	10.8	10.8	20.3
TOTAL 01 - 06									
PMI	36.3	NA	NA	36.8	NA	NA	37.5	NA	NA
Inventory	35.7	30.1	12.4	36.3	31.1	12.4	36.3	31.1	12.4

*Detail may not add to totals due to rounding

**Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Accession.

[a] Enlisted. ARNG recruiting performance and projected goals are shown in the table below:

ARNG Enlisted Accessions (Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	34.0	41.8	37.3	34.8
Non-Prior Service	(47.0)	(43.8)	(44.3)	(42.6)
Male	44.0	40.5	41.0	39.1
(HSDG)	37.9	28.6	35.7	34.4
Female	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.5
(HSDG)	3.0	3.0	3.3	3.5
TOTAL	81.0	85.6	81.6	77.4

[b] Officer/Warrant Officer Accessions

Total FY 1986 Officers strength represents a three-percent net growth from FY 1985 and was the best results since FY 1983 (when performance was 99.7 percent of objective). This growth can be attributed to several factors such as enhanced officer recruiting; improved retention efforts; excellent performance by the ARNG Lieutenants Management Team (ALMT) (approximately 37 percent of total FY 1987 accessions, and record production from the state Officer Candidate School (OCS) Program. The above efforts were aided by enhanced over-strength policies which resulted in a 94 percent of programmed officer gains compared to 93 percent achievement in FY 1986 gains. Total losses were 99 percent of programmed. These gains and losses resulted in an overall officer loss rate of 9.5 percent.

This program ended the direct appointment authority for technical service warrant officer and implemented a three-phased training and certification process which takes approximately three years to complete. Actions are ongoing to develop alternatives to the Warrant Officer Training System (WOTS) process. Shortages of medical corps officers and combat arms captains continue. Achievement of the FY 1988 objective of 5,350, will require continued emphasis on accession goals from all sources.

ARNG Officer/Warrant Officer Accessions

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Commissioned Officers	4,450	4,904	4,475	4,475
Warrant Officers	<u>1,200</u>	<u>865</u>	<u>1,225</u>	<u>1,225</u>
Total	5,650	5,796	5,700	5,700

2. Retention

Total officer losses were 4,146 and was 97 percent of loss program (4,277). The resulting 9 percent officer loss rate was a significant improvement in officer retention efforts. During the period FY 1988 through FY 1989 emphasis will continue to focus on specific tailored recruiting and retention programs including support of the Full-time Recruiting Force for AMEDD shortages; waivers of age, overstrength, and alternate training requirements for doctors; establishment of temporary positions for Army Nurse Corps officers in States without large medical units; and enrollment of full-time seminary or theological graduate students in the ARNG Chaplain Candidates Program to alleviate chaplain shortages. Actual and projected loss goals for total officers follow:

ARNG Officer/Warrant Officer Losses

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
	4,277	4,372	4,433

3. Officer Strength Initiatives.

Several initiatives have been implemented that will significantly impact future ARNG officer accessions. These include approval for the Reserve Component Individuals Account for Officers, development of an enrollment enhancement program for State OCS ("Warrior 2000 AD"), refinement of the WOTS, and continued success of the ALHT.

HQDA approved the establishment of the RC Officers Individuals Account in mid-FY 1986. When fully implemented this initiative will provide the Reserve Component an officers trainee account to manage the assignment of both untrained officers as well as officers who are attending extended professional military education courses. The net benefit of this program is better appreciation of personnel and unit readiness. Officers in the RC Individuals account are carried overstrength and do not count against unit readiness. Currently, only ARNG soldiers participating in the ROTC Simultaneous Membership Program are assigned to this account. Program development for full implementation is ongoing.

New life was breathed into the State OCS Programs by the ARNG "Warrior 2000 AD" initiative. A result of this initiative was the Recruiting

Incentive Program which was developed by the Army Personnel Division to increase OCS enrollment with quality candidates. It employs a four hour motivational seminar that includes participation by the chain of command. The Recruiting Incentives Program targets the college market and seeks to enroll over 50 percent of seminar participants. This program was only implemented in California during FY 86. It was extended to over forty states during FY 1987. The California ARNG OCS enrollment has increased from 153 in FY 1986 to over 300 for the FY 1987 class. Similar success has been achieved in other states.

The ALMT, which became operational on 1 July 85, was again successful this year. With a three-man team located at St. Louis, MO, the ALMT serves as the centralized referral and distribution agency for assignment of RFD officers to the States. The ALMT also screens the ROTC RFD and USAR Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) markets for qualified officers to fill Guard unit vacancies. During FY 1986 the ALMT was responsible for over 1,900 appointments which represented approximately 37 percent of total FY 1986 accessions.

The Total Warrant Officer System was approved by the Chief of Staff, Army to meet current and future warrant officer needs of the Total Army. The ARNG began implementation of the new WOTS effective 1 October 1985. This program requires warrant officer candidate training and military occupational speciality (MOS) technical certification prior to initial appointment. The ARNG major concern with WOTS implementation is the extended technical certification requirements. Following completion of entry and mid-level training courses, candidates must complete resident technical certification courses which are provided by MOS proponent centers/schools. In most cases these courses are too long for RC participation. However, alternative methods for technical certification are currently under development, such as certification by review boards and diagnostic examinations. The goal for development of final technical certification alternatives is 1 October 1988.

[2] Retention.

[a] Enlisted. ARNG retention performance and projected requirements shown in the following table reflect steady requirements through FY 1989. Reenlistments did not exceed the goal in FY 1987. The overall ARNG extension of enlistments (reenlistments) decreased. The overall ARNG strength fell short the FY 1987 objective of 452,700 by only 842. As the economy continues to improve, meeting strength goals will be more difficult.

ARNG Reenlistments (Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	
First Term	16.9	13.5	17.1	17.3	
Career	54.9	50.3	55.3	55.7	
TOTAL	71.8	63.8	72.4	73.0	

[b] Officer. Officer retention problems continue to exist with Army Medical Department (AMEDD) personnel and chaplains. Increased emphasis in State retention programs will be developed with recruiting efforts in these officer specialties.

[3] Inventory Stability. Lower attrition, higher personnel quality and greater job satisfaction have contributed to the relatively constant trend for both officer and enlisted stability from FY 1981 to FY 1987. The decrease in unit personnel stability from FY 1984 to FY 1987 is attributed to force structure turbulence (activations, inactivations, and reorganizations).

ARNG Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Enlisted	82.2	84.1	82.9	83.5	85.7
Officer	90.8	90.7	89.2	91.0	94.2

ARNG Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Enlisted	72.3	75.6	71.5	72.2	69.1
Officer	66.1	69.4	66.6	68.0	64.3

[4] Success Factors.

[a] Enlisted. The successful strength growth of the ARNG was due to programs such as enlistment, extension of enlistment (reenlistment), educational financial assistance programs, and the non-prior service split option training program. (The non-prior service split option training program allows the ARNG to recruit high school students -- a market not otherwise available.)

[b] Officer. Ten percent of new ARNG officers in FY 1986 were accessed from ROTC and 27 percent from State OCS. The remaining 63 percent were direct appointments into the ARNG, Reserve Component OCS production, and individuals who previously held commissions in other components. To meet the future end strengths, the ARNG will continue to rely on these sources. Total accession requirements will be over 6,000 officers and warrant officers by FY 1992. ROTC is programmed to remain the primary source for lieutenants, providing over 50 percent of total commissioned officers required. However, in light of anticipated shortfalls in ROTC production through FY 1989 or 1990, State OCS will play a greater role in the ARNG Accessions Program with State OCS equaling or exceeding appointments for ROTC. By continuing to serve as the Reserve Forces Duty Management harness, the ALMT is expected to sustain its vital role in ARNG officer procurement.

(g) Readiness Assessment. ARNG personnel readiness is affected by available strength and MOS qualification. Ongoing recruiting and retention programs are dealing effectively with the available strength shortfall. MOS qualification (MOSQ) remains the primary readiness inhibitor. To address this problem, the ARNG is involved in an effort to improve MOSQ through command emphasis and increased management of available school seats to ensure best use of training resources. However, recent ARNG force modernization has had a significantly negative impact on MOSQ. As MOSs are changed to match new equipment, personnel first undergo new equipment training and become MOS-qualified to support the new modernized equipment. During the transition period from old to new requirements, personnel are not MOS-qualified according to new document requirements. Highly technical and professional skill areas (e.g. medical, chemical) requiring lengthy schooling are also a major problem. M-day soldiers frequently experience difficulty obtaining leave from their civilian jobs commensurate with school seat availability.

(h) Full-time Support Program.

[1] The goal of the Full-time support program is to provide the Army with operationally ready units prior to mobilization. In order to accomplish this, sufficient full time manpower must be available to train, supply, maintain, administer, recruit and manage the force. There is not sufficient time between mobilization and deployment to correct significant deficiencies. The units must be ready before mobilization. Full time support for ARNG units consists primarily of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program and the military technician program. Active component soldiers and civil service personnel are also involved.

[2] The AGR program provides unit commanders with the Full-time personnel necessary to improve training, logistics and mobilization planning and readiness. In the event of mobilization, AGR soldiers mobilize and deploy with the unit to which they are assigned.

[3] The ARNG Technician program provides Full-time support to units and other activities. Although Technicians are civilian employees, they are required to be members of the National Guard and must be available to enter military active duty when their units are mobilized. The largest number of Technicians are concentrated in maintenance and logistics.

[4] National Guard Bureau Headquarters and Field Operating Activities (FOA) are staffed with civilian employees. Unlike ARNG Technicians, these employees do not mobilize.

ARNG Full-time Support

	<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
AGR	25,237	25,725	25,725
Dual Status Military Technicians	25,593	25,920	25,920
Non Dual Status ARNG Civilians	2,182	2,200	2,200
Active Army with ARNG	756	745	745
Army Civilians	390	406	406
* Congressional floor total 26,629			

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

(1) With a current strength of approximately 301,000, the IRR is the largest pool of pretrained individual manpower available during mobilization. It will provide filler personnel for both active component and reserve component units.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
287.5	300.9	295.1	328.1

(2) The Army plans on approximately 70 percent of the enlisted IRR and 90 percent of the officer IRR being available for use during mobilization. An IRR 3-year reenlistment bonus was given to approximately 967 soldiers who reenlisted by the end of FY 1986. The bonus program for FY 1987 produced 848 reenlistments out of a total of 3,540 reenlistments. About the same number of reenlistments for bonuses is expected in FY 1988 and FY 1989.

(3) In FY 1987, the Army IRR Screening program was conducted at over 2,000 recruiting stations nationwide. Approximately 104,000 members of the IRR participated in the one day recall during their birth month to check personnel data, medical fitness, and some basic military skills knowledge in selected MOS. A significant number of corrections were made to the personnel records and mobilization data base. Further, a number of leads were developed for recruiting. This screening process is planned to continue into FY 1988. Because of other higher priority requirements no funds for the program have been requested for FY 1989.

(4) The Army study of IRR skill retention and decay is scheduled for completion by mid FY 1989. IRR mobilization training is based upon mobilization requirements. The IRR will continue to be a vital mobilization manpower pool throughout the program years. Other initiatives are underway or in planning to add vitality to the IRR. Contributing to this effort is the recent reorganization of the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center and the Army Reserve Personnel Center into a single personnel center. Reorganization has enhanced personnel management and responsiveness of this important body of mobilization manpower.

c. Inactive National Guard (ING).

The ING consists of those ARNG members who are unable to participate in peacetime training (training assemblies and/or annual training), but who wish to retain their Guard affiliation. They will join and deploy with their units when called to active duty. The ING are not members of the Selected Reserve; therefore, they are not available for mobilization unless a national emergency or a war is declared. ING members muster for one training session each year and are qualified in a military skill. Actual and projected strengths for the ING are shown below:

Inactive National Guard
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
10.3	10.3	10.5	10.5

2. Standby Reserve.

The Standby Reserve consists of reserve personnel who have a remaining military service obligation, or a desire for a voluntary commitment, but who, because of a temporary conflict such as being an elected official, cannot be readily available for immediate mobilization. The Standby Reserve is screened regularly to ensure all eligible members are transferred to the Ready Reserve. Actual and projected strengths of the Standby Reserve are shown below:

Standby Reserve
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4

3. Retirees.

Regular Army and Reserve retirees with 20 years or more of active duty, who are receiving retirement pay, can be recalled to active duty at any time in the interest of national defense. The Army's retiree recall program preassigns retirees to appropriate mobilization positions throughout the CONUS support base. Exercise "Certain Sage 88" was conducted at twenty installations in October-November 1987. The exercise recalled almost 500 volunteer retirees to active duty to test mobilization procedures at the installation level, test skill retention, and evaluate medical fitness of retirees. The pool of retirees under age 60 and eligible for preassignment is shrinking because of the decrease in the size of the Army since the Vietnam War. However, the number of preassignees is expected to remain relatively constant because of program enhancements to be implemented in the next five years including expansion of retiree positions, improvement of preassignment procedures, and provisions for retiree program managers at the installation level. The total number of retirees is shown below:

Retirees
(Strengths in Thousands)

Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees (AC/RC)	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Categories I and II	225.8	225.8	225.8
Categories III	164.0	164.0	164.0
Other Retiree Reserves			
Categories I and II	37.6	37.6	37.6
Category III	104.7	104.7	104.7

4. RC Personnel on Active Duty

The FY 1987 (Actual) figures are for those individuals serving on active duty for training as of the last day of FY 1987 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days.

USAR Personnel on Active Duty for Training in Excess of 180 Days

	<u>FY 87</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	4	282
Flight Training	82	127
Professional Training at Military Institutions	6	1
Professional Training at Civilian Institutions	0	19
Officer Acquisition Training	0	0
Other Training	40	15
Total	132	444

ARNG Personnel on Active Duty for Training in Excess of 180 Days

	<u>FY 87</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	15	2,155
Flight Training	114	175
Professional Training at Military Institutions	12	107
Professional Training at Civilian Institutions	0	271
Officer Acquisition Training	0	0
Other Training	225	1,381
Total	366	4,089

C. Civilian Manpower.

1. General.

a. Role of Civilians.

Army civilians provide a major contribution in support of the Army's mission. Army civilians, which comprise nearly 21 percent of the Army's work force, including the Reserves and National Guard, manage and operate most bases, depots and laboratories. They support the Army mission by performing a full range of logistics functions, including depot maintenance, supply and acquisition management, and transportation management. Civilians also provide essential support in training, medical care, research and development, engineering, and facilities management. Over 20 percent of the Army's appropriated fund civilian force are stationed overseas and provide a critical mobilization base needed for transition to wartime operations.

b. Civilian End Strength Ceilings.

(1) The FY 1987 Defense Authorization Act eliminated civilian end strength ceilings on a test basis for FY 1985. Subsequent Authorization Acts have continued the prohibition of managing DoD civilian personnel by end strength constraints. The FY 1987 Appropriation Act also continued the exception from civilian end strength ceilings, but added the following controls: (a) Work year limitation on civilians in overseas areas to the level actually achieved in FY 1986; (b) A plan, by month, of strength and workyears by Service, broken out by CONUS/Overseas with overseas further broken out by U.S. direct hire, foreign direct hire, and foreign indirect hire; (c) Monthly report on the execution of civilian employment levels by end strength and work years, comparing budgeted to actual employment levels; and, (d) Quarterly report on the execution of civilian employment levels and funding obligations by appropriation.

(2) Based on the Army's positive experience in operating with end strength ceilings, the ceiling exemption should be continued without the overseas workyear limitation. This will provide the flexibility to respond to changing work load requirements in all programs and will preclude personnel turbulence and associated administrative cost which result from the requirement to release temporary employees on the last day of the fiscal year in order to reach end strength ceilings. In FY 1987, the Army's reported actual civilian strength was 417,889 compared with a budgeted strength of 412,153. This was accomplished without releasing necessary employees at the end of the year. The success in being within 1.39 percent of the projected strength level was the result of continued management of civilian manpower throughout the fiscal year, not just at the end of the year.

*It has also forced managers to plan employment levels carefully throughout the fiscal year rather than focusing on an end year.

c. Civilian Substitution.

The civilian substitution program, which increases readiness by releasing military service members for duty in essential combat, combat support, and combat service support units, continue to expand. During FY 1983 through FY 1987, the Army converted 8,509 military positions to civilian positions. Civilian substitution will be further expanded by 999 in FY 1988. A total of 9,508 military positions are programmed for conversion to civilian incumbency from FY 1983 to FY 1988. After FY 1988, no additional military to civilian conversions were planned; however, full implementation of this program has been hampered due to a congressionally-directed dollar reduction of \$10 million for FY 1987.

2. Major Program Changes. The FY 1988 and 1989 Program reflects civilian strength reductions associated with lower funding levels contained in the Army Operation and Maintenance Amended Budget Submission (ABS) and OSD directed force structure reductions. A total of -11,690 authorizations were reduced in FY 1988 and -12,216 in FY 1989. While the final impacts of these reductions on current mission requirements have not been fully assessed, analysis of programmed levels show significant reductions in the Army's manning levels associated with: support to installations (both combat and support installations), training support; logistics support; information management; Europe-MTOE unit support; POMCUS support; family and community programs; and, the Army food service program. The following table shows the civilian employment estimate by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

TABLE III-11
ARMY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING & END STRENGTH
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 80			FY 87			FY 88			FY 89		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	% MNG	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	
STRATEGIC	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.8	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	83.01%	0.2	0.2	83.98%	
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	18.3	24.3	31.1	30.9	37.5	75.49%	28.3	75.49%	37.5	28.7	76.58%	
Land Forces	16.2	23.0	29.1	28.9	35.1	75.61%	26.4	75.61%	35.1	26.7	76.12%	
Division Forces	15.0	21.8	23.3	23.2	26.4	81.65%	21.6	81.65%	26.4	20.8	78.55%	
(Divisional Increment)	4.8	5.4	3.2	3.3	3.9	83.12%	3.2	83.12%	3.9	3.2	84.15%	
(Non-div Cbt Increment)	5.0	4.6	3.2	3.5	3.3	98.78%	3.2	98.78%	3.3	3.0	92.14%	
(Tactical Support Incrmt)	5.2	11.8	17.0	16.5	19.3	78.46%	15.2	78.46%	19.3	14.5	75.13%	
Theater Forces	1.2	1.2	5.8	5.7	8.7	54.18%	4.8	54.18%	8.7	6.0	68.72%	
Mobility Forces	2.1	1.3	2.0	1.9	2.4	82.40%	2.0	82.40%	2.4	2.0	83.28%	
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	6.1	5.9	4.9	5.1	6.4	78.13%	5.0	78.13%	6.4	5.1	79.65%	
Intelligence	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.3	3.1	81.12%	2.5	81.12%	3.1	2.6	83.87%	
Centrally Managed Comm	4.3	4.3	2.5	2.8	3.3	75.35%	2.5	75.35%	3.3	2.5	75.74%	
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	85.6	78.0	83.4	85.4	90.8	85.75%	77.8	85.75%	90.8	76.8	84.56%	
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.9	1.1	2.0	1.8	3.4	69.41%	2.4	69.41%	3.4	2.4	69.12%	
MEDICAL SUPPORT	25.6	25.6	27.0	27.5	34.8	73.69%	25.6	73.69%	34.8	25.9	74.39%	
JOINT ACTIVITIES	3.2	1.2	2.7	3.0	3.4	82.35%	2.8	82.35%	3.4	3.1	92.78%	
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	86.79%	0.2	86.79%	0.2	0.2	86.79%	
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	89.95%	0.2	89.95%	0.2	0.2	100.00%	
Federal Agency Support	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	60.00%	0.0	60.00%	0.0	0.0	60.00%	
Spt to JCS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	74.07%	0.0	74.07%	0.0	0.0	74.07%	
OSD/Defense Agcy & Activities	2.8	1.0	2.3	2.5	3.0	81.74%	2.4	81.74%	3.0	2.8	93.13%	
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	84.8	73.4	85.9	87.0	99.7	87.11%	86.8	87.11%	99.7	87.1	87.37%	
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	13.4	12.8	14.1	13.2	15.1	93.74%	14.2	93.74%	15.1	12.9	85.21%	
Combat Commands	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.6	95.82%	2.5	95.82%	2.6	2.4	90.68%	
Support Commands	10.2	9.9	11.3	10.3	12.5	93.90%	11.6	93.90%	12.5	10.5	84.06%	

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	27.1	24.8	19.3	19.9	25.2	19.3	76.64%	25.2	19.6	78.00%
Research and Development	27.1	24.8	19.3	19.9	25.2	19.3	76.64%	25.2	19.6	78.00%
Geophysical Activities	0.0	0.0								
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	19.3	19.6	24.3	24.0	31.3	22.9	73.04%	31.3	23.0	73.40%
Personnel Support	7.2	7.1	9.4	9.0	12.2	9.0	73.91%	12.2	9.2	75.53%
Individual Training	12.1	12.4	14.9	15.0	19.1	13.8	72.48%	19.1	13.8	72.04%
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	74.8	93.7	117.2	120.0	137.5	114.6	83.34%	137.5	115.4	83.94%
Support Installations	45.1	65.5	67.7	67.6	77.4	63.2	81.61%	77.4	63.9	82.47%
Centralized Support Act'y	29.6	28.2	49.5	52.4	60.0	51.4	85.58%	60.0	51.5	85.85%
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	359.1	360.5	412.2	417.9	485.2	399.8	82.41%	485.2	400.1	82.46%
(Military Technicians)			35.2	35.8		36.5			36.6	

NOTE: Detail may not add due to rounding.
 *Fewer than 50 spaces. **Includes Military Technicians

3. Civilian Fitness

The Army supports health promotion programs designed to promote fitness and to reduce factors associated with employee illness and absenteeism. These programs include medical screening, physical exercise, classes on weight control, nutrition, stress management, smoking cessation, and substance abuse control.

4. Position Management

a. The Army allows commanders maximum flexibility in managing the civilian work force to support readiness, force modernization, civilian substitution, and improved resource management initiatives. Commanders are expected to manage the civilian work force prudently through effective position management (PM), accurate job grading, and organizational efficiency reviews.

b. Army regulations on manpower and organization have been strengthened by inclusion of policies which emphasize economical structuring of supervisory levels and non-supervisory positions. This is in line with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-64 which requires managers to utilize total staff resources in fulfilling their PM responsibilities.

c. During FY 1987 the number of GS/GM 11 and above positions increased by 3,368. The ratio of GS/GM 11-15 positions to GS 1-10 positions (1:1:70) was slightly higher than the FY 1986 ratio (1:1:64).

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower.

The peak trained military manpower demand occurs late in the scenario (near M+180) when the expanded size and composition of the force has stabilized and the cumulative demand for casualty replacements is near its peak. The peak trained manpower shortfalls normally occur in the middle of the scenario (at about M+90) when shortages of combat arms and medical personnel peak. This occurs because early battle losses are high; sizable returns to duty of wounded personnel previously evacuated have not yet occurred; and newly trained personnel are not yet available in significant quantities from the mobilized training base (not until M+113).

Early military manpower demand can only be filled, therefore, from manpower assets already under military control (mobilized early in the scenario). Such resources include:

o Non-Unit Trained Individuals: Transients, holdees (primarily prisoners and patients), and students. These manpower assets (known as the THS Account) will be used to fill as much as possible the manpower shortfall caused by peacetime manning limitations versus full wartime manning requirements.

o Pretrained individual manpower: Individual Ready Reservists (IRR), Inactive National Guardsmen (ING), Standby Reservists, and retirees. We estimate these resources will be fully mobilized by M+50.

o Training Output: Accelerated output of active and reserve personnel already in the training base on M-Day.

Although increased manning of the Selected Reserve and the IRR has eliminated the aggregate shortfalls beyond M+10, this masks significant shortfalls that exist in a number of essential skills. Critical skill shortfalls are expected in the enlisted combat arms and medical areas through M+180. There will also be shortages of enlisted engineering, intelligence, chemical, petroleum, and ammunition personnel as well as communications electronic equipment maintenance, intelligence, and automotive repair warrant officers. Key commissioned officer shortfalls are expected in the infantry and medical specialties, with shortages also in chemical, legal, foreign area officers and chaplains.

It should be noted that the major factor determining shortfalls and overages, especially after M+60, is the estimate of casualty replacements required to maintain the fighting force in wartime. Army casualty estimates are derived from models of dynamic conventional combat simulations and historical attrition factors. This modeling effort provides planning estimates, but cannot be expected to predict actual conflict casualties. Therefore, in a future war, Army personnel shortfalls may be significantly different from the estimates. In addition, the demand is limited to requirements to fill and sustain the existing force structure. It does not include personnel requirements that would be needed if the force structure is expanded, as is likely for a war that extends beyond 180 days.

If our manpower demand does not change significantly, further increases in Active and Selected Reserve manning or additional pretrained manpower will be needed to reduce or eliminate the by-skill shortfalls at M+90. The success of our efforts beyond M+90 will depend largely on current Army efforts to increase our training base capabilities to meet our mobilization needs.

2. Civilian Manpower.

Before M-Day, the requirement for U.S. direct hire Full-time civilian manpower is represented by the peacetime authorized civilian work force (314,000). On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for employment/deployment. A total of about 267,000 additional civilian requirements are created at that time. Concurrently, about 133,000 peacetime positions that are not required in wartime will be terminated (including virtually all the support positions for the USAR and ARNG). This causes a net peak demand of about 448,000 positions at M-Day.

Prior to M-Day, the only component of the civilian manpower supply is the peacetime U.S. direct hire Full-time permanent work force of about 303,000. At M-Day, this number is reduced to about 233,000 by the loss of 70,000 civilian employees called up for military duty (ready reservists and retirees). To avoid calling up civilians in essential positions, the Army continuously screens individuals who hold such positions and who are also members of the Ready Reserve or are retired military personnel eligible for recall. The combination of new positions, terminated positions and losses to military duties causes an M-Day shortfall of about 215,000 civilians (448,000 required compared with 233,000 available).

The Army plans to offset this shortfall by converting about 33,000 civilian employees from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status and reassigning all available personnel from terminated positions. After M-Day, the new hire requirement for 182,000 civilians will be filled from other manpower sources, including civil funded manpower, new hires provided by the U.S. Employment Service offices and the Office of Personnel Management, and the rehiring of retired Federal employees.

Significant skill shortages in transportation management, engineering, logistics management, procurement, and data processing make such critical occupations prime targets for the use of retired Federal civilian employees. During FY 1985, OSD conducted a study which found that of 12,000 retirees contacted, 50 percent said they would be willing to return to work under mobilization conditions on a full time basis. An additional 20 percent said they would be willing to return on a part-time basis. There is no indication that these percentages have changed.

E. Manpower Management Improvements.

The Army has implemented many programs to improve both personnel and manpower management as part of its concerted effort to become more efficient using available resources. Some of these programs are described below.

1. Organizational Efficiency Review Program (OERP)

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requires the Service Secretaries to review functions under their purview with the primary goal of increasing productivity. The Department of the Army accomplishes this goal through the Organizational Efficiency Review Program (OERP). The objective is to assure that assigned missions of non-deployable activities are accomplished in the most efficient and cost effective manner. Efficiency reviews are conducted on both contractible and non-contractible functions.

For contractible functions, the results of the efficiency review are tested by using the procurement process to select competitively a contractor whose costs are compared to Government costs. Then, the most economical source (commercial firm or Government) is selected to perform the contractible functions in the future. This process results in increased efficiency and cost reduction regardless of whether the final decision is to contract for the work or to perform it with Government employees. In FY 1986, the Army completed studies on over 2,950 civilian and military spaces, saving about 870 positions. These results have been incorporated into our manpower estimates. The Army plans to study about 40,000 additional positions in FY 1987, 1988, and 1989. In compliance with Congressional direction, no adjustments have been made to civilian estimates in anticipation of contract decisions on these studies.

In the case of non-contractible functions, the Army began the first Army-wide Efficiency Review (ER) in FY 1986, using the installation Directorate of Resource Management as the test bed. This study combines efficiency review techniques with the manpower requirements determination procedures of the Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3) discussed in paragraph II.E.9. The Resource Management Directorate pilot study will serve as the model for future, joint ER/MS-3 studies of Army-wide functions. In FY 1986, the Army completed efficiency review studies on over 9,000 civilian and military spaces, saving over 250 positions. These results were incorporated into our estimates through programming changes in 1984.

2. Capital Investment Programs.

These programs include the Quick Return on Investment Program, Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment Program, and OSD Productivity Investment Funds. Under the productivity Capital Investment Programs, money is set aside for fast payback capital tools, equipment, and facilities that save manpower, reduce costs, increase productivity, and improve readiness. Modernized equipment and facilities provided through these programs raise organizational productivity and improve the quality of support services. In addition, troops are trained with state-of-the-art equipment leading to a more ready force. For example, the types of equipment purchased under these programs include loading ramps, weapons training simulators that enhance feedback on marksmanship while saving live ammunition, hand-held radios that assisted in the Grenada incident, and asphalt reclaimers that refurbish roads damaged by training exercises. For every dollar invested, \$17 is returned in benefits over the economic life. A positive environment is created for Army leaders through opportunities enabling them to obtain modern equipment and facilities, to reapply manpower and dollars toward other priority initiatives, to motivate the work force, and to achieve an efficient and cost effective organization. These achievements will assist the Army in meeting its goal established by the President to increase productivity three percent per year.

3. Value Engineering (VE).

The Value Engineering Program enhances productivity by eliminating unnecessary functions that contribute to costs of weapon systems, equipments, or processes, but not to performance. VE takes advantage of state-of-the-art technology to produce cost savings for the Army.

Value Engineering Incentive clauses are included in all contracts of \$100,000 or more, and \$25,000 or more for spare parts contracts. Contractors are encouraged to submit resource conserving Value Engineering Change Proposals (VECPs) to reduce contract costs. The contractor's incentive is that he shares up to 50 percent of the net savings resulting from accepted and implemented VECPs. During 1985, VE Programs were introduced at two additional Army MACOMs, and VE incentive clauses began to be included in spare parts contracts of \$25,000 and above. On July 1, 1986, the placement of funded VE Program Requirement Clauses in initial production contracts for major systems was mandated by the DepSecDef. Value Engineering is playing a significant role in achieving the President's goal to increase productivity. The VE Program averages a return on investment of \$15 for each dollar invested.

Every commander, project manager, and resource manager must foster an environment that encourages innovative cost savings. That environment is characterized by positive leadership, openness, and a willingness to listen. Innovators champion new ideas, encourage horizontal and vertical communications, allow subordinates the "freedom to fail," and encourage creative problem solving. The Army VE program provides a framework by which to accomplish the above.

4. The Army's Integrated Productivity Efforts.

The Army has quite successfully applied the tools of productivity and efficiency (e.g., Productivity Capital Investment Programs, Value Engineering, Organizational Efficiency Reviews, Quality Circles, Productivity Gain Sharing) fostering an environment where innovative management on the part of individuals, organizations and contractors can flourish. Reinforced by Executive Order 12552, 25 February 1986, which directs that federal agencies improve productivity 20 percent by 1992, Army will promote even broader application of the existing tools to ensure that maximum productivity is achieved at all organizational levels. In order to achieve the President's goal, it is necessary, first, to identify those areas that are susceptible to improvement and broad input/output measurement. Three areas were selected for measurement to begin in FY 1987. They are: depot supply operations; finance and accounting; and recruiting for the Regular Army, Army Reserve and National Guard. The additional functions of Depot Maintenance, Army Family Housing, Real Property Maintenance, Medical Care, Military Personnel Management, Reserve Personnel Management, Commissary Operations, and Executive Level Software Control were selected to begin in FY 1988. All other functions are to be covered by 1992. Dedicated leadership, an aware and motivated workforce, and use of already-proven tools and techniques will help achieve the President's goal while meeting the ongoing challenge to produce a better Army.

5. Reshaping the Logistics Force.

During FY 1988-89, the Army will continue actions to reduce major U.S. logistical structure shortfalls in some areas. Over the program years, labor-intensive units will be modernized to be equipment-intensive, provide better utilization of available manpower, and enhance readiness/sustainability. Shortfall reductions will also be achieved by increased reliance on external support (e.g., Host Nation Support and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program) and through improved productivity of logistics units. For example, productivity in supply units will be improved through increased automation and the Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) Variant, the High Mobility Materials Handling Equipment. In petroleum units, the Army will use commercially available 20,000 gallon collapsible storage tanks instead of 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks. Transportation units will use the 7,500 gallon petroleum tanker and the 65 Ton Crane. Ammunition units will use the 6,000 pounds Variable Reach Rough Terrain Forklift. Further, labor savings in FY 88 are anticipated through a new field feeding concept.

6. The Army Family Action Plan (AFAP). Improving soldier, civilian, and family working and living conditions within the Army is a major management goal. The AFAP significantly fosters soldier and civilian employee retention and undistracted job performance. The FY 1988 budget includes additional resources for the construction of child care facilities. Additionally, it continues funding for family programs that provide services to handicapped family members, assistance to family members attempting to enter the job market, outreach to junior enlisted family members residing away from the installation, coordination of installation volunteers, family fitness programs, and expanded child care options directing services to latchkey children through coordinated programming. The AFAP contributes to the combat readiness of the Army by providing services that enhance family stability and reduce training distractors.

7. Information Resources Management. In May 1984, the Chief of Staff of the Army established the Information Mission Area consisting of five subdisciplines: telecommunications, automation (to include office automation), visual information, records management (to include mail), and printing/publications. The Information Mission Area has resulted in the realignment of manpower resources between major commands and USAISC, and within USAISC, in order to perform their missions of designing, acquiring, installing, testing, accepting and managing information systems for the Army. This realignment of manpower began in FY 1986, and will continue into FY 1988, until full realignment of information resources assets is achieved.

8. The Army Functional Dictionary (AFD).

The AFD provides definitions for all Army functions and work centers. Codes associated with the AFD have been applied to Army manning documents to provide a link between Army functional manpower requirements determination and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES). Accomplished in coordination with the Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO) redesign effort, AFD development has been completed for all Army TDA functions.

9. Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3).

The Manpower Staffing Standards System is a program designed to provide credible manpower requirements for the Army's TDA organizations through the application of workload-based staffing standards. Approximately 415,000 of the Army's 620,000 peacetime TDA requirements are workload-driven and, as such, will be determined through the application of staffing standards developed by performing detailed work measurement studies or by using statistical analyses of historical data. In FY 1987, standards were approved for 16,026 spaces, studies were begun on an additional 38,481 spaces, and 69,938 spaces were formally scheduled for study.

10. Force Alignment Plan II (FAP II).

Since 1983, HQDA has been issuing grade ceilings designed to align field grade officer authorizations with constraints contained in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). FY 1984 and FY 1985 ceilings resulted in a total reduction of 4,400 field grade authorizations (900 conversions to civilian, 600 MTOE downgrades, and 2,900 TDA downgrades). Ceilings for FY 1986-1988 require further downgrades of 900 authorizations (675 TDA, 225 MTOE) due to Army structure changes. Major commands and Army staff agencies began the downgrade of these 900 positions in the FY 1987 documentation cycle. The Army continues to believe that the DOPMA Grade Tables (10 US Code 523) understate the Army's need for experience in key training and readiness related positions. The Army thus continues to support an increase of 1,000 field grade officers in the DOPMA ceilings.

11. Improving the Procurement Process.

The Army is continuing efforts to increase efficiency in procurement functions. The Standard Army Automated Contracting System (SAACONS) is a microcomputer-based system designed primarily to support Army installation contracting offices. SAACONS provides installation contracting offices with the most sophisticated automated contracting systems available within the Federal Government. It will provide complete office automation to reduce procurement administration leadtime and contracting backlog. Overtime will be reduced by making procurement more efficient in the award process, allowing more effective contract administration. During FY86 and FY87, ADP equipment was ordered for Forces Command, Health Services Command, Western Command, Military Traffic Management Command, Army Materiel Command and Military District of Washington. During FY88, hardware installations will continue for the National Guard Bureau, ISC, Corps of Engineers. The functional software contract was awarded to CACI, Inc.-Federal in August 1986. Software acceptance test of Version 1 was completed in May 1987. Version 2 (improving upon Version 1) and Version 3 software are being planned. Version 3 software interfaces are being developed to include the Commercial Accounts Payable System and the AMC-DESCOM Standard Depot System. In FY88 software installations will proceed for FORSCOM, HSC, WESTCOM, MTMC, AMC, ISC, Corps of Engineers. Twenty-one SAACONS sites were installed, trained and made operational during the calendar year 1987. The present schedule of installations is 6 sites per month until 256 sites are operational.

12. Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) Program.

MARC is the Army's process for determining wartime manpower requirements for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) functions in all TOE/MTOE units. Approximately 500,000 of the Army's TOE manpower requirements in the Active Army and Reserve Components are determined by this process. MARC is designed to reflect more accurately the minimum essential CS/CSS requirements for sustained operations. Accuracy of the criteria developed is assured by firmly anchoring the determination process to sample data collection and other equipment and maintenance data reporting programs presently ongoing within the Army. Most of the 500,000 requirements are being determined through a systematic method which uses computer modeling in conjunction with scenario-oriented data to enhance the process. To complete the process, another element of information must be determined. This information deals with the amount of time that a soldier is not available (non-productive time) to perform duties directly related to his/her military occupational specialty (MOS). These elements of information were determined independently by a private contractor (TOE nonavailability factors study, August 1986) and were made available for Army use in the April 1987 documentation process. In April 1986, the pilot MARC development course was completed. Work on functional studies already underway continues. Progress on the computer modeling of MARC studies has been slow. Emphasis will be placed on interim procedures to update manpower requirements in these specific functional areas during FY 1988 until the modeling process can be completed. The final aircraft maintenance study is scheduled to be submitted to HQDA in FY 1988.

III. PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPCC)

A. Strategic Force.

1. Defensive Strategic Forces.

2. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.6	.5	.5
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.2	.2

Manpower in this subcategory is for support of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WMCCS), including airborne command posts and an alternate National Military Command Center.

B. Tactical/Mobility Forces.

1. Land Forces.

a. Division Forces.

Division Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	438.3	443.6	445.5
Reserve Component			
ARNG	405.4	405.1	405.1
USAR	179.0	194.4	197.4
<u>Civilian</u>	23.2	21.6	20.8

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to or in support of the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units.

The increase (+5,300) in active military manpower in FY 1988 reflects force structure reductions in division forces and aviation structure (-5,682) offset by undermanning in Pacific forces (+627); realignments from Theater forces, (+5,025); and programmed increases in light divisions (+3,116), platoon leaders (+1,600), and other CONUS manning adjustments (+614).

The increase (+1,850) in active military manpower in FY 1989 reflects continued Army of Excellence (AOE) redesign.

The increase (+15,400) in USAR manpower for FY88 reflects programmed increases in manning of the USAR force structure and new aviation, medical, combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI), and other combat support/ combat service support units. The increase (+3,000) in FY 1989 reflects continued activation of aviation, CEWI and other combat support/ combat support/ combat service support units.

The decrease (-2,583) in civilian manpower in FY 1988 reflects undermanning in divisional forces (+200) offset by mandated dollar reductions in Operations and Maintenance, Army (-2,783).

The increase (+388) in civilian manpower in FY 1989 reflects a decrease in military technicians (-751) offset by increases in POMCUS support (+440), force modernization initiatives (+107), military technicians for the National Guard (+345), and other force structure realignments (+247).

b. Theater Forces.

Theater Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	36.2	35.9	35.5
Reserve Component			
ARNG	19.4	20.6	20.6
USAR	22.0	21.8	22.4
<u>Civilian</u>	5.7	4.8	6.0

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to theater-wide and specialized units such as three active and five reserve component separate infantry brigades, and one scout group; certain supply, maintenance, and security activities in support of NATO; and theater-level psychological warfare and civil affairs units and related support.

The decrease (-372) in active military manpower in FY 1988 reflects realignments to divisional forces (-5,025) offset by undermanning in intelligence support (+183), Panama forces (+512), support to other services (+797), missile forces (+2,408), and special operations forces (+753).

The increase (+400) for USAR manpower in FY 1989 reflects planned force structure changes to increase military intelligence capabilities.

The decrease (-395) in active military manpower in FY 1989 is associated with various unit manning adjustments.

The decrease (-949) in civilian manpower for FY 1988 reflects undermanning (+106) in theater forces support offset by mandated dollar reductions in Operations and Maintenance, Army (-1,055).

The increase (+1,207) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects force modernization initiatives (+117), tactical equipment maintenance support (+810), force structure realignments to support Army of Excellence changes (+351), and other miscellaneous manning adjustments (-71).

2. Mobility Forces.

Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.2	.3	.3

Reserve Component USAR	8.8	8.8	8.8
<u>Civ'lian</u>	1.9	2.0	2.0

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the Defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

C. Communications/Intelligence.

1. Intelligence.

Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.3	9.8	9.9
Reserve Component USAR	1.0	1.1	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	2.5	2.6

Manpower in this category supports Consolidated Cryptologic Activities, the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Foreign Counter-intelligence Program, Security and Investigative Activities, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

The increase (+485) in active military manpower in FY 1988 reflects increased manning in defense agencies (+125) and other classified intelligence and cryptological activities (+360).

The increase (+91) in active military manpower for FY 1989 reflects defense agency support (+4) and other classified intelligence programs (+87).

The increase (+85) in civilian manpower in FY 1989 supports increase in classified intelligence programs.

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.0	11.0	11.5
<u>Civilian</u>	2.8	2.5	2.5

Manpower in this category supports defense consolidated telecommunications and the worldwide command and control system, and excludes support of tactical units (included under Land Forces) and installations (included in support activities).

The decrease (-1,064) in active military manpower in FY 1988 results from further signal unit reorganization (-480) and overmanning in long-haul communications (-584).

The increase (+566) in active military manpower in FY 1989 reflects increased defense agency support (+25); long haul communications support (+461); communications security (+23); and signal unit manning adjustments (+57).

D. Combat Installations.

Combat Installations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.4	16.7	15.9
<u>Civilian</u>	85.4	77.8	76.8

Manpower in this category supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth US Army-Korea, US Forces Command, and the US Army Western Command.

The decrease (-9,698) in active military manpower for FY 1983 reflects overmanning in support activities for Europe forces (-2,089), Pacific forces (-605), CONUS forces (-5,645), Panama forces (-48), and traffic control activities (-95); in addition to programmed decreases of (-1,216).

The decrease (-789) in active military manpower for FY 1989 reflects force structure realignments in support functions for Pacific forces (-393), Panama forces (-18) and CONUS forces (-53); in addition to programmed decreases for traffic control activities (-325).

The decrease (-7,609) in civilian manpower for FY 1988 is due to reductions in food service support (-197), installation maintenance support (-302), real property maintenance support (-1,716), installation management operations (-3,393), and overmanning in FY 1987 (-2,001).

The decrease (-1,076) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 is due to reductions in installation management support (-1120) offset by small increase in force modernization support (+44).

E. Force Support Training.

Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.1	4.6	4.0
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	2.4	2.4

Manpower in the category supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany.

The decrease (-587) in active military manpower during FY 1988 reflects programmed decreases in joint training support (-161), CONUS training support (-269), and Pacific training support (-43); in addition to overmanning in FY 1987 (-114).

The decrease (-599) in active military manpower in FY 1989 supports force structure realignments in force support activities for various units.

F. Medical Support.

Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	33.6	33.4	33.4
Reserve Component			
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.2
USAR	7.0	6.9	6.9
<u>Civilian</u>	27.5	25.6	25.9

Manpower in this category supports health care activities.

The decrease (-1,883) in civilian manpower for FY 1988 reflects mandated reductions in Operations and Maintenance, Army (-261), force structure and strength reductions (-45), the transfer of Army manpower to the Joint Regional Defense Medical Center (-1,111) and station hospital reduction (-711); offset by increases for Military Enlistment Processing Command drug testing (+165) and other medical program adjustments (+80).

The increase (+241) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects increases for family practice clinics (+190) and station hospitals (+51).

G. Joint Activities.

1. International Activities.

International Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.2	.2

Manpower in this category is assigned to management headquarters activities in international military organizations.

2. Unified Commands.

Unified Commands Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.1	.9	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.2	.2

Manpower in this category is assigned to management headquarters in unified commands.

The decrease (-151) in active military manpower for FY 1988 reflects overmanning in management headquarters support for various unified commands.

3. Federal Agency Support.

Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.1	.2	.2
USAR	3.5	3.5	3.5
<u>Civilian</u>			

Manpower in this category is assigned to non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis, unless they support a DoD mission.

The increase (+64) in active military manpower for FY 1988 reflects undermanning in FY 1987.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.9	.9	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

* less than 30.

Manpower in this category represents service support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint commands.

The increase (+11) in FY 1989 reflects support in joint commands.

5. Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense Agencies and Activities.

OSD/Defense Agencies & Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.7	5.0	5.1
<u>Civilian</u>	2.5	2.4	2.8

Manpower in this category represents service support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, various Defense support agencies such as Defense Nuclear Agency and Defense Logistics Agency, and security assistance.

The net increase (+25) in active military manpower for FY 1989 reflects increased intelligence support (+36) and OSD support (+9) offset by reductions in defense agencies (-1) and foreign military sales support (-19).

The increase (+337) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects increased foreign military sales support (+265), growth in intelligence activities (+34), and other manning adjustments (+38).

H. Central Logistics.

Central Logistics Manpower (End strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.3	7.9	7.9
<u>Civilian</u>	87.0	86.8	87.1

Manpower in this category serve in supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the US Army Material Command and US Army Europe.

The increase (+522) in active military manpower in FY 1988 reflects overmanning in FY 1987 for supply (+247) and maintenance operations (+628) which is offset by programmed decreases (-353) in FY 1988.

The increase (+257) in civilian manpower in FY 1989 represents programmed support of non-Army military construction support (+1,590); procurement operations (+1,154); depot maintenance workload increase (+1,510); logistics and maintenance support (+664); inventory control (+649); offset by programmed decreases in missile facilities (-5,310).

I. Service Management Headquarters.

1. Combat Commands Management Headquarters

Combat Commands Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.2	2.2	2.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	0	0	0
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	2.5	2.4

Manpower in this category is assigned to service support in combat commands.

The decrease (-135) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects the implementation of the DoD Reorganization Act.

2. Support Commands Management Headquarters

Support Commands Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.9	4.8	4.6
Reserve Component			
USAR	0	0	0
<u>Civilian</u>	10.3	11.6	10.5

Manpower in this category is assigned to service support in support commands to include Department of the Army (Office of the Secretary and Office of the Chief of Staff).

The decrease (-206) in active military manpower for FY 1989 supports implementation of the DoD Reorganization Act.

The increase (+1,322) in civilian manpower for FY 1988 reflects undermanning during FY 1987 (+1,033) and miscellaneous reprogramming (+7).

The decrease (-1,152) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 supports implementation of the DoD Reorganization Act.

J. Research and Development.

Research and Development Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.0	4.3	4.5
<u>Civilian</u>	19.9	19.3	19.6

Manpower in this category performs in-house efforts and directs contractor efforts for basic and applied research; exploratory, advanced, and engineering development; and test and evaluation for the Army's weapon systems and other equipment items. In addition, it provides administrative and logistical support for other RDTE installations and activities.

The decrease (-690) in active military manpower in FY 1988 reflects the FY 1988 force structure reduction taken in RDTE activities (-752) offset by programmed increase in special operations forces support (+62).

The increase (+120) in active military manpower in FY 1989 is due to the conversion of Army Missile Command from industrial fund operation to appropriated fund operations.

The decrease (-655) in civilian manpower for FY 1988 reflects an IMA mission transfer from RDTE,A to OMA (-443); a three percent FOA reduction (-73); and numerous reprogramming actions from RDTE,A appropriation to OMA (-278); offset by an increase in the Chemical Biological Warfare program (+139).

The increase (+343) in civilian manpower in FY 1989 results from the conversion of Army Missile Command from industrial fund operation to appropriated fund operations (+1,141); offset by an RDTE,A force structure reduction (-662); and reprogramming actions from RETE,A appropriation to OMA (-136).

K. Training and Personnel.

1. Personnel Support.

Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.3	12.8	12.8
USAR	2.6	2.6	2.6
<u>Civilian</u>	9.0	9.0	9.2

Manpower in this category is used in the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC Program, Army personnel processing activities, and off duty education programs.

The decrease (-1,557) in active military manpower in FY 1988 reflects overmanning in training center support (-359), recruiting activities (-732), and joint activities support (-68); in addition to programmed decreases (-398) resulting from mandated force structure reductions.

The increase (+198) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 represents increase in civilian education initiatives (+138) and other personnel programs (+60).

2. Individual Training.

Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	45.7	42.6	42.1
Reserve Component			
ARNG	6.2	6.2	6.2
USAR	52.6	59.1	59.0
<u>Civilian</u>	15.0	13.8	13.8

Manpower in this category supports the conduct of individual training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee and cadets portions of the Individuals Account.

The decrease (-3,072) in active military manpower for FY 1988 reflects overmanning in recruit training (-831) and medical training (-430); FY 1988 force structure reduction effecting aviation and ROTC support (-264); and programmed decreases in training developments and general skill training (-1,547).

The decrease (-449) in active military manpower for FY 1989 reflects professional training reductions (-576) partially offset by increases in special operations training (+127).

The increase (+6,500) in USAR manpower in FY 1988 reflects planned increases in manning of training divisions. The decrease (-100) in FY 1989 reflects minor strength changes due to reorganizations within the training structure.

The decrease (-1,138) in civilian manpower for FY 1988 reflects overmanning (-106); and programmed reductions for cryptological/signal training profession training (-134), general skill training (-591), training developments (-236), support of training establishments (-24), and professional military education (-47).

L. Support Activities.

1. Support Installations.

**Support Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.6	16.2	16.3
Reserve Component			
ARNG	23.5	23.7	23.8
USAR	5.3	5.3	5.4
<u>Civilian</u>	67.6	63.2	63.9

Manpower in this category is for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Command, US Army Information Systems Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, US Army Military District of Washington, and US Army Health Services.

The decrease (-2,386) in active military manpower for FY 1988 reflects overmanning in food service (-175), community support activities (-300), personnel support (-302), supply support (-60), installation management functions (-338), RPMA support (-144), medical support (-481), and various information management functions (-586).

The increase (+25) in active military manpower for FY 1989 reflects miscellaneous manpower adjustments.

The increase (+100) in FY 1989 in USAR manpower reflects minor strength increases in certain USAR signal units.

The decrease (-4,371) in civilian manpower for FY 1988 overmanning (-288) and programmed reductions in base operations/logistics (-1,170), base operations/RDTE (+298), commissary retail sales (-504), RPMA/training (-789), information management realignments (-1,145), RPMA Logistics (-205), and Base Operations/Training (-568).

The increase (+662) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects changes in the troop issue subsistence (-51), civilian personnel office staffing (+73), force modernization initiative (+120), and realignments to due to implementation of Standard Installation Organizations (+418).

2. Centralized Support Activities.

Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.9	17.1	17.2
Reserve Component			
ARNG	1.4	1.4	1.4
USAR	19.0	15.2	15.7
<u>Civilian</u>	52.4	51.4	51.5

Manpower in this category supports combat development activities, public affairs, personnel administration, and criminal investigation activities.

The decrease (-808) in active military manpower for FY 1988 reflects overmanning in information management activities (-495) and reserve component support (-289) with other manning adjustments (-24).

The increase (+124) in active military manpower for FY 1989 supports gains in combat development activities.

The decrease (-3,800) in USAR manpower in FY 1988 reflects correction of a coding error in FY87 manpower. The increase (+500) in FY 1989 reflects the activation of a signal unit and reorganization of two Army Reserve commands.

The decrease (-1,026) in civilian manpower for FY 1988 reflects undermanning (-2862) offset by programmed increases in military technicians (+500), information management realignments (+1,018), and reserve readiness support for the Army Reserves (+318).

The increase (+161) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects gains in full time unit support.

M. Undistributed Manning.

Undistributed Manning (Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active (End Year)	8.7	4.6	8.0
(Manyears)	(6.1)	(2.0)	(-4.2)

Reserve Component

ARNG	0	0	0
USAR	-32.6	-28.0	-29.3

Undistributing manning is the number of spaces in the force structure (units) that are not filled (undermanning) or are over filled (overmanning), because of the seasonal nature of gains and losses, fluctuations in the force structure, and changes in the Individuals subaccounts. End year deviations reflect a snapshot situation as of 30 September and are usually not representative of the average deviation throughout the year.

N. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>

Military**Reserve Component**

USAR	13.1	14.7	14.7

An IMA is an individual reservist (officer or enlisted) who is preassigned to an Active Component organization in peacetime to train for wartime duty with that organization. Increases are the result of growth in the program.

O. Individuals.

The Individuals subaccounts include manpower in transient, holdee (patient, prisoner, separatee), trainee, student, and US Military Academy cadet status. All of these subaccounts are affected by seasonal or other factors. As a consequence, manpower numbers should be used to accurately gauge the average size of these subaccounts. End year numbers are not ordinarily useful in this regard and are seldom a basis for meaningful comparisons.

(1) Transients.

Transient Manpower
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>

Military**Active (End year)**

(Many years)	15.5 (19.2)	16.9 (18.4)	17.8 (19.4)

Transient strengths are based on the projected levels of non-prior service accessions; separations; retirements; and operational, rotational, and training moves. The changes in transient strengths are a result of changes in volume timing, and duration of PCS moves. Moves are seasonally

influenced and manpower figures are more reflective of average transient strength than are end year numbers which are often atypical.

(2) Holdees, (Patients, Prisoners, PCF's, and Pending Separations).

Holdee Manpower
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active (End year)	4.9	4.0	3.9
(Manyyears)	(5.3)	(4.8)	(4.7)

Holdee numbers generally remain fairly stable over time. Many year numbers reflect average holdee strength. End year values have no particular significance.

(3) Trainees, Students and Cadets.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active (TOTAL) (End year)	74.5	74.8	70.1
(Manyyears)	(69.5)	(66.6)	(72.1)
Trainees/Students (EY)	70.1	70.3	65.7
(Manyyears)	(65.3)	(62.4)	(67.9)
Cadets	4.4	4.5	4.5
	(4.2)	(4.2)	(4.2)

Reserve Component

Trainees/Students (Pay categories F, P, Q, U, and T)

ARNG	36.0	39.1	39.4
USAR	42.3	35.4	25.3

The active component trainee data largely mirror the flow of non-prior service accessions. Many year values are much more meaningful than end year positions, particularly in view of the seasonal nature of accessions which directly impact on the numbers of trainees and officer accession students.

The Reserve Component Individuals Account consists of Troop Program Unit junior enlisted personnel who have not completed initial entry qualification training and are not deployable. ARNG and USAR decreases in FY 1987 correspond to a programmed increase in the number of soldiers trained in a unit. USAR decreases from FY 1987 to FY 1988 correspond to a programmed increase in the number of soldiers trained in the unit.

CHAPTER IV

NAVY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION:

A. General

This chapter describes the Navy's manpower program for FY 1988 and FY 1989 in terms of its active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower components. It also depicts manpower trends, initiatives, and improvements, reflects changes implemented by the President's Amended Budget submission for FY 1989, and describes the changes from FY 1987 to FY 1989. In addition, it discusses the programs and initiatives that provide the Naval Reserve with new missions and greater integration with the active forces, in keeping with Congressional guidance on Active/Reserve Mix. The Navy manpower program is based on the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions within the scope of national political and military strategy.

Achievement of a 600 ship Navy, our highest and most visible priority for several years, has been delayed. In FY 1988, programmed ship growth will be reduced by 12 to a total of 570 vice 582. In FY 1989 Navy will have a total of 580 ships vice the 605 originally envisioned in the FY 1988/1989 budget submission.

With this lower growth rate, we are still proceeding to a goal of a 600 ship Navy. Force levels will increase by two ships in FY 1988 and ten in FY 1989. We will adequately man these ships, however, our task becomes increasingly difficult due to decreasing resources and constrained end strength.

In FY 1988, the Navy will grow to an end strength of 593,200, an increase of 6,200 over FY 1987 programmed strength of 587,000. From FY 1988 to FY 1989 it will remain level at 593,200, a reduction of 9,600 (727 officers/8875 enlisted) from the FY 1988/1989 Presidential Budget submission. Included in this action is Navy's response to Congressionally directed DoD-wide officer reductions. The FY 1987 and FY 1988 one percent DoD officer reductions deleted 1576 Navy billets in FY 1987, 2090 in FY 1988, and precipitated a loss of 2817 officer billets in FY 1989 from officers presented in the FY 1988/1989 Biennial Budget of January 1987.

The Navy is committed to providing required medical care to meet combat casualty requirements and the required level of care to active duty personnel as well as to their dependents and eligible retiree beneficiaries. Medical strength has been protected from the officer and enlisted strength reductions implemented in FY 1988 and FY 1989. The Navy plans to increase FY 1988 active duty health professional end strength by 1,087. The Navy plan is to meet the requirements of the FY 1988 House Appropriations Committee Report for a growth of 277 officers and 542 enlisted. Numerous actions have been taken to improve medical

officer accessions, and we are optimistic that these changes will help. However, it is unlikely that we can access the increased numbers in FY 1989 mandated by the Congressional language that requires 25 percent of officer accessions to be medical officers. We request this requirement be reviewed.

The mandated reductions we have taken have brought the Navy to the limit of acceptable risk, beyond which readiness and operational commitments will be impacted. Operational tempo has not diminished. Changes in the international scene, as most clearly exemplified by our presence in the Persian Gulf, have sharply increased Naval force requirements. We currently have about 100 ships forward deployed in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and the Mediterranean Sea. The pressure to increase these numbers is not diminishing; on the contrary, it is increasing. Navy manpower is vital to meeting our commitments. The support of the Congress in preventing further erosion of our existing manpower is essential.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The military Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) report is an annual, DoD directed manpower study based upon the wartime scenario in the Defense Guidance. The military and civilian data in the table that follows indicate the times that peak military and civilian demand occurs. The reduction in military peak demand in the FY 1992 scenario is the result of proposed manning improvements in theater medical facilities, increasing "return to duty" rates, and reducing numbers of replacements required.

Wartime Peak Demand For Trained Manpower (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>
Time at which peak demand occurs	M+180	M+150	M+180
Peak Demand	1004.4	958.5	352.6

C. Strength Request

The Navy requests resources for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1988 and FY 1989 as follows:

Navy Manpower Program

(Strength in Thousands)

Military	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Active	593.2	593.2
Selected Reserve	152.6	152.6
Civilian	325.7	317.4

The Navy manpower program reflects only the authorized end strength required to effectively operate the Navy during peacetime, while wartime requirements reflect the end strength which would be needed during mobilization.

To ensure the most effective and efficient military/civilian mix, the SECNAV has directed a critical review of all military billet requirements in the shore establishment with a view toward substituting civilians or contractors to the maximum degree possible for all non-military essential billets.

The civilian manpower estimates represent the manpower levels required to execute reduced program funding levels and reflect a concerted effort to contain personnel costs through pursuit of economy and efficiency programs.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program

1. Manpower Program by Major DPPC

The distribution of military manpower from FY 1988 to FY 1989 reflects growth supporting an increase in the number of ships, squadrons, and auxiliary activities but decreases in the support elements of the force, within a constant end strength of 593,200. The following tables depict the growth profiles as currently programmed. They reflect programmed end strength for each Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) between FY 1987 and FY 1989. The specific figures may change as a result of annual budget decisions; however, the general proportions should remain relatively stable.

Navy Active Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1980*</u>	<u>FY 1987*</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Strategic	21.0	20.9	22.2	23.1
Tactical/Mobility	238.0	289.0	304.6	306.5
Communications/				
Intelligence	15.3	15.9	16.7	16.8
Combat Installations	32.7	24.9	25.6	26.4
Force Support Training	14.4	15.4	15.9	15.5
Medical Support	22.9	11.1	11.5	11.5
Joint Activities	4.4	4.6	5.0	5.0
Central Logistics	5.6	6.2	6.8	6.3
Service Management				
Headquarters	6.7	6.0	5.6	5.6
Research and Development	7.6	6.9	7.7	7.7
Training and Personnel	39.0	37.4	37.6	36.9
Support Activities	25.1	44.4	45.1	44.3
Operating Strength				
Deviation	0	0	-7.0	-7.0
Individuals**	95.5	104.2	95.9	94.8
TOTALS***	<u>527.2</u>	<u>586.8</u>	<u>593.2</u>	<u>593.2</u>

Navy Selected Reserve Strength Distribution by DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1980*</u>	<u>FY 1987*</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Strategic	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
Tactical/Mobility	56.1	86.2	89.5	90.3
Communications/				
Intelligence	5.8	6.3	6.2	6.3
Combat Installations	8.5	11.1	9.8	9.5
Force Support Training	0.7	1.4	0.7	0.7
Medical Support	2.6	13.0	15.7	16.1
Joint Activities	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8
Central Logistics	3.7	8.6	7.5	7.4
Service Management				
Headquarters	3.1	4.0	3.6	3.7
Research and Development	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.1
Training and Personnel	0.8	1.6	1.2	1.2
Support Activities	3.2	8.5	9.8	9.8
Operating Strength	0	0	0	0
Deviation				
Individual Mobilization				
Augmentee	0	0.2	0.5	0.5
Individuals**	0.9	5.2	5.5	4.8
TOTALS***	<u>87.0</u>	<u>148.3</u>	<u>152.6</u>	<u>152.6</u>

* End Year Actuals

** Individuals includes students, transients, and trainees.

*** Totals may not add due to rounding.

Navy Civilian Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Strategic	1.2	3.3	3.9	4.2
Tactical/Mobility	6.2	6.9	7.8	7.8
Communications/ Intelligence	2.4	3.3	3.5	3.5
Combat Installations	30.0	34.0	34.4	33.7
Force Support Training	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.8
Medical Support	3.5	4.2	4.3	4.2
Joint Activities	1.5	2.6	2.9	2.9
Central Logistics	149.4	170.9	164.5	158.2
Service Management Headquarters	8.1	11.5	10.8	10.8
Research and Development	30.3	37.5	36.4	36.2
Training and Personnel	4.4	5.8	6.2	6.1
Support Activities	50.5	49.6	49.2	48.1
TOTALS***	<u>289.2</u>	<u>331.5</u>	<u>325.7</u>	<u>317.5</u>

*** Totals may not add due to rounding.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

Major force structure consists of total ship battle forces (strategic forces, major surface combatants and attack submarines, support ships and mobilization forces), local defense (auxiliaries and sealift forces), miscellaneous support forces, and naval aviation forces.

a. Total Battle Forces

In FY 1988 the total ship battle forces will increase by two to a total of 570 ships. In FY 1989 the total ship battle forces will increase by ten to a total of 580 ships. Changes in each of the four categories comprising total ship battle forces follows:

(1) Strategic Forces

In FY 1989 strategic forces will remain at the FY 1987/1988 level of 43 ships. The number of Fleet Ballistic Missile System Submarines will decrease by two MADISON class transfers to inactive status, and the number of OHIO class TRIDENTS will increase by two.

(2) Battle Forces

In FY 1988 battle forces will decrease by eight to a total of 438. In FY 1989 battle forces will increase by four to a total of 442. There will be 14 aircraft carriers through FY 1989. There will be a net decrease of 15 surface combatants by FY 1989 bringing the total to 188. Battleships will grow from three to four in FY 1989 with the conversion of one IOWA class battleship. Cruisers will grow from 36 to 38 in FY 1988 and from 38 to 40 in FY 1989 with the addition of four TICONDEROGA Class cruisers. There will be 68 destroyers through FY 1989. Navy will undergo a force reduction of 16 frigates, eight in FY 1988 and eight in FY 1989, resulting in phase out of two classes of frigates - the FFG-1 BROOKE class and the FF-1040 GARCIA class. In FY 1988 six GARCIA class frigates and two BROOKE class frigates will be decommissioned. One KNOX class and four PERRY class frigates will transfer to the Naval Reserve Force, leaving a total of 83 active frigates in FY 1988. In FY 1989 four GARCIA class frigates and four BROOKE class frigates will be decommissioned. With the commissioning of one PERRY class frigate in FY 1989 there will be a total of 76 frigates in active service.

There will be six patrol combatants (PEGASUS class) through FY 1989. The commissioning of one LSD-41 class amphibious warfare ship in FY 1988 brings the total of amphibious warfare ships to 62. An increase of three amphibious warfare ships (one LHD-1 WASP class and two LSD-41 (WHIDBEY ISLAND) class) in FY 1989 brings the total to 65. There will be a net gain of three mine warfare ships by 1989, bringing the total to six. One AVENGER class will be transferred to the Naval Reserve Force and two will be commissioned in FY 1988. In 1989, three AVENGER class ships will be commissioned. In 1989, two AVENGER class ships will be transferred to the Naval Reserve Force. There will be an increase of two KAISER Class Fleet Oilers in FY 1988 (total: 58) and two in FY 1989, bringing the total number of Combat Logistics ships to 60.

Within our non-strategic submarine forces, there will be a net decrease of one attack submarine in 1988 and a net increase of two in 1989. In 1988, four ships, one TULLIBEE class, one SKATE class, one SKIPJACK class, and one PERMIT class will be transferred to inactive status, and three LOS ANGELES class attack submarines will be commissioned. In FY 1989, one PERMIT class will be transferred to inactive status, and three LOS ANGELES class attack submarines will be commissioned.

(3) Support Forces

In FY 1988 the number of support forces will increase by four to a total of 61, and in FY 1989 the number will increase by four to a total to 65. There will be a total of 19 mobile logistic ships through FY 1989. Fleet support ships grow by two ATF's and two TAGOS Ocean Surveillance ships in FY 1988 and increase by four TAGOS ships in FY 1989 to a total of 46 support ships.

(4) Mobilization Forces Category "A"

In FY 1988 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will increase by six ships to a total of 28 with the aforementioned addition of five frigates and one mine countermeasures ship. In FY 1989 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will increase by two ships to a total of 30, with the addition of two mine countermeasure ships in FY 1989.

b. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces

(1) Auxiliaries and Sealift Forces

In FY 1988 auxiliaries and sealift forces will increase by 14 to a total of 141 with the addition of three TACSs, five TAKs, two TAKRs, four TAOs, one TAH, and the decommissioning of one TAK. In FY 1989 auxiliaries and sealift forces will increase by seven to a total of 148 with the addition of four TACSs and four TAKRs, and the decrease of one TAKR.

(2) Mobilization Forces Category "B"

In FY 1988 Mobilization Forces Category "B" will decrease by one to a total of 20 with the decrease of one MSO mine warfare ship. In FY 1989 Mobilization Forces Category "B" will decrease by two to a total of 18 with the net decrease of two MSO mine warfare ships.

c. Naval Aviation Forces

A total of 91 Navy deployable active and 15 reserve tactical squadrons will be operating during both FY 1988 and FY 1989. A total of 62 active and 19 reserve fixed-wing and rotary-wing anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense squadrons will be operating in FY 1988. This number increases to 63 and 20, respectively, in FY 1989. The number of active direct-support squadrons remains at 19 active and 17 reserve squadrons during FY 1988 and FY 1989.

E. Key Manpower Issues

1. Officer Reduction

The FY 1987 Defense Authorization Act levied a six percent officer reduction on DoD and directed the reduction be taken on a 1/2/3 percent schedule for FY 1987-1989. The FY 1988 Defense Authorization Act allowed the Secretary of Defense to waive one percent of the FY 1988 reduction and spread the remaining portion of the six percent reduction into FY 1989 and FY 1990 (two percent each year).

OSD apportionment to Navy of the FY 1987 one percent reduction equated to -1576 officers from the programmed level (2.1 percent of Navy officer budgeted strength). In FY 1988, OSD apportionment resulted in a -514 decrement to Navy from the programmed level. Planning direction to Navy indicated that the remaining four percent DoD officer reduction will

result in an additional loss of 2508 officers by end FY 1990 from the programmed level (1254 in FY 1989 and 1254 in FY 1990). The net result of these actions will be an officer strength which is 6,118 below that which was programmed for in FY 1990.

In taking the FY 1987 reduction, Navy directed a seven percent reduction ashore, which was considered to be consistent with Congressional intent and the need to maintain adequate combat force levels and officer manning of those forces. The FY 1988 reduction (-514 decrement to Navy) was again applied ashore and equated to an additional two percent reduction. From the functional standpoint, the Navy has reduced officer end strength in combat support and other support by almost nine percent between 1986 and 1988.

Navy is faced with a difficult challenge of achieving force levels commensurate with world-wide commitment. The operating tempo is demanding and unabating and the pressure to increase naval presence has not diminished. Officer manning in combat forces must be adequate to ensure readiness and sustainability. These reductions have brought the Navy to the limit of acceptable risk.

The Navy has a need for continued officer growth in essential support positions. Officer strength in medical specialties must be protected in an effort to meet our wartime needs and to bring the medical provider-to-patient ratio into balance for peacetime health care.

Little flexibility is available regarding where to take additional officer reductions. The FY 1988 and FY 1989 reductions will cut areas of essential support to the bone. Navy continues efforts to moderate the need for increased officer growth which has been tightly constrained from earlier estimates of manpower requirements to man a 600 ship Navy. Our officer/enlisted ratio has remained essentially constant at 7:1 since 1980. Navy manpower levels are budgeted in balance with the overall program, including manpower force level additions. The majority of programmed officer growth was earmarked for combat forces, and the effect of subsidizing that growth in a declining officer strength environment is one of implementing a 25 percent reduction in combat support and other support areas. If the planned FY 1989 and FY 1990 reductions are allowed to take effect, the long-term impacts on readiness and management of our officer corps will be disastrous.

2. Shortage of Experienced Nuclear-Trained Surface and Submarine Officers

The shortage of experienced nuclear-trained officers in the grades of lieutenant commander through captain continues to be a critical manning problem. These officers are required as commanding officers, executive officers, and department heads at sea as well as for key fleet support billets ashore.

Enhancements to Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay (NOIP) enacted in FY-86 will enable us to grow larger inventories of these officers by optimizing accessions and maximizing retention of nuclear-trained junior officers. The Continuation Pay (COPAY) provisions of enhanced NOIP allow us to pay up to \$12,000 per year to those nuclear trained officers agreeing to remain on active duty for a period of three, four or five years beyond their service obligation. Those nuclear officers beyond service obligation who do not opt for COPAY are paid an Annual Incentive Bonus (AIB) of \$7,200 (authorized ceiling is \$10,000). Initially, Navy employed a COPAY rate of \$9,000 per year. However, only 33 percent of the nuclear-qualified lieutenants with five to nine years commissioned service signed up for COPAY agreements. Additionally, nuclear submarine officer retention declined from 43 percent in FY 1986 to 39 percent in FY 1987 (50 percent required to support submarine officer career path). Because of this, Navy took action to increase the value of COPAY to \$10,000 per year for FY 1988, making the COPAY agreements more attractive and committing more officers to long-term agreements. Navy projects that this program will reduce the experienced nuclear-trained officer shortfall from 22 percent to 12 percent by the end of FY 1992.

The long-term nature of the nuclear-trained officer shortage requires the temporary promotion (Spot Promotion) of some exceptional lieutenants to fill certain essential lieutenant commander engineering billets. Spot Promotion is a no cost management tool - all promotions occur within statutory grade ceilings - that is used only when needed.

Submarine Duty Incentive Pay (SUBPAY) was increased by Congressional action to offset the effects of inflation. We believe that this action combined with the NOIP enhancements described earlier will significantly help to overcome our critical submarine personnel shortfalls.

3. Medical Officer Growth

It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing an adequate level of care to military beneficiaries and retirees. Therefore, Congress has directed that 25 percent of FY-1989/1990 officers accessions be in the health care professions. It will be difficult for Navy to execute the directed 25 percent accession requirement in FY 1989/1990. The critical constraint will be Navy's inability to recruit such large numbers of medical officers, particularly physicians, in specialties we need. In FY-1987 Navy's officer end strength was held to zero growth. Planned medical accessions were 17 percent, however only 15.8 percent was achieved. Navy's FY 1988 plan grows 304 medical officers, yet this represents only 20.5 percent of total officer accessions.

Congressionally-directed active medical growth is inconsistent with other guidance. It directly conflicts with Congressionally-directed officer reductions and goes against previous strong guidance to maintain growth in ships and squadrons. It will impact upon combat readiness.

If a two percent officer cut is sustained in FY 1989, Navy will be required to cut 1254 officers. If medical grows 300, Navy would then have to cut 1554 officers. To achieve a growth of 300 medical officers,

and offset a high loss rate would require 1444 medical accessions, which would amount to 22.5 percent of total FY 1989 officer accessions. The Navy, even in a cut situation must still man its ships, aircraft and submarines; and ten more ships are scheduled to come on line in FY 1989. Current law provides little flexibility to manage reductions. Active duty reservists are most vulnerable to cuts, and 69 percent of Navy's active duty reservists (other than medical, which would be protected), are in combat or combat-related communities. Officer reductions may very likely require reduced accessions. Depending upon the level of accessions, the 25 percent requirement does not guarantee medical growth.

4. Shortage of Active Duty Medical Personnel

Navy considers increasing accessibility of its Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) to more beneficiaries as a top priority during the next two years. To more effectively fulfill this peacetime portion of its mission, as well as its primary mission of wartime medical readiness, the Navy has proposed a plan to grow the active duty medical inventory in a balanced, incremental manner and to provide civilian medical providers utilizing our in-house facilities. The principal challenge is to acquire the necessary quantity and skill mix of military physicians and nurses.

To meet this challenge, the Navy must actively work towards the retention of those physicians currently on active duty. An integral part of this retention effort is the Incentive Special Pay (ISP) program. Enhancements to the FY 1989 ISP program will enable the Navy to better retain those physicians practicing in specialties where manning levels are critical.

Another phase of Navy's plan to meet its challenge within the Medical Command is to attract, recruit, and train the needed numbers and specialties required. The ISP can be an important tool in attracting and recruiting physicians into the Navy and drawing active duty physicians into training programs to meet the Navy's specialty needs. The Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship (AFHPS) program has proven itself as the most reliable source of Medical Corps accessions. By increasing the overall AFHPS program from a current FY 1988 level of 1,050 to an eventual total of 1,200 by FY 1990 and beyond will assist in sustaining our physician force at the manning level and specialty mix required to meet the mission of Navy Medicine. The nationwide nursing shortage has greatly increased competition for these skills and may present serious recruiting and retention problems for the next several years.

5. Aviation Officer Retention Problem

The current Navy mid-grade pilot shortage of approximately 1100 pilots, considered a most critical manpower issue, could become even worse in the near future as a result of a dramatic down turn in pilot retention in the last three years. Overall pilot retention has fallen from 54% in FY-84 to 35% in FY-87. This is measured against a sustaining rate requirement of 43%. The problem becomes even more pronounced when retention is measured within the respective jet, prop, and helo pilot communities. Retention rates in these communities fell from 54%/47%/68% in 1984 to 36%/19%/55% in 1987. A February, 1988 study of Active Duty

Service Obligation in the Navy found that unprecedented, sustained airline pilot hiring has been the principal cause for the downturn. Traditionally cyclic in nature, airline hiring is predicted to remain at levels over 6,000 per year for the foreseeable future. Current (1988) hiring is at a 10,800 pilot per year pace, far surpassing the previous high of 7900 hired in FY-85.

The Navy has taken numerous personnel management actions to reduce the impact of the pilot shortage, including emphasis on family stability, support for working spouses, career path modifications, and reductions in operational/personnel tempo. While helpful, these measures have not been sufficient to halt the exodus of experienced pilots to the airlines.

Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP), when adequately funded, has proven to be a successful retention tool. However, at the current legislated maximum level of \$6,000 per year, AOCP no longer provides the necessary financial incentive to meet retention goals. The Navy and Air Force are jointly proposing an improved bonus, Aviator Continuation Pay (ACP), to address shortages and low retention. The new program, proposed for FY-89, will pay up to \$12,000 per year to aviators in the communities where shortages are most critical. It is designed to provide Service Secretaries the flexibility required to target bonus money to necessary communities in a timely manner. ACP is needed to return retention to the necessary levels to sustain fleet manning.

6. Implementation of Title IV of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986

The provisions of Title IV set tour lengths at 3 1/2 years for field grade officers and at 3 years for flag officers. It further requires a full joint tour before promotion to O-7 and that specific percentages of joint duty assignments be filled with joint specialty officers. These provisions are unduly restrictive. The result is that Navy is forced to make officer assignment decisions which adversely affect the individual. Without flexibility in tour lengths and reassignment dates, the Navy will have to assign some very talented officers to jobs not meeting their potential. This will be done simply to establish joint duty credit.

Senior year groups may not have time to serve joint duty tours before they are considered for flag. Although a concerted effort is being made to fulfill the requirements of Title IV, the Navy will be unable (without adjusting rotation dates) to fill all the critical joint billets with joint specialty officers by 1 Oct 1988. These adjustments are disruptive to family plans in an already turbulent career and are not being executed pending further guidance. The full impact of Title IV on our officer community is under continued review; however, the Navy is committed to supporting the intent of Title IV with increased participation in the joint arena.

For nuclear-trained officers, Title IV poses a specific problem. The nuclear-trained officer communities are faced with a significant conflict of interest in that they must satisfy two separate and competing requirements: the safe and reliable operation of Naval nuclear propulsion plants and complying with the provisions of Title IV. Both requirements impact on assignment policies for the best nuclear-trained officers, from which the Navy will select its future flag officers.

Navy's impeccable nuclear safety record is a direct consequence of careful attention to detail in all aspects of supervision, operation, and maintenance of naval nuclear power plants, where many of the Navy's nuclear-trained flag officers have spent much of their pre-flag career. Title IV now requires that the Navy send these same officers to a joint assignment in order to make them eligible for appointment to flag rank. The Navy's choice then becomes a decision between using a lesser quality officer in nuclear support jobs or not sending the very best nuclear-trained officers to a joint assignment, and thus potentially precluding their appointment to flag rank. The fact that nuclear-trained officers have typically been in short supply, particularly in the senior grades, prohibits any opportunity to totally satisfy both requirements. The outgrowth of this policy will be that most newly selected nuclear-trained flag officers will continue to require legislative relief from the provisions of Title IV for the foreseeable future.

Other unrestricted line officers face similar conflicts between joint duty and the operational tours needed to hone warfighting skills. A reduction in the duration of joint duty assignments is needed to provide our best officers with the opportunity to serve in key operational fleet assignments and joint billets. The elimination of statutory tour lengths and the sequencing requirement for joint education and joint duty assignment would provide the assignment flexibility needed for our top officers with warfighting skills to qualify as joint staff officers.

7. TAR End Strength Reductions

In the 1986 Report to the Congress on Navy's Total Force, Navy addressed SECNAV's policy to man FF-1052 and FFG-7 ships with approximately a 30%/70% active/TAR crew mix. Between 1987 and 1989, programmed TAR growth has been reduced by 4,987 because of Congressional and OSD actions. One thousand of these billets were originally programmed for Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships. To cover these unplanned TAR shortfalls, Navy has had to provide offsets from the active MPN component. To cover FY 1987/1988 requirements, 832 MPN enlisted personnel were assigned to augment NRF ships and Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA). Even with this augmentation, the Navy currently projects an additional shortfall of 392 TAR billets by the end of FY 1989 to meet the 70 percent TAR manning goal on FF/FFGs. The assignment of additional MPN assets to ensure proper manning of NRF ships places an even greater demand on the constrained active duty manpower.

II. Significant Program Highlights

A. Active Component Military Manpower

1. General

Navy's highest priority continues to be the attainment of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to support the 600 ship Navy. People are as integral to new weapon systems as hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy continues to focus on

retaining those enlisted and officer personnel whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the 600 ship Navy.

Inadequate manning has a devastating impact on ship and squadron readiness as witnessed in the late 70s and early 80s. Although Navy's successful recruiting and retention efforts have helped to maintain readiness, Congressional limitations on end strength growth continue to degrade maintenance, training, and logistics support to operating units thus seriously degrading the ability of those units to accomplish their missions. Navy's strength request reflects extensive analysis of all possible Total Force manpower alternatives.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

Navy's program in FY 1989 is oriented toward supporting growth in operating forces. The active manpower shown in Table IV-1 reflects the increasing demands being placed upon our fleet operating forces. End strength constraints and directed manpower realignments have necessitated reductions to vital readiness-related support functions.

3. Skill and Grade

Navy is still experiencing an imbalance of petty officers when compared to authorized billets. The hardware (ships and aircraft) for achieving Navy's goal of 600 ships continues to be introduced into our inventory. The authorized billets associated with this hardware require trained petty officers because of the highly sophisticated, technical equipment which necessitates a more involvement in the decision-making process than was required by the less technical 1960-1970 Navy. In addition, increased emphasis on improving sea: shore rotation for petty officers in sea intensive ratings has increased the authorized billets for senior petty officers. The petty officers are "late" in arriving. Continuing reductions in requested end strength growth and Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) funding restrict the size of the accession base and limit petty officer growth. Navy is managing these imbalances by using lateral conversions and maximum accession and reenlistment bonuses for critical ratings. However, Navy requires the requested MPN dollars, including selective reenlistment bonuses, OMN dollars for training, and improved pay comparability, to correct these shortages.

Table IV-2 depicts an 0-4 to 0-6 shortage in inventory as compared to programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) each year. Although PMI accurately reflects Navy 0-4 to 0-6 requirements, the associated control grade inventory is constrained below PMI by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. As a result, the Navy maintains an excess of 0-1 to 0-3 inventory to attempt to satisfy the unfilled 0-4 to 0-6 PMI.

TABLE IV-1
PROGRAMMED ACTIVE DUTY OFFICER MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (Thousands) a/

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989			% END
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH		PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH		
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	1.8	1.9		2.2	2.0		2.3	2.2		2.5	2.3		
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.5	1.7		1.7	1.7		1.8	1.7		2.0	1.9		
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.3	0.2		0.5	0.4		0.5	0.4		0.5	0.5		
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	20.5	19.9		24.5	24.2		25.1	25.1		25.2	25.1		
Land Forces	0.5	0.4		0.6	0.6		0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7		
Tactical Air Forces	5.2	4.9		6.1	5.8		6.2	6.1		6.2	6.2		
Naval Forces	14.7	14.5		17.6	17.7		18.1	18.1		18.1	18.0		
Warships and ASW Forces	(9.4)	(9.2)		(12.0)	(11.3)		(11.4)	(11.4)		(11.2)	(11.1)		
Amphibious Forces	(2.1)	(2.2)		(2.4)	(2.5)		(2.7)	(2.7)		(2.8)	(2.8)		
Naval Support Forces	(3.2)	(3.1)		(3.2)	(3.8)		(4.0)	(4.0)		(4.1)	(4.1)		
Mobility Forces	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	1.7	1.5		1.7	1.5		2.0	1.7		1.9	1.7		
Intelligence	1.1	1.0		1.3	1.1		1.4	1.3		1.4	1.3		
Centrally Managed Com.	0.6	0.6		0.5	0.5		0.6	0.4		0.6	0.4		
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	2.4	2.1		2.2	1.9		2.3	2.1		2.4	2.1		
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	1.7	1.5		2.2	1.7		2.3	2.2		2.3	2.2		
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT*</u>	7.7	7.8		4.4	4.2		4.6	4.6		4.6	4.6		
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	2.1	1.8		2.0	1.9		2.2	2.2		2.2	2.2		
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		
Unified Commands	0.5	0.3		0.5	0.5		0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6		
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		
OSD/Defense Agencies	1.0	0.9		0.8	0.8		1.0	1.0		0.9	0.9		
JCS	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.1	0.1		

<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>86%</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>83%</u>
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>86%</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>82%</u>
Combat Commands	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.2	<u>87%</u>	1.5	1.2	<u>85%</u>
Support Commands	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.0	<u>90%</u>	2.2	2.0	<u>89%</u>
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>80%</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>79%</u>
Research and Development	1.2	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.2	<u>79%</u>	1.5	1.2	<u>79%</u>
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	<u>80%</u>	0.4	0.3	<u>80%</u>
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>89%</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>88%</u>
Personnel Support	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	<u>100%</u>	0.9	0.9	<u>101%</u>
Individual Training	4.1	3.8	4.5	4.1	5.0	4.4	<u>87%</u>	5.0	4.3	<u>86%</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>96%</u>
Support Installations	2.2	2.1	7.6	7.0	7.4	7.2	<u>98%</u>	7.5	7.3	<u>98%</u>
Centralized Support Act'y	1.8	1.7	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	<u>101%</u>	2.0	2.0	<u>100%</u>
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>54.4</u>	<u>52.2</u>	<u>63.0</u>	<u>58.7</u>	<u>65.2</u>	<u>62.2</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>65.1</u>	<u>62.2</u>	<u>95%</u>
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/</u>			-1.4			-1.4			-1.4	
(Many years)										
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTIES</u>										
<u>INDIVIDUALS c/</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>100%</u>
Transients	3.3	4.5	4.4	3.9	4.1	4.1		4.1	4.1	
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	
Students/Trainees	6.1	6.5	7.7	9.3	7.6	7.6		7.6	7.6	
Midshipmen/NAVCADS										
<u>END STRENGTH**</u>	<u>63.7</u>	<u>63.1</u>	<u>73.6***</u>	<u>72.0</u>	<u>77.0</u>	<u>72.6</u>	<u>94%</u>	<u>77.5</u>	<u>72.6</u>	<u>94%</u>

* Station Hospitals and Clinics are included in Support Installations.

** Totals may not add due to rounding.

*** FY 87 authorizations do not reflect 1576 officer reduction.

PROGRAMMED ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (Thousands) a/

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989			%
	AUTH	INV	%	AUTH	INV	%	PROG BOBT	PROG AUTH	%	PROG BOBT	PROG AUTH	%	
STRATEGIC	17.5	18.2		19.1	18.8		21.1	20.1		21.4	20.8		97%
Offensive Strategic Forces	16.3	17.0		17.4	17.3		19.2	18.2		19.4	18.9		95%
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.2	1.1		1.8	1.6		1.9	1.9		2.0	1.9		98%
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	250.4	218.1		274.7	264.8		286.4	279.6		287.7	281.5		98%
Land Forces	3.0	2.5		4.0	3.4		4.4	4.3		4.5	4.4		99%
Tactical Air Forces	57.7	53.8		65.0	61.8		65.6	65.6		67.1	67.1		100%
Naval Forces	169.5	161.7		205.5	199.4		216.0	209.3		215.8	209.7		97%
Warships and ASW Forces	(87.5)	(83.2)		(103.1)	(100.8)		(107.0)	(104.7)		(103.8)	(102.7)		98%
Amphibious Forces	(28.8)	(27.2)		(31.9)	(30.7)		(33.5)	(33.4)		(35.9)	(35.6)		99%
Naval Support Forces	(53.0)	(51.2)		(70.5)	(67.9)		(75.5)	(71.2)		(76.1)	(71.4)		94%
Mobility Forces	0.1	0.1		0.3	0.3		0.4	0.3		0.4	0.3		77%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	14.6	12.8		14.9	14.4		16.9	14.9		17.0	15.1		88%
Intelligence	7.4	6.8		7.6	7.3		9.7	7.8		9.8	8.0		81%
Centrally Managed Com.	7.2	6.9		7.2	7.1		7.2	7.1		7.2	7.1		99%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	29.9	30.6		21.8	23.0		34.3	23.5		35.4	24.3		69%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	12.7	13.0		14.0	13.7		15.2	13.7		15.0	13.3		89%
MEDICAL SUPPORT*	14.6	15.0		6.8	6.9		7.0	6.9		7.0	6.9		99%
JOINT ACTIVITIES	2.7	2.6		2.9	2.7		2.9	2.9		2.9	2.9		100%
Int'l Military Org	0.6	0.6		0.7	0.6		0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7		100%
Unified Commands	0.3	0.3		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		100%
Federal Agency Support	0.8	0.8		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9		100%
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.9	0.8		0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8		104%
JCS	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		100%

<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>									
	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>61%</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>3.5</u>
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>									
Combat Commands	3.0	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.3	83%	2.8	2.3
Support Commands	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.4	82%	1.8	1.4
	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.9	1.1	0.9	84%	1.1	0.9
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>									
Research and Development	6.3	6.3	6.3	5.7	7.8	6.2	80%	7.8	6.2
Geophysical Activities	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.1	5.8	4.6	81%	5.8	4.6
	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	2.0	1.6	78%	2.0	1.6
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	33.9	34.5	32.9	32.5	34.3	32.3	94%	34.3	31.7
Individual Training	6.3	6.8	7.9	7.7	7.8	7.8	100%	8.0	8.0
	27.6	27.7	25.0	24.9	26.5	24.6	93%	26.3	23.6
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	19.9	21.3	34.3	35.3	39.2	35.8	91%	39.7	35.0
Centralized Support Act'y	16.7	18.1	31.3	32.3	36.2	33.0	91%	36.7	32.0
	3.2	3.4	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	97%	3.0	2.9
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE</u>									
STRUCTURE	388.7	379.6	433.9	423.9	474.1	442.1	93%	477.2	443.3
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/</u>									
(Many years)			-5.6			-5.6			-5.6
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>									
INDIVIDUALS c/	75.7	84.4	85.1	90.3	84.1	84.1	100%	82.9	82.9
Transients	20.0	19.2	21.4	20.7	21.2	21.2		20.9	20.9
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	4.7	5.8	4.2	4.1	4.3	4.3		4.3	4.3
Students/Trainees	46.5	54.9	54.7	61.3	53.9	53.9		53.0	53.0
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	4.4	4.5	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8		4.8	4.8
END STRENGTH*	464.3	464.1	513.4***	514.8	558.3	520.6	93%	560.2	520.6

* Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics are included in Support Installations.

** Totals may not add due to rounding.

*** FY 87 authorizations do not reflect additional 1576 enlisted caused when officer authorizations were reduced by the same amount during the FY 1987 congressionally directed officer reductions.

PROGRAMMED TOTAL ACTIVE MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (Thousands)^{a/}

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV	%	AUTH	INV	%	PROG RCMT	PROG AUTH	%	PROG RCMT	PROG AUTH	%
STRATEGIC												
Offensive Strategic Forces	19.2	20.1		21.3	20.9	95%	23.4	22.2	95%	23.9	23.1	96%
Strategic Control and	17.8	18.8		19.1	18.9	95%	21.0	19.9	95%	21.5	20.7	96%
Surveillance Forces	1.5	1.3		2.2	1.9	97%	2.4	2.3	97%	2.5	2.4	96%
TACTICAL/MOBILITY												
Land Forces	250.9	238.0		299.2	289.0	98%	311.7	304.6	98%	312.9	306.5	98%
Tactical Air Forces	3.5	2.9		4.6	3.9	99%	5.1	5.0	99%	5.2	5.1	99%
Naval Forces	62.9	58.8		71.1	67.5	100%	71.8	71.8	100%	73.2	73.2	100%
Warships and ASW Forces	184.2	176.1		223.1	217.1	97%	234.1	227.3	97%	233.9	227.7	97%
Amphibious Forces	(97.2)	(92.4)		(115.1)	(112.1)	98%	(118.4)	(116.1)	98%	(115.0)	(113.8)	99%
Naval Support Forces	(30.9)	(29.4)		(34.3)	(33.2)	100%	(36.1)	(36.1)	100%	(38.7)	(38.3)	99%
Mobility Forces	(56.2)	(54.4)		(73.7)	(71.7)	94%	(79.6)	(75.2)	94%	(80.2)	(75.5)	94%
	0.3	0.2		0.5	0.4	78%	0.7	0.5	78%	0.7	0.5	77%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL												
Intelligence	16.4	15.3		16.6	15.9	88%	18.9	16.7	88%	19.0	16.8	88%
Centrally Managed Com.	8.5	7.8		8.9	8.4	82%	11.1	9.1	82%	11.2	9.3	83%
	7.8	7.5		7.7	7.5	97%	7.8	7.6	97%	7.8	7.5	96%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS												
	32.3	32.7		24.0	24.9	70%	36.6	25.6	70%	37.8	26.4	70%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING												
	14.4	14.4		16.2	15.4	91%	17.5	15.9	91%	17.3	15.5	89%
MEDICAL SUPPORT*												
	22.3	22.9		11.3	11.1	100%	11.5	11.5	100%	11.5	11.5	101%
JOINT ACTIVITIES												
Int'l Military Org	4.8	4.4		4.9	4.6	100%	5.0	5.0	100%	5.0	5.0	100%
Unified Commands	0.8	0.8		0.9	0.8	100%	0.9	0.9	100%	0.9	0.9	100%
Federal Agency Support	0.8	0.6		0.9	0.8	100%	1.0	1.0	100%	1.0	1.0	100%
OSD/Defense Agencies	1.0	1.0		1.1	1.1	100%	1.1	1.1	100%	1.1	1.1	100%
JCS	1.9	1.7		1.6	1.6	101%	1.8	1.8	101%	1.8	1.8	102%
	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%

<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>									
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>									
Combat Commands	5.9	5.6	6.8	6.2	9.6	6.8	71%	9.6	6.3
Support Commands	6.5	6.7	6.4	6.0	6.6	5.6	84%	6.7	5.6
	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.2	2.7	84%	3.2	2.7
	3.5	3.6	3.3	3.1	3.3	2.9	88%	3.3	2.9
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>									
Research and Development	7.8	7.6	7.9	6.9	9.6	7.7	80%	9.6	7.7
Geophysical Activities	6.0	5.8	6.0	5.1	7.3	5.8	80%	7.3	5.8
	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	2.4	1.9	78%	2.4	1.9
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	38.6	39.0	38.2	37.4	40.1	37.6	94%	40.2	36.9
Individual Training	7.0	7.5	8.8	8.5	8.7	8.6	100%	9.0	9.0
	31.7	31.5	29.5	28.9	31.5	28.9	92%	31.3	27.9
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	23.9	25.1	44.1	44.4	48.6	45.1	93%	49.2	44.3
Centralized Support Act'y	18.9	20.2	38.9	39.3	43.6	40.2	92%	44.2	39.4
	5.0	4.8	5.2	5.1	5.0	4.9	98%	5.0	4.9
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE</u>	<u>443.1</u>	<u>431.8</u>	<u>496.9</u>	<u>482.7</u>	<u>539.3</u>	<u>504.3</u>	<u>94%</u>	<u>542.9</u>	<u>505.5</u>
<u>STRUCTURE</u>									
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING</u> b/									
(Many years)			-7.0			-7.0			-7.0
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTERS</u>									
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u> c/	85.0	95.5	97.2	104.2	95.9	95.9	100%	94.8	94.8
Transients	23.3	23.7	25.8	24.6	25.3	25.3		25.0	25.0
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	4.7	5.9	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.4		4.4	4.4
Students/Trainees	52.6	61.4	62.4	70.6	61.5	61.5		60.6	60.6
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	4.4	4.5	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8		4.8	4.8
<u>END STRENGTH*</u>	<u>528.0</u>	<u>527.2</u>	<u>587.0</u>	<u>586.8</u>	<u>635.3</u>	<u>593.2</u>	<u>94%</u>	<u>637.7</u>	<u>593.2</u>

* Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics are included in Support Installations.

** Totals may not add due to rounding.

Notes:

a/ Programmed Manpower Structure (PMS) is defined as the aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirements for all units and organizations in the program force, which is the table of organization structure (or its equivalent) for operational units, and the structure associated with full peacetime workload requirements for non-operational units. Operational units are those combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations with operational readiness reporting requirements under UNITREP.

Programmed Manning (PM) is defined as those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be staffed. The term "Programmed manning" recognizes that 100% staffing of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; the term is synonymous with Distributable Billets.

b/ Undistributed Manning includes Operating strength deviation will show the difference between total operating strength and programmed manning as of the end of the fiscal year. Operating strength refers to the number of trained personnel actually staffing programmed manning billets in both operational and other units.

c/ Individuals refers to the transients, trainees (for the Reserve Components, the training pipeline), patients, prisoners, cadets and students in "overhead" and not available for staffing programmed manning spaces.

TABLE IV-2
Active Navy Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
(Strength in Thousands)
FY 1987

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	33	28	27	88
Pgmng & Ind	129.0	82.9	56.0	267.9
Inventory	144.3	83.8	49.2	277.3
Over/Short	+15.3	+0.9	-6.8	+9.4

<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	6	62	33	101
Pgmng & Ind	7.7	156.7	76.6	241.0
Inventory	8.4	152.5	70.9	231.8
Over/Short	+0.7	-4.2	-5.7	-9.2

<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	17	53	35	105
Pgmng & Ind	127.5	272.2	109.4	509.0
Inventory	137.3	271.5	100.3	509.1
Over/Short	+9.8	-0.7	-9.1	**

<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills		3	1	4
Pgmng & Ind		2.9	0.2	3.1
Inventory		2.8	0.1	3.0
Over/Short		-0.1	**	-0.2

<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	12	13	3	28
Pgmng & Ind	22.0	18.7	0.6	41.3
Inventory	25.1	18.3	0.5	43.9
Over/Short	+3.1	-0.4	-0.1	+2.6

<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	1	11	14	26
Pgmng & Ind	**	9.9	17.4	27.3
Inventory	0.1	9.9	15.0	25.0
Over/Short	**	**	-2.4	-2.3

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	3	25	28
Program & Ind	10.9	57.7	68.6
Inventory	11.7	57.1	68.8
Over/Short	+0.8	-0.6	+0.2

* Status is based on programmed manning + individuals (PMI) for each skill

Skills with PMI of 500 or more people (over if fill is 105% or more of PMI, balanced if between 95% and 105%, short if fill is less than 95%).

Skills with PMI of 100-499 people (over if fill is 110% of PMI balanced if 90% or greater and 110% or less, short is fill less than 90%).

Skills with PMI of 100 people (over if fill is 115% of PMI, balanced if 85% or greater and 115% or less, short if fill is less than 85%).

** Less than 50 people

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
Versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

FY 1988

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	32	28	30	90
Pgang & Ind	105.4	83.4	80.0	268.8
Inventory	130.2	82.5	67.4	280.0
Over/Short	24.7	-1.0	-12.6	-11.2

E5-E9

Number of Skills	4	91	7	102
Pgang & Ind	1.6	228.6	15.8	246.1
Inventory	1.9	218.6	14.4	234.9
Over/Short	0.3	-10.0	-1.5	-11.2

Total E1-E9

Number of Skills	18	56	31	106
Pgang & Ind	112.9	226.1	175.9	514.9
Inventory	131.4	228.7	154.8	514.9
Over/Short	18.5	2.6	-21.1	0

WO

Number of Skills		1	3	4
Pgang & Ind		0.3	2.9	3.2
Inventory		0.3	2.7	3.1
Over/Short		**	-0.2	-0.2

01-03

Number of Skills	5	11	11	27
Pgang & Ind	16.5	11.9	14.6	43.0
Inventory	19.2	11.5	13.3	44.0
Over/Short	+ 2.7	- 0.4	- 1.3	+ 1.0

04-06

Number of Skills	8	12	6	26
Pgang & Ind	4.0	11.8	10.2	26.0
Inventory	4.4	12.1	8.9	25.3
Over/Short	+ 0.4	+ 0.3	- 1.4	- 0.7

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	5	13	9	27
Pgang & Ind	26.5	28.9	13.7	69.0
Inventory	28.4	28.3	12.6	69.3
Over/Short	+ 1.9	- 0.6	- 1.1	+ 0.3

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

FY 89

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	51	25	14	90
Pgang & Ind	129.9	86.8	52.3	269.0
Inventory	160.9	73.5	45.9	280.3
Over/Short	31.0	-13.3	-6.4	11.4

<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	4	94	4	102
Pgang & Ind	1.6	239.7	4.5	245.7
Inventory	1.8	228.3	4.2	234.3
Over/Short	0.3	-11.4	-0.3	-11.4

<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	31	61	14	106
Pgang & Ind	154.7	241.3	118.9	514.8
Inventory	179.4	229.7	105.7	514.8
Over/Short	24.8	-11.6	-13.2	0

<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills		3	1	4
Pgang & Ind		0.5	2.7	3.2
Inventory		0.5	2.5	3.0
Over/Short		**	-0.2	-0.2

<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	4	13	10	27
Pgang & Ind	16.5	17.7	8.8	43.1
Inventory	19.2	17.3	7.8	44.3
Over/Short	+ 2.7	- 0.4	- 1.0	+ 1.3

<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	6	16	4	26
Pgang & Ind	3.0	15.9	7.1	26.0
Inventory	3.3	15.9	5.9	25.1
Over/Short	+ 0.3	**	- 1.2	- 0.9

<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	4	16	7	27
Pgang & Ind	14.6	40.9	13.5	69.0
Inventory	15.8	41.0	12.5	69.3
Over/Short	+ 1.2	+ 0.1	- 1.0	+ 0.3

4. Experience

Table IV-3 shows programmed versus actual experience level. The need for experienced personnel (people with greater than 4 years of service (YOS) continues to increase. Experienced manpower is essential to operate and maintain our sophisticated and highly technical weapon systems and to provide the training and supervision necessary to effectively develop similar skill levels in our junior personnel. Navy's objective is to continue retaining personnel at the first and second term reenlistment points and to grow the experience in the force structure through advancements and training. However, even with these initiatives, Navy will have fewer experienced petty officers (when compared to past years) in many of the sea intensive ratings. This experience problem will directly impact on Fleet readiness. To correct this situation, Navy requires the requested bonuses and recruiting resources.

TABLE IV-3
ACTIVE NAVY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Thousands)

		FY 1987	
	<u>Total Billets/ People</u>	<u>People with greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
EPA	268.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	277.4	38.8	2.3
<u>E5-E9</u>			
EPA	241.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	231.7	216.3	10.7
<u>E1-E9</u>			
EPA	509.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	509.0	255.1	6.1
<u>WO</u>			
OPA	3.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	3.0	3.0	22.1
<u>01-03</u>			
OPA	41.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	43.9	25.7	6.9
<u>04-06</u>			
OPA	27.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	24.9	24.8	17.6
<u>01-06</u>			
OPA	68.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	68.8	50.5	11.0

FY 1988			
<u>Total Billets/</u>	<u>People with</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>	
<u>People</u>	<u>greater than</u>		
	<u>4 YOS</u>		

E1-E4

EPA	268.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	280.0	38.4	2.3

E5-E9

EPA	246.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	234.9	218.6	10.8

E1-E9

EPA	514.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	514.9	257.0	6.2

WO

OPA	3.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	3.1	3.0	21.7

01-03

OPA	43.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	44.0	25.4	6.7

04-06

OPA	26.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.3	25.1	17.5

01-06

OPA	69.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.3	50.5	10.7

	FY 1989		
	<u>Total Billets/</u>	<u>People with</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
	<u>People</u>	<u>greater than</u>	
		<u>4 YOS</u>	
<u>E1-E4</u>			
EPA	269.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	280.0	43.6	2.5
<u>E5-E9</u>			
EPA	245.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	234.9	218.1	10.9
<u>E1-E9</u>			
EPA	514.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	514.9	261.7	6.3
<u>WO</u>			
OPA	3.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	3.0	3.0	21.7
<u>01-03</u>			
OPA	43.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	44.3	26.0	6.8
<u>04-06</u>			
OPA	26.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.1	25.0	17.5
<u>01-06</u>			
OPA	69.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.4	51.0	10.6

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. The Navy achieved its Active Component recruiting objectives in FY 1987. Recruiters wrote 98,583 new contracts in FY 1987 compared to only 94,234 in FY 1986. The Delayed Entry Program (DEP) ended FY 1987 at 35,792 compared to 30,118 for FY 1986. Although the number in DEP is close to the desired level (a minimum of one-third of the new fiscal year's 1988 accession requirement), the distribution of contracts is heavily skewed to the summer months. Recruiting Command will be entering the more difficult recruiting months of the winter/spring with a very high requirement for "direct shippers" (recruits with no time in DEP). This situation normally leads to high attrition (the "filtering" aspects of DEP are not available) and lower quality.

In the FY 1988 Appropriation Bill, Congress reduced the Navy Recruiting and Advertising Budget by 10.6 million dollars. Because Navy apted to apply the full reduction against its advertising budget, this translated into a forty-three percent reduction from the benchmark FY 1986 advertising level. This will significantly decrease Navy's ability to advertise in an increasingly competitive recruiting market. Past reductions in Navy advertising levels have resulted in a downward trend in both youth awareness of Navy programs and youth propensity to enlist Navy. An adequate advertising budget is necessary for the Navy to meet its increased accession requirements of the next few years.

The Navy continued to have success in the prior service market, achieving its goal of 5,116. Recruitment of prior service personnel is targeted to specific shortage skills and emphasis in FY 1988 has been placed on Navy Veterans (NAVETS) rather than Other Service Veterans (OSVETS). Upon enlistment, these personnel are available for immediate assignment to Fleet units, thus improving personnel readiness. In FY 1988, the prior service goal has been reduced for several reasons: limited market, high cost in pay and allowances, and the requirement to maintain a large accession base to ensure the proper "bottom-up" flow of personnel.

Navy's FY 1987 non-prior service (NPS) quantity and quality goals were met. NPS male accessions totaled 80,057 of which 71,805 held high school diplomas. Navy accessed 48,471 upper AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) (I-III A) males and 5,458 upper AFQT females. Navy's total AFQT Category IV attainment of 8,992 is under the Congressional ceiling of 20 percent, but is approaching Navy's own limit of 12 percent.

Despite end strength constraints, accession requirements remain high. The attainment of both quantity and quality goals will be very difficult under existing market conditions with keen competition for a shrinking recruitable population, high youth employment, and constrained recruiting resources (particularly advertising). Also, the 9000 billets now open to women as a result of the recent Navy study group will require additional effort to attract women to more non-traditional sea-intensive jobs. Navy must be provided the required resources to access the high quality recruits needed for an increasingly technical Navy.

To supply Navy's quality and quantity manpower needs, the goals identified in the following table must be met. A target is established for the percentage of male high school diploma graduates as these individuals have a higher probability of completing their first term of enlistment, thereby reducing training costs, lowering attrition, and increasing readiness. During FY 1987, Navy achieved an increase in the percentage of accessions with high school diplomas. However, Navy also regards AFQT as a measure of recruit quality. AFQT category is indicative of an individual's likelihood of successfully completing the technical training necessary to operate and maintain the equipment in the modern Navy.

Active Navy Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 1987</u>		<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>End Strength</u>	510,026	510,249	515,815	515,815
<u>Accessions</u>	92,909	91,451	92,900	89,112
Prior Service	5,116	5,103	2,388	4,547
Non-Prior Service				
Male	80,057	78,931	80,859	75,534
AFQT I-III A	48,471	45,385	46,493	43,432
HSDG	71,805	71,038	72,772	67,981
Female	7,736	7,417	9,653	9,031
(%)	(8.8)	(8.6)	(10.7)	(10.7)
AFQT I-III A	5,458	4,265	5,550	5,193
HSDG	7,731	6,675	8,688	8,123

Navy's force management initiatives continue to focus on building the inventory to man 600 ships and balancing the skill inventory for proper distribution of personnel necessary to sustain the force. Navy must be resourced to obtain qualified recruits, train them and ensure they are retained in sufficient numbers. Skilled technicians required in 1992 must be recruited and trained now.

(2) Retention. FY 1987 retention remained high during the first half of the year, but dropped slightly toward the end. Targeting stable retention rates will aid in reducing the number of undermanned ratings and improving the balance of Navy's force structure. Retention results and goals are as follows:

	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1st Term	54.6%	57.4%	55.2%	54.9%	54.6%
2nd Term	63.9%	64.1%	61.2%	62.7%	61.6%
3rd Term and Beyond	93.4%	93.6%	92.4%	91.5%	91.3%

Balancing Navy's force structure in FY 1988 and FY 1989 will require compensation and quality of life initiatives to continue a favorable retention climate. Measures to combat the anticipated retention decline must include competitive compensation, retirement system stability, selective reenlistment bonus funding, continued educational opportunities, and command sponsored leadership programs. The FY 1988-89 goals reflect Navy's best estimate of projected enlisted retention behavior.

(3) Aggregate population stability. As shown, the Navy has experienced fluctuations but shows a relatively level aggregate population stability (See stability definition in Appendix B).

Aggregate Population Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Officer	92.7	92.6	91.9	91.4	91.4	91.4
Enlisted	84.1	85.9	84.8	84.8	85.1	85.4

(4) Unit personnel stability. The Navy also shows a relatively level unit personnel stability (defined in Appendix B).

Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Officer	51.0	50.8	47.9	51.5	50.0	51.0
Enlisted	47.3	50.2	49.7	49.4	50.5	52.1

(a) Enlisted Attrition. First-term enlisted attrition for FY 1987 showed a decrease to 11.9 percent from the FY 1986 level of 12.3 percent.

(b) Enlisted Desertion and Unauthorized Absences (UA). The FY 1987 desertion rate increased slightly to 9.8 per 1000 (5126 incidents) from the FY 1986 level of 9.4 per 1000 (4828 incidents). The unauthorized absence rate continues to improve. The FY 1987 UA rate of 30.4 per 1,000 represents a 3.5 percent improvement when compared to the FY 1986 UA rate of 31.5 per 1,000. This is the eighth consecutive year the UA rate has declined, and the FY 1987 UA rate was the lowest in the Navy since FY 1973.

b. Officer/Warrant Officer

(1) Accessions. Active officer procurement goals and attainment for the FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget period are as follows:

Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals

<u>FY 1987</u>		<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
6,190	6,602	6,858	6,400

Accessions to the Navy officer corps come from both regular and reserve officer commissioning sources. Of the 6,190 officers commissioned in FY 1987, 2,444 (39 percent) received regular commissions and 3,746 (61 per-cent) received reserve commissions. Of the 2,444 regular officers, 2,317 came from the U. S. Naval Academy or the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship program.

The majority of naval officers are commissioned through reserve officer programs. The recruiting command met or exceeded recruiting goals for warfare officer designators, including surface, submarine and aviation programs, and attained 97 percent (2,611) of its overall FY 1987 reserve officer recruiting goal. Navy experienced shortfalls in recruiting reserve officers in medical field designators and in engineering specialties.

Navy also continues to experience some shortfalls in attainment of nuclear power officer requirements from regular officer commissioning programs. Navy met 87 percent (688 of 795) of FY 1987 requirements for nuclear power officer accessions compared to 92 percent (713 of 777) in FY 1986.

(2) Officer Retention. URL designators experienced modest retention improvements in FY 1987. Though encouraging, these improvements were insufficient to reduce officer shortages in the pilot and nuclear designators. Recent increases in resignation submission rates suggest retention declines for FY 1988. Additionally, slowed promotions, increased tour lengths, and potential officer reductions have created a negative retention environment for our junior officers. Our retention challenge is to increase the attractiveness of a military career by successfully countering these dissatisfiers, seeking pay comparability with the civilian sector, and in continued attention to quality of life issues.

UNRESTRICTED LINE OFFICER RETENTION
CUMULATIVE CONTINUATION RATES (CCR)*

3 to 12 Years of Service

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY19 87</u>	<u>Goal FY 1988</u>
Surface	31%	32%	26%	32%	36%
Pilot	45%	29%	28%	31%	43%
Naval Flight Officer	56%	54%	51%	56%	43%
Nuclear Submarine Officer	40%	35%	26%	29%	37%
General URL	38%	26%	25%	25%	27%

* CCR retention rates are a probability statement that personnel in year groups 3 through 12 will remain in the service. The Table above reflects the percent of expected retention of those officer year groups during each fiscal year.

c. Women in the Navy

During FY 1987 we continued to increase the number of women as a percentage of the active force. The percentage of enlisted women will increase to 9.6 percent of the active force by FY-1991. The percentage of female officers will grow to 10.6 percent of the active officer end strength by FY-1991.

Navy policy is to employ women to the fullest extent possible, assigning them to positions commensurate with their skills and pay grades. Title 10, U.S.C., Section 6015, prohibits permanent assignment of women to ships or aircraft engaged in combat missions. Consequently, 9 of the Navy's 84 general and 9 of 18 service ratings are closed to women because billets in these ratings are almost exclusively in combatant ships and squadrons, or because they don't provide a viable career path for women. For the same reasons two officer communities, submarine warfare and special warfare, are also closed to women. It should be noted, however, that both officer and enlisted women are assigned to non-combatant ships and billets in aviation support and training squadrons. Women are also assigned to support billets in sea duty aviation squadrons such as land based anti-submarine patrol squadrons.

There were 5,054 enlisted women and 248 female officers serving on 59 ships and 3 afloat staffs at the end of FY-1987. For the same period there were 174 female pilots (including trainees) and 77 female Naval Flight Officers (including trainees). As a result of the Navy's recent study group, over 9000 additional billets on combat logistics force ships and shore based Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons are now open to women.

6. Readiness Assessment

Overall, Navy personnel readiness has continued to show improvements in FY 1987. Senior enlisted (E-5 to E-9) manning at sea has maintained an average of 100 percent of billets authorized during the last fiscal year. The personnel readiness factor of our combat readiness equation for the period from end of FY 1982 thru FY 1987 has improved by 49.7 percent for ships, by 70.9 percent for aviation squadrons, and by 17.9 percent for submarines.

Nevertheless, skill imbalances and personnel shortages in selected areas continue to exist. Programs that are planned or currently are in place to correct these problems include recruiting and reenlistment policies which will aid in shoring up undermanned ratings, changes in the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program to target undermanned critical skills where personnel have high training and replacement costs, and adjustments to sea/shore rotation to reflect the actual distributable manning of specific ratings/rates.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

1. Ready Reserve

a. Selected Reserve Manpower

The Navy has programmed Selected Reserve manpower for FY 1988 and and FY 1989 as follows:

Navy Selected Reserve Manpower Program (Strength in 000s)

	(Actuals) <u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Total Selected Reserve <u>4/</u>	148.1	152.6	152.6
Unit Reservists and Trainees	126.9	130.1	130.1
SAM <u>1/</u>	(2.5)	(3.8)	(3.1)
OSAM <u>2/ 4/</u>	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.6)
Full Time Support	21.3	22.0	22.0
TARs	(19.9)	(20.3)	(20.3)
Canvasser/Recruiters (TEMACS)	(1.2)	(1.5)	(1.5)
10 USC 265	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
IMAs <u>3/</u>	0.2	0.5	0.5

- 1/ Sea and Air Mariner Program
- 2/ Officer Sea and Air Mariner Program
- 3/ Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) perform up to 48 paid drills per year, plus two weeks of active duty.
- 4/ Includes 279 OSAMS erroneously excluded 30 Sep 88 from RCCPDS.

(1) General. A major component of Navy's growth toward the goal of 600 ships is occurring in the Naval Reserve, now well under-way in the most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. Navy endeavors to use limited resources with optimum efficiency, while remaining prepared to respond rapidly to crises, accomplish heavy training requirements, and maintain Fleet readiness.

The gap between peacetime capability and wartime requirements must be filled with qualified reserve units and trained individuals. The major function of the Naval Reserve in peacetime is to man, equip, and train for a high state of readiness upon mobilization. In training to fill this gap and ensure effective integration upon mobilization, the Naval Reserve provides active forces with direct support that is mutually beneficial to Selected Reserve mobilization and training requirements. The phrase "mutual support" has been adopted to describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions that simultaneously provide direct assistance to active duty units in performing their missions. Examples are air logistics support for the Continental U.S. (CONUS), air tanker services, predeployment air combat refresher training, fleet intelligence production, fleet exercise support, ship intermediate level maintenance, cargo handling support, construction support, chaplain and medical support, and security group signal analysis.

(2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. Expansion of the Naval Reserve has been integral to expansion of the Total Force. Past increases in Selected Reserve manpower were distributed among the Defense Planning and Programming Categories as shown in Table IV-5. The force structure will continue to grow at a much slower rate than the programmed manning. Programmed manning represents the degree that trained personnel (program) fill the structure (requirements). However, it does not measure trained strength in units. The following breakdown represents the Reserve trained strength in units.

TABLE IV-4

Naval Reserve Trained in Unit Strength
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>
End Strength	148.1	152.6	152.6	153.4
- Training Pipeline/ Transients	5.2	5.4	4.8	4.8
- IMAs 1/	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Operating Strength	143.0	146.7	147.3	148.1
- NON Unit AGR	11.5	12.0	11.2	11.2
+ Unit AC Personnel	<u>5.1</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>
Trained Unit Strength	136.6	139.9	141.0	141.8
Wartime Unit Structure	142.4	146.1	153.4	151.6
%Trained in Units	95.9%	95.7%	91.9%	93.5%

Between FY 1987 and FY 1989, the percent of unit manning will decrease from 95.9 to 91.9 percent of requirements. This negative trend is a result of an increase in wartime requirements without a corresponding increase in authorizations.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) increase from 101 in FY 1987 to 388 in FY 1989. The increase in manpower for Training and Administration of Reserves (TARs) between FY 1987 and FY 1988 directly supports the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships and squadrons, Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments, SIMAs, and base support. The number of TARs remains constant between 1988 and 1989. The drilling Reserve (Category A status) will increase by 1,667 between FY 1987 and FY 1988, with an additional 656 increase planned for the following year. Medical manpower will expand from 12,869 in FY 1987, to 15,731 (FY 1988) and 16,070 (FY 1989). Manpower for ships, squadrons, SIMAs, construction forces, and operational staffs increases from 86,215 to 89,546 and 91,065 (FY 1988 and FY 1989, respectively). The remaining manpower is distributed throughout the DPPC structure, as shown in Table IV-5.

The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program was inaugurated in FY 1984, to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements (E-3 and below). The SAM program employs a variety of methods to access and train junior reservists--increased use of "A" schools for specialized skill training, non-traditional accession means (vocational-technical education, or VOTECH), and other command-sponsored training. Once trained, the SAMs transition into Category A pay status to fill mobilization requirements for ships, squadrons, SIMAs, mobile construction battalions, and medical units. The SAM program delivers approximately 5,800 non-prior service enlisted accessions per year.

The program concept has been extended to include junior officers (OSAMs). The OSAM program is scheduled to increase from 279 in FY 1987 to 540 in FY 1988, with an additional increase of 62 in FY 1989.

REVISED TABLE IV-5
NAVY RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG EQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG EQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Defensive Strategic Forces										
Strategic Cont and Surv										
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	9.0	7.7	12.5	11.2	13	12.9	99%	13.1	12.9	98%
Land Forces	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Tactical Air Force	0.9	0.7	1.2	1	1.2	1.2	100%	1.3	1.2	92%
Naval Forces	7.4	6.3	10.1	9.3	10.6	10.5	99%	10.6	10.5	99%
Warships and ASW	(4.5)	(3.7)	(6.0)	(5.4)	(6.1)	(6.1)	100%	(6.1)	(6.1)	100%
Amphibious Forces	(0.8)	(0.4)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(1.4)	(1.3)	93%	(1.4)	(1.3)	93%
Naval Support Forces	(2.1)	(2.1)	(2.9)	(3.0)	(3.2)	(3.2)	100%	(3.2)	(3.2)	100%
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.7	87%	0.8	0.6	75%
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.0	100%	2.0	2.0	100%
Intelligence	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.8	100%	1.8	1.3	100%
Centrally Managed Comm	*	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	100%	1.2	1.2	100%
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT*</u>	1.3	0.6	3.3	3.1	4.7	3.8	81%	5.9	3.8	64%
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Unified Commands	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%
Federal Agency Support	*	*	0.1	*	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%

<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>96%</u>
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>95%</u>
Combat Commands	1	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	100%	1.1	1.1	100%
Support Commands	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	91%	1.0	1.0	91%
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100%</u>
Research and Development	*	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	67%	0.2	0.2	67%
Geophysical Activities	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100%</u>
Personnel Support	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%
Individual Training	0.1	0.1	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>100%</u>
Support Installations	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.2	100%	1.2	1.2	100%
Centralized Support Act'y	0.7	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	100%	1.1	1.1	100%
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>27.1</u>	<u>29.1</u>	<u>28.0</u>	<u>30.4</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>28.0</u>	<u>28.0</u>	<u>92%</u>
Undistributed Manning										
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	-	-	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	
Individuals b/ Transients	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6	
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
Students/Trainees	-	-	*	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>30.2</u>	<u>29.1</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>29.1</u>	<u>29.1</u>	<u>92%</u>

* Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics are included in Support Installations.

NAVY RESERVE ENLISTED PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV	INV	AUTH	INV	%	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	%	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	%
STRATEGIC	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Defensive Strategic Forces												
Strategic Cont and Surv												
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	50.7	48.6	75	74.3	75	98%	77.8	76.6	98%	80.7	77.4	96%
Land Forces	1.5	1.1	1.7	1.8	1.7	100%	1.9	1.9	100%	1.9	1.9	100%
Tactical Air Forces	3.6	2.1	5.7	6.6	5.7	100%	7.1	7.1	100%	8.0	7.1	89%
Naval Forces	44.9	44.8	66.7	64.5	66.7	98%	67.5	66.3	98%	69.5	67	96%
Warships and ASW	(15.1)	(16.3)	(23.2)	(23.4)	(23.2)	99%	(23.8)	(23.5)	99%	(24.8)	(23.6)	95%
Amphibious Forces	(4.5)	(3.3)	(6.5)	(7.0)	(6.5)	95%	(7.5)	(7.1)	95%	(7.7)	(7.3)	95%
Naval Support Forces	(25.3)	(25.3)	(37.0)	(34.1)	(37.0)	99%	(36.2)	(35.7)	99%	(37.0)	(36.1)	98%
Mobility Forces	0.7	0.4	1.0	1.3	1.0	100%	1.3	1.3	100%	1.3	1.3	100%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLI	2.9	4.0	4.2	4.6	4.2	100%	4.3	4.3	100%	4.3	4.3	100%
Intelligence	2.5	2.2	2.8	3	2.8	100%	2.9	2.9	100%	2.9	2.9	100%
Centrally Managed Comms	0.4	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.4	100%	1.4	1.4	100%	1.4	1.4	100%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	3.8	7.5	9.9	8.8	9.9	97%	8.9	8.6	97%	8.9	8.6	97%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.5	1.0	100%	0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%
MEDICAL SUPPORT*	2.2	2.0	9.9	12.0	9.9	78%	15.3	11.9	78%	17.4	12.2	70%
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Unified Commands	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%
Federal Agency Support	*	-	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>96%</u>
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>100%</u>
Combat Commands	<u>0.7</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>100%</u>
Support Commands	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>86%</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>86%</u>
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>100%</u>
Research and Development	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100%</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>100%</u>
Personnel Support	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100%</u>
Individual Training	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>95%</u>
Support Installations	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>94%</u>
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>68.5</u>	<u>69.0</u>	<u>117.0</u>	<u>117.2</u>	<u>123.8</u>	<u>118.6</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>129.3</u>	<u>119.4</u>	<u>92%</u>
Operating Strength Deviation										
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>		-	0.1	-		-	-		-	-
<u>Individuals b/</u>										
Transients	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>		<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>	
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>		<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	
Students/Trainees	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>		<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	
Students/Trainees	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>		<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	<u>69.4</u>	<u>69.9</u>	<u>121.7</u>	<u>121.9</u>	<u>128.7</u>	<u>123.5</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>133.4</u>	<u>123.5</u>	<u>93%</u>

* Less than 50

NAVY RESERVE TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED HANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH		INV	AUTH		INV	PROG RIGHT		% INV	PROG RIGHT		% INV
STRATEGIC	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%
Defensive Strategic Forces												
Strategic Cont and Surv												
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	59.8	56.1	56.1	86.8	86.2	86.2	90.9	89.5	98%	94.0	90.3	96%
Land Forces	1.9	1.4	1.4	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.3	96%	2.4	2.4	100%
Tactical Air Forces	4.5	2.8	2.8	7.8	6.6	6.6	8.3	8.3	100%	9.2	8.4	91%
Naval Forces	52.3	51.1	51.1	74.6	76	76	78	76.8	98%	80.2	77.5	97%
Warships and ASW	(19.6)	(20.0)	(20.0)	(29.4)	(28.6)	(28.6)	(29.9)	(29.5)	99%	(30.9)	(29.7)	96%
Amphibious Forces	(5.3)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(8.2)	(7.4)	(7.4)	(8.8)	(8.4)	95%	(9.1)	(8.6)	95%
Naval Support Forces	(27.4)	(27.4)	(27.4)	(37.0)	(40.0)	(40.0)	(39.3)	(38.9)	99%	(40.2)	(39.2)	98%
Mobility Forces	1.0	0.8	0.8	2.1	1.6	1.6	2.2	2.1	95%	2.2	2	91%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	4.7	5.8	5.8	6.6	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.2	98%	6.3	6.3	100%
Intelligence	4.3	3.9	3.9	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.7	98%	4.8	4.7	98%
Centrally Managed Comms	0.4	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	100%	1.6	1.6	100%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	4.7	8.5	8.5	10.0	11.1	11.1	10.1	9.8	97%	10.2	9.5	93%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.4	1.4	0.7	0.7	100%	0.7	0.7	100%
MEDICAL SUPPORT	3.6	2.6	2.6	15.3	13.0	13.0	20.0	15.7	78%	23.2	16.1	69%
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	100%	0.8	0.8	100%
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%
Unified Commands	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*	0.1	*	*	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%

<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	5.2	3.7	7.5	8.6	7.6	7.5	99%	7.6	7.6	97%
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	2.7	3.1	3.9	4	3.8	3.6	95%	3.8	3.7	97%
Combat Commands	1.7	1.7	2.1	2.3	2	2	100%	2	2	100%
Support Commands	1	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.6	89%	1.8	1.7	94%
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	0.3	0.7	1.2	1	1.1	1.2	100%	1.2	1.1	92%
Research and Development	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	100%	0.7	0.7	100%
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	1.3	0.8	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.2	100%	1.2	1.2	100%
Personnel Support	0.8	0.4	0.9	1.1	1	1	100%	1	1	100%
Individual Training	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	2.9	3.2	9.5	8.5	9.8	9.8	100%	10.2	9.8	94%
Support Installations	1.5	1.6	7.8	6.6	8.1	8	99%	8.5	8	94%
Centralized Support Act'y	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.8	100%	1.8	1.8	100%
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	86.5	86.1	144.0	143.0	152.9	146.7	96%	159.7	147.3	92%
Operating Strength Deviation										
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>		-	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	
Individuals	0.9	0.9	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.5		4.8	4.8	
Transients	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7		0.8	0.8	
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1		0.0	0.0	
Students/Trainees	0.9	0.9	4.1	4.3	4.7	4.7		4.0	4	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	87.4	87.0	149.5	148.4	158.9	152.6	96%	165	152.6	92%

NOTE: Programmed Manpower Structure reflects the presence of Full-time Support personnel (TARs) in addition to NAMPOS requirements.

a/ Programmed Manpower Structure (PMS) is defined as the aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirements for all units and organizations in the program force, which is the table of organization structure (or its equivalent) for operational units, and the structure associated with full peacetime workload requirements for non-operational units. Operational units are those combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations with operational readiness reporting requirements under UNITREP.

Programmed Manning (PM) is defined as those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be staffed. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100% staffing of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; the term is synonymous with Distributable Billets.

End strength (ES) is the sum of programmed manning or the operating strength and the individual's account at the end of the fiscal year.

b/ Individuals refers to the transients, trainees, patients, prisoners, students in "overhead" not available for staffing programmed manning spaces, and individual mobilization augmentees.

(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Table IV-6 reflects a marked rate imbalance in the FY 1987 Selected Reserve. The imbalance results from the increased emphasis on placing E-3 and below and junior officer requirements in the Reserve Force. The SAM program is meeting some of these junior enlisted mobilization requirements. Targeted bonuses for enlisted personnel in critical rates will also alleviate this imbalance.

The term "skills" as used in Table IV-6 is synonymous with enlisted ratings and the logical grouping of officer designators (i.e., surface, intelligence, etc.) used in inventory planning.

(4) Reserve Experience. Although the Naval Reserve is composed of senior enlisted personnel, it does not yet have the necessary data processing resources to determine the average years of service or to separate those personnel with greater than four years of service for PH1. In addition, only current year data are available; data on full-time support personnel are not maintained in the Naval Reserve data base.

The FY 1987 data in Table IV-7 show a continuing imbalance of junior officer inventory to requirements. The OSAM program is reducing that imbalance over time.

(5) Reserve Personnel Management

(a) Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. Although most Reserve accessions come from the Naval Veterans (NAVETS) Program, SAM recruiting efforts have been very successful. Significant achievements were also recorded in the Other Service Veteran (OSVET) and Advanced Pay Grade (APG) program. The rapid programmed increase in Selected Reserve Strength has driven a related increase in TAR recruiting to secure the necessary full time support personnel to manage this growing force and man the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships. Navy experienced difficulties in meeting its goals in these two areas in FY 1984, but management changes and added recruiting resources addressed the FY 1984 problems in FY 1985. The Navy met the SAM and TAR accessions plans in 1985 with the use of targeted incentives, however, in FY 1986, with additional substantial growth programmed to man the NRF ships, Navy did not meet goal, specifically in shipboard ratings.

The actual number of Selected Reserve Personnel recruited in FY 1987 and the accession goals for FY 1988 through FY 1989 are shown below:

TABLE IV-6
NAVY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL & PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS
PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS (PMI)* (Note 1)**
(Strength in thousands)

	<u>FY 1987</u>			
	<u>Over**</u>	<u>Balanced**</u>	<u>Short**</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>				
Number of Skills	24	17	44	85
PMI	15.1	5.0	33.2	53.3
Inventory	19.0	4.9	23.3	47.3
Over/Short	+3.9	*	-9.9	-6.0
<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	45	35	16	96 (Note 2)
PMI	20.1	19.1	9.9	49.2
Inventory	24.7	19.2	7.9	51.8
Over/Short	+4.5	+0.1	-2.1	+2.3
<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	31	36	32	99
PMI	29.0	24.9	48.6	102.5
Inventory	35.6	25.4	38.0	99.0 (Note 3)
Over/Short	+6.6	+0.5	-10.6	-3.5
<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills	7	9	15	31
PMI	*	.2	.3	.6
Inventory	*	*	-.2	-.2
Over/Short	+29	-19	-178	-168
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	12	6	38	56
PMI	.7	.2	12.4	13.3
Inventory	1.2	.2	6.7	8.2
Over/Short	.6	*	-5.7	-5.1
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	13	7	27	47
PMI	4.4	2.2	4.9	11.5
Inventory	10.1	2.2	2.9	15.2
Over/Short	-5.7	*	-2.0	+3.7
<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	15	7	42	64
PMI	6.7	2.9	15.2	24.9
Inventory	10.7	3.0	9.7	23.4
Over/Short	-3.9	0.1	-5.5	-1.5

*Less than 50.

**See definitions in Appendix B under "Balanced".

***Navy's terms for PMI include Enlisted Personnel Authorizations (EPA) and Officer Personnel Authorizations (OPA).

Note 1 - Total billets taken from FY 1987 OPA/EPA.
NRPC reports 4080-1050-7 and 4080-1020-7
DTD 30 Sep 87 source for inventory. SELRES
end strength not funded to the total
billet file.

Note 2 - Ratings not included: AN, FN, SN, MU, TD

Note 3 - Onboard numbers do not include 2,485
CAT "F" in training pipeline.

TABLE IV-7
NAVY RESERVE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Strength in thousands)

	FY 1987		
	<u>TOTAL PEOPLE</u>	<u>PEOPLE WITH GREATER THAN 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
PMI**	53.3	*	*
Inventory	57.0	17.5	3.6
<u>E5-E9</u>			
PMI	49.2	*	*
Inventory	63.2	59.8	13.4
<u>E1-E9</u>			
PMI	102.5	*	*
Inventory	120.2	77.3	8.8
<u>WO</u>			
PMI	.6	*	*
Inventory	.5	.5	22.4
<u>01-03</u>			
PMI	13.3	*	*
Inventory	8.8	7.2	8.3
<u>04-06</u>			
PMI	11.5	*	*
Inventory	16.2	16.1	18.0
<u>01-06</u>			
PMI	24.9	*	*
Inventory	25.1	23.3	14.7

* Data not available

** Programmed manning plus individuals

Sources:

1. PMI - SELRES EPA/OPA (May 87) (Does not include TAR/TEMAC)
2. Inventory - RCCPDS (Jun 87) (Includes TAR/TEMAC)

Enlisted Reserve Accession Plans

	<u>FY 1987</u>		<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
NAVETS	22,325	28,760(1)	27,749(2)	27,047(3)
SAM	7,059	7,000	6,075	5,775
OSVETS	1,575			
APG	3,212			
TAR	1,657	1,803	488	0

(1) Goal includes NAVETs/OSVETs/APGs.

(2) Goal includes NAVETs/OSVETs/APGs and reflects 3,326 reduction in FYDP end strength.

(3) Goal includes NAVETs/OSVETs/APGs and reflects 6,211 reduction in FY-89 FYDP end strength.

(2) Retention. To more realistically analyze retention within the Selected Reserve, enlisted retention is now measured at significant career points, e.g. at the end of first, second, or subsequent enlistment. Since many Selected Reservists are non-obligors who may cease to participate at any time, an analysis by enlistment allows reserve unit managers to direct special retention efforts toward newer affiliates who are 1st and 2nd term enlistees.

Enlisted Reserve Retention
(Percent)

<u>Affiliated</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>		<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1st Enlistment	80.7	85	85	85
2nd Enlistment	82.2	85	85	90
3rd or more Enlistment	89.1	90	90	90
Overall Naval Reserve	83.4	85	85.5	90

(b) Officers. The Naval Reserve continues to invest significant efforts in new junior officer recruiting areas, while continuing to expand and publicize those ongoing specific accession programs which include direct commissions into the Naval Reserve. The Officer Sea and Air Mariner (OSAM) Recruiting Program provides direct accessions of junior Selected Reserve Officer Personnel with no prior naval experience. One option of the OSAM College Program provides \$100 per month stipend for qualified college students during their junior and senior years. The associated service obligation may require up to two years of active duty to attain a qualification in a designator specialty. The remaining military service obligation is served on inactive duty in the Selected Reserve. FY 1987 provided 75 quotas for the College Program and similar execution is expected in FY 1988. In addition, 75 OSAM quotas were provided to the Navy Recruiting Command for officer candidate school accessions. The OSAM option is open to unrestricted line and certain restricted line and staff corps designators.

Officer Reserve Accession Plans

	<u>FY 1987</u>		<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
VETERAN				
AFFILIATIONS	3,663	3,421	4,373	3,932
DIRECT				
APPOINTMENTS	834	805	1,189	984
OSAM	275	278	327	530
OFFICER				
RECRUITERS	158	174	86	35
TARS	231	212	279	185

(6) Reserve Readiness Assessment. The personnel readiness posture of the Naval Reserve will improve through FY 1989, as we continue to fill all mobilization billet requirements with qualified personnel. Improvements in personnel stability, closer skill matches, and attainment of training requirements will contribute to this increased readiness assessment.

(a) Reserve Aggregate Population Stability

Reserve Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Officer	85.0	86.2	88.6	86.6	87.8	83.4
Enlisted	76.7	75.4	81.6	70.3	79.3	83.4

(b) Reserve Unit Personnel Stability.

Reserve Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Officer	*	58.5	59.7	*	*	*
Enlisted	*	47.2	54.5	*	*	*

*Data not available.

(7) Individual Mobilization Augmentee Programs. An IMA is an officer or enlisted person in the Selected Reserve who will fill a specific billet in the Active Force upon mobilization. Each IMA will be assigned to a mobilization billet within the active force, training in that billet during peacetime. The increases in IMAs from FY 1987 through FY 1989 will be applied to Medical Support requirements.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
	(Actual)		
Total IMAs	240	538	520

(8) Full Time Support Programs. The active duty TAR community is being expanded in FY 1988 to support, manage, and train the larger Selected Reserve. This will enable the Naval Reserve Force ships to achieve required operational readiness, while at the same time providing optimum training to assigned Selected Reserves. A new program to allow direct accessions from active Navy to TAR status has helped end strength requirements. Also, full time Reserve recruiters (transferred from the active (MPN) accounting system to the Selected Reserve (RPN) accounting in FY 1985) assist in the achievement of Total Force recruiting goals. Navy's Reserve active duty support manpower include the following categories:

Reserve Full Time Support Programs
(End Strength in Thousands) ^{1/}

	<u>FY 1987</u> (ACT)	<u>FY 1988</u> (PROJ)	<u>FY 1989</u> (PROJ)
Sect. 265 2/	0.2	0.2	0.2
TAR Officer	1.8	1.9	1.9
TAR Enlisted	18.1	18.4	18.4
Reserve Recruiters	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>
Reserve Subtotal	21.3	22.0	22.0
Active Navy	6.9	6.9	6.5
Navy Civilians	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.0</u>
TOTAL	31.2	32.0	31.5

1/ Totals may not add due to rounding.

2/ Reserve Officers in headquarters billets in accordance with Section 265, of Title 10, U.S. Code.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)

Navy IRR is composed of, in large part, personnel with recent active duty experience who still have a remaining military service obligation (MSO). The FY 1986 increase in IRR end strength marked the reversal of declining IRR strength that began in 1981.

In June 1984, the eight year MSO began, and in August 1984 the \$900 bonus for a three year IRR reenlistment was instituted. The extension of the MSO from six to eight years and the IRR bonus implementation should result in continuing IRR growth through FY 1992.

IRR Strength

	<u>FY 1987</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1988</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1989</u> (Projected)
<u>Drilling Without Pay (Volunteer Training Unit)</u>			
Officers	2,454	2,500	2,550
Enlisted	<u>734*</u>	<u>300*</u>	<u>850*</u>
Total	3,188	3,300	3,400

Not Drilling			
Officers	15,810	16,000	16,200
Enlisted	59,431	60,125	62,500
Total	75,241	76,125	78,700
 Total	 78,429	 79,425	 82,100

*SAM/OSAMS Not included.

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve is composed of personnel who maintain their military affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve and who are liable for active duty in accordance with 10 USC 672 and 674. The Standby Reserve Active Status List (S1) includes members transferred from the Ready Reserve as a result of a temporary hardship, key employees in Federal and non-Federal employment, and theological students. The Standby Reserve Inactive Status List (S2) includes those volunteers who are no longer required to remain in an active status.

Standby Reserve Strength

	FY 1987 (Actual)	FY 1988 (Projected)	FY 1989 (Projected)
A breakout of the FY 1987 Standby Reserve actuals follows:			
Active (S1)			
Officers	83	84	87
Enlisted	857	870	899
Total	940	954	986
Inactive (S2)			
Officers	10,261	10,382	10,731
Enlisted	22	22	23
Total	10,283	10,404	10,754
Total	11,223	11,358	11,740

3. Retirees

This program includes regular and reserve retirees who have completed 20 years of active duty and, separately, reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60. Twenty year active duty retirees are liable for recall to active duty at any time by the Secretary of the Navy in the interest of national defense. The latter category are liable for recall only in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law. Eighty percent of the Fleet Reserve, 70 percent of the Retired USN/USNR Class I and II (includes those non-disabled, under age 60, retired 0-10 years), and 10 percent of the retired USN/USNR Class III (includes over age 60 or disabled) are expected to respond to a call up.

Retired Strength

	<u>FY 1987</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1988</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1989</u> (Projected)
Twenty-year Active Duty Retirees (USN/USNR)*			
CAT I and II	190,049	193,470	193,664
CAT III	125,605	127,866	127,994
Other Retiree Reserves (Excluding Honorary Retirees)*			
CAT I and II	68,967	70,209	70,279
CAT III	39,824	40,541	40,581

* Includes Fleet Reserve

4. Active Duty For Training

The following table shows enlisted (SAM) and officer (OSAM) reserve members serving on active duty for training in excess of 180 days.

Officers and Enlisted Members Serving on Active Duty for Training

<u>Category</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	(YTD-7 Jan 1988)
<u>Enlisted</u>			
Recruit and Specialized Training (Including SAM Trainees)	7,106	4,495	
<u>Officer</u>			
Flight Training (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	70	61	
Professional (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	<u>203</u>	<u>319</u>	
TOTAL	7,379	4,875	

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy's overall resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our Fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E,

printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the readiness of the Fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development, and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on readiness.

The civilian estimates represent the manpower levels required to execute reduced program funding levels and reflect a concerted effort to contain personnel costs. To manage civilian costs effectively, the DON implemented in FY 1987 a new policy called "Manage to Payroll". Under this program, greater authority, incentive, and flexibility for the position classification and position management programs are placed on appropriate management levels. Military and civilian line managers are provided authority for establishing and classifying civilian positions, subject to the civilian payroll resources available to their organizations. The concurrent allocation of authorized payroll funding levels to line managers is part of the emphasis on managing civilian employment as an element of costs. Civilian estimates are balanced and structured to reflect declining end strength levels between FY 1987 and FY 1989 consistent with reduced program funding levels. The Navy civilian manpower request also demonstrates a continued strong commitment to manpower economies and efficiencies.

The FY 1988/FY 1989 request is for 325.7/317.5 civilians, respectively. This request is shown by DPPC in Table IV-8.

REVISED TABLE IV-8
PROGRAMMED CIVILIAN MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Direct and Indirect Hires in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
STRATEGIC				
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.2	3.3	3.9	4.2
Defensive Strategic Forces	1.1	3.1	3.7	4.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
TACTICAL/MOBILITY				
Tactical Air Force	6.2	6.9	7.8	7.8
Naval Forces	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3
Warships and ASW	0.7	1.3	1.6	1.6
Amphibious Forces				
Naval Support Forces				
Mobility Forces	5.2	5.0	5.9	5.9
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL				
Intelligence	2.4	3.3	3.5	3.5
Centrally Managed Comm	1.0	1.6	1.8	1.8
	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.7
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	30.0	34.0	34.4	33.7
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.8
MEDICAL SUPPORT	3.5	4.2	4.3	4.2

<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Int'l Military Org	1.5	2.6	2.9
Unified Commands	1.3	2.4	2.6
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>			
	149.4	170.9	158.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>			
Combat Commands	8.1	11.5	10.8
Support Commands	1.2	3.0	2.5
	6.9	8.5	8.3
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>			
Research and Development	30.3	37.5	36.2
Geophysical Activities	29.2	36.4	35.1
	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Personnel Support	4.4	5.8	6.1
Individual Training	1.2	2.4	2.6
	3.2	3.4	3.5
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Support Installations	50.5	49.6	48.1
Centralized Support Act'y	43.9	44.4	42.7
	6.7	5.2	5.4
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>			
	289.2	331.5	317.5
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>			
	289.2	331.5	317.5

2. Major Program Changes

The FY 1988 and FY 1989 estimates reflect decreases consistent with the reduced overall funding levels. Major decreases in FY 1988 include adjustments for Congressionally directed resource reductions for savings to be achieved as a result of efficiency and productivity studies, organizational analyses, and other cost containment activities, as well as Congressional reductions targeted for streamlined staffing of acquisition management and another in Management Headquarters staffing levels as mandated in the Goldwater - Nichols DoD Reorganization Act. The FY 1989 estimates carry forward the impact of the directed FY 1988 reductions above and project additional savings to be achieved as the result of economy and efficiency initiatives.

Reductions in required depot level maintenance will result in a corresponding reduction at the Naval Shipyards, while the Naval Aviation Depots and Naval Ordnance Activities each draw down from their FY 1988 levels. The end strength estimates for industrial fund activities continue to reflect the benefits of improved efficiency and productivity. These savings are being achieved through improved scheduling to realize the most efficient working tempo, optimum use of overtime, reductions in overhead, and other measures.

3. Improvements and Efficiencies

The Navy estimate of civilian manpower requirements reflects a continuing commitment to increase the efficiency of the civilian work force. The majority of the Navy's efforts in this area are concentrated in the Commercial Activities (CA) and in the Navy Industrial Improvement Program (NIIP).

Under the CA program, we are conducting cost studies using OMB Circular A-76 procedures to determine whether performance of CA functions are more cost effective when performed under contract or by using in-house resources. In FY 1987 we completed CA Program studies on over 2,000 civilian positions, saving about 1,200 positions. In FY 1988 we expect to study 5,400 positions and expect to save 2,500 positions. These results have been incorporated into our civilian estimates in compliance with the Executive Order of 19 Nov 1987 which requires, among other things, that budget estimates include expected yearly budget savings from the privatization of commercial activities.

The Naval Industrial Improvement Program (NIIP), representing one of the highest Navy management priorities, is designed to implement a series of cost-avoidance management improvements within the Navy's industrial base. These efforts do not constitute a sweeping reform but rather represent the implementation of the basics of management and control which in turn facilitate significant efficiencies of operations.

With respect to civilian manpower considerations we are drawing upon private sector experience and expertise in managing workforce levels in a more orderly manner commensurate with workload requirements. At each industrial activity (currently shipyards, Naval Air Rework Facilities and Public Works Centers) we are conducting detailed reviews of overhead staffing and workload requirements in order to better align resources. Additionally, various initiatives are directed at issues which limit Navy's flexibility to pursue productivity improvements, including:

- Fostering changes to rules which limit the quality of personnel resources and cause the retention of larger than necessary numbers of people.
- Refocusing personnel rules to more closely align with industrial activity needs through the concept of competition and reinforcement of cost consciousness in the workplace.
- Pursuing the realignment of the compensation system to relate productivity and compensation thereby providing workers the opportunity to have more of a stake in the process and be evaluated for the bottom line results of their efforts.

Finally, we are attempting to remove a number of obstacles which preclude the maintenance of a lean, flexible workforce, including the streamlining of internal reduction-in-force procedures and the use of Transition Staffing Pools to lessen the adverse impact on employees while transitioning to new workforce configurations.

Navy also participates in a number of programs designed to enhance productivity and achieve economies of operation. The Productivity Investment Fund and the Navy Industrial Fund capital investment programs invest in modern equipment, methods, and labor saving devices to replace labor-intensive, costly operations and bring activities to a state-of-the-art position. The Defense Retail Interservice Support Program and Productivity Enhancing Inventive Fund provide local commanders with a means to achieve cost effectiveness and economies of operation through interservice consolidations and acquisition of capital investments in areas of fast payback potential.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower

Immediately upon mobilization, Navy experiences a manpower shortfall due to casualties, peacetime active duty manning, and mobilization delays. The shortfall is eliminated quickly with the mobilization surge and the commencement of casualties returning to duty.

Manpower shortages persist, however, in the medical support designators and ratings. The pre-trained individual manpower (PIM) will not be able to meet all of the requirements because of similar needs in other services as well as the civilian sector. Only after "ramping up" the military training schools to a wartime level will any substantial progress be made, and that progress will begin only after the training facilities graduate their first classes.

2. Civilian Manpower

The peacetime civilian authorizations form the baseline for civilian mobilization manpower planning. On M-Day and after, the peacetime numbers increase to reflect the growth in support required to build toward and sustain full mobilization. During mobilization, civilian positions will be created to support the buildup, and, concurrently, positions will be terminated in activities that do not directly support the war effort.

Wartime manpower requirements include over 54,289 new positions, 37,255 additional people needed to replace peacetime employees recalled to perform military duties, and 7,824 people are required to fill positions currently vacant. Therefore, Navy needs to procure more than 99,368 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenario. These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles as well as associated equipment and supply support.

Navy plans for offsetting the shortfall in civilian manpower after M-day include substantive recruitment efforts using the Emergency - Indefinite appointing authority for the rapid acquisition of new personnel. Other efforts include recall of recently retired civilian personnel and cross training of on-board staff.

E. Manpower Management Improvements

1. Navy Total Force

A Total Force Advocate flag officer billet within the Plans, Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component manpower and units in the Navy. With analytical support from the Center for Naval Analysis, potential changes in Total Force composition are evaluated to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime.

By the mid-1990's, the US Naval Reserve (measured in manpower, ships, and aircraft) will become the tenth most powerful naval force in the world. Combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active Navy, this Total Force will ensure that the United States will prevail in any conflict at sea. In some cases, most or all of the Navy's mission capability resides in the Reserve Component (e.g., U.S. based logistic air transport (VR), helicopter, light attack (HAL), combat search and rescue squadrons (HC), and naval control of shipping (NCS) units). In others, from one-third to more than three-quarters of the assets available for traditional Navy missions are provided by the Reserve (cargo handling, mine countermeasures, Military Sealift Command personnel, composite aircraft squadrons, SEABEES, special boat operations, maritime air patrol, and personnel for medical support). It is significant that those warfighting areas which exhibit relatively small Reserve participation (less than 15 percent) are essentially surface or subsurface missions supporting the maritime strategy through extended, forward deployments.

The Naval Reserve provides a wide range of capabilities within Navy's Total Force. Significant Naval Reserve contributions include the following (data as of the end of FY 87):

- 100 percent of light attack helicopter squadrons (HAL)
- 100 percent of inshore undersea warfare units
- 100 percent of Navy combat search and rescue (SAR) capability (HC-9)
- 99 percent of Naval control of shipping organization
- 93 percent of Navy cargo handling battalions
- 86 percent of Naval U.S. based logistic airlift squadrons (VR)
- 85 percent of Military Sealift Command (MSC) Military Personnel
- 82 percent of Naval ocean minesweepers
- 65 percent of Navy Mobile Construction Battalions
- 57 percent of Navy Special Boat Forces
- 49 percent of Naval intelligence personnel
- 35 percent of Naval maritime air patrol squadrons (VP)
- 33 percent of Navy medical support personnel
- 33 percent of Naval composite (service) squadrons (VC)
- 25 percent of Navy Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadrons (HM)
- 19 percent of Navy base operating support personnel
- 16 percent of Navy surface combatants (Frigates/Destroyers)
- 13 percent of Navy carrier air wings (CVW)
- 3 percent of Navy amphibious warfare ships

The Navy has continued to increase the Reserve participation, as indicated in FY 1987, including further increased participation in aviation, surface combatant, mine countermeasures, and Fleet support.

In FY 1987, the Navy evaluated a number of important initiatives which promise payoffs in improved manpower management of the Total Force. These include:

- Adjustments to Naval Reserve manning policy to improve mobilization readiness. Specifically, personnel in pre-assigned billets ashore will fill augmentation requirements in immediately deploying Naval Reserve ships and squadrons. Because it is difficult to predict in advance which ships and squadrons will require Selected Reserve augmentation in a mobilization contingency, later deployers will be supported by Selected Reserve augmentation units structured and trained along generic rather than hull/unit-specific lines, -- e.g., Frigate Augment Unit, instead of USS KNOX Augment Unit; or VF (F-14) Augment Unit, instead of VF-2 Augment Unit. This policy will improve Selected Reserve augmentation billet stability and produce efficiencies in Reserve personnel management and training. At the same time, the Navy has moved to restructure ship and squadron augmentation units with a ratio of sixty percent petty officers to forty percent non-rated personnel, a mix which more closely approximates the makeup of the Active Component. In doing so, Sea and Air Mariner requirements will be reduced, and veteran petty officer billets will be retained.

- Manning the inactive combatants with members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Fleet Reserve, retirees, and active personnel in peacetime-only billets.

- Planned IRR manning of a Fleet Hospital.

- Zero-based review of Selected Reserve billets. By validating Selected Reserve billets, a zero-based study in late FY 1987 resulted in manning efficiencies and dollar savings for the Navy.

- A series of analytical studies in support of the Total Force Advocate, by the Center for Naval Analyses, examining a wide variety of alternatives to man and support the Navy's 600 ship force with Active, Reserve, and civilian personnel.

III. NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustment in overall Navy strength.

Current projections are for 580 battle force ships and 230 aviation squadrons by the end of FY 1989. To adequately man this growing force structure within a constant end strength of 593,200, Navy has shifted manpower to fleet categories (strategic, tactical/mobility, intelligence, central communications) from fleet support and other support activities.

The Navy increased manning to fleet categories nearly one percent (+2,864) in FY 1989 while reducing fleet support and other support, retiring 16 frigates, decommissioning two SSBNs, slowing trident commissionings, and deactivating the 14th carrier airwing.

A. Strategic

The Strategic category includes nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces having the objective of deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. The majority of Navy manpower in this category is associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The TRIDENT program, strategic operational headquarters, and communications and Automated Data Processing support are also included.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces

The increase in active spaces in FY 1988 results primarily from an increase in overall manning of the Fleet Ballistic Missile System Support Ships (+799) and of the Trident Program (+382) to support the requirement for pre-commissioning crews. The increase in active spaces in FY 1989 results primarily from an increase in overall manning of the Fleet Ballistic Missile System (+307) and the commissioning of two Ohio Class submarines (+412).

2. Active Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

The increase of active spaces in FY 1988 was due primarily to the increase of +197 for FBM Control System - Communication. There were no major increases or decreases in active spaces in FY 1989.

3. Civilian Strategic Forces

The increase in civilian spaces through FY 1989 results from additional staffing of the Trident facilities at Kings Bay, Georgia.

B. Tactical and Mobility

The Tactical and Mobility manpower is associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units.

The active military growth in Tactical/Mobility forces supports the increase in the number of ships and squadrons, all of which require full time manpower due to deployment requirements.

1. Land Forces

Navy Land Forces include physicians, dentists, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to the Fleet Marine Forces and Marine Corps bases.

The increase in active spaces in FY 1988 results primarily from additional increase in the previously mentioned Marine Divisions (+584) and the Force Support Service Groups (+463). There were no major changes to active spaces in FY 1989.

Selected Reserve growth in Land Forces corrects the under-manning difficulties of FY 1987 for medical support enlisted personnel (Hospital Corpsmen).

2. Tactical Air Forces

The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, strike fighter, airborne early warning and electronic warfare squadrons; attack, multipurpose aircraft carriers; and tactical air operational headquarters units.

The increase in active spaces in FY 1988 results primarily from increases of +2284 for Multi-purpose Aircraft Carriers in support of pre-commissioning crews, +566 for A-6 Squadrons, +732 for F/A-18 Squadrons, +499 for F-14 Squadrons, +152 for Early Warning Squadrons, +177 for Sea-Based EW Squadrons, and +169 for Shore-Based EW Squadrons, partially offset by a decrease of -470 to A-7 Squadrons. The increase in active spaces in FY 1989 results primarily from increases of +2426 for Multi-purpose Aircraft Carriers, +985 for F/A-18 Squadrons, and +146 for Sea-Based EW Squadrons, partially offset by decreases to A-6 Squadrons (-200), A-7 Squadrons (-122), F-14 Squadrons (-454), and Early Warning Aircraft Squadrons (-120).

The annual increases in Selected Reserve manpower are partly attributable to modernization of the Reserve Carrier Air Wings. Specific efforts include phasing in of F/A-18 and A-6 squadrons to replace aging

F-4 and A-7 aircraft. FY 1987 marked the introduction of the first reserve airborne mine countermeasures squadron (RH-53D), with an additional squadron programmed for FY 1989. Other growth in Selected Reserve manpower supports expanding active-force squadron and carrier augmentation requirements.

The decrease in civilian spaces between FY 1987 and FY 1988 is the result of the transfer of Joint Cruise Missile Project.

3. Naval Forces

The Naval Forces subcategory includes manpower for anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces and support forces. It is the largest subcategory of active military and Selected Reserve manpower in the Navy. Naval Forces include virtually all ship manpower requirements except the fleet ballistic missile manpower in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower in Tactical Air Forces.

The increase in active spaces for FY 1988 includes, in the area of ASW and Fleet Air Defense Forces, increases of +1624 for Battleships to support one IOWA Class from conversion, +1787 to support two newly commissioned TICONDEROGA Class Cruisers, +468 for Missile Destroyers, +148 for Non-Missile Destroyers, +214 for SH-3 Squadrons, +164 for LAMPS Squadrons, +181 for ASW Patrol Squadrons, +122 for Mine Countermeasures Forces, +376 for Air Mine Countermeasures Squadrons, +206 for Operational Headquarters (Sea Control-Air), and +139 for Mine Countermeasures Forces-Reserve, partially offset by decreases to Guided Missile Frigates (-350) due to the transfer of four PERRY Class Frigates to the Naval Reserve Force and the decommissioning of two BROOKE Class and six GARCIA class Frigates, and decreases of -858 to attack submarines.

In the area of Amphibious Forces, there were increases of +1681 for Amphibious Assault Ships to support the addition of one WHIDBEY ISLAND Class LSD-41, +241 for Amphibious Tactical Support Units, +239 for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces, +411 for Ongoing Operational Activities-Active (Special Warfare Forces), +233 for Ongoing Operational Activities-Reserve, and +223 for Active Training, partially offset by a decrease of -50 to Ongoing Operational Activities-Reserve.

In the area of Naval Support Forces, there are increases of +1181 to Support Forces, +985 to Underway Replenishment Ships, +106 to Major Fleet Support Ships, +407 to Minor Fleet Support Ships, +721 to Direct Support Squadrons-Aircraft, +101 to Fleet Logistics Support, +183 to Electronic Warfare Readiness Support, and +303 to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities. These increases are partially offset by decreases of -134 to Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments, -300 to Naval Construction Forces, and -214 to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities.

The decrease in active spaces in FY 1989, in the area of ASW and Fleet Air Defense Forces, is partially due to decreases of -1640 to Guided Missile Frigates and -2671 to Non-Missile Frigates due to the decommissioning of four GARCIA class and four BROOKE class frigates, -158 to SH-3 Squadrons, -253 to S-3 Squadrons, and -180 to Reserve Missile Frigates, partially offset by increases of +1621 to support two new TICONDEROGA Class Cruisers, +317 to Missile Destroyers, +108 to Non-Missile Destroyers, +251 to LAMPS, +101 to Submarines, +228 to Air Mine Countermeasures Squadrons, and +153 to Undersea Surveillance Systems.

In the area of Amphibious Forces, increases are due primarily to Assault Ships (+1828) in support of one LHD-1 Class and two WHIDBEY ISLAND Class LSD-41 ships, to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces (+110), and to Active Ongoing Operational Activities (+284).

In the area of Naval Support Forces, increases are directed to +360 for Support Forces and +171 for Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities, offset by a decrease of -159 to Electronic Warfare Readiness Support.

Annual Reserve personnel increases support the continuing modernization of the Naval Surface Reserve, pursued vigorously since the early 1980's. In FY 1987, four additional frigates (FFs and FFGs) joined the Naval Reserve, with five more scheduled to arrive in FY 1988. The Reserve Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare program will add three units each in FY 1987 through FY 1989. The Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP) increased by two units in FY 1987 and will increase by five units in FY 1988, with three additional units programmed for FY 1989.

The civilian increase in FY 1988 is due to the transfer of some planning and engineering functions and to other functional transfers. Other general increases are in the areas of intermediate maintenance, special warfare forces, fleet logistics support, and Navy Command and Control Systems.

4. Mobility Forces

The Mobility Forces subcategory includes Navy strength for airlift and sealift capability, plus port terminal and traffic management operations.

There were no major increases or decreases of active duty spaces in FY 1988 or FY 1989.

Selected Reserve growth in Mobility Forces between FY 1987 and FY 1988 supports mobilization requirements of the Military Sealift Command.

The increases in civilian staffing from FY 1987 to FY 1988 are primarily for civilian mariner manning of TAO ships scheduled for delivery from construction during the period FY 1987 through FY 1989 and for the transfer of the Military Sealift Command Headquarters Component.

C. Communications/Intelligence

This category includes Manpower associated with Intelligence and Centrally Managed Communications.

1. Intelligence.

This category includes strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities within the Department of Defense.

The increase in active spaces for FY 1988 includes increases of +121 for Ocean Surveillance Information Center, +108 for Pacific Command GDIP Activities, and +141 for Service Support to NSA. The increase in FY 1989 is primarily due to +103 spaces to Ocean Surveillance Information Center.

Reduced SELRES strength between FY 1987 and FY 1988 reflects overmanning in FY 1987.

The increase in Civilian Manpower generally is for Cryptologic Activities, Intelligence Support Center, HUMINT, Pacific and Atlantic Command GDIP activities and for auto data processing (GDIP).

2. Centrally Managed Communications

This subcategory includes strength associated with the Defense Communication System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications system, communications security, and other related communications units.

There is an increase of +177 in Navy Communications, and decreases of -122 in Satellite Communications and -115 to COMSEC in FY 1988. There are no major increases or decreases in active spaces in FY 1989.

There is no change in Civilian Manpower levels between FY 1987 and FY 1989.

D. Combat Installations

This category includes strength associated with Base Operating Support for Combat Installations. Manpower in this category provides operation and maintenance of strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands including base communications and air traffic control.

The increases in active duty spaces for Combat Installations in FY 1988 are due primarily to increases to Naval Air Bases (+955) and Fleet Support-Subsurface (+101), partially offset by a decrease of -511 to Base Ops-Fleet Support Surface.

The increases in FY 1989 active duty spaces for Combat Installations are mainly directed at manning Base Ops-Offensive (+886) and Base Ops-Fleet Support Surface (+143), partially offset by a decrease of -248 to Base Ops-Naval Air Bases.

The decrease of Selected Reserve Manpower in Combat Installations between FY 1987 and FY 1988 reflects overmanning FY 1987 and reduction of authorizations in FY 1988 to accommodate higher priority programs.

Civilian increases in FY 1988 provide for Trident base support, for support to the Strategic Homeporting initiative, continued physical security upgrades and increased base operation and RPMA support at shore activities. Decreases in FY 1989 include estimates for economies and efficiencies to be realized through the Efficiency Review Program, the Commercial Activities Program, and other Navy initiatives to improve efficiency and productivity.

E. Force Support Training

Force Support Training manpower supports units providing training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

The increases in active spaces in FY 1988 are due primarily to increases in Readiness Squadrons (+136), Readiness Squadrons ASW (+108), Fleet Support Training (+155), and Training-USMC (+155). The decrease in active spaces for FY 1989 is due primarily to a decrease of -456 in Readiness Squadrons.

The decrease in Selected Reserve manpower between FY 1987 and FY 1988 reflects overmanning of Fleet Support Training in FY 1987.

The increase in civilian manpower between FY 1987 and FY 1988 is due to increased support for readiness squadrons and fleet support training.

F. Medical Support

Navy manpower in this category provides medical care in DoD military medical facilities and to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities.

The FY 1988 increases are due primarily to an increase of +620 to Care in Regional Defense Facilities, partially offset by a -294 decrease to Dental Care Activities. There were no major increases or decreases to active duty spaces in FY 1989.

The increases in Selected Reserve manpower support the rapidly expanding mobilization medical requirements, particularly for deployable medical systems, such as fleet hospitals.

Civilian increases in FY 1988 are related to care in regional defense facilities partially offset by replacement by non-medical military in order to enhance hospital ship and fleet hospital mobilization capabilities. FY 1989 decreases are a reflection of continued milsub and for economies and efficiencies related to the Efficiency Review Program.

G. Joint Activities

This category includes International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, and Navy manpower assigned to other federal departments and agencies, normally made on a reimbursable basis.

1. International Military Organizations

There are no major increases or decreases to active duty spaces in FY 1988 or FY 1989.

The increase in Civilian Manpower is due primarily to increased activity in foreign counterintelligence and security investment activity.

2. Unified Commands

The increase in active spaces in FY 1988 is due primarily to a +103 increase to Management Headquarters (SOFCOM).

There are no major increases or decreases to active duty spaces in FY 1989.

3. Federal Agency Support

There are no major increases or decreases to active spaces in FY 1988 or FY 1989.

H. Central Logistics

Manpower in this subcategory is associated with Supply, Maintenance, and Logistics Support operations. This manpower provides critical support to the fleet and directly affects readiness.

The increases in active spaces in FY 1988 are due primarily to increases in Procurement Operations (+507) and Navy Avionics Facilities (-105). The decrease in active spaces for FY 1989 is due primarily to a decrease of -359 in Navy Avionics Facilities.

The decrease in Selected Reserve manpower between FY 1987 and FY 1988 is caused by a combination of overmanning in FY 1987 and a reduction in FY 1988 and FY 1989 to accommodate higher priority programs.

Civilian changes for FY 1987, and FY 1988, and FY 1989 are discussed separately by type of operation as summarized below:

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Supply Operations	26.8	25.7	25.0
Maintenance Operations	124.2	118.9	113.9
Logistic Support Operations	19.9	19.9	19.3

1. Supply Operations

Included are supply depots, inventory control points and procurement operations activities that provide fleet support and contract expertise for ship and aircraft systems acquisition.

The decreases in FY 1988/FY 1989 are partially attributable to economies and efficiencies to be gained from the Efficiency Review Program, commercial activities, and MEO's. The major reduction, however, is due to the balancing of civilian manpower with funding constraints levied in accordance with the Deficit Reduction Summit Agreement.

2. Maintenance Operations

Included are Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPS), shipyards, ordnance activities, and Maintenance Support Activities. The NADEPs perform depot level maintenance of aircraft frames, engines and components. Shipyards provide logistic support for ships and service craft in connection with construction level maintenance of aircraft frames, engines and components. Shipyards provide logistic support for ships and service craft in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking and outfitting. Ordnance activities receive, renovate, maintain, store and issue ammunition, explosives, weapons and ordnance material. These activities provide technical engineering and logistics support for combat systems, manage underwater acoustic ranges and provide support for weapons systems acquisition. Maintenance support activities include naval aviation engineering service units, shipyard planning, estimating of engineering repairs and alteration activities, and Fleet combat directional systems support activities. These activities provide logistics planning, design and engineering services for the operating forces and provide technical assistance to the shore establishment.

The civilian decreases between FY 1987 and FY 1989 are predominantly in the naval shipyards, naval aviation depots, and ordnance activities. A portion of these reductions result from efficiencies and productivity that will result from properly defined work packages, improved manpower requirement determination based on workload, improved management techniques to identify and eliminate causes of rework, and better discipline regarding overtime work.

Although efficiencies and productivities are a factor in declining civilian end strength, the major contributors are an overall workload reduction at the Naval Shipyard coupled with funding constraints levied in accordance with the Deficit Reduction Summit Agreement. Reduction of funded workload reduced manpower requirements at the NADEPS and Ordnance Stations.

3. Logistics Support Operations

Logistics support comprises a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy Publications and Printing Service and technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, Facilities, and Electronics Systems Commands.

The reduction in civilians through FY 1989 results primarily from funding constraints levied in accordance with the Deficit Reduction Summit Agreement. Additional reductions are associated with savings projected to result from efficiency review studies, decreased program management effort in commercial activities, and realignment of priorities as performed at the Engineering Field Division which fund logistics, maintenance of real property, and military construction efforts.

I. Service Management Headquarters

This category includes management headquarters manpower required to support Combat and Support Commands.

The decrease to active spaces in FY 1988 is due primarily to decreases in Management Headquarters (Fleet) (-155) and Management Headquarters (Departmental) (-130).

There were no major increases or decreases to active duty spaces in FY 1989.

The decrease in Selected Reserve combat command strength between FY 1987 and FY 1988 reflects overmanning in FY 1987.

The decrease in FY 1988 civilian manpower generally reflects the management headquarters reduction mandated by Congress.

J. Research and Development

Within this category fall Research and Development and Geophysical Activities.

1. Research and Development

The Navy's Research and Development (R&D) community comprises headquarters, laboratories, Research and Development, Test and Evaluation project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. A large portion of the manpower is attached to R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations.

The increase in active spaces in FY 1988 was due primarily to increases in Research and Development Labs -Industrially Funded (+416) and Facilities/Installations Support (+209). There were no major increases or decreases in active spaces in FY 1989.

The increase in Selected Reserve manpower between FY 1987 and FY 1988 reflects undermanning in FY 1987.

The decrease in civilian manpower is for contract conversions, reduced range operations support, and for reduced engineering support for various systems and technical programs which are offset partially by increases in infectious disease and other medical research.

2. Geophysical Activities

The Navy's geophysical programs include the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities throughout the world. These employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, directed by a small headquarters staff.

There were no major changes in active spaces in FY 1988 or FY 1989.

The increase in SELRES manpower in FY 1988 reflects an increase in augmentation requirements.

K. Training and Personnel

This category includes manpower associated with Personnel Support and Individual Training.

1. Personnel Support

This subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy recruiting and examining, education of overseas dependents, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career-training and intern programs. The Personnel Support category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

In FY 1988 there is an increase in active spaces of +106 in Recruiting Activities. The increase in active spaces in FY 1989 was due primarily to an increase of +369 to Other Personnel Activities.

The increases in civilian manpower are generally for recruiting activities and for the transfer of aircraft station operations at the training command which is partially offset by the extensive use of intermittents and temporaries at Antilles School System.

The decrease in Selected Reserve manpower between FY 1987 and FY 1988 reflects overmanning in FY 1987.

2. Individual Training

This category includes manpower for formal military and technical training, as well as for professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category include recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category is dedicated to training of active Navy students and trainees and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in permanent change of station status are carried in the Individuals subcategory; those in temporary additional duty status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

The decrease to active spaces in FY 1988 is due primarily to a decrease to Undergraduate Pilot Training-Strike (-353), partially offset by increases of +114 to General Skill Training and +100 to Recruit Training Units. The decrease in FY 1989 is primarily due to decreases of -150 in General Skill Training and -727 in Undergraduate Pilot Training-Strike.

Reduced Selected Reserve strength between FY 1987 and FY 1988 reflects the continuing scarcity of training funds.

The major increase in FY 1988 civilian manpower is for various functions at academic institutions, as well as for a civilian substitution initiative of clerical personnel at the training command. The reductions in FY 1989 are generally associated with the economies and efficiencies associated with the Efficiency Review Program.

L. Support Activities

This category includes strength associated with Base Operating Support (BOS) for Support Installations and for Centralized Support Activities.

1. Support Installations

Support forces (BOS) includes auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

In Support Installations, the increased active duty manning in FY 1988 can be attributed to increases of +136 to Base Ops-Fleet Logistics Support, +253 to Base Ops-Logistics (IF)-Navy, +439 to Base Ops-Training-Navy, +284 to Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics, and +466 to Base Ops-Health Care, partially offset by decreases in Base Ops-Other Base Support (-474), Base Ops-Other Naval Reserve (-227), and Commissary Retail Sales (-150).

In FY 1989, the decreases are due primarily to decreases of -117 to Base Ops- Other Base Support, -228 to Commissary Retail Sales, and -582 to Base Ops-Training-Navy, partially offset by an increase of +185 to Base Ops-Other General Personnel Activities.

The increase in Selected Reserve Manpower in Support Installations between FY 1987 and FY 1988 reflects undermanning in FY 1987.

Civilian manpower decreases in FY 1988 and FY 1989 are due primarily to economies and efficiencies expected to be achieved as a result of public works management initiatives being implemented at all Public Works Centers, for replacement by non-medical military in order to enhance hospital ship and fleet hospital mobilization capabilities and for the realignment of the aircraft station operations at the training command. Further economies in FY 1989 will be realized through the Commercial Activities Program, the Efficiency Review Program and other Navy initiatives to improve efficiency and productivity.

2. Centralized Support Activities

This subcategory includes non-management headquarters strength for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense Agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

The decrease in FY 1988 active spaces is due primarily to a -164 decrease in Personnel Management, partially offset by a +125 increase in Foreign Military Sales Support (reimbursable). There were no major increases or decreases to active spaces in FY 1989.

The decrease in Selected Reserve strength between FY 1987 and FY 1988 was caused by overmanning in FY 1987.

The increase in FY 1988 in civilian manpower is due primarily to functional transfers and to other Service-wide support.

M. Operating Strength Deviation

The Navy's internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force structure manning. Average strength for the force differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning, usually related to permanent change of station moves and accessions. These seasonal fluctuations may result in undermanning (fewer people than spaces) or overmanning (more people than spaces) in both the active and reserve force. Through proper management of the distributable force, Navy endeavors to maintain a steady active force deviation.

N. Individuals

The Individuals account represents spaces to accommodate Navy's manpower not in the Force Structure due to a specific type of status described in the following subcategories.

The decrease of the Selected Reserve Individuals account between FY 1988 and FY 1989 reflects an adjustment to the Sea & Air Mariner (SAM) program to accommodate a slower growth rate and reduced requirement.

1. Transients

Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during permanent change of station moves and include travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute (except those on temporary duty for training).

For FY 1988 Transients were increased by +758. For FY 1989 Transients decreased by -349.

FY 1988 and 1989 Reserve fluctuations result from fluctuations in force levels and do not result from any growth in the factors used to estimate the account.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

There is an increase of +200 to the Personnel Holding Account in FY 1988. There are no major increases or decreases in active spaces in FY 1989.

3. Trainees, Students, Midshipmen, and NAVCADS

Spaces for manpower completing initial entry training (trainees), manpower attending noninitial entry courses of instruction in a permanent change of station status or in a temporary duty status while executing a permanent change of station move (students), students (Midshipmen) attending the United States Naval Academy, and Naval Aviation Cadets (NAVCADS).

The decrease in active spaces for FY 1988 is due primarily to decrease in Recruit Training Units (-181), Officer Candidate/Training Schools (-172), General Skill Training (-8180), Undergraduate Navigator/NFO Training (UNT) (-347), Undergraduate Pilot Training-Strike (-256), Undergraduate Pilot Training-Maritime (-178), Undergraduate Pilot Training-Rotary (-106), and Fleet Support Training (-132), partially offset by increases of +121 to Crypto/Sigint Related Skill Training and +514 to Education and Training-Health Care-DoD Instruction.

The decrease in FY 1989 is mainly a result of decreases to other College Commissioning Programs (-170) and General Skill Training (-863), partially offset by a +184 increase to Recruit Training Units.

The number of midshipmen seldom fluctuates by as much as 100.

The fluctuations in Selected Reserve manpower result primarily from a restructuring of the Sea and Air Mariner program, to reduce the throughput of the program from approximately 10,000 new recruits annually to less than 6,000. The number of skill training billets ("A" school seats) have been increased for both officer and enlisted Sea and Air Mariners who have completed initial training.

CHAPTER V

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General

This chapter describes the Marine Corps Active military, Reserve military, and civilian manpower program; presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1989; depicts manpower trends; discusses initiatives; and explains the changes from year to year. It also describes changes to provide the Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment, and greater integration with the Active Forces, in keeping with the Total Force concept.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987 requires the submission of a two year budget beginning in FY 1988. Specifically, the Act stated: "In order to more coherently establish National Defense priorities, last year the Congress directed in law that the President submit a two year budget for the Department of Defense beginning in FY 1988." Consequently, this chapter addresses the second year of the biennial budget, i.e., FY 1989.

The Marine Corps has a unique mission as established by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, which provides that the Marine Corps will consist of and shall provide:

- "Three combat divisions, air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services.. organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet."
- "Detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy."
- "Security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases."
- "Marines to perform such other duties as the President may direct."
- "Guards for U.S. embassies...as a result of a Memorandum of Agreement based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended."

The National Security Act of 1947 also requires that the Marine Corps provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. The requirement to deploy forces rapidly has resulted in a Fleet Marine Force (FMF) that provides a balance between strategic mobility and tactical capability that is well suited to meet assigned United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) missions.

To support its missions and functions, the Marine Corps maintains an FMF posture as follows: a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) on each Coast composed of a Command Element, a Marine Division, a Marine Aircraft Wing, and a Force Service Support Group (FSSG). In addition, one MEF is forward deployed in the Pacific area.

The roles of the Marine Corps Reserve Forces on mobilization are to selectively augment the Active Forces in order to field three active Marine Expeditionary Forces at full wartime structure, selectively reinforce the active MEF's with Selected Marine Corps Reserve units, and provide the capability to field a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (with reduced aviation and limited combat service support capability) to reinforce an active MEF. If augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered, to provide the capability to field a Division, Wing, and Force Service Support Group with reduced capability. The Marine Corps Reserve Forces are also to provide a nucleus to reconstitute a Division, Wing, and Force Service Support Group. As a general rule, individual Reserve units are mirror images of their active counterparts in order to facilitate their integration into the Total Force. The structure and equipment found in the Marine Corps Reserve are similar to that found in the Active Component, thus enhancing the Marine Corps Reserve's augmentation and reinforcement capabilities.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) data prepared in accordance with the Defense Guidance Illustrated Planning Scenario is one of the tools available for the Marine Corps to determine military and civilian manpower requirements. These requirements are shown on the next page.

Wartime Peak Demand for Trained Manpower (M+180) (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>			<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Peak Demand	390	390	342.3	*20.0

*Excludes Foreign National Indirect Hire

C. Marine Corps Military Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan

Although the National Security Act of 1947 mandates that the Marine Corps maintain a minimum of three wings and divisions with supporting units, it does not specify the size, composition, or percent of manning of these units. These factors, as well as the nature, size, and composition of the supporting establishment, are left to the discretion of the President and Secretary of Defense.

The Marine Corps selectively mans its authorized force structure to maximize combat capability with minimum strength, placing top priority on manning combat forces. Support forces are kept to a minimum. Except during wartime, the active forces are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements and are scheduled to be augmented by reassigning active component or pretrained manpower (Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Retirees) in time of emergency. Fiscal realities preclude manning of certain units, such as salvage platoons, in peacetime.

If the Marine Corps were to fully man all active authorized Marine Corps units and organizations 219,909 Marines would be needed in FY 1988 and 217,733 in FY 1989.

The Marine Corps request for Active and Reserve military and civilian manpower for FY 1988 and FY 1989 is as follows:

Marine Corps Manpower Program
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Active Military	197.2	197.2
Marine Corps Reserve	43.6	43.6
Civilian Personnel	22.3	22.1

The difference between the peacetime manpower program and wartime demand for manpower is the requirement to man vacant FMF billets, support non-FMF billet increases, and provide for casualty replacements. To meet the demand for wartime manpower, the Marine Corps will use all available assets: Active Component personnel, Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, Retirees, and non prior service accessions.

The Marine Corps' officer to enlisted ratio is the lowest among the Services. The request for slight growth in officer end strength in FY 1989 will allow us to approach our restricted officer requirements.

D. Major Force Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' long term program includes a carefully planned restructuring to modernize and standardize the force. This program provides for improved Active and Reserve Force capabilities, retaining in the Active Component only those forces and functions essential for the timely response to contingencies and maintenance of the nation's force in readiness. All other forces and functions are placed in the Reserves.

The structure changes planned from FY 1988 to FY 1992 are designed to enhance tactical mobility, firepower, and sustainability to meet potential threats and requirements. These changes will significantly improve the readiness and capabilities of the command, ground combat, combat service support, and aviation combat elements of the Marine Corps.

1. Active Structure Changes

In FY 1989, the Marine Corps Tables of Organization are being restructured in support of force modernization. All facets of the Marine Corps have been analyzed to ensure proper force mix levels.

During FY 1989, the ground combat forces are programmed to receive three remotely piloted vehicle platoons, one general support artillery battalion, two additional artillery firing batteries, and one artillery headquarters battery. Also, three Marine Air Ground Task Force Headquarters receive additional structure previously programmed.

The aviation combat forces are transitioning to improved models of aircraft including the F/A-18 and the AV-8B fixed wing aircraft. Also, an additional Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM) Battery is being added. The fielding of these weapons systems drives the increased requirement for tactical and helicopter combat support.

The combat service support forces are in a dynamic transition. The programmed Force Service Support Group reorganization will ensure that the combat service support forces are efficiently organized to provide the required support. New or improved items of equipment currently being introduced or programmed are the Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) and the Medium Lift Motor Transport Item/Container Handling Equipment (MHE). The new weapons and equipment being fielded impact directly on the supporting establishment, which is expanding to meet the sophisticated training requirement of the modern Marine Corps.

2. Reserve Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' continuous review of requirements within the Total Force has identified needs to increase the Reserve structure. In FY 1988, we will continue activation of a light armored vehicle battalion and one TOW platoon. We continue to enhance the Reserve artillery organization as the direct support artillery battalions continue to reorganize for and receive the M198, 155mm towed howitzer, thus acquiring a substantial increase in firepower. Also, three infantry platoons and a TOW missile section will be activated. Aviation planners are being challenged by the complexities presented by future fixed wing aircraft transitions in the Reserves, as one attack helicopter squadron and one KC-130 aerial refueler squadron are activated.

3. Manpower Plan

The Marine Corps Manpower Plan is given in the following tables:

Marine Corps Active Manpower Plan (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
*STRATEGIC	*	*	*	*
TACTICAL MOBILITY	106.2	123.7	122.6	124.0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	9.9	9.9	9.8	9.8
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.2	3.5	2.9	2.8
JOINT ACTIVITIES	1.5	1.9	2.0	2.0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS	2.1	1.7	1.6	1.6
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	13.1	14.6	14.1	14.0
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	13.9	13.3	12.6	12.5
UNDISTRIBUTED	NA	NA	-1.2	0.8
INDIVIDUALS	37.0	28.9	30.9	27.7
Transients	23.7	5.3	6.4	6.0
Holdees	5.9	1.2	1.1	1.1
Students	61.4	22.4	23.5	20.7
TOTAL	527.2	199.5	197.2	197.2

* LESS THAN 50

Marine Corps Reserve Manpower Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Tactical/Mobility*	31.2	36.3	37.4	37.4
Support Activities	0.1	.7	0.9	0.9
Individuals	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.0
IMA	.2	1.3	1.3	1.3
TOTALS	35.7	42.3	43.6	43.6

* Includes Reserve Full Time Support assigned to tactical mobility forces.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Support Activities	19.5	21.6	22.3	22.1
TOTALS	19.5	21.6	22.3	22.1

E. Key Manpower Issue

Although Congress authorized the Marine Corps a FY 1988 end strength of 199,600, the Marine Corps end strength goal for FY 1988 is 197,224, and the end strength request for FY 1989 is 197,200. Reductions and absorptions to the budget in the FY 1988 Appropriation Act and the decrements necessary to meet the DOD reductions for FY 1989 (as a result of the budget summit between the Executive Branch and the Congress) placed the Marine Corps in the position of unacceptably damaging programs essential to maintaining force quality or reducing end strength. The Marine Corps opted to reduce end strength in order to maintain the programs essential to force quality.

Also, since the submission of last year's President's Budget, the Marine Corps' FY 1989 officer end strength has been reduced by 180 as a result of Congressional mandate to the Department of Defense. To avoid any detrimental effect to the Fleet Marine Force, the Marine Corps opted to reduce officer strengths in the supporting establishment. However, any further officer reductions would necessitate that the reductions come from the Fleet Marine Force, further reducing the Fleet Marine Force manning level.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Military Manpower

1. General

Congress authorized the Marine Corps a FY 1988 end strength of 199,600. However, due to fiscal constraints, an end strength of 197,200 is requested for FY 1989.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

a. Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning

Following the previously planned long term force modernization plan, the Marine Corps increases Total Active Force structure from 186,908 in FY 1988 to 186,962 in FY 1989, an increase of 54 structure spaces. Programmed manning decreases in relation to force structure growth in FY 1989 and the Total Active Force Structure is manned at 90.2%.

Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 provide an overview of the changing relationship between programmed manpower structure, programmed manning, and end strength, by officer, enlisted, and total manpower.

TABLE V-1
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH		INV	AUTH		INV	PROG		BOQT	PROG		%
												MGC
* STRATEGIC	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100%
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100%
TACTICAL MOBILITY	108.4	106.2		123.9	123.7		139.8	122.6		139.9	124.0	89%
Land Forces	81.7	80.3		93.8	93.9		106.3	93.4		106.8	94.6	89%
Tactical Air Forces	26.1	25.4		29.2	29.1		32.6	28.4		32.3	28.6	89%
Naval Forces				0.9	0.8		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9	100%
Warships and ASW	0.3	0.3		0.6	0.5		0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6	99%
Amphibious Forces	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100%
Naval Support Forces	0.1	0.1		0.1	*		*	*		*	*	100%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.8	0.7		0.9	0.8		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9	100%
Intelligence	0.7	0.7		0.8	0.7		0.9	0.8		0.8	0.8	100%
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	9.0	9.9		9.6	9.9		10.5	9.8		10.5	9.8	93%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	2.8	3.2		3.5	3.5		2.9	2.9		2.8	2.8	99%
JOINT ACTIVITIES	1.6	1.5		2.0	1.9		2.0	2.0		2.0	2.0	100%
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100%
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3	100%
Federal Agency Support	1.3	1.2		1.5	1.4		1.5	1.5		1.5	1.5	100%
Joint Chiefs of Staff	*	*		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100%
OSD/Defense												
Agencies/Activities	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100%
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.8	0.8		1.0	1.0		1.0	0.9		1.0	0.9	98%
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	2.1	2.1		1.8	1.7		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6	96%
Combat Commands	1.1	1.1		0.8	0.8		0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7	97%
Support Commands	1.0	1.0		1.0	1.0		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9	96%

TABLE V-1 (CONTINUED)
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG BQRT	PROG AUTH	%	%	PROG BQRT	PROG AUTH	%	%
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT												
Research and Development	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100%	100%	0.2	0.2	100%	100%
	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100%	100%	0.2	0.2	100%	100%
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Personnel Support	13.1	13.1	14.4	14.6	14.4	14.1	98%	98%	14.4	14.0	97%	97%
Individual Training	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.3	5.2	97%	97%	5.3	5.1	96%	96%
	7.7	7.7	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.0	98%	98%	9.1	8.9	97%	97%
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	13.5	13.9	13.5	13.3	13.6	12.6	93%	93%	13.6	12.5	92%	92%
Centralized Support Act'y	11.2	11.5	11.0	10.9	11.1	10.2	92%	92%	11.1	10.1	91%	91%
	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.4	95%	95%	2.6	2.4	95%	95%
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	152.2	151.1	170.6	170.6	186.9	167.5	90%	90%	187.0	168.7	90%	90%
UNDISTRIBUTED	NA	0	-1.9	0	NA	-1.2	NA	NA	NA	0.8	NA	NA
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTALS												
			1.3	1.3	NA	1.3	NA	NA	NA	1.3	NA	NA
INDIVIDUALS												
Transients	33.0	37.0	30.9	28.9	NA	30.9	NA	NA	NA	27.7	NA	NA
Holderes	7.7	8.1	6.8	5.3	NA	6.4	NA	NA	NA	6.0	NA	NA
Students	1.4	1.7	1.0	1.2	NA	1.1	NA	NA	NA	1.1	NA	NA
	23.8	27.2	23.2	22.4	NA	23.5	NA	NA	NA	20.7	NA	NA
END-STRENGTH	185.2	186.5	199.6	199.5	NA	197.2	NA	NA	NA	197.2	NA	NA

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive. The Marine Corps INA program did not begin until FY 1981.

TABLE V-2
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS OFFICER PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND LEO STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV	%	AUTH	INV	%	PROG BOBT	AUTH	%	PROG BOBT	AUTH	%
* STRATEGIC	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100%	*	*	100%
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100%	*	*	100%
TACTICAL MOBILITY	7.8	6.1	9.8	10.3	9.8	10.9	10.9	10.4	95%	10.9	10.0	92%
Land Forces	5.1	5.7	7.1	7.2	7.1	7.7	7.7	7.3	95%	7.7	7.2	93%
Tactical Air Forces	2.6	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.6	3.1	3.1	2.9	93%	3.1	2.7	97%
Naval Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	96%	0.1	0.1	96%
Warships and ASW	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	97%	*	0.1	97%
Amphibious Force	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Naval Support Forces	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100%	*	*	100%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	99%
Intelligence	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Centrally Managed Com	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	95%	*	*	97%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.0	86%	1.1	1.0	86%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.1	100%	*	0.1	100%
Defense Agencies	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100%	*	*	100%
Joint Chiefs of Staff	*	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	100%	*	*	100%
Office of the Secretary of Defense	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	*	*	100%
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	96%	0.2	0.2	96%
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	96%	0.9	0.9	96%
Combat Commands	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%
Support Commands	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	95%	0.7	0.6	95%

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TABLE V-2 (CONTINUED)
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS OFFICER PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG BOBT	PROG AUTH	% MNC	PROG BOBT	PROG AUTH	% MNC
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT										
Research and Development	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL										
Personnel Support	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	97%	2.1	2.1	97%
Individual Training	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	98%	0.7	0.7	98%
	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	97%	1.4	1.4	97%
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES										
Support Installations	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	96%	1.5	1.4	96%
Centralized Support Act'y	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	97%	0.7	0.7	97%
	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	96%	0.8	0.7	96%
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	14.2	14.5	17.2	16.6	17.8	17.0	95%	17.9	16.7	93%
UNDISTRIBUTED	NA	0	-0.6	0	NA	-0.7	NA	NA	-0.3	NA
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES										
			0.8	0.8	NA	0.8	NA	NA	0.8	NA
INDIVIDUALS										
Transients	3.7	3.7	3.4	3.4	NA	3.8	NA	NA	3.7	NA
Holdees	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	NA	0.6	NA	NA	0.6	NA
Students	*	*	0.1	0.1	NA	0.1	NA	NA	0.1	NA
	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.9	NA	3.2	NA	NA	3.1	NA
END-STRENGTH	17.9	18.2	20.0	20.0	NA	20.1	NA	NA	20.1	NA

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive. The Marine Corps IMA program did not begin until FY 1981.

TABLE V-3
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS ENLISTED PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		PROG BOMT	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG BOMT	PROG AUTH	% DEV
* STRATEGIC	*	*		*	*		*	*	100%	*	*	100%
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*		*	*		*	*	100%	*	*	100%
TACTICAL MOBILITY	100.6	98.1		113.6	113.9		128.9	112.2	87%	129.0	114.0	86%
Land Forces	76.6	74.6		86.6	86.8		98.6	85.9	87%	99.0	87.4	86%
Tactical Air Forces	23.5	23.1		26.3	26.5		29.5	25.5	86%	29.2	25.8	86%
Naval Forces	0.5	0.4		0.7	0.6		0.8	0.8	100%	0.8	0.8	100%
Warships and ASW	0.3	0.3		0.5	0.5		0.6	0.6	100%	0.6	0.6	100%
Amphibious Forces	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.2		0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Naval Support Forces	*	*		*	*		*	*	100%	*	*	100%
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.7	0.6		0.7	0.6		0.7	0.7	100%	0.7	0.7	100%
Intelligence	0.6	0.6		0.7	0.6		0.7	0.7	100%	0.7	0.7	100%
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*		*	*		*	*	100%	*	*	100%
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	8.1	8.9		8.6	9.0		9.4	8.8	93%	9.4	8.8	93%
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	2.5	2.7		3.0	3.1		2.5	2.5	98%	2.5	2.4	99%
JOINT ACTIVITIES	1.3	1.2		1.6	1.4		1.6	1.6	100%	1.6	1.6	100%
Int'l Military Org	*	*		*	*		*	*	100%	*	*	100%
Unified Commands	*	*		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.2		1.4	1.3		1.4	1.4	100%	1.4	1.4	100%
Defense Agencies	*	*		*	*		*	*	100%	*	*	100%
Joint Chiefs of Staff	*	*		*	*		*	*	100%	*	*	100%
Office of the Secretary of Defense	*	*		*	*		*	*	100%	*	*	100%
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.6	0.7		0.7	0.7		0.8	0.7	95%	0.8	0.7	95%
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	1.1	1.1		0.8	0.8		0.7	0.7	96%	0.7	0.7	96%
Combat Commands	0.8	0.8		0.5	0.5		0.4	0.4	95%	0.4	0.4	95%
Support Commands	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3	98%	0.3	0.3	98%

TABLE 7-3 (CONTINUED)
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS ENLISTED PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988		FY 1989	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT								% INV
Research and Development	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	10.9	10.9	12.2	12.5	12.3	12.0	12.3	11.9
Personnel Support	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.4
Individual Training	6.2	6.2	7.6	7.7	7.7	7.6	7.7	7.5
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	12.2	12.6	12.0	11.9	12.2	11.2	12.2	11.1
Support Installations	10.5	10.8	10.3	10.2	10.4	9.5	10.4	9.4
Centralized Support Act'y	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.7
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	138.0	136.9	152.1	154.0	169.1	150.5	169.1	152.0
UNDISTRIBUTED	NA	0	-1.3	0	NA	-0.5	NA	1.1
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES			6.5	6.5	NA	0.5	NA	0.5
INDIVIDUALS	29.3	33.3	27.5	25.5	NA	27.1	NA	24.0
Transients	7.0	7.4	6.3	4.7	NA	5.8	NA	5.4
Holdees	1.4	1.7	0.9	1.2	NA	1.0	NA	1.0
Students	20.9	24.2	20.3	19.5	NA	20.3	NA	17.6
END-STRENGTH	167.3	170.3	179.6	179.5	NA	177.1	NA	177.1

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive. The Marine Corps IMA program did not begin until FY 1981.

b. Operating Strength

For FY 1988 and FY 1989 the Marine Corps has programmed operating strength supply equal to programmed manning demand, forming a balanced manpower plan in the sense that if all elements of the program are executed (recruiting, training, staffing, etc.), the average operating strength population will be sufficient to staff the billets programmed for manning. Actual execution of the plan in FY 1988 and FY 1989 may deviate somewhat from the program, but these deviations have historically been minimal.

3. Skill and Grade

Table V-4 summarizes the existing and projected inventories as they compare to programmed manning and individuals. In the aggregate, the enlisted population is believed to be sufficient to meet the programmed manning demand through FY 1988/89. However, there will continue to be both overages and shortages in specific military occupational specialties (MOSs). The total number of enlisted skills which remain unbalanced is projected to decrease by 19% by FY 1989. This decrease will be reflected primarily in the E5-E9 population, as the new Marine Corps policy of selecting career force Marines for promotion by MOS requirements better shapes the career force inventory. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) continues to be the most important tool for reducing career force skill imbalances in the Fleet. The overall trend is favorable.

4. Experience

Table V-5 displays the average years of service (YOS) by grade for officer and enlisted. The enlisted force is becoming more experienced. The career force is expected to approach 76,000 by the end of FY 1989. This reflects a more mature and experienced career force, providing a stable leadership cadre in the Corps. However, this careerist growth has not been matched by grade growth, and the resulting promotion stagnation is now affecting retention, especially at the first term reenlistment point. Programs are being examined which may relieve this problem.

TABLE V-4
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in thousands)

	FY 1987			FY 1988		
	OVER**	RAI**	SHORT**	OVER**	RAI**	SHORT**
E1-E4						
Number of Skills	104	93	134	331	94	111
PMI	34.2	45.6	43.5	123.3	NA	NA
Inventory	43.8	44.7	33.3	121.8	NA	NA
Over/Short	+9.6	-0.9	-10.2	-1.5	+8.6	-9.2
E5-E9						
Number of Skills	121	106	143	370	111	133
PMI	13.9	20.7	20.6	55.2	NA	NA
Inventory	18.2	20.6	15.2	54.0	NA	NA
Over/Short	+4.3	-0.1	-5.4	-1.2	+3.3	-4.4
Total E1-E9						
Number of Skills	105	153	150	408	95	140
PMI	30.4	96.5	51.6	178.5	NA	NA
Inventory	40.7	95.9	39.4	176.0	NA	NA
Over/Short	+10.3	-0.6	-12.2	-2.5	+9.3	-11.2
W1-W4						
Number of Skills	17	20	17	54	21	6
PMI	0.2	0.6	0.7	1.5	0.3	0.4
Inventory	0.3	0.6	0.5	1.5	0.3	0.3
Over/Short	+0.1	*	-0.2	*	+0.1	*
01-03						
Number of Skills	19	37	18	74	18	74
PMI	3.6	7.1	2.1	12.8	3.4	2.4
Inventory	4.4	7.1	1.5	12.9	4.2	1.6
Over/Short	+0.8	*	-0.7	+0.1	+0.8	-0.8
04-06						
Number of Skills	18	25	33	76	15	30
PMI	1.3	1.3	2.8	5.4	1.1	2.7
Inventory	2.5	1.3	1.5	5.3	2.1	1.4
Over/Short	+1.2	*	-1.3	-0.1	+1.0	-1.3
Total 01-06						
Number of Skills	17	26	27	76	16	25
PMI	5.3	8.5	5.7	18.5	4.3	6.3
Inventory	7.2	8.5	3.9	18.5	6.1	3.5
Over/Short	+1.9	*	-1.7	*	+1.8	-2.8

*Less than 50.

**See definitions in Appendix B.

	FY 1989			
	<u>OVER**</u>	<u>BAL**</u>	<u>SHORT**</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>				
Number of Skills	84	133	114	331
PMI	NA	NA	NA	
Inventory	NA	NA	NA	105.1
Over/Short	+7.6	-0.9	-8.2	-1.5
<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	101	146	123	370
PMI	NA	NA	NA	
Inventory	NA	NA	NA	54.1
Over/Short	+2.3	-0.1	-3.4	-1.2
<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	85	193	130	408
PMI	NA	NA	NA	
Inventory	NA	NA	NA	157.8
Over/Short	+8.3	-0.6	-10.2	-2.5
<u>W1-W4</u>				
Number of Skills	21	27	6	54
PMI	0.3	0.8	0.2	1.4
Inventory	0.4	0.8	0.2	1.4
Over/Short	*	*	*	*
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	15	43	16	74
PMI	1.7	7.7	3.7	13.1
Inventory	3.1	7.7	2.3	13.1
Over/Short	+1.4	*	-1.4	*
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	17	31	26	74
PMI	1.4	1.5	2.6	5.5
Inventory	2.7	1.5	1.3	55
Over/Short	+1.3	*	-1.3	- .1
<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	15	34	25	74
PMI	3.3	9.1	6.2	18.6
Inventory	4.6	9.1	4.9	18.6
Over/Short	+1.3	*	-2.2	*

TABLE V-5
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	TOTAL	PEOPLE WITH > 4 YOS	AVE. YOS	TOTAL	PEOPLE WITH > 4 YOS	AVE. YOS	TOTAL	PEOPLE WITH > 4 YOS	AVE. YOS
E1-E4									
PMI*	124.2	N/A	N/A	120.7	N/A	N/A	120.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	124.3	16.6	2.9	120.7	18.3	2.9	120.6	20.1	3.1
E5-E9									
PMI	55.4	N/A	N/A	56.4	N/A	N/A	56.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	55.2	54.0	11.6	56.4	55.3	11.9	56.5	55.9	12.2
E1-E9									
PMI	179.6	N/A	N/A	177.1	N/A	N/A	177.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	179.5	70.6	5.6	177.1	73.6	5.8	177.1	75.9	6.0
W1-W4									
PMI	1.5	N/A	N/A	1.5	N/A	N/A	1.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	1.5	1.5	13.0	1.4	1.5	13.0	1.4	1.4	13.0
01-03									
PMI	12.8	N/A	N/A	13.0	N/A	N/A	13.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	12.8	6.7	6.8	13.0	7.0	7.0	13.1	6.9	7.1
04-06									
PMI	5.4	N/A	N/A	5.5	N/A	N/A	5.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	5.3	5.3	18.1	5.4	5.4	18.0	5.5	5.5	18.0
01-06									
PMI	18.5	N/A	N/A	18.5	N/A	N/A	18.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	18.5	12.0	12.9	18.5	12.4	12.3	18.6	12.5	12.7

*Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. The Marine Corps achieved 100.3 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals in 1987. The Marine Corps recruited 216 two and three-year, 24,555 four-year, and 9,253 five and six-year enlistees. In FY 1988, enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of 90 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions. In FY 1987, 98.1 percent of non-prior service enlistees were high school graduates. High school graduates are the best source of quality manpower in terms of retention, and amenability to discipline. We have set a recruiting goal for FY 1988 for 90 percent of all male non-prior service recruits to be Tier I high school graduates. The goal for female non-prior service accessions is 100 percent Tier I high school graduates.

The Enlisted Bonus Program (EBP) increased from a budgeted amount of \$7.7 million with 2,400 bonuses in FY 1980 to \$9.5 million with 2,565 bonus allocations in FY 1988. The FY 1989 EBP is budgeted for \$9.5 million with approximately 2,777 allocations. These increases have helped substantially in ensuring accession of quality recruits in key skills.

The Marine Corps has adopted a "level load" accession policy, i.e., modifying the flow of recruits so that Marines are accessed more evenly throughout the year. The expected benefits are more efficient entry level training, more even separation patterns, and increased readiness.

Enlisted Accession Plans

	<u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 87</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 83</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 89</u> <u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	340	988	488	600
Non-Prior Service	34,032	33,715	34,811	30,157
Male	32,206	31,330	32,711	28,057
(HSG)	(31,560)	(29,763)	(29,440)	(25,251)
Female	1,826	1,738	2,100	2,100
(HSDG)	(1,826)	(1,738)	(2,100)	(2,100)

(2) Retention. Although the Marine Corps fell short of overall retention goals in FY 1987, we exceeded our FY 1987 expiration of active service (EAS) intermediate and careerist retention goals, which offset a slight shortfall in first term reenlistments. Marines who are authorized to reenlist 12 months prior to their EAS are delaying their decision to reenlist more frequently than in the past. As a result, early reenlistments in FY 1987 of Marines with a FY 1988 EAS were

down. Shortfalls in this category, however, do not affect end strength or readiness. By retaining well-qualified and proven Marines, the leadership and experience levels of the force were raised substantially. Additionally, better retention proved cost-effective in that the Marine Corps did not need to recruit and train replacements for those Marines who decided to stay on active duty. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) is still essential as the most significant factor in retaining skilled and experienced career force Marines. It is a key reason why the Marine Corps is experiencing a continuation of the quality recruiting and retention trends realized in both FY 1986 and FY 1987.

Enlisted Retention Plans

<u>RETENTION</u>	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	8,271	6,844	6,170	5,536
Career	10,231	9,862	11,141	9,935

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. Since 1980, the Marine Corps has kept a consistent population stability.

Aggregate Population Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Enlisted	80.2	79.3	79.2	82.0	82.8	82.7

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The improvement in retention and the population stability has translated into greater unit stability. This unit stability provides the commander with the ability to maintain a trained, cohesive unit throughout the year. Consequently, FMF readiness increases and deployment preparation improves.

Unit Personnel Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Enlisted	38.0	38.0	41.9	39.9	43.7	45.5

(5) Other. The degree of difficulty in meeting the FY 1989 enlisted accession plan will depend in part on the youth unemployment rate, competition with educational institutions, and the competitiveness of military pay with civilian pay.

b. Officer and Warrant Officer

(1) Accessions. Officer end strength is programmed to be 20,096 in FY 1988 and 20,120 in FY 1989. High officer retention continues and permits the maintenance of the officer inventory with a

smaller accession population. The officer strength affords the Marine Corps necessary leadership both for combat forces and support functions, while continuing to retain the most promising officers and maintain a normal promotion flow. Yet it still provides the base for rapid expansion in time of emergency.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objectives

<u>FY 87</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 88</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 89</u> <u>Goal</u>
1,569	1,569	1,816	1,854

(2) Retention. Overall officer retention in FY 1987 exceeded the historic averages. Current retention rates are expected to remain stable during FY 1988 and FY 1989. As yet, we have not experienced either total officer community or special community (i.e., aviation) shortfalls.

Active Marine Corps Officer Retention
(Percent)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Ground Unrestricted	91	91	91
Aviation Unrestricted	93	93	93

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. High officer retention contributes to high population stability.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officer	92.3	93.3	92.6	91.3	91.3	92.1

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The officer community shows a steady trend in unit stability.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officer	42.4	42.4	44.4	44.8	46.8	46.5

c. Women in the Marine Corps

The Marine Corps assigns women Marines to billets commensurate with their individual abilities and in keeping with their potential to contribute to the fulfillment of the Marine Corps' roles and missions. The Marine Corps' classification, assignment, and deployment policy for women Marines takes into consideration physical risk and turbulence. Combat exclusion rules prohibit women from being assigned to units with the greatest physical risk, such as infantry regiments and their sub-elements, while including women in those units with acceptable levels of physical risk (Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, fixed-wing aircraft squadrons, etc.). Women Marines may be classified within any noncombatant occupational field for which qualified.

The total goal for enlisted women Marines is about 10,800 by FY 1989. This goal continues the growth of women Marines which began over a decade ago.

Female Marine Strength
Total (Officer/Enlisted)

	<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)
Active	9,789 (649/9,140)	9,955 (655/9,300)	10,465 (665/9,800)
Reserve	1,836 (153/1,683)	1,894 (158/1,736)	1,900 (160/1,740)

Marine Enlisted Women in
Traditional/Nontraditional DoD Occupational Groups

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Infantry/Gun Crew	0	0	0	0	0
Electronic Equipment Repair	349	492	270	268	273
*Communication/Intelligence	779	1,014	844	961	961
Other Technical	223	289	264	254	246
*Support & Admin	3,788	4,386	3,912	4,197	4,093
Mechanic Equipment Repair	552	669	844	845	806
Craftsmen	159	167	201	222	229
*Service Supply	1,149	1,238	1,479	1,579	1,480

Remainder are in individuals category.

* Considered traditional fields by USMC

6. Readiness Assessment

The Marine Corps FY 1989 end strength request of 197,200 is less than the FY 1988 Congressional authorization of 199,600 due to budgetary constraints. However necessary structure improvements continue to reflect growth, based upon previous programmed structure decisions although the overall manning decreases. Readiness improvements can be seen resulting from improving trends in occupational imbalances and personnel stability through continued quality accessions and retention bonus programs. As the Marine Corps returns to level accessions in FY 1988, improvements will be made in readiness, training pipeline flow, and separation patterns.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to maintain highly trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency. The Marine Corps Reserve is divided into two categories: Ready Reserve Standby Reserve. The primary source of both units and individual manpower upon mobilization is the Ready Reserve, which consists of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve.

1. Ready Reserve

a. Selected Marine Corps Reserve

(1) General. The SMCR units taken together form a Division, Aircraft Wing, and Force Service Support Group. These units present a balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces similar to their Active Force counterparts.

(2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

(a) Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Tables V-6, V-7, and V-8 provide an overview of the changing relationship between the programmed manpower structure, and programmed manning.

(b) Trained in Unit Strength. Table V-9 reflects trained in unit strength for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.

(3) Skill and Grade. Table V-10 summarizes the existing and projected Reserve inventory as compared to programmed manning.

TABLE V-6
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE TOTAL PROGRAMMED HANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		PROG BOBT	PROG AUTH	% MNC	PROG BOBT	PROG AUTH	% MNC
TACTICAL/MOBILITY												
Land Forces	30.2	31.2		36.8	36.3		40.2	37.4	93%	40.3	37.4	93%
Tactical Air Force	21.9	24.9		27.2	26.8		30.4	27.7	91%	30.5	27.7	91%
	8.3	6.3		9.6	9.5		9.8	9.7	99%	9.8	9.7	99%
SUBTOTAL	30.2	31.2		36.8	36.3		40.2	37.4	93%	40.3	37.4	93%
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Centralized Support Activities	0.1	0.1		0.7	0.7		0.9	0.9	100%	0.9	0.9	100%
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	30.3	31.3		37.5	37.0		41.1	38.3	93%	41.2	38.3	93%
UNDISTRIBUTED	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
*IMA'S		.2		1.3	1.3		N/A	1.3	N/A	N/A	1.3	N/A
INDIVIDUALS	3.4	4.2		4.0	4.0		N/A	4.0	N/A	N/A	4.0	N/A
END-STRENGTH	33.7	35.7		42.8	42.3		N/A	43.6	N/A	N/A	43.6	N/A

*The Marine Corps IMA program did not begin until FY 1981.

TABLE V-7
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMMED HANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PROG BOHT	PROG AUTH	% MNC		PROG BOHT	PROG AUTH	% MNC	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Land Forces	2.2	2.3	2.8	2.6	3.1	2.8	90%		3.1	2.8	90%	
Tactical Air Force	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.9	1.6	84%		1.9	1.6	84%	
	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	100%		1.2	1.2	100%	
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	2.2	2.3	2.8	2.6	3.1	2.8	90%		3.1	2.8	90%	
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Centralized Support Activities	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%		0.1	0.1	100%	
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	2.3	2.4	2.9	2.7	3.2	2.9	91%		3.2	2.9	91%	
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	
*IMA'S			0.8	0.8	N/A	0.8	N/A		N/A	0.8	N/A	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	2.3	2.4	3.7	3.5	N/A	3.7	N/A		N/A	3.7	N/A	

*The Marine Corps IMA program did not begin until FY 1981.

TABLE V-8
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE ENLISTED PROGRAMMED STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(THOUSANDS)

	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988		FY 1989	
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>INV</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>INV</u>	<u>PROC</u> <u>BOBT</u>	<u>PROC</u> <u>AUTH</u>	<u>PROC</u> <u>BOBT</u>	<u>PROC</u> <u>AUTH</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>								
Land Forces	28.0	28.9	34.0	33.7	37.1	34.6	37.2	34.6
Tactical Air Force	20.7	23.5	25.5	25.3	28.5	26.1	28.6	26.1
	7.3	5.4	8.5	8.4	8.6	8.5	8.6	8.5
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	28	28.9	34.0	33.7	37.1	34.6	37.2	34.6
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Centralized Support Activities	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	28.0	28.9	34.6	34.3	37.9	35.4	38.0	35.4
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
*IMA'S			0.5	0.5	N/A	0.5	N/A	0.5
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	3.4	4.2	4.0	4.0	N/A	4.0	N/A	4.0
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	31.4	33.1	39.1	38.8	N/A	39.9	N/A	39.9

*The Marine Corps IMA program did not begin until FY 1981.

Table V-9
Trained in Unit Strength

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>
End Strength	42.3	43.6	43.6	44.4
-Training Pipeline	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
-IMAs	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>
 Operating Strength	 37.0	 38.3	 38.3	 39.0
-Non Unit Personnel	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.7
+Unit AC Personnel	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>
 Trained Unit Strength	 39.1	 40.3	 40.3	 40.2
 Structure Requirement				
(Wartime)	42.5	42.7	42.8	45.2
-Non-Unit Structure	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>1.7</u>
 Wartime Unit Structure	 41.8	 41.8	 41.9	 43.5
 % Trained in Units	 93.5%	 96.4%	 96.2%	 92.4%

TABLE V-10
RESERVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS
(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1987				FY 1988				FY 1989			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1-E4												
Number of Skills	44	37	183	264	42	48	174	264	42	48	174	264
PMI	3	3.6	26.7	33.3	2.8	5	25.3	33.1	2.8	5	25.3	33.1
Inventory	4.8	3.6	20.7	29.1	3.9	5	21.1	30	3.9	5	21.1	30
Over/Short	1.8	0	-6	-4.2	1.1	0	-4.2	-3.1	1.1	0	-4.2	-3.1
E5-E9												
Number of Skills	117	43	63	223	111	52	60	223	111	52	60	223
PMI	3.3	1.2	3	7.5	3.1	1.5	2.8	7.4	3.1	1.5	2.8	7.4
Inventory	6.5	1.2	2	9.7	6.4	1.5	2.1	10	6.4	1.5	2.1	10
Over/Short	3.2	0	-1	2.2	3.3	0	-0.7	2.6	3.3	0	-0.7	2.6
Total E1-E9												
Number of Skills	161	80	246	487	153	100	234	487	153	100	234	487
PMI	6.3	4.8	29.7	40.8	5.9	6.5	28.1	40.5	5.9	6.5	28.1	40.5
Inventory	11.3	4.8	22.7	38.8	10.3	6.5	23.2	40	10.3	6.5	23.2	40
Over/Short	5	0	-7	-2	4.4	0	-4.9	-0.5	4.4	0	-4.9	-0.5
W1-W4												
Number of Skills	33	10	21	64	33	17	20	70	33	17	20	70
PMI	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.5
Inventory	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.5
Over/Short	0	0	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0	-0.1	0	0.1	0	-0.1	0
01-03												
Number of Skills	10	10	62	82	10	14	60	84	10	14	60	84
PMI	0.1	0.3	1.3	1.7	0.3	0.6	1.2	2.1	0.3	0.6	1.2	2.1
Inventory	0.1	0.3	1	1.4	0.1	0.6	0.8	1.5	0.1	0.6	0.8	1.5
Over/Short	0	0	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2	0	-0.4	-0.6	-0.2	0	-0.4	-0.6
04-06												
Number of Skills	37	11	30	78	35	14	30	79	35	14	30	79
PMI	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.7
Inventory	1.4	0.1	0.1	1.6	1.3	0.2	0.1	1.6	1.3	0.2	0.1	1.6
Over/Short	0.9	0	-0.1	0.8	1	0	-0.1	0.9	1	0	-0.1	0.9
Total 01-06												
Number of Skills	47	21	92	160	45	28	90	163	45	28	90	163
PMI	0.6	0.4	1.5	2.5	0.6	0.8	1.4	2.8	0.6	0.8	1.4	2.8
Inventory	1.5	0.4	1.1	3	1.4	0.8	0.9	3.1	1.4	0.8	0.9	3.1
Over/Short	0.9	0	-0.4	0.5	0.8	0	-0.5	0.3	0.8	0	-0.5	0.3

(4) Experience. Table V-11 reflects the SMCR experience and grade mix.

TABLE V-11
RESERVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH in THOUSANDS)

	FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	TOTAL	PEOPLE AVE.		TOTAL	PEOPLE AVE.		TOTAL	PEOPLE AVE.	
	PEOPLE	WITH > 4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	WITH > 4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	WITH > 4 YOS	YOS
<u>E1-E4</u>									
PMI *	33.2	N/A	N/A	34.1	N/A	N/A	34.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	29.1	5.3	2.6	29.9	5.7	2.7	29.9	6.0	2.8
<u>E5-E9</u>									
PMI	9.2	N/A	N/A	9.4	N/A	N/A	9.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	9.7	9.6	11.0	10.0	9.9	11.1	10.0	9.9	11.2
<u>Total E1-E9</u>									
PMI	42.4	N/A	N/A	43.5	N/A	N/A	43.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	38.8	14.9	4.7	39.9	15.6	14.8	39.9	15.9	4.9
<u>W1-W4</u>									
PMI	0.5	N/A	N/A	0.5	N/A	N/A	0.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	0.5	0.5	20.9	0.5	0.5	20.5	0.5	0.5	20.0
<u>01-03</u>									
PMI	2.4	N/A	N/A	2.4	N/A	N/A	2.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	1.4	1.4	10.2	1.6	1.6	10.5	1.6	1.6	10.8
<u>04-06</u>									
PMI	1.1	N/A	N/A	1.1	N/A	N/A	1.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	1.6	1.6	19.4	1.6	1.6	19.7	1.6	1.6	20.0
<u>Total 01-06</u>									
PMI	3.5	N/A	N/A	3.5	N/A	N/A	3.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	3.0	3.0	15.1	3.2	3.2	15.5	3.2	3.2	15.8

* Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

(a) Recruiting. Recruiting goals and actual for the SMCR are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals

	FY 87		FY 88		FY 89
	Goal	Actual	Goal		Goal
Non-prior Service	8,200	8,375	8,200		7,631
Prior Service	4,375	5,836	4,600		4,600

For FY 1987, the SMCR attained its prior service enlistment goal. In FY 1987, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve achieved a total paid end strength of 42,253.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are essentially the same as for the Active Force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes primarily from officers leaving active duty who have not yet completed their mandatory obligated service, recently extended from six to eight years.

(b) Retention. Many things are being done to reduce attrition in the Selected Reserve. A professional career planner's course and an inspector-instructor orientation course have been added. Full time support career planners were brought on board in FY 1986. We have implemented contract lodging at home armories for drilling reservists commuting more than 50 miles. Additionally, increased emphasis has been placed on the Reserve referral credit program coordinated with Active Force recruiters. Under this program, Reserve units are tasked to refer qualified applicants to the Active Force recruiters for enlistment in the Marine Corps Reserve.

(c) Inventory Stability. While aggregate enlisted population stability decreased, unit personnel stability increased, as shown below. However, it should be noted that nearly 35 percent of the personnel are non-mandatory participants who can leave the SMCR at will.

Enlisted Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Aggregate Stability	74.6	77.8	73.1	68.4	71.9	86.7
Unit Stability	66.1	59.0	57.2	57.7	52.0	57.9

(d) Officer Recruiting. We are attempting to attract more company grade officers leaving active duty by contacting them 90 days prior to expiration of service and through better advertising of available officer billets.

(6) USMCR Readiness Assessment. From a manpower perspective, the combat capability of the SMCR has been consistently improving since 1980. As the SMCR end strength rises, there has been a corresponding increase in MOS match within the units. Recruitment by MOS within each unit by the recruiting service will continue to reduce the enlisted MOS imbalances and increase overall readiness.

(7) Other. FY 1988/89 SMCR personnel requirements are 43,600 for both fiscal years. These requirements provide sufficient personnel to ensure SMCR units report to Station of Initial Assignment with a minimum of 92% of their wartime manning by FY 1989, maintain a training pipeline, and maintain ancillary mobilization manpower requirements.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY 1988/89 is 42,199 and 42,493, respectively. This strength supports the force structure and personnel support requirements. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on initial active duty, individual mobilization augmentees and full-time active duty personnel for administration and training of reserves.

(8) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program.

The IMA Program assigns pre-trained Marines to wartime billets in order to ensure the designated Marine is prepared to function in a critical duty effectively on or shortly after mobilization. Typical assignments for IMA's include Joint Staffs; Headquarters, Marine Corps; FMF staffs; Marine Corps Mobilization Stations; the Naval Readiness Command; Selective Service System offices; recruit depots; and Marine Corps Bases and Stations.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees
(In Thousands)

<u>Drills</u> ^{1/}	<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)
(48)	1.1	1.1	1.1
(24)	0.1	0.2	0.2
(36)	*	*	*
(varied)	*	*	*
TOTAL	1.2	1.3	1.3

*Less than 50.

^{1/} IMAs listed in this Table serve two weeks of active duty a year plus the number of drills shown in parentheses. They are paid for all active duty and for all drills.

(9) Full Time Support Program (FTS). FTS Reservists contribute to mobilization readiness and the accomplishment of the Reserve mission in two ways. First, they are qualified Marine reservists on active duty for periods of one to four years to support the Marine Corps Reserve. Their knowledge and efforts assist the active forces with administration and understanding of reserve programs. Secondly, knowledge and expertise gained by FTS reservists on active duty are taken back to SMCR units, thereby enhancing their effectiveness. FTS personnel can be found in administrative, recruiting, and instructor training billets throughout the SMCR and at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

Full-Time Support Personnel
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)
Reserve (AGR)	1.7	1.9	1.9
Civilian	0.3	0.4	0.4
Active Duty	5.3	5.1	5.1
Total	7.3	7.4	7.4

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

The IRR consists of members of the Ready Reserve who have no mandatory training requirement. The IRR provides pre-trained Marines to fill shortfalls in Active Operating Forces and Reserve units, and also provide for the expansion of the supporting base, as necessary, to meet wartime contingency requirements.

Individual Ready Reserve
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)
44.6	49.2	49.6

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve consists of members of the Reserve Component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment Active and Reserve Forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

Standby Reserve
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 87</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 88</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)
1.4	1.4	1.4

3. Retirees

The retired military population is composed primarily of (1) retirees, both regular and reserve, who have completed 20 years active duty; these retirees are liable for recall at any time by the Service Secretary in the interest of national defense; (2) reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60. The second category may only be recalled in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law.

Retirees
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees			
Categories I and II	38.2	38.2	38.2
Category III	44.7	44.7	44.7
Other Retiree Reserves			
Categories I and II	3.0	3.0	3.0
Category III	3.5	3.5	3.5

4. Marine Corps Reserve Personnel on Active Duty for Training in Excess of 180 Days

The Marine Corps did not have any Reserve personnel on Active Duty in excess of 180 days in FY 1987, nor are any programmed for FY 1988.

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Marine Corps military and civilian manpower resources are integrated to maximize efficiency and avoid duplication of effort. Civilian personnel are used to meet the requirements of supporting activities to the maximum extent practicable and to permit more effective manning of operational forces with Marines, thereby enhancing training, readiness, and sustainability. It also ensures continuity in operations and provides for specialized experience that is not otherwise available within the military structure. Marine Corps civilian personnel are employed in a wide variety of professional, technical, trade, and administrative functions.

The Marine Corps actively seeks means to use civilian manpower more economically and efficiently. Improved use of this critical resource is achieved through numerous programs, such as Commercial Activities, Efficiency Reviews, and Productivity Enhancement Programs.

The FY 1989 request for 22,114 civilians is essential to continue mission responsibilities while minimizing the requirement for military personnel. This request, displayed by DPPC, is shown in Table V-12.

TABLE V-12
MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(DIRECT AND INDIRECT HIRE END STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 80</u>		<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>AUTH</u> 10.2	<u>INV</u> 10.3	<u>AUTH</u> 11.0	<u>INV</u> 10.9	<u>AUTH</u> 11.0	<u>AUTH</u> 11.1
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS						
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	2.7	2.7	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7
Combat Commands	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Support Commands	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6
Personnel Support	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	5.7	5.5	6.2	5.9	6.3	6.1
Support Installations	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.5	4.3
Centralized Support Act'y	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	19.6	19.5	22.3	21.6	22.3	22.1

2. Major Program Changes

There are no major program changes from last year's DMRR, however, the FY 1989 strength requested reflects a net decrease of 168 from the strength planned for FY 1988.

3. Position Management

The success of the Marine Corps' Position Management Program can be attributed to stringent application of position management and position classification standards in controlling and managing grade growth in grades GS/GM 11-15. The Marine Corps continuously monitors all recertifications and establishment of high grade (GM 13-15) positions through post-audit reviews to verify program compliance.

4. Civilian End Strength Management

Removal of statutory civilian personnel end of year number constraints for FY 1987 permitted Marine Corps activities to adjust their work force to workload fluctuations. That flexibility allowed management to increase productive output for urgent, high priority requirements while maintaining scheduled production on routine workload.

Without an end of year constraint, limited civilian personnel resources can be used more effectively. Temporary employees can be hired to support short-term requirements, as well as to support workload requirements that are not considered stable enough to warrant full time permanent employees. In areas where future workloads are not certain, hiring of temporaries can allow Marine Corps activities to manage personnel requirements without making long-term commitments.

5. Recruiting

The Marine Corps has been able to fill the majority of its civilian positions without undue difficulties. Some problems continue to exist, however, in the recruiting of personnel to fill clerical and professional engineering positions. Clerical and typing positions are filled at each Marine Corps activity through the local civilian personnel office.

6. Commercial Activities (CA) Program

Due to severe reductions in the FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget for the Commercial Activities Program, it is anticipated that only those functions staffed with civilian personnel or those which will not require additional funding for the conversion of military billets will be completed during this timeframe.

<u>Number of Studies Completed</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Completed</u>	<u>Number of Activities Converted to Contract</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Ac- tivities Converted</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>Civ. Mil. Total</u> 55 *6 61	<u>3</u>	<u>Civ. Mil. Total</u> 10 *6 16

*An additional 134 Fleet Assistance Program personnel who were assigned to duties in the food services functions as an additional duty were returned to their parent unit.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower

The Marine Corps enjoys an acceptable amount of pre-trained manpower for mobilization. Modest overages early in FY 1988 increase somewhat in FY 1992. The increased Active Component and Selected Reserve end strengths are sufficient to meet initial deployment requirements. In most manpower categories the supply is adequate for the demand. Of course, the Marine Corps is seriously affected by medical manpower shortages in the Navy. The decrease in the total shortfall for FY 1991 is attributed to an assumed improved medical evacuation policy and the change in the Military Service Obligation from 6 to 8 years.

A more significant concern is meeting mobilization requirements with adequate numbers of trained personnel by skill category. Major emphasis is being placed upon enhancements in the mobilization and training process to reduce mobilization time for Pretrained Individual Manpower and to quickly provide refresher training or cross-training. As a result, the Marine Corps will be able to meet its wartime shortfalls with pretrained and current service personnel more rapidly. By establishing a better match between peacetime skills and wartime requirements, the Marine Corps will ensure the availability of mobilization manpower for the needed skills.

2. Civilian Manpower

In peacetime, the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the authorized civilian work force. On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment. Civilian positions are created to support the military buildup; concurrently, wherever possible, positions are terminated where not required to support wartime requirements. At M-Day, the peacetime civilian source is reduced because some civilian employees are subject to call-up as reservists or military retirees. To avoid the loss of civilians in essential government positions, the Marine Corps continuously screens to identify those individuals who hold key positions in the Federal government and who are also either members of the Ready Reserve or retired military personnel eligible for recall.

The Marine Corps would need to recruit at least 2,200 new direct-hire civilian personnel to fill wartime position requirements. Although these requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, our needs are concentrated in logistics support personnel.

The Marine Corps will use civilian employees who may be converted from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status to help meet the requirements for civilian new hires after M-day. Additional manpower sources include new hires arranged by the United States Employment Service and the Office of Personnel Management, as well as retired Federal civilian employees. Retired civilian employees are ideal sources to support skill shortages in critical occupations such as logistics management, engineering, aircraft systems repair, clerical, and materiel handling.

E. Manpower Management Improvements

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. These initiatives include conversion of Western Pacific unaccompanied billets, the Unit Deployment Program, and development of automated systems and models which improve the planning and assignment process.

1. Conversion of Unaccompanied Billets

The Marine Corps expansion of accompanied tours in the Western Pacific improves tour stability and promotes unit integrity. Many one year unaccompanied tours are being converted to three year accompanied tours. During FY 1988, the Marine Corps will change 243 billets from one year unaccompanied tours to three year accompanied tours. Over 400 additional billets are scheduled to be similarly converted during FY 1989. Over 5,000 billets will be converted to accompanied tours by FY 1996, with the continued support of the government of Japan. Overall cost in transients and permanent change of station (PCS) moves will be reduced as a result of this action.

2. Unit Deployment Program

The Marine Corps' unit deployment program is designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence. It permits Marines assigned to infantry battalions and tactical aviation squadrons to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for periods of approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean commitments. This program reduces requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours. There is a net annual budget savings associated with this program. Many year savings are also realized from the reduction of the transient pipeline in comparison with 12 month PCS moves.

As a result of the program's success, a plan to expand the program has been largely completed. This initiative will incorporate several combat support units into the established Unit Deployment Program. The expansion will further decrease PCS moves to the Western Pacific while strengthening uniform readiness and reducing personnel turbulence.

3. Military Manpower Management Initiatives

To best use our manpower assets, the Marine Corps is continuing development of a computer-based planning and assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of first-term Marines among all units in the active structure. The goal is to provide improved readiness through the use of automated systems that best fill requirements with first-term Marines consistent with approved manning policies.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, models dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas and management of the career force are improving enlisted force management. The Marine Corps has begun work on other models that will support the same goals for the officer force and would extend our capabilities in the management of the mobilization force.

Classification and assignment of enlisted Marines is currently supported by sophisticated models providing optimal recommendations to decision makers. The system is becoming even better as testing has started to integrate all the separate models into the Precise Personnel Assignment System (PREPAS). PREPAS integrates both planning and execution of the manpower plan for the first term enlisted force. The models make the best use of this portion of the force through the reduction of turbulence, improvement in tour stability, and uniform staffing. Recommended assignments will support the total plan over time, rather than merely making the best use of manpower resources to solve the short term assignment problem. The implementation of the complete PREPAS started with the testing of the first model in FY 1987.

Level load recruiting, first implemented in FY 1984, was designed to correct both manpower and training plan imbalances that resulted from the past cyclic nature of accessions, which were disproportionately higher in the summer months. The goal of level load policy has been the stabilization of readiness, reduction in the number of missed school seats, and more evenly distributed separation patterns.

III. MARINE CORPS MANPOWER BY DPPC

A. Tactical and Mobility Forces

Marine Corps tactical and mobility forces include land forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces. About 124,000 Marines (63 percent of the Corps) will be in this category in FY 1989. Tactical and mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military personnel are included in these units.

With the exception of Reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to tactical and mobility forces.

A. Tactical and Mobility Forces

1. Land Forces

Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting force service support groups. Additionally, this category includes land force aviation units which are the helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays land forces for FY 1987 to FY 1989.

<u>Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower</u>			
<u>(End Strength in Thousands)</u>			
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	93.9	93.4	94.6
Reserve	26.8	27.7	27.7

The FY 1989 Land Forces end strength increased from the FY 1988 level by 1,298, reflecting increased manning of selected ground, combat service support and land force aviation units, as a result of programmed manning and structure increases. The changes which have occurred within the combat service support, land force aviation, and Marine Divisions sub-categories of land forces are discussed below.

The structure requirement for the force service support groups remains constant from FY 1988 to FY 1989, although manning increases by 286, assuring continued high quality equipment maintenance and combat service support.

In land force aviation, manning increased by 427 in FY 1989 from the FY 1988 level. This was due to the activation of a headquarters and service detachment and a firing battery in the First Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion coupled with increased manning to six additional firing batteries (+351). Also, manning levels were increased at the OV-10 and the helicopter combat support squadrons resulting in a net increase of +187. However, these increases were partially offset by decreases in manning throughout the CH-53 and the AH-1 squadrons (-111).

Within the Marine Divisions, manning increased by 585. However, there are activations, deactivations, enhancements, and reductions in manning levels of selected units which occur in FY 1989.

The activations and enhancements which occur in FY 1989 are as follows. Three remotely piloted vehicle companies each add one platoon of 13 Marines each for a total manning increase of +36. One general support towed artillery battalion will be activated (+466), and one general support, self-propelled artillery battalion will activate two firing batteries and a headquarters battery to optimize support (+97). The Marine Air Ground Task Force Headquarters will increase manning (+75) due to previously programmed structure growth, and manning increases occur throughout the Marine Divisions (+118).

The activations and enhancements discussed above are offset by decreases in the structure of the three Headquarters Battalions which result in a net manning decrease in the Headquarters Battalions of -207.

2. Tactical Air Forces

Tactical air forces manpower includes air crews, and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with Reserve Component support and various command, control, and support functions.

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	29.1	28.4	28.6
Reserve	9.5	9.7	9.7

Overall manning increases from FY 1988 to FY 1989 by 154, assuring the levels of readiness required to support the ground forces.

Several types of units will receive additional manning from their FY 1988 level. The five AV-8 squadrons will receive additional manning of approximately 10 per squadron (+49). Four Marine Air Control Squadrons and three Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons will receive increased manning, resulting in an increase of +87. Three KC-130 squadrons will increase manning by 21 each, for an increase of +63. The transition of one F/A-18 squadron from an F-4 squadron results in an increase of +38. In FY 1989, the EA-6 squadrons begin to increase from 15 to 18 primary authorized aircraft which results in a net increase of +26. Finally, the F-4 squadrons in the Marine Corps Reserve increase manning by +24.

The increase discussed above are offset by the following manning decreases in FY 1989. The A-4 squadrons reduce manning for a net decrease of -5. Due to the A-6 squadrons reorganizing for deployments aboard aircraft carriers, manning decreases at each of the five A-6 squadrons by approximately 12 for a net decrease of -62. Finally, manning reductions will be made throughout the Wing Headquarters, Wing Support Groups, and the Headquarters and Maintenance squadrons resulting in a net decrease of -66.

3. Naval Forces

The Marine Corps request for naval forces includes Marines assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in tactical air forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships. In FY 1989 a ship's detachment for the USS Abraham Lincoln will be activated (+68), however, the manning is provided from within existing Naval Forces manpower assets.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.9	0.9

B. Communications and Intelligence

1. Intelligence

The manpower in the intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and at Unified and Specified Commands. The manpower program also provides for a small number of Marines who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.7	0.8	0.8

The Marines in the Intelligence function in peacetime are cryptologic specialists gaining experience through actual national signal intelligence collection activities. Marine general intelligence specialists assigned to the DIA and the Unified and Specified Commands also gain valuable training and experience while supporting the national intelligence effort. Under wartime conditions, approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Expeditionary Force.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

In FY 1989, 60 Marines will be in the Centrally Managed Communications category. Marines in this category support the Naval Communications Activities and the Defense Communications Agency. Marines in this category also support the Military Affiliate Radio System.

Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)
FY 87 FY 88

FY 89

Military

Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

C. Combat Installations

Marines in this category are assigned to bases and stations which provide support to the Fleet Marine Force Units assigned. The type of support provided includes maintenance, communications audiovisual, and administrative support. Civilians in this category reinforce capabilities that directly affect the readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and support safety and quality of life functions.

Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)
FY 87 FY 88

FY 89

Military

Active	9.9	9.8	9.8
<u>Civilian</u>	10.9	11.0	11.1

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for base operating support-combat installations using a fixed and variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the base operating support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services that are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the tactical and mobility forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to base operating support-combat installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training. Increases to this category are necessary to enhance the daily support provided to the deployed forces.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for base operating support manpower at all combat installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to determine manpower staffing requirements. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. These manpower requirements determination reviews will improve support organizations by consolidating duplicate functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

D. Force Support Training

Force support training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps combat readiness training group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission. This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower profile for the force support training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.5	2.9	2.8
<u>Civilian</u>	0.05	0.05	0.05

E. Joint Activities

Marines assigned to Joint Activities provide Marine Corps representation in the joint arena and provide fair share manning of joint billets. This ensures Marine Corps' knowledge and participation in joint matters which involve the Marine Corps. Marines provide support or augmentation to four types of joint activities: international military organizations, unified commands, federal agencies, and other activities. Marines assigned to the International Military Organizations and the Unified provide two important functions. First, they provide readily

available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps keeps current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs stay aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations. A summary of the manpower assigned to joint activities is provided below.

1. International Military Organizations

Marines assigned to International Military Organizations are assigned to international activities such as the United Nations Truce Observer Team, Military Advisory and Assistance Groups in Venezuela and Spain and the U.S. Military Observation Group, Palestine. Marines in this category are also assigned to the management headquarters of International Commands and the Northern Air Defense Command. Finally, this category includes Marines assigned to foreign military sales activities. The following table displays the manpower assigned to the International Military Organizations.

<u>International Military Organizations</u>			
<u>(End Strength in Thousands)</u>			
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>

Military

Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

2. Unified Commands

Marines assigned to the Unified Commands are Marines assigned to the management headquarters of the U.S. Space Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Readiness Command, and U.S. Central Command. A summary of the manpower assigned to the Unified Commands is provided.

<u>Unified Commands</u>			
<u>(End Strength in Thousands)</u>			
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>

Military

Active	0.3	0.3	0.3

3. Federal Agency Support

Federal Agency Support refers primarily to those Marines who are assigned to the Marine Corps Security Guard program which provides security for the foreign posts of the Department of State. The number of Marines assigned to this program is based upon a signed memorandum of understanding between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of State. The last memorandum of understanding was signed on 15 December 1986. Marines in this category are also assigned to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Selective Service System.

Federal Agency Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.4	1.5	1.5

4. Defense Agencies

The Marines assigned to the Defense Agencies in this category are Marines assigned to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense Mapping Agency.

Defense Agencies
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	*	0.1	0.1

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

6. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

F. Central Logistics

The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services for Marine Corps units. Marines in this category also provide support to Navy Logistics Operations such as the Naval Ships Ports Control Center and the U.S. Naval Magazine in Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.0	0.9	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	3.6	3.6	3.6

G. Service Management Headquarters

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) imposed manpower ceilings to management headquarters activities. Reductions to meet ceiling constraints are being implemented with the least possible disruption to mission and workload accomplishment. Reductions are being achieved through elimination of low priority billets, consolidation of duties, and delegation of functions to subordinate organizations. The reductions will be accomplished by 1 October 1988.

1. Combat Commands

Manpower in this category are assigned to major Navy operational commands and Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Headquarters.

Combat Commands (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>

<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	0.02	0.02	0.02

2. Support Commands

Service support commands include Navy and Marine Corps departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters.

	<u>Support Commands</u> <u>(End Strength in Thousands)</u>		
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.0	0.9	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	0.7	0.7	0.7

H. Research and Development

1. Research and Development

Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period.

	<u>Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower</u> <u>(End Strength in Thousands)</u>		
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2

Marines assigned to research and development activities manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Marines in this category are assigned to industrially funded research and development labs, Marine Corps Operations, Test, and Evaluation Activities and the Pacific Missile Test Range.

I. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support

Marine Corps activities in this category include recruiting and examining and the Marines assigned to the Marine Corps Districts and the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. It also includes the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command which performs research and development for human factors and personnel development research. A subordinate organization of the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command is the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, and it is a tenant activity at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts in this category include the development of the equipment and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force during amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other Services to avoid duplication. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to development activities of the other Services to avoid duplicate efforts. Also, Marine Corps Research and Development includes an active evaluation of foreign developments for possible adoption.

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.5	5.2	5.1
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3

2. Individual Training

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel through the use of other Service and Marine Corps schools. A detailed justification of training requirements is contained in the FY 1989 Military Manpower Training Report. The following provides a summary of the manpower assigned to this category. The decrease in end strength between FY 1988 and FY 1989 reflects decreased manning as a result of budgetary constraints.

Marine Corps Individual Training (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.1	9.0	8.9
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3

J. Support Activities

1. Support Installations

Marines assigned to support installations are primarily assigned to Marine Corps Security Forces (which provide security to naval installations); Marine Corps Logistics Bases; Real Property Maintenance Activities; Recruit Depots; the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps; and the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the Marine Helicopter Squadron, Quantico Virginia which provides support to the President.

Personnel are provided to the Marine Corps Security Forces based upon the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and other assigned responsibilities. Also, the determination of manpower in the support installations category is based upon analysis of the functional and work load requirements. The manpower determination process mirrors the process for determining the manpower requirements for combat installations (previously discussed in paragraph IIIC) except that the input action of the variable support element is excluded, as the bases in this category do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units.

Marine Corps Support Installations (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.9	10.2	10.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.3	4.5	4.3

2. Centralized Support Activities

The Marines in this category provide service wide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations Truce Teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, the Joint Postal Service Agency, and the Far East Network. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Administration Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records; the Marine Corps Automated Service Centers, which maintain the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System; and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the Joint Uniform Manpower Pay System for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category. Increases in the reserve program reflect support of additional aviation assets and full manning of the centralized Individual Reserve Management Organization.

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.3	2.4	2.4
Reserve Components	0.7	0.9	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.8	1.8

K. Undistributed

The Marine Corps' internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Average strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning or overmanning for September 30 is expressed as undistributed. This is shown as a minus entry in the active military programmed manpower DPPC table for FY 1988 and as a positive entry in FY 1989, reflecting the seasonal fluctuations in manning.

	<u>Undistributed</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	NA	-1.2	0.8

L. Individuals

The estimates for the individuals accounts are based on historical data modified by current and projected manpower plans and policies. The individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces, because shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

	<u>Marine Corps Individuals Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	5.3	6.4	6.0
Patients/Prisoners/ Holdees	1.2	1.1	1.1
Trainees/Students	22.4	23.5	20.7
Total	28.9	30.9	27.7

Reserve

Trainees/Students (Category F)	4.0	4.0	4.0

From FY 1988 to FY 1989, the Individuals account decreased by 3,189. This was due to several factors.

Transients decreased by 415 as a result the decreased number of operational, accession, and separation moves.

Recruit trainees decreased by 1,506. A high number of losses is projected for FY 1988 (due to the high number of 4 year enlistments in FY 1984) therefore requiring a high number of recruits in FY 1988 to meet end strength. However, the recruit requirement in FY 1989 decreases from the FY 1988 level as fewer losses are projected and enlisted end strength decreases from the FY 1988 level.

The number of Marines requiring general skills training in FY 1989 also decreases from the FY 1988 level (-1,190). As there are fewer recruits in FY 1989, there are also less Marines who require general skills training.

Efficiencies were also realized in the personnel holding account and in training at Officer Candidate School offset by slight increases in intelligence training, pilot training, and college commissioning programs for a net decrease of 78.

CHAPTER VI

AIR FORCE MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General.

This chapter describes the Air Force manpower requirement in terms of active military, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian manpower components. The manpower need derives from the force structure required to accomplish Air Force missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy. In that light, the chapter identifies wartime manpower requirements, requested manpower strengths for this budget year and major changes by component.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements.

The Air Force's annual total wartime manpower requirement flows from the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and the Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance (DG). The DG establishes a warfighting scenario which serves as a baseline against which we can compare our aggregate capability, and thus influences planning and programming activities. Each Air Force major command under the guidance of the appropriate theater commander, identifies its total wartime requirements and these are compared against the total active component and Selected Reserve manpower resources. Consideration is also made for casualties and the availability of Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and retired personnel. Finally, the supply and demand data are broken out by occupation and time phased over the DG scenario. Peak demand for trained military manpower occurs at M+60. The demand is 866.4 thousand in FY 1989 and increases to 880.9 thousand in FY 1993.

The end strength requested in the Amended President's Budget still falls short of peak wartime demand. In fact, the wartime demand for trained Air Force manpower exceeds our supply for more than 40 days after mobilization (M-Day) begins. Our peak shortfall of 21,000 (FY 1989) occurs at about M+30. Continuing analysis of manpower requirements to ensure the most economical force required to meet wartime taskings led to a reduction in the Air Force's wartime shortfall from FY 1987. The Air Force plans to further reduce the shortfall in a variety of ways, one of which is a change to acceptance criteria applied to Pretrained Individual Manpower. For example, medical disabilities that previously disqualified people from service are being reevaluated against job requirements. The Air Force will also apply advances in technology (e.g. special polymer concrete to repair bomb damaged runways versus the manpower intensive matting procedure now used). Further, the Air Force will continue to review the use of contractor and Host Nation Support to satisfy mission requirements.

C. Strength Request.

The FY 1989 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1988 and FY 1989 is as follows:

Air Force Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Active Military	575.6	575.6
Selected Reserve		
ANG	115.9	115.2
USAFR	82.4	83.6
Civilian	265.4	263.7
(Technicians)	(33.6)	(33.6)

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Requirements.

The tables below display manpower requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), showing inventory for FY 1980 and FY 1987 and the FY 1988 and FY 1989 totals in the FY 1989 request. (End strength in thousands).

Active Military

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 89 PB(A)</u>	
DPPC			<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	73.5	71.6	71.4	71.4
Tactical/Mobility	118.9	153.1	152.6	151.0
Communications/				
Intelligence	31.4	33.4	33.6	33.6
Combat Installations	112.3	117.5	117.1	116.8
Force Support Training	24.1	26.5	24.9	25.4
Medical Support	32.0	38.4	39.4	40.0
Joint Activities	8.2	9.3	9.5	9.4
Support Activities	95.9	103.1	98.3	98.4
Undistributed	-	-	-12.2	-14.6
Individuals	61.6	54.1	40.9	44.2
Totals	558.0	607.0	575.6	575.6

Air National Guard

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 89 PB(A)</u>	
DPPC			<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	21.1	17.4	18.0	17.8
Tactical/Mobility	59.2	70.3	69.6	69.5
Communications/				
Intelligence	10.6	11.1	11.7	11.2
Combat Installations	.4	3.9	3.6	3.6
Medical Support	-	3.8	4.2	4.2
Support Activities	2.5	5.8	5.5	5.5
Individuals	2.5	2.3	3.2	3.5
Totals	96.3	114.6	115.9	115.2

US Air Force Reserve

			FY 89 PB(A)	
<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
Tactical/Mobility	39.4	48.6	49.9	50.6
Communications/ Intelligence	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
Combat Installations	4.9	10.3	10.9	11.1
Medical Support	1.8	3.6	4.2	3.9
Support Activities	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1
Individuals	1.0	1.7	1.4	1.4
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	8.6	13.0	12.7	13.5
Totals	58.9	80.4	82.4	83.6

Civilian

			FY 89 PB(A)	
<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	8.1	8.3	8.8	8.8
Tactical/Mobility	26.7	29.7	30.1	30.3
Communications/ Intelligence	5.2	6.9	7.7	7.4
Combat Installations	50.9	52.8	52.7	52.9
Force Support Training	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0
Medical Support	7.7	8.6	9.2	9.2
Joint Activities	1.5	2.0	2.5	2.4
Support Activities	142.7	154.1	152.5	150.8
Totals	244.3	264.3	265.4	263.8

The following sections highlight Air Force major force structure changes and include a brief rationale of the factors that resulted in integrating them into either the active or Reserve component. The force structure presented here reflects the Amended FY 88/89 Biennial Budget Submission.

1. Strategic Offensive Forces.

These forces consist of B-1B, B-52 and FB-111 bombers totaling 90, 234, and 48 Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA), respectively, and KC-135 tanker aircraft totaling 460 PAA. Minuteman missiles are reduced to 950 in FY 1989 with the deployment of additional Peacekeeper missiles. Peacekeeper missiles will total 50 in FY 1989, bringing the total missile inventory (Minuteman and Peacekeeper) to 1,000. Air National Guard Strategic Offensive forces total 110 PAA KC-135 aircraft with 24 PAA in the Air Force Reserve. Participation by the ANG/USAFR in the strategic offensive missions is limited to tanker operations because of the highly time sensitive nature of bomber and missile operations and the intensive peacetime training. ANG/USAFR tanker units are operationally capable, and availability is manageable because of the reduced alert commitment. (Currently one tanker in eight for ANG/USAFR versus a minimum of one tanker in four for the active force).

2. Strategic Defensive Forces.

These forces will include two active and twelve Air National Guard interceptor squadrons in FY 1989. In addition, strategic defensive forces include aircraft and ground radars for surveillance, control, and defense. The Air Force continues to operate nine military radars in the Continental United States (CONUS) as a part of the joint USAF/FAA Joint Surveillance System. In addition, the Air Force operates four Sector Operations Control Centers (SOCC) in the CONUS and one Region Operations Control Center (ROCC) in Alaska.

The air defense fighter mission is well suited to the Air Reserve Forces because of its in-place wartime role. For over 30 years, ANG units have performed air defense alert in the United States, and now provide 86 percent of the CONUS air defense force.

3. Tactical Air Forces.

The tactical fighter force is measured in terms of tactical fighter wing (TFW) equivalents, each wing equivalent containing 72 PAA aircraft. The active tactical fighter force, currently has 24.6 wing equivalents. The ANG/USAFR tactical fighter force is being modernized simultaneously with the active force. By end FY 1989, an ANG/USAFR consisting of 12.2 wing equivalents will enhance the total tactical force. These forces are being modernized and their mission is being expanded with additional F-16 and F-15 aircraft. The Air Force Reserve also contributes KC-10 maintenance support. The ANG has assumed half the total forces in tactical reconnaissance by providing five of the total 10 squadrons.

To meet current tactical commitments, the Air Force must have strong, flexible, in-place forces to support a forward defense. Overseas basing represents roughly one-third of our total tactical fighter forces, with another third providing stateside rotational and training units. The final third is made up of Air Reserve Forces units able to provide a responsive surge of military capability during a national crisis. This force posture has been developed so that the rotation base supports overseas tactical force commitments.

Training requirements must be considered in developing the total tactical force structure. Close air support, interdiction, and counterair missions are complex and require high levels of training and, in many cases, specialized training ranges, to retain proficiency. The part-time nature of the Air Reserve Forces and physical location of individual units are carefully assessed when assigning roles and missions that require skills that must be continually exercised to achieve and maintain essential levels of proficiency.

4. Airlift Forces.

In FY 1989, the Air Force will continue the growth of organic strategic airlift in the Air Reserve Forces by transferring additional C-5 aircraft from the active force to the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. This transfer of C-5s has been developed to provide measured, nearly simultaneous active/Air Reserve Forces expansion as the Air Force takes delivery of 50 C-5Bs by the end of FY 1989. The Air National Guard will have a total of 20 C-130 airlift units and the Air Force Reserve will have 14 units. The Air Force Reserve associate units continue to provide nearly 50 percent of C-141, C-9, and C-5 wartime airlift capability. In addition to operating and maintaining airlift aircraft, the Air Reserve Forces provide substantial capabilities in aeromedical evacuation, rescue and recovery, aerial port, and weather reconnaissance.

5. Support Forces.

There are several support and auxiliary missions which are full-time functions required for peacetime support of the combat forces. These missions include such things as centralized logistics, research and development, and intelligence. Because of their full-time requirement, these missions require full-time personnel. Transfer to the Air Reserve Forces would not diminish the required level of support, but it would increase the number of ANG/USAFR full-time personnel, offsetting some of the intended cost savings. Some examples of ANG and USAFR support forces in FY 1989 include 113 Guard and 34 Reserve communications units, 98 Guard and 60 Reserve civil engineering squadrons/flights, and 40 Guard weather squadrons and flights. Auxiliary and support activities have been and will continue to be established in the Air Reserve Forces when the active peacetime requirements are satisfied, but the wartime requirements are not.

E. Key Manpower Issues

Officer Reduction. The FY 1987 Defense Authorization Act requires the number of officers serving on active duty not exceed 99%, 97%, and 94% of the total number of commissioned officers on active duty as of 30 September 1986 for FY 1987, FY 1988, and FY 1989, respectively. The Secretary of Defense was given authority to allocate the reduction based on his assessment of the relative priorities of the military services. The Air Force portion of this reduction from the FY 1986 base-lines was 1255 officers in FY 1987 and 2255 in FY 1988.

Additional officer reductions will have a significant impact on the Air Force. This impact is mitigated, to a certain extent, depending on our ability to convert the lost officer authorizations to civilian or enlisted personnel. However, it should be noted that direct conversions are not possible in every case. Assuming civilians are available in the labor pool, legislative restrictions on reprogramming funds from the military personnel account into the Operations and Maintenance accounts (civilian pay) restrict our ability to replace lost officers with civilians. Officer reduction cost figures in FY 1988 legislation were developed by the Congressional Budget Office based on a total conversion to

enlisted. And while we have a highly professional and competent Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) force, in many cases their educational and experience backgrounds are not suited to the leadership and command responsibilities of the eliminated officers. Even private industry does not replace a CPA with a bookkeeper, an architect with a draftsman, or a plant manager with a line foreman, no matter how competent the latter individuals may be. There are also legal restrictions on top NCO grades. The net result becomes one of replacing officers with junior enlisted personnel.

Even when converting wherever possible, adverse impacts will remain. Wartime shortfalls in areas such as Intelligence will be increased. Deployment capability will be lost, placing the burden on the remaining force. Training slots for junior officers in maintenance and support squadrons, such as transportation, supply, and civil engineering, will have to be reduced. This will slow job accomplishment as junior officers are forced into more responsible positions before they are fully qualified, and will create an "experience hole" that will be with us for years to come.

An intangible aspect of officer reductions is the impact on the remaining force. As people see their taskings increase, services for their families decrease in order to maintain our fighting capability as intact as possible, and watch their fellow officers forced out of the Service for no reason other than an arbitrary legislative requirement, they may become dissatisfied. Rather than endure the longer hours and career uncertainty, they may elect to leave. Unfortunately, the people who leave the Air Force - voluntarily or otherwise - will not always be in the skills we will be forced to reduce on the manning documents. As a result, we will have shortages in many skills and overages in others. This mismatch in skills will be with us well into the next century, compounding the effects of the officer reduction as we spread our force to cover the ongoing mission. The net impact may be more far reaching and expensive than that intended by the original legislation.

European Troop Strength Ceiling. The European Troop Strength (ETS) ceiling is a Congressional strategy to encourage the NATO allies to increase their share of the total NATO defense burden. In FY 1983 and FY 1984, Congress established this ceiling in NATO European countries. The Air Force undermanned the European theater in FY 1983 to meet ceiling constraints, but continuation of the ceiling in FY 1984 and FY 1985 required program and force structure cuts from the theater. The FY 1985 DoD Authorization Act established a permanent DoD ceiling at an FY 1986 level of 326,414.

Theater ceilings, and this one in particular, have severe flaws. It continues to be the single most significant management obstacle to performance of the Air Force mission in Europe. Defense manpower levels and locations should be determined based on how to counter threats to U.S. security interests, within the limits of a politically acceptable defense budget, rather than by a Congressionally imposed arbitrary ceiling. Ceilings are established outside the context of warfighting capability and ignore the necessary military balance to counter the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat. If the Air Force is required to limit its

military posture, support capabilities and certain growing programs must be decremented to allow continued force modernization and expansion in theater, but at a price -- readiness and sustainability.

Forces are deployed to potential combat theaters to preserve the peace and defend our national interest in response to a threat. When force structure is based on an artificial ceiling in lieu of that required to counter the threat, readiness and sustainability suffer. The ceiling forces the Air Force to trade off current combat capability or essential support base to fund additional needed programs. Priority programs like GLCM and Compass Call were offset through efforts such as force structure deletion, contract support, returning functions to CONUS, and undermanning. USCINCEUR emphasizes that an INF agreement, ongoing basing options, and budget constraints may require that ETS decrements be modified during the execution phase to ensure that only the minimum forces required in the theater are decremented. Further, USCINCEUR notes that temporary relief from the ETS will be required to ensure an orderly transition of forces during implementation of any INF agreement.

In Europe, the Air Force is responding to capabilities requested and supported by the theater commander. Examples of these critical growth programs include Air Base Ground Defense, Air Base Operability, Rescue and Recovery, Special Operations Forces (SOF), equipment prepositioning, and enhanced intelligence capabilities. The theater commander must have the flexibility, within overall political and fiscal realities, to structure the force mix based on the threat.

The ability to accommodate required military growth in Europe is further hampered by the Congressionally imposed ceiling on civilian workyears overseas at the FY 1986 levels.* This leaves only two options to accommodate vital military growth: contracting and host nation support. Both these options require long lead times, are politically sensitive, and therefore are extremely difficult to work.

The emphasis of the Congress has been to increase the conventional capability in Europe to preclude early employment of nuclear forces. Therefore, the Air Force strongly supports the DoD position that the force structure in Europe must be based on the threat, and that artificial, arbitrary ceilings detrimentally affect our ability to deter and repel conflict and support national security objectives. In addition, ceilings unnecessarily divert the attention of U.S. commanders and their personnel away from their primary mission. For these reasons the Air Force strongly believes that the European troop strength and civilian workyear ceilings should be eliminated.

*In November 1985, the Committee praised the Army's successful efforts at civilianization in Europe and criticized the Air Force's lack of effort in this area. In September 1986, the Committee cited excessive DoD civilian growth in Europe. The FY 1987 and FY 1988 Omnibus Continuing Resolutions followed suit by imposing an overseas civilian workyear cap which further hampers our ability to accommodate vital growth.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General.

Last year the Air Force reduced 8,150 manpower authorizations. Congress approved this lower end strength, but Congressional dollar reductions would not support even this lower manning level. Those funding cuts forced an additional 23,100 military manpower reductions. Thus, the Air Force reduced a total of more than 31,000 military manpower authorizations in FY 1988, resulting in a total end strength of 575,603. Virtually the same end strength level is requested in FY 1989: 575,600. Again, this end strength is 25,000 below that requested in the FY 1988/89 President's Budget for FY 1989 and is the largest one year reduction since the post Southeast Asia drawdown in 1973. It leaves the Air Force only slightly larger than it was in FY 1981. This additional reduction is achieved by eliminating a tactical fighter wing, reducing strategic flying hours, and cutting out some reconnaissance aircraft. Further, it requires scaling back the small ICBM program, reducing communications capability, reducing training, and forcing unit undermanning.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

Table VI-1 reflects Air Force Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Budget reduction decisions taken well into FY 1988 eliminated more than 23,000 authorizations in FY 1988 and 25,000 in FY 1989 below the end strength originally programmed in the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget. Where these reductions were tied to programs, reductions were made in appropriated DPPCs. However, the lateness of the budget decisions made a complete allocation of reductions to the manpower file impossible. The balance of the reductions are reflected as Undistributed. Therefore, while the charts in Table VI-1 show a high programmed manning level, budget reductions force an additional 2% undermanning in the Air Force.

3. Skill and Grade.

a. Enlisted.

As shown in Table VI-2, inventory excesses and shortages existed in 34 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1987 (105 of 310 skills, E1-E9). In grades E5-E7, which are a convenient gauge of mid-grade NCO manning, inventory imbalances existed in 58 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1987 (142 of 245 skills).

b. Officer.

The number of over and under manned officer skills in FY 1987 has been exacerbated by the ongoing officer strength reduction. This reduction has led to numerous personnel decisions being made without knowing in which specific skills the manpower authorization

changes occurred, thus the imbalances. We anticipate the imbalances will continue to occur throughout the officer reduction, though every effort will be made to minimize them.

4. Experience.

As shown in table VI-3, experience levels, as measured by average years of service, both overall and within each grade, have shown relatively little change over the past several years. This results from the combined effect of improved retention of experienced personnel, and decreased accessions to support the lower end strength. The average experience level in FY 1988-1989 is expected to grow slightly over the FY 1987 level. Some of this growth is attributed to the management actions taken in FY 1988 to stay within budgetary constraints; i.e., DOS rollback and reduced accession levels. Both these actions reduce the junior (lower years of experience) force.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Total Military)
(In Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV	%	AUTH	INV	%	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH
STRATEGIC	73.6	73.5		72.3	71.6		71.7	71.7	71.4	71.6	71.6	71.4
Offensive Strat Forces	53.9	53.9		54.7	54.4		55.4	55.4	55.2	55.7	55.7	55.5
Defensive Strat Forces	8.5	8.6		5.3	5.0		4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	11.2	11.0		12.3	12.2		12.3	12.3	12.2	12.0	12.0	11.9
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	118.9	118.9		153.2	153.1		154.9	154.9	152.6	153.4	153.4	151.0
Tactical Air Forces	83.0	82.9		114.2	114.0		119.2	119.2	117.6	118.0	118.0	116.3
Mobility Forces	35.9	36.0		39.0	39.1		35.7	35.7	35.0	35.4	35.4	34.7
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	32.7	31.4		33.6	33.4		33.9	33.9	33.7	34.0	34.0	33.6
Intelligence	17.6	16.3		16.7	16.7		17.3	17.3	17.1	17.3	17.3	17.1
Centrally Managed Comm	15.1	15.1		16.9	16.7		16.6	16.6	16.6	16.7	16.7	16.5
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	112.4	112.3		117.7	117.5		119.6	119.6	117.1	119.3	119.3	116.8
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	24.1	24.1		26.4	26.5		24.9	24.9	24.9	25.4	25.4	25.4
MEDICAL SUPPORT	32.7	32.0		38.3	38.4		42.0	42.0	39.4	42.6	42.6	40.0
JOINT ACTIVITIES	8.5	8.2		9.4	9.3		9.6	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.4
Int'l Military Org	1.1	1.0		.6	.6		.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4
Unified Commands	.6	.6		.9	.9		1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3
Federal Agency Support	.3	.3		.3	.3		.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
Joint Chiefs of Staff	1.5	1.6		2.6	2.6		2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
OSD/Def Agencies & Actys	5.0	4.7		5.0	4.9		5.1	5.1	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.8
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	4.0	3.8		4.8	4.8		10.2	10.2	10.2	10.2	10.2	10.2
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	16.6	16.7		15.5	15.5		14.3	14.3	14.1	14.2	14.2	14.1
Combat Commands	9.5	9.6		9.0	9.0		8.4	8.4	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.3
Support Commands	7.1	7.1		6.5	6.5		5.9	5.9	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.8
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	19.4	18.3		20.4	20.4		14.3	14.3	14.3	15.0	15.0	14.9
Research and Development	11.6	10.6		12.6	12.6		7.1	7.1	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.2
Geophysical Activities	7.8	7.7		7.8	7.8		7.2	7.2	7.2	7.7	7.7	7.7

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TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED LEARNING AND END STRENGTH
(OFFICERS)

(In Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	AUTH	INV	%	AUTH	INV	%	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH
STRATEGIC	13.1	13.1		12.9	13.0		13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0
Offensive Strat Forces	10.1	10.1		9.5	9.6		9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7
Defensive Strat Forces	1.1	1.1		.8	.8		.7	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.9	1.9		2.6	2.6		2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	16.6	16.6		19.8	19.8		20.1	19.8	19.8	19.9	19.9	19.6
Tactical Air Forces	11.0	11.0		13.9	13.9		14.1	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	13.9
Mobility Forces	5.6	5.6		5.9	5.9		6.0	5.8	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.7
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	3.7	3.6		5.0	5.0		5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	4.9
Intelligence	2.7	2.6		3.0	3.0		3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1
Centrally Managed Comms	1.0	1.0		2.0	2.0		2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	6.8	6.8		7.5	7.7		7.7	7.5	7.5	7.3	7.3	7.1
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.0	3.0		3.3	3.3		3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
MEDICAL SUPPORT	9.9	9.8		11.7	11.7		13.1	12.0	12.0	13.3	12.2	12.2
JOINT ACITIVITIES	3.6	3.5		4.6	4.6		4.1	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.2
Int'l Military Org	.4	.4		.2	.2		.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
Unified Commands	.4	.4		.7	.7		.7	.7	.7	.8	.8	.8
Federal Agency Support	.2	.2		.2	.2		.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
Joint Chiefs of Staff	.5	.5		.8	.8		.9	.9	.9	.9	.9	.9
OSD/Def Agencies & Actys	2.1	2.0		2.7	2.7		2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	1.7	1.5		2.2	2.1		6.9	6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.8
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	9.4	9.5		9.2	9.2		9.3	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2
Combat Commands	5.0	5.0		4.9	4.9		4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9
Support Commands	4.4	4.5		4.3	4.3		4.4	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.3

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	7.7	7.1	9.4	9.4	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.3	100
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>										
Research and Development	6.0	5.4	7.3	7.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	100
Geophysical Activities	1.7	1.7	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>										
Personnel Support	6.1	6.1	6.5	6.8	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	100
Individual Training	.9	.9	.8	.8	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7	100
	5.2	5.2	5.7	6.0	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>										
Support Installations	5.7	5.9	6.3	6.3	6.0	5.9	5.9	6.0	5.9	98
Centralized Support Act.	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8	95
	4.0	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	100
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>										
UNDISTRIBUTED	87.3	86.5	98.4	98.9	99.2	97.4	98.8	98.8	96.9	98
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>										
AUGMENTEES**										
INDIVIDUALS	10.1	11.0	11.0	7.7	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.7	7.7	
Transients	1.7	2.6	2.0	8.5	8.2	8.2	8.2	9.0	9.0	
Patients, Prisoners,				1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	
& Holders	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Trainees & Students	8.3	8.3	9.0	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.6	7.3	7.3	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>										
	97.4	97.5	109.4	107.4	105.5	105.5	105.5	105.5	105.5	

* Less than 50
 **Not included in end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

Totals may not add due to rounding.

TOTALS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING

Some differences exist between these totals and those in the Officer Requirements Report. Differences are due to accounting for students.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANING AND END STRENGTH
(ENLISTED)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1987			FY 1988			FY 1989		
	(In Thousands)								
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	PRGMD	REQT	MNG	PRGMD	REQT	MNG
STRATEGIC	60.5	60.4	59.4	58.7	58.4	100	58.4	58.4	100
Offensive Strat Forces	43.8	43.8	45.2	45.7	45.5	100	45.8	46.0	100
Defensive Strat Forces	7.4	7.5	4.5	3.3	3.3	100	3.3	3.3	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	9.3	9.1	9.7	9.7	9.6	99	9.3	9.4	99
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	102.3	102.2	133.4	134.8	132.8	98	133.5	131.4	98
Tactical Air Forces	72.0	71.9	100.3	105.1	103.6	99	104.0	102.4	98
Mobility Forces	30.3	30.3	33.1	29.7	29.2	98	29.5	29.0	98
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	29.0	27.8	28.6	28.8	28.6	99	28.9	28.7	99
Intelligence	14.9	13.7	13.7	14.2	14.0	99	14.2	14.0	99
Centrally Managed Comms	14.1	14.1	14.9	14.6	14.6	100	14.7	14.7	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	105.6	105.5	110.2	111.9	109.6	98	112.0	109.7	98
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	21.1	21.1	23.1	21.6	21.6	100	22.1	22.1	100
MEDICAL SUPPORT	22.8	22.2	26.6	28.9	27.4	95	29.3	27.8	95
JOINT ACTIVITIES	4.9	4.7	4.8	5.5	5.4	98	5.3	5.2	98
Int'l Military Org	.7	.6	.4	.2	.2	100	.2	.2	100
Unified Commands	.2	.2	.2	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
Federal Agency Support	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
Joint Chiefs of Staff	1.0	1.1	1.8	1.7	1.7	100	1.7	1.7	100
OSD/Def Agencies & Actys	2.9	2.7	2.3	3.0	2.9	97	2.8	2.7	96
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	2.3	2.3	2.6	3.3	3.3	100	3.4	3.4	100
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	7.2	7.2	6.3	5.0	4.9	98	5.0	4.9	98
Combat Commands	4.5	4.6	4.1	3.5	3.4	97	3.5	3.4	97
Support Commands	2.7	2.6	2.2	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100

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<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	11.7	11.2	11.0	11.0	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.6	10.6	100	100	100
Research and Development	5.6	5.2	5.3	5.3	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	100	100	100
Geophysical Activities	6.1	6.0	5.7	5.7	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.7	5.7	100	100	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	18.7	18.7	22.1	21.5	19.7	19.6	19.3	19.3	19.2	99	99	99
Personnel Support	5.1	5.1	5.7	5.7	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.8	5.7	98	98	98
Individual Training	13.6	13.6	16.4	15.8	13.9	13.9	13.5	13.5	13.5	100	100	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	26.5	26.4	27.8	27.8	28.6	27.8	28.5	28.5	27.7	97	97	97
Support Installations	20.8	20.6	22.4	22.4	23.2	22.5	23.3	23.3	22.6	97	97	97
Centralized Support Act.	5.7	5.8	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.1	98	98	98
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	412.6	409.7	455.9	454.0	456.9	449.5	456.5	449.1	449.1	98	98	98
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	-2.4		-2.5			-12.1		-14.2				
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>												
<u>AUGMENTEES**</u>												
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	50.4	50.6	44.1	45.6		5.2		5.8				
Transients	13.3	13.3	11.6	14.7		32.7		35.2				
Patients, Prisoners, & Holders	.6	.8				7.6		8.0				
Trainees & Students	32.1	32.1	.5	.5		.5		.5				
Cadets	4.4	4.4	27.6	26.0		20.2		22.3				
			4.4	4.4		4.4		4.4				
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	460.6	460.3	497.5	499.6		470.1		470.1				

* Less than 50.

**Not included in end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

Totals may not add due to rounding.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED TRAINING AND END STRENGTH
(CIVILIAN)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980				FY 1987 (In Thousands)				FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH		INV		AUTH		INV		PRGRD REQ		AUTH		PRGRD REQ		AUTH	
	8.1	3.7	8.1	3.7	8.4	3.6	8.3	3.4	8.8	3.6	8.8	3.6	8.8	3.6	8.8	3.6
STRATEGIC																
Offensive Strat Forces	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	100
Defensive Strat Forces	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	27.0	26.7	26.7	26.7	29.6	29.7	29.7	29.7	30.2	30.2	30.1	30.1	30.4	30.3	30.3	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY																
Tactical Air Forces	14.0	14.1	14.1	14.1	15.6	16.0	16.0	16.0	16.1	16.1	16.0	16.0	16.1	16.0	16.0	99
Mobility Forces	13.0	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.0	13.7	13.7	13.7	14.1	14.1	14.1	14.1	14.3	14.3	14.3	100
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL																
Intelligence	5.7	5.2	5.2	5.2	7.6	6.9	6.9	6.9	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.4	7.4	7.4	100
Centrally Managed Comms	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	100
	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.7	5.4	4.8	4.8	4.8	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.1	5.1	5.1	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	50.0	50.9	50.9	50.9	52.5	52.8	52.8	52.8	53.5	53.5	52.7	52.7	53.5	52.9	52.9	99
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	100
MEDICAL SUPPORT	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.8	8.6	8.6	8.6	9.5	9.5	9.2	9.2	9.5	9.2	9.2	97
JOINT ACTIVITIES																
Int'l Military Org	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.4	92
Unified Commands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Federal Agency Support	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	100
Joint Chiefs of Staff	.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-
OSD/Def Agencies & Actys	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.1	91
	66.3	68.4	68.4	68.4	78.1	77.7	77.7	77.7	90.9	90.9	85.0	85.0	89.4	83.4	83.4	93
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS																
Combat Commands	8.9	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.6	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	100
Support Commands	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	100
	6.1	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	100

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	18.5	14.8	16.4	16.5	9.6	9.6	100	9.6	100
Research and Development	17.4	13.8	15.2	15.3	8.5	8.5	100	8.5	100
Geophysical Activities	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	7.3	7.1	9.6	9.3	10.1	10.1	93	9.4	93
Personnel Support	2.0	2.0	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.5	83	2.9	83
Individual Training	5.3	5.1	6.4	6.2	6.6	6.6	98	6.5	98
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	41.0	43.6	41.1	42.2	43.5	43.5	93	40.4	93
Support Installations	33.0	36.3	33.0	33.7	35.4	35.1	92	32.4	92
Centralized Support Act.	8.0	7.3	8.1	8.5	8.1	8.1	97	8.0	99
END STRENGTH	243.9	244.3	263.8	264.3	276.2	274.5	96	263.8	96

* Less than 50.

Totals may not add due to rounding.

TABLE VI-2
ACTIVE AIR FORCE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>FY 1987</u> <u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	96	82	53	231
PMI**	101.4	121.2	43.7	266.3
Inventory	115.4	113.0	38.9	267.3
Over/Short	14.0	-8.2	-4.8	1.0
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	55	103	87	245
PMI**	41.8	92.3	84.0	218.1
Inventory	47.5	90.3	75.3	213.1
Over/Short	5.7	-2.0	-8.7	-5.0
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	49	79	61	189
PMI**	2.2	6.5	6.8	15.5
Inventory	3.0	6.4	5.4	14.8
Over/Short	0.8	-0.1	-1.4	-0.7
<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	63	205	42	310
PMI**	69.7	400.8	29.2	499.7
Inventory	76.6	392.3	26.3	495.2
Over/Short	6.9	-8.5	-2.9	-4.5
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	18	20	5	43
PMI**	19.1	38.8	9.2	67.1
Inventory	22.0	38.5	8.4	68.9
Over/Short	2.9	-0.3	-0.8	1.8
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	5	20	27	52
PMI**	3.5	18.4	17.8	39.6
Inventory	4.3	20.9	12.8	38.1
Over/Short	0.8	2.6	-4.9	-1.5
<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	0	41	11	52
PMI**	0	84.1	22.6	106.7
Inventory	0	85.8	21.2	107.0
Over/Short	0	1.7	-1.4	0.3

*For definitions see Appendix B

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

NOTE: Due to late budget decisions and the inability to allocate significant end strength reductions, accurate projections of skill inventories for FY 1988 and 1989 are unavailable.

TABLE VI-3
ACTIVE AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORIES *
(in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1987			PROGRAMMED FY 1988			PROGRAMMED FY 1989		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
E1-E4 PMI** Inventory	226.3 227.3	N/A 68.5	N/A 3.4	238.5 238.5	N/A 68.4	N/A 3.4	242.1 242.1	N/A 66.7	N/A 3.5
E5-E7 PMI Inventory	218.1 213.1	N/A 212.0	N/A 12.8	211.6 211.6	N/A 210.6	N/A 12.8	209.4 209.4	N/A 208.4	N/A 12.8
E1-E9 PMI Inventory	499.7 495.2	N/A 295.3	N/A 8.0	465.6 465.6	N/A 293.5	N/A 8.4	465.6 465.6	N/A 289.1	N/A 8.3
01-03 PMI Inventory	67.1 68.9	N/A 44.4	N/A 9.3	67.6 67.6	N/A 46.8	N/A 9.5	67.6 67.6	N/A 45.1	N/A 9.3
04-06 PMI Inventory	39.6 38.1	N/A 37.6	N/A 17.6	37.4 37.4	N/A 35.3	N/A 17.8	37.4 37.4	N/A 36.7	N/A 17.6
01-06 PMI Inventory	106.7 107.0	N/A 82.0	N/A 13.1	104.9 104.9	N/A 82.1	N/A 13.1	104.9 104.9	N/A 81.8	N/A 13.0

*Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting. The Air Force attained its non-prior service (NPS) and prior service (PS) objectives for FY 1987. The Air Force measures NPS accession quality using a combination of high school diploma graduate (HSDG) rates, upper AFQT category (CAT I&II) and lowest acceptable AFQT category (CAT IV) scores from the ASVAB. In FY 1987, 99.0 percent of our NPS accessions were HSDGs and 48.6 percent were in the top two AFQT categories. Conversely, only 0.2 percent were CAT IVs. While these indicators compare favorably with recent fiscal years, recruiting remained somewhat difficult during the year. The combined impacts of a recovering economy, declining unemployment, civilian competition (both industry and post-secondary schools) and budget cuts made recruiting tougher. These conditions will continue to challenge recruiting, especially in the budget arena, into FY 1989 and 1990, when we must recruit from a smaller youth population. We may experience a slight redistribution of enlistees within our standard quality indicators as we respond to external environmental factors. We are cautiously optimistic about our ability to meet the FY 1988-89 requirement with the continued reduction of requested resources. Should the environment deteriorate at an unanticipated rate, success will be jeopardized.

Recruiting Results

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
HSDG	98.9%	99.0%
CAT I&II	45.8%	48.6%
CAT IV	0.3%	0.2%
Objective	64,400	55,000
Attained	64,400	55,000

(2) Retention. Excellent retention continues and is a result of increased emphasis on leadership and military values, efforts to protect institutional programs, improved professional education, and adequate recognition, providing a reasonable quality of life for the Air Force member and his or her family.

Enlisted Retention (Percent)

	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>
First-term	66	62	54	58	65
Second-term	83	80	78	77	79
Career	97	96	96	96	97

Retention successes this decade are rebuilding experience levels and bringing about a significant shift in the enlisted force structure. In FY 1980, our first-term airmen comprised 52 percent of the enlisted force; today that figure is 43 percent. Excellent retention and end strength

limitations forced lower non-prior service accession numbers and reduced the first-term airmen reenlistment eligible population. Larger year group populations are starting to build in the career force as a result of good second-term airmen retention and light retirement activity. As we move into a limited or no-growth strength environment, this shift in structure will require new approaches for working retention.

In the past, our challenge, during periods of conflict and force expansion, was to influence retention as much as possible. Large numbers were brought in, served one term, and most separated. Now, first-termers are more inclined to enter the career force and career airmen are not retiring as early in their career. But without force expansion to accompany this increase in retention, factors such as diminished promotion opportunities, quality losses through early release programs and the filling of a lower grade manning position with a more senior member could have a negative effect on career decisions.

Managing retention, which includes many influencing factors both internal and external, presents a unique challenge. The Air Force's reputation for first-class technical training in highly marketable skills is recognized by the private sector, especially in the airline maintenance and electronics/communications career fields. Growing demand from the private sector for educated, trained, and motivated young people could seriously challenge our ability to retain the best airmen, especially first-termers, in the coming years. While we could sustain losses for the short-term in our career force, any significant loss of our first-term airmen would impact on future readiness. This competition requires us to continue to target retention efforts and emphasizes the need for a viable selective reenlistment bonus program.

Concerns also include the effects of continued promotion slowdowns and reduced promotion opportunities. Combined with fewer bonus dollars, out-of-pocket PCS expenses, continued cuts to morale, welfare and recreation funding, and the widening pay gap, the potential for increased losses becomes a reality.

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. This personnel retention factor continues at a very high level.

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officer	94.0	93.9	92.6	93.5	93.5	92.3
Enlisted	87.2	88.6	88.8	87.6	88.7	89.6

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. This indicator combines retention with a personnel stability factor. The indicator is a measure of how many personnel assigned to a unit at the beginning of a fiscal year are still there at the end of that fiscal year.

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officer	56.9	55.0	52.9	55.1	55.3	57.9
Enlisted	53.6	55.6	52.8	58.9	57.9	59.9

b. Officer.

(1) Accessions. The officer recruiting program supports line officer requirements for flight training (pilot and navigator), scientific, engineering, and a range of other skills necessary to sustain Air Force capabilities. The broad spectrum of Health Professionals, including physicians, nurses, etc., is also recruited under this program.

The major challenge in our FY 1988 officer recruiting program will be continuing requirements for physician and nursing specialists. Our physician requirement will increase and remain limited to specific critically required skills. Physician and nurse specialist shortages affect our ability to treat combat casualties, as well as the overall health and well-being of our members and their families. Referring those who need specialized treatment to CHAMPUS causes increased cost.

(2) Retention. Officer retention is reported as a Cumulative Continuation Rate (CCR). CCR, a quarterly updated yearly rate, is the percent of officers ending their initial service obligation who would complete their eleventh year of service if current retention rates continue. For pilots and navigators the 6-11 year group's rate is reported, while the 4-11 year group's rate is reported for engineers, nonrated operations officers (NRO) and mission support officers (Msn Spt). After reaching a critically low point in FY 1979, officer retention climbed steadily to record levels in FY 1983. Navigator, NRO, and Msn Spt retention had similar trends, and have stabilized at relatively healthy levels. Engineer and pilot retention, however, have been on a steady decline. Pilot retention has declined from a high of 78 percent in FY 1983 to 48 percent in FY 1987. The Air Force is actively working a wide spectrum of issues and programs to reverse this trend.

OFFICER RETENTION
(CCR)

	<u>FY79</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>
PILOT	26	78	72	59	56	48
NAVIGATOR	44	76	75	78	74	75
NONRATED OPS	59	69	68	68	72	62
MISSION SPT	48	62	61	61	57	55
ENGINEER	34	58	65	62	54	47

There are several factors contributing to poor Air Force pilot retention. The strength of the airline industry, its projected growth and the high number of mandatory (age 60) retirements all combine to create the highest sustained level of pilot hiring in history. More than 6,000 pilots have been hired by large jet carriers each year for the last three years, and industry experts predict that level will continue through the mid 1990s. This compares to an annual average of 1,935 hire for the eight years prior to 1984. The national pool of qualified pilot applicants is shrinking and well-trained, experienced military pilots are in high demand by the industry. This provides a ready flying career

alternative for pilots dissatisfied with some aspect of their military careers. Pilots have voiced concern about assignment policies, officer rating system, professional military education, pay and entitlements, officer continuation policies, the fly only career option, and "careerism." The Air Force has instituted changes in all of these areas to eliminate career irritants but the results of these changes will not be felt in the immediate future. Establishment of aviation continuation pay is the key remaining program which must be initiated to stem the loss of our pilot force. We expect pilot retention to remain below sustainment level unless we are successful with these initiatives.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve.

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) US Air Force Reserve (USAFR).

(a) General. The U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR) programmed end strength increases by 1,200 between FY 1988 and FY 1989 (+1,212 drill and -12 full-time active duty Guard/Reserve). This increase is for force structure growth and modernization, including support for increased numbers of U.S. Air Force Reserve equipped C-5 units (+555) plus another increment of KC-10 maintenance and support personnel (+350). Civil engineering authorizations increase to redress wartime shortfalls (+243). Finally, the small decrease (-12) in full-time personnel was made by reducing the Base Individual Mobilization Augmentee Administrators.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning & Operating Strength. Table VI-4 displays by DPPC category the USAFR programmed manpower structure, its programmed manning and operating strength for FY 1980, FY 1987, FY 1988, and FY 1989. The USAFR structure increases by 1,670 spaces, while the programmed manning of that structure increases by 2,644 people (does not include IMAs and active duty Guard/Reserve who do not man the structure).

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table VI-5 displays Air Force Reserve end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units. The results show the Air Force Reserve is growing, yet maintaining a high percentage of trained personnel.

(d) Skill and Grade. Table VI-6 compares actual inventory to programmed manning plus individuals for USAFR personnel. Critical skills within the inventory were 99.1 percent manned as of September 30, 1987.

(e) Experience. Table VI-7 compares programmed manning plus individuals to actual inventory. Trends show that the average enlisted grade was relatively constant while the level of experience increased. The average grade and experience of the USAFR officer corps remained stable.

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*
TOTAL

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH	INV	MNG	AUTH	INV	MNG	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH	MNG	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH	MNG
STRATEGIC	2.1	1.9	96	2.0	1.9	96	2.0	2.0	1.9	96	2.0	2.0	1.9	96
Offensive Strat Forces	2.1	1.9		2.0	1.9		2.0	2.0	1.9		2.0	2.0	1.9	
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	39.7	39.4	98	47.9	48.6	98	51.0	51.0	49.9	98	51.1	51.1	50.6	99
Tactical Air Forces	6.6	6.6		11.7	11.6		12.9	12.9	12.7		12.4	12.4	12.7	102
Mobility Forces	33.0	32.8		36.7	36.9		38.0	38.0	37.2		38.6	38.6	37.8	98
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	-	-	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	.1	100
Centrally Managed Comm	-	-		.1	.1		.1	.1	.1		.1	.1	.1	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	1.5	4.9	99	10.6	10.3	99	11.0	11.0	10.9	99	11.1	11.1	11.1	100
MEDICAL SUPPORT	1.9	1.8	90	4.7	3.6	90	4.7	4.7	4.2	90	3.7	3.7	3.9	104
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	.5	.5	72	.5	.2	72	.1	.1	.1	72	.1	.1	.1	72
Geophysical Activities	.5	.5		.5	.2		.1	.1	.1		.1	.1	.1	72
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	-	-	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	.1	100
Individual Training	-	-		.1	.1		.1	.1	.1		.1	.1	.1	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	.4	.4	84	.5	.5	84	.5	.5	.4	84	.5	.5	.5	84
Centralized Support Act.	.4	.4		.5	.5		.5	.5	.4		.5	.5	.5	84
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	49.7	48.8	97	66.8	65.2	97	69.5	69.5	67.6	97	68.4	68.4	68.0	99
AGR		.5			.6				.7				.7	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION														
AUGMENTEES		8.6			13.0				12.7				13.5	
INDIVIDUALS (Trainees														
& Students)		1.0			1.7				1.4				1.4	
END STRENGTH		58.9			80.4				82.4				83.6	

* Numbers may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)**
OFFICERS

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PRGMD REQT	PRGMD AUTH	%	MNG	PRGMD REQT	PRGMD AUTH	%	MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strat Forces	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	96	96	.3	.3	96	96
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Tactical Air Forces	5.7	5.6	6.9	6.9	7.0	6.7	96	96	7.0	6.7	96	96
Mobility Forces	.8	.9	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	97	100	1.5	1.5	100	100
	4.9	4.7	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.2	96	96	5.4	5.1	95	95
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	-	-	*	*	*	*	100	100	*	*	100	100
	-	-	*	*	*	*	100	100	*	*	100	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	.4	.2	.5	.5	.5	.5	87	87	.5	.5	88	88
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	.4	.4	1.2	.8	1.2	1.1	96	96	.9	.9	105	105
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	.1	.1	.1	*	*	*	100	100	*	*	100	100
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1	.1	*	*	*	100	100	*	*	100	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	-	-	*	*	*	*	100	100	-	-	-	-
Individual Training	-	-	*	*	*	*	100	100	-	-	-	-
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	91	91	.2	.2	91	91
Centralized Support Act.	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	91	91	.2	.2	91	91
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	7.1	6.7	9.2	8.7	9.3	8.9	95	95	9.0	8.7	96	96
AGR		.1		.2		.2				.2		
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>												
AUGMENTEES		6.1		7.7		7.5				7.7		
END STRENGTH		13.0		16.6		16.6				16.5		

* Less than 50.
** Numbers may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)**
ENLISTED

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH	MNG	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH	MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6	96	1.7	1.7	1.6	96
Offensive Strat Forces	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6	96	1.7	1.7	1.6	96
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	33.9	33.8	41.4	41.6	44.0	44.0	43.2	98	44.1	44.1	43.9	99
Tactical Air Forces	5.8	5.8	10.1	10.1	11.3	11.3	11.1	98	10.9	10.9	11.2	103
Mobility Forces	28.1	28.0	31.3	31.5	32.7	32.7	32.1	98	33.2	33.2	32.7	98
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	-	-	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	.1	100
Centrally Managed Comm	-	-	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	.1	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	4.8	4.7	10.1	9.8	10.4	10.4	10.4	100	10.5	10.5	10.6	100
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	1.5	1.4	3.5	2.8	3.6	3.6	3.1	98	2.8	2.8	2.9	104
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	.4	.4	.4	.2	.1	.1	*	59	.1	.1	*	59
Geophysical Activities	.4	.4	.4	.2	.1	.1	*	59	.1	.1	*	59
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	-	-	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	-	-	-	-
Individual Training	-	-	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	-	-	-	-
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	.2	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3	.2	78	.3	.3	.2	78
Centralized Support Act.	.2	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3	.2	78	.3	.3	.2	78
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	42.6	42.1	57.5	56.4	60.1	60.1	58.7	98	59.5	59.5	59.4	100
AGR		.4		.5			.5				.5	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>												
AUGMENTEES		2.5		5.3			5.2				5.8	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees</u>												
& Students)		1.0		1.7			1.4				1.4	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>		46.0		63.9			65.8				67.1	

* Less than 50

** Numbers may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-5

TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH - USAFR
(in thousands)

USAFR	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>
End Strength	80.4	82.4	83.6	84.2
-Training Pipeline*	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.3
-IMAs	13.0	12.7	13.5	13.5
Operating Strength	65.0	67.6	67.8	68.4
-Non Unit AGR	.7	.7	.7	.7
+Unit AC Personnel	.6	.6	.6	.6
Trained Unit Strength	64.9	67.5	67.7	68.3
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	66.8	69.5	68.4	68.9
% Trained in Units	96.4%	96.3%	98.2%	99.1%

* Includes categories F and P

TABLE VI-6

US AIR FORCE RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>FY 1987</u> <u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
E1 - E4				
Number of Skills ^b	47	4	34	85
PMI**	1.9	0.4	18.9	21.2
Inventory	3.5	0.4	11.3	15.2
Over/Short	+1.6	a	-7.5	-6.0
E5 - E7				
Number of Skills ^b	35	26	30	91
PMI**	20.1	5.5	7.2	32.8
Inventory	28.2	5.3	5.4	38.9
Over/Short	+8.0	-0.2	-1.8	+6.1
E8 - E9				
Number of Skills ^b	8	14	50	72
PMI**	a	0.5	2.2	2.7
Inventory	a	0.5	1.6	2.1
Over/Short	a	-	-0.7	-0.6

<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
<u>Number of Skills</u> ^b	90	44	114	248
PMI**	22.1	6.4	28.3	56.7
Inventory	31.7	6.2	18.3	56.2
Over/Short	+9.6	-0.2	-10.0	-0.5

<u>01-03</u>				
<u>Number of Skills</u> ^b	51	5	48	104
PMI**	0.3	0.4	4.9	5.5
Inventory	0.7	0.3	3.1	4.1
Over/Short	+0.4	a	-1.9	-1.4

<u>04-06</u>				
<u>Number of Skills</u> ^b	42	25	57	124
PMI**	1.0	0.6	2.4	3.9
Inventory	2.2	0.5	1.6	4.3
Over/Short	+1.2	a	-0.8	+0.4

<u>Total 01-06</u>				
<u>Number of Skills</u> ^b	93	30	105	228
PMI**	1.3	.9	7.3	9.5
Inventory	2.9	.9	4.7	8.4
Over/Short	+1.6	a	+2.6	-1.1

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

a Less than 50

b Based on AFS (first three positions of AFSC - previous years submission was based on first two positions)

TABLE VI-7

US AIR FORCE RESERVE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED vs ACTUAL INVENTORY
(in thousands)
FY 87

	<u>Total People</u>	<u>People with Greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>	<u>FY 88** Total People</u>	<u>FY 89* Total People</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>					
PMI*	21.3	N/A	N/A	22.2	21.9
Inventory	14.9	4.9	3.5	15.4	15.6
<u>E5-E7</u>					
PMI	33.6	N/A	N/A	35.0	34.6
Inventory	41.0	39.5	12.7	42.5	42.9
<u>E8-E9</u>					
PMI	2.8	N/A	N/A	3.0	2.9
Inventory	2.2	2.2	25.0	2.3	2.3
<u>E1-E9</u>					
PMI	57.8	N/A	N/A	60.2	59.4
Inventory	58.1	46.6	10.1	60.2	60.8

<u>01-03</u>					
PMI	5.4	N/A	N/A	5.3	5.1
Inventory	4.1	3.2	9.4	4.2	4.1
<u>04-06</u>					
PMI	4.0	N/A	N/A	4.0	3.8
Inventory	4.6	4.5	19.0	4.7	4.6
<u>01-06</u>					
PMI	9.4	N/A	N/A	9.3	8.9
Inventory	8.7	7.7	14.4	8.9	8.6

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

**Estimates

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Enlisted.

[a] Recruiting. The US Air Force Reserve placed emphasis on matching accessions to critical skills and programmed structure requirements. As noted earlier, critical skill manning was 99.1 percent as of 30 September 1987. The US Air Force Reserve exceeded its FY 1987 adjusted goals for both prior and non-prior service personnel. The actual numbers of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1987 and the accession goals for FY 1988 and FY 1989 are shown below:

USAFR Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	11,076	10,475	10,513	10,271
HSDG	11,010	10,265	10,450	10,209
Non-Prior Service	3,891	3,395	3,541	3,541
Male	2,580	2,261	2,348	2,348
Female	1,311	1,134	1,193	1,193
HSDG	3,821	3,320	3,477	3,477

The above data shows that 99.4 percent of the prior service accessions and 98.1 percent of the non-prior service accessions were high school diploma graduates. In addition, 90 percent of prior service accessions and over 98 percent of non-prior service accessions were in the top three AFQT categories. This data shows the continued high quality of USAFR accessions.

[b] Retention. Retention rates for the US Air Force Reserve enlisted force for FY 1987 and goals for FY 1988 and FY 1989 are shown below:

USAFR Retention Rates
(percent)

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Retention</u>				
First Term	80	81	80	80
Career	85	88	85	85

The FY 1987 enlisted retention rates continued to show favorable results although they were slightly lower in career airmen than the 89% experienced in FY 1985.

[c] Aggregate Population Stability. Since aggregate population stability is a measure of retention, it is logical that this factor should remain at a very high level.

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Enlisted	83.5	83.6	86.8	87.7	84.8	92.2

[d] Unit Personnel stability. This category is also impacted by the strong retention statistics.

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Enlisted	73.2	74.9	78.6	77.0	76.2	73.0

[2] Officer.

[a] Accessions. The U.S. Air Force Reserve receives officers separated from the active force, other reserve status components, and from the non-extended active duty commissioning program for qualified enlisted personnel who hold needed skills and are presently participating in reserve activities. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1987 and the estimated requirement for FY 1988 and FY 1989 are shown below:

USAFR Officer Strength Plan

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Est Req</u>
Accessions	2,000	2,156	2,160	2,150

[b] Retention. Retention has not been a problem in the US Air Force Reserve. The FY 1987 aggregate population rate was 91.6 percent and unit population stability was 82.2 percent. Manning levels historically exceed the 90 percent level; therefore, no specific goals have been established.

(g) Readiness Assessment. The readiness of the U.S. Air Force Reserve is a function of unit staffing, stability, occupational imbalances, and the level of experience. Improvement can be documented in three of these four areas. If the existing skill imbalances do not worsen substantially, the personnel readiness posture should remain unchanged or improve slightly through FY 1989.

(h) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Programs. The purpose of the IMA program is to provide highly skilled individuals who augment active units during wartime or emergency situations. All IMA positions are reviewed annually as part of the Wartime Manpower Planning Exercise (MANREQ) and justified solely on the basis of wartime or contingency requirements for which the active forces are insufficient. An IMA is not authorized based on peacetime tasks or peacetime manning shortages. U.S. Air Force Reserve IMA program growth is approximately 4% from FY 1987 through FY 1989.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Total	12,483	12,969	12,700	13,482
48 Drill	720	639	651	773
24 Drill	11,163	12,047	11,649	12,109
Other	600	283	400	600

(i) Full-Time Support Programs. Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are Guardsmen and Reservists on active duty for periods in excess of 179 days who provide full-time support to the Reserve Components and are paid from Reserve personnel appropriations. They assist members of the Air Reserve Forces Policy Committee; advise and assist in developing and implementing Reserve Forces policies, procedures, and programs; and, assist in organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the Reserve components.

Air Reserve Technicians serve in dual status. As civilians they provide full-time support to an Air Force Reserve unit. They are also members of the Air Force Reserve who perform all military training and duty in their unit, and must be available to enter active duty should their unit be mobilized.

	<u>USAFR Full Time Support</u>		
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Active Duty Guard/Reserve	629	669	657
Air Reserve Technicians	8,722	9,994	10,004
Civilians	4,906	4,577	4,573
Active Air Force with AFR	<u>635</u>	<u>624</u>	<u>599</u>
Total	14,853	15,864	15,833

(2) Air National Guard.

(a) General. The Air National Guard (ANG) has a programmed decrease of 700 between FY 1988 and FY 1989. Of this decrease 812 are drilling Guardsmen, offset by a 112 increase in full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel. The full-time growth is required to support new maintenance requirements, expansion of the training mission at the ANG Professional Military Education Center, a gradual build at the newly established Electronic Security Squadron, and to provide an Air Operational Center in support of the Army's close air support requirements.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning & Operating Strength. Table VI-8 displays by DPPC category the ANG programmed manning and operating strength for FY 1987, FY 1988, and FY 1989. The Air National Guard manpower structure increases by 2,009 with a corresponding end strength increase of 1305 in FY 1988. Requirements continue to climb in FY 1989 by 726, however, authorized end strength declines by 700, thus widening the gap between wartime requirements and the number of trained assets available to fill the mobilization requirements.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table VI-9 displays Air National Guard end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units.

(d) Skill and Grade. ANG skill and grade imbalances are depicted in tables VI-10 and VI-11.

The overall enlisted skill and grade overages in the ANG are caused by several factors: low number of authorizations for grades E-1 to E-4, unit conversions/new missions, the required time lag to realign or attrit resources, and filling some projected authorizations up to one year in advance. Overall enlisted shortages are mainly caused by the inability of the ANG as a reserve component to reassign overages in one geographical location to fill shortages in another geographical area. Overall the ANG is 91.8 percent manned in enlisted critical wartime skills.

The officer grade and skill overages are caused by several factors: low numbers of authorized grades for O-1 and O-2, unit conversions/new missions and the required time lag to realign or attrit resources. The overall officer shortages are mainly in difficult to recruit medical specialties and engineering/high tech skills, and the inability of the ANG as a reserve component to reassign overages in one geographical location to fill shortages in another geographical location.

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(in thousands)**
TOTAL

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH	MNG	PRGMD	REQT	AUTH	MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strat Forces	21.1	10.6	17.2	17.4	18.4	8.3	18.0	98	18.4	8.3	17.8	97
Defensive Strat Forces	9.7	9.7	8.6	8.6	9.4	9.4	8.2	99	9.3	8.8	8.8	95
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.7	.7	.8	.7	.8	.8	.7	87	.8	.8	.8	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Tactical Air Forces	59.2	42.2	72.6	70.3	71.9	53.6	69.6	97	72.5	69.5	69.5	96
Mobility Forces	17.0	17.0	18.2	17.9	18.3	18.3	18.0	98	18.5	17.9	17.9	97
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	10.6	10.6	11.6	11.1	11.8	11.7	11.6	99	11.8	11.2	11.2	95
Intelligence	-	-	-	-	.1	.1	-	-	.1	.1	.1	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	.4	.4	4.8	3.9	4.8	4.8	3.6	75	4.8	3.6	3.6	75
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	-	-	4.1	3.8	5.6	5.6	4.2	75	5.6	4.2	4.2	75
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQ'S</u>	.1	.1	.2	.1	.2	.2	.1	50	.2	.1	.1	50
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	.4	.4	.6	.5	.6	.6	.6	100	.6	.6	.6	100
Geophysical Activities	.4	.4	.6	.5	.6	.6	.6	100	.6	.6	.6	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	.4	.4	3.7	3.4	3.7	3.7	3.4	92	3.7	3.3	3.3	89
Personnel Support	.4	.4	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	.5	100
Individual Training	-	-	3.2	2.9	3.1	3.1	2.9	94	3.2	2.8	2.8	88
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.5	83	1.8	1.5	1.5	83
Centralized Support Act.	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.5	83	1.8	1.5	1.5	83

<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	93.8	116.6	112.3	118.6	112.7	95	119.4	111.7	94
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)</u>	2.5		2.3		3.2			3.5	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	96.3	116.6	114.6	118.6	115.9	98	119.4	115.2	96

* Less than 50

** Numbers may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(in thousands)**
OFFICER

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		PRGMD REQT	PRGMD		% MNG	PRGMD REQT	PRGMD		% MNG
		AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		REQT	AUTH			REQT	AUTH	
STRATEGIC														
Offensive Strat Forces		2.6	2.3	2.4	2.3		2.5	2.4	2.4	96	2.5	2.4	96	
Defensive Strat Forces		1.4	1.1	1.1	1.1		1.2	1.2	1.2	100	1.2	1.2	100	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces		1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1		1.2	1.1	1.1	92	1.2	1.1	92	
		.1	.1	.1	.1		.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	
TACTICAL/MOBILITY														
Tactical Air Forces		7.5	8.0	8.4	8.0		8.3	8.3	8.3	100	8.5	8.1	95	
Mobility Forces		5.1	5.3	5.6	5.3		5.4	5.3	5.3	98	5.4	5.3	98	
		2.4	2.7	2.9	2.7		2.9	2.9	2.9	100	3.1	2.8	90	
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL														
Centrally Managed Comm		.6	.7	.7	.7		.7	.7	.7	100	.7	.7	100	
Intelligence		.6	.7	.7	.7		.7	.7	.7	100	.7	.7	100	
		-	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS														
		*	.2	.2	.2		.2	.3	.3	150	.2	.3	150	
MEDICAL SUPPORT														
		-	1.1	1.3	1.1		1.8	1.4	1.4	78	1.8	1.4	78	
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HOTS														
		.1	.1	.1	.1		.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT														
Geophysical Activities		.1	.1	.1	.1		.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	
		.1	.1	.1	.1		.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL														
Personnel Support		*	.3	.4	.3		.4	.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100	
Individual Training		*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
		-	.3	.4	.3		.4	.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES														
Centralized Support Act.		.8	.9	.9	.9		.9	.9	.9	100	.9	.9	100	
		.8	.9	.9	.9		.9	.9	.9	100	.9	.9	100	

<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	11.9	14.5	13.8	15.1	14.5	96	15.2	14.3	94
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	11.9	14.5	13.8	15.1	14.5	96	15.2	14.3	94

* Less than 50

** Numbers may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(in thousands)**
ENLISTED

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1980			FY 1987			FY 1988				FY 1989			
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		PRGMD REQT	PRGMD AUTH		% MNG	PRGMD REQT	PRGMD AUTH		% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>														
Offensive Strat Forces		18.5		14.9	15.1		15.9	15.6		98	15.9	15.4		97
Defensive Strat Forces		9.2		6.8	7.0		7.1	7.1		100	7.1	7.0		99
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces		8.6		7.4	7.5		8.2	7.9		96	8.1	7.7		95
		.7		.7	.6		.7	.7		100	.7	.7		100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>														
Tactical Air Forces		51.5		64.2	62.3		63.6	61.3		96	64.0	61.4		96
Mobility Forces		37.0		48.8	47.1		48.2	46.3		96	48.6	46.2		95
		14.5		15.4	15.2		15.4	15.0		98	15.4	15.2		98
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>														
Centrally Managed Comm Intelligence		10.0		10.9	10.4		11.1	10.9		98	11.0	10.4		94
		10.0		10.9	10.4		11.0	10.9		98	11.0	10.4		95
		-		*	*		*	*		*	*	*		*
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>		.4		4.6	3.7		4.6	3.3		72	4.6	3.3		72
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>		-		2.8	2.8		3.8	2.8		74	3.8	2.8		74
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HOTS</u>		-		*	*		*	*		*	*	*		*
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>														
Geophysical Activities		.3		.5	.4		.5	.5		100	.5	.5		100
		.3		.5	.4		.5	.5		100	.5	.5		100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>														
Personnel Support		.4		3.3	3.1		3.3	3.0		91	3.3	3.0		91
Individual Training		.4		.5	.5		.5	.5		100	.5	.5		100
		-		2.8	2.6		2.8	2.5		89	2.8	2.4		86
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>														
Centralized Support Act.		.9		.8	.8		.8	.6		75	.9	.6		67
		.9		.8	.8		.8	.6		75	.9	.6		67

<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	81.9	102.1	98.5	103.6	98.2	95	104.1	97.4	94
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)</u>	2.5		2.3		3.2			3.5	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	84.4	102.1	100.8	103.6	101.4	98	104.1	100.9	97

* Less than 50

** Numbers may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-9
TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH - ANG
(in thousands)

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>
End Strength	114.6	115.9	115.2	114.7
-Training Pipeline*	2.3	3.2	3.5	2.6
Operating Strength	112.3	112.7	111.7	112.1
-Non Unit AGR	.4	.4	.4	.5
+Unit AC Personnel	.7	.6	.6	.6
Trained Unit Strength	112.6	112.8	111.8	112.2
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	116.6	118.6	119.4	117.5
-Non-Unit. Structure**	.4	.4	.4	.4
Wartime Unit Structure	116.2	118.2	119.0	117.1
% Trained in Units	96.9	95.4	94.0	95.8

*Includes categories F and P.

**Management Headquarters, ANG Support Center, and ANG State Headquarters.

TABLE VI-10
AIR NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>FY 1987</u> <u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	27	13	29	69
PMI**	4.4	6.6	18.9	29.9
Inventory	6.8	6.5	13.6	26.9
Over/Short	2.4	-0.1	-5.2	-2.9
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	24	35	40	99
PMI	20.7	24.8	20.2	65.7
Inventory	24.3	24.7	16.1	65.0
Over/Short	3.6	-0.1	-4.1	-0.7
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	5	20	57	82
PMI	0	1.0	4.9	5.9
Inventory	0	1.0	3.2	4.2
Over/Short	0	0	-1.7	-1.7

<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	6	65	35	106
PMI	2.7	58.3	40.5	101.5
Inventory	3.0	57.1	36.1	96.2
Over/Short	0.3	-1.1	-4.5	-5.3
 <u>WO (Total Numbers)</u>				
Number of Skills	2	0	0	2
PMI	.002	0	0	.002
Inventory	.002	0	0	.002
Over/Short	0	0	0	0
 <u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	17	5	9	38
PMI	1.4	0.8	3.1	8.8
Inventory	2.4	0.8	2.9	7.4
Over/Short	0.9	0	-0.2	0.7
 <u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	6	5	27	37
PMI	1.0	2.3	5.6	14.1
Inventory	1.2	2.3	3.9	13.4
Over/Short	0.2	0	-1.6	-1.4
 <u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	9	11	17	0
PMI	23	4.7	7.1	0
Inventory	3.0	4.5	5.9	0
Over/Short	0.7	-0.2	-1.2	-0.7

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individual.

(e) Experience.

TABLE VI-11

AIR NATIONAL GUARD EXPERIENCE
ACTUAL/PROGRAMMED INVENTORY
(in thousands)

FY 1987

	<u>Total People</u>	<u>People with Greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
PMI*	32.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	31.0	9.2	3.35
<u>E5-E7</u>			
PMI	66.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	65.5	63.5	14.2
<u>E8-E9</u>			
PMI	5.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	4.2	4.2	28.3
<u>E1-E9</u>			
PMI	104.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	100.7	76.9	11.5
<u>WO (Total Number)</u>			
PMI	0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	.002	0	36.0
<u>01-03</u>			
PMI	5.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	6.0	4.8	9.6
<u>04-06</u>			
PMI	8.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	7.4	7.3	20.3
<u>01-06</u>			
PMI	14.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	13.4	12.2	15.6

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Enlisted.

[a] Recruiting. The actual number of ANG enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1987 and the accession goals for FY 1988 and FY 1989 are shown below:

	<u>ANG Enlisted Plan</u>			<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual*</u>	<u>HSDG</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Non-Prior Service (NPS)	4782	5083		5275	5375
Male	3282	3787	3068(81%)	3725	3775
Female	1500	1296	1011(78%)	1550	1600
Prior-Service (PS)	7011	8261		7389	6312
Male		7170	6812(95%)	6436	5491
Female		1091	1047(96%)	962	821

*ANG attained 101.0 percent of its funded end strength. This can be attributed to increased retention and a successful recruiting program.

[b] Retention. Retention rates for the ANG Enlisted forces for FY 1987 are shown below:

ANG Retention Effectiveness: Rates
(percent)

	<u>FY 87</u>	
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>
First Term	65	72
Mid Career	70	65
Career	85	86
Overall	80	78

First Term, Career and Overall Retention Effectiveness Rates met or exceeded established goals for FY 1987.

Due to interim system update complexities, the ANG will be unable to track retention effectiveness rates at the national level for FY 1988. For FY 1988 the ANG has established a loss cap of no more than 10% of ANG members with less than 20 years satisfactory service. Our goals for FY 1989 will be finalized at a later date, pending a complete restructuring of retention tracking formulas.

[c] Aggregate Population Stability. The Air National Guard continues to maintain a stable force as reflected below:

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Officer	92.9	93.2	94.5	94.6	94.3	95.5
Enlisted	88.7	84.5	90.0	91.3	90.7	92.7

[d] Unit Personnel Stability. The Air National Guard unit personnel stability remains fairly stable since FY 1982.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>
Enlisted	80.6	90.5	91.0	91.0	80.8	79.5

[2] Officer Accessions. The actual number of ANG officers recruited in FY 1987 and accession goals for FY 1988 and FY 1989 are shown below:

ANG Officer Accession Plan

	<u>FY 87^{1/}</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
2139	1349	1707	806

^{1/} ANG attained 101.0 percent of its funded total (officer and enlisted) end strength, however, officer strength was below program. This has been a special interest item for ANG commanders and desired levels should be achieved in FY 1988.

(g) Readiness Assessment. A continued high level of programmed manning, greater stability (particularly at the unit level), and an increasing level of experience will maintain and improve further the Air National Guard's overall readiness posture.

(h) Full-Time Support Program. Full-time support manpower represents an essential element for mission accomplishment and readiness of Air National Guard units. Full-time manpower authorizations, consisting of military technicians, active Guard and Reserve (AGR), and civil service personnel perform the day-to-day duties necessary for mission accomplishment and readiness objectives. Specifically, the full-time force performs maintenance, training and support duties associated with unit equipment and mission objectives. Adequate full-time manning is a key factor in mission readiness. Half of the full-time manpower available to the ANG is dedicated to equipment maintenance. The remainder is dedicated to logistics, administration and other support functions. The elements of full-time manpower programmed for the ANG are as follows:

	<u>ANG Full-Time Support</u>		
	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military Technicians	23,049	23,113	23,113
Civilians*	2,462	2,457	2,455
Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR)	7,623	7,836	7,948
Active Air Force with ANG	731	606	591
Total	33,865	34,014	34,107

*Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR).

The IRR consists of people who have recently served in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have remaining a period of obligated service. They are subject to being called to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress.

Individual Ready Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
43.8	43.8	43.9

2. Standby Reserve.

The standby reserve consists of people who have completed their statutory military obligation and have chosen to maintain a reserve status. They are not in a pay status and do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs, but are liable for active duty in time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress.

Standby Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
24.5	28.3	28.3

3. Retirees.

Retirees
(Strength in Thousands)

Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees (AC/RC)	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Categories I and II	272.9	281.8	281.7
Category III	196.8	197.0	197.0
Other Retiree Reserves			
Categories I and II	16.9	16.9	17.0
Category III	68.0	68.0	68.0

4. Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty

The following charts depict the numbers of officers and enlisted members serving on active duty for training as of the last day of FY 1987 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days and an estimate for FY 1988 of the number that will be ordered to such duty.

Air National Guard

	FY 1987		FY 1988	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	--	2019	-	2400
Flight Training	309	-	309	-
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	26	-	26	-
Officer Acquisition Training	-	-	-	-

Air Force Reserve

	FY 1987		FY 1988	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	1697	-	3334
Flight Training	44	-	59	-
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	28	-	28	-
Officer Acquisition Training	-	-	-	-

C. Civilian Force Management

1. General

Air Force civilians comprise approximately one fourth of the total work force. Civilian end strengths include Air Reserve Force military technicians, who serve their units as civilians during peacetime, and as military upon mobilization.

2. Major Program Changes

Air Force civilian manpower authorizations decreased by 1669 in FY 1989. These changes are the result of logistics modernization savings,

communications/data automation, and reductions in force structure and flying hours.

The civilian work force supports the Air Force mission in numerous capacities. For example, at the five Air Force Logistics Centers (ALCs), civilian personnel provide the backbone of our materiel management, distribution, maintenance, and contracting activities. Representing well over \$4 billion in industrial capacity, these Air Force depots function as the ultimate repair source for critical workloads in peace and in war, and are the foundation of Air Force readiness.

To further improve work force efficiency, the Air Force continues to review all applicable areas against the criterion of military essentiality. Additional efficiencies are achieved through use of overtime and part-time employees.

Since FY 1986, emphasis on improved pricing of spare parts has resulted in an extensive training program for new employees prior to their assignment to pricing and buying divisions of new competition offices in the ALCs.

3. Management Improvements

A key strategy in fulfilling our mission is to improve our management of human resources within budget constraints. The Air Force is pursuing several initiatives to achieve this objective. This year the Air Force begins a two-year demonstration project at Edwards AFB in managing its civilian personnel at the lowest organizational level strictly according to budgetary limitations. During the test, known as PALACE Compete, supervisors at Edwards AFB will be allowed to make employment and position management decisions based on personnel budget allocations. This will be aided by new computer software developed by HQ USAF which tracks expenses, makes workforce projections, and computes the effects of various personnel decisions on their budgets.

Another initiative to manage personnel within budget begins at McClellan AFB this year, and tests the ability to expand and contract the work force as funds, work loads, and skill imbalances require. Pilot project PACER Share will create an "on call" work force, with built in protections for the majority of workers and procedures for personnel reductions which are simpler and less costly than at present.

During FY 1987, the Air Force completed 61 A-76 full cost comparisons with approximately 1841 positions. Contracts were awarded as a result of 35 reviews, while in-house operations were found to be more economical in 26 cases. In addition, 39 activities with 783 workyears were converted to contract using a simplified cost comparison, and activities with 480 workyears were converted directly to contract.

4. Civilian Employment

The absence of statutory civilian ceilings in FY 1985-1986 provided the Air Force a welcome opportunity to manage its work force requirements from a resources perspective. However, the FY 1987 and 1988 continuing

resolutions imposed civilian workyear ceilings on employment overseas. These ceilings should be eliminated for FY 1989 because they reduce flexibility for programmatic manpower adjustments and focus on ceiling management rather than budgetary and employment decisions. The civilian workyear ceiling, coupled with the congressionally-imposed European troop strength ceiling, continue to impact adversely on the readiness and sustainability of Air Force units overseas. We propose elimination of the overseas civilian workyear ceiling, or at the minimum, a 2% ceiling flexibility, as Congress has previously allowed under pre-FY 1985 end strength ceilings.

5. Recruiting

As a result of the elimination of the congressional limit on cooperative education programs within the Department of Defense, the Air Force has been able to increase its use of these programs as a means of bringing new employees into the work force. Our total co-op program has 14,058 students; those involved in the associate degree program have decreased to 613, a drop of 18 percent from last year. In addition, the development and implementation of the PALACE ACQUIRE intern program has provided a new source of highly qualified college graduates for placement in numerous fields, including many hard-to-fill engineering specialties.

D. Mobilization Manpower.

1. Military.

In section B we noted that the peak demand for military manpower occurs mid-way in the scenario, when force strength has stabilized and casualty replacement requirements peak. The peak manpower shortages occur earlier in the scenario. Peak shortfalls of approximately 21,000 in FY 1989 at M+30 and 18,000 in FY 1993 at M+10 are the result of shortfalls in the active/reserve/guard force structure to meet initial deployment requirements, early casualty losses not yet offset by returns to duty, and the lag in the mobilization and training process.

Reduction in the shortfall between FY 1989 and FY 1993 is primarily due to the increase in Wartime Host Nation Support made available through agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. The shortfall in security police does not yet reflect the memorandum of agreement with the Army, and the on-going implementation planning for Army assumption of the Air Base Ground Defense mission. Significant shortfalls in civil engineering, and lesser shortfalls in such areas as food services and transportation, will persist.

2. Civilian.

On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower changes to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment/employment. Civilian positions are created to support the buildup and concurrently, positions are terminated in activities that are not required in wartime. The net result is that the total requirement declines from 235,000 in peacetime to 216,000 in wartime.

At M-Day, the civilian work force is reduced by the loss of civilian employees subject to call-up as reservists, guardsmen, and retired military. Approximately 29,000 Guard and Reserve dual status technician positions are terminated reflecting their mobilized military status. In addition, approximately 14,500 civilian employees are recalled to active duty. To insure the availability of civilians in essential federal positions, the Air Force continually screens employees who are also members of the Ready Reserve or are retired personnel eligible for recall.

The Air Force plans to offset a shortfall of approximately 30,000 civilian employees at M-Day by converting employees who are currently in other than full time permanent civilian status, i.e. they will be converted from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status. Additional manpower sources include available new-hires provided by the United States Employment Service and the Office of Personnel Management, and retired Federal civilian employees. Skill shortages in critical occupations such as logistics management, engineering, aircraft systems repair, clerical, and materiel handling make such positions prime targets for the utilization of retired Federal civilian employees. Finally, civilians who are reassigned from areas of conflict or other terminated positions are, where possible, retained and assigned to wartime positions in safer areas, thus reducing the shortfall by approximately one half.

III. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPCC).

A. Strategic.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	234	234	234
FB-111	52	48	48
B-1B	58	90	90
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	472	460	460
<u>Missiles</u>			
Minuteman	968	950	950
Peacekeeper	27	46	50
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANG KC-135	100	110	110
AFR KC-135	24	24	24

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1989, we have 14 B-52 squadrons, five FB-111 squadrons, six B-1 squadrons, 32 active force and 16 smaller Air Reserve Force KC-135 tanker squadrons, 19 Minuteman squadrons, and one Peacekeeper squadron with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	54.4	55.2	55.5
Selected Reserve			
ANG	8.1	8.2	8.1
AFR	1.9	1.9	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	3.4	3.6	3.6

The FY 1988 growth in active military manpower is a result of the continued deployment of the B-1B bomber (+32 PAA, +1096 authorizations), growth in the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) program in support of the B-1B (+147), and additional manpower for classified programs (+226). This growth is partially offset by a reduction in the FB-111 program of -4 PAA (-214 authorizations), elimination of the last Titan II ICBM manpower (-56), and a drawdown in the Minuteman III ICBM (-367) to accommodate deployment of the Peacekeeper ICBM.

In FY 1989, active military manpower grows to reflect completion of an additional KC-135 wing (+126), increased requirements in classified programs (+57), and an increase in FB-111 flying hours (+60).

The Air National Guard reduction of 104 manpower positions between FY 1988 and FY 1989 is in consonance with budgetary pressures to lower costs. This reduction lowers the manning level from 99.6 percent to 98.4 percent. Although this reduction may appear insignificant, the Air National Guard is being tasked to provide conventional refueling support in addition to support of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). This additional tasking will drive the manpower requirements up in the seven conventionally tasked units by 204 personnel per unit for which funds are not available. The capability of KC-135E aircraft will have to be lowered by 60 percent due to manpower and dollar constraints.

2. Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
F-15	54	36	18
F-16	0	0	18
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANG F-4	126	126	108
ANG F-106	30	0	0
ANG F-16	36	72	90
ANG F-15	0	18	18

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard, and ground radars of Alaskan Air Command for atmospheric tactical warning/attack assessment, airspace control and limited defense.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Force Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.0	4.0	4.0
Selected Reserve			
ANG	8.6	9.0	8.8
AFR(IMAs)	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.4	3.6	3.6

Air Force Defensive Strategic Force Manpower

The FY 1988 decrease in military manpower is attributed to inactivating one fighter interceptor squadron (-627), the FAA assuming the O & M at two USAF radar sites (-136) and phasing out the T-33 aircraft (-363). The decrease is offset by phasing in the OTH-B radar (+96) and establishing the CONUS Command Post (+47).

The Air National Guard decreases in FY 1989 reflects efforts to modernize the air defense force by converting an F-4 unit (-787) to F-16 aircraft (+728). Budgetary constraints drive a further reduction of positions within each air defense unit (-109).

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

In FY 1989, Control and Surveillance Forces include one squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance, 27 PAA EC-135 Post Attack Command and Control System aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers, and three E-4B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; the Consolidated Space Operations Center at Falcon AFS, CO, for command and control of selected military satellites; three ballistic missile early warning sites; six Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning sites; six SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command System. Control and surveillance forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.2	12.2	11.9
Selected Reserve			
ANG	.7	.8	.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.6	1.6

The active military decrease in FY 1989 results from the phased drawdown of the SR-71 program (-342).

B. Tactical/Mobility.

1. Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents	25.2	25.5	24.6
Tactical Fighter Aircraft	1812	1836	1770
Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C and TR-1) 1/	105	105	105
Special Operations Force Aircraft	63	71	87
Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft	29	29	29
Airborne TACS Aircraft (OV-10, OA-37, OA-10)	80	82	66
Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (KC-10)	57	57	57
Electronic Combat Aircraft 2/	48	48	48
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles	256	304	224

Reserve Forces

ARF TAC Fighter Wing Equivalents	12.5	12.4	12.2
ANG Fighter Aircraft	690	672	660
AFR Fighter Aircraft	228	237	231
ANG Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C)	120	108	90
AFR Special Operations Aircraft	9	14	13
ANG Airborne TACS Aircraft (OA-37, OV-10,OA-10)	54	54	54
ANG Special Operations Aircraft (EC-130)	6	6	6
 Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (AFR-Assoc) 3/	 3	 3	 3

1/ Includes TR-1/U-2 Training and Augmentation Squadrons

2/ Includes EF-111A and EC-130H (Compass Call) squadrons.

3/ Associate squadrons currently provide one-half of the wartime required aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft (for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance), tanker/cargo aircraft, the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, GLCM missile operations crews, weapon systems security, and GLCM and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering RED HORSE (Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer) squadrons and tactical intelligence squadrons.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	114.1	117.6	116.3
Selected Reserve			
ANG	52.4	51.6	51.5
AFR (Includes IMAs)	11.7	12.8	12.8
 <u>Civilian</u>	 16.0	 16.0	 16.0

The active military increase in FY 1988 results from Special Operations Forces (SOF) force structure transferring to program 11 (+2033), Ground Launched Cruise Missile force structure growth (+650), tactical force structure growth (+780), increased air base ground defense requirements (+100), close air support for increased Army units (+200), and an initial crew ratio increase in KC-10s (+54). These increases are partially offset by range contract maintenance (-203), and Precision Location Strike System drawdown (-87).

The active military decrease in FY 1989 results from force structure changes (-1867), SOF increases (+987), follow-on crew ratio increase for KC-10 (+146), air base ground defense requirements (+88), and improvements in both combat ready mobile communications (-489) and tactical cryptological programs (-192).

The Air National Guard increases 105 manpower positions between FY 1987 and FY 1988 due to modernization of the tactical force by converting two F-4 units to F-15 and F-16 aircraft, and equipping an F-4C unit with the newer F-4E model. Twenty-six positions are programmed in the F-15 units in support of increased security requirements. This increase is offset by reducing three RF-4 units from 22 to 18 aircraft (-270) and the transfer of one F-16 unit from a tactical to an air defense mission (-775). The overhiring of 188 personnel during FY 1987 contributes to the balance of the difference.

The ANG decrease between FY 1988 and 1989 is the result of aircraft conversions within the general purpose, tactical air support, and reconnaissance forces (-60). This decrease is offset by increases for an Air Support Operational Center established in conjunction with the Army's close air support requirements (+203), and the gradual build in weapon systems security flights (+156), which in the past were contracted in peacetime. In order to support the above changes and keep within budgetary limitations, 377 manpower positions go unfunded, driving the FY 1988 manning level of 96.2 to 95.4 percent in FY 1989.

Air Force Reserve increases in FY 1988 and 1989 reflect the continued modernization and expansion of the tactical fighter force, increases in aircrews in the A-10 and F-16 aircraft to parallel the active force, assumption of KC-10 maintenance responsibilities and activation of a special operations unit. This growth is tempered by the imposed drawdown of the USAFR tactical fighter force.

2. Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	208	208	192
Strategic Airlift Aircraft	284	285	288
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Aircraft	121	64	46
Aeromedical Aircraft	17	0	0
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	304	296	280
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Aircraft	51	45	44
Strategic Airlift (AFR-unit equipped)	18	31	37
Strategic Airlift (ANG-unit equipped)	13	16	19

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces includes crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations, Air Force special airlift missions, administrative airlift, and special operations forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	39.1	35.0	34.7
Selected Reserve			
ANG	17.9	18.0	17.9
AFR (Includes IMAs)	36.9	37.3	37.9
<u>Civilian</u>	13.7	14.1	14.3

The decrease in active military in FY 1988 results from the elimination of 26 PAA UH-1N helicopters (-276), 14 PAA CH/NH-3 helicopters (-283), 3 PAA HC-130 aircraft (-100), 3 PAA HH-53 helicopters (-90), a C-130 crew ratio reduction of 2.0 to 1.75 (-252), transfer of aeromedical airlift resources from Mobility Forces to Medical Support (-882), reductions in aerial port manpower (-456), and the transfer of SOF support resources into Tactical Forces, Special Operations Command (-1709).

The decrease of active military in FY 1989 results from a decrease of 16 PAA C-130 aircraft (-582)¹, eliminating one mobile aerial port squadron (-71), and the transfer of SOF support resources to Tactical Forces, Special Operations Command (-208). This decrease is partially offset by an increase of 3 PAA C-5 aircraft (+431).

An overall decrease of 40 Air National Guard manpower positions between FY 1988 and FY 1989 is the result of a reduction of partime aircrews in nine C-130 aircraft (-266) and a need to reduce positions in order to meet budgetary limitations (-46). These decreases are offset by increases required to support the C-5 aircraft build from eight to eleven (+255) and aircrews in support of the operational support aircraft buy (+17).

Air Force Reserve activation of its second C-5 unit equipped wing plus a combined growth in PAA of 13 aircraft in FY 1988 and six more in FY 1989 result in an increase of 867 civilians by FY 1989. Coinciding with these increases are corresponding decreases within the C-130 inventory as more AFR tactical airlift units are converted to strategic

¹ Congressional direction to reinstate 8 PAA C-130s at McChord AFB has been implemented. The impact is +403 military and is reflected in the FY 1990 POH.

airlift units (-216). Additional decreases in C-130 manpower (-74) result from a crew ratio change from 2.0 to 1.75, aircraft deactivation (-11) and model changes (-38). Steeper reductions in C-130 manpower are offset by the activation of a new C-130 unit (+155) resulting from a conversion from WC-130 aircraft. Finally, differences between programmed versus actual manpower for FY 1987 equate to 140 authorizations which may be attributed to implementation of budget adjustments and recruiting shortfalls.

C. Communications/Intelligence

1. Intelligence.

This category includes manpower for selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs and other Air Force intelligence related activities. The Air Force Intelligence Service and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.7	17.0	17.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	*	*	.1
AFR (IMAs)	1.8	1.9	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	2.1	2.2	2.3

* Less than 50

The active military increase in FY 1988 results from increases in selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs (NFIP) (+183) and Special Analysis Activities (+93).

The active civilian increase in FY 1989 results from increases in selected NFIP activities (+100).

The Air National Guard increase between FY 1988 and FY 1989 supports the gradual growth in the newly established Electronic Security Squadron (+21).

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.7	16.6	16.5
Selected Reserve			
ANG	11.1	11.6	11.1
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.8	5.5	5.1

The civilian increase (+726) in FY 1988 is attributed primarily to a lower than programmed number of personnel actually on-board as of 30 September 1987.

The active military decrease in FY 1989 results from reduction of Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) divisions (-172), and cancellation of the Inter-Service/Agency Automated Message Processing Exchange (IS/A AMPE) (-80). This decrease is partially offset by increases in satellite communication terminals maintenance (+47), MILSTAR Master Control Center operations management and communications (+37), and an engineering and installation adjustment (+24).

The civilian reduction in FY 1989 is due to an Engineering and Installation reduction (-338), the AFCC Division reduction (-129), and cancellation of the I-S/A AMPE (-39).

An increase of 588 Air National Guard positions is programmed between FY 1987 and FY 1988. Of this increase, 99 positions are programmed in support of maintenance and operation of new equipment for the Combat Information Systems and Communications units. The remaining 465 position growth is a combination of the inability to hire hard-core skills during FY 1987, coupled with efforts to gradually increase the manning level in the communications area in FY 1988. Additionally, 24 positions are programmed for the continued build at the newly established Electronic Security Squadron at Salt Lake City, Utah. The decrease in FY 1989 represents a reduction in the number of units scheduled to receive TRI-TAC equipment.

D. Combat Installations.

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as air traffic control operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Air Force - Combat Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	117.5	117.1	116.8
Selected Reserve			
ANG	3.9	3.6	3.6
AFR (Includes IMAs and AGR)	13.4	13.8	14.4
<u>Civilian</u>	52.8	52.7	52.9

The decrease in military spaces in FY 1989 is a result of host nation support in the United Kingdom (-500), which is partially offset by an increase in tactical base communications (+221).

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1989 is due primarily to Family Support Centers (+51), military-to-civilian conversions in security police (+94), and vehicle maintenance support in USAFE (+80).

The AFR increases in FY 1988 (+407) and FY 1989 (+243) primarily offset civil engineering wartime shortfalls.

E. Force Support Training.

Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct strategic, tactical, and mobility support training. Also included are tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.5	24.9	25.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	1.9	2.0

The decrease in active military spaces in FY 1988 results primarily from decreases in air defense training (-113), decreases in tactical air forces training for force structure changes (-314) and contracting initiatives (-846), decreases in force support training squadrons for redistributing C-130 aircrew training systems (-80), simulator maintenance contracts (-262), and phase-out of CH-3 combat rescue aircraft (-46). This is partially offset by increased training for space combat crew readiness training (+49).

The increase in FY 1989 results from increases in offensive training for Accelerated Co-Pilot Enrichment (ACE) Program flying hours and annual adjustments of maintenance requirements for offensive training (+146), increases in defensive training for space combat crew readiness training (+30), increases in force support training squadrons for rephasing helicopter training (+104) and increases in tactical air forces training for force structure changes (+264).

F. Medical Support

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	38.4	39.4	40.0
Selected Reserve			
ANG	3.9	4.2	4.2
AFR (Includes IMAs)	5.3	5.8	5.5
<u>Civilian</u>	8.6	9.2	9.2

The increase in active military spaces in FY 1988 results from increases in medical wartime support (+288), and transfer of aeromedical airlift squadrons to this DPFC (+882). The increase in FY 1989 also results from increases in medical wartime support (+550).

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1988 results from the transfer (+1157) from the Army to the Air Force for the activation of the San Antonio Joint Military Medical Command (SAJMMC), adjustments for actual on-board strength at the end of fiscal year (-655), plus transfer of aeromedical evacuation resources from Major Force Program 4 (+125).

The FY 1988 AFR increase (+550), reduces an FY 1987 medical recruiting shortfall.

G. Joint Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support of activities outside the Air Force. It includes support to international military organizations, unified commands, and other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis. Manpower supporting OSD, JCS, foreign military sales and counterintelligence activities is also included.

Air Force Joint Activities Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.3	9.5	9.4
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.4	.5	.7
<u>Civilian</u>	2.0	2.5	2.4

H. Central Logistics

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily in the Air Force Logistics Command.

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.8	10.2	10.2
Selected Reserve			
AFR (IMAs)	1.2	1.7	1.7
<u>Civilian</u>	77.7	85.0	83.4

The increase in military and civilians in FY 1988 is primarily due to the functional transfer of Acquisition and Command Support to O&M (5505 military and 7020 civilians). Additionally, the SDI transfer (+380) from R&D to Central Supply accounts for the remaining FY 1988 civilian growth. The decrease in civilian authorizations in FY 1989 is mainly the result of an Air Force decision to meet revised fiscal guidance in FY 1989 (-1930). This is partially offset by an increase in Air Force Logistics Command's Special Operations Force manpower (+102), increased B-1B Distribution Support (+73), ALCM/F107 Engine Supportability (+40), KC-135 Reengining (+26), and an increase in SDI manpower (+81).

The FY 1988 AFR increase primarily satisfies surge requirements in the Air Logistics Centers.

I. Service Management Headquarters.

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters, including the Departmental Headquarters, Air Force Secretariat, and the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve), Departmental Support Activities, major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force System Command's product divisions.

Air Force Manpower in DoD Management Headquarters
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.5	14.1	14.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	.1	.1	.1
AFR (IMAs and AGR)	1.0	1.0	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.4	8.0	8.0

The active military and civilian decrease in FY 1988 is due to the reduction in Departmental Headquarters to achieve a ceiling of 2,639.

Over the period from 1968 to 1987 the Air Force reduced management headquarters by approximately 30,000 authorizations. The effect of those actions has been a cumulative reduction of 56 percent in management headquarters manning as compared to a total Air Force end strength reduction during the same period of 32 percent.

J. Research and Development/Geophysical Activities

1. Research and Development.

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

Air Force Research and Development Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.6	7.1	7.2
Selected Reserve			
AFR (IMAs)	1.3	1.1	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	15.3	8.5	8.5

The active military decrease in FY 1988 is primarily associated with the functional realignment of Acquisition and Command Support from RDT&E to Central Logistics (-5559). This is partially offset by an increase of 157 authorizations in Test and Evaluation Support. This increase supports Special Operations Force (SOF) Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and increased test aircraft maintenance requirements.

The civilian decrease for FY 1988 results from the functional realignment of Acquisition and Command Support to Central Logistics (-6623). Additional decreases are attributed to realignment of reimbursable authorizations for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to Central Logistics (-380). In addition, SDI authorizations are realigned to the following laboratory program elements: Defense Research Sciences (+51), Aerospace Propulsion (+26), Advanced Weapons (+29), Conventional Munitions (+55), and Command Control Communications (+47).

2. Geophysical Activities.

The manpower in this category supports active and Reserve weather service activities, meteorological, navigational satellite, and space programs.

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.8	7.2	7.7
Selected Reserve			
ANG	.5	.6	.6
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.3	.2	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.1	1.1

The active military decrease in FY 1988 results from drawdown of WC-130 operations (-409) and the Vandenberg Shuttle Launch Complex-6 (SLC-6) (-267), offset by activation of the Fairchild Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Operations Center (+95).

The active military increase in FY 1989 results primarily from an increase in improved weather support for aircrew safety (+172), WC-130 maintenance (+111), maintenance for the Automated Weather Distribution System (+77), and Space Transportation Systems Support (+65).

The Air Force Reserve reduced its weather reconnaissance responsibilities with the 7PAA WC-130 unit converting to 8 PAA tactical airlift C-130s plus a 4 PAA WC-130 weather reconnaissance augmentation complement for the active force.

K. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support.

Included in this category is manpower to support all recruiting activities (recruiting, examining, and personnel processing), American Forces Information Service, honor guards, and other activities such as drug and alcohol training, equal opportunity race relations training, and civilian education/training development.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.5	6.4	6.4
Selected Reserve			
ANG	.5	.5	.5
AFR (IMAs and AGR)	.4	.4	.4
<u>Civilian</u>	3.1	2.9	2.9

2. Individual Training.

Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees, Students, and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.8	19.6	19.2
Selected Reserve			
ANG	3.0	2.9	2.8
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.7	.4	.4
<u>Civilian</u>	6.2	6.5	6.5

Active military spaces decrease in FY 1988 primarily because of reduced accessions, and contracting actions. These changes reduced general skill training (-925), officer training school faculty (-34), and general intelligence and cryptographic skill training (-71). Also, other adjustments were contracting training aircraft maintenance (-882) and decreasing undergraduate navigator training production (-151). Other decreases include support to the training establishment (-77) for training development and medical training.

Active military spaces in FY 1989 change primarily because of accession changes and contracting. General skill training (-236), recruit training (-81), officer training school (-52), and contracting of training aircraft maintenance (-752) were the major changes.

The reduction of 79 Air National Guard manpower positions between FY 1988 and FY 1989 is the result of the conversion of 12 F-4D aircraft to F-16s at McConnell AFB, Kansas. The F-16 requires fewer spaces per aircraft in the maintenance function and the weapon systems operator requirement diminishes slightly.

L. Support Activities.

Support Activities are subdivided into Support Installations and Centralized Support Activities.

Accounting for Base Operating Support (BOS) manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the BOS category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. The Air Force also includes all manpower providing food, transportation and supply type services in the BOS category and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These accounting differences between Services preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

1. Support Installations.

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as laundries and commissaries.

Air Force Support Installations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	24.6	24.3	24.4
Selected Reserve			
AFR (IMAs)	1.0	1.0	1.2
<u>Civilian</u>	33.7	32.6	32.4

The civilian decrease between FY 1987 and FY 1988 is primarily due to actual end strengths in FY 1987 for both the commissary and training base operations coupled with commissary PBD actions in FY 1988.

2. Centralized Support Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. It includes manpower supporting readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various Air Reserve Force activities.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.5	9.4	9.2
Selected Reserve			
ANG	1.6	1.5	1.5
AFR (Includes IMAs)	1.1	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	8.5	7.9	8.0

The military decrease in FY 1989 is primarily a result of cancelling the Inter Service/Agency Automated Message Processing Exchange Program (-121).

The civilian reduction in FY 1988 is primarily a result of adjustments for actual on-board end strength (-546), life cycle military pay program effort (-48), and a civilian reduction (-21).

M. Undistributed.

The manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units as opposed to the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the actual in-place strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. Historically, the number of transients tend to be higher in the summer than on average due to seasonal variations in PCS moves; hence there are fewer numbers of people in operating units at the end of the fiscal year. The Air Force accounts for this by projecting year end vacancies in field units in a separate, undistributed manpower program element or account.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, arbitrary budget reductions were imposed in addition to those programmed in the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget. These reductions were still being adjusted in February 1988, more than four months into the fiscal year. The impact of these decisions was the elimination of more than 23,000 authorizations in FY 1988, and 25,000 in FY 1989, below those originally programmed. Some of these reductions were the results of changes to programs; however, the larger portion was arbitrarily driven in response to fiscal constraints. The lateness of these decisions made an orderly allocation to the manpower file impossible. As a result the Undistributed account was decremented to maintain the proper end strength level. Actual allocation of the reduction to the appropriate DPPCs will occur during the year of execution.

Undistributed
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0	-12.2	-14.6

N. Individuals.

The Individuals account contains manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets. The manpower in the Individuals account is based primarily on end strengths required for training military people and moving them to and between duty assignments. Many years are also included to cover unit personnel losses due to prolonged sickness, criminal confinement, and holding while processing out for disciplinary separation.

1. Transients.

Air Force manpower in this category accounts for personnel in travel, leave, or proceed status while under PCS orders.

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.5	9.2	9.7

The active military decrease for FY 1988 results from a reduction in PCS moves (-1336), and a decrease due to adjustment for actual on-board end strength (-6440).

The active military increase in FY 1989 results from adjustments in PCS moves (+533).

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees.

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining, patients in a hospital for over 90 days, and personnel awaiting discharge for disciplinary reasons.

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.5	.5	.5

3. Trainees and Students.

This category accounts for people undergoing basic military and initial skills training, and all other formal training in courses at least 20 weeks long.

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	32.7	26.8	29.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	2.3	3.2	3.5
AFR	1.7	1.4	1.4

The decrease in FY 1988 results from decreases in Individual Training of -5939 student spaces (-2220 student spaces for general military training, -3451 student spaces for skill training, -182 student spaces for officer acquisition training, and -86 student spaces for Undergraduate Flying Training). The increase in FY 1989 results from adjustments in Individual Training of +2805 student spaces (+1189 student spaces for general military training, +1243 student spaces for skill training, and +373 student spaces for officer acquisition training). This FY 1989 increase still represents a reduction from the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget position.

The FY 1988 increase for the Air National Guard is due to a higher number of personnel who will be awaiting initial active duty for training in a non-paid status (+660) and by an increase in the number who will be in training at the end of the fiscal year (+324).

The ANG increase between FY 1988 and FY 1989 reflects an expected increase in the number of individuals in training at the end of the fiscal year (+227). Actual entries into training do not change.

4. Cadets.

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

Air Force Cadet Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.4	4.4

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1958, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to integrate as a separate organizational entity, "any supply or service activity common to more than one military department, whenever (he) determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency". Since that time, the Secretary has utilized that authority several times to create 13 Defense Agencies and 8 DoD Field Activities. The missions of these organizations vary widely, ranging from communications, mapping, intelligence, education, logistics and other support to the Military Services and other parts of the federal government. Consolidations increase organizational efficiency, while at the same time permit the Services to devote a greater portion of their resources to their primary military missions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), oversees, assigns responsibilities, and periodically evaluates the organizational effectiveness of Defense Agencies and related organizations.

II. MANPOWER PROGRAMS

The manpower programs of the following organizations are displayed within this chapter:

- A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD);
- B. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS);
- C. Twelve Defense Agencies (NSA excluded);
- D. Eight DoD Field Activities;
- E. Inspector General (IG, DoD);
- F. The Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS); and
- G. The US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA).

The manpower data depicted reflects actual full-time equivalent (FTE) end strength for FY 1980 and FY 1987 and programmed manpower levels for FY 1988 and FY 1989. The military strength figures represents Active Component manpower and are also included in the Active Component strengths of the Services.

The mission and associated manpower programs of each organization are discussed below. The manpower program, displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), is contained at the end of this chapter.

DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS
MANPOWER PROGRAM

(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	7,386	9,244	9,837	9,859
Officer	(4,553)	(5,830)	(6,375)	(6,397)
Enlisted	(2,833)	(3,414)	(3,462)	(3,462)
Civilian	76,821	97,796	98,852	98,841
Total	84,207	107,040	108,689	108,700

The manpower projections for FY 1988 and FY 1989 do not reflect programmatic adjustments mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. Subsequent to the submission of the Department's FY 1989 Additional Budget Submission (ABS), Secretary Carlucci signed out a memorandum to Defense Agencies/DoD Field Activities which implemented manpower reductions relative to this Act for FY 1988. All of the agencies/activities received a relatively equal share of the reduction, except for 800 spaces associated with the DoD Dependents Schools (DoDDS). The DoDDS reduction was allocated to the Services, on the basis of student populations, and at the request of the Commanders-in-Chief to protect the quality of dependents' education. This action reduces the FY 1988 manpower program, contained within this chapter, by 4,121 end strength (from 108,689 to 104,568). The impact of this reduction results in imbalances in work force levels that will lead to inefficiencies and diseconomies throughout DoD. Consequently, the Department has proposed legislation that would forgo the additional reductions required by this Act in FY 1989.

A. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)

OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary, responsible for overall policy development, planning, resources management, and program evaluation.

OSD Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	441	482	550	550
Officer	(385)	(421)	(485)	(485)
Enlisted	(56)	(61)	(65)	(65)
Civilian	290	1,259	1,346	1,372
Total	731	1,741	1,896	1,922

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (OJCS)

The Joint Chiefs are the principal military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Members of the staff, other than the Chairman, include senior military officers from each Service.

OJCS Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	1,017	1,290	1,314	1,287
Officer	(663)	(891)	(913)	(896)
Enlisted	(354)	(399)	(401)	(391)
Civilian	260	297	353	353
Total	<u>1,277</u>	<u>1,587</u>	<u>1,667</u>	<u>1,640</u>

C. DEFENSE AGENCIES:

There are currently thirteen Defense Agencies, excluding the National Security Agency, which is exempted from this publication in accordance with Public Law 98-36.

1. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages and directs advanced basic research and development projects which employ high risk and high payoff technologies.

DARPA Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	26	23	26	26
Officer	(23)	(20)	(23)	(23)
Enlisted	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
Civilian	105	119	139	139
Total	<u>131</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>165</u>	<u>165</u>

2. Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JTC³A)

JTC³A was established in FY 1984 to ensure the interoperability of tactical command, control and communications systems for combined operations.

JTC³A Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	---	127	*	*
Officer	(---)	(91)	(*)	(*)
Enlisted	(---)	(36)	(*)	(*)
Civilian	---	211	*	*
Total	---	338	*	*

*JTC³A was combined with the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) in FY 1988.

3. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA provides operational direction and management control over the Defense Communications System (DCS) and engineering and technical support to the National Military Command, Minimum Essential Communications Network, and Worldwide Military Command and Control systems. DCA also supports the Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) systems and provides ADP support to OSD, OJCS, and other DoD Components. The Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JTC³A) was consolidated under DCA in FY 1988 to ensure the interoperability of tactical communications systems for joint operations.

4. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The mission of DIA is satisfy the military foreign intelligence requirements of DoD and other authorized recipients, and provide the military intelligence contribution to national intelligence.

DoD COMM/INTEL Manpower Program*
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	3,170	4,020	4,430	4,477
Officer	(1,575)	(1,981)	(2,353)	(2,386)
Enlisted	(1,595)	(2,039)	(2,077)	(2,091)
Civilian	4,126	5,650	6,409	6,420
Total	7,296	9,670	10,839	10,897

*The DoD COMM/INTEL Manpower Program for FY 1988 and FY 1989 includes DCA, DIA, and JTC³A.

5. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

DCAA is the Department's "contract" auditor, responsible for providing audit and financial advisory services to DoD Components involved in procurement and contract administration operations.

DCAA Manpower Program (End Strength Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Civilian	3,428	6,073	6,089	6,439

The civilian end strength increases in FY 1989 will be used primarily to reduce the Agency's backlog of incurred cost audits and raise the level of defective pricing reviews.

6. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS is DoD's law enforcement, personnel investigative, and industrial security arm. DIS also provides industrial security services to over twenty Federal civilian agencies.

DIS Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	179	---	---	---
Officer	(89)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Enlisted	(90)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	1,500	4,321	4,029	4,054
Total	1,679	4,321	4,029	4,054

7. Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)

DLSA provides centralized legal advice, services, and support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to the Defense Agencies and related organizations.

DLSA Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	---	6	9	9
Officer	(---)	(1)	(2)	(2)
Enlisted	(---)	(5)	(7)	(7)
Civilian	---	117	117	117
Total	---	123	126	126

8. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common support supplies and worldwide logistic services across DoD and to other federal agencies and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence, medical goods, industrial and construction material, general and electronic supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services include contract administration, surplus personal property reutilization and disposal, documentation services to the R&D community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	961	995	1,040	1,040
Officer	(797)	(832)	(858)	(858)
Enlisted	(164)	(163)	(182)	(182)
Civilian	<u>46,120</u>	<u>53,727</u>	<u>52,673</u>	<u>51,533</u>
Total	<u>47,081</u>	<u>54,722</u>	<u>53,713</u>	<u>52,573</u>

The DLA forecasts include an anticipated three percent improvement in productivity in both FY 1988 and FY 1989. End strengths will decline slightly through FY 1989 as work load stabilizes.

9. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA provides mapping, charting, and geodetic (MC&G) services in support of the Department's strategic and tactical military operations and weapon systems. DMA also compiles general aeronautical and marine navigation data.

DMA Manpower Program (End Strength Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	436	463	484	483
Officer	(178)	(192)	(216)	(216)
Enlisted	(258)	(271)	(268)	(267)
Civilian	<u>8,137</u>	<u>8,563</u>	<u>8,537</u>	<u>8,475</u>
Total	<u>8,573</u>	<u>9,026</u>	<u>9,021</u>	<u>8,958</u>

The manpower levels reflected in FY 1989 are the minimum requirements necessary to provide essential support to the Unified and Specified Commands.

10. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA acts as the principal staff advisor on all matters concerning nuclear weapons.

DNA Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	485	555	589	586
Officers	(289)	(348)	(386)	(386)
Enlisted	(196)	(207)	(203)	(200)
Civilian	606	775	959	969
Total	1,091	1,330	1,548	1,555

The manpower increases through FY 1989 will support the Strategic Defense Initiative; Underground Nuclear Testing; and radiobiology, survivability, security, and nuclear system safety research.

11. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.

DSAA Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	21	28	28	28
Officer	(20)	(25)	(24)	(24)
Enlisted	(1)	(3)	(4)	(4)
Civilian	87	105	114	114
Total	108	133	142	142

12. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)

SDIO was organized in FY 1984 as a research activity designed to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles, and to increase the contribution of defense systems to U.S. and Allied security.

SDIO Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	---	107	123	123
Officer	(---)	(95)	(112)	(112)
Enlisted	(---)	(12)	(11)	(11)
Civilian	---	<u>104</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>140</u>
Total	---	211	263	263

13. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

OSIA was created in 1988 to conduct and coordinate on-site inspections associated with monitoring the Intermediate - Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

OSIA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	---	---	79	79
Officer	(---)	(---)	(56)	(56)
Enlisted	(---)	(---)	(23)	(23)
Civilian	---	---	<u>41</u>	<u>41</u>
Total	---	---	120	120

14. Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)

DAVA was established in 1979 to centrally manage the acquisition and production of motion picture films, video and audio tapes, still photographs, and audiovisual media products. The agency was disestablished in FY 1986 with the functions and manpower returned primarily to the Services.

DAVA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	7	---	---	---
Officer	(5)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Enlisted	(2)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	<u>16</u>	---	---	---
Total	23	---	---	---

DAVA is included within this chapter merely to substantiate the FY 1980 officer base level.

D. DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES:

DoD Field Activities perform designated services on a DoD-wide basis which are more limited in scope than those of a Defense Agency. These organizations include:

1. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support (including space management, budget and accounting, personnel, and security) to OSD and to various other DoD Components, as assigned.

WHS Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	90	138	139	139
Officer	(33)	(70)	(71)	(71)
Enlisted	(57)	(68)	(68)	(68)
Civilian	<u>332</u>	<u>496</u>	<u>1,825</u>	<u>1,825</u>
Total	<u>422</u>	<u>634</u>	<u>1,964</u>	<u>1,964</u>

The FY 1989 manpower program reflects the transfer in FY 1988 of 1,349 positions from the General Services Administration (GSA) for DoD space management purposes.

2. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program and the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.

AFIS Manpower Program (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	40	62	68	68
Officer	(12)	(18)	(20)	(20)
Enlisted	(28)	(44)	(48)	(48)
Civilian	<u>132</u>	<u>148</u>	<u>147</u>	<u>147</u>
Total	<u>172</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>215</u>	<u>215</u>

3. The Defense Information Services Activity (DISA) implements assigned DoD policies and programs related to the provision of information to the media and the public.

DISA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	---	19	18	18
Officer	(---)	(15)	(15)	(15)
Enlisted	(---)	(4)	(3)	(3)
Civilian	---	36	37	37
Total	---	55	55	55

4. The Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) administers civilian health and medical care programs for retirees, dependents, and survivors of active duty, retired, and decreased Service members. OCHAMPUS also administers a similar program for selected beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration.

OCHAMPUS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	5	8	10	10
Officer	(5)	(7)	(9)	(9)
Enlisted	(---)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Civilian	205	219	223	223
Total	210	227	233	233

5. The Defense Medical Support Activity (DMSA) is responsible for all aspects of DoD information systems used to support military health care and medical facility construction projects.

DMSA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	23	53	57	57
Officer	(22)	(49)	(52)	(52)
Enlisted	(1)	(4)	(5)	(5)
Civilian	27	70	92	92
Total	50	123	149	149

6. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) provides economic advice and assistance to communities significantly affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, or substantial Defense-oriented growth.

OEA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	3	6	6	6
Officer	(3)	(6)	(6)	(6)
Enlisted	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	<u>30</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>
Total	33	38	39	39

7. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas. DoDDS also operates a junior college in Panama.

DoDDS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Civilian	10,500	13,204	13,224	13,979

The increase in FY 1989 will reduce the current student-teacher ratio, and enhance the overall educational curriculum for dependents.

8. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) administers the DoD technology security program, and is responsible for processing export license applications.

DTSA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	---	46	49	49
Officer	(---)	(20)	(21)	(21)
Enlisted	(---)	(26)	(28)	(28)
Civilian	<u>---</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>
Total	---	117	135	135

E. INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (IG, DoD)

The Inspector General serves as an independent and objective official within the Department of Defense responsible for the prevention and detection of DoD fraud, waste and abuse.

DoD Inspector General Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	---	31	36	56
Officer	(---)	(31)	(36)	(36)
Enlisted	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	<u>379</u>	<u>1,334</u>	<u>1,380</u>	<u>1,394</u>
Total	379	1,365	1,416	1,430

The increase in manpower in FY 1989 will permit the Inspector General to maintain the momentum of greater emphasis on acquisition-related audits, increase criminal investigations focusing on white collar crime, and respond to more DoD Hotline complaints.

F. THE UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES (USUHS)

USUHS is a fully accredited four year School of Medicine whose primary mission is to select, educate, and train qualified applicants to become "military" physicians. The University is also authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees in basic medical sciences and public health.

USUHS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Military	482	785	782	788
Officer	(454)	(717)	(717)	(723)
Enlisted	(28)	(68)	(65)	(65)
Civilian	<u>502</u>	<u>822</u>	<u>810</u>	<u>810</u>
Total	984	1,607	1,592	1,598

G. THE US COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS (USCMA)

The Court serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

USCMA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Civilian	39	43	49	49

III. PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY
(DPPC)

The following tables show the combined military and civilian
manning programs of the Defense-related organizations by DPPC.

TABLE VII-1
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

TOTAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988 EQMT/AUTH	FY 1989 EQMT/AUTH
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV		
<u>STRATEGIC</u>						
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.1	---	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>						
Intelligence	4.4	4.3	6.0	5.7	6.4	6.4
Centrally Managed Comm.	3.1	3.0	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.5
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	.3	.2	.4	.4	.4	.4
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	41.8	40.6	46.5	46.6	45.8	44.6
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>						
Support Commands	2.8	1.9	3.0	2.9	3.2	3.2
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>						
Research and Development	.5	.5	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1
Geophysical Activities	8.3	8.4	9.3	8.8	8.8	8.7

<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>					
Personnel Support	11.0	10.7	13.4	13.4	14.2
Individual Training	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.4
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>					
Support Installations	6.6	6.4	7.7	8.2	8.2
Centralized Support Act'y	7.5	7.2	14.5	14.1	15.8
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	87.4	84.2	107.8	107.0	108.7
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	---	---	.2	---	.2

TABLE VII-2
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

		TOTAL CIVILIAN MANPOWER (End Strength in Thousands)				FY 1988 RQST/AUTH	FY 1989 RQST/AUTH
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPFC)		FY 1980 AUTH	FY 1980 INV	FY 1987 AUTH	FY 1987 INV		
<u>STRATEGIC</u>							
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces		---	---	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>		---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>							
Intelligence		2.6	2.6	3.7	3.6	4.1	4.1
Centrally Managed Comm.		1.6	1.5	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>		---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>		---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>		.2	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>		---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>		40.6	39.6	45.4	45.5	44.5	43.4
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>							
Support Commands		2.1	1.2	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.4
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>							
Research and Development		.3	.3	.7	.7	.8	.7
Geophysical Activities		7.9	8.0	8.9	8.4	8.3	8.3

<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>					
Personnel Support	11.0	10.6	13.3	13.3	13.3
Individual Training	.6	.5	.7	.6	.7
					14.1
					.7
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>					
Support Installations	6.5	6.3	7.5	8.1	8.1
Centralized Support Act'y	6.3	6.0	13.1	12.7	13.9
					14.3
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	79.7	76.8	98.3	97.8	98.8
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	---	---	---	---	---

TABLE VII-3
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

TOTAL MILITARY MANPOWER (End Strength in Thousands)						
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988	FY 1989
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	BOBT/AUTH	BOBT/AUTH
<u>STRATEGIC</u>						
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>						
	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>						
Intelligence	1.9	1.8	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.3
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.5	1.4	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>						
	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>						
	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>						
	---	---	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>						
	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>						
	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQ/RTS</u>						
Support Commands	.7	.7	.7	.7	.8	.8
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>						
Research and Development	.2	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3
Geophysical Activities	.4	.4	.4	.4	.5	.5

<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>					
Personnel Support	---	.1	.1	---	.1
Individual Training	.5	.5	.8	.8	.8
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>					
Support Installations	.1	.1	.2	.2	.1
Centralized Support Act'y	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.5
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	7.7	7.4	9.5	9.2	9.9
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	---	---	.2	---	.2

TABLE VII-4
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

MILITARY MANPOWER-OFFICER ONLY
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988		FY 1989	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	REQST/AUTH	REQST/AUTH	REQST/AUTH	REQST/AUTH
<u>STRATEGIC</u>								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>								
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>								
Intelligence	1.2	1.1	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Centrally Managed Comm.	.5	.5	.8	.7	.8	.8	.8	.8
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>								
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>								
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>								
	---	---	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>								
	.8	.8	.9	.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQ/RTS</u>								
Support Commands	.6	.6	.5	.5	.6	.6	.6	.6
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>								
Research and Development	.1	.1	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
Geophysical Activities	.2	.1	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2

<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>					
Personnel Support	---	---	---	---	---
Individual Training	.5	.5	.7	.7	.7
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>					
Support Installations	.1	.1	.2	.1	.1
Centralized Support Act'y	.7	.8	1.0	1.0	1.0
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	4.7	4.6	6.1	5.8	6.4
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	---	---	.1	---	.2

TABLE VII-5
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

MILITARY MANPOWER-ENLISTED ONLY
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	FY 1980		FY 1987		FY 1988		FY 1989	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV
<u>STRATEGIC</u>								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>								
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>								
Intelligence	.7	.6	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>								
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>								
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>								
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>								
	.3	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQRS</u>								
Support Commands	.1	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>								
Research and Development	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
Geophysical Activities	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3

<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Individual Training	---	---	.1	---	.1	---	1	---	.1
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Centralized Support Act'y	.5	.4	---	.4	---	.4	.5	---	.5
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	3.0	2.8	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	---	3.5
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	---	---	.1	---	---	---	---	---	---

APPENDIX A

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

I. Introduction

This appendix provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1988.

II. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower, but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions that alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1988 DMRR, by component, are included in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY					CIVILIAN				
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1990
<u>ARMY</u>												
JOINT ACTIVITIES TRANSFER	Tactical Mobility Theater Forces	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
FORSCOM TRANSFER	Tactical Mobility Theater Forces	Tactical Mobility Tactical Support Units	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
AHS EACA	Support Activities	Training and Personnel Personnel Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*	*
FORSCOM COOKS	Combat Installations	Support Activities Support Installations	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	*	*
TRADOC/HICOM	Training and Personnel Individual Training	Support Activities Support Installations	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
VINT HILL TRANSFER	Support Activities Support Installations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRANSFER TO MILPERCEN	Service Management Headquarters Service Support - Combat Commands	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	*	*	*	*	*
CIVPER SVC Transfer	Medical Support	Support Activities Support Installations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*
FINANCE SPT TRANSFER	Tactical Mobility Tactical Support Units	Tactical Mobility Tactical Support Units	0	0	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
JACS TRANSFER	Training and Personnel Personnel Support	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAPLIN SVC TRANSFER	Training and Personnel Individual Training	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	*	*	*	*	*

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY					CIVILIAN				
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1990
TRANSFER FROM JT/USAREC	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	Training and Personnel Personnel Support	0	0	*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRANSFER HSC TO USAREC	Medical Support	Training and Personnel Personnel Support	0	0	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMA TRANSFER	Support Activities Support Installations	Support Activities Centralized Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	.6	.6	*	.2
IMA TRANSFER	Central Logistics Maintenance Operations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	.3	.3	*	.2
IMA TRANSFER	Force Support Training	Support Activities Support Installations	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	*	*
IMA TRANSFER	Centralized Logistics	Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	.2	.2	*	.1
IMA TRANSFER	Support Operations	Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	.2	.2	*	.2
IMA TRANSFER	Combat Installations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	*	*	*	.1
IMA TRANSFER	Combat Installations	Support Activities Support Installations	0	*	*	*	0	0	*	*	*	.1
IMA TRANSFER	Central Logistics Logistics Support Operations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	.2	.2	*	.2
IMA TRANSFER	Tactical Mobility Division Forces	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	*	*	*	.1

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY					CIVILIAN				
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1990
IMA TRANSFER	Medical Support	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	*	*
IMA TRANSFER	Research and Development	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	.1	.1	*		*
IMA TRANSFER	Tactical/Mobility Mobility Forces	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	.3	.3	*		*
IMA TRANSFER	Training and Personnel Individual Training	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	*	*	*		.3
IMA TRANSFER	Tactical/Mobility Tactical Support Units	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*		*
EEO TRANSFER	Medical Support	Combat Installations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		.2
ARTBASS SYS	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	Training and Personnel Personnel Support	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*		.1
SOF TRANSFER	Force Support Training	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	*	*	*		.2
SOF TRANSFER	Support Activities Support Installations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0		0

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	ROM	TO	MILITARY					CIVILIAN				
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1990
SOF TRANSFER	Tactical/Mobility Division	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	.2	.8	.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
SOF TRANSFER	Tactical/Mobility Non-Deployment Units	Tactical/Mobility Theater Forces	0	0	.2	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
PEO TRANSFER	Central Logistics	Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*
PEO TRANSFER	Training and Personnel Individual Training	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	0	0
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING	Medical Support	Research and Development	0	*	*	*	0	*	*	*	0	0
ATR AVIATION TRANSFER	Combat Installations	Service Management HQ Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.1
TRANS MDW TO SECARMY	Support Activities Support Installations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	*	0	.2	.2	0
SPRING TNG AREA TRANSFER	Support Activities Support Installations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRANSFER USAFAC TO SEC	Support Activities Support Installations	Support Activities Centralized Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	0
COMMERCIAL ACT STUDY	Support Activities Support Installations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	0	*	*	.1	.1	.1
COMMERCIAL ACT STUDY	Central Logistics	Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.1	.1	*
COMMERCIAL ACT STUDY	Central Logistics Maintenance Operations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.1	.1	.1

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM:	TO	MILITARY					CIVILIAN				
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
ECOM JRP	Tactical/Mobility Theater Forces	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	*	*
TRANSFER MILVAN	Central Logistics Supply Operations	Tactical/Mobility Mobility Forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	*
PRD331 FUNC TRANSFER	Support Activities Support Installations	Communications/Intelligence Intelligence	0	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	.1	
PRD331 FUNC TRANSFER	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	Communications/Intelligence Intelligence	0	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	*	*
PRD331 FUNC TRANSFER	Tactical/Mobility Theater Forces	Communications/Intelligence Intelligence	0	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	*	*
PRD331 FUNC TRANSFER	Joint Activities International Military Organizations	Communications/Intelligence Intelligence	0	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0
PRD331 FUNC TRANSFER	Research and Development	Communications/Intelligence Intelligence	0	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	*	*
TV AUDIO TRANSFER	Center Logistics Maintenance Operations	Support Activities Support Installations	0	*	*	*	*	0	*	*	*	*
TV AUDIO TRANSFER	Central Logistics Logistics Support Operation	Support Activities Support Installations	0	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	*
TV AUDIO TRANSFER	Central Logistics Supply Operations	Support Activities Support Installations	0	*	*	*	*	0	.1	.1	*	*

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY					CIVILIAN				
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
CLOSING OF COMMISSARY	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	Support Activities Support Installations	0	*	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0
LSV TRANSFER	Training and Personnel Individual Training	Tactical Mobility Tactical Support Units	0	*	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	*
MICROGRAPHICS TRANSFER	Service Management HQ Service Support-Support Commands	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	*	*
TRADOC TO CZAC TRANSFER	Support Activities Support Installations	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	*	*
TACEN TO MILPERCEN XFER	Service Management HQ Service Support-Support Commands	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
CANOPY WING TRANSFER	Training and Personnel Individual Training	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	0	0	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	*
MILPERCEN TO USAREC	Support Activities Centralized Support Activities	Training and Personnel Personnel Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*
ROUTE RESTORAL TRANSFER	Support Activities Support Installations	Tactical/Mobility Division Forces	0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
PERSONNEL SVC TRANSFER	Medical Support	Support Activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	0

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990

- NOTES:
1. Figures are based upon the FY 88-89 Presidents Budget through the Amended Budget changes.
 2. MORAD, SPACECOM AND EDTZ changes based upon OSD direction.
 3. * less than 50

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
			FY 1966	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969	FY 1966	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969
<u>NAVY</u>										
Air Engineering Centers	Centralized Logistics	Base Operating Support					5.2	5.4	5.3	5.4
Naval Civil Engineering	EDICE, N	Base Operating Support					.4	.4	.4	.4
Cruise Missiles Project	Tactical Air Forces	Centralized Logistics					.2	.2	.2	.2

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1967	FY 1968
<u>MARINE CORPS</u>						
Support to JTC3A	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Communications Intel Centrally Managed Comm	*	*	*	*
International Activities	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities International Military Organizations	*	*	*	*
Support to OSD	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities International Military Organizations	*	*	*	*
Foreign Military Sales	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities International Military Organizations	*	*	*	*
HQ, Northern Air Defense	Support Forces Management Headquarters International Headquarters	Joint Activities International Military Organizations	*	*	*	*
International Management Headquarters	Support Forces Management Headquarters International Headquarters	Joint Activities International Military Organizations	.05	*	*	*
Management Headquarters US Space Command	Support Forces Management Headquarters Unified Commands	Joint Activities Unified Commands	*	*	*	*
Management Headquarters Atlantic Command	Support Forces Management Headquarters Unified Commands	Joint Activities Unified Commands	*	*	*	*

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Management Headquarters US European Command	Support Forces Management Headquarters Unified Commands	Joint Activities Unified Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Pacific Command	Support Forces Management Headquarters Unified Commands	Joint Activities Unified Commands	.05	*	*			
Management Headquarters Southern Command	Support Forces Management Headquarters Unified Commands	Joint Activities Unified Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Readiness Command	Support Forces Management Headquarters Unified Commands	Joint Activities Unified Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Central Command	Support Forces Management Headquarters Unified Commands	Joint Activities Unified Commands	.13	.12	.12			
US Space Command	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
US Ele. Lt., Northern Air Defense	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
US Southern Command	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
Support to OSD	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Support to JCS	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Other Activities	.05	.07	.07			
Foreign Counter Intel	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
Support to DoD Inspector General	Support Forces Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
Support To Defense Mapping Agency	Auxiliary Activities Geophysical Activities	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
Support To Defense Nuclear Agency	Support Forces Central Logistics Logistics Support Ops	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
Support to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	Auxiliary Activities Research and Development	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
Support To Defense Logistics Agency	Support Forces Central Logistics Supply Operations	Joint Activities Other Activities	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Fleet	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management HQ Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Sea Control	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management HQ Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*			

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Management Headquarters Surface	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters FMF	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	.7	.6	.6	*	*	*
Management Headquarters Sealift	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Research and Development	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Logistics, Navy	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Training, Navy	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*			
Management Headquarters Public Affairs	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*	*	*	*
Management Headquarters Departmental	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	.3	.3	.3	.1	.1	.1
Management Headquarters Departmental, Navy	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	.1	.1	.1			

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1987	FY 1988
Management Headquarters Administrative	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	.5	.5	.6	.6
Management Headquarters Administrative, Navy	Support Forces Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat HQ	Service Management Headquarters Service Support-Combat Commands	*	*	*	*

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1987	FY 1988
<u>AIR FORCE</u>						
Station Hosp and Clinics	Spt Install	Med Spt	22.6		4.3	
Intl Activities	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	1.3		*	
Svc Spt to OSD/DSAA, Map	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.2		*	
Misc Spt to Oth Nations	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	*		-	
Svc Spt to OSD/DSAA, Map						
Non-Reimbursable	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	*		*	
For Mil Sales (Reimburs)	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	1.2		1.3	
US SPACECOM Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.1		-	
US Element NOPAD Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.1		*	
Atlantic Command Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.1		*	
US European Cmd Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	*		*	
US Pacific Cmd Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	*		*	
US Southern Cmd Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	*		-	
US Read Command - Coma	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.1		-	
US Read Command - Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.3		*	
US Central Cmd Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.1		-	
For Counterintel Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.4		.1	
Security & Invest Actys	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	1.5		.4	
Service Spt to OSD	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.2		-	
Service Spt to JCS	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	.4		-	
Service Spt to DIG	Cnt Spt Act	Joint Actys	*		-	

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1987	FY 1988
Service Spt to DARPA	R&D	Joint Actys	*		-	
Service Spt to DWA	R&D	Joint Actys	.1		-	
Service Spt to SDIO	R&D	Joint Actys	.1		-	
Service Spt to JCS	R&D	Joint Actys	*		-	
Service Spt to DWA	Geophysical	Joint Actys	.2		-	
Service Spt to OSD	Personnel Spt	Joint Actys	*		-	
Service Spt to USUSH						
(Including Students)						
EURO-MATO Jet Trng	Indiv Trng	Joint Actys	.2		-	
Service Spt to DLA	Indiv Trng	Joint Actys	.4		*	
Service Spt to DWA	Supply Ops	Joint Actys	.4		-	
	Log Spt Ops	Joint Actys	.2		-	

*Fewer than 50

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1987	FY 1988
Service Spt to DARPA	R&D	Joint Actys	*		-	
Service Spt to DNA	R&D	Joint Actys	.1		-	
Service Spt to SDIO	R&D	Joint Actys	.1		-	
Service Spt to JCS	R&D	Joint Actys	*		-	
Service Spt to DMA	Geophysical	Joint Actys	.2		-	
Service Spt to OSD	Personnel Spt	Joint Actys	*		-	
Service Spt to USUSH (Including Students)						
EURO-NATO Jet Trng	Indiv Trng	Joint Actys	.2		-	
Service Spt to DLA	Indiv Trng	Joint Actys	.4		*	
Service Spt to DNA	Supply Ops	Joint Actys	.4		-	
	Log Spt Ops	Joint Actys	.2		-	

*Fewer than 50

. APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AC: Active Component

AFR: Air Force Reserve of the Air Force

ARF: Air Reserve Forces of the Air Force. Includes Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.

Authorized Strength Report: A Marine Corps term synonymous with programmed manning.

Balanced Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meets the following criteria: (See overage and shortage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	> 95% and < 105%
100-499 people	> 90% and < 110%
less than 100 people	> 85% and < 115%

Billet: A programmed manpower structure space that defines by grade and occupation a job to be performed which is associated with a specific unit or organization (see position).

Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM): Military personnel assigned to tactical units who are actually employed in civilian positions in support activities. BMM usually occurs when civilian position requirements have been identified, but no civilian personnel are authorized due to budget or end strength ceiling constraints.

Careerist: A service member with more than four years of completed Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS). (see First-Termer)

Critical Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory is equal to or less than 85% of the desired population for the fiscal year.

Distributable Billets: A Navy term synonymous with programmed manning.

End-Strength: The sum of operating strength and the "Individuals" category on the last day of the fiscal year.

First-Termer: An enlisted service member who has completed four years or less Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS). (see Careerist)

Force Structure: The numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings.

Force Structure Allowance: An Army term synonymous with programmed manning.

Force Structure Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with programmed manning.

Funded Peacetime Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with programmed manning.

Grade: The pay grade requirement of a billet or the pay grade possessed by a service member.

Individuals: Transients, trainees (includes Reserve Component training pipeline for the Reserve Component), patients, prisoners, holdees, cadets and students -- personnel not filling programmed manpower structure spaces. This "overhead" is required to maintain the programmed structure at one hundred percent of programmed manning.

Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA): Individuals carried in the Selected Reserve programmed manning who fill Active Component billets upon mobilization. IMA billets are not included in Active Component Programmed Manpower Structure in the DMRR.

Lateral Movement: A reclassification action resulting in a change of a service member's primary occupation.

Manning Level: Synonymous with programmed manning

Occupation: The specialty skill requirement of a billet, and the skill qualifications of personnel. Occupations are defined according to the following coding systems.

Army: SSI (officer), MOS (Enlisted)
 Navy: NOBC (officer), Rating/NEC (enlisted)
 USAF: AFSC (officer & enlisted)
 USMC: MOS (officer & enlisted)

Occupational Field: An aggregation of discrete occupations.

Operating Strength: An Army term identifying that portion of end strength assigned to units in the programmed structure. The term is synonymous with the following for the other Services:

Navy: distributable strength
 USAF: assigned strength
 USMC: chargeable strength

For the Selected Reserve, "trained strength in units" is equivalent to operating strength.

Operating Strength Cycle:

The annual variation in operating strength resulting from seasonal fluctuations in the number of personnel categorized as "Individuals."

Operating Strength Deviation:

The difference between operating strength and programmed manning at a point in time or the average difference (expressed in man-years) for the entire fiscal year.

Overage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meet the following criteria: (see balanced and shortage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	> 105%
100-499 people	> 110%
less than 100 people	> 115%

Position:

Same as Billet above,

Programmed Force Structure:

The set of units and organizations that exists in the current year, and which is planned to exist in each future year of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

Programmed Manpower Structure:

The aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirement for all units and organizations in the programmed force structure. This does not include IMAs or Individuals.

Programmed Manning:

Those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be filled. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100% fill of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. The term "programmed manning" is synonymous with:

Army: Force Structure Allowance
Navy: Distributable billets
USAF: Force Structure Authorizations, and
Funded Peacetime Authorizations
USMC: Authorized Strength Report

RC:

Reserve Component (includes Selected Reserve and National Guard); the Air Force also uses the term Air Reserve Forces (ARF).

Round out:

An Army term wherein Reserve Component units are assigned to Active Component divisions to make up the difference between the number of Active Component units required in a standard division configuration and the number of Active Component units actually assigned. These Reserve Component units are scheduled to deploy with the Active Component division, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Round Up:

An Army term wherein Reserve Component units are assigned to Active Component divisions to augment the division structure. These Reserve Component units are scheduled to deploy with Active Component divisions, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Shortage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory, when compared to Programmed Manning plus Individuals (PMI), meets the following criteria: (see balanced and overage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	< 95%
100-499 people	< 90%
less than 100 people	< 85%

Skill:

Same as occupation

Stability:

Aggregate: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the Service continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.

Unit: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the same unit continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.

Staffing:

The process of distributing personnel to fill programmed manning targets in accordance with assignment policies, tour length constraints, and projections of the trained operating strength population.

**Training and
Administration of
Reserves (TARS):**

A Navy term referring to full-time manpower support to the Navy Reserve. This Manpower is budgetted and accounted for within the Selected Reserve.

Training Pipeline:

Reserve component military personnel in training status, including training/pay categories F, Q, U, P, and T.

APPENDIX C

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

1. STRATEGIC. The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies.

a. Offensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships, long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft, strategic cruise missiles, and operational headquarters for these forces.

b. Defensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command, control, and surveillance and warning systems.

c. Strategic Control and Surveillance. This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY. The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

a. Land Forces. This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

(1) Division Forces. This category contains program elements for Army and Marine divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine war reserve materiel, for Army resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC), and for the Army and Marine Components of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force are also included in this category.

(2) Theater Forces. This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Berlin and Panama; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other Services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units; and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar reinforcing units in Army Forces Command.

b. Tactical Air Forces. This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and weapon system security units; multi-purpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems and ground launched cruise missiles; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Force direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force command control facilities and systems in Europe and the Pacific, Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC), war reserve materiel, and the Air Force Component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

c. Naval Forces. The DPPCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

(1) Warships and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Forces. This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, battleships, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and tactically supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

(2) Amphibious Forces. This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, Navy special warfare forces, the Navy component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

(3) Naval Support Forces. This category contains program elements for forward logistical supporting forces, carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, intermediate maintenance activities, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the Navy component of the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) program.

d. Mobility Forces. This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift; sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships; and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

3. COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. This category contains program elements for the centrally managed communications and intelligence gathering activities.

a. Centrally Managed Communications. This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications Systems, the military Service's communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical, or WWMCCS missions, and management headquarters.

b. Intelligence. This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

4. COMBAT INSTALLATIONS. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Programs 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

5. FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING. This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant, surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training at fleet training centers, submarine schools and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps unit and force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, and Air Force combat crew training squadrons.

6. MEDICAL SUPPORT. This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD regional medical facilities, including medical centers and laboratories; and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research, medical equipment and systems, and health care in station hospitals and medical clinics.

7. JOINT ACTIVITIES. This category contains program elements for those source manpower billets which are outside of service control. They include manning requirements of such organization as the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the like.

a. International Military Organizations. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Examples are: NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

b. Unified Commands. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: US European Command, US Pacific Command, etc.

c. Federal Agency Support. This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

d. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This category contains the program element codes for the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities. This category contains the program element codes for the Staffs of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Agencies and Activities.

8. CENTRAL LOGISTICS. This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

a. Supply Operations. This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, centralized procurement offices, and for military personnel support to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). It also includes resources for POL pipeline and storage operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operations.

b. Maintenance Operations. This category contains elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities and logistic centers.

c. Logistics Support Operations. This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are program elements for industrial preparedness.

9. SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS. This category contains the program elements for the service combat and support commands.

a. Combat Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the military Service combat commands, i.e., those in Major Defense Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: US Army, Europe; US Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

b. Support Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of military Service support commands, i.e., those in Major Defense Programs 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

10. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. This category also includes program elements for geophysical activities.

a. Research and Development Activities. This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) projection and for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other program elements not in Program 6, but containing research and development resources.

b. Geophysical Activities. This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

11. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL.

a. Individual Training. This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of Service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

b. Personnel Support. This category contains program elements for provision of varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, Section 6 schools, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the American Forces Information Program, civilian career training and intern programs, and the VEAP program. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

12. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for support installations and centralized activities.

a. Support Installations. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, and administrative commands (Programs 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

b. Centralized Support Activities. This category contains miscellaneous Service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for combat developments, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, audiovisual activities, claims, service-wide support, and other miscellaneous support.

13. INDIVIDUALS. The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not considered force structure manpower. They are transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets/midshipmen.

a. Transients. This category contains only the Transient program element, which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees. This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element that consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

c. Trainees, Students, and Cadets/Midshipmen. This category contains active service officer students, active enlisted students, active enlisted trainees, Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen, active officer accession students, and the Reserve Components training pipeline personnel.