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THE PROSPECT OF INCREASED
JAPANESE MILITARY BURDENSARING

BY

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defense efforts become an even more serious issue by having to continue to rely on the United States to provide security and stability in Northeast Asia. Japan's attempt to increase its share of defense burden faces strong opposition in Japan as well as in other Asian nations. The Japanese, in general, do not perceive the Soviet threat to be real despite the presence of large Soviet forces just off Japan. Additionally, the Japanese argue that any attempt at rearming is prohibited by the Constitution imposed by the United States after World War II. Furthermore, some state that the current level of Japan Self-Defense Forces represents a balance between the dictates of the Constitution and the need to defend Japan against a small-scale attack--any increases in their military capability amounts to rearming. Other Asian nations remain fearful of Japan's rise toward military power and object to any attempt of Japan playing a greater military role in Asia. Negotiating with Japan, then, for a much greater role in defense burdensharing will be difficult. Unfortunately, many American negotiators are not adequately prepared to deal with the Japanese because they are not familiar with Japan's consensus-oriented decisionmaking process. Japan, however, does plan to contribute more toward its own defense by following its current defense programs which have been characterized by a steady growth in its defense budget to modernize the Self-Defense Force. Indeed, as this paper suggests, such growth is a most realistic approach to achieving a greater role in defense burdensharing with the United States.

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THE PROSPECT OF
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A GROUP PROJECT

by

Colonel Hajime Matsusaki, JGSDF
Lt Colonel Brian Y. Shiroyama, USAF

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Project Advisor



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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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ABSTRACT

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THE PROSPECT OF
INCREASED JAPANESE MILITARY BURDENSARING

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In April 1952, [Ambassador John] Allison outlined the case for going slowly on the issue of Japanese defense. In a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, he pointed out that Japanese rearmament was as much a political problem as a military one, in that "the development and expansion of Japanese military forces go to the very heart of Japan's future and explore the sensitive nerves of Japan's political life."¹

Not much has changed since 1952, and the debate concerning Japan's rearmament continues. Today's debate, however, is inextricably tied to economic as well as political dimensions in the Japan-U.S. relations. The economic difficulties in the United States today have once again spurred criticism that Japan's "free ride" must end. The emotional reaction to Japan's seemingly uncooperative attitude is understandable. After all, the protective umbrella of the United States enabled Japan to prosper by having to spend minimally on its own defense and mostly on its economy. Therefore, it appears reasonable to demand that Japan now reciprocate by rearming or contributing more to defense burdensharing with the United States.² Some critics even argue that Japan should assume a greater role in the security of the entire Northeast Asia. However, while emotions may be high in America, the prospect of Japan doing much more toward its own defense and certainly for the security of the entire region appears low. The evolution

of Japan's defense forces has been a painful process, and, therefore, substantial changes are not likely to occur soon. From the United States' perspective, Japan appears arrogant and ungrateful. From Japan's view, however, it is a necessary course of action, at least for now, for its current position on defense is a product of carefully balanced consensus; changes are difficult.

JAPAN'S FUTURE

Japan faces serious future challenges--management of major internal forces shaping the future and maintaining its full partnership share in the Japan-U.S. defense alliance.³ Under the protective umbrella of the United States, Japan has invested only 1 percent of gross national product (GNP) on defense over the years. It has also emerged as a front rank economic power with a per capita GNP that surpasses even the United States. The oil embargo in the 1970s, however, highlighted Japan's vulnerability to external forces and the frailty of its economy. Accordingly, in order to manage these future challenges, Japan once again looked to the United States for help, for Japan's Self-Defense Forces were built only to counter a limited, small-scale threat to Japan. The United States in turn has let Japan know of its concerns about the alliance. Although the Nakasone Cabinet did eventually supersede the self-imposed 1-percent-of-GNP limit on defense,⁴ the fundamental questions of national security still remain.

Should Japan rearm? Can Japan still count on the United States to defend Japan against the Soviets? If Japan must rearm, can its economy survive? These are difficult questions that Japan must answer in order to meet the basic challenges facing the country in the future.

THESIS

This paper will examine these questions in an effort to better understand Japan's position. It will look at the role the Soviet threat plays in Japan's planning for defense. It will trace the evolution of Japan's defense posture and analyze views expressed by various critics of Japan's defense effort. The paper will also outline Japan's position and explore future possibilities and implications.

Essentially, the paper will argue that Ambassador Allison's idea on patiently negotiating with Japan will serve the best interests of the United States. In offering explanations for this approach, the paper will assert that Americans must first understand Japan, its people, culture, and history in order to be effective in negotiating with the Japanese. Finally, the paper will offer some clues as to how the Americans can negotiate better with the Japanese.

The future of the Japan-U.S. relationship will be tempered by the quality of agreements and understanding of economic and defense issues. Therefore, it is vitally important that the

United States is best prepared now for future negotiations.
This paper is intended to help that process.

ENDNOTES

1. H.W. Brands, Jr., "The United States and the Reemergence of Independent Japan," Pacific Affairs, Fall 1986, p. 392.

2. The terms rearming and militarism will be used interchangeably to imply a substantial increase in military capability. Japan's current defense expenditure characterized by gradual growth, therefore, would not fall within the definition of rearming or militarism. The term burdensharing relative to Japan is used in most American literature to imply Japan's assumption of a greater military responsibility through larger monetary contributions for defense. Burdensharing, however, has added meaning from Japan's perspective. See Appendix I for perspectives on defense burdensharing viewed from both sides.

3. Fortune (30 March 1987) cited five forces that will shape the future of Japan: demands from outsiders for Japan to "internationalize;" discontent with a school system that may stifle creativity; the burden of caring for the increasing number of senior citizens; shortage of space; and a blow to the national psyche as the ideal of lifetime employment fades away. These problems will be addressed in Chapter II.

4. Although Japan's annual defense budgets for the last decade were limited to 1 percent of GNP, the expenditures showed real growth because of an increase in GNP each year. Notwithstanding pressures from the United States, the real growth in Japan's defense budgets were necessary in response to changes in the international environment such as the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets and the perceived decline of U.S. strength in Asia after the withdrawal from Vietnam.

CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING JAPAN

Japan is confronted with the need for nothing less than a sweeping cultural change. Having become a global economic power, it is now being asked to adopt truly internationalist attitudes and policies--and in the shortest possible time. The impediments to such a course are considerable. Japanese society is still governed largely by hierarchical principles, and if hazardous generalizations are permissible, the Japanese people are basically introverted, most comfortable with a small, intimate group living and acting in accordance with long-established rules. The tolerance, the openness, the "turning out" in a psychological as well as an economic sense required of a cosmopolitan people is yet to be widely acquired.¹

The lack of understanding--in some cases, the unwillingness to understand or even appreciate each other's views--is a major factor in what has become a most difficult relationship between two nations. To some extent, the current Japan-U.S. relationship reflects that observation. Unfortunately, it is probably true that the Japanese know more about the United States than the Americans about Japan. In order to be successful in dealing with the Japanese, the Americans need to know more about Japan--lifestyle, motivation, and values. When the American critics press for Japan's rearming, they need to understand Japan's sensitivity toward other Asian nations. Additionally, when the American negotiators deal with their Japanese counterparts on trade or defense issues, the understanding of Japan's future will be a key asset in formulating an effective negotiation strategy.

SOME COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE JAPANESE

Perhaps the most common misperception about the Japanese is that they are enormously wealthy because of Japan's economic successes. No doubt, the healthy economy helped boost their personal income and some Japanese, in fact, enjoy a comfortable life. The number of Japanese tourists in the United States certainly reinforce American perceptions of their wealth. In Japan, however, one sees an entirely different picture, for most live modestly and frugally with little sign of the wealth the Americans attribute to the Japanese. Many Japanese live in small, exorbitantly priced houses, labor 500 hours a year longer than their European counterpart, and pay almost twice as much for food as North Americans.² To make matters worse, Japan is extremely crowded (travel is always measured by the time it takes, not by distance). All this translates to the quality of life that is incongruent with their perceived wealth and comfort. Yet, despite strong criticism of the high cost of land and houses and concern for pollution caused by industries, the Japanese are content and grateful for what they have, especially after having experienced the devastation of war. They consider their current status as the product of long years of hard work and sacrifices and thus take exception to any suggestions that they must either change or make more sacrifices. Robert Scalapino, a professor of East Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, describes the feeling of many Japanese:

For many Japanese . . . there is no particular reason to alter economic practices for the benefit of others. Is not Japanese success the product of hard work and sacrifice, with material gratification often postponed?³

Suggestions by American economists to increase domestic spending, therefore, is looked upon by some Japanese as an attempt to change the basic structure of Japanese lifestyle, for saving now for pleasure later is the Japanese way of life. For this reason, an attempt by the Japanese government to help balance the trade imbalance by spurring domestic spending will probably not produce any measurable results soon. The apparent wealth of the Japanese, thus, should not be the reason for driving an economic initiative to ease the trade tension, for such perceptions can be erroneous in view of their quality of life and disciplined but modest lifestyle now.

Americans also fail to appreciate another important aspect of Japanese lifestyle that has an impact on the Japan-U.S. relationship. It is the intensity and depth of their competitive spirit whose success is measured only by winning, not by the consolation of having participated in the competition. Winning becomes institutionalized to the point that it simply becomes the process of a student, businessman, or politician. It starts early. In some cases, the process begins even in the kindergarten in order to enter a prestigious university which in turn maps out a winning course for later endeavor. Winning in industries is obviously determined by the margin or profit, politics by adroitly gathering consensus, and so forth. It is a relentless process the Japanese thrive on; it is their

lifestyle. For this reason, helping to balance the trade imbalance becomes a difficult predicament for them. Japan's economic success is based on exporting, and being told by the government to export less and import more is looked upon as accepting defeat--totally contrary to their winning lifestyle. Helping, they understand; losing--it's another story. The Japanese government, therefore, must be extremely careful in dealing with trade issues, for it was the unique partnership of Japan's political bureaucracy and the private sector that brought Japan into its superpower status in the first place. Concession, then, if any at all, on trade and overall economic issues will have to be a carefully derived position. It is the slow process that often results in emotional responses from U.S. Congressmen. To make the matter worse, shortsighted "Japan bashing" episodes and the threat of retaliation by protectionism only cause to delay that already slow process. A deliberate and patient approach is the best way for American negotiators.

Another important ingredient in the Japanese way of life is the sense of loyalty, interpersonal and organizational. The Americans hear about the concept of life-long employment in Japanese businesses, but they often do not comprehend the magnitude of its relevancy in their lifestyle. Loyalty also begets expectations of reciprocation, not by demand but simply by a sense of obligation. Sometimes, this sense of obligation transcends time as in the case of protecting the interest of

the farmers. The Japanese government vowed many years ago to give the farmers special consideration because of centuries of abuse and injustice during the feudal periods. Consequently, the farmers now wield considerable influence in the political process, thus ensuring continued protection. This does not imply, by any means, that the interests of the farmer will continue to be protected. Already, Japan has become the largest importer of farm products from the United States. It is possible that more concessions will be made. However, again, it will be a careful and deliberate process that will take time, perhaps much longer than some Congressmen are willing to wait. The bond of loyalty and obligation is difficult to transcend in the interest of expediency.

The breach of loyalty in Japan's value system causes irrevocable damage to a relationship. Unfortunately, the "Nixon shocks" of the 1970s are still being felt in Japan and continue to undermine trust and confidence that are essential to a sound Japan-U.S. relationship. The Japanese are also victimized by an even more significant breach of loyalty of the past. It is more significant because the breach was by its own government before and during World War II, and this sentiment continues to haunt any rearming effort. It was the Tojo government's deception throughout the war that misled the people into believing that Japan was winning the war and that their sacrifice and hardship in the name of the Emperor were not in vain. The defeat might have been militarily inevitable

but they, nevertheless, felt betrayed by the military government--not to be forgotten easily. For this reason, some Japanese will not support the Self-Defense Forces, much less the rearming of Japan. For them, non-military diplomacy is the main approach to promoting peace and stability in Japan.

JAPAN'S SENSITIVITY TOWARD OTHER ASIAN NATIONS

Critics of Japan's defense posture fail to argue views which include reactions from other Asian nations on Japan's rearming. If they do, they show only a superficial understanding and appreciation for the sensitive nature of the relationships among Asian nations, for Japan is still remembered by many as the "former enemy." This view is certainly understandable since most of the current leaders of these Asian nations have first-hand experience with the occupation and domination of Japan's military forces in World War II. Now that Japan has become an economic giant in its own class, they fear the potential Japan has in becoming a military power as well. Therefore, they watch Japan's progress on defense carefully and respond to any sign of militarism. For instance, George Packard wrote of China's reaction when Japan breached its self-imposed one-percent-of-GNP limit:

This will presumably remove some of the political and psychological restraints against even greater defense spending. But Japanese leaders were shocked by harsh criticism from China over this step, and they continue to face strong domestic opposition to a more rapid military buildup. Thus it seems clear that American advocates of faster Japanese rearmament will be disappointed for some years to come.⁴

Informal interviews of officers representing the Asian nations at the U.S. Army War College revealed unanimous concern for the potential Japan has for rearming. It is interesting to note that they were particularly concerned about Japan's proposal to defend its sea lanes of communication (SLOC) that extends 1,000 miles from Japan. The sight of Japanese warships will certainly evoke the memory of the Imperial Japanese Navy escorting the armada of invasion troops. The Japanese battle flags on these warships will restore fears of the past some 40 years ago. Such perceptions can cause an adverse impact on trade, and since Japan is already looking for China to become its major trade partner in the future, it is certain that Japan will move cautiously toward implementation of the SLOC defense. For this reason, some critics of the SLOC policy believe Japan's SLOC defense to be more myth than reality.⁵ Regardless of Japan's actual SLOC defense capability, the importance of other Asian nations' perceptions will cause Japan to surely remain sensitive.

JAPAN'S TROUBLED FUTURE?

Japan should also be studied from the perspective of its future, for understanding its future beyond its current economic success may give valuable insight as to how Japan may react to American proposals on trade and defense. One, then, may see that to assume that Japan will continue to be an economic

superpower and therefore to argue that Japan should contribute substantially more for its defense may be too simplistic.

It appears that Japan is headed for difficult times. For example, the strength of the yen is said to be already creating an adverse impact on its economy with export in 1986 dropping by 16 percent and industrial production falling to its lowest level in 11 years. Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, Japan's unemployment figure might have topped 3 percent in 1986.⁶ These are figures Japan is unaccustomed to seeing in modern years. Additionally, for the first time, there are voices of discontent of its own economy:

At the root of the problems in contemporary Japan is the fact that men and women are used as tools for economic competition. It added that the process had "deprived them of their humanity."⁷

Another analyzes Japan's industrial concerns:

Japan, the great tinkerer, is not yet the great inventor. In high technology it will have to face the unsettling question of whether it can be truly creative or must be resigned to imitate--perhaps better and more cheaply--what someone else has already invented.⁸

Japan obviously would like to consider itself above the "tinkering" level in its technology, and, in fact, can show evidence of higher-level accomplishments in computer and other technologies. Yet, the days of Japan's domination even as a tinkerer may be rapidly nearing its end as it faces stiff competition from other Asian nations. Such views are expressed by Peter Drucker, a professor of social science and management at the Claremont Graduate School in California. He traces the history of Japan's economic development, analyzes its growth,

and subsequently warns that Japan's future rests on making decisions about the "persona of Japan in modern, that is, Western world." Interestingly, he argues that the unique Japanese ways that helped Japan become an economic power may also serve to bring a major economic disaster. Drucker assesses that Japan's cost advantage, despite its high productivity, is rapidly declining, yielding to such newcomers as South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. This decline is expected to have a serious impact on Japan's export-led economic strategy. Accordingly, Japan has already reacted with several initiatives. Japan has successfully marketed quality in luxury cars and electronic equipment. Japan also invested heavily in automation to cut production costs. Most successful, yet most controversial from the perspective of Japan's future, was its decision to adopt a multinational approach which moved production out of Japan. Hondas and Toyotas quickly became the symbols of success in Japan's multinationalism. However, according to Drucker, serious problems emerged because moving factories overseas meant less job opportunities for Japan's blue-collar work force. A more serious problem having a profound impact on Japan's society is the undermining of its traditionally family-like approach to management. Therefore, Drucker maintains that Japan must now choose between its traditional way or Westernized way of multinationalism. Japan's economic survival depends on that choice.

Japan, in fact, has been "going Western" for some time. In the last decade, the term "internationalization" has received immense popularity. However, Japan's definition of Westernization was more in the realm of participating, pleasure or business, abroad rather than freely opening Japan for Western invasion. This was particularly true in the area of trade and business adventures. Japan will most likely practice Westernization overseas and continue to stay with traditional ways in Japan. Japan really has no choice inspite of an anticipated downtrend in its economic production, for their society is resistant to any major change. The country still remembers the arrival of Commodore Perry several hundred years ago and giving in to the West. Whatever the choice Japan ultimately makes will most likely be accompanied by turmoil in its society.

In addition to its economic problems, Japan is expected to face social problems of significant importance. One is the growing number of elderly Japanese compounded by acute housing shortages due to high cost. Fortune estimates that by the end of the century, as many as ten million elderly persons could be looking for places to stay.¹⁰ It amounts to 16% of Japan's population over the age of 65, and current expenditure of 5% of GNP for the elderly is expected to go up substantially. The problem of care for the elderly is relatively new in Japan for, traditionally, they were taken care of by the oldest son. However, more and more elderly persons are being displaced now, and the government is expected to be burdened

with this relatively new phenomenon. Obviously the enormous cost of caring for the elderly will compete with defense programs in the future. Austere times may be ahead.

Future social problems will not be limited to the elderly. In fact, Japan's more serious problem in terms of causing long-term implications may be the educational system. It has been the object of criticism for many years, but not much progress has been made to solve the problem. Japan's educational system is an extremely stressful process. It is a process that places much more emphasis on rote learning than creativity, efficiency over deliberateness, and conformity over new ideas. It is fair to state that a student's success as an adult is primarily determined by his/her educational accomplishments. As explained previously, the competition starts early, even in kindergarten, and it continues to its ultimate goal--to be accepted by one of the prestigious universities which significantly enhances one's job prospects after graduation. In this process, many high school students with aspirations to go to college attend preparatory courses after school at their own expense. The process, then, while highly efficient in producing disciplined and competitive students, miserably fails to produce creative thinkers and innovators. The process simply does not permit the nurturing of "what if" ideas, for there is neither the time nor the place to successfully challenge the process. The economic arena so far has been very much enhanced by highly productive managers and workers. However, this regimented

style with practically no flexibility only reinforces Drucker's earlier characterization of Japan's business practices as imitative rather than innovative. Unless Japan's educational process changes, Japan will not be able to produce the innovators and inventors, and without them, "Westernization" may be difficult.

Japan, then, may be headed for difficult times economically and socially. For this reason, pressuring Japan to do more on its defense in the next decade may not produce the magnitude of results Americans may be expecting. American negotiators may need to look for other ways to approach Japan so that a momentum of steady increase in the defense budget can be maintained.

CONCLUSION

In an international environment, misconceptions about another nation and its foreign policy can be dangerous. Unfortunately, the Japan-U.S. relationship in recent years seems to reflect a lack of understanding of each other. The Americans perpetuate the problem by not having "Japan experts" in the government. Japan, while having an extensive knowledge of the United States, does not appear to be able to articulate Japan's position to the U.S. government.¹²

The critics of Japan's defense effort often fail to adequately consider other Asian nations' reactions to Japan's potential in rearming. Ignoring other Asian nations' reactions will only increase the American burden in having to mediate

between Japan and other Asian countries. They will look to the United States to keep Japan under control.

Japan's anticipated economic decline will certainly have an adverse impact on its defense efforts in the future. If the quality of life in Japan declines because of an economic slowdown, the Japanese are not likely to support a substantial increase in defense spending. A steady, modest increase in the defense budget is more realistic than rearming.

In the difficult times ahead, Japan must actively and carefully cultivate its economic relationship with other nations. One viable way, especially in dealing with other Asian nations, is to step up the technological assistance to newly industrialized countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Similar aid to the Philippines, Thailand, and China will also be helpful. Akira Kubota, an editorial writer for the Asahi Shimbun, offers his view:

Japanese industrialists should also remember that almost all sectors of Japanese industry have benefited from the generous technological cooperation given to Japan by the United States. This cooperation was responsible for the revival and boom of the postwar Japanese economy. Now Japan's turn has come to share what it has learned to other nations in Asia.¹³

Additionally, technological cooperation between the United States and Japan could offer significantly tangible benefits to both sides. The signing of the Strategic Defense Initiative agreement in which Japanese companies would be allowed to participate in the project, appears to indicate positive progress. There are, however, problems. The deeply

ingrained attitude of the Japanese government and industries keeps the Japanese from openly sharing what is developed in Japan while still acquiring needed technology from abroad.¹⁴ One way to motivate Japan's cooperation, according to an executive from a major U.S. aircraft industry, is to offer Japan the same degree of cooperation that the United States seeks with NATO allies.¹⁵ In any case, the technological cooperation between the United States and Japan is a lucrative area for exploration on both sides.

Japan can also help the United States significantly by continuing to fund a large segment of the cost for the U.S. forces in Japan. The Self-Defense Forces should continue its present course of modernization and upgrade the combat capability through combined exercises with the U.S. forces.

The success of any recommendations for Japan will depend on the health of its economy. Japan, therefore, must do its utmost to tackle its social problems and devise an innovative strategy for maintaining its economic might. While remaining sensitive to other Asian nations, Japan must continue to upgrade its Self-Defense Forces according to its own schedule. Recognizing the problems ahead in Japan's economy and domestic issues, the United States in turn should develop a realistic, cohesive strategy for negotiating with the Japanese for a greater role in defense burdensharing.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia's Future," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1987, pp. 85-86.
2. "Japan's Inc.'s New Face," Maclean's, November 30, 1987, p. 26. Newsweek (14 March 1988, p. 30) quotes last month's editorial from the Asahi Shimbun: "A great majority of the Japanese people continue to feel deprived, even though their nation is the richest in the world today. And while many people sympathize with the poor and starving Africa, they have mixed feelings about giving them a modern sewer system when they themselves don't have one."
3. Scalapino, p. 86.
4. George Packard, "The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1987/88, p. 355.
5. For example:
P. Lewis Young, "Japanese Rearmament in the '80's: Myth or Reality?" Asian Defence, May 1986, pp. 16-23.

Thomas B. Modley, "The Rhetoric and Realities of Japan's 1,000-Mile Sea-Lane Defense Policy," Naval War College Review, January-February 1985, pp. 25-36.
6. Maclean's, p. 23.
7. "Japan's Troubled Future," Fortune, March 30, 1987, p. 27.
8. Fortune, p. 22.
9. Peter F. Drucker, "Japan's Choice," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1987, pp. 923-941.
10. Fortune, p. 27.
11. Fortune, p. 27.
12. Yomiuri Shimbun (14 March 1988, p. 1) reported that a government poll in October 1987 revealed that 52.7% of the respondents believed Japan did not accurately convey its opinions and positions to other countries. Among them, 56.9% stated that other countries' inadequate understanding of Japan as contributing to their assessment of Japan's inability to articulate its opinions and positions. Additionally, only 15.2% of the respondents believed that Japan did convey its opinions and positions accurately to other countries.

13. Kubota Akira, "Transferring Technology to Asia," Japan Quarterly, January-March 1986, p. 44.

14. Gregg A. Rubinstein, "Emerging Bonds of U.S.-Japanese Defense Technology Cooperation," Strategic Review, Winter 1987, p. 49.

15. Richard Milburn, "The Challenge of Defense Industrial Cooperation," Japan Economic Survey, August 1987, p. 15.

CHAPTER III

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT TO JAPAN

The Soviet Union, which is deploying powerful military forces around this country, has continued consistently to bolster its strength in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The Soviet build-up is creating further tension in the international military situation in this region; it is also increasing the potential threat to this country.¹

The existence of a military force in most countries is justified on the basis of the threat they face. Sometimes, the threat is more imaginary than real, but, nevertheless, the perceived threat is important particularly when competing for funds with other priorities. Japan is no exception. It was the threat of communism in the 1950s that led to the formation of the Self-Defense Forces and the threat of the Soviet forces that sustained the growth of Japan's military forces in the 1970s. But is the Soviet threat now and in the future real enough to justify rearming? The answer depends on how political leaders translate the Japanese people's perception of threat and shape that perception into consensus.

THE SOVIET THREAT

Tadanori Fukuta, a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force officer, documented the threat in his essay at the U.S. Army War College.² The deployment of a division of troops, backed by tanks, armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters, heavy artillery, and high-performance aircraft on islands just off Japan's

northern island of Hokkaido seems to support the Soviets' intention to invade Hokkaido in the event of war and create a strategic buffer to facilitate uninterrupted movement of its naval forces from the Sea of Japan. A similarly formidable troop concentration on the Sakhalin Island north of Hokkaido reinforces the Japan Defense Agency's concern not only for Hokkaido but also for Japan itself. It appears that the Soviets have amassed their forces close to Japan in order to gain the momentum to dominate the Northeast region. At least, it seems that the Soviet troops are there to intimidate Japan. In either case, the Soviets are poised strategically to serve their purposes at any time.

SOVIET INTENTIONS

Do the Soviet forces really pose a threat to Japan? What are their intentions? The nature of Soviet intentions, ironically, can be found in examining the U.S. strategic interests in the region. First, it is clear that the economic potential of the region is enormous. For example, one study shows that the combined GNPs of Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and Hong Kong rapidly approach that of the combined European community or that of the entire Warsaw Pact nations and the Soviet Union together.³ A Rand Corporation study also concluded that Asia's economy will play a larger part in a future U.S.-Soviet conflict, and may even be the cause or object of such conflict.⁴ Japan's economy and technological advances, in particular,

have become the source of opportunity for Western nations--and for the Soviets as well. The recent Toshiba scandal and espionage cases in Japan demonstrated clear intentions of the Soviet Union to acquire Japan's technological products at any cost. The Soviet interests in Japan are then similar to that of the United States. The Soviets, however, face an enormous dilemma--how to be friendly enough with Japan to acquire technological help while still maintaining a large concentration of forces near Japan.

The subtleness of their recent gestures of friendship toward Japan is typically Gorbachev's style. The Soviet Union may not only gain valuable help in technology but a recent visit by Shevardnadze to Japan may help to neutralize the Reagan Administration's strategy to encircle the Soviet Union.⁵ Gorbachev's initiative is already having an important impact on how Japan perceives the Soviet Union. Because of the easing of tensions between the two, many Japanese do not believe that the Soviet Union poses an immediate threat to Japan in spite of the presence of Soviet forces near Hokkaido.⁶

The absence of perceived threat then affects any rearming effort. A Japanese observer of defense issues noted:

It is indeed this rather benign threat perception that is the basis for the general acquiescence in the nation's current defense efforts. The Japanese think their defense is adequate and requires only incremental improvement according to technological changes.⁷

The unfortunate aspect of this perception is that neither the historical relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union

nor incidents involving the Soviets in and around Japan supports it. The airspace violations by Soviet Aircraft are many, and allegations of their espionage activities in Tokyo are rampant. The downing of a Korean airliner just north of Japan is a clear example of the Soviet's ruthlessness. The militant aspect of Soviet intentions, however, is readily forgotten as the Japanese see Soviet merchant ships peacefully anchored in Japanese harbors and Soviet cultural events in Japan always well attended and enthusiastically received. Furthermore, their perceptions of the Russians are very positive since most diplomats speak fluent Japanese, appreciate the Japanese culture, and are skilled in cultivating the Japanese. Their perception of the Soviet threat is merely academic; in their minds, the Soviet threat is just a myth. For this reason, the Japan Socialist Party is the leading and powerful opposition to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party which has always, despite some tentative moments, remained positively committed to the United States. The perceived lack of threat of the Soviets by some Japanese political segments obviously helps the Socialist Party which has always opposed alliance with the United States and questioned the existence of the Self-Defense Forces. The challenges faced by the Liberal Democratic Party are even more magnified now that the Socialist Party is openly preaching the danger of being drawn into a superpower confrontation by being aligned with the United States. In this political

environment, then, any effort to rearm Japan's military faces significant political difficulties.

CAN THE SOVIETS BE TRUSTED?

According to the Department of State:

The most serious threat to the U.S. and its allies continue to be Soviet military power and Moscow's willingness to use that power, thereby endangering our interests. The Soviets threaten our interest directly and also exploit regional instability.⁸

The apparent disparity between how the Americans (and Japan Defense Agency) interpret the Soviet threat and how the Japanese, in general, perceive Soviet intentions is explainable in terms of the historical standpoint from which they look at the Soviet Union. The Japanese, in general, are basing their perceptions solely on what they see now, whereas the Americans and the officials of the Japan Defense Agency cite events in the past to be a more accurate gauge of their true intentions. The Japan Defense Agency historians believe that the Soviets really do not trust the Japanese because they still remember the agony and misery of defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.⁹ The Soviets fear the potential Japan has to become a military power and thus are determined to dominate Japan now in every possible way. The positioning of the troops so close to Japan gives them that advantage. The Japanese military planners do not trust the Soviets either and caution government leaders that the Soviets' apparent move toward openness and reconciliation is only to gain access to the Japanese technology market.¹⁰

The Japanese military leaders also remember the Soviets' previous attempt to gain control of Japan after World War II by declaring war on Japan two days after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and occupying the northern territories.¹¹ Therefore, from the historical perspective, despite the overtures of friendship by Gorbachev now, Japanese military leaders consider the Soviet threat to be real.¹²

THREAT TO SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC)

Obviously, threat to Japan is not limited to the threat posed by the Soviet forces near Japan. Perhaps the more realistic threat to Japan's economy is the security of its sea lanes of communication. The incidents in the Persian Gulf graphically demonstrate this threat. Without oil from the Persian Gulf, Japan cannot survive. Accordingly, even before the Persian Gulf crisis, Japan had announced an ambitious plan to secure its sea lanes of communication up to 1,000 miles of Japan.¹³ Politically it was a risky move, but the United States welcomed it as a sign that Japan would do more toward defense burdensharing. Unfortunately, it was a plan beyond its current capability or even future aspirations, for the obstacles are many in implementing the proposed plan. First of all, it is expensive.¹⁴ More importantly, however, such a plan will arouse the sensitivity of other Asian nations whose leaders still remember the events of some 40 years ago. Therefore, while the Japanese may agree that the threat to

Japan's SLOC is more real than that posed by the Soviet forces, not much is expected in terms of building a credible SLOC defense force--at least for now.

CONCLUSION

The Japanese, in general, see the Soviet threat differently from the Americans. The Japanese themselves see the threat in different perspectives; while military leaders see the threat based on historical events, the Japanese, in general, are unconvinced of such threat primarily because of recent initiatives by Gorbachev which reduced tension between the two countries. The security of the sea lanes of communication may be a more tangible issue for the Japanese. However, while it remains as an on-going issue for the Japan Defense Agency, the cost and sensitivity to other Asian countries slow its progress. Therefore, it is unlikely, based on the threat of the Soviets alone, that Japan will rearm or substantially increase its defense budget.

ENDNOTES

1. White Paper, Defense of Japan, Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1987.

2. Tadanori Fukuta, Colonel, The Military Threat of USSR in Northeast Asia and the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in Response. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 27 March 1987.

3. Richard L. Armitage, "U.S. Strategic Interests in East Asia and the Pacific," Defense Issues, Vol. 2, 1986, p. 1.

4. Francis Fukuyama, "Asia in a Global War," Comparative Strategy Vol. 6, 1987, p. 388.

5. Takayama Satoshi, "The Soviet Union Smiles at Japan," Japan Quarterly, April-June 1986, p. 131.

6. For example: Taketsugu Tsurutani, "Japan's Defense Forces, Can the Islands Defend Themselves?" Journal of Defense and Diplomacy Vol. 5, 1987, p. 48. Also: Larry A. Niksch, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense and Security Issues," Naval War College Review, July-August 1983, p. 61. Tsurutani does not define "Japanese" when he writes, ". . . the Japanese do not really believe in the likelihood of a limited small-scale aggression or of a disruption of their lifelines in the western Pacific." Niksch uses Asahi Shimbun survey to discuss the Japanese attitude: "that Japan was in little danger of being attacked by another country." However, no further explanation of "Japanese" is available. In this paper, unless specifically identified, "Japanese" will be used similarly to refer to the Japanese people in general.

7. Tsurutani, p. 48.

8. Armitage, p. 1.

9. Based on writers' conversation with military historians of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force at the Military-History Exchange, 24-31 October 1987 at the United States Army War College.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. See for example, White Paper, Defense of Japan, Part I, Chapter 2, Military Situation Around Japan.

13. Thomas B. Modley, "The Rhetoric and Realities of Japan's 1,000-Mile Sea-Lane Defense Policy," Naval War College Review, January-February 1985, p. 26.

14. Modley, p. 31.

CHAPTER IV

EVOLUTION OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE POSTURE

The NSC paper (NSC 125/2) began with an assessment of the vital role that Japan plays in American strategic planning. The authors stated forthrightly: "The security of Japan is of such importance to the United States position in the Pacific area that the United States would fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part of the territory of Japan." For the immediate future, America would have to remain the primary guarantor of Japanese security, but this situation should not be allowed to persist. It ought to be the policy of the United States to "encourage and assist" Japan to rearm with non-nuclear weapons. The first objective of a rearmament program obviously was to allow Japan to defend itself against outside attack and thus to lighten the American strategic burden. The second objective was more ambitious: to bring Japan into a system of collective security for the Pacific area, so that its resources might contribute to the defense of other American allies in the region.¹

It is fascinating that as early as 1952 when the Japanese peace treaty was enacted, the United States had a vision for Japan's rearmament and its role in the Pacific. In fact, it can be used even now to give the United States a foundation from which to deal with Japan. One may then ask why Japan still has not made much progress since 1952 except for the formation of a small but well-equipped Self-Defense Forces? Although answers may never be found, it may be instructive to examine the relationship between the United States and Japan after World War II and to identify several events which might have adversely impacted on that relationship.

EARLY YEARS

As the occupation of Japan ended, the overriding concern for the United States was to keep Japan aligned with the West, and to keep communism out of Japan. The goal of American policy was to strengthen Japan's economy through trade and to build a limited defense against the Soviet Union or China. The idea of rearming Japan was met immediately with protests from American allies, especially from the Philippines and South Korea.² Even with assurances from the United States that Japan would not be permitted to become a major military power, Asian countries remained suspicious and fearful, even today. In the midst of these concerns by American allies, the Japan Self-Defense Forces were created in 1954. It is interesting to note that only a slight majority of Japan's population supported the creation of Japan's military forces.³ Therefore, Japan's Prime Minister was confronted with strong opposition stating that Japan's Constitution did not permit rearming of any kind.⁴ They asserted that the term "self defense" was being used as a euphemism for rearming, a ploy to eventually militarize Japan with or without revising the Constitution. However, despite early difficulties and without the convincing support of the people, the Self-Defense Forces survived and matured into what they are today.

The strength of pacifist sentiments placed the government on the defensive and led to restraints on the Self-Defense Forces.⁵ The size of the forces became an important issue

because size was looked upon as a principal component of the definition of self defense. Additionally, as the weapon systems were received from the United States, the capability of such weapon systems also became an issue in order to satisfy a large segment of population in Japan that feared Japan's involvement in an offensive war. As an example, Japanese Phantom jets were modified and external fuel tanks removed so they could be employed only in a defensive role. Although patently ridiculous on the surface, actions were politically prudent in order to preserve the Self-Defense Forces. Considering the restrictions and close monitoring of Japan's fledgling military forces, developing the Self-Defense Forces into something that the United States had envisioned in NSC 125/2 was extraordinarily difficult.

THE SECURITY TREATY AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTENTION

The signing of the security treaty between the United States and Japan in 1951 quickly followed the formal ending of the occupation of Japan. The fundamental concern of the United States was to keep Japan aligned with the West by bolstering Japan's economy and providing for a common defense. The outbreak of the Korean Conflict vividly demonstrated the strategic importance of Japan to the United States in its campaign to contain the spread of communism. The security treaty then essentially placed Japan under the protective umbrella of the United States. The treaty, however, did not

immediately gain popular support in Japan. In fact, for over a decade, the status of the security treaty remained uncertain with only a third of the population supporting it in 1960.⁶ The renewal of the unpopular treaty in 1960 brought unprecedented student violence which ultimately caused the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan. The resignation of the Prime Minister elevated Japan's crisis and highlighted the delicate nature of Japan's political process which had to balance the people's desire with that of the United States. These difficult years truly tested Japan's commitment to the treaty and the United States.

A similar crisis and political instability resurfaced again in 1960 during another review and renewal of the treaty. The resulting student violence was provoked in part by anti-Vietnam sentiments against the United States as well as "return Okinawa" protests. Additionally, the emergence of the notorious Japan Red Army Brigade in Japan further threatened the stability of the pro-U.S. government of the Liberal Democratic Party. The survival of the Liberal Democratic Party largely depended upon positive overtures from the United States to stem the tide of the rising socialistic movement and the growth of the Japan Socialist Party. The reversion of Okinawa to Japan, then, in 1972, was a positive sign that strengthened the Liberal Democratic Party.⁷ Additionally, hosting of the World Exposition in Japan, despite threat from the Japan Red Army

Brigade and other terrorist groups, signaled Japan's economic recovery and leadership in the international scene.

Unfortunately, more crises were yet to come. First came a series of "Nixon shocks" that disappointed the Liberal Democratic Party. Specifically, President Nixon's trip to China without consulting with Japanese leaders provided a negative cast to Japan-U.S. relations.⁸ Then, when President Carter proposed a phased withdrawal of the U.S. ground forces from South Korea, the Japan Socialist Party argued in Japan's Diet that being aligned with the United States would not be in the best interest of Japan. The lack of confidence toward the United States and its commitment still lingers today among some political leaders and plays an important part in Japan's relationship with the United States. A breach of protocol is unacceptable behavior in Japan, and while Japanese leaders do not expect foreigners to live by the same code, they still desire courtesy and thoughtfulness in international politics. Therefore, the impact of these difficult years will continue to be a factor in Japan's view toward the United States in economic and defense negotiations.

CONCLUSION

If the 1970s were difficult years for the Japan-U.S. relationship, the 1980s began with a far more optimistic trend with the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone to Washington. He said:

Japan should be an unsinkable aircraft carrier equipped with a tremendous bulwark of defense against the [Soviet]

Backfire bombers, and should assert complete and full control of the four straits that go through the Japanese islands so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines and other naval atrocities.⁹

Although the statement created many controversies in Japan, it helped to restore a new relationship with the United States. Although frequently criticized for being too outspoken, Prime Minister Nakasone was popular in Japan for his confident demeanor in the international political arena and his vitality in dealing with the opposition in Japan. It seemed hopeful, then, that the Reagan-Nakasone duo would break out of the seemingly stalemated progress toward assumption of a greater security role by the Self-Defense Forces. Indeed, Japan's defense expenditure did surpass the 1-percent-of-GNP mark and more Japan-U.S. combined exercises were undertaken. In the end, however, the Reagan-Nakasone duo was not able to fulfill the expectations of some Congressional leaders who now seek a commitment of an even greater percentage of Japan's GNP for defense.

As long as the problem of trade imbalance remains, the United States will continue to press Japan to do more to relieve the burden for American forces. The new Prime Minister will most likely devote more time to domestic issues and Japan's expenditures than his predecessor. One bright note from Japan reveals that now nearly 70 percent of the Japanese population expresses support of the security treaty.¹⁰ Perhaps this unusually high approval rate will become a catalyst for encouraging the Japanese government to do more for defense

burdensharing with the United States. However, at least for now, even such popularity for the treaty is not expected to have a significant impact on Japan's defense spending. The events and memories of the past are difficult to overcome overnight.

ENDNOTES

1. H.W. Brands, Jr., "The United States and the Reemergence of Independent Japan," Pacific Affairs, Fall 1986, pp. 389-90.

2. Ibid., p. 391.

3. Koichi Kato, "An Emerging Consensus: The Evolution of Japan's Defense Posture," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Winter 1985/86, p. 327.

4. According to Theodore McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," Armed Forces and Society, Vol 13, Fall 1987, p. 83, Japan is the only major country to ban military forces in its Constitution. McNelly quotes Article 9 of the Constitution:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The White Paper, Defense of Japan, Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1987, p. 80, states: "It is recognized beyond doubt that the provision in the article does not deny the inherent right to self-defense that Japan should be entitled to maintain as a sovereign nation."

According to McNelly, the formation of the Japan Self-Defense Force was prompted by the outbreak of the Korean War. Since then, the Japanese government has successfully maintained that the self-defense military is not unconstitutional. The courts

have been reluctant to rule on the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces. Therefore, defining what constitutes "self-defense" has become the subject of much debate since the creation of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954. See Appendix II for an extract of current national defense policy of Japan from the White Paper.

5. Larry A. Niksch, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense and Security Issues," Naval War College Review, July-August 1983, pp. 57-72

6. Kato, p. 326.

7. Because of its strategic location for the defense of Korea and Taiwan, the United States retained Okinawa even after the termination of its occupation of Japan in 1952. By the late 1960s, however, "Reunite Okinawa with Japan" has become an important national issue in Japan. At the same time, the negotiations for the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, vital to the United States' Asian strategy, were starting. Politically, therefore, reverting Okinawa to Japanese control was in the best interest of the United States provided that the U.S. military bases in Okinawa were still made available for the U.S. forces. For an excellent account of the Okinawa negotiations, see Henry Kissinger's White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1979, pp. 325-336.

8. Concerning the "Nixon shock" over the announcement of Nixon's impending trip to China, Kissinger wrote in White House Years, p. 726:

I believe in retrospect that we could have chosen a more sensitive method of informing the Japanese even though [Ambassador Armin] Meyer's considerations precluded earlier consultation. It would have surely been more courteous and thoughtful, for example, to send one of my associates from the Peking trip to Tokyo to brief [Prime Minister] Sato a few hours before the official announcement. This would have combined secrecy with a demonstration of special consideration for a good and decent friend.

9. Murray Sayle, "The Ballad of Ron and Yasu," The New Republic, 15 June 1987, p. 18.

10. Kato, p. 326.

CHAPTER V

VIEWS ON THE REARMING OF JAPAN

Essential to American success is the forward basing of U.S. forces and the assumption by allied nations, especially Japan, of a larger role in regional defense.¹

Japan's increased military contribution is largely unnecessary to maintaining global equilibrium.²

Views on whether or not Japan should rearm vary. Some critics argue solely from the economic standpoint. They believe Japan's larger role in defense burdensharing will help relieve America's economic woes. Others argue from the strategic perspective that supports strengthening of the allied forces, thereby reducing the load of American forces deployed on forward locations such as Japan and South Korea. Some, on the other hand, do not support rearming of Japan, at least for now. The Reagan Administration has taken a middle road that encourages Japan to do more without suggesting rearming. With these diverse views in the background, a review of some noted authors' speculations about the future and explanations of where America might have gone wrong may be beneficial.

OPPOSING VIEWS

Stephen Gibert of the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University states that because of the growing importance of Northeast Asia, the United States must adjust its traditionally European strategy to focus on Asia. He argues

that the allied nations must do more to help the United States, particularly with its maritime strategy.³ However, the difficulties in acquiring such help from the allied nations are compounded by differences in the threat faced by these nations. Regardless of how difficult these programs are, Gibert still asserts that Japan, in particular, must do more:

While all of the great powers in Western Europe are appropriately regarded as allies of the United States, Japan, despite the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960, and some improvement recently in the Self-Defense Forces, is in essence a military protectorate of the United States. How extraordinary it is that the deficit-ridden United States, with twice Japan's gross national product but equivalent per capita income, spends approximately twenty-two times as much as Japan on defense. More to the point, the unreciprocated U.S. commitment to defend Japan stands in sharp contrast to the genuinely mutual security situation in Europe.⁴

Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, agreed with Gibert on the importance of Asia to the United States and the critical role Japan plays in Asia's equilibrium. However, he arrives at a completely different assessment on Japan's rearming:

It cannot be in America's interest to have one Asian power or group of powers so strong that it can dominate the rest.⁵

Kissinger was obviously talking about Japan. He further argues that Japan will rearm according to its own schedule and for its own purpose. Therefore, he continues that America's demand for quick fixes is dangerous. He also warns that, contrary to what many Americans believe, a major rearming effort by Japan will further spur its economy because of a greater involvement by its government to ensure its success.

The end result of Japan's rearming, then, will be destabilizing because Japan will certainly emerge as a major military power backed by its powerful economy. Besides, Kissinger argues Japan does not need to further rearm, for its Self-Defense Forces are capable of making a Soviet attack on Japan too costly. Instead, he recommends that Japan make a more substantial contribution to global peace by increasing aid to developing nations. He concludes by advocating that American foreign policy toward Japan be on a greater political relationship before military matters are allowed to dominate the relationship.⁶

Richard Armitage, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, also agrees on the strategic importance of Northeast Asia and Japan's role in alliance strategy. He then states that the defense relationship with Japan is a success story.⁷ Through quiet diplomacy instead of open criticism, the Reagan Administration had made substantial progress in convincing Japan to do more for defense. He also cautions that Japan is too small to survive a conflict with a military superpower independently, and neither Japan nor its trading partners in Asia desire to see Japan assume military superpower status.⁸

Japan, in fact, has made significant progress in building its defense capabilities. This year's defense budget shows a 5.2 percent increase over last year, to about \$30 billion, which places Japan among the top five or six countries in the world by size of military expenditure.⁹ The 1988 defense

budget is consistent with the statement of the former Director General of the Japan Defense Agency:

The security treaty helps maintain countervailing power. Japan also has to make a greater contribution to its own defense.¹⁰

Japan's current defense expenditures and the optimistic statement by Armitage, however, do not appease the critics of Japan's role in defense burdensharing. They still believe that Japan should do more. It is intriguing then to examine the explanations offered by several noted Americans as to why Japan does not want to rearm.

WHY JAPAN DOESN'T WANT TO REARM: AMERICAN VIEWS

Takesugu Tsurutani, a political science professor at Washington State University, states that the United States and Japan view the Soviet threat differently.¹¹ He writes that a large concentration of Soviet forces in Northeast Asia is simply a manifestation of the Soviets' traditional sense of inferiority and insecurity and, therefore, the Japanese do not have to fear Soviet aggression. Tsurutani bases his argument on his historical analysis of the Soviets and observations of life in Japan which is almost totally lacking in civil defense. Thus, he states that Japan considers its current defense programs to be adequate, not requiring massive rearming. He then comments that the Japanese are more afraid of being dragged into war by being aligned with the United States. The surprise attack on Libya, the invasion of Grenada, and the

fiasco at Beirut do not give the Japanese a sense of security. The ambiguity of Japan's defense policy, therefore, is a reflection of its uneasiness in being tied to the United States. The Self-Defense Forces symbolize the tie with the United States and thus Japan is not likely to jeopardize its security by rearming the Self-Defense Forces.

Ezra Vogel, a professor from Harvard University, examined the same issue from another perspective. He states that Japan conceived a vision of economic power without military power and made it work.¹² In fact, Vogel argues that Japan believed expanded military power would detract from the willingness of trading partners. On the criticism of a "free ride," the Japanese would argue that they pay for their own defense and that rearming would not result in a safer environment. Why do the Japanese behave this way? Vogel maintains that the Japanese naturally resist, with all due politeness, any foreign influences ever since Commodore Perry forced the opening of Japan:

Through long decades of subservience to the United States, the Japanese have learned how to develop and use whatever leverage they have to achieve their goals. They have learned how to delay and postpone while being polite, yielding only when all other choices seem absolutely exhausted.¹³

The current trade problems with the United States further serves to describe Japanese attitudes. Vogel states that Japan questions why Europe and the United States presume to set the standards of what is fair and unfair when Japan has generally followed international laws and has won the economic competition. In other words, Japan beat the West at its own

game following its own rules. He then criticizes American economists who do not seem to understand Japan's economic power:

It is not yet clear that America has the political will to overcome the decades of complacency that stemmed from the unique period following World War II.¹⁴

While critical of Japan's attitude and America's ineptness in dealing with the Japanese, Vogel still believes that Japan will eventually increase its defense spending as the United States becomes less able. However, he warns of the dangers of emotional outbursts in Congress because Japan will resist once more as it did when Commodore Perry forced open its door.

Another view on why Japan is reluctant to respond to pressures from the United States on defense matters is eloquently expressed by Richard Morse and Edward Olsen, scholars on Asia:

Confident that the United States is far more important to Japan than Japan is to the United States, American officials have consistently treated Japan as a junior partner in defense and economic affairs. Japan is told frequently that it, not China, has been and still remain the cornerstone of Washington's Asia policy, but the Japanese find it difficult to take such rhetoric seriously.¹⁵

They argue that the United States is ineffective in dealing with Japan because there are no Japan experts in Congress, State Department, or even in the U.S. Embassy in Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese place a high premium on training experts on the United States. Japan's bureaucratic edge, therefore, will continue to make the difference in the U.S.-Japan relations--in Japan's favor.

Larry Nicksch, a specialist in Asian affairs with the Congressional Research Service for the Library of Congress,

explains Japanese attitudes from the perspective of four themes: pacifism, reliance on the United States for defense, the perceived absence of an external military threat, and the primacy of economic expansion.¹⁶ He states that Japan's pacifistic sentiments came from American policy of complete demilitarization after World War II. Rearming of the Self-Defense Forces, therefore, was not popular, and limiting of defense budgets to less than 1 percent of GNP and renunciation of nuclear weapons were inevitable results of pacifism. Furthermore, Japan's reliance on the United States for defense was strengthened by the 1960 version of the security treaty; it placed greater demands on the United States to defend Japan than on Japan to rearm. It was a departure from the 1951 security treaty which was based on expectations that Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense. This position is supported by previously cited NSC 125/2. Nixson also states that Japan has placed little emphasis on defense because it did not see the Soviets to be threatening and because the promotion of its export-oriented economy was its top priority.

WHERE DID AMERICA GO WRONG?

Here, Kissinger's memoirs offer interesting analyses.¹⁷ Essentially, he states that the lack of understanding of Japan's national style places the Americans in a difficult position in dealing with the Japanese. Americans, for example,

fail to recognize that the Japanese rely on consensus to plan for the future. Consensus avoids confrontation, and the art of Japanese decisionmaking, therefore, seeks deliberation until genuine agreement is reached. For this reason, decisions are normally firm and difficult to change. Not knowing this process, the Americans often make the serious mistake of pressuring whom they presume to be the leader, failing to see that such individuals are only a part of a larger decisionmaking process. Additionally, the Japanese normally come to negotiations with thoroughly informed positions through meticulous study and analysis of issue. Therefore, it is quite possible that when the Japanese negotiator asks a question, he/she is rarely looking for an answer; the answer is already known and figured into the overall strategy of negotiation. Kissinger summed up his observation and analysis of Japanese decisionmaking and diplomacy by quoting a passage from a former Japanese Foreign Minister's autobiography:

In diplomacy, even when an agreement cannot be reached, it is essential that each party have an understanding of the other's position. The fostering of understanding and trust, in fact, is just as important as the actual reaching of agreement. Between Japan and the United States, in particular, it is of the utmost importance.¹⁸

If Kissinger focused primarily on the Americans and their naivete, Karel Wolferen, a Dutch correspondent who is a long-time resident of Japan, concentrated on the character of politics and economy in Japan. Using the term "Japan problem," he described the fundamental conflict between the United States and Japan:

What makes conflict between Japan and the United States so menacing is that the two countries do not know how to cope with each other. The United States does not understand the nature of the Japanese political economy and thus cannot accept the way it behaves. Americans can hardly be blamed for this, as the Japanese themselves present their country as simply another member of the community of democratic nations committed to the free market. Japan is largely unaware of the threat posed by America's unwillingness to accept it for what it is. Never having experienced its wrath, Japan does not believe in the powers of the American legislature. The Japanese make things worse with ritualistic arguments and empty promises that only convince congressmen, businessmen, and other Americans that they are being deceived.¹⁹

He observed that the Japanese government has no top; power is shared among groups of bureaucrats and politicians without a single source of national decisionmaking. Failing to see this is a deficiency in political skill. However, perhaps a more serious error is often made in the economic arena. He cites a well-known economist to argue that Japan falls into an economic label called the capitalist developmental state characterized by a partnership between central bureaucrats and entrepreneurs.²⁰ An often-made mistake is that the United States thinks that Japan belongs to the same category as capitalist free-market economy, and, therefore, Japan should obey the same rules played by the United States and European nations. The capitalist developmental state is essentially protectionist, thus magnifying the "Japan problem" and perpetuating trade imbalance.

CONCLUSION

Views on the rearming of Japan are as many as they are complex. Obviously the state of economy on both sides plays a

major role in influencing the divergent views. Again, the lack of understanding of each other surfaces as a factor that limits the quality of Japan-U.S. relationship. The Dutch correspondent's assessment of both the United States and Japan is pertinent in accurately describing the problem:

In American eyes Japan does not perform commensurately with its wealth, in any field, so it is time for Japan to grow up and play a responsible role in the international community. Japan is all the more obliged to do this, according to the American perceptions, after four decades of American nurture, help, and protection. The United States, of course, has helped create the current situation by providing diplomatic and military shelter for Japan, by discouraging strong central rule and by accepting, at least initially, Japan's postwar economic practices.²¹

ENDNOTES

1. Stephen P. Gibert, "Great Power Naval Strategies in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 6, 1987, p. 363.

2. Henry Kissinger, "The Rearming of Japan--and the Rest of Asia," The Washington Post, 29 January 1987, p. A-25.

3. Gibert, p. 365.

4. Ibid., p. 366.

5. Kissinger, p. A-25.

6. Ibid.

7. Richard Armitage, "U.S. Strategic Interests in East Asia and the Pacific," Defense Issues, Vol. 2, 1986, p. 2.

8. Ibid. In his remarks at the Pacific Symposium (National Defense University) on 25 February 1988, Armitage commented on the criticism of Japan's defense spending: "The critics are unclear, and at times, contradictory. While demanding that Japan buy advanced U.S. defensive systems so that it can relieve us of military roles in the area, they warn that Japan will steal our technologies for other uses. Bashing a key friend and ally in this manner is, to say the least, not an edifying spectacle, viewed from either Washington or Tokyo."

(News release from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs, 25 February 1988, p. 6.

9. "New U.S.-Japan Honeymoon Ahead?" U.S. News & World Report, 18 January 1988, p. 52. The breakdown of Japan's 1988 budget was reported by Kyodo on 28 December 1987. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 29 December 1987, p. 3) The defense budget is included in general expenditures as shown below:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Year-on-year change</u>
Social security	2.9
Education and Science	0.2
Pensions and others	- 0.8
National defense	5.2
Public works	0.0
Disaster reconstruction	0.0
Economic cooperation	5.1
Measures for small business	- 1.1
Energy measures	- 6.8
Foodstuff control	-17.1
Other expenses	0.6
Reserve	0.0
Total	1.2

It is interesting to note that the allocation for national defense shows a substantial increase although negative and zero growth is seen in 7 of 12 categories.

10. Koichi Kato, "An Emerging Consensus: the Evolution of Japan's Defense Posture," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Winter 1985/86, p. 326.

11. Takesugu Tsurutani, "Japan's Defense Forces: Can the Islands Defend Themselves?" Journal of Defense & Diplomacy, Vol. 5, 1987, pp. 44-48.

12. Ezra F. Vogel, "Pax Nipponica?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, 1986, pp. 752-767.

13. Ibid., p. 759.

14. Ibid., p. 763.

15. Ronald A. Morse and Edward A. Olsen, "Japan's Bureaucratic Edge," Foreign Policy, Fall 1983, p. 173.

16. Larry A. Niksch, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense and Security Issues," Naval War College Review, July-August 1983, pp. 58-59.

17. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1982, pp. 735-746.

18. Ibid., p. 744.

19. Karel G. Wolferen, "The Japan Problem," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1986/87, pp. 288-303.

20. Ibid., p. 295.

21. Ibid., p. 301.

CHAPTER VI

WHERE IS THE JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP HEADED?

The defense-spending limit of 1 percent of the GNP is gone, but this does not mean a sudden jump in defense spending to the level of, say 2 percent or 3 percent of the GNP. Yet the Japanese people would do well to remember that flood-gates do not give way without warning. Now that an important budgetary restraint is gone, military authorities can, with official endorsement, purchase the latest--and most expensive--in military technology. Japan's military power will grow and its defense industries will become increasingly important to the national economy. Though change may be gradual, pursuing this course will mean a radical reorientation of Japan's ideology and economy, set against war since the promulgation of the Peace Constitution. Removal of the ceiling makes it even more imperative to deal with the question of what is necessary for national defense and just what it is that Japanese are afraid of.¹

As already discussed, views expressed by American critics on Japan's defense effort vary. Similarly, Japanese views are divergent, some forecasting more crises ahead and others predicting an optimistic future. In the end, however, it appears that unless the trade conflict is resolved between the two countries, the optimism of getting Japan to do much more on defense burdensharing may be premature.

JAPAN'S VIEWS

According to Kiyofuku Chuma, the editor and senior staff writer for Asahi Shimbun, a major Japanese newspaper, many Japanese are critical of any dramatic increase in defense spending. He cites Asahi's poll in March 1987 as evidence

that only 15 percent approved the removal of the 1-percent ceiling while more than 60 percent expressed disapproval.² He states that the Japanese, although aware of the Soviet buildup, are not really concerned about that threat. In fact, most believe, according to Chuma, that a buildup of the Self-Defense Forces to be more provocative than the Soviets. He then offers, in another article, reasons for the antimilitaristic views of the Japanese and their unwillingness to expand their defense forces.³ He argues that the experience of defeat in World War II still persists. Additionally, he states that the postwar democratic education by the United States and drafting of the Constitution which denounced any offensive military posture helped guide their disposition toward antimilitarism. Still more, Chuma maintains that the Japanese are not willing to give up their successes in the economic area by risking war. Therefore, he concludes that more pressure by the United States to rearm will only result in unfavorable perceptions of the United States:

Unfortunately, the more emphatically the United States warns Japan about the Soviet threat and the heavier U.S. pressure on Japan for military buildup becomes, the greater the tendency is for Japanese to cast a cold eye on the United States. Some say that Washington is intent upon forcing Japan to raise its defense capability so that Tokyo will take on some of America's military responsibilities. Others even suspect that Washington's real intention is to weaken Japan's economy and financial power and reduce its international competitiveness.⁴

Accordingly, the differences in perceiving the Soviet threat lead to an inadequate understanding that strains the Japan-U.S. relationship. It is Japan's inadequate understanding of

U.S. strategy and America's lack of understanding of Japan's defense policy that contribute toward this problem. It is important to note that an influential journalist like Chuma with a major newspaper in Japan can make a profound impact in swaying public opinion toward views that are critical to Japan's rearming.

Equally critical of rearming of Japan's military is a noted military critic, Hisao Maeda. Evaluating former Prime Minister Nakasone's proposal to block the straits surrounding Japan to trap the Soviet Navy in the Sea of Japan, Maeda warns that such a plan only provokes a limited nuclear attack by the Soviets in retaliation.⁵ He also argues that the security treaty does not bind Japan and the United States in military alliance. The treaty, according to Maeda, only provides for joint defense in the event either side is attacked on Japanese territory; it does not require Japan to militarily aid the U.S. forces in attacks outside of Japan. Further, he warns of the danger in cooperating with the United States:

The United States is now urging Japan to build up its defensive power on the pretext of the Soviet "military threat." But . . . the Soviet threat exists for Japan only so far as Japan cooperates militarily with the United States. By strengthening its defenses and stepping up military cooperation with the United States, Japan is in fact steadily undermining its own security and inviting Soviet nuclear attack.⁶

The views of Chuma and Maeda, in our opinion, are not representative of Japanese views in general. But it is important to recognize that the Japanese do not necessarily view their defense matters in the same way the Americans do. For instance,

as previously discussed, the Japanese, in general, are not concerned about the Soviet threat in Northeast Asia as much as the Americans think they are. Instances of Soviet military aircraft penetrating Japan's airspace--one even resulting in firing of warning shots--do not arouse the Japanese into a higher level of threat perception. The Japanese believe and rely on the powers of diplomacy to maintain the security which ensures the flow of natural resources into Japan and manufactured goods abroad. Additionally, the Japanese are worried about being dragged into war by being aligned to the United States, especially into a war starting in Europe or Southeast Asia.

Some views, on the other hand, especially those expressed by military members, do take the Soviet threat seriously. Masashi Nishihara of Japan's National Defense Academy, for example, states that Japanese perception of the lack of Soviet threat in general does not downgrade the serious nature of military threat to Japan.⁷ He cites the Soviet forces' recent exercise near Japan, simulating an invasion of Hokkaido, as a clear indication that the Soviet threat cannot be ignored. He thus advocates strengthening ties with countries that possess important natural resources and modernizing the Self-Defense Forces. Additionally, he supports allowing the Japanese naval forces to help defend U.S. naval forces outside of Japanese territory if the latter are on their way to defend Japan.⁸ He is concerned, however, that the U.S. naval strategy of horizontal escalation will force the Soviets to react and thus endanger Japan.

Some Japanese thoughts, therefore, are far from being dominated by antimilitaristic views expressed by Chuma and Maeda. Voices of support for the military, as expressed by Nishihara, are also strong. However, views expressing massive rearming of Japan are conspicuously absent even among the strong supporters of the military. The subject is much too sensitive for politicians to discuss, for as Chuma and Maeda brought out, the Japanese in general are not concerned enough to support rearming. It is likely, then, that further insistence by the United States to rearm will only bring more frustration to the Americans. Some even predict more rough roads ahead in the Japan-U.S. relationship over defense and economic issues.

MORE CRISES AHEAD?

As the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan persists, and the American economy remains stagnated, the relationship will consequently be headed for more difficult times. George Packard, a well-known scholar on East Asian matters, predicts the coming of U.S.-Japan crisis:

Since the 1970s we have seen a gradual decline of trust, at least at the governmental level. As Japanese exports poured into American markets, Japanese corporations have been accused of conducting "adversarial trade," targeting one American industry after another for destruction. For their part, Japanese leaders have become privately critical of American weaknesses. The extraordinary friendship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone tended to obscure the strong undercurrents of hostility within the higher levels of government and the private sectors on both sides.⁹

A recent spectacle of Congressmen bashing a Japanese radio on Capitol Hill is a good example of the manifestation of American frustration. Similarly, the sight in which a group of Japanese farmers were also seen bashing a symbol of their own frustration--an American-made tractor--portrays Packard's observation of the difficult relationship between the two countries. It is no surprise, then, that a New York times/CBS-Tokyo Broadcasting Company survey taken in May 1987 showed that 55 percent of the Japanese polled viewed U.S.-Japan relations to be "unfriendly," up dramatically from less than one third a year ago, and a Washington Post/ABC poll in the same month showed that 63 percent of Americans favored a higher trade barrier.¹⁰ Astoundingly, Packard cites, an Asahi Shimbun poll in April 1987 revealed that China was now the favorite nation of the Japanese people, thus bumping the United States into second place.¹¹ Despite these incredible revelations, Packard states that the Americans know that Japan is important for their economy, and the Japanese recognize the importance of a healthy American economy for Japan to maintain its economic success. The fundamental problem rests with the Americans not understanding the Japanese ways of doing business and the Japanese underestimating the vitality and resilience of Americans. Fortunately, Packard further observes, that Japan's recent decision to purchase the new generation of fighter aircraft from the United States rather than to produce its own as originally considered helps to improve the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Additionally, recent action by the Nakasone Cabinet to breach its own self-imposed 1-percent-of-GNP limit on defense spending should help to dispel allegations by some American critics that Japan is not doing enough in defense burdensharing. Despite these optimistic trends, however, Packard predicts the coming of more crises between the two countries and does not see Japan rearming in the near future.

OPTIMISTIC OUTLOOK IN JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP?

In contrast to Packard's rather pessimistic outlook of the future of the Japan-U.S. relationship, there are many optimistic forecasts. For example, Michael Armacost, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, sees Japan's participation in global terms and praises the expanding scope of Japan's foreign assistance and aid programs.¹² While there are many trade problems to overcome, he is hopeful of reducing friction between the United States and Japan. Additionally, he is impressed with Japan's greater expenditure of funds for U.S. forces and Japan's willingness to participate in more combined exercises. He then warns that both sides must overcome the difficulties and promote a permanent relationship.

An even more cordial expression toward Japan's defense effort comes from Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. In the area of security relationship, Sigur states that Japan's steady growth in defense expenditure and significant contribution toward the

U.S. forces in Japan are positive signs of Japan's effort toward its defense. He then argues that the Japanese recognize the Soviet threat and the need to build military forces to counter the threat. In this effort, the presence of the U.S. forces to provide the nuclear umbrella is vital. Sigur then asserts that Japan's defense programs are correct because they reflect a careful balance between a need to develop military capabilities against the Soviet threat and sensitivity toward its neighbors by not posing a threat to them. On the economic issue, Sigur makes profound recommendations:

In our attempt to deal with the effects of trade on our industries and with political pressures in the United States, we often forget that other democratic governments must deal with much the same political realities and problems as we. This is by no means an argument for inaction. Rather it is a caution that patience and subtlety may bring better results than importunate demands.¹⁴

The quality of forecast can be judged by its accuracy in comparison with actions. The Economist made such an analysis and reported that while America and Japan may be antagonist with each other on trade issues, their defense relations have rarely been better.¹⁵ Additionally, the report states that the 1991-1995 defense plan is expected to include a defense concept beyond just defending Japanese territory. For example, it will include the controversial SLOC defense up to 1,000 miles of Japan. Further, the increase in defense expenditure of 1988 by 5.2% (1.01% of GNP) will, if computed on the same scale NATO counterparts are measured, amount to some \$40 billion (1.5% of GNP) which is the world's third largest

defense outlay after the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Additionally, Japan will be paying more for American troops in Japan, providing navigational equipment for ships operating in the Persian Gulf, and giving more aid to developing countries. According to The Economist then, the optimistic outlook for the Japan-U.S. relationship appears to be accurate. The new Prime Minister's recent visit to Washington also underscores optimism for the future with his pledge to improve East-West relations and world economic development and to upgrade the quality of its self-defense capabilities.¹⁷

CONCLUSION

Despite some very pessimistic outlooks expressed by Japanese critics on defense, the prospect for Japan-U.S. relations in the future looks optimistic. It is, however, necessary to keep the pessimism of Chuma and Maeda in perspective for their views still reflect sentiments of a large portion of Japan's society. In consensus-driven politics, the dissenting faction plays a crucial role in decisionmaking and, therefore, some of the optimistic remarks by a ruling faction, such as the Liberal Democratic Party, may later turn out to be nothing more than rhetoric. To some extent, even former Prime Minister Nakasone ran into difficulties and was ultimately unable to fulfill his part of the "Ron and Yasu" relationship. The new Prime Minister, not known for his skills in international relationships, will probably not make any breakthrough in

either the defense or economic areas soon. As long as the problem of trade imbalance remains, Congress will not be satisfied with Japan's current and planned defense efforts. The optimistic view then can quickly turn into more frustration on both sides with not much progress toward rearming or contributing more for defense burdensharing.

ENDNOTES

1. Kiyofuku Chuma, "What Price the Defense of Japan?" Japan Quarterly, July-September 1987, p. 258.

2. Ibid., p. 258.

3. Kiyofuku Chuma, "The 1986-90 Defense Plan: Does It Go Too Far?" Japan Quarterly, January-March 1986, pp. 13-18.

4. Ibid., p. 15.

5. Hisao Maeda, "A Perilous Plan for Japan's Security," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1984, pp. 395-399.

6. Ibid., p. 395. This view is similar to that often expressed by the Japan Socialist Party. From the American perspective, William Finan and Richard Samuels, writers for the New York Times (22 July 1987, p. A-27) commented: "Many Americans question the value of the overall alliance. They wonder what America gets for its continuing defense of Japan and why our Navy should protect Middle Eastern oil that fuels Japan's exports. The Toshiba sale is forcing a re-examination of the old answers."

7. Masashi Nishihara, "Maritime Cooperation in the Pacific: The United States and Its Partners," Naval War College Review, Summer 1987, pp. 37-41.

8. Ibid., p. 39.

9. George R. Packard, "The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1987/1988, p. 350.

10. Ibid., p. 353.

11. Ibid. Packard's reference may be misleading. The writers' research assisted by Asahi Shimbun representatives in

Washington, DC failed to disclose such a poll in April 1987. However, both Asahi and Yomiuri Shimbun did report (16 March 1987) the result of a government survey conducted in October 1986 to assess the "familiarity" or "closeness" of the Japanese toward the United States, China, Korea, and Soviet Union. This is an annual survey since 1977. According to this 1986 survey, the scores for the United States did drop to 67.5% from 75.6% of the previous year. Trade tensions and escalating value of the yen relative to the dollar were cited as some of the reasons for this decline. Also, China's score of 68.6% did, in fact, replace the United States at the top of these four nations. However, the 1986 scores as cited above tend to skew the interpretation and therefore cause erroneous conclusions. If Packard used this government survey to make his statement, he failed to mention that the scores for both China and Korea declined also from the previous year (for China, the 1985 score was 75.4%; for Korea, the score dropped from 45.4% in 1985 to 39.7% in 1986). The Soviet Union scored a modest increase from 8.6% to 8.9%. Furthermore, China had previously recorded the top scores three times since the survey began. Nevertheless, the essence of Packard's argument--the "closeness" of the Japanese toward the United States should not be assumed--remains valid. Added note: The results of the 1987 survey were reported in Yomiuri Shimbun (14 March 1988, p. 1). According to this latest survey, the United States has regained the lead by scoring 72.2% to China's 69.3%. The Soviet Union's score also rose to 9.8%

12. Michael H. Armacost, "U.S.-Japan Relations: A Global Partnership for the Future," Department of State Bulletin, October 1986, p. 21.

13. Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., "Perspective and Proportion for U.S.-Japanese Relations," Department of State Bulletin, October 1986, p. 24.

14. Ibid., p. 26.

15. "Stronger Samurai," The Economist, 23 January 1988, pp. 27-28.

16. Ibid., p. 28.

17. "Takeshita Comments on Talks with Reagan," East Asia, (Daily Report by Foreign Broadcast Information Service), 14 January 1988, p. 1.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The challenge facing both America and Japan is to manage the coming changes without reviving an unhealthy Japanese nationalism that could destroy a mutually beneficial economic and security relationship. American diplomacy must exert steady, quiet pressure aimed at supporting Japan's internationalists and avoiding the kind of emotional bashing that strengthens the nationalists.¹

Japan's challenges in defense burdensharing becomes even more complex as Japan heads toward economic and social difficulties at the turn of the century. The voices of pacifism, militarism, nationalism, internationalism, and protectionism will continue to influence Japan's future. Japan's rearming or defense programs will continue to be tied to trade issues not only with the United States but also with Asian countries. As long as current trade imbalance persists, Japan will continue to be under pressure to contribute more to defense burdensharing:

Japan needs to accelerate its defense efforts even more. Japan should, in a reasonable period of time, meet its limited defense goals as befits its status as a member of the advanced free nation.²

In fact, Congress will introduce a joint resolution in the near future:

Requiring the President or his designee to enter into negotiations with Japan for the purpose of having Japan bear a greater share of the free world's defense burden by either increasing its annual defense expenditures to at least 3 percent of its Gross National Product or by obtaining payment by Japan to the United States of the difference between 3 percent of Japan's annual Gross National Product and what Japan actually spends on defense.³

Such pressure from Congress is not new, and the response from Japan is not expected to be any different from what Prime Minister Takeshita told President Reagan recently--gradual but steady growth of its military according to Japan's current and future defense plans while paying substantially more to help the U.S. forces in Japan. As pointed out earlier, this year's 5.2 percent increase in Japan's defense budget will amount to the third largest defense budget in the world if computed on the NATO scale of measuring defense burdensharing. Negotiating for a 3-percent-of-GNP contribution, therefore, will be extremely difficult.

SOME THOUGHTS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH JAPAN

While not intended to be a complete dissertation, some fundamental thoughts on how to deal with Japan may be helpful.

Obviously it goes without saying that Americans must diligently study everything about Japan--the people, history, culture, and so on. Additionally, anyone who will have the responsibility to negotiate with the Japanese must learn the language. Most Japanese negotiators are skilled in English although they will not show it. It means that they have a distinct advantage of having the extra time to formulate the response while American negotiator's comments are being interpreted or translated. Additionally, the Japanese negotiator has another important advantage of being able to assess the American position even more accurately by being able to listen to the

American's consultation with his staff. The Soviet diplomats in Tokyo have mastered the Japanese language, and they are successful in dealing with the Japanese. The Americans must do the same in order to be at par with the Japanese negotiators.

Unfortunately, however, learning the Japanese language is only the first step toward understanding the hidden nuances of the spoken language. A skilled negotiator must be mindful of the "linguistic fog"⁴ which can be quite misleading. In the Japanese response, for example, "I will do my best," and "I will think about it" generally means "I don't like it." Furthermore, "it is difficult" almost always means "the answer is no and don't press the issue anymore." A skilled negotiator, therefore, must learn to interpret the response correctly by understanding that linguistic ambiguity, vagueness, and haziness are all part of the Japanese culture that is manifested to avoid concreteness. It is also important to understand that not all Japanese practice the skill of linguistic fog. Adding to this confusion, some Japanese believe that the most effective form of communication is nonverbal and that conversations in negotiations are mere formality. In either case, the American negotiator must recognize that demanding immediate answers is not the best approach in Japan and the Japanese reply may have a totally different meaning from what it appears to convey.

The American negotiator must also understand the intricate nature of Japan's consensus-driven decisionmaking. One must resist the temptation to react to its slowness; one must be

patient and persistent. Most important, however, is to take advantage of the delay in response by "lobbying" with those in the decisionmaking process. It is a common practice in Japan, and failing to play the political game according to their rules and procedure often produces nothing for the American negotiator. One must be astute enough to find out the key players in the decisionmaking process. For example, in defense matters, in addition to the Prime Minister, the proper protocol should be extended to other key figures such as those representing the Defense Agency, the Finance Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry. Additionally, recognizing the "hidden power" within the Liberal Democratic Party (for example, the previous Prime Minister Nakasone) will pay important dividends.

The American negotiator must pay close attention to the media in order to gain valuable information on public opinion. As already discussed, the consensus of Japan's society will strongly influence the political decisionmaking process. The American negotiator must pay particular attention to the contents of at least three major newspapers, Yomiuri, Asahi, and Mainichi Shimbun. The Japanese are avid readers of daily newspapers and thus are well informed of world and domestic issues. Being able to "gauge the mood of Japan's society" may be a significant asset in formulating an effective negotiation strategy. On the other hand, not paying attention to the power of the media can be a significant detriment in Japan.

A study by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on government decisionmaking in Japan cited excellent recommendations for American negotiators:

1. There should be a clearer American definition of what U.S. interest vis-a-vis Japan are and what the United States wants Japan to do.
2. U.S. representatives should better coordinate their approaches to Japan.
3. The U.S. side must make a strong effort in negotiations to show the Japanese that initiatives proposed by the United States are rational in a Japanese context, and are in the best long-term interest of Japan.
4. The United States must apply steady pressure and persuasion, especially at the working level of the bureaucracy, the party, and among nongovernment interest groups. A broad, high-level pressure from the United States at Japan's leadership level may also be helpful.⁵

THE PROSPECT OF INCREASED JAPANESE MILITARY BURDENSARING

If defense burdensharing is defined as rearming of Japan, the prospect is dim. However, if burdensharing means paying more for the defense of Japan to relieve the United States of its cost of military strategy in Northeast Asia, the prospect appears more encouraging. Of particular importance, it has been suggested that Japan's ability to implement the new Five-Year Defense Plan hinges on its continuing economic growth. The forecast of Japan's economic slowdown and costly domestic problems may cause delays in meeting the goals of Japan's future defense programs. Thus, the description of the U.S.-

Japan defense partnership as being an "unshakable alliance"⁶ may turn out to be more of a wish than a reality.

This paper has repeatedly emphasized the importance of knowing and understanding each other for future negotiations. Professor Akira Nishikawa of the National Institute for Defense Studies makes this point clear relative to Japan's defense strategy:

. . . I believe that a major problem with future Japanese defense strategy lies not with the fact that it would not properly serve our purpose of defense, but with the fact that the concept and theoretical structure of defense policy are not understood accurately either at home and abroad.⁷

The paper has also discussed the significance of perceptions when translated into political actions. The lack of a perceived threat of the Soviet forces near Japan will be a key ingredient that will continue to impact on defense spending. Perceptions of the Americans? A survey by Yomiuri Shimbun in June 1987 revealed that the perceptions of America by the Japanese, in general, have changed since nine years ago. The focus is less on the association with World War II and more on American strength and freedom.⁸ While the older generation still think of America in terms of World War II, the future leaders of Japan perceived the United States much more positively--a good sign that the United States should cultivate.

In discussing Japan's military forces, it is important to remember that Japan's security programs are intended to acquire the minimum necessary force level which should be capable of defending the country from a limited, small-scale aggression

without relying on the United States.⁹ The Self-Defense Forces were never conceived with the idea of defending Japan from a massive attack; Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. forces to thwart such an aggression. For this reason, the proposed SLOC defense will remain controversial, and other Asian nations will continue to worry about Japan's rearming potential as portrayed by the SLOC defense concept. In the meantime, the Self-Defense Forces are expected to modernize through technology and become even more capable. Perhaps, then, the strongest aspect of Japan's contribution for defense burdensharing may not be quantity--but quality.

ENDNOTES

1. George R. Packard, "The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1987/88, p. 361. William Finan and Richard Samuels of the New York Times (22 July 1987, p. A-27) also expressed similar views. They wrote: "America must ask itself what it wants from Japan. Rearmament? Military burdensharing? Technology? Economic leadership? Obedience? American officials seem to want it all ways: They want Japan to be more assertive on defense issues but submissive on trade issues. More important, both nations must consider what they want from the overall alliance."

2. Richard L. Armitage, "The U.S.-Japanese Defense Partnership: Unshakable Alliance Despite Tensions over Trade," News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, 17 January 1986, p. 4.

3. Extracted from House Joint Resolution 327.

4. Clyde Haberman, "Some Japanese (One) Urge Plain Speaking," New York Times, 27 March 1988, p. 3.

Apparently a few Japanese have begun to demand plain speaking. Haberman wrote:

Mr. [Kazuhisa] Inoue, who belongs to the opposition Komeito Party, says it is bad enough that ordinary

Japanese cannot figure out what their leaders are saying. But with Japan now a global force, he says, obtuse language can only create mistrust and encourage overseas stereotypes of "sneaky Japanese."

Haberman also added that "making an effort" means "doing nothing at all." We contend that Haberman is essentially correct. However, Japan's multinationalistic approach to its economic endeavors has opened the door for more direct negotiations. Consequently, as the Americans learn more about the Japanese way in their effort to compete in Japan, the Japanese are learning the American way in their effort to compete in the United States. In the political arena, however, the problems associated with the "linguistic fog" is likely to continue.

5. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Government Decisionmaking in Japan: Implications for the United States, pp. X-XI.

6. Armitage, News Release, p. 1.

7. Akira Nishioka, The Perspectives on the Defense Strategy of Japan, p. 9.

8. "Image of America," Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 June 1987, p. 10.

9. White Paper, Defense of Japan, Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1987, p. 76.

APPENDIX I

This paper examined Japan's role in defense burdensharing with the United States and focused mainly on Japan's contributions in terms of spending a larger percentage of its GNP toward defense as desired by the U.S. Congress. Defense burdensharing, however, has other variables and perspectives which will ultimately shape their respective approach to negotiation.

DEFENSE BURDENSARING: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE

- OBJECTIVE: Have Japan assume a greater military role in order to enhance the security of Asia, thereby reducing financial burden of the United States.
- QUESTION: To what degree can the United States count on Japan to meet the U.S. objective?
- OPTIONS:
- U.S. to retain its current security posture in Asia while negotiating with Japan to spend more on its own defense. (current option)
 - Pro: U.S. forward-deployed strategy remains intact.
 - Con: Cost.
 - Prospect: Likely to continue.
 - Japan to partially assume the U.S. role in Asia.
 - Pro: Relieves some financial burden of the U.S.
 - Con: Raises concerns for Japan's militarism among other Asian nations.
 - Prospect: Uncertain.
 - Japan to totally assume the U.S. role in Asia.
 - Pro: Relieves financial burden of the U.S.
 - Con: Adversely impacts the balance of power in Asia.
 - Prospect: Unlikely.
 - Japan to participate with the U.S. on military research and development programs.
 - Pro: Potential exists for technological and financial cooperation for mutual benefit.
 - Con: Concerns may exist over undesirable technological transfer.
 - Prospect: Good.

- Japan to participate in the United Nation's peacekeeping operations.
 - Pro: Contributes to the mission of the United Nations.
 - Con: Does not directly contribute toward easing of defense burdensharing with the U.S.
 - Prospect: Likely in the distant future.
- Japan to militarily assist the U.S. forces outside of Japan if Japan is threatened.
 - Pro: Shows Japan's commitment.
 - Con: Japan may need to resolve its constitutional constraint on the use of military forces.
 - Prospect: Possible within the policy on the defense of sea lanes of communication (SLOC). Unlikely beyond SLOC defense.
- Japan to spend 3% of GNP for defense.
 - Pro: Relieves financial burden of the U.S.
 - Con: Adverse reaction from Japan if pressured to deviate from its defense program. Significant protest from other Asian nations anticipated.
 - Prospect: Unlikely.
- Japan to increase aid to developing nations in which the U.S. maintains strategic interest.
 - Pro: Relieves financial burden of the U.S.
 - Con: Japan's interests and U.S. strategic interests may not coincide.
 - Prospect: Likely to continue.

DEFENSE BURDENSARING: JAPAN'S PERSPECTIVE

- OBJECTIVE: Enhance the Japan-U.S. relationship through defense as well as diplomatic and economic cooperation.
- QUESTION: How far will the United States pressure Japan to do more for defense burdensharing?
- OPTIONS:
 - Japan to contribute toward defense burdensharing with the United States according to steady, real-growth increases in defense budget annually. (current option)
 - Pro: Represents a realistic approach according to established defense programs.

- Con: Will probably continue to draw criticism of "free-ride" from U.S. Congress.
Prospect: Likely to continue.
- Play a greater military role in Northeast Asia.
 - Pro: May satisfy the U.S. demands for such role.
 - Con: Destabilizes Japan's relationship with other Asian nations and the Soviet Union. Constitutionality of such role must be resolved.
 - Prospect: Possible within the strict context of self-defense. Unlikely otherwise.
 - Participate in the United Nations' peacekeeping operations.
 - Pro: Globally enhances the image of Japan.
It can be implemented without drastic changes to its current defense programs and policy.
 - Con: Extends constitutionality of such participation.
Does not directly help the U.S.
 - Prospect: Possible within a few years.
 - Protect the sea lanes of communication (SLOC).
 - Pro: Enhances the security of Japan's economic life-line.
Defense guidance already includes SLOC defense.
 - Con: Costly.
Adverse reaction from other Asian nations and Soviet Union.
 - Prospect: Possible in the distant future.
 - Increase its share of the cost to maintain U.S. forces in Japan.
 - Pro: Directly assists the U.S. in relieving some of its financial burden.
 - Con: Additional expenditures that compete against domestic programs.
 - Prospect: Programmed for 1988 budget.

- Participate in military technological cooperation with the United States and select European nations.

Pro: Mutually enhances technological developments.

Can be implemented within the existing defense guideline.

Con: Does not directly contribute toward defense burdensharing with the United States.

Prospect: Good.

Perspectives, then, on defense burdensharing between the United States and Japan vary on several key points. For example, Japan is unlikely to rearm its Self-Defense Forces to the degree desired by some U.S. Congressmen. There are, however, several similar points which should be the focus of negotiation for Japan's increased share in defense burdensharing. For example, Japan's participation in the U.N. peacekeeping operation and technological cooperative programs with the United States should be pursued. At the same time, the U.S. negotiator will probably gain nothing by demanding 3% of GNP for defense.

APPENDIX II

The knowledge of Japan's basic policy toward defense is key to understanding its views on rearming, the role of Self-Defense Forces, and perspectives on defense burdensharing with the United States. Accordingly, the following has been extracted from Defense of Japan:

BASIC POLICY OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE

CONSTITUTION AND RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

- Since the end of World War II, Japan resolved not to repeat tragedy of war and has since made tenacious efforts to establish itself as a peaceloving nation. The establishment of permanent peace is the heartiest wish shared by the Japanese people. The Constitution, upholding the idea of pacifism, sets forth in Article 9 renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential and rejection of the right of belligerency of the state.
- It is recognized beyond doubt that the provision in the article does not deny the inherent right of self-defense that Japan should be entitled to maintain as a sovereign nation. As long as the right of self-defense cannot be denied, the government remains firm in the view that the Constitution does not prohibit the maintenance of the minimum level of armed strength necessary to exercise the right of self-defense.
- The "exclusively defense-oriented" refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. Thus, adhering to this policy, Japan will initiate its defensive operations only when its land is attacked by a foreign power or powers. Even then the scope of military operations and the level of the defense forces to be mobilized will be kept to the minimum required for the purpose of self-defense.
- The necessary minimum force to defend Japan as employed in the execution of its right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic scope of the Japanese territorial land, sea and airspace. However, it is difficult to make a wholesale definition of exactly how far this geographic area stretches because it would vary with separate individual situations. Nevertheless, the government believes that the Constitution does not permit it to dispatch armed forces to foreign territorial land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using force,

because such deployment of troops overseas generally goes beyond the minimum limit necessary for self-defense.

BASIC POLICY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles. To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles:

- To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
- To promote the public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.
- To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
- To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.

THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES

Japan holds fast to the three non-nuclear principles of "not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not permitting their introduction into Japan" as a matter of national policy.

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