The American Airlift to Israel in 1973: Political and Military Implications
Abstract
The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 provides an excellent case study for the use of airlift resources during a modern day battle. The two sides in conflict, the Arabs and the Israelis, were supplied with sophisticated weapons that would increase the rate of attrition and operational tempo. This excessive rate of loss caused the Israelis concern about supplies of equipment and ammunition needed to provide for a counter offensive. The Israelis would need the help of their friend the United States. The U. S. had the capacity to deliver much needed supplies but the new Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, did not want to disrupt detente with the Soviets. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wanted to be sure the U.S. could play an 'honest broker' role in the peace settlement after the war ended. The Defense and State Departments were pursuing their own course of action but the combination was causing a delay in the start of the airlift. This paper will look at the effects of airlift and its ability to play a deterrent role in conflicts. The decision making process in the United States was hindered but a timely decision needed to be made. This paper will evaluate the decision process and the airlift resources available. A brief comparison of airlift with sealift will be made. The American airlift will be compared with the future will be discussed in light of the lessons learned during the American airlift to Israel in 1973.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 30, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA192795
Entities
People
- Roger W. Hansen
Organizations
- United States Army War College