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
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

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# AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

## STUDENT REPORT

BOOK ANALYSIS: THE PENTAGON AND  
THE ART OF WAR

MAJOR DENNIS M. MCCARTHY 88-1710

"insights into tomorrow"

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**TITLE** BOOK ANALYSIS: THE PENTAGON AND THE ART OF WAR

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## PREFACE

There are a multitude of approaches one can take in a book analysis, depending on what questions one is attempting to answer. In analyzing Edward Luttwak's The Pentagon and the Art of War, the author chose to determine if the book merited serious study by those interested in military reform. To make such a determination, he sought to compare Luttwak's work with other literature addressing the same subject. The analysis is organized in the following manner:

1. The first chapter provides the reader with a brief biographical background of Edward N. Luttwak, followed by a synopsis of The Pentagon and the Art of War.
2. Chapter Two looks at a sample of the historical events which Luttwak uses to support his thesis, and compares and contrasts his account with those of other authors.
3. Chapter Three examines the views and opinions of various contemporary military and government leaders on military reform, and compares and contrasts them to those of Luttwak.
4. The fourth chapter reviews certain aspects of recent reform legislation and compares the results with Luttwak's ideas and proposals concerning such reform.
5. The final chapter draws some brief and general conclusions based on the overall book analysis.

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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Dennis M. McCarthy is a C-141 Pilot currently attending the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He was commissioned through ROTC in 1975 and subsequently attended the Undergraduate Pilot Training Helicopter course at Ft Rucker, Alabama, where he was recognized as an honor graduate. His first operational assignment was as a CH-3 Helicopter Pilot with the 22nd Tactical Drone Squadron, Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona. Twenty months later he was selected to become an instructor pilot and was assigned to the 1550th Aircrew Training and Test Wing, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. During this tour he performed in a variety of positions including Squadron Executive Officer and Unit Standardization and Evaluation Officer. In 1982 he was selected for an ASTRA assignment and was sent to the Pentagon where he held positions in AF/MP and SAF/LL. Following this staff tour he attended the Fixed Wing Qualification course at Reese AFB and subsequently transitioned to the C-141. He was then assigned to the 15th Military Airlift Squadron, Norton AFB, California. While stationed there, he again served in a variety of positions, most recently as the Chief Pilot, where he supervised the daily operations of over 90 pilots.

Major McCarthy holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Geography from San Diego State University and a Master of Arts Degree in Procurement Management from Webster University. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



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**REPORT NUMBER** 88-1710

**AUTHOR(S)** MAJOR DENNIS M. MCCARTHY

**TITLE** BOOK ANALYSIS: THE PENTAGON AND THE ART OF WAR

During the past several years, the subject of military reform has been given much attention by Congressional and military leaders. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has probably instituted the most significant changes in our defense establishment during the last thirty years. It is this recent emphasis on military reform that led to the analysis of The Pentagon and the Art of War by Edward N. Luttwak, which looks at the problems in our defense establishment and offers solutions.

In this analysis, the author identifies three significant themes which Luttwak discusses in his book. These include: first, America's tendency to concentrate on material aspects of defense versus what Luttwak terms intangibles; second, the military officer surplus and its relationship to both leadership decline and our research and development functions; and finally, problems in the budget process and their relation to our strategy and recent history. These themes, along with Luttwak's proposals for reform, are analyzed in an effort to determine the value of The Pentagon and the Art of War to the student of military reform.

## CONTINUED

The analysis approaches the book from several different perspectives. First, the author evaluates some of the factual data for accuracy and relevance to the subject of military reform. He accomplishes this by taking historical support used by Luttwak, and comparing and contrasting it with the writings of other authors on the same subject. Second, he analyzes Luttwak's ideas and opinions for credibility and acceptance by comparing them with those of contemporary military and civilian government leaders. Third, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 is examined and compared to Luttwak's proposals for military reform. Finally, some brief conclusions are drawn based on the analysis. The author suggests that The Pentagon and the Art of War is a credible and excellent source which accurately portrays many of the existing problems in our defense establishment. The author feels the book's only shortcoming is that the effort Luttwak expends on his reform proposal is limited compared with his detailed description of the problems.

The author recommends that Luttwak's book, The Pentagon and the Art of War, be included on PME suggested reading lists under the subject of military reform.

## Chapter One

Any author is to some degree influenced by his background and environment. For this reason, I will provide some brief biographical facts on Edward N. Luttwak. My intent in doing so is not to draw conclusions based on these facts but to introduce the reader to some possible areas of bias.

Edward N. Luttwak was born November 4, 1942, in Arad, Rumania, the son of a successful businessman. His early education was accomplished in Palermo and Milan, Italy. He later attended the London School of Economics and Political Science where he received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Economics in 1964. After college, Luttwak worked in Eastern Europe for CBS-TV, lectured at the University of Bath in England, worked as an oil consultant in England, and served as a strategic consultant on the Middle East in Washington, DC. In 1972, he assumed his current position as an associate director at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. Luttwak has written numerous books, including The Political Uses of Sea Power, 1974; A Dictionary of Modern War, 1971; and The Strategic Balance, 1972. This brief biographical sketch provides the reader with possible areas of influence on Luttwak and sets the backdrop for the following synopsis of his book.

The need for military reform is the central thesis of The Pentagon and the Art of War. According to Luttwak, this need has been demonstrated by various events which have occurred over the past forty years. The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to give a comprehensive synopsis of Luttwak's main ideas, providing a solid basis for understanding of his thesis.

The first four chapters provide a broad overview of the structural problems of the US defense establishment, as perceived by Luttwak. Luttwak's introductory chapter sets the stage for the rest of his analysis of what he perceives as the significant problems of our defense establishment (2:21). He accomplishes this by presenting a synopsis of practices which were followed in the Vietnam war. He approaches the Vietnam war from the point of view that it was a military failure. In analyzing this failure, Luttwak points out that it was not a one-dimensional failure, but that the blame should be levied across a wide spectrum of political, military, and societal elements. However, his emphasis on the failure of our military is summed up by the following statement: "But for all the blame cast upon others, the failure of the entire military structure and command system--not

just the leaders now gone but institutions still unchanged--looms large and unforgivable" (2:24). Luttwak's beliefs were centered around various themes including the thesis that every service, even the Coast Guard, competed for a piece of the action and its fair share of the war effort (2:24). He contends the United States government did not understand or in some cases chose to ignore the type of conflict in which it was engaged. For example, he asserts the majority of US forces in Vietnam had no business fighting guerrillas and terrorists in a revolutionary type of conflict (2:24). He also suggests the problem was compounded by an evolved complex bureaucratic system which supported the growth and promotion of our officer corps without contributing to the war effort. Luttwak felt it was this "institutional indulgence" which laid the foundation from which we could only proceed down a path leading to eventual defeat (2:33).

Having laid the groundwork by analyzing the US failure in Vietnam, Luttwak continues to build on his premise that the problems experienced in Vietnam still exist. He develops a pattern of failures designed to build a credible argument that we have not learned from our mistakes in Vietnam nor any of the succeeding events. Luttwak reviews several problems which occurred in the Iran rescue raid, the Beirut bombing of the Marine barracks, and Grenada, and attempts to link them to flaws in the overall military structure.

Although most of the free world saw the Grenada operation as a success, Luttwak points out several fallacies in that conclusion. His bottom line for Grenada was that the large number of significant errors in the operation were hidden by the vastly superior force in both numbers and equipment used to conduct the operation and combat a "fourth rate enemy" (2:58). Through these examples he presents a simple picture of how the overall structure of our defense department is flawed, which in turn leads to problems in each service's structure, the budget and procurement processes, and the development of an effective officer corps.

Next, he elaborates on the structure of our current armed forces (as of 1984) from a manpower, weapons systems, and geographical point of view. Luttwak describes the inherent problems in the way our forces are structured (2:41). For example, Luttwak contends the bureaucratic system forces many parochially oriented officers to temporarily serve in a Joint Chiefs organization or one of the unified commands (2:43). The resulting structure provides an atmosphere where ineffectiveness and inefficiency flourish. Luttwak believes that military structural reform from within is impossible because of the very nature of the structure, and the only plausible answer is to restructure it from without (2:91). The congressional branch of

government, which would eventually have to approve any changes in the military structure regardless of who initiated them, would be the most likely and practical institution for initiating the changes. Basically, Luttwak feels that the military has evolved into a large bureaucratic organization that is incapable of self-reform.

After outlining the structure of the United States forces, Luttwak discusses those of our primary adversary, the Soviet Union. A quote from the introduction to his discussion explains its relationship to the remainder of the book: "Our own armed forces are difficult to comprehend but to reach sensible conclusions about our defense we have to understand the true nature of the military power of the Soviet Union, and that is even more difficult" (2:93). His conclusions after evaluating the Soviet's military power reflect an attitude of caution and concern. He emphatically rejects any serious proposal to cut defense spending across the board or any like proposals without first "achieving radical reforms which would enable us to spend the money more wisely" (2:128). Luttwak concludes his discussion of the Soviet forces with the following statements showing his cautious concern about the reality of the situation: "In what follows, reform is the subject, but the pressing reality of the Soviet Union's ascent to military primacy affects every aspect of it. To do less in the name of reform is much worse than no reform at all" (2:129).

The next six chapters of his book are an attempt to provide a more detailed look at some of the structural problems and their effects on our national security. These chapters concentrate on three basic areas: America's concentration on material versus intangible assets; the officer surplus and its relationship to both leadership decline and problems in our research and development functions; and finally, the budget process as it relates to our strategy and recent history.

First, Luttwak deals with America's tendency to concentrate too much on the material aspects of defense versus what he terms the intangibles (2:139). Much of the criteria established for procuring weapon systems and determining the way the defense department does business has evolved from business practices which are implemented under pressure from public and congressional scrutiny. An example of this would be the purchase of a weapons system at a low cost and with a short acquisition time, but with no procurement flexibility such as the possibility for a future increased production rate contrasted to an equal system purchased at a higher price, but with the flexibility to increase future production in an emergency (2:133). With this type of example Luttwak attempts to show that certain intangibles

are of great benefit when one is in the business of preparing for war or attempting to deter war. He further suggests that efficiency from a pure business point of view is not applicable nor in the best interests of the country.

Next, he deals with a problem which has grown out of the bureaucratic structure. According to Luttwak, the military has too many chiefs for the amount of indians, or simply stated, too large an officer corps. He documents its proportional growth since World War II and presents the case that it has been extremely detrimental to the organization (2:157). The primary basis he uses in his analysis is officer to enlisted ratio. In making his point he establishes there has been significant growth in both mid-level (O-4 through O-6) and flag officer to enlisted ratios since post-World War II. He acknowledges that because of certain technological requirements and sophistication of weapon systems, more officers would be required now than in the early 1950s; however, he also points out this growth should have been in the junior officer ranks but has not increased when compared to enlisted personnel (2:164). Having described and documented what he terms the officer surplus, he attempts to analyze the growth rate to determine how and why it has occurred.

Although Luttwak feels technological changes and growth have led to some necessary increases in officer strengths, he believes the majority of increases have come out of an elaborate administrative growth which got out of hand. The end result of this elaborate system is the decentralization of goals by the organization. Each small office loses sight of the big picture and "pursues only the narrowest goals within the boundaries of their own offices" (2:179). To present his case Luttwak takes the reader through the evolution of the Air Force Systems Command and how the development and procurement of certain weapon systems resulted in a very elaborate and large officer force to oversee these types of operations.

It is important to note Luttwak in no way feels the officer corps is intentionally trying to abuse the system by creating overelaborate products (2:174). In fact, he defends all ranks of the officer corps for their devotion to economy and simplicity, but feels they are a victim of the "grossly overelaborate structure" (2:174). In other words the bureaucratic system is so large and elaborate that individuals can't easily see the problems from their perspective. This results in expending vast amounts of money, manpower, and effort on projects or systems which could be accomplished with much less. Luttwak believes that this way of doing business leads to "a classic vicious circle [which] defeats the good intentions [of our officers]" (2:174).

Another problem, besides tending to create even larger bureaucracies, is the tendency to constantly reach for perfection. Luttwak explains that because the structural system is so elaborate and needlessly complicated, it results in needlessly complicated and elaborate products (2:176). But even more important is the problem that "often important military capabilities are lost because some things are not produced at all" (2:176). Luttwak further states "the problem is rather the refusal of the research-and-development offices to put themselves out of business by actually declaring their work completed and ready for production" (2:177). "This systematic holding back of innovation in peacetime has a serious impact on the overall military balance" (2:179). He sums this problem up by stating the following:

The very purpose of keeping a Systems Command is to harness the scientific and industrial potential of the nation to serve the urgent needs of the Air Force. What defeats that purpose is the way the Command is structured, as a layer cake of bureaucracies in which officers lose sight of the operational needs of the Air Force while pursuing the narrowest goals within the boundaries of their own offices (2:179).

Some of the other economic and technological problems resulting from this type of structure are overelaborate studies of simple weapon systems and the purchase of American-made weapons when they are readily available from our allies at a lower cost and equal or better quality. He describes these problems and gives them credibility by documenting several cases to demonstrate his accusations.

While this structurally flawed system results in needed weapon systems being too expensive to produce in sufficient quantities, there is another area Luttwak believes is effected which is not so tangible--the decline of leadership. By having such large numbers of officers, especially those of senior rank, we have diluted the possibilities for potential leaders to spend a good deal of time in true command positions of organizations with a combat mission. As previously stated, Luttwak documents the increased ratio of mid-level and flag rank officers to enlisted personnel in the post-World War II era. The following passage reflects the type of growth Luttwak is describing.

In 1945, the 12 million at war were managed and commanded by a total of 101 three-star officers (lieutenant generals/vice admirals) and 38 full generals and admirals, including the seven of five star rank. In 1983, a total of just over 2 million in uniform enjoyed the attentions of 118 three-star officers and 34 full generals and admirals (2:192).

Luttwak feels that with this large number of senior officers, a critical problem occurs in developing our leadership to its highest potential. The number of senior officers far outnumber the available command positions. Most of the officers end up being absorbed into the overelaborate supporting structure as previously described (2:192).

Unable to command, because only a fraction can be accommodated in bonafide command slots, all the senior officers must manage instead; but there is not enough management to keep them occupied, so they must overmanage and micro-manage, or else coordinate the massive complications that overstaffing has caused in the first place (2:192).

According to Luttwak this phenomena results in some bad side effects on the quality of leadership in our armed services. For example, many of our senior officers get so entangled in the paperwork bureaucracy they find little time to concentrate on war fighting skills. "Much [of their] energy is consumed in bureaucratic warfare with other officers of parallel rank who head competing departments" (2:194). To try and cope with this imbalance, the services have come up with many schemes, such as short command tours. Luttwak feels that all this does is improve the record of the individual so he can get promoted, but is detrimental to the overall health of the organization. These short command tours often result in lack of unit continuity and cohesiveness as well as demoralization of personnel (2:196). In addition, according to Luttwak, it puts the short-time commander in a position of not being able to really do much except punch his ticket for promotion. He further believes that the officer who tries to emphasize the military art of war and combat skills at the expense of keeping the immense amount of bureaucratic paperwork straight will suffer the fate of non-promotion. Again, it is not the officers who are at fault. Instead he blames the "grossly overelaborate military bureaucracies" (2:203). Even though the quality of our officer corps is extremely high, its large numbers, limited opportunities, and bureaucratic promotion system results in an overall decline in leadership.

After reviewing the officer surplus problem, Luttwak examines the budget process. He contends the way in which defense spending is accomplished leads to a situation where extreme amounts of energy and resources are committed to the process itself without any direct benefit to our national defense. He sums up his views toward the overall process by stating: "If only all this abundant energy and wisdom were applied to the making of our defense strategy and to the reorganization of our defense, spectacular improvement could be achieved" (2:204). In looking at the budget process, Luttwak examines several aspects starting with Congress.

Luttwak believes the existing way in which the United States Congress approves the annual defense budget is fundamentally antiquated and inadequate (2:205). One aspect of this would be the way most of our budget has to be renewed every year. With a system as sophisticated and large as our defense establishment, a situation is created in which vast amounts of resources, including manpower and money, are expended each year. Much of the effort is duplicated year after year. Even with all the resources dedicated to the budget process, Congress historically has trouble finalizing the budget by the end of the fiscal year. Many defense industries are constantly kept hanging by a string wondering if their products or programs will be approved. Luttwak summarizes their frustration as follows:

Until that day at the end of January when they can see their own products included in one or another of the several hundred line items of the budget request, defense contractors cannot be absolutely certain that their purchase will be authorized, and if so, in what quantity--even though they will have done their best during the preceding twelve months to follow closely and influence the officers and officials of the branches, services, and departments as the latter bargain within the Pentagon to accommodate competing desires within the total budget that the President and his men will submit for defense. If their product is safely included, it will meet its first test in the hearings and staff reviews of the Armed Services Committees of both the House and Senate, which will recommend for or against authorization (2:205).

Another problem, according to Luttwak, is the way in which Congress categorizes expenditures. He believes the categories currently used have no logical basis and although it does not result in great additional cost, are extremely confusing to those in the system who have to sort it all out during the budget process (2:207). This confusion makes it very difficult for the average individual to see and understand exactly what defense dollars are being spent on.

All of these overelaborate bureaucratic organizational and procedural aspects of our defense system are costly and detrimental to the defense establishment and the nation. Luttwak explains that this leads to the biggest cost of all; "the unstrategic urge for evermore readiness has become one more factor in keeping the officer corps focused on mechanical, managerial, and logistic priorities at the expense of strategy, operations, and tactics" (2:213).

After discussing the basic flaws of the budgeting system, he briefly covers how these flaws, combined with the other structural problems already discussed, result in the purchase of only a few highly technological systems. Luttwak explains that by going overboard with quality over quantity, we end up with a limited number of extremely expensive systems which are often still vulnerable to enemy forces during conflict. The best example of this is his description of the production of a Navy aircraft carrier and the required force needed to protect that carrier. What we end up with is an aircraft carrier whose expense is in excess of 3 billion dollars and a supporting force which costs almost as much (2:220). In other words, for all the money we spend on this elaborate system, much of it is for protecting the combat resources and very little of its capability is devoted to destruction of the enemy force.

Another failure Luttwak sees as a result of the budget process is what he terms a fundamental imbalance in American strategy. As already alluded to, the concentration on and procurement of one type of force at the expense of others leaves us with large gaps of vulnerability. To illustrate this, Luttwak uses the huge investment in US naval forces at the expense of building up conventional theater forces as an example of this process. He questions this strategy and presents the case that there is little logical reason to believe it is necessary to have such a large Navy when our primary adversary is the Soviet Union. He sees this as a classic error in our strategy (2:264). Luttwak sums up his feelings on this event when he states the following:

At a time when the extraordinary magnitude of the Soviet military buildup compels the United States to focus its military resources more than ever on deterrence and defense in the major continental theaters, the single largest American force-building effort is devoted to a form of military power whose usefulness is least precisely when used to oppose the Soviet Union in those same theaters. At the level of grand strategy this is the equivalent of outmaneuvering oneself: the United States is giving its highest budget priority to naval forces, which in a major conflict with the Soviet Union would be the least useful, except to oppose the Soviet Navy, to which the Soviet Union gives the lowest budget priority--after the army, tactical airpower, the strategic-nuclear forces, and homeland air defenses (2:264).

The underlying theme of all these perceived failures continues to be the bureaucratic structure which drives both our civilian and military leaders to spend their energies on administrative matters rather than concentrating on our national military strategy and the priority of providing our nation with a credible and effective defense establishment.

In his final chapter Luttwak provides us with his ideas on reform. He reviews his theme of the existence of a faulty defense establishment with the following statement. "As we have seen, the fundamental problems are structural: it is the organization which must be changed, not the culture; there is nothing in our political system that precludes sound strategy, as there is nothing in the spirit of young Americans that prohibits military success" (2:268).

His first proposal is to establish a central military staff that can provide centralized guidance and present advice and choices which reflect a national policy instead of several parochial viewpoints. He believes that once formed and in place this defense staff could provide advice and guidance which would eliminate much of the waste and interservice rivalry and lead to increased emphasis on such things as tactics, strategy, and the operational art of war (2:269). By centralizing these functions and taking away parochialism from the joint arena, Luttwak believes the defense establishment would be much less susceptible to the kinds of operational failures demonstrated in events such as Vietnam, Iran, Beirut, and Grenada.

With this corps of national defense officers, Luttwak explains there would be a significant improvement in various critical military functions. He discusses three of these: the planning of large and small combat operations, immediate and contingent; the effective command of joint service commands; and the quality of professional advice given to our national command authority (2:272). Having described what form of reorganization he suggests, Luttwak goes on to propose a system for attaining such a national defense staff.

Basically he proposes that a system be devised where the best of the officer corps be afforded the opportunity to join the defense staff at a point in their career where they have attained the rank of colonel or navy captain. "The obvious attraction would be its monopoly over the higher direction of our national defense" (2:273). From this pool of highly qualified officers would come the future commanders of all unified and specified commands. The head of the defense staff would be the nations senior military officer. The individual services would still have senior officers which would lead their respective services, but they would largely be oriented toward positions which tend to be more administrative and managerial in nature as opposed to being oriented towards commanding combat forces and planning for war (2:274). There would still be incentives for individuals who stayed with their parent service, in that they would still control large forces and be able to attain up to three-star rank. By setting up this defense staff, Luttwak believes we would "subordinate the services to a selection of their best men,

formed into a cohesive cadre" (2:276). With parochialism removed, Luttwak feels the defense staff would be able to operate more effectively and efficiently without worry of repercussion such as non-promotion.

In discussing his proposed organizational changes, he suggests the defense establishment be divided into seven major functional areas. In doing this he provides his rationalization for each category. After extolling the virtues and benefits of his reform proposals in very general and broad terms, he closes the book with the following subtle warning. "If this reform is rejected, if the present system is allowed to endure, it will continue to absorb much treasure and give us inadequate military power" (2:286).

## Chapter Two

Luttwak uses historical events which have occurred over the last four decades to support his thesis: the defense establishment has some basic flaws in its structural makeup and is in desperate need of reform. In analyzing his arguments for reform and events used to support his thesis, it is important and beneficial to look at these events for relevance to the subject. One way of doing this is to take various topics or events Luttwak has written about and compare his accounts and opinions with other accounts and opinions of the same events or topics. This chapter will use this type of comparison to give us some idea as to whether or not Luttwak's analysis has merit from a factual point of view. Luttwak uses various historical events to support his arguments. Because it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover each one of them, I have chosen only a few of the more recent ones to review.

In reviewing the tragic loss of lives in the terrorist bombing of the Marines in Beirut on 23 October 1983, Luttwak criticizes the elaborate chain of command (2:51). Luttwak believes the command structure, with its many layers from USCINCEUR down to the commander of the marine battalion, was "hopelessly diluted [of] responsibility" (2:51). Orders and instructions were passed down with each layer making its input. With all this supervision, adequate security measures still were not put into effect. Luttwak also believes it was more of a system failure than an individual commanders failure. Commanders were making inputs without total and accurate information, only seeing a part of the big picture.

There have been various articles and publications written on the Beirut tragedy. A DOD Commission's report on the event came up with a number of findings, conclusions, and recommendations. "The commission believed there was a fundamental conflict between the peace-keeping mission provided through the chain of command to the USMNF (the US portion of the multi-national force), and the increasingly active role that the United States was taking in support of the LAF" (12:55). The commission basically reports that there was a breakdown in effective command supervision. Although both Luttwak and the commission agree on the chain of command failure to be effective, the commission does not directly attribute this to any structural flaws in the system. They rather cite the failure of USCINCEUR and his subordinate commanders "to monitor and supervise effectively" (12:56).

In reviewing the commission's report it is evident they feel many of the commanders were victims of the situation. Their tone was not excessively harsh, even when they levied blame, which seems to indicate a general feeling that the system more than the commanders was at fault, although the report does not clearly state so. It seems to be evident our process of arriving at decisions and policies is in need of changes. One soldier who was at the Marine Headquarters during the bombing sums it up by saying: "US policy in Lebanon had become a catastrophic failure" (3:215). In the case of the Lebanon Marine bombings it is not clear whether it was a fundamental structural failure or a failure of the system to operate effectively within the structure.

Another event which happened only days following the Beirut bombings was the US invasion of Grenada, known as Operation Urgent Fury. Luttwak was very critical of the military's overall performance in Grenada. Ironically, most Americans seem to see this as one of our few successful military operations since World War II. But Luttwak contends, when analyzed in detail, it was filled with military failures; obscured by the apparent overall success of the operation because of our vastly superior US forces.

One report, which analyzes the operation in terms of the principles of war, concluded command and control was a significant problem in Operation Urgent Fury because of the multi service facet of the operation (15:18). This report also reinforces Luttwak's assertion that special forces did not perform up to expectations in Grenada (15:22). Furthermore, it faults the overall command structure and lack of interoperability of systems as major flaws in the operation. These accusations are consistent with Luttwak's theme of a system in which the parochial views of the services often override the necessary jointness required for effective operations. In describing problems with the operation, one Battalion Commander who participated in the operation said, "Commanders must train the way they expect to fight--subordinate leaders must be able to read the commander and anticipate his commands" (14:28). These types of comments clearly indicate problems with the system.

From readings of various sources it would seem to be clear that Luttwak is fairly accurate in his assessment of the Urgent Fury operation. The fact that US forces accomplished their objective does not take away the problems which occurred. These problems may have much greater significance in future operations when the forces are much more evenly matched.

The final operation I will review, which Luttwak sees as a military failure, is the Iran hostage rescue attempt known as Desert One. A review of the literature regarding this event

substantiates Luttwak's argument that many problems were associated with this operation. One report is extremely critical of the JCS role in the operation (16:45). It reveals a system in which decisions were made at the JCS level based on poor information from subordinates. It also indicates that the creation of a joint force for the operation and its ad hoc nature were serious shortcomings. In his book, Delta Force, Colonel Beckwith, commander of Desert One, summed up the problem as follows:

In Iran we had an ad hoc affair. We went out, found bits and pieces, people and equipment, brought them together occasionally and then asked them to perform a highly complex mission. The parts all performed but they didn't necessarily perform as a team. Nor did they have the same motivation. My recommendation is to put together an organization which contains everything it will need, an organization which would include Delta, the Rangers, Navy SEALs, Air Force pilots, its own staff, its own support people, its own aircraft and helicopters (1:295).

A study of this operation by a Marine officer concluded that one factor which "contributed to the mission's failure was the unorthodox and inefficient nature of command organization and planning" (13:10). This statement reveals the problems that occur when it comes to the use of joint forces.

In reviewing several operations Luttwak uses to support his theme of structural defects in our defense establishment, I have concluded that overall, his assessment and assertions are fairly accurate. The conclusions he draws are logical and based on sound evidence. Although very few writings reflect a direct correlation between the defense establishment structure and the need for radical reform, most do recommend changes in the way we do business. The overall assessment seems to be that we do not operate efficiently nor effectively, especially when considering the immense resources and capabilities we have in our armed forces.

### Chapter Three

This chapter will compare Luttwak's views with those of current military and civilian leaders and authors who have studied this subject. By doing so, we can get a feel for the differences and similarities in opinions which exist. This will give some insight as to the validity of Luttwak's theme. To do this, I chose to look first at individuals who tended to be supportive of reform and then those who were non-supportive or at least less supportive.

Two of the most outspoken Congressmen during the past few years have been Senator Goldwater of Arizona and Senator Nunn of Georgia (4:3). Both are long-time members of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), and have written and spoken widely on the subject of reform.

Senator Nunn was an advocate of comprehensive change prior to the recent Reorganization Act of 1986. He has been a leader in advocating and bringing about many of the changes caused by the act. In talking about the budget process, Nunn says the military's preoccupation with maximizing resources, Congress's preoccupation with micro-management, and the refusal of civilian leadership to establish stable long-term plans for defense spending, has left our budget process with many problems (4:33). His views on the Joint Chiefs prior to enactment of the Reorganization Act were summed up in the following statement:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff fail to consistently provide useful and timely military advice to the senior civilian leadership...The Joint Chiefs generally operate under an informal rule agreement prior to the rendering of advice. As a result advice is often muddled and tends to protect the Service interests" (4:34).

Senator Goldwater has voiced similar views and is in general agreement with Senator Nunn on the state of our defense establishment. Goldwater also feels the military services should become more integrated and centralize some of their functions (4:25). He feels "that Unification of the four services-as provided by the National Security Act of 1947 and 1949 amendment-was only a first step toward providing unified fighting forces" (4:25).

Perhaps one of the most important groups to influence military reform in the last decade was the President's Blue Ribbon Commission, known as The Packard Commission. It called for several structural changes in the defense establishment. The commission's study called for removing "the duplicative administrative layers that exist between Service Chiefs and the Service Secretary" (4:60). They also proposed changes in the JCS structure to improve its overall effectiveness. Although the commission report supported change, it was by no means advocating revolutionary changes, but changes which would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the existing DOD structure.

Probably the best and most comprehensive study on the need for reform came out of a SASC report titled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change." This study was used as one of the starting points for work on The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Its contents supported many of the same assertions and conclusions reached by Luttwak concerning the structural failures of our defense establishment. Although the study was in general agreement with Luttwak's ideas about the problems, its recommendations were much less radical and were basically designed to work within the existing framework rather than make significant structural changes.

Besides government leaders there are many military people who have commented on the need for military reform. Major General Harpe, the Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, expressed his views of the Reorganization Act as follows: "All the provisions in the law tempered with reasonableness, will provide us with the structure we need for improved jointness. It'll be better" (6:14). Retired Admiral James L. Holloway generally supported the findings and recommendations of the Packard Commission in an article in which he analyzed the report (5:85).

It is very evident from a review of recent literature there is much support for military reform. But there are those who either feel reform is not needed or are afraid the results may leave us worse off than before reform. One view against JCS reform holds that interservice rivalry is often healthy and beneficial (8:104). This view holds that benefit is derived because the separate services, in their competition, tend to be more innovative. But even if this is true the expense and price we pay in extra bureaucratic processes may outweigh any gain. Other arguments against reform see it as adverse to our commitment to civilian control over the military (9:43). Still others feel reform will not accomplish what it is designed to do and may have unfair adverse effects on particular organizations. Former Marine Corps Commandant General P.X. Kelley has voiced his concern over the recent legislation (10:20). He feels the emphasis on jointness and headquarters staff reductions will

hinder the Corps ability to function (10:21). Admiral Crowe, CJCS, has also expressed minor concern over certain provisions in the new law (7:28). Although he generally agrees with the changes, he believes there are some provisions related to the joint program which will be hard to live with if not changed (7:28).

There is an abundance of opinions on military reform which exist today. And even though there are those for and against various proposals, almost all would agree the current system could be better. The majority of views seem to support at least some kind of reform. Those that do not seem to support the current parochialism. This may stem from fears that the great traditions of our separate services will be lost in the policies of reform. Luttwak's assertions of structural flaws are clearly shared by many, at least to some degree. But it is also clear his specific recommendations for reform are less supported. Although many of his basic themes are parallel with those who are for reform, their recommendations tend to be much more conservative. In a society such as ours, based on tradition of slow change, this conservatism is only natural and should come as no surprise.

## Chapter Four

In analyzing Luttwak's proposals it may be of some benefit to compare them with recent changes in the law which have been instituted since his book was written. Many of these changes cannot be attributed directly to specific groups or individuals on a one-to-one basis, but it does seem fair to say that individuals such as Luttwak, who in the literature on military reform are referred to as reformers, have had a significant impact as a collective group in bringing about many of these changes. The most recent change, and probably the most important since the National Security Act of 1947, was Public Law 99-433, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986 (11:992). The purpose of this act was to:

reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commands is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of the military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes (11:992).

Luttwak's proposals for reform would most likely be categorized as revolutionary as opposed to evolutionary if they are looked at in total. Because of the structure of our nation's government, in which three separate branches may play a part in any major reform of any kind, it would be highly unlikely that significant revolutionary changes would be instituted. This would seem to be especially true in any military organization which historically has changed very slowly and very little as an institution. Modern military institutions put much emphasis on tying themselves to the military art, heroes, leaders, and

organizations of all previous military history. Although I would not call it revolutionary legislation, there are several changes brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 which encompass some of Luttwak's ideas on reform.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has dictated some significant changes in our military organization even if they are only evolutionary in nature. Although the act does not create a "National Defense Staff" as proposed by Luttwak (2:278), many of the underlying problems he has discussed were addressed by this act. The new legislation does contain various changes which were suggested by Luttwak. According to Luttwak, the fundamental problems of the military establishment are all structural (2:268). This basic flaw has resulted in an organization which has often failed to function in a successful, efficient, and effective manner (2:268). The Goldwater-Nichols Act does address the structure of our armed forces in several areas.

In comparing this piece of legislation with Luttwak's ideas on reform I will look at three key areas of the act. First, I will discuss the changes relating to joint functions of the military departments including those to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and personnel policies relating to joint officer assignments; second, the changes relating to Combatant Commands; and finally, the directed reductions in military headquarter's staffs. It is not my intent to cover this act section by section but only to compare and analyze some key provisions of the act with Luttwak's ideas and recommendations on reform.

Title II-Military Advice and Command Functions, Part A-Joint Chiefs of Staff, revises some of the functions of the JCS. The first change makes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) (11:1005). Since the CJCS is required to submit the opinions of the other chiefs on particular matters when he submits his own advice (11:1005), one might ask if this portion of the law really has any real impact on the CJCS status and his function? The question is one which will only be answered with time, but may well depend more on various factors unrelated to the act itself than the specific provisions of the law. For example, individual personalities and personal relationships between the CJCS and the President, NSC, and SECDEF may be two such factors. After all, being the principal adviser doesn't guarantee your advice will be adhered to over the advice of those under you. The key to whether or not this will help to alleviate some of the structural problems as identified by Luttwak will probably depend on the changes in the supporting structure, and the personal views of the CJCS toward the intent of these changes, than those which put him above the service chiefs.

Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act did not create a National Defense Staff as envisioned by Luttwak, it did attempt to reorganize the supporting structure of the JCS in an effort to address many of the same problems and issues identified by Luttwak. Under the act the selection and management of the joint staff has changed significantly. The CJCS has been given more control of the joint staff. The composition of the staff and their required duties have been more narrowly defined under the act. For example, certain prerequisites will have to be completed prior to most officers being assigned to the joint staff (11:1025). Under the law, "the Secretary of Defense is required to establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in the active-duty list who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters (11:1025). The act further directs the SECDEF to create a "joint specialty" using specific guidelines as outlined in the act (11:1005). These guidelines include numbers, grades, education and experience requirements of those officers who can be nominated to fill this joint specialty (11:1026). One important educational requirement states, "an officer who is nominated for the joint specialty may not be selected for the joint specialty until the officer (a) successfully completes an appropriate program at a joint professional military education school, and (b) after completing such a program of education, successfully completes a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment" (11:1026).

Although the law does provide a few loopholes, apparently to allow for a more gradual full compliance to take place, its requirements are designed to build a professional corps of joint officers with specific skills and expertise in joint matters. This intent appears to be in line with Luttwak's desire to make the joint staff less parochial and more joint. But one of Luttwak's main arguments against the joint system was even if officers were assigned to the joint staff, as long as they were still members of their parent service, their loyalties and allegiance would be first to the parent service, and second to promoting joint solutions. This would be largely due to the fact that their careers were directly or indirectly controlled by the parent service. Promotions and follow-on assignments were used as a leash to keep officers from straying too far in espousing views which did not support the parochial interests of the parent service. Congress seemed to recognize the importance of this concern in the creation of the new act.

Under Title IV-Joint Officer Personnel Policy of the act, several changes to the management of joint officers and their careers have been directed (11:1025). In addition to this portion of the act establishing the criteria for the selection of officers for the joint specialty as previously mentioned, it also addresses the promotion policies for joint officers (11:1026).

The Act requires SECDEF to establish policies ensuring Joint Staff Officers as a group are promoted at a rate not less than the rate of officers assigned to the Service Headquarters staffs (11:1030). This emphasis on promotion should be of some benefit in trying to attract quality officers. But even with this provision, there may be some initial hesitation on the part of our officer corps to trust the system and leave their careers in the hands of the US Congress. This is largely due to the fear that if additional changes are made in the future, they may become the victims of change instead of its beneficiaries. There seems to be a lack of trust in any changes which affect the careers of officers in today's military. In addition to requirement for the SECDEF to closely monitor the careers of his Joint officers, it requires him to report the results of such monitoring to the Congress (11:1031).

These types of changes certainly support Luttwak's ideas for change, but not to the extent he advocates. As stated before, recognizing the military is very conservative and slow to change, these changes may be considered significant. This is especially true if these are only the first in a series of changes directed at improving the overall way the defense department does business, which I strongly suspect to be the case.

The next area of the act I will review deals with the Combatant Commands. One of the things it does is to strengthen the overall authority of the combatant commanders. It specifically gives them more authority in the area of "selection, retention, and evaluation of their staff members and their subordinate commanders" (11:1015). It also authorizes "the combatant commanders to specify the chains of command and organizational relationships within their commands" (11:1014). Basically, these changes are designed to give the combatant commander the authority needed to effectively run his organization despite the parochial differences which may exist. This broadening of authority is consistent with the reform intentions of Luttwak. Under the act, a combatant commander has the authority to evaluate all subordinate commanders and to submit the evaluation to the secretary of the military department and the CJCS. If this works as intended it should improve our effectiveness in the joint commands. This portion of the act offers remedies to many of Luttwak's concerns.

Finally I will look at one of Luttwak's key criticisms of the defense establishment. This deals with the large bureaucratic staffs which exist at almost all headquarter levels and are labeled as "officer surplus" by Luttwak (2:157). The act, under Title VI-Miscellaneous, directs a "reduction in personnel assigned to management headquarters activities and certain other activities" (11:1064). It basically requires a 10 percent reduction of all military department and combatant command staffs

by 1 October 1988. These reductions are to be based on staff strengths as of 30 September 1986 (11:1064). In addition, the act provides for similar reductions in other defense agencies and DOD field activities (11:1065). To complement this reduction in staff size there will also be a significant reduction in previously required DOD submissions of reports, studies, and notifications (11:1066). This elimination of some of the existing bureaucratic framework and what Luttwak felt was significant overstaffing at the headquarters level would be considered a step in the right direction under his reform proposals. But even though a reduction is called for there exists one significant problem. Since there will be no reduction by grade or specific position, the ratio of flag and general officers to other staff members will be greater than before. If one subscribes to Luttwak's theories of officer surplus and its resultant effect on the bureaucratic framework, one may see limited gains from this overall reduction. But Luttwak would certainly agree that any reduction of staff is probably in the right direction. This reduction will at least cut out some of the excess layers of staff officers who only exist to coordinate on and pass paperwork from one level to the next.

In analyzing the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, I have concluded that it generally supports Luttwak's concerns and ideas on military reform. Although the act does not take as radical an approach to reform as Luttwak advocates, many of his suggestions are incorporated into the legislation to some degree. In my opinion, this lends a good deal of credibility to his arguments and ideas.

## Chapter Five

This chapter is a short summary of conclusions I have reached in analyzing The Pentagon and the Art of War. First, Luttwak's portrayal of historical events are highly accurate. A review of the literature, including several writings by actual participants in these events, generally support Luttwak's appraisal.

Second, by comparing his views with those of current military and government leaders, I have established that most of his views are supported to some degree by many individuals. It also lends credibility to his assessment of the existing problems in our defense establishment, since various sources have reached many of the same conclusions independently.

Finally, I have determined that many of Luttwak's concerns were shared by members of Congress when they passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Many of the same suggestions which Luttwak made in his book were incorporated into this legislation. But it is important to note that there were also many of Luttwak's proposals which were not adopted such as the idea of a separate defense staff.

Concerning his approach on reform, I feel it is necessary to make a few comments about his proposals which were not brought out in the research. When discussing the problems with our defense establishment, Luttwak goes into great detail and depth, providing many examples of how the system has failed. But this level of detail ended when he began writing about his major reform proposals. The nature of his proposals were broad and general, leaving the reader with a feeling of incompleteness. In my opinion, he should have devoted more effort into developing and describing the details of these reform proposals. This would have given the book more credibility and balance. However, this conclusion does not detract from the excellent job Luttwak does in elaborating on defense department problems.

In summary, The Pentagon and the Art of War is certainly a book which should be read by those interested in the serious study of military reform. It also has value for any student who is casually concerned about the problems which have led to recent legislation in this area. Based on these conclusions, I recommend this book be included on all PME reading lists associated with military reform or related subjects.

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