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JUNIOR OFFICER COMPETENCY MODEL:
RESEARCH RESULTS AND APPLICATIONS

Bernard J. Cullen, George O. Klemp, Jr., and
Richard S. Mansfield
McBer and Company

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Through the methodology of Job Competence Assessment this report identified a set of individual attributes required for effective performance as a junior officer. From an initial target sample of 300 junior officers in six branches (Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Defense, Artillery, Engineer, Signal and Transportation/Quartermaster) at four Army installations (forts Bragg, Carson, Riley and Stewart) a final sample of 56 superior and 49 satisfactory performers were identified. Found to clearly distinguish between superior and average performers were the following competencies: planning, initiative, (continued)																	

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concern for standards, self-confidence, job involvement, willingness to confront others, concern with image, concern for clarity and realistic positive attitudes. In addition, four measurement instruments to 1) evaluate the performance of junior officers and 2) assess the effectiveness of various ROTC training programs, were developed. A combination of these instruments was found to be needed to predict both overall ratings and individual competencies. *Key words:*

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FOREWORD

The research represented by this report was performed under contract to the Army; the Army Research Institute was the monitoring agency and is meeting the regulatory requirement to publish and submit to the Defense Technical Information Center the final report submitted by the contractor.

This report represents the contractor's best efforts within available resources; there were, however, remaining problems and unresolved methodological issues which could not be resolved within the scope of the contract. Therefore, the final product does not reflect the technical and scientific standards usually expected of ARI technical documents.

The reader should use caution in interpreting the material contained in this report.

JUNIOR OFFICER COMPETENCY MODEL:
RESULTS AND APPLICATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

- 1) To identify the job domains of junior officers in six combat arms and support positions;
- 2) To identify the individual attributes or competencies required for effective performance in these positions;
- 3) To develop a set of measures suitable for evaluating the performance of junior officers so that the effectiveness of different ROTC training courses can be assessed

Procedure:

The basic methodology used in this study was Job Competence Assessment. A competency is a characteristic of an individual that underlies effective work performance. The Job Competence Assessment process is based on the assumption that the best way to identify the characteristics of effective performers is to identify the effective performer, study what he or she actually does on the job that distinguishes him or her from individuals whose performance is less satisfactory, and identify the characteristics that account for the difference in performance.

Data collection took place at Forts Bragg, Carson, Riley, and Stewart. From an initial target sample of 300 junior officers in six branches (Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineer, Signal, and Transportation/Quartermaster), the research identified a final sample of 56 men and women who were superior performers and 49 junior officers who were satisfactory performers.

To address Requirement #1, two different methodologies were used. Two surveys - the Performance Characteristics Inventory (PCI) and the Task Analysis Inventory (TAI) - were administered to all 300 subjects in the target sample. In addition, 12 panels of six to eight experienced junior officers in each of the six branches were convened at Forts Stewart and Bragg to constitute a resource panel of experts on the job of the junior officer.

To address Requirement #2, multiple research methodologies

were also employed. Empirical data on unit performance was collected; an organizational climate survey - the Work Environment Questionnaire (WEQ) - was distributed to each officer in the target sample and to three of that officer's subordinates; peer nomination forms were utilized; and an in-depth interview - the Behavioral Event Interview (BEI) - was conducted on the final sample of superior and average performers. The BEI was subsequently content-analyzed.

To address Requirement #3, four measurement instruments representing three different kinds of methodologies were developed. Administered to those who had been previously identified in the research as superior or average performers were the Military Picture Story Exercise (MPSE), a projective technique, and the Army Leadership Problem Exercise (ALPE), a series of structured problem-solving exercises in questionnaire format. Finally, two surveys - the Officer Performance Style Inventory: Supervisor (OPSI-Supervisor) and the Officer Performance Style Inventory: Self-Rating (OPSI-Self) were administered to this sample of superior and average performers and their supervisors.

Findings:

The research resulted in the development of the Army Junior Officer Competency Model, which identified four clusters of fourteen competencies leading to effective performance as a junior officer. They were:

The Mission Focus (or Motivation for Achievement) Cluster:
Specific competencies: Concern for Efficiency; Planning;
Initiative; Concern for Standards

The Professional Maturity Cluster:
Specific competencies: Self-confidence; Job Involvement

The Power and Influence Cluster:
Specific competencies: Persuading Others; Willingness to
Confront Others; Forcefulness; Concern with Image

The Understanding and Managing Others Cluster:
Specific competencies: Concern for Clarity; Understanding
People, Situations, and Data; Positive Attitude toward
Subordinates; Developing Subordinates

Found to distinguish clearly between superior and average performers were the following competencies: planning, initiative, concern for standards, self-confidence, job involvement, willingness to confront others, concern with image, concern for clarity, and realistic positive attitude. Another important finding was that these competencies were generic - that is, not unique to a particular branch of the Army, but applicable across all of the branches studied, and were found to occur in both men and women.

Regarding the design of measurement instruments to assess the relative success of ROTC programs in junior officer development, the OPSI-Supervisor and the OPSI-Self were useful in predicting the overall ranking (superior or average) of a junior officer, but were not useful in predicting the individual competency scores. The reverse was true for the ALPE. The MPSE showed little ability to predict either overall ranking or individual competency scores.

Utilization of Findings:

The major significance of this research lies in the development of the Army Junior Officer Competency Model. Initial findings suggest that a competency based model could be used to identify those abilities which distinguish superior from average performers.

Additional research is necessary in order to utilize the Army Junior Officer Competency Model as a training standard in various junior officer accession programs. Additional research would be required to determine how these competencies 1) can be developed, 2) can be specifically incorporated into training programs, and 3) can be matched with the appropriate training techniques.

Further research is necessary to refine individual measurement instruments and scoring techniques which evaluate how well ROTC programs are meeting their overall mission of training effective junior officers for today's Army, and some combination of the measurement instruments developed in this research must be used if the goal is to predict both overall ratings and individual competencies of junior officers. The present form of these instruments represents an early stage of development.

Compiled by: Dr. M. C. Devilbiss, ARI

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to summarize the results of an empirical study with three objectives:

- (1) To identify the job domains of junior officers in six combat arms and support positions; that is, to describe these jobs in terms of their primary tasks and functional elements
- (2) To identify the individual attributes or competencies required for effective performance in these positions
- (3) To develop a set of measures suitable for evaluating the performance of junior officers so that the effectiveness of different ROTC training courses can be assessed

This present study differs from many previous efforts in four ways:

- (1) It makes a clear distinction between attributes of the job (i.e., tasks) and attributes of individuals (i.e., competencies).
- (2) The findings are based primarily on detailed descriptions of what individuals actually do, rather than what they think is important.
- (3) As a result, the study defines competencies that are behaviorally specific rather than vague and general, so they may be observed and assessed readily.
- (4) It emphasizes the differences between superior and average performers, rather than the similarities among all those holding a given position.

This report is based on a research process called Job Competence Assessment. The precise procedure is described in detail in Chapter II. Its primary objective is to identify those generic behaviors or attributes--i.e., competencies--that lead to effective performance as a junior officer. A second objective is to identify behaviorally specific and measurable indicators of these competencies, so that they can be translated into criteria for evaluating ROTC training programs. Later on, the same indicators can be used to design training programs or personal development programs.

The kernel of competence lies in effective performance by an individual. For the purposes of this report, a competency, or component of overall competence, is a characteristic of an individual that underlies effective work performance. A competency can be any human quality: It can be knowledge, a category of usable information organized around a specific content area (for example, knowledge of mathematics); it can be a skill, the ability to demonstrate a set of behaviors or processes related to a performance goal (for example, logical thinking); it can be a trait, a consistent way of responding to an equivalent set of stimuli (for example, initiative); it can be a self-schema, a person's image of self and his or her evaluation of that image (for example, self-image as a professional); or it can be a motive, a recurrent concern for a goal state or condition that drives, selects, and directs behavior of the individual (for example, the need for efficacy). A person may possess many of these characteristics, but by our definition, if the knowledge, skill, trait, self-schema, or motive is not explicitly related to effective performance, it is not a competency.

Task performance provides an indication of the required competencies, but does not define the competencies directly. Job-task analysis methods, accordingly, have been employed to identify the requirements of different jobs, and these job requirements have served as the criteria for inferring areas of knowledge, skills, or other characteristics that "cause" job performance. The many tasks performed in the myriad of careers in which people are engaged have produced a search for single variables, such as I.Q., that would account for a variety of performance outcomes in a variety of roles.

With the publication of Talent and Society (1958), David McClelland and his colleagues expressed interest in the concepts of competence and competency measurement. In "Testing for Competence Rather Than for 'Intelligence'" (1973), McClelland again voiced his concern about the direction the testing movement was taking, noting a consistently low correlation between I.Q. and job or life effectiveness. This article advanced an argument for empirical studies of knowledge, skills, and other personal characteristics directly related to real-world outcomes, as opposed to single variables to predict what a person could do or how successful he or she would be in life.

This idea has important implications for a methodology of job performance assessment:

- (1) Performance outcomes can be measured in terms of competencies, or characteristics of people who are particularly effective in a job.
- (2) Analyses of individual tasks required by a job do not provide a useful method of identifying the characteristics of outstanding job incumbents.

- (3) Once defined, the competencies of the outstanding performer can be related directly to training and development needs.
- (4) Individual competence must be considered within an overall performance system, which includes the person, the job, and the work environment.

The Job Competence Assessment process is based on the assumption that the best way to identify the characteristics of effective performers is to identify the effective performer, study what he or she actually does on the job that distinguishes him or her from individuals whose performance is less satisfactory, and identify the characteristics that account for the difference in performance. The process is, therefore, a criterion-based approach, which identifies the critical skills and competencies of the highly effective junior officer, as opposed to a norm-referenced approach, which would identify the characteristics of the average junior officer.

Relationship to Other Approaches

The Job Competence Assessment process is a very straightforward methodology, based on elements from a variety of different sources. McClelland's (1961) early work on achievement motivation and Glaser and Strauss's (1967) work on grounded theory underlie the overall approach. Flanagan's Critical Incident Interview technique (1971) provides the primary data-collection method. Argyris and Schon's (1974) focus on analyzing self-report data is reflected in the careful content analysis of interview transcripts. Primoff's (1977) work on job analysis questionnaires provides the basis for the design of the two surveys used to augment the interview data. The work of Lewin and Zwany (1976), and Litwin and Stringer (1968) in the use of peer nominations and climate surveys as methods of identifying superior and average performers serves as the basis for developing the criterion sample. In sum, Job Competence Assessment combines techniques developed by others in a single process.

Job Competence Assessment, while based on the work of others, is markedly different from the mainstream research on leadership. Table I.1 provides a very broad comparison of Job Competence Assessment to the primary methodologies used in leadership research in the field (i.e., excluding laboratory studies).

These comparisons are somewhat overdrawn, but the implied deficiencies of the dominant methodologies have been frequently documented. Luthans (1979), for example, notes that

The biggest problem with existing leadership theories and measurement techniques is that they

TABLE I.1

Leadership Research: A Comparison of Approaches

	JOB COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT	DOMINANT METHODOLOGIES
SOURCE OF HYPOTHESIS	grounded theory approach	a priori; statistical
METHOD	operant; respondent	respondent
DATA COLLECTION	customized survey; non-directive Behavioral Event Interview	standardized survey; structured interview
TYPE OF DATA	descriptive, behaviorally specific; non-parametric; traits, skills, knowledge, <u>plus</u> self-image and motives	evaluative, generaliza- tions; parametric; traits, skills, knowl- edge
UNIT OF ANALYSIS	individual	groups of individuals
RESPONDENT	individual	individual, subordinates
SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS	criterion-related	frequently random; less frequently criterion- related
TYPICAL NUMBER OF DIMENSIONS	12-25	2-5
THEORY- SITUATION MATCH	built into model	not considered except for research on contingency theories
APPLICATION TO PARTS OF PERSONNEL SYSTEM	provides behaviorally specific data that can be directly organized for use in training, performance appraisal, or selection	must translate dimensions or measurement scales into behaviorally specific hypotheses, measures, or indicators before they can be used

have strayed too far away from leadership behaviors.

. . . The widely used behavioral measurement techniques such as the Ohio State, Fiedler, and Michigan questionnaires are not really measuring behaviors.

. . . In addition, because the instruments are administered to groups rather than individuals and the scores represent averages, actual leadership behavior may never be described.

By the same token, the Job Competence Assessment method is far from perfect. For example, as a multi-method approach it still lacks a systematic observation technique.

Table I.2 summarizes a number of recent leadership studies for officers. These studies are described in more detail elsewhere (Cullen, Klemp, and Schaalman, 1980). The current study is methodologically unique insofar as the majority of empirical military studies have focused on different types of surveys rather than in-depth interviews.

Another methodologically unique aspect of the current study is that it maintains a sharp distinction between attributes of individuals and jobs. As can be seen from the third column of Table I.2, some studies unconsciously mix job and individual attributes (e.g., Clements and Ayres, 1976), while others focus on either jobs (e.g., Gilbert, 1975) or individual attributes (e.g., Helme et al., 1979).

Limitations of the Method

The limitations of the Job Competence Assessment method are stated briefly here to ensure an appropriate understanding of the results.

First, the junior officers in this study have never been in actual combat. Consequently, the results refer to junior officers in peacetime. While we believe that the findings would be applicable under combat conditions, we have no data to support this contention.

Second, the results of this study are dependent upon the validity of the criterion data. Due to institutional, logistical, and procedural problems, only limited amounts of objective data could be collected on the performance of junior officers. The criterion samples used in this study rely heavily on subordinate ratings of performance obtained through the use of a survey.

Third, the Job Competence Assessment process is most suited for identifying underlying skills and abilities. Specific technical skills or knowledge, such as being able to strip an M16 in an allotted time, are not directly evaluated, yet these certainly may be important.

TABLE I.2

Dimensions of Leadership
(Derived from Military Job Studies)

AUTHOR/YEAR	DERIVATION OF LEADERSHIP DIMENSIONS	DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP
Helme, W.H. (1968)	Factor analysis of Differential Officer Battery	Decisive leadership Administration Combat command Manual crafts Outdoor activities Social advantages Rejection of aesthetic interest Emotional control Construction Easygoing disposition Organized sports Nature-endurance Social interaction Achievement orientation
Helme, W.H. (1971) Willemin, L.P. Grafton, F.C.	Factor analysis of observations and ratings of simulation performance	Combat leadership Technical-managerial skill Team leadership Command of men Mission persistence Executive direction Tactical staff skill Technical staff skill
<u>Leadership for the</u> <u>1970's: USAWC Study</u> <u>of Leadership for the</u> <u>Professional Soldier</u> (1971)	Army principles of leadership (Source unclear; apparently accepted system-wide, over time)	Be technically and tacti- cally proficient Know yourself and seek self-improvement Know your men and look out for their welfare Keep your men informed Set the example Ensure the task is under- stood, supervised, and accomplished Train your men as a team Make sound and timely decisions Develop a sense of respon- sibility among subordi- nates (continued)

(Table I.2, continued)

AUTHOR/YEAR	DERIVATION OF LEADERSHIP DIMENSIONS	DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP
<u>Leadership for the 1970's (continued)</u>		Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions
<u>Leadership for Professionals</u> (Report of the CONARC Leadership Board, 1971)	Literature review--conclusions of experts on factors facilitating leadership	Professional standards Training Administrative courage Informing the troops Recognize and respond to nonverbal cues for help Stability (re: longer tours in one place)
Helme, W.B. (1979) Willemin, L.P. Day, R.W.	Factor analysis of Differential Officer Battery items--factors used as scoring scale	Mechanical technology Combat leadership Administration General knowledge Outdoor activity Personal adjustment Sports Socioeconomic advantage Leadership readiness Supervision Science Aesthetic-intellectual Authority and structure Easygoingness Strict command Political orientation Managerial leadership
Vaughan, M.R. (1973) Kriner, R.E. Reaser, J.M.	Factor analysis of existing Army Leadership Survey	Professionalism Authoritarianism Consideration: task- oriented Consideration: need- oriented Social support Facilitation

(continued)

(Table I.2, continued)

AUTHOR/YEAR	DERIVATION OF LEADERSHIP DIMENSIONS	DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP
Gilbert, A.C.F. (1975)	Factors underlying duty modules (Factor analysis of 93 duty modules)	Unit command Operations and training Manpower personnel Logistics Intelligence Troop welfare
Clements, S.D. (1976) Ayres, D.B.	Used to sort and summarize dimensions reported in literature	Communication Human relations Counseling Supervision Technical Management science Decision making Planning Ethics
Olmstead, J.A. (1978) Elder, B.L.	Areas of questions in re- search on and choice of management games	Principal duties Types and difficulty of problems Skill requirements Tasks performed Technical requirements
Gilbert, A.C.F. (1979)	Scales of Officer Evaluation Battery (derivation unclear)	Combat leadership Technical managerial leadership Career potential Combat leadership Career intent
Giesler, R.W. (1979) Harden, J.T. Best, P.R. Elliott, M.P.	Grouped tasks and responsi- bilities from Army task lists and literature	Maintenance Administration Taskings Combat Schools Inspections/tests/evalua- tions Training

(continued)

(Table I.2, continued)

AUTHOR/YEAR	DERIVATION OF LEADERSHIP DIMENSIONS	DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP
Gilbert, A.C.F. (Draft)	Group training content, needs in 4 areas when evaluating their benefits	Interpersonal/management General technical Branch-specific technical General background
Army, <u>Review of Education and Training for Officers</u> (1978)	Review of literature and industry development programs	Technical specialty Supervisor Counseling Human relations Communication Management science Decision making Planning Ethics

Fourth, the Job Competence Assessment process focuses on what differentiates superior from average junior officers. One consequence of this emphasis is that relatively less attention is paid to some basic job requirements, or characteristics possessed by both superior and average performers. In part the use of additional sources of data such as the performance-characteristics survey compensates for this limitation. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to claim that the competency model exhaustively lists all the characteristics needed for effective performance as a junior officer.

Fifth, the Job Competence Assessment method identifies relatively broadly defined characteristics, and as a result does not provide a detailed explanation of why and how a particular competency is important. This reflects primarily the methodological limitations of most research in the field, where it is difficult to manipulate individual variables. While theoretical models can be developed to show how the competencies might interact (Winter, 1979), they are largely correlational rather than causal models.

Organization of the Report

The rest of this report is organized as follows. The details of the data collection and analysis procedures are summarized in Chapter II. The results of the task analysis survey are presented in Chapter III. The main set of results, the competency model for junior officers, is summarized in Chapter IV. Chapter V presents a second set of survey results that provides some cross-validation of the competency model results.

Chapters VI and VII present two applications of the results. Chapter VI describes the development and evaluation of four instruments designed to measure the competencies. Chapter VII presents a generic job-domain description for junior officers and outlines how the competencies might be developed.

CHAPTER II

Data Collection Procedures

Overview: The Job Competence Assessment Methodology

Since a number of instruments and data-collection procedures were used in this study, we will begin with an overview of the methodology. The basic methodology used in this study was Job Competence Assessment (JCA), a methodology developed by David C. McClelland and his associates at McBer and Company.

JCA is based on the theory that the best way to identify what it takes to do a job well is to (1) identify the effective performer; (2) study what he or she does on the job that distinguishes him or her from less effective performers; and (3) identify the knowledge, skills, and other characteristics implied by these distinguishing behaviors that are responsible for this difference. The procedure is thus criterion-based--designed to identify the critical attributes of the effective junior officer--as opposed to a norm-referenced approach, which would identify the attributes of typical, less effective junior officers.

The Job Competence Assessment method is logical and straightforward. It involves six steps:

1. Criterion Analysis. This step is to identify criterion groups of superior and average performers. Various kinds of data may be used for this purpose: "hard" outcome measures (e.g., ARTEP scores); peer and supervisory nominations or evaluations; and measures of the organizational climate, obtained from each person's subordinates. In the present study, most of these sources of data were used in the criterion analysis. The approach was to collect data from a large target sample, analyze these data, and use the results to select subsamples of superior and average performers, which could then be studied and compared.

2. Performance-Characteristics Analysis. A "resource panel," consisting of experts on the job under consideration, is convened to list the characteristics of people who do the job well. This list is then used in a survey, in which job incumbents are asked to rate each item's importance for superior job performance. The most highly rated items can serve as hypotheses about important competencies.

3. Job-Task Analysis. The resource panel also lists the tasks performed by the people in the job. This list forms the

basis for a survey in which job incumbents are asked to rate the importance of each task for effectiveness on the job.

4. Behavioral Event Interviews. In-depth investigative interviews are conducted with both superior and average job incumbents. The interviews focus on instances of effective and ineffective job performance and the behaviors that contribute to these outcomes.

5. Development and Validation of the Competency Model. The interview data are subjected to a thematic analysis in which the behavioral patterns and themes separating the superior and the average incumbents are extracted and organized into a behaviorally specific competency model. Half of the interview transcripts are used in the thematic analysis; the remaining transcripts are set aside for use during a validation process. Two types of validation are normally used: In the first, the competency model is used as a "codebook," with which all the interview transcripts are coded for the competencies and their behavioral indicators. Statistical tests are then used to identify the competencies that differentiate the criterion groups of superior and average performers. The second type of validation is accomplished by comparing the competency model with the results of the performance-characteristics analysis.

6. Application of the Competency Model. Once validated, the competency model can be used as the basis for the design of training and career-development programs, or as the primary criterion in evaluation procedures such as selection tests, interviews, assessment centers, and performance appraisal.

In the present study, the competency model was used to develop some paper-and-pencil tests and some self- and supervisory rating forms for competency assessment. These are discussed at length in Chapter VI.

All six steps of the standard JCA process were used in this study. The sampling design was complex, and various additional sources of data were incorporated. For clarity, the various types of data collection will be described in the sequence in which they occurred. The applications of the competency model are discussed separately in Chapters VI and VII.

1. Criterion Analysis

The basic strategy of the criterion analysis was to start by identifying a large sample of junior officers--this target sample had to be broadly representative of different sites and branches. Three types of criterion data were obtained for the junior officers in the target sample: (1) hard outcome measures (e.g., overall IG and ARTEP inspection scores); (2) peer nominations of outstanding performers; and (3) unit effectiveness and

satisfaction scores from an organizational-climate survey administered to each junior officer and to three subordinates. The three types of criterion data were used to identify the subsamples of superior- and average-performing junior officers who would be given in-depth Behavioral Event Interviews in a later phase of the data collection. The various parts of the criterion analysis will now be described in greater detail.

As stated, the initial task of the criterion-analysis phase of the data collection was to identify the target sample. At each of four sites (Forts Bragg, Carson, Riley, and Stewart) an Army contact was asked to identify 75 junior officers: 12 or 13 in each of 6 branches (Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineer, Signal, and Transportation/Quartermaster). The 300 junior officers who were identified constituted the target sample. The target sample is illustrated in Table II.1.

The next step was to obtain criterion data for the officers in the target sample, so that subsamples of superior and average performers could be selected for the in-depth interviews.

To obtain hard performance data, G-1s at each site were asked to complete a Performance Measure Form for each junior officer in the target sample at that site. The Performance Measure Form requested data about overall IG ratings, overall ARTEP ratings, number of persons reported AWOL in the unit, number of Article 15s received in each unit, and number of persons re-enlisting in the unit. The G-1s were asked to rate the junior officer's unit's performance on each of these dimensions.

This effort to obtain hard performance data met with only mixed success. The completed Performance Measure Forms were obtained from about 60 percent of the units at three of the four sites; no Performance Measure Forms were returned from Fort Stewart. In addition, the ratings on the forms that were returned showed little variance. And a revised form, used at one site, failed to produce any increase in the variance of the ratings. This lack of variance appeared to be due to an absence of detailed record keeping at the platoon level; the relatively low number of AWOLs and re-enlistments at the platoon level; the cycle of inspections, which meant that many junior officers had not been in their units long enough to have been inspected. Because of the limited variance in these hard outcome measures, the criterion analysis was based primarily on the other two types of criterion data.

The second source of criterion data came from a peer-nomination form, which was distributed to the 300 junior officers in the target sample. They were asked to list the names and branches of 6 to 10 junior officers at their site whom they believed to be superior performers. Completed peer-nomination forms were received from 46% of the target sample.

TABLE II.1
The Target Sample

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Fort Bragg</u>	<u>Fort Carson</u>	<u>Site Fort Riley</u>	<u>Fort Stewart</u>	<u>Totals</u>
<u>Infantry:</u>	13	13	12	12	50
<u>Field Artillery:</u>	13	13	12	12	50
<u>Air Defense Artillery:</u>	13	13	12	12	50
<u>Engineer:</u>	12	12	13	13	50
<u>Signal:</u>	12	12	13	13	50
<u>Transporta- tion/Quarter- master:</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>50</u>
<u>Totals:</u>	75	75	75	75	300

The third source of criterion data was an organizational-climate survey, the Work Environment Questionnaire (WEQ), which was mailed to each officer in the target sample and to three of that officer's subordinates. The WEQ consists of two parts: The first part includes 13 background questions and 20 questions on unit effectiveness and satisfaction. The second part consists of 80 statements to be rated on the degree to which they describe the respondent's situation, both as it is now, and as the respondent thinks it should be.

The 20 questions from the first part of the WEQ, on unit effectiveness and satisfaction, were used as the third source of criterion data. The first 3 of these questions asked whether the unit had passed or failed specific types of the most recent inspections; the remaining 17 questions dealing with the respondent's job satisfaction and perception of his or her unit's effectiveness were in Guttman-scale format, with 4 to 8 alternatives. A criterion measure was developed, based on the proportion of an officer's subordinates' responses that (a) indicated passing of inspections for the first 3 questions or (b) were in the two highest Guttman-scale levels for the remaining 17 questions. A similar but secondary criterion measure was developed on the basis of the officer's responses to the same questions.

These data from the WEQ provided the primary basis for selecting subsamples of superior- and average-performing junior officers from the target sample for interviews. Because there were a number of last-minute substitutions in the sample designated for interviews, it was necessary, after the interviews, to re-examine all of the criterion data for each person who was interviewed, in order to divide the sample more accurately into superior and average performance groups. For this purpose, a refined criterion measure was developed, also based on the 20 questions on unit effectiveness and satisfaction from the WEQ. This measure was supplemented by use of the peer-nomination data.

The final interview groups were determined as follows:

- (1) The data from the first part of the WEQ were used to create four subscales: performance, discipline, re-enlistment, and job satisfaction. Separate scores were calculated for the junior officers and their subordinates. Where there was more than one subordinate, the scores were averaged across subordinates.
- (2) A summary measure was constructed on the basis of median splits on each of these four subscales (+1 for scores above the median, -1 for scores below the median). The medians were calculated for the entire sample of surveys, not simply for those officers interviewed.
- (3) Officers whose subordinates had an average score on this

Table II.2, continued

19. Has obvious aptitude for the technical or physical aspects of assigned duties, e.g., mechanical, electrical, or stamina
20. Develops possible solutions before outlining a problem to a superior
21. Constantly aware of rank and its associated responsibilities
22. Looks for ways to be involved in work-related activities
23. Expresses self clearly both verbally and in writing
24. Possesses and maintains extensive familiarity with branch-related equipment
25. Capable of solving problems without continually relying on Army manuals
26. Even when in basic disagreement, demonstrates a willingness to accept decision of superiors rather than complain
27. Communicates positive attitudes toward unattractive tasks
28. Establishes priorities
29. Completes tasks without being prompted
30. Uses hands-on training methods rather than lectures whenever possible
31. Performance-oriented
32. Personally prepares or obtains additional training materials
33. Puts mission ahead of personal interests
34. Comprehends the larger picture
35. Demonstrates clear ability to learn from mistakes
36. Talks easily with others
37. Avoids letting personal differences interfere with the mission
38. Demonstrates tact with both superiors and subordinates

TABLE II.3

Task Analysis Inventory for Junior Officers

1. Personally counsel troops and NCOs
2. Personally train troops in combat skills
3. Acquire related technical knowledge from manuals and publications
4. Schedule personnel and resources for projects
5. Read and interpret plans and/or technical documents
6. Read, interpret, and implement directives
7. Develop detailed plans to accomplish branch-related tasks
8. Write personnel-related reports (e.g., awards, efficiency reports, discipline)
9. Write task-related reports (e.g., after action report, accident reports)
10. Personally deliver technical skills training
11. Prepare estimates of personnel and equipment capabilities and requirements
12. Formally brief superiors
13. Informally brief superiors
14. Deploy or set up branch-related resources equipment (e.g., troops, construction equipment, electronic signal equipment, charge and small weapons systems)
15. Supervise the deployment of branch-related resources
16. Provide technical advice to other units or officers
17. Coordinate use of resources with peers
18. Complete collateral duties
19. Monitor maintenance checks

(continued)

Table II.3, continued

20. Maintain records
21. Personally employ basic military skills (e.g., map reading, individual weapon)
22. Personally participate in the completion of branch-specific tasks (e.g., profile radio shots, combat maneuvers, drive equipment, direct fire)
23. Supervise the completion of branch-specific tasks
24. Arrange for maintenance and repair of equipment
25. Schedule own time
26. Monitor the control of inventory and equipment
27. Direct troops and NCOs to sources of help for personal problems
28. Communicate verbally and in writing with staff or other agencies

the characteristic in the people who are normally considered for the job. Three-point scales were provided for making the ratings on each dimension.

The first three ratings of the performance characteristics were used to provide two overall ratings. The first overall rating, Success Value, measures the degree to which the characteristic was seen as important and possessed by outstanding performers. It is given by:

$$\text{Success Value} = \text{Rating 1} \times \text{Rating 3}$$

The second rating, the Threshold Value, measures the degree to which the characteristic was seen as important and possessed by the majority of average performers:

$$\text{Threshold Value} = \text{Rating 2} \times \text{Rating 3}$$

The Task Analysis Inventory (TAI), based on the 28 generic tasks, asked the officers to answer four questions about each task:

- (A) Is the task important for outstanding results?
- (B) Is the task required for routine performance in the job?
- (C) Is the task most critical to consider in performing the job?
- (D) Is the task performed frequently in the job?

Officers circled "yes" or "no" to indicate their responses to each question.

These four ratings of the tasks were combined to provide two overall ratings of the individual tasks. The first overall rating, High Performance, provides a measure of how much the successful completion of a task contributes to outstanding results, and is given by:

$$\text{High Performance} = (\text{Rating A} + \text{Rating C}) \times \text{Rating D}$$

Tasks that are performed frequently, that are perceived as critical, and that lead to outstanding results score high on this rating. Tasks that are performed very infrequently receive a lower rating.

The second overall rating, Required Performance, provides a measure of how necessary a task is for routine performance, and is determined as follows:

$$\text{Required Performance} = \text{Rating B} \times \text{Rating D}$$

Tasks that are performed frequently and that are necessary for routine performance receive high scores. Infrequent tasks or tasks not associated with routine performance receive low scores.

The response rate for both surveys was approximately 47 percent. The distribution of responses by site and branch is given in Table II.4.

4. Behavioral Event Interviews

The primary method of data collection used in this study was an in-depth interview, the Behavioral Event Interview, developed by McBer and Company as part of its Job Competence Assessment program. In the BEI, a variant of the classic critical-incident technique, the interviewee is asked to provide detailed descriptions of specific times when he or she felt effective and of times when he or she experienced frustration or other problems.

Since the BEI was to be given to criterion samples of superior- and average-performing junior officers, it was necessary to identify these groups from the target sample. Through the use of criterion data (the WEQ and the peer nominations), 72 superior-performing junior officers and 48 average-performing junior officers were so identified. Table II.5 summarizes the original interview sampling plan. The interviews were equally distributed across the six branches (Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineer, Signal, and Transportation/Quartermaster) and the four sites (Forts Bragg, Carson, Riley, and Stewart).

Because of last-minute substitutions in the designated interview sample, the criterion data for all the junior officers selected for interviews were reanalyzed. The final interview sample is summarized in Table II.6.

The BEIs were scheduled by site and conducted by McBer professionals, who did not know the criterion-group designation of each interviewee. Each BEI took one to two hours. The interviewers assured the interviewees of confidentiality and requested permission to tape-record the interviews; permission was granted in every case.

In the present study the objective of the BEI was to have each junior officer describe in great behavioral detail several incidents: times when the officer felt particularly effective, and times when the officer experienced frustration or other problems. For each of six such incidents, or "behavioral events," the interviewer obtained the following information:

- the important preconditions or circumstances preceding the event

TABLE II.4

Distribution of Responses to the PCI and the TAI

<u>Branch</u>		<u>Fort Stewart</u>	<u>Fort Bragg</u>	<u>Site Fort Riley</u>	<u>Fort Carson</u>	<u>Totals</u>
<u>Infantry:</u>	TAI	9	3	10	5	27
	PCI	9	3	9	5	26
<u>Field Artillery:</u>	TAI	5	7	4	9	25
	PCI	5	7	4	9	25
<u>Air Defense Artillery:</u>	TAI	5	2	11	4	22
	PCI	5	2	10	4	21
<u>Engineer:</u>	TAI	8	6	12	7	33
	PCI	8	6	12	8	34
<u>Signal:</u>	TAI	5	4	7	4	20
	PCI	5	4	6	3	18
<u>Transporta- tion/Quar- termaster:</u>	TAI	5	3	5	1	14
	PCI	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>15</u>
<u>Totals:</u>	TAI	37	25	49	30	141
	PCI	37	25	47	30	139

TABLE II.5

The Original Interview Sampling Plan

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Criterion Group</u>	<u>Site</u>				<u>Totals</u>
		<u>Fort Bragg</u>	<u>Fort Carson</u>	<u>Fort Riley</u>	<u>Fort Stewart</u>	
<u>Infantry:</u>	Superior	3	3	3	3	12
	Average	2	2	2	2	8
<u>Field Artillery:</u>	Superior	3	3	3	3	12
	Average	2	2	2	2	8
<u>Air Defense Artillery:</u>	Superior	3	3	3	3	12
	Average	2	2	2	2	8
<u>Engineer:</u>	Superior	3	3	3	3	12
	Average	2	2	2	2	8
<u>Signal:</u>	Superior	3	3	3	3	12
	Average	2	2	2	2	8
<u>Transporta- tion/Quar- termaster:</u>	Superior	3	3	3	3	12
	Average	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>Totals:</u>		30	30	30	30	120

TABLE II.6
The Final Interview Sample

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Criterion Group</u>	<u>Site</u>				<u>Totals</u>
		<u>Fort Bragg</u>	<u>Fort Carson</u>	<u>Fort Riley</u>	<u>Fort Stewart*</u>	
<u>Infantry*</u>	Superior	1	3	3	5	12
	Average	1	4	2	1	8
<u>Field Artillery</u>	Superior	4	3	5	2	14
	Average	3	4	1	1	9
<u>Air Defense Artillery*</u>	Superior	1	3	2	2	8
	Average	1	2	3	0	6
<u>Engineer*</u>	Superior	2	3	2	1	8
	Average	3	1	3	4	11
<u>Signal</u>	Superior	3	0	2	3	8
	Average	1	3	2	1	7
<u>Transporta- tion/Quar- termaster*</u>	Superior	1	1	2	2	6
	Average	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>Totals:</u>		23	28	30	24	105

*Missing data due to absence of criterion data for these branches, and branch data for 1 individual from Fort Stewart.

- the people who were involved in the event, and the roles that these people played
- what the junior officer did or said in the event
- what the junior officer was thinking or feeling at critical points in the event
- the outcome of the event

The interviewer probed for equal numbers of positive and negative behavioral events, so that variation in this fifty-fifty distribution reflected the information volunteered by the interviewee.

The Behavioral Event Interview format was as follows:

- obtaining the officer's position in the organization and reporting relationships
- obtaining the major job functions and responsibilities involved, and the tasks to be performed
- obtaining the six behavioral events, both high points and low points
- obtaining an elaboration of the performer characteristics felt by the interviewee to be especially important in the performance of his or her duties

(The number of behavioral events obtained varied among the interviews, because some interviewees provided long, involved events, which used up the time.)

5. Development and Validation of the Competency Model

Each of the 115 junior officer interviews was transcribed verbatim from the tapes, and the transcripts were subjected to an in-depth content analysis to determine the knowledge, skills, traits, motives, and other aspects of competence demonstrated by each interviewee in carrying out the junior officer role. This analysis proceeded in three phases. The first phase consisted of an in-depth analysis of 38 interviews by paired members of the interviewer team. (Four teams were used.) Whenever a specific statement by the interviewee suggested the presence of an underlying characteristic that contributed to effective performance, the characteristic or theme was catalogued on an index card.

The second phase of the analysis process involved the discussion of all the characteristics identified in the first

phase. All interviewers were involved in the discussion. The purpose of the discussion was threefold:

- (1) To integrate the findings of the separate teams of analysts and eliminate redundant characteristics
- (2) To ensure that each characteristic is supported by specific behavioral evidence from the interviews
- (3) To ensure that the demonstration of a characteristic leads to clearly positive outcomes as outlined in the interviews

The resultant themes were hypothesized to be junior officer competencies. The output of this discussion was a competency codebook consisting of competency labels and associated "behavioral indicators," or alternative ways in which the given competency was manifested in the interviews for each of the identified competency themes.

The third phase consisted of using this codebook to score all the original interview transcripts.

Of the original 115 interviews, 110 were systematically coded for the hypothesized competencies. Five interviews were identified as uncodable because of the poor quality of the interview. In most instances the poor quality was due to the interviewee's inability or unwillingness to generate the type of data needed in the study.

An initial team of five coders was established. A set of training interviews was identified to enable coders to master the coding categories. After an initial effort to establish individual coding reliabilities and to refine coding categories, it was decided that all interviews would be double coded. The single coding of interviews, which in other studies had produced inter-coder reliabilities greater than .80 (Boyatzis, 1980), was found to be impractical because of the length and number of the interviews. All coders were kept unaware of the interviewees' overall criterion ratings.

Coding Rules

In coding Behavioral Event Interviews, standard coding procedures were followed. The basic coding rules were as follows.

1. Code only when the evidence relevant to a scoring category is part of a specific incident. General descriptions of behavior are not codable.
2. A competency can be coded only once per incident, unless the incident is clearly made up of sub-incidents. The

latter will occur when an incident extends through a significant period of time, when new actors are introduced, or when the interviewer describes a new set of activities.

3. Any evidence of a competency must be evaluated in terms of its relevance to the overall incident.
4. A given piece of data can be coded for more than one competency, but only when the competencies are equally salient.
5. No corrections are made for the length of an interview, since in the vast majority of cases the length of the interview is determined by the interviewee.

CHAPTER III

Results of the Task Analysis Inventory

This chapter summarizes the results of the Task Analysis Inventory (TAI) and consists of three subsections. The first subsection summarizes the High Performance and Required Performance ratings of the items. The second subsection presents the results of a factor analysis of the 28 TAI items. The third subsection presents an analysis of differences among branches and between performance ratings for scales derived from the TAI factor analysis.

High Performance and Required Performance on the Job

Tables III.1 and III.2 list the tasks in the top and bottom 25 percent in terms of their relevance to high job performance. For the highly rated tasks, three dominant themes are apparent:

- Understanding Written Material (items 6 and 3)
- Maintaining and Supervising Equipment and the Activities of Others (items 19, 26, 23)
- Providing Individual Support (items 1, 27)

These can be contrasted with the two themes emerging from the lowest-rated items (see Table III.2):

- Formal Communication (items 8, 12, 9)
- Personal Skill Mastery or Demonstration (items 22, 18, 2, 10)

Together the results indicate that high performance is related to the successful accomplishment of managerial tasks, as opposed to individual-contributor tasks.

This emphasis on managerial tasks emerges when tasks are rated in terms of their importance for routine performance (see Tables III.3 and III.4). Tasks scoring high in terms of required performance reflect a similar emphasis on Maintaining and Supervising Equipment and the Activities of Others. In addition, the theme of Planning and Organizing also emerges (items 25, 24, 4). Tasks perceived as least important for routine performance are those indicating a high level of Personal Skill Mastery or Demonstration.

TABLE III.1

Tasks Most Associated with High Performance

<u>Item</u>		<u>High Performance Rating</u>
6	Read, interpret, and implement directives	76
19	Monitor maintenance checks	71
25	Schedule overtime	71
26	Monitor control of inventory and equipment	64
3	Acquire related technical knowledge from manuals	60
23	Supervise the completion of branch-specific tasks	60
27	Direct troops and NCOs to sources of help for personal problems	57
1	Personally counsel troops	54

TABLE III.2

Tasks Least Associated with High Performance

<u>Item</u>		<u>High Performance Rating</u>
8	Write personnel-related reports	41
22	Personally participate in completion of branch-specific tasks	33
18	Complete collateral duties	33
2	Personally train troops in combat skills	29
9	Write task-related reports	29
12	Formally brief superiors	28
10	Personally deliver technical skills training	16

TABLE III.3

Tasks Most Associated with Required Performance

<u>Item</u>		<u>Mean Required Performance Rating</u>
6	Read, interpret, and implement directives	82
13	Informally brief superiors	82
19	Monitor maintenance checks	80
25	Schedule overtime	80
24	Arrange for maintenance and repair of equipment	72
4	Schedule personnel and resources for projects	71
26	Monitor the control of inventory and equipment	70

TABLE III.4

Tasks Least Associated with Required Performance

<u>Item</u>		<u>Mean Required Performance Rating</u>
14	Deploy or set up branch-related equipment	45
9	Write task-related reports	42
7	Develop detailed plans to accomplish branch-related tasks	40
22	Personally participate in completion of branch-specific activities	38
12	Formally brief superiors	31
2	Personally train troops in combat skills	29
10	Personally deliver technical skills training	20

The strong distinction between management and individual-contributor roles is illustrated by the ratings given to somewhat similar tasks: schedule personnel and resources for projects (item 4) and develop detailed plans to accomplish branch-related tasks (item 7). Both involve planning, but the latter presupposes markedly greater technical knowledge.

While the distinction between managerial tasks and individual-contributor tasks does exist, with more importance attached to the former, the ability to complete individual-contributor tasks is still relevant. This is demonstrated by the importance attached to acquiring technical knowledge. This task is perceived as not being required, yet contributing to outstanding performance. In short, junior officers see themselves primarily as managers whose technical expertise is to be acquired for the purpose of managing others, not as individual contributors.

Factor Analysis of Task Analysis Inventory

A standard factor analysis using a varimax rotation was conducted on the TAI data in order to provide a more parsimonious way of summarizing it. The factor analysis also permits an empirical assessment of the manager/individual-contributor distinction outlined above.

On the basis of standard techniques for identifying the number of factors to be interpreted (i.e., eigen values greater than unity and the scree test), it was determined that a five-factor solution would provide the best analysis. These five factors accounted for 46% of the variance in the High Performance scores and 44% of the variance in the Required Performance scores (see Table III.5). Table III.6 lists the tasks with loadings equal to or greater than .40 for each of the five factors.

Factor 1: Branch-Specific Activities

The six items influencing this factor most heavily all refer explicitly to branch-related activities. The items refer to both managerial and individual tasks. This suggests that the previously identified dichotomy may be somewhat overstated. This factor accounted for 18.53% of the variance in High Performance scores. When the Required Performance data were factor analyzed, it accounted for 19.55% of the variance in those scores.

Factor 2: Planning and Coordination

The six tasks most heavily associated with this factor refer to aspects of planning and coordination. The tasks cover both formal and informal planning activities. Two refer to interpreting directives. While these two tasks do not explicitly

TABLE III.5

Variance Explained by Task Dimensions Derived from Factor
Analysis of Task Analysis Inventory Data

<u>Factors</u>	<u>Percentage of Variance Explained-- High Performance Scores</u>	<u>Percentage of Variance Explained-- Required Performance Scores</u>
1. Branch-Specific Activities	18.53	19.55
2. Planning and Coordination	7.91	5.47
3. Maintenance and Control of Equipment	7.46	6.36
4. Administration	6.76	6.80
5. Formal Communication	<u>5.41</u>	<u>5.57</u>
Cumulative Percent- age of Variance:	46.07	43.75

TABLE III.6

Rotated Factor Loadings for High Performance and
Required Performance Scores on Task Dimensions

<u>Task Dimension</u>	<u>Required Performance Factor Loading</u>	<u>High Performance Factor Loading</u>
Factor 1 BRANCH-SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES		
• Supervise the deployment of branch-related resources	.73	.70
• Deploy or set up branch-related resources	.54	.61
• Personally participate in the completion of branch-specific tasks	.51	.72
• Develop detailed plans to accomplish branch-related tasks	.46	.59
• Personally employ basic military skills	.46	.64
• Supervise the completion of branch-specific tasks	.46	.50
Factor 2 PLANNING AND COORDINATION		
• Schedule people and resources for projects	.68	.71
• Coordinate use of resources with peers	.66	.71
• Read, interpret, and implement directives	.47	.60
• Prepare estimates of personnel and equipment capabilities	.40	.49
• Informally brief superiors	.40	.46
• Read and interpret technical documents	--	.49

(continued)

Table III.6, continued

<u>Task Dimension</u>	<u>Required Performance Factor Loading</u>	<u>High Performance Factor Loading</u>
Factor 3		
MAINTENANCE AND CONTROL		
● Arrange for maintenance and repair of equipment	.75	.71
● Monitor maintenance checks	.73	.73
● Monitor the control and management of inventory	.63	.72
Factor 4		
ADMINISTRATION		
● Direct NCOs and troops to sources of help for personal problems	.61	.51
● Write personnel-related reports	.59	.65
● Personally counsel troops and NCOs	.42	--
Factor 5		
FORMAL COMMUNICATION		
● Formally brief superiors	.57	.64
● Personally train troops in combat skills	.48	.61
● Personally deliver technical skills training	.44	.66

refer to planning, they are related and they have somewhat low factor loading. This factor accounted for 7.91% of the variance in High Performance scores, and 5.47% of the variance in the Required Performance scores.

Factor 3: Maintenance and Control of Equipment

The three tasks affecting this factor most heavily refer to the management of equipment. Junior officers see activities involving maintenance and inventory control as a distinct set of tasks, whether they are monitoring the work of others or arranging for the work to be done. This factor accounts for 7.46% of the variance in High Performance scores, and 6.36% of the variance in the Required Performance scores.

Factor 4: Administration

Three tasks define this factor. The factor is somewhat difficult to interpret, but its two largest component tasks involve writing reports. The remaining tasks, while not strictly administrative, do incorporate specific administrative aspects. This factor accounts for 6.76% of the variance in the High Performance scores.

The results are somewhat different for the Required Performance scores. The three tasks mainly involved refer to handling personnel-related activities. This factor accounted for 6.80% of the variance.

Factor 5: Formal Communication

The three tasks concerned with this factor refer to formal communication activities, namely training and briefing superiors. The same factor also focuses upon a junior officer's individual or personal involvement in an activity. This factor accounted for 5.41% of the variance. In the Required Performance scores, it accounted for 5.57% of the variance.

Based on these five task factors, five scales were developed using the items loading with the heaviest influence (equal to or greater than .40) on the individual factors. All items were equally weighted.

As indicated in Table III.7, the junior officers saw Maintenance and Control of Equipment and Planning and Coordination as the task dimensions most important to high and routine performance. Formal Communication was seen as the least important task.

Differences among Branches and between Performance Groups

The data were examined to see whether differences existed among branches and performance groups in the importance attached to these task dimensions for high performance. As Table III.8 indicates, the importance of Formal Communication and Maintenance and Control for high performance varied according to branch. Maintenance and Control and Administration were seen as more important for high performance by junior officers classified as superior performers.

The same pattern of results emerged for the Required Performance scale scores.

These differences in absolute scores, however, did not result in any significant differences in the relative importance of the five task dimensions (see Tables III.7 and III.9).

TABLE III.7

Mean Performance Scores on Task Dimension
Scales by Performance Rating

<u>High Performance Scores</u>	<u>Overall (n ≥ 125)</u>	<u>Superior (n ≥ 48)</u>	<u>Average (n ≥ 50)</u>
Branch-Specific Activities	43 (4)	45 (4)	41 (4)
Planning and Coordination	67 (2)	71 (2)	65 (1)
Maintenance and Control	71 (1)	79 (1)	62** (2)
Administration	47 (3)	51 (3)	44* (3)
Formal Communication	30 (5)	29 (5)	26 (5)
<u>Required Performance Scores</u>			
Branch-Specific Activities	48 (4)	48 (4)	45 (4)
Planning and Coordination	77 (2)	79 (2)	76 (1)
Maintenance and Control	79 (1)	85 (1)	73* (2)
Administration	63 (3)	62 (3)	61 (3)
Formal Communication	34 (5)	31 (5)	29 (5)

* $p \leq .05$, 2-tailed t-test

** $p \leq .01$

() relative rank

TABLE III.8

Anova (2-way) of Task Dimensions by Branch and
Performance Rating (Total n = 97) for High Performance
and Required Performance Scores

<u>High Performance Scores</u>	<u>Branch F-Value</u>	<u>Performance Rating F-Value</u>	<u>Branch x Performance F-Value (df=5)</u>
Branch-Specific Activities	-	-	-
Planning and Coordination	-	-	-
Maintenance and Control	2.7*	7.6**	-
Administration	-	3.8*	-
Formal Communication	2.6*	-	-
<u>Required Performance Scores</u>			
Branch-Specific Activities	-	-	-
Planning and Coordination	-	-	-
Maintenance and Control	-	4.1*	-
Administration	-	-	-
Formal Communication	-	-	-

- not significant

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

TABLE III.9

Mean High Performance Scores on Task Dimension Scales
by Branch

	<u>Infan- try</u>	<u>Field Artil- lery</u>	<u>Air De- fense</u>	<u>Engi- neers</u>	<u>Signal</u>	<u>Quarter- master/ Transpor- tation</u>
Branch-Specific Activities	49 (4)	47 (4)	52 (3)	33 (4)	48 (4)	33 (4)
Planning and Coordination	69 (2)	68 (1)	62 (2)	62 (2)	78 (1)	62 (2)
Maintenance and Control	83 (1)	55 (2)	68 (1)	73 (1)	76 (2)	68 (1)
Administration	53 (3)	50 (3)	47 (4)	39 (3)	52 (3)	48 (3)
Formal Communi- cation	39 (5)	31 (5)	34 (5)	20 (5)	35 (5)	23 (5)

() relative rank

CHAPTER IV

The Army Junior Officer Competency Model

This chapter comprises two sections. The first section provides a detailed description of the model, summarized in Table IV.1 on pages 83-85. Each competency is discussed in depth, together with illustrative examples. The second section presents a summary of the statistical analysis of the interview data, based on the coding procedures outlined in Chapter II.

Description of the Competency Model

The competencies found in superior-performing junior officers fall into four clusters: (1) Mission Focus, (2) Professional Maturity, (3) Power and Influence, and (4) Understanding and Managing Others. Each cluster comprises several competencies, and each competency is demonstrated by several "behavioral indicators." In describing the model, we will proceed through each cluster, its competencies, and the behavioral indicators of each competency. Detailed examples of each behavioral indicator are provided, to illustrate the ways that the competencies are demonstrated. The examples may also serve as case material for use in training or other applications of the competency model.

The Mission Focus Cluster

Superior-performing junior officers demonstrated four competencies that seem to reflect an underlying mission focus, or motivation for achievement. This motivation for achievement is reflected in an overriding concern to get the job done. Thirty years of research have shown that people with this motivation like to compete with others or with themselves: they have a personal standard of excellence. The competencies in the Mission Focus cluster are: (1) Concern for Efficiency, (2) Planning, (3) Initiative, and (4) Concern for Standards. Each will be discussed in turn.

Competency 1: Concern for Efficiency

Superior-performing junior officers are concerned with making the best possible use of time, money, and resources. They are disturbed by the waste of time and resources, and take action on their own to eliminate such waste and find ways to get things done more efficiently. The behavioral indicators of this

competency are provided below, with examples from the interviews.

Expresses Annoyance at Things That Slow Tasks

In the interviews, the superior-performing junior officers often voiced their dismay at things that slow progress on tasks. In the example below, a lieutenant expressed annoyance at the slowness with which some of his troops began work:

"I noticed that when we gave these guys a disagreeable task, with a junior NCO, they would waste almost an hour in the morning just getting the tool boxes out."

This officer also took action to stop the foot dragging.

In the next example, an officer expressed resentment that he had to work his troops hard to make up for a mistake that had delayed a task by four hours:

"I don't particularly like working the troops when it's somebody else's mistake and they could have got it done four hours earlier."

Expresses Displeasure to Specific People When Time or Effort Is Wasted

This behavior indicated the competency when the person expressed the displeasure to someone who could prevent it. Outstanding junior officers often expressed this displeasure to their superiors, as in this example:

"I says, 'Sir, you know we wasted an hour down there, and nothing got done packing the pallets.'"

In other cases, the displeasure was expressed to the junior officers' noncommissioned officers, as in this example, which involved work delays caused by a truck that sold cigarettes and candy:

"Well, as I watched. I noticed that they'd mosey on over to the 'roach coach' and stand in line for about ten minutes. By the time they'd got something, walked back, got through eating it, smoked a cigarette, and then got back to work, it was about forty-five minutes. So I brought this to the attention of the platoon leaders in training."

Defines Problems or Outcomes as Significant Costs or Savings in Resources

Sometimes Concern for Efficiency was demonstrated when problems or outcomes were thought of in terms of the efficient use of resources. In the next example a junior officer noted ineff-

iciency when one of his noncommissioned officers took over a task that should have been performed by troops:

"He has a tendency to want to go do that himself--which in effect takes my supervisor completely out of the system for a period of maybe two hours, while the rest of the mechanics are around with no guidance and nobody watching 'em."

In the next example a junior officer anticipates an inefficient use of resources:

"So what we felt was that by the time we got the soldiers up in the morning, got them fed, had formation, had people pulled for details, traveled out there, got to work, and then left early enough to travel back and get them dinner, we probably wouldn't have much more than four hours of work done a day, at most."

Explicitly Mentions Doing Something Faster or More Efficiently

Strong evidence of Concern for Efficiency is provided when a junior officer does something faster or more efficiently than it has been done before. Note in the examples below that the superior performing officers give specific numbers as evidence of what they have done more efficiently:

"I took us from 90.666 in our maintenance rating to a 94-percent rating . . . I took us from an average of twenty-five items down to an average of six items down."

"I told them, 'In a war you're going to be dead, because that jet takes about ten seconds to make the first pass and about thirty seconds to come around and get you again.' So I wanted to see if they could do it in thirty or forty-five seconds . . . One of the squads was getting it around to about forty seconds, which was damn good."

Designs Systems to Improve Efficiency

Perhaps the strongest evidence of Concern for Efficiency is provided when a junior officer comes up with a new way to do something more efficiently. In the next example the junior officer improved the plans for constructing a bridge:

"In going through this I was able to find some places where if I modified the plans somewhat, it would simplify the materials needed, in that I wouldn't need--for example--the spikes that you use to put the timbers together. If I put it together a certain way, instead of the way that was shown on the plans, it would probably take less time to construct the bridge, and I would only need two sizes of spikes--instead of, say, four sizes of spikes--to try and keep track of."

Note that Concern for Efficiency may sometimes be demonstrated at the expense of another competency: Concern for Standards (Competency 4). In the above example, technical expertise would be needed to determine whether this was the case.

In the next example, a junior officer suggests organizing the parts to be assembled, so as to make the best use of everyone involved in the assembly process:

"I said, 'Chief, did you ever think that you might want to locate all the parts that you have already from when you pulled it, to make sure you've got everything--get 'em laid out in some system so that you can have each person do something? You know, try to organize it? Because otherwise they'll be there all night, a lot of times, because they can't prioritize or plan at all. So that's what I would do: lay down a sequence of things for them to do.'"

Competency 2: Planning

The second competency in the Mission Focus cluster is Planning. Junior officers who care about achieving goals often demonstrate this competency. Several behavioral indicators of Planning are especially characteristic of outstanding junior officers.

Sets Priorities

Junior officers often have a large number of pressing demands: many tasks to be completed in short periods of time. Sometimes a junior officer is working on more tasks than can possibly be completed in the available time. Under these circumstances, it is vital to set priorities, which is what superior-performing junior officers often do. The following example--in which a junior officer is responsible for a motor pool with many vehicles in disrepair--is typical:

"And once I'd prioritized which vehicle fleets of ours I thought were in the worst shape, I arrived at the 548s as being the worst--our ammo vehicles. And then within those I determined in my opinion from worst to best, so that I could start off with the worst vehicle."

In the next example, the junior officer sets priorities by having the mechanic do the repairs for which he has the necessary tools:

"Sometimes I'll have a mechanic working on one vehicle, and regardless of how much he works on it, he probably won't get it fixed; if he would spend half a day working on this other

vehicle, he'd be able to get this other one out. I'll shift him over to the other vehicle and wait till we get the right tools to work on the one that he's wasting his time on."

Note that this junior officer also displays the competency Concern for Efficiency.

Develops Methods to Keep Track of Tasks' Progress

To ease planning, some junior officers develop ways to keep track of progress on tasks. One junior officer took notes on the effective and less effective behavior of different sections during training exercises; with these notes, he was able to provide specific feedback:

"I got my little book out--I watch them do what they're supposed to be doing, take notes on anything that I see right or wrong, and when we get back together at a meeting I tell them, 'O.K., you've done this and this and this right; the first section looked good; the second looked terrible.'"

Another way of keeping track of tasks is writing "to do" lists:

"Usually what I do at the beginning of each day, or the end of the day, is write down on a sheet the things that I want to accomplish, either that day or the next day. And when I do accomplish them I'll either mark them off mentally or mark them off on paper, saying, 'I've got this accomplished.' And the days when I sit down with my list of things to do, I get them all done."

Thinks Things Through Systematically Ahead of Time

Planning is also displayed when a junior officer, before beginning a task, thinks through all the steps that are necessary to complete the task. In the following example a junior officer used a map to plot the course of a convoy:

"As soon as I find out where we're moving to, I give them a map-out, plot out a map--a plot by our present location--and figure out what route we'll travel to get to the location, how long it's going to take us to get there, what the order of march is, and so forth. And what the distance between each vehicle is going to be and what checkpoints we're going to have, what other points we're going to have in case the convoy gets split up, and what actions we take in case of ambush, in case of an air attack, in case a vehicle breaks down, and things like that."

Sometimes junior officers think things through ahead of time by inspecting the site of a planned activity:

"I went ahead on my own and got my driver and we went out to this site that we were going to and took a look at it. I put tape on trees--I wanted to be able to say, once I got to the areas with all my equipment, 'This gets parked right here in this spot,' and that was it."

When junior officers were observed in the field, they showed other ways of thinking things through ahead of time. For example, a junior officer who was conducting a four-day consolidated maintenance program for vehicles coming in from the field had nine inspection stations arranged in a circle, so that every vehicle could rotate through each inspection station.

Competency 3: Initiative

Superior-performing junior officers take an active approach to coping with problems. Unlike their average counterparts, they do not feel that they have no control over problems or that they should give up if their first effort to solve a problem is unsuccessful. In short, superior-performing junior officers show initiative.

Uses Imaginative or Other Unusual Means to Overcome an Obstacle

Initiative sometimes means finding an unusual way to overcome an obstacle. One junior officer, trying to conduct a range with his troops, arrived at the site and found that the keys to the range tower were missing; instead of canceling the range, he found a way to get into the tower without the keys:

"We didn't know where the keys were to get into the tower. What happened is they'd been turned in but Range Maintenance didn't know it and Lieutenant Smith didn't know it, and I didn't have them. So we ended up having to get one of the guys in my platoon to be a 'second-story man.' He went into the damn open window and we broke into the place."

In another example involving a range exercise, a junior officer whose battalion had repeatedly failed to supply the unit with food during range exercises found a way to get C rations from the mess hall for use during these exercises:

"Every time we go down-range, the battalion forgets about us. They say, 'Oh damn, we've got an air-defense unit out there.' I've been forgotten for food so many times that now before I go down-range I go to the mess hall and draw enough C rations--I manage to weasel it out somehow or other--that I can manage to feed all my people the entire time I'm down there without ever having to have food from the battalion. I dish them out and each team takes some, enough for the entire meal, just in case we don't get fed."

Develops Innovative Strategies to Accomplish a Mission

In addition to these imaginative ways of overcoming obstacles, superior-performing junior officers show initiative in more complex ways: by developing innovative strategies to accomplish a mission. For example, one junior officer modified some training exercises to make them simpler and more practical for combat:

"There are different sequences, and different manuals that you use at different times--and stuff like that. And I just changed quite a few of their procedures to make them not only more polished but more practical for combat. So we didn't do the exercise according to the rules. What we did was simpler and worked out just as well."

Presumably, this modified training was more effective and did not compromise standards. Here the innovation may have been motivated by another competency, which we will discuss later: Concern for Clarity (Competency 11).

Another example of an innovative strategy came from a junior officer who had a problem distributing hot food to units in different locations while on a field training exercise:

"Then we had the food problem. I had anticipated: 'There's no possible way they can get out--we're spread out for miles.' So what I did was take two mermite cans. (A mermite can is a big can about a foot and a half or two feet long and about eight inches wide and another foot and a half tall. It's like a thermos can. You have three inserts where you can put three types of food and it'll stay warm for a long time. They use this to transport food in the field.) I brought two cans of my own and I was going to give them to the mess sergeant to fill up with our rations of food. My plans were that the platoon sergeant would come in with the mermite can ahead of time; give it to the mess sergeant, who would fill it up; and then take it out to the red-eye section. The platoon sergeant would travel around to each team and feed them and then bring the can back."

Builds and Uses Personal Contacts to Solve Problems

Superior-performing junior officers also show initiative in their use of people as resources. Many of the effective officers who were studied had made personal contacts with people from other units who could help them or provide scarce resources. For example, when a radio battery case that was on order had not arrived after three months, one junior officer obtained one from a friend in another unit; she noted that you often have to get equipment this way:

"One of the radios in one of the shops needed a battery

case. One had been on order for about three months, and I finally just went to a friend who had an extra one and she gave it to me and we squared it away. There's so many things that if you wait around for Supply or PLL to get for you, your truck will be deadlined, your radio will be deadlined, so you gotta get out on your own and find out where these assets are--because they're all around us. And you can usually get what you want if you try hard enough."

Another junior officer used this method to obtain a building for the unit's radio section:

"We needed a new building for our radio section. Well, actually we needed a vault for all of our secure gear. I'd been submitting work orders, and I finally got hold of a friend that worked down at Engineers, and he said, 'Hey, we got this building open and it's really nice. We're gonna let you sign for it and have it.'"

Persists in Order to Overcome Obstacles

A key way that initiative is demonstrated by superior-performing junior officers is through persistence: taking two or more actions to overcome an obstacle. For example, one junior officer who needed a welder went to a warrant officer several times unsuccessfully; instead of giving up, he then went to his executive officer, who supplied the welder:

"Well, I finally gave up trying to talk to the warrant officer who's in charge of the welders--he never wanted to give me a welder. Then I started talking to the XO instead, and we worked something out where they would just let me use the welder, you know, for the whole weekend. So we did that."

Another junior officer got approval for a building project by talking to several people, including, finally, the battalion commander:

"I talked to the guy over there and he said somebody else had already started this project a long time ago. They hadn't really built anything, but they'd started--they'd submitted plans and everything. So I found out from him that not only did we have enough money to do it my way, we had extra money. So then I went back and finally persuaded our battalion commander to let me build it my way."

Competency 4: Concern for Standards

The last competency in the Mission Focus cluster, Concern for Standards, reflects the desire of superior-performing junior officers to do their jobs well. These officers set and enforce high standards for both themselves and their subordinates.

Sometimes they use Army standards to evaluate their own and others' performance, but often they develop their own standards of excellence.

Makes an Effort to Surpass Existing Mission Standards

The interviews of outstanding junior officers contained many examples of assessing the unit's performance and then trying to improve it:

"I would read them the step, watch them perform the step, and provide some suggestions or guidance on how to improve it, or get any ideas they had to improve the operation."

Sometimes the effort to surpass mission standards takes the form of demanding repeated practice until performance reaches a certain standard of excellence. This is illustrated in the next example, in setting up a weapon in the field:

"If they're timed, they should be able to do that within five minutes, falling into position within eight minutes. Moving into position, they should be ready to shoot within about fifteen minutes--they should have all their camouflage and that set up in any points they have, and they and all their equipment should be displayed the way that it's supposed to be. And then we keep drawing on it until they come close to obtaining it. It's a tough standard, and only experienced chiefs will really meet that."

Strives for Precision in Mission Accomplishment

Another indication of Concern for Standards is a desire for precision in mission accomplishment. In one example of this, a junior officer who had to move his unit in total darkness to a point specified on a map strove successfully to get as close as possible to this point.

Another officer showed this striving for precision in the way she handled official forms in a motor pool:

"If you've got six or seven different forms, and every one of them is interrelated, you have to be able to trace every part through all of them, every deadlined vehicle through all of them, and that type stuff. So we were just basically ensuring that everything matched, which it didn't. So I was reinitiating forms that had been lost, forms that had never been maintained, and stuff like that."

Yet another junior officer, who was in charge of a weight-loss program, began insisting that everyone in the program make weekly progress in weight loss:

"I found out the people who had been in the program an excessive amount of time, and went back to their time of entry into the program, and from that point figured out what they should weigh in order to be making progress. And then I started reporting the new figures. Just losing weight was not enough for a guy to be making progress; he had to have been losing a pound a week from the time he'd started the program to be making progress--he had to be within that standard. And if he gained three pounds and lost two the next week, he was still not making progress, because he'd fallen out of his acceptable progress limits."

Rejects Substandard Performance in Mission-Related Activities

Superior-performing junior officers give negative feedback to their subordinates for substandard performance:

"I had to sit down with the chief firefighter and the section chiefs and jump on them for some things that went wrong."

Notice that the officer here also showed another competency, to be discussed later: Willingness to Confront Others (Competency 8).

In another example, a junior officer held a section chief responsible for substandard performance:

"As soon as I found out all the things that he'd done I pulled him off to the side and . . . told him that what had happened out there shouldn't happen again. If he continued to perform as bad as he was performing, he wasn't going to be my chief very much longer."

As in the preceding example, this officer also showed Willingness to Confront Others. In addition, the officer's threat to get rid of the section chief demonstrated the Forcefulness competency (Competency 9).

Requires Additional Effort from Others When Mission-Related Standards Are Not Met

When standards are not met, it is common for outstanding junior officers to require more work, as illustrated in these two examples:

"I just kept those people down there tightening up straps and we just kept readjusting until I was satisfied."

"I came down and the line was not swept and the equipment was not stored away the way that it's supposed to be, and I told the chief of the fire battery that I'd be back in one

hour to inspect again: 'You can come get me when you think everybody is ready for inspection.'

Systematically Monitors the Performance of Subordinates

Outstanding junior officers make a point of checking on their subordinates' performance in a systematic way:

"Once I got all the people started, I went from station to station tracking them and making sure that the squad leader and the two hundred fifty-four ECHO'S I had were testing what I wanted."

This monitoring is especially important during field exercises:

"They went out there and set up their position, and we watched them through binoculars the whole time--my section sergeant and me. And then we got in our jeep and went down and analyzed their positions--told them what was good and what was bad, what they should have done instead of what they did do."

Note that giving specific feedback in this way reflects another competency to be discussed later: Developing Subordinates (Competency 14).

Systematic monitoring of subordinates was also seen in junior officers in the field. For example, one junior officer was observed conducting a tool inventory in a motor pool by reviewing with each sergeant the location of each tool on a master list. Another junior officer drove the observer to an ammunition-supply depot that was under construction; the officer said he had to check the site constantly, because on every visit he found something wrong.

Takes Steps to Ensure That Subordinates Master Mission-Related Tasks and Materials

Sometimes junior officers personally take steps to make sure that their noncommissioned officers and troops master tasks or materials. For example, one junior officer gave instruction in processing complex forms:

"I asked them if they had any questions, and they said no, but I didn't believe them, because it's pretty complex stuff. So I gave them practical examples . . . they screwed it all up again. So then we went over that again three or four times, and then when I was satisfied that they understood how to complete the forms and how to keep them, we went on from there."

Another junior officer had troops on a field training exer-

cise set up in and depart from a location seven times, until the unit's performance was satisfactory. Again, giving specific feedback during this process also reflects the competency Developing Others.

"So we pulled them out of that location--we must've occupied that same place about seven times. And then just through repetition and critique . . . that was the big thing, to get them after they pulled in and tell 'em where they messed up and where they did good--you know, tryin' to reinforce that. And we just pulled in and out of that place about seven times, and they started lookin' pretty good, started comin' around."

The Professional Maturity Cluster

In their actions and the way they described their jobs during the interviews, the outstanding junior officers showed professional maturity. They said they liked their jobs; they were confident of their leadership ability; and they worked hard. Two competencies make up this cluster: Self-confidence and Job Involvement.

Competency 5: Self-confidence

Outstanding junior officers are confident of their ability and their effectiveness. Without being arrogant or boastful, they make it clear that they know what they are doing and are pleased with the results.

Expresses Belief in Own Expertise

Self-confidence was sometimes expressed directly, as when a junior officer stated a belief in his or her own expertise. Sometimes this belief was stated to the interviewer:

"I've been here long enough so that people trust me and know what's going on. And I've got a lot more confidence that I know what I'm talking about."

Other times, this belief was stated to someone else, such as a superior officer:

"He said, 'Why are you, a lieutenant, in command when there's all these captains running around at battalion looking for a job?' I said, 'Cause I'm good.'"

Describes Self as a Star

A few of the outstanding junior officers who were interviewed were so filled with self-confidence that they described themselves as star performers, as in these examples:

"Any school I've been to here at Fort Carson I've been the honor graduate at."

"I'm supposed to be the best . . . I'm known to be one of the 'horses,' they call me, in the battalion. If I say something, you take heed, you listen to me."

Compares Self Favorably with Others

More common than describing oneself as a star was comparing oneself favorably with other people:

"I ended up getting that award, and I think I was the only one of the junior officers out there with different units within FAST that got one."

"I graduated Honor Student out of my jump master school. Out of the sixty people that went through the course, only eight of us passed all the tests the first time."

The self-confidence displayed by the outstanding junior officers was in strong contrast to the frustration, inadequacy, and powerlessness that their average peers felt. These average junior officers often voiced doubts about their technical ability, especially compared with that of experienced noncommissioned officers; they often felt intimidated by these older, more experienced NCOs.

Clearly, self-confidence is both a result and a cause of effectiveness. When a junior officer acts effectively, he or she will probably get positive feedback, which reinforces self-confidence; conversely, if a junior officer is ineffective, he or she will get negative feedback, which reduces self-confidence. Similarly, self-confidence can be a self-fulfilling prophecy: if the leader approaches tasks with a can-do attitude, the subordinates will probably follow this example, and the chance of a successful outcome will be increased.

Competency 6: Job Involvement

Outstanding junior officers take their jobs seriously. They demonstrate this job involvement in a variety of ways.

Makes Personal Sacrifices for Professional Gain as an Army Officer

Outstanding junior officers often reported working extra hours to improve their chances for professional success as an Army officer. One reported putting in 19-hour days while attending a school:

"I was trying to compete for Honor Graduate, and I think I came out fourth, and what probably made the difference was that while everyone else in the school was going home at five o'clock, I was getting home at ten or eleven o'clock at night, studying until one or two o'clock in the morning, and then going to school at six-thirty. I was getting pretty run-down for the week."

Another junior officer spent evenings reading books on his new responsibilities as a maintenance officer:

" . . . I work a fourteen-hour day; that made it a fifteen-hour day for me right there. But it gets more ridiculous than that. For instance, when I first became maintenance officer, sometimes I worked until ten o'clock at night just reading the books, trying to figure out how to do this stuff."

Works on Own Knowledge and Skill Development

Superior-performing junior officers often reported taking action on their own to develop their professional knowledge and skills. Two examples of this independent self-development are:

"I spend a lot of time with a couple of my friends just sitting around after work and sharpshooting each other questions--just to expand our technical knowledge of the job."

"He and I went down and practiced. They have a mock-up down there where you can get in and practice the stuff you do inside the aircraft."

Expresses Enthusiasm for Past or Future Challenges

One of the striking features of outstanding junior officers is their enthusiasm when they talk about challenges in their work. Sometimes this enthusiasm is for their unit's response to a challenge:

"The battalion didn't have nothing to do with it! Because we did all the work! And everybody kept telling us we couldn't do it! And we got it done."

Other times, the enthusiasm is for a personal challenge:

"And he said, 'I want you to get within ten meters of this spot on the map.' And so I got my little map out, and we moved out at two, and for an hour and a half all I did was read that map. I didn't think of sleep anymore. We got to the destination--I didn't know how close, because it was pitch dark. The man had challenged me."

Outstanding junior officers also speak enthusiastically about future challenges:

"I agreed, because I had a chance to work with several Korean units as a passport-team chief. I had worked with Korean rangers and I enjoyed that very much, so I said, 'This will be a good experience for me.'"

In strong contrast to these superior performers, many less effective junior officers showed little enthusiasm for their jobs, and complained several times during the interviews.

Pinch-Hits for Others When Necessary to Get Job Done

Another way that superior performers demonstrated their job involvement was by "pinch-hitting": pitching in with subordinates to get a job done:

"We were a little shorthanded this time, so I helped stretch the camouflage and stake it down."

In another example, a junior officer whose noncommissioned officers did not know how to conduct a machine-gun range studied the manuals and conducted the training himself:

"When we got out there my sergeants didn't know anything about machine guns--none of them had ever fired one before. They're the ones that are supposed to be helping these people learn, but they didn't know anything about it. So I had to do the thing myself and basically run everything myself. I read the book, so I knew how to do it."

Puts in Very Long Hours to Get Job Done

The most common evidence of job involvement was voluntarily working very long hours. The following example is typical:

"You know, we were working late at night. As a matter of fact, for the first sixty hours neither myself nor my acting first sergeant went to sleep, you know, 'cause we--I was brand new at the job."

In the next example an officer worked most of the night to correct errors in the distribution of ammunition during a field training exercise:

"So myself and the chief of the fire battery had to go downhill and inventory each vehicle and find out where he made his mistake and redistribute the ammunition. And when we finally finished it was three in the morning and wake-up was in about an hour. So the entire battery got about two hours of sleep that night."

The Power and Influence Cluster

Junior officers must often get things done through other people. To do this they have to use power and influence effectively. Four competencies related to the use of power and influence were observed in superior-performing junior officers: (1) Persuading Others, (2) Willingness to Confront Others, (3) Forcefulness, and (4) Concern with Image. Each of these competencies will be discussed in turn.

Competency 7: Persuading Others

When dealing with higher-ranking officers and experienced noncommissioned officers, junior officers often have to use persuasion. The most effective junior officers use an expert influence style: they rely on their technical expertise or their knowledge of Army regulations. They also often give several reasons for a course of action that they are recommending.

Uses Knowledge of Regulations to Support a Position

Superior junior officers know the Army regulations that affect their jobs, and use this knowledge when necessary to persuade people. One junior officer used this knowledge to explain to an E-6 why the E-6 had to be moved out of a platoon-sergeant position:

"I called the platoon sergeant and said, 'Look, Sergeant Smith, I want you to know something right now. You're caught up in a bureaucratic system, and you're seeing the effects of it. Nobody is tossing you aside and nobody's getting rid of you; you're staying in the battalion. But now you're just going to be a commo. chief, that's all, an E-6 slot. We've got an E-7 coming in. We can't stop it.'"

Another junior officer used his knowledge of regulations to justify not signing an OER that he felt was unfair:

"I went back to Captain Jones with it and told him that I wished to exercise my option under the regulation not to sign it, because I did not think that all the data on it--especially the reason for submission--was correct. I said, 'My understanding of why a deficient report is rendered does not match the circumstances surrounding my departure from the duty position.'"

The use of knowledge of regulations to support positions was also noted during observations of junior officers in the field. For example, a junior officer who had to arrange driving-permit tests for soldiers going to Germany, as part of a Reforger exercise, used knowledge of regulations to justify this requirement to an irate major.

Uses Technical Expertise to Persuade

In conversations with superiors, effective junior officers display their technical expertise in order to persuade--technical expertise is a powerful tool for persuasion. In the example below, a junior officer used this kind of expertise to discuss alternative ways of providing mortar support:

"I would say, 'This is the best way. I can support this' or 'I can't support that type of move.' He would say, 'I need to move over here.' I would say, 'We can do that, but you won't have your mortar support. You have to recognize that your mortar won't be there to support you if you need it. You only need artillery.' He would say, 'Yes, we can do that.' I would say, 'We do that, but the chances of getting a quick response for the artillery are slim, because the artillery may be shooting for another company--maybe Alpha Company or Bravo Company--so we may not get the artillery support where we want it. If you're in a hot spot and you get ambushed . . . ' I steer him thinking: 'If I get ambushed and I can't get artillery, what am I going to do?' I say, 'Well, sir, you can do one or two things: You can move up here and move around this way and I can still support you; or you can go and make that move, only hold up here; or while we're moving, move the mortars up.'"

In the next example, a junior officer used technical knowledge of maintenance reports to persuade a company commander to prepare his equipment for an inspection:

"I went down to the company commander and said, 'Hey, sir, I went through your company today down in the motor pool and I started asking Operations if they had daily 2404s or weekly on their communications equipment, and they did not. That means they're not maintaining equipment the way they're supposed to.' I said, 'We're fixing to go through an IG inspection, and that inspector is not going to ask your commo. chief.'"

Uses Two or More Reasons in Order to Persuade

A key feature of Persuading Others is giving two or more reasons for a recommendation. This behavior reflects a tendency to analyze situations and focus on more than one aspect of a problem. Maybe because it's hard to dismiss a recommendation that is made for several reasons, the junior officers who presented their recommendations this way often "sold" them to their superiors.

One junior officer gave two reasons for banning a snack cart from the area of his motor pool:

"I said, 'Sir, I would like for you to ban the snack cart from the vicinity of the motor pool, because I don't want my battery going down there--because, one, I think they charge too much, and, two, I can't get any work done.'"

In the next example a junior officer gave several reasons for having more frequent maintenance of communications equipment in armored vehicles:

"I said, 'Now you've got tracks, and those tracks are locked, and there's only certain times you can get into them.' If they're dusty, they heat up and a lot of the equipment gets bad. So I said, 'What I've looked at is the training schedule, and it's my recommendation that if you start putting in "vehicle/commo. maintenance" and you start instilling in your platoon sergeant's mind and squad leaders--they'll see this, and automatically as soon as they see "vehicle/commo.," they'll start checking the radios. Even if they only accomplish checking the radios every day, at least you'll know if they're bad or not.' The way things were then, the day before we'd go down to the field, they'd go and check them, and I said, 'That's too late.'"

Competency 8: Willingness to Confront Others

Junior officers must usually work closely with a superior officer and some experienced noncommissioned officers. To be effective, a junior officer sometimes has to confront these fairly powerful people. The more effective junior officers showed a willingness to do this--even at some risk to themselves--by defending their actions against criticism; by standing up to others on issues of principle; and by resisting encroachment on what they saw as their own areas of responsibility. Confronting others was often effective, but even when it was not, it seemed to increase respect for the junior officer in the eyes of others.

The less effective junior officers did not seem to confront others. As a result, they sometimes found themselves in situations where the conflicting demands of different people (e.g., the commanding officer and an experienced noncommissioned officer) allowed for no satisfactory course of action.

Defends His or Her Actions Against Others' Criticisms

Junior officers' actions are often criticized by their superiors. Effective junior officers defend their actions when they feel the criticism is unjust. For example, a junior officer who did not have two functioning radios when running a range responded angrily when he was accused of inadequate planning:

"I said, 'Sir, Lieutenant Smith told me the land mine was good when he was out there four days earlier. I had six

radios. Six radios. Sir, I had a land mine and six radios, and I only have to get two of them to work. Either the land mine and one radio, or two radios.' Now I says, 'Sir, isn't that enough redundancy? I got six radios out there.'"

Another junior officer, who was criticized for how he was running his section, responded this way to his commanding officer:

"I explained to him that my philosophy for running that section was that I had NCOs in there, that they were the ones who were supposed to run that section, not me. Sure, I'm their supervisor, but I shouldn't have to sit in there and do their work for them. I can sit there and I can dictate every single thing they're going to do, and how it's going to be done--down to the last period on every page, if I have to. It will get done, by God, but it will ruin that section, because what's going to fall out in this is the fact that the NCOs will not have had the opportunity to exercise their responsibility, and they'll finally say, 'Well look, if he's going to do everything, why should I have to think about what I'm doing? I'll just walk in at eight and punch out at five.'"

Stands up to Others for What He or She Believes In

Effective junior officers stand up to their superiors on issues of principle. For example, a junior officer whose commanding officer verbally abused junior officers in front of the troops stood up to him this way:

"He got mad at me one day and called me a quote _____, and I told him he better not call me that again. He did it one more time, and I said, 'Sir, you have one more shot. If you do it again, we're going to have major problems.'"

Another junior officer took exception to an executive officer who treated him like a son:

"The XO thought of the guy I replaced as his son. And he looked at me and said, 'Maybe you'll be my son. You've got some big footsteps to fill.' And I got tired of hearing that, and one day I looked at him and said, 'Look, sir, I don't have anybody's footsteps to fill. I have my own footsteps. I'll do my best.'"

Resists Encroachment on His or Her Area of Responsibility

The junior officers who were studied sometimes found themselves in situations where their job responsibilities were encroached upon by a higher-ranking officer or by an experienced noncommissioned officer. The superior-performing junior officers resisted such encroachment. For example, one junior offi-

cer objected when the battalion executive officer tried to dictate how his unit should prepare for an event involving the local community:

"The battalion XO came down. He has a tendency to be high-strung sometimes. He said, 'O.K. This is the way we're going to do this.' And I said, 'No, this isn't the way we're going to do this. I'm doing it, and that's too many people in a closed area.' He said, 'Well, we want you to do it this way.' And I said, 'Well then get somebody else to do it.' And at that point he said, 'All right. You may . . . go ahead and do it that way. But I would prefer it the other way.' So, I got my way."

Another junior officer confronted her commanding officer when he tried to set up the tasking for her section:

"I said to him, 'As far as tasking those people to do something, I would appreciate it if you would go through me on it. Because they don't work for you; they work for me. If it's going to be my section, I'm going to be the one who's responsible for it, and that's the way I would like it to be.'"

Competency 9: Forcefulness

In dealing with subordinates, effective junior officers do not hesitate to use their position and power--to act forcefully. Sometimes the junior officers who were interviewed did this to get compliance, but other times their use of this competency seemed to reflect a more general need to control events and influence their subordinates. Almost all the junior officers disciplined subordinates who violated regulations, but the superior-performing officers also used their position and power to prevent a violation.

Pulls Rank to Overcome Resistance

The most common expression of Forcefulness was when a junior officer dealt with subordinates' resistance to a request by reminding them of his or her higher rank. The two examples below are typical:

"I told him he wasn't ever going to get a Good Conduct that way, if I had anything to say about it. And he told me I was showing too much disrespect to him. And I said, 'Hold it, I think you've got this mixed up: I don't show disrespect to Spec4s--you show disrespect to me.'"

"So I found him in the bleachers sitting there, smoking a cigarette, and I said, 'Smith, didn't I tell you to move over to the ammo table?' And he was just sort of looking

off into space. And I walked up to him and I said, 'I'm talking to you, Private.' And he sort of looked up. Just the look on his face--I lost my control at this point. Like, who cares? I said, 'Well, get on your feet, Soldier.' And when I said it, I shouted it. And everybody else in the stands looked up. And I put him in the position of attention."

Coerces When Necessary

If a simple request fails to get compliance, effective junior officers use coercion. In some cases, coercion is accomplished through physical force. For example, when a private refused several times to get out of bed, one very muscular junior officer picked him up and threw him against the wall; when the private still would not get up, the junior officer repeated this action until the private agreed to get up.

More often, though, coercion is accomplished by threats of discipline or loss of the subordinate's job. Two examples are:

"As soon as I found out all the things that he'd done I pulled him off to the side and in a very loud voice told him that what had happened out there shouldn't happen again. If he continued to perform as bad as he was performing, he wasn't going to be my chief much longer."

"I looked at the outgoing supply sergeant and said, 'Fix it. I don't think you're organized back here--I don't think you care, and I don't think you're doing your job. You get it fixed. You got two weeks to get it fixed, or your EER will reflect your platoon's backing.'"

Manipulates Situations and People

Superior-performing junior officers often use aggressive influence strategies to manipulate both situations and people. For example, a junior officer arranged to pick up an AWOL soldier at the airport so as to use the ride back to the base to question the soldier about possible drug and race-relations problems in the barracks:

"So I went to the colonel and the company commander and said, 'Look, I want to drive up there and pick up Private Smith myself, at the airport. While I'm on the way back, I want to talk to him and find out if I've got a drug problem in my barracks.' So I convinced the battalion commander to let me go to the airport, and I picked up Smith. On the way back, I talked to him. I said, 'Smith, I think I know what part of the problem is. I think part of the problem is the platoon.' I said, 'I want to know, do I have a problem in the barracks with dope, or are there racist problems?'"

Another junior officer, whose battalion was faced with a poor report from an inspector, persuaded the inspector to delay the report to allow time for needed equipment parts to arrive:

"My equipment was down, not operating, because the parts hadn't come in. They were going to write up a bad report on the battalion. I knew at that time the battalion commander could not afford a bad report from the division. So me and my platoon sergeant conned the guy into not writing a bad report, to give us twenty days to get the equipment up and then come back and reinspect us."

Note that this example also involves the competency Initiative (Competency 3).

Deliberately Takes Advantage of Position and Symbolic Power

Some of the superior-performing junior officers who were studied use their position and power to influence and control subordinates. One outstanding junior officer noticed that many of his troops had personal financial problems, because they did not know how to manage their money; he therefore requested that all his troops present their checkbooks and go over their finances with him:

"I do a few things that maybe an Army officer shouldn't do--like I make soldiers bring their checkbook in, and I make them show it to me and explain what they're doing, especially if they have financial problems. I tell 'em right off, 'If you have any complaints, you don't have to bring it in,' but that I want to talk to them about it; and they say, 'No complaints, sir,' they'd bring it to me."

He then counseled them about unnecessary or extravagant expenditures (note that this example also involves the competency Initiative).

This same junior officer, noting a high incidence of marital problems among his troops, got them to think about how much time they were spending with their spouses, as opposed to their friends:

"And I said it so quick it shocked 'em. And he come back and said, 'Wait a minute, sir . . . I didn't say my wife was not as important as my friends. My wife's the most important.' I said, 'You just equalized your time--you had to spend as much time with your friends as your wife--which way do you want to go? Are you going to rate your friends more important than your wife, or your wife more important? Now, how many hours do you spend a day at work?' 'Oh, about fourteen, fifteen maybe . . . sometimes twenty, sir.' They all laughed. I said, 'You're going to rate your friends better than your wife, right? Because, you see, you spend sixteen to seventeen hours a day with them, don't you?'"

Another junior officer, hearing that two of his troops had just taken LSD, took steps to find these men and put them in protective custody:

"And I went back over and called the captain. I said, 'Let's find these two guys--I want to put them in protective custody. Because if they've dropped LSD, I want them to spend the night in a room.' So one by one, we found one guy and then we found the other guy, the whole bit--we finally got hold of them, and we got permission to put them in the confinement facility for the weekend. We took them up there and put them in."

Competency 10: Concern with Image

The most effective junior officers demonstrated a variety of behaviors that indicate a concern with the image that they project and that others project. This Concern with Image is helpful in planning strategies to influence others. At the heart of this competency is a sensitivity to the impact that behavior makes on people; by contrast, the average performers showed this sensitivity much less. The different behaviors that show Concern with Image are described below.

Describes People's Perceptions of Him or Her

People who have the competency Concern with Image are aware of how others perceive them. Many of the junior officers who had this behavior knew that they had a good chance of influencing if their commanding officers viewed them positively:

"And I was in very good stead in his eyes, because I had my Brownie points, or whatever you want to call it."

In the next example a junior officer shows both Concern with Image and Self-confidence:

"I'm supposed to be the best--one of the best . . . if I say something, the battalion XO listens. (I'm known to be one of the 'horses,' they call me, in the battalion--if I say something, you take heed, you listen to me.) . . . I'm supposed to be a good lieutenant. If I have something to say, he takes the time to listen to me."

Discusses the Impact of Own Behavior on Attitudes and Behavior of Others

Junior officers with Concern with Image are likely to notice and think about the effects of their behavior on others. For example, an officer who had been trying to persuade his command-

ing officer to support a weight-control program noticed changes in the CO's behavior, and interpreted these behavior changes as positive changes in attitude:

"The only thing I remember him specifically doing was kind of laughing and asking about the program--which indicated his pleasure with it. Then that week or shortly thereafter he started talking to company commanders a little more strongly about it--which showed me that essentially my efforts had given him a little better handle on what was going on."

Another junior officer, who made it his business to know how and where each of his troops spent their spare time, described the effects of this activity on the troops:

"They never play games with me. Because I know everything they do. And that really makes 'em mad--because I know what bar they go to. They don't know how I know, but I say, 'You spent too much money at the club tonight.' And they go, 'Sir, you weren't there.' And I say, 'No, I don't drink.' 'Well, how did you know I was there?' 'Well, I was riding by and I saw your car there with the license tag.'"

Discusses the Power Implications of Situations

Officers with the competency Concern with Image often discuss the power implications of situations. Such discussion can focus on their own power and status, as opposed to others'. Here are two examples:

"I wouldn't be nervous now, but thinking about it . . . It was two years ago--a second lieutenant looking at a lieutenant colonel. Even though he was the greatest guy in the world as far as I was concerned, being new to the battalion--it takes a while to prove yourself, especially as a second lieutenant. You start advising commanders and if you're only a second lieutenant they're looking at you: 'This guy's only been in the Army about a year. Well, we'll let him say what he wants to but we won't take it to heart, because he doesn't really know what he's talking about--he's only a second lieutenant.'"

"I think he wanted me to cross that fine line into where if he wanted to give me a bad evaluation, he had that excuse, and I wouldn't be able to go to the colonel."

Another example was supplied by a junior officer who counseled a noncommissioned officer on the transition from E-4 to E-5:

"I said, 'The transition from an E-4 to an E-5 is probably the toughest transition to make in the United States Army.

Because you're surrounded by your peers, whose primary motivation in life is to get by, and you're buddy-buddy with them. And then, all of a sudden, you outrank them, and certain responsibilities are heaped on your shoulders, and you're expected to deal with it. And it's tough to tell somebody who you were on a first-name basis with the other day to do something that he doesn't want to do, because you're torn between losing that friendship and succeeding in the Army."

Keeps Superiors Informed, So That They Are Not Embarrassed

Junior officers with Concern with Image care about other people's images, too, especially the images of their superior officers. Therefore, they keep their superiors informed about potentially embarrassing situations. Two illustrations are:

"I got with the major and told him. I said, 'Hey, I worked up there in that staff before, but we're going to catch you about January. They're going to start asking questions.'"

"I knew who the colonel was, so I called him, and told him that I had signed for the buildings, and what we were doing, and he was impressed that I had taken the time out to let him know."

Shows Awareness of People's Interpretation of Behavior

Junior officers with Concern with Image are aware of how behavior is interpreted. They can predict when their actions, or others' actions, will be viewed unfavorably.

One junior officer realized he had spent too long trying to decide what to do with the troops; he recognized that this indecisiveness would be interpreted negatively by the troops:

"I ended up kind of standing there talking to the platoon sergeant, trying to figure out something to do. He and I kept coming up with ideas and just saying, 'Nah, I don't think that would work,' and we were all standing around--the troops were just standing around and they weren't doing anything. It probably would have been better in that case to just say, 'Go ahead--hey, let's do this and we're all going to do it' and not have it work than to stand around like I did and just, you know, not be sure what to do. What happens then is the troops see you standing around not knowing what to do and they basically get the idea that you don't know what you're doing out there. So in some cases it's better to execute a poor plan aggressively than to stand around and try to come up with a good one."

Another junior officer showed awareness of people's interpretation of behavior by protecting the image of his commanding officer when the CO had not planned adequately:

"I made the commander look good so that the whole thing wouldn't fall apart completely, which it certainly would have if I hadn't done something. He was running around like a chicken with his head cut off. I'm sure he realized what was going on--that he hadn't done any crew planning. It was that kind of feeling that if you like your commander--which I basically did--you'll do things (and I know other officers will) that'll make him look good."

The Understanding and Managing Others Cluster

The most effective junior officers demonstrated four competencies that reflect the ability to understand and work well with subordinates. These competencies are (1) Concern for Clarity, (2) Understanding People, Situations, and Data, (3) Positive Attitude toward Subordinates, and (4) Developing Subordinates. Descriptions of each of these competencies follow.

Competency 11: Concern for Clarity

Superior-performing junior officers try to communicate clearly. They take steps to make sure that people understand their presentations and instructions. This behavior helps prevent problems and makes it easier for subordinates to complete their assigned duties.

Junior officers with Concern for Clarity also probe for the information they need in order to understand a problem or other situation. Five behavioral indicators of Concern for Clarity were identified in the superior-performing junior officers; each is described below.

Uses Material Aids to Increase Audience's Understanding

When making presentations, effective junior officers show Concern for Clarity by using charts, graphs, models, and other visual aids. These officers know that to arouse interest and increase the audience's understanding, they have to do more than just talk. Two examples of using material aids are:

"And then I had an easel set up with a map of my area--you know, like the road network and where the shelters were positioned. And then I'd take them outside and say, 'You saw the map. This is how they really are.' And also on the charts I had the capabilities--what I was capable of repairing--out there. And the communications network within the FAST."

"I thought, 'Well, we ought to have a couple of telephones and a switchboard. That way they can see that we do it.' (It's something they see everyday in Andy of Mayberry on

television--always having to go through the operator.) How does that system work? Exactly what do we use in the field? How do you communicate if you're a long way from each other? Well, you use radios. And how do you do that? You have this little book, the CEOI, and it shows you the frequency of whoever you want to talk to--their frequency's in there; also, their call sign. And how do you know if you've really got them? You use your authentication tables--you ask them to authenticate."

Issues Instructions and Systematically Reviews Procedures

Junior officers with Concern for Clarity make a special effort to be sure that subordinates understand instructions and procedures. These officers are clear and logical in the way they give assignments. For example, one junior officer systematically explained the points to be remembered in parachute-jumping:

"'Well,' I said, 'the first point of form is "Hit it!": You'd exit; check the battle position; count "one thousand, two thousand, three thousand, four thousand"; chin on chest, eyes open, elbows locked to the sides, hands and fingers like that.' And you explain to them exactly what they do . . . You go through malfunctions: 'If you have a malfunction in the air, you immediately pop the reserve, if you have a complete malfunction. If you have a partial malfunction . . . You just give them the pre-jump training. You go through all the aspects of it, just like that. You just go right through it: you tell them exactly what to do and they do it and simulate it as much as possible. And you just tell them to 'Hit it!' and they pop into that body position. And when they deploy on their reserve they gotta do it the right way. You kind of watch them, make sure that they're doing performance-oriented training."

This systematic approach to giving instructions is also done when a junior officer assigns parts of a task to different persons, as in this example:

"Then I said, 'I want this team to take care of the sand table; I want this team to write paragraphs one and two--I'll write paragraph three; and I want this team to write paragraphs four and five. I want you to have them done by such and such a time, so I can look at them and do it. I want you to do this coordination--do whatever coordination we have to do. You know, pick the different people to go do these things.'"

Other examples of giving systematic instructions were seen during observations of junior officers in the field. One offi-

cer was preparing a subordinate for a briefing with a colonel: for each area of the briefing, the junior officer stated the questions that the colonel would ask and how each question should be answered.

Asks Subordinates to Repeat Instructions, to Be Sure They Understand Them

Because of their Concern for Clarity, effective junior officers sometimes ask their subordinates to repeat the instructions they have been given, to be sure they have understood them. Two examples of this behavior are:

"He said, 'Well, to measure where this hold goes in the sheetrock, you do this.' So I asked him to show me, and he showed me, and it was right."

"I read it out to them. Then I make a squad leader go off and recite it till he's got it memorized."

Demands or Develops Adequate Channels of Communication

Concern for Clarity sometimes leads junior officers to take steps to make sure that important information is communicated between themselves and others. One junior officer, preparing for an ARTEP, called his battery commander to get specific details about the planned operations:

"I called the battery commander back and said, 'Are you sure? . . . What about this? . . . Do you have the following things coordinated in the operations sections, firing points, chow, assets, and resources?' I asked him what the requirements were for my section to support him. Did he need the operations sergeant in the field to come into his position and add an extra set of eyes to his gun line? Did he want us to generate problems? To make his unit move or react to certain situations, did his fire-direction officer want me to be down there to work with his FCDs? . . ."

Not only did the junior officer get the information he needed to carry out his own unit's duties effectively; he also got the battery commander to do additional planning of the details of the operation.

The officers with Concern for Clarity sometimes insisted that the important messages be communicated through special channels. For example, one junior officer insisted that some special orders be hand-delivered:

"I had to hand-carry all the paperwork. I gave it to a sergeant and told him, 'Don't send these in distribution. I'll be back to get 'em.' Eyeball contact: 'I'll be back to get em.' I wanted to make sure these orders stuck. I didn't want them lost."

Probes for Information to Clarify a Problem

Concern for Clarity leads junior officers to probe for information to clarify problems. A junior officer who was told that equipment he needed was unavailable noticed that some of this equipment was in plain sight; he insisted that the supply officer explain where each piece of equipment was going:

"I said, 'You've got X amount of pieces of equipment here--these over here in this corner--what are they for? Who is getting these?' And I went on that way. I had him explain to me where each piece of equipment was going."

The result of this probing was that the officer learned that some of the equipment was available for his use.

Probing for information also occurred when a junior officer lacked technical expertise. One officer who was tasked with disposing of some dead munitions got information from experts on how to do this:

"I went over to EOD--they're the experts in removing dead munitions, the ones that have to blow them up and get them out of there. I talked to the commander over there and his senior NCO and another NCO, and discussed with them what the requirements were, how many people they had to have--how many troops they would need."

By probing for information, the effective junior officers avoided wasting time and making mistakes. The less effective junior officers, by contrast, made more mistakes, because they failed to get needed information before taking action.

Competency 12: Understanding People, Situations, and Data

Effective junior officers are able to diagnose and interpret different kinds of situations. When analyzing interpersonal situations, these officers interpret unstated motives and feelings; when analyzing data, they detect patterns and inconsistencies. Their capacity for diagnostic understanding enables them to solve problems while maintaining good working relationships with their subordinates and superiors.

Gives Clear, Reasonable Explanations of Why People Behave in Certain Ways

One way that junior officers show this competency is in analyzing people's motives in specific situations. For example, a junior officer whose unit had failed to deliver ammunition during a field training exercise figured out that the problem stemmed from rivalry among the platoon sergeants:

"Each one of these damned E-6s was jealous of the others, and every one of them was stabbing the others in the back. They wanted the others to look bad, so they could take charge of the platoon."

This understanding of motives was also illustrated when a junior officer analyzed the effect of supervision on his troops' willingness to work:

"But what was happening was he wasn't down there, so the squad leader would get up and leave, and then nobody would be watching the troops. A few of the troops are good and will do their work, but after a while, even they got to a point where 'Hell, everybody else is just leaving, why don't I?'"

Describes a Personal Experience to Communicate That He or She Understands

Effective junior officers communicate their diagnostic understanding: when a subordinate raises a personal problem with these officers, they express their understanding of the problem by describing a similar experience of their own, as in this example:

"But then in the middle of all this he brought up the Lord and how he had given his life over to the Lord. And I began to share with him my experience in that area. I wanted to relate to him how that happened to me and what I had found."

Another junior officer, concerned about excessive drinking among his troops, told them how he, as a teenager, had come to give up drinking:

"I said, 'Yeah, this is the difference between me and most lieutenants. What do you think your lieutenant did at seventeen or eighteen? Do you think he went to church every Sunday and never drank?' 'Well, sir, we know you was going to those fancy schools.' And I said, 'O.K., I remember at age seventeen' (and this is wrong by Army doctrine, for an officer to get this close) 'I was out drinking. Guess what. I quit. I worked for a hospital for a long time, and I'd see people coming in with their heads severed off.' I said, 'That's your scare tactic for the day. From drinking to driving.'"

States Another Person's Viewpoint in a Disagreement

Another indication of the understanding competency is being able to see another person's viewpoint in a disagreement. Whereas average-performing junior officers often see only their own point of view, superior performers describe both their own and the other person's viewpoints. One junior officer, who had

had to demote an E-6 when an E-7 was assigned to the unit, demonstrated an understanding of the E-6's point of view:

"I guess it looked like an insult--degrading for him to go from a battalion communications chief down to a line company commo. chief, and I could see his point."

Another junior officer described the perspective of a battalion commander with whom he had had a personality conflict:

"We didn't like each other. It was just one of those things; no problem. He left last year, and before he left, he said, 'Look, Lieutenant Jones, you came in second lieutenant, you're OCS, you're prior enlisted, and I didn't baby you; I kicked you in the ass every time I needed to.' Straightforward. He said, 'I wasn't going to play games with you. You and I do not like each other, but I have not stabbed you in the back.' I said, 'You don't stab me in the back; you look me square in the face and tell me you don't like me, the same way I do you.' He said, 'Look, it's my last ten days here. Why don't you come over and let's have a cup of coffee? You've done a good job for this battalion--you've done an outstanding job.'"

Recognizes Patterns in Situations and Behaviors

Diagnostic understanding is not limited to personal interactions; people with this competency are also able to apply it to data. For example, they can recognize patterns in situations. One junior officer realized that four items were causing most of the vehicle breakdowns in her unit; by checking those four items frequently, she then prevented breakdowns:

"I drew up a list of four specific items that caused most vehicles, most 548s, to go deadline. On long convoys we would stop halfway to check those four things."

Another junior officer noticed a pattern in the behavior of a noncommissioned officer who supervised motor-pool mechanics:

"Every time I found him physically working on the vehicle when he had mechanics available, I'd just talk to him and say, 'Wouldn't it be better if you did this?'"

The behaviorally specific suggestion in this example illustrates another competency, to be discussed later: Developing Others (Competency 14).

Analyzes Information for Differences between "Real" and "Ideal"

Closely related to recognizing patterns is the ability to see differences, or discrepancies, between what is happening

(the "real") and what should be happening (the "ideal"). Junior officers with the competency Diagnostic Understanding have a clear mental picture of the ideal, and test their observations--the real--against this ideal. One officer noticed that one of his units was regularly short of fuel; since this "real" was far from the "ideal" (i.e., it should not have been happening), he investigated the problem:

"I just couldn't understand why every month they were short of fuel. That's what caused me to look into the situation more deeply."

Another junior officer noticed a problem in the design of a wrecking truck:

"I don't know what this designer's conception of a wrecker was, but when you pull that wrecker right up next to the trailer and try to lift it up, you can lift it but the boom doesn't extend far enough to flip the trailer over. Yet the weight of it doesn't allow you to drive with the wrecker to back it up and flip it that way."

In a few cases a junior officer would manipulate a situation to see if the results were the same as his or her concept of what should have been happening:

"I just told the squad leader that he'd better find out where the trailers were. I knew where they were--two of the five--but I wanted to see if he could find out, because I wanted to know how serious the problem was. This way I discovered that the squad leader--who was directly responsible for the equipment and should have known where it was--did not know."

Competency 13: Positive Attitude toward Subordinates

Effective junior officers demonstrate a positive attitude toward their subordinates; in a variety of ways they show that they care about their subordinates. At the same time, they are able to make realistic--fair--assessments of subordinates whose performance is substandard.

The positive attitude of effective junior officers contrasts with the negative attitude of some less effective junior officers, who emphasize the lack of ability, motivation, and character in their troops; this negative attitude may impair these officers' effectiveness, since expectations can become "self-fulfilling prophecies" (as proven in psychological studies). Conversely, the positive attitude of effective junior officers probably helps them get the best effort from their subordinates.

Sees to the Comfort and Welfare of Troops

One of the clearest ways that junior officers demonstrate this competency is by seeing to the comfort and welfare of their troops. For example, effective junior officers ensure that their troops get adequate rest after long, hard work. Two such examples are:

"I said, 'If we can get it done quickly and everything gets done tonight, we'll get some comp. time tomorrow for you.' So they know at least that if they work till eight o'clock that night they can come in a couple hours late in the morning."

"I was more concerned about the troops. I was telling them to go ahead and get some rest--especially the ones who didn't have any work at that time."

Another junior officer made sure that some troops had field jackets while on an evening training exercise:

"I asked them if they had any field jackets, because it was a little chilly that night. They aren't my people, they don't work for me, but I wanted to make sure that they were being taken care of, because I wasn't sure the new lieutenant had thought of these things."

One junior officer was so concerned about his troops' lack of money for food that he would go so far as to buy them groceries:

"A lot of times me and my platoon sergeant would go out and buy fifty or sixty dollars' worth of groceries and give it to them. I said, 'I'm not doing this for charity. I'm doing this because I'm trying to take care of you. It's my job.'"

Other examples of attending to the comfort and welfare of troops were noted during observations of junior officers in the field. One junior officer checked on a range-tower construction project where his crew complained about bologna-and-cheese sandwiches; the officer therefore arranged for the crew to get peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwiches (their preference) instead.

Expresses Concern When Subordinates Are Not Respected, Rewarded, or Thanked

Junior officers also demonstrate a realistic positive attitude toward others by expressing concern when their subordinates are not treated fairly or with respect. This situation occurred when a colonel ordered a unit to work all night to fix some vehicles; the junior officer was disturbed that the troops had been given no explanation for this unusual demand:

"A full colonel was telling us we had to do everything, at any cost, to get these vehicles up. All that ends up doing is screwing the troops, because they don't understand what's going on. All of a sudden they're told, 'Drop everything, you aren't going home tonight, you're working until that thing's in.' And they don't understand why that's going on."

In another situation, some troops had been working long hours outdoors in 100-degree heat when they were told to halt work on the project just before it was finished. The junior officer in charge of these troops got very upset:

"The troops were frustrated because they'd been working from dawn to dusk, and in the middle of the summer--that's long hours--and up on this heavy equipment it's extremely hot (the temperature was at least a hundred plus whatever it is on the equipment), and they'd been working hard, and then they were told to stop. They were almost finished with the project, and they were told to stop. I did a little screaming and yelling at that."

Goes out of Way to Help Subordinates Solve Personal Problems

The competency Positive Attitude toward Subordinates is also demonstrated by going out of the way to help a subordinate solve a personal problem. One junior officer personally mediated a marital conflict of one of her troops and then arranged for professional counseling for the couple:

"So I got in my duty vehicle and they took me up to the house. I went in, and they're Guam and Filipino, so they talk real fast and everything. I'd never met the wife before. I talked to her alone for about an hour and got the gist of the situation--what was happening, the family, and why they'd gotten into an argument. She told me her husband had tried to strike her, and I said, 'Let's go back and talk to him, and maybe with me there, you know . . . ' he's not that kind of person anyway. What it was was the parents were living there, and we sat down and talked for a good two or three hours at the house, where I had both of them together, and we had more or less a counseling session right there. I told the parents to go to another room. The following day I made arrangements for the couple to see a professional counselor, and then I went with them to the counselor."

Another junior officer helped a subordinate who was having family problems stemming from financial difficulties:

"They seemed hesitant to talk about finances, but he came out and told me it was finances and the baby . . . he said he couldn't stand it anymore. The baby wasn't sleeping

through the night, and there was no money--just no money. I told him what we could do: get him scheduled to meet with a counselor, and set up an appointment that afternoon to go up to the hospital on this other program. Now they're doing great. I also went over his budget with him. I said, 'I want to see your LES. I want you to write down everything you're spending right now.' That's what he did. And I told him to get rid of 'this and this and this . . .'. These GIs will get suckered into buying these magazines and books, which they just can't afford. He said he'd tried to quit, but the book company kept writing and saying if he didn't send the money . . . I said, 'That's hogwash. The next time a book comes, you just package it up and send it back.'"

Rewards Troops for a Good Job

Positive Attitude toward Subordinates was also demonstrated when junior officers rewarded troops for good performance. Two examples are:

"I had a trooper who I thought was outstanding. He came in as a new guy about four or five months after I'd been a platoon leader, and he came in as a new cherry. He did a real good job when he got there. He was well motivated, he did what he was told, he didn't grumble a lot, he looked sharp, and he did well in the field. And I thought a whole lot of this guy and got him promoted a little early over a few other guys who'd been there awhile."

"I gave them their pep talk and told them they did an outstanding job, and then I let them off for two days."

Acknowledges People's Contributions to Success (Gives Credit Where It Is Due)

Another way that junior officers demonstrated their positive attitude was by talking about subordinates' contributions to successful performance:

"I felt good about the platoon--the work that they'd put into it--because those guys helped. They really worked."

They also talked about subordinates who did their jobs well:

"I put him on a mission to communicate to another station, and he proceeded to pass every message as quickly as possible, and he did a fine job, and he kept me informed."

Other examples were noted during observations of junior officers on the field. For example, one junior officer wrote a letter of appreciation to the leader of a unit that had provided excellent support to one of his units in the field.

Expresses Confidence in Subordinates' Ability to Do Well

Closely related to the preceding behavioral indicator is expressing confidence in subordinates' ability to do well. Two illustrations are:

"I wasn't concerned that he was in any sort of danger physically, or anything like that. You know, I had total confidence in him."

"I had a kid who came out of AIT and he's like one of these guys you'd like to clone--he was just outstanding."

Demonstrates Willingness to Learn from Subordinates

Another indication of a positive attitude toward subordinates is willingness to recognize their expertise and learn from them. Remember that many junior officers work with noncommissioned officers who have extensive technical knowledge, as well as years of leadership experience; the junior officers who were interviewed often mentioned learning from these NCOs. Two examples are:

"The area we were working in was really marshy--a thin crust of hard dirt. And once he got that through my head, he said, 'Now that you understand the problem, you got to be more careful.' So I said, 'What do you think I should do?' He said, 'Well, you messed the side up, sir. You go back and fix it.' I said, 'O.K.' So I went back up and fixed it."

"I want to know what I'm doing wrong. If I've frustrated the NCOs in any way, I wish they'd give me innocent feedback. Because I'm a very open person, and they're the experts, really. They're the only ones who can teach me."

Makes a Realistic Assessment of What the Individual Is Capable of, and Avoids Unfair Blame

In talking about a subordinate whose performance was substandard, junior officers with Positive Attitude toward Subordinates gave a realistic assessment of the subordinate, mentioning both strengths and weaknesses. Two examples of such balanced assessment are:

"Super guy, smart as a whip--had more talent and more common sense than I'd ever seen in my life. A lot of potential. But he had the biggest mouth you've ever heard--couldn't shut up. I finally had to transfer him down. He was one of those people who were literally indispensable, but I still had to get rid of him, because he did more damage than good . . . He was just ruining everyone else's morale, because he'd say anything. It just wasn't worth having him around, as competent as he was."

"There's a couple of things that he does real well, but if you give him a whole lot of things that most XO's have to do, he drops the ball a lot."

Junior officers who lack the competency Positive Attitude toward Subordinates tend to see only the negative qualities in subordinates whose performance is substandard.

Competency 14: Developing Subordinates

Superior-performing junior officers want to develop the skills of their subordinates. These officers are enthusiastic about training; they assign tasks that will improve their subordinates' skills; they set an example for their subordinates; they give specific feedback on subordinates' performance; and they give their subordinates some freedom in deciding how to accomplish tasks. Each of these behavioral indicators of Developing Others is described in more detail below.

Expresses Enthusiasm for Training

A very clear indicator of Developing Subordinates is a junior officer's enthusiasm for training. Officers with this competency like to be personally involved in training:

"The aspect of it that was a high point was the five or six days that we got to work by ourselves. We could go out each day on our own and really get our training done outside of garrison, outside classrooms--where you could teach them a class and say, 'Let's go out and do it now.'"

These officers feel pleased when they can take credit for improving their subordinates' skills. They get satisfaction from seeing people they have trained develop excellent technical skills:

"People tell me, 'Hey, this guy is a good plumber' or 'a good carpenter,' and it gives me a sense of accomplishment, because I played a role in his training."

Enthusiasm for training was also seen in junior officers in the field. One who was visiting a motor pool to arrange for some repairs was delighted when someone suggested that he send two of his troops to the motor pool to learn how to make simple welds. He said that everyone gets excited about the chance to learn something new.

Assigns Tasks to Subordinates with the Stated Purpose of
Developing Their Skills or Self-image

A concern for developing others is also seen in the way effective junior officers assign tasks. These officers select tasks that they feel will help improve needed skills in their subordinates. On a field training exercise, one junior officer described a realistic situation and gave his subordinates only general directions for setting up their positions, to teach them how to operate--to make decisions--in wartime:

"Then about the third day, instead of giving them any specifics, I said, 'That point over there is what you're supposed to protect--that's your critical asset. Your front is to such and such. You're on the right; you're in the middle; and you're on the left. Go out and pick positions. Go out and set them up, and then tell me when I get out there what your avenues of approach are, why you set up in that position, and why you did it like you did.' That's really their entire job--they'd just be told to go out and do it, and they'd have to be able to go out and do it like that."

Another junior officer had a new noncommissioned officer march some troops, partly to save time but also to give the new NCO some experience in leadership:

"People were just straggling back and forth, and I felt we were losing man-hours because of the stragglers. So I said, 'I want them marched.' That would accomplish two things: Number one, it'd get them back to the motor pool on time and everybody would leave on time. Number two, it would give the junior NCO an opportunity to exercise his leadership, and give him confidence in dealing with a large group of people."

A third example of this indicator was provided by a junior officer who gave the lieutenants under him various executive-officer duties to prepare them for responsibilities they would have when they became captains:

"I thought about it and said, 'Well, a lot of lieutenants are going to get screwed, because they're going to make captain and be expected to know a lot more than they do know.' So what I did was take one platoon leader and make him motor officer, which is an XO's duty. I took another platoon leader and made him squad officer, which is another XO duty. Took another platoon leader and made him physical-security officer--NBC officer--which, again, is an XO's duty. And I pretty much made the XO sort of chief of staff, to keep touch on all these other guys."

Sets an Example

Developing Subordinates also means modeling desired behavior for subordinates: setting an example. Effective junior officers demonstrate how to do something, so that subordinates will understand what is wanted:

"And I'm demonstrating--I'm playing demonstrator at this point, 'cause I know how I want it done. I'm demonstrating how we're going to do it, so that they understand the way we want it done."

Another junior officer used the principle of modeling to show how hard it is to spot a camouflaged target from a helicopter:

"I had a little demonstration set up--the demonstrator pulled his little cover over it. Now, 'Can you see where he is?' And, you know, from ten feet away they couldn't really tell. They could imagine what it's like from a helicopter."

Gives Specific Feedback on Performance

A common but important indicator of Developing Subordinates is giving specific feedback to subordinates on their performance. The most useful feedback describes exactly what the subordinate is doing that should be done differently. Two examples of this are:

"I had the manual in my hand. I would read them the step, watch them perform it, and then provide some suggestions or guidance on how to improve it."

"First I asked him, 'Why are we doing it this way?' And he says, 'Well, this is the way I learned it a year back in my experience.' And I said, 'Wouldn't it be better to do it this way? I think this is the right way to do it, from what I learned at Fort Benning.'"

Other specific performance feedback was seen in junior officers in the field. For example, one junior gave his crew specific suggestions for improvements on a range-tower construction project.

Gives Subordinates Some Freedom to Decide How to Accomplish Tasks

The final indicator of Developing Subordinates is giving subordinates some freedom in how to carry out a task. Junior officers with this competency assign a task but allow the subordinates to take some responsibility in deciding how to do the task. Two examples are:

"I said, 'I want you to fix it up however you want to fix it up. Put your test benches in--put your stuff in however you want to put it in. Paint it the way you want it with camouflage paint.'"

"I offered several alternatives--different ways of doing different things. I said, 'You know, I'm throwing them out and if you like them, use them; if you don't, forget them. It's your section--you do it the way you've got to do it to accomplish the mission.'"

TABLE IV.1
Competency Model of the Army Junior Officer

<u>Competencies</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
MISSION FOCUS Cluster	
1. Concern for Efficiency	• Expresses annoyance at things that slow tasks • Expresses displeasure to specific people when time or effort is wasted • Defines problems or outcomes as significant costs or savings in resources • Explicitly mentions doing something faster or more efficiently • Designs systems to improve efficiency
2. Planning	• Sets priorities • Develops methods to keep track of tasks' progress • Thinks things through systematically ahead of time
3. Initiative	• Uses imaginative or other unusual means to overcome an obstacle • Develops innovative strategies to accomplish a mission • Builds and uses personal contacts to solve problems • Persists in order to overcome obstacles
4. Concern for Standards	• Makes an effort to surpass existing mission standards • Strives for precision in mission accomplishment • Rejects substandard performance in mission-related activities • Requires additional effort from others when mission-related standards are not met • Systematically monitors the performance of subordinates • Takes steps to ensure that subordinates master mission-related tasks and materials
PROFESSIONAL MATURITY Cluster	
5. Self-confidence	• Expresses belief in own expertise • Describes self as a star • Compares self favorably with others
6. Job Involvement	• Makes personal sacrifices for professional gain as an Army officer • Works on own knowledge and skill development • Expresses enthusiasm for past or future challenges • Pinch-hits for others when necessary to get job done • Puts in very long hours to get job done

(continued)

Table IV.1, continued

<u>Competencies</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
POWER AND INFLUENCE Cluster	
7. Persuading Others	• Uses knowledge of regulations to support a position • Uses technical expertise to persuade • Uses two or more reasons in order to persuade
8. Willingness to Confront Others	• Defends his or her actions against others' criticisms • Stands up to others for what he or she believes in • Resists encroachment on his or her area of responsibility
9. Forcefulness	• Pulls rank to overcome resistance • Coerces when necessary • Manipulates situations and people • Deliberately takes advantage of position and symbolic power
10. Concern with Image	• Describes people's perceptions of him or her • Discusses the impact of own behavior on attitudes and behavior of others • Discusses the power implications of situations • Keeps superiors informed, so that they are not embarrassed • Shows awareness of people's interpretation of behavior
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING OTHERS Cluster	
11. Concern for Clarity	• Uses material aids to increase audience's understanding • Issues instructions and systematically reviews procedures • Asks subordinates to repeat instructions, to be sure they understand them • Demands or develops adequate channels of communication • Probes for information to clarify a problem
12. Understanding People, Situations, and Data	• Gives clear, reasonable explanations of why people behave in certain ways • Describes a personal experience to communicate that he or she understands • States another person's viewpoint in a disagreement • Recognizes patterns in situations and behaviors • Analyzes information for differences between "real" and "ideal"

(continued)

Table IV.1. continued

<u>Competencies</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
13. Positive Attitude toward Subordinates	• Sees to the comfort and welfare of troops • Expresses concern when subordinates are not respected, rewarded, or thanked • Goes out of way to help subordinates solve personal problems • Rewards troops for a good job • Acknowledges people's contributions to success (gives credit where it is due) • Expresses confidence in subordinates' ability to do well • Demonstrates willingness to learn from subordinates • Makes a realistic assessment of what the individual is capable of, and avoids unfair blame
14. Developing Subordinates	• Expresses enthusiasm for training • Assigns tasks to subordinates with the stated purpose of developing their skills or self-image • Sets an example • Gives specific feedback on performance • Gives subordinates some freedom to decide how to accomplish tasks

Statistical Analysis of Behavioral Event Interviews

Table IV.2 summarizes the results of a comparison of superior and average junior officers in terms of the average frequency with which the competencies were demonstrated. Of the 17 hypothesized competencies, 9 competencies were found to distinguish superior from average junior officers at a statistically significant level (one-tailed t-test, $p \leq .05$). These competencies were:

- Planning ($p \leq .01$)
- Initiative ($p \leq .001$)
- Concern for Standards ($p \leq .01$)
- Self-confidence ($p \leq .01$)
- Job Involvement ($p \leq .001$)
- Willingness to Confront Others ($p \leq .04$)
- Concern with Image ($p \leq .05$)
- Concern for Clarity ($p \leq .004$)
- Realistic Positive Attitude toward Others ($p \leq .04$)

An additional five competencies were found to distinguish superior from average junior officers at a marginally statistically significant level (one-tailed t-test, $p \leq .10$). These competencies were:

- Concern for Efficiency ($p \leq .10$)
- Expert Influence ($p \leq .06$)
- Forcefulness ($p \leq .06$)
- Diagnostic Understanding ($p \leq .06$)
- Concrete Learning Style ($p \leq .06$)

The remaining three competencies did not distinguish superior from average junior officers:

- Developing Others
- Technical Proficiency
- Sees Self as a Manager

Superior junior officers demonstrated these three competencies more frequently than did average junior officers, but the difference did not reach acceptable levels of statistical significance.

Analysis of variance was used to examine the differences among branches. Performance rating and branch were the independent variables. The results indicated only two significant main effects for branch and two significant interaction effects.

These differences among branches were strongest for the Developing Others competency ($F = 3.175$, $p = .01$). Here junior officers in the Signal and Transportation/Quartermaster branches demonstrated the competency less frequently than their peers in

TABLE IV.2

Comparison of Junior Officer Competencies by
Criterion Groups

	Superior Performers		Average Performers		t-value	p
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Mission Focus						
1. Concern for Efficiency	1.61	1.40	1.27	1.41	1.27	.10
2. Planning	1.79	1.61	1.06	1.13	2.72*	.01
3. Initiative	2.14	1.84	0.96	1.04	4.14*	.001
4. Concern for Standards	3.37	2.08	2.43	1.93	2.40	.01
Professional Maturity						
5. Self-Confidence	1.17	1.39	0.63	0.99	2.33*	.01
6. Job Involvement	1.68	1.25	0.71	1.02	4.32	.001
Power and Influence						
7. Expert Influence	0.86	1.25	0.53	0.77	1.66	.06
8. Willingness to Confront	1.00	1.13	0.65	0.88	1.74*	.04
9. Forcefulness	1.14	1.40	0.76	1.15	1.53	.06
10. Concern with Image	2.00	1.88	1.43	1.53	1.70	.05
Understanding and Managing Others						
11. Concern for Clarity	2.16	1.89	1.31	1.25	2.69	.004
12. Diagnostic Understanding	1.81	1.62	1.33	1.45	1.60	.06

* Based on separate variance estimates rather than a single-pooled variance estimate.

(continued)

Table IV.2, continued

	Superior Performers		Average Performers		<u>t-value</u>	<u>p</u>
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>		
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	2.26	1.70	1.71	1.44	1.78	.04
14. Developing Others	1.28	1.11	1.04	1.06	1.13	.13
15. Concrete Learning Style	0.40	0.78	0.20	0.46	1.64	.06
16. Technical Proficiency	0.54	0.73	0.39	0.70	1.11	.13
17. Sees Self as a Manager	0.22	0.46	0.16	0.37	0.78	.21

the other branches. For junior officers in the Signal branch this is understandable, since in many assignments they had very few or no subordinates to develop. It is more difficult to understand why junior officers in Transportation and Supply demonstrated this competency less frequently than their peers.

A somewhat less significant effect was also found for Planning ($F = 2.03$, $p = .08$). Not surprisingly, given the nature of the assignments, planning was most frequently demonstrated by junior officers in the Infantry and Engineering branches.

Interaction effects were found for Takes Initiative ($F = 3.35$, $p < .01$) and Concrete Learning Style ($F = 3.03$, $p = .01$). The difference between superior and average performers in the frequency with which initiative was demonstrated was much stronger in the Infantry and Transportation/Quartermaster branches. With respect to Concrete Learning Style, the difference between superior and average performers was greatest in the Signal and Transportation/Quartermaster branches.

Overall there were few significant differences by branch in the frequency with which the competencies were demonstrated.

A number of the interviewers did feel that differences did exist among individuals according to whether they were in line or staff positions. Unfortunately this hypothesis could not be examined, since there was no unambiguous way of assigning individuals to line or staff categories and a large number of the junior officers interviewed had received assignments in both categories. A more global test of the hypothesis was undertaken. The branches were designated as combat and support: infantry, field artillery, and air defense artillery were classified as combat, with the remainder classified as support. This is only a rough classification, since many signal officers were in combat units, and some infantry and artillery officers were in support or staff assignments. Only one competency was found to differ significantly by the combat/support classification, namely Developing Others ($t = 2.1$, $p = .04$ (two-tailed), with junior officers in combat units demonstrating the competency more frequently.

Table IV.3 summarizes the correlations among the individual competencies. While most of these intercorrelations are statistically significant ($r > .16$, $p < .05$), only five correlations (or 4% of the total number of correlations) are greater than .40. This suggests that any halo effect is of limited significance, particularly when compared to that found in the paper-and-pencil measures developed for the second part of this project (see Table VI.8).

After review of the above statistical results, 3 of the 17 hypothesized competencies were dropped from the model: Concrete

TABLE IV.3

Intercorrelations of Competency Scores from Junior Officer Interview Data

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Concern for Efficiency																	
2. Planning	.19																
3. Initiative	.20	.34															
4. Concern for Standards	.33	.39	.25														
5. Self-confidence	.05	.21	.25	.12													
6. Job Involvement	.00	.35	.25	.36	.37												
7. Expert Influence	.05	.20	.44	.12	.13	.04											
8. Willingness to Confront	.16	.11	.30	.12	.20	.00	.36										
9. Forcefulness	.10	.24	.41	.22	.29	.14	.32	.18									
10. Concern for Image	.03	.18	.15	.24	.50	.29	.23	.19	.28								
11. Concern for Clarity	.09	.46	.26	.39	.20	.20	.38	.18	.18	.26							
12. Diagnostic Understanding	.20	.17	.10	.25	.37	.19	.22	.06	.31	.50	.37						
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	.11	.18	.22	.12	.26	.26	.23	.12	.19	.36	.26	.38					
14. Developing Others	.11	.14	.05	.34	.10	.12	.21	.13	.19	.36	.37	.31	.25				

(continued)

Table IV.3, continued

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
15. Concrete Learning Style	.19	.11	.31	.20	.14	.21	.05	.23	.12	.05	.10	.19	.24	.14			
16. Technical Proficiency	-.04	.00	.04	.04	.19	.04	.06	.06	-.03	.05	.10	.14	.08	.01	.09		
17. Sees Self as a Manager	.02	.24	.12	.09	.05	.20	.08	-.08	.12	.08	.22	.08	.15	.20	-.04	.12	

Learning Style, Technical Proficiency, and Sees Self as a Manager. The latter two competencies were dropped because they failed to distinguish superior from average junior officers and they were coded very infrequently. Although Concrete Learning Style did distinguish between superior and average performers, it also was coded very infrequently.

It should be noted that these three competencies may yet be found to differentiate superior from average performers. But given the type of data and the present coding categories, they were considered to be of marginal significance in determining how effectively a junior officer performed.

One competency, Developing Others, was retained in the model although it failed to distinguish superior from average junior officers significantly. This failure may have been due to inadequacies in the coding categories. From a general assessment of the interview data and an understanding of the tasks of junior officers, Developing Others was considered to be sufficiently important to remain a part of the model.

CHAPTER V

Results of the Performance-Characteristics Analysis

The Job Competence Assessment methodology takes into account the opinions of junior officers on the individual attributes associated with outstanding performers. The Performance-Characteristics Inventory (PCI) was employed to supplement the interview data and to examine the degree of convergence between the different methods of collecting this information. The responses of the junior officers who completed the PCI ($n = 141$) were first analyzed by coding the individual PCI items in terms of the competencies identified through the BEIs. Second, the PCI data was factor analyzed to determine the extent to which the underlying structure of the empirical data reflected the competencies. The responses of the junior officers who rated the 38 hypothesized performance characteristics were reduced to two scales:

- (1) Success value, or the degree to which a characteristic was seen as important and possessed by outstanding performers
- (2) Threshold value, or the degree to which a characteristic was seen as important and possessed by the majority of average performers

The 38 PCI items were first coded by the competencies derived from the BEI data. Table V.1 indicates the number of items coded to each of the 14 competencies. The coding of the individual items is provided in the final column of Table V.2.

As noted earlier, the PCI items were obtained from a series of panels made up of junior officers. The items can be interpreted, therefore, as the junior officers' espoused theory of effective performance. Table V.1 indicates that while 10 of the 14 competencies were addressed in the PCI, no PCI items could be coded for 4 competencies: Concern for Efficiency, Expert Influence, Forcefulness, and Willingness to Confront Others. The junior officers on the panels appear to believe that competencies associated with the use of power and influence have little significance for effective performance. Clearly, we are dealing with a very small sample, but at the same time, the absence of these particular competencies is surprising.

Table V.1 also indicates that of the competencies addressed in the PCI, Self-confidence, Realistic Positive Attitude, and Planning received the highest success values. Realistic Positive Attitude, Developing Others, and Concern with Image are the three competencies with the highest threshold scores.

TABLE V.1

Rating of Competencies Based on the PCI

	<u>Number of Performance Characteristics</u>	<u>Mean Success Score</u>	<u>Mean Threshold Score</u>
MISSION FOCUS			
1. Concern for Efficiency	0	-	-
2. Planning	4	64	24
3. Initiative	7	55	19
4. Concern for Standards	4	60	24
PROFESSIONAL MATURITY			
5. Self-confidence	3	75	26
6. Job Involvement	6	51	22
POWER AND INFLUENCE			
7. Expert Influence	0	-	-
8. Willingness to Confront Others	0	-	-
9. Forcefulness	0	-	-
10. Concern with Image	8	56	27
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING OTHERS			
11. Concern for Clarity	3	60	23
12. Diagnostic Understanding	4	55	22
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	2	68	33
14. Developing Others	4	55	29

Table V.2 summarizes the PCI data in more detail. This analysis is based on the definition of a competency as an individual attribute that is demonstrated frequently by outstanding performers. One way of applying this definition to the PCI data is to divide the items into four categories: high success/high threshold, high success/low threshold, low success/high threshold, and low success/low threshold. High success/low threshold items come closest to the definition of competencies mentioned above. These items suggest that junior officers perceive Initiative, Concern for Standards, and Self-confidence as the competencies most likely to distinguish outstanding from average performers.

Ideally, all the competencies identified in the BEI data should be represented in this quadrant (Klemp and Sokol, 1980). That only three are represented suggests a considerable divergence between the behaviors junior officers say are important and the behaviors they describe in handling specific on-the-job situations.

An alternative way of analyzing the PCI data is to examine them independently of the competency model. Two basic analyses of this sort were undertaken. The first involved a straightforward examination of those items rated highest and lowest on the success scale. The second utilized factor analysis to examine the underlying structure of the data. Scales were developed from the factor analysis, and these were analyzed to determine whether differences existed among branches or between junior officers rated as superior and average performers.

Table V.3 lists the 11 items junior officers rated as most characteristic of outstanding performers. Three dominant themes are apparent:

- Self-control and self-discipline (items 4, 35, 33, 8, 37, 38)
- Planning (items 28, 3)
- Delegates (items 3, 5)

Table V.4 lists the 10 items junior officers saw as least characteristic of outstanding performers. Three dominant themes are discernible:

- Independent problem solving (items 20, 9, 25, 10, 16)
- Image awareness (items 14, 21)
- Involvement in training (items 30, 32)

While there are some clear similarities between these themes and the competencies derived from the interview data, an important difference exists. In the competency model, delegation and training were both treated as components of the Developing Subordinates competency. Junior officers clearly see them as distinct. Any reanalysis of the interview data or

TABLE V.2

Junior Officer Ratings of Individual PCI Items

a) Characteristics rated high for success and high for threshold

	Mean Success	Mean Threshold	Related Competencies
3. Involves NCOs in planning	72	35	13, 14
5. Delegates tasks to NCOs	71	37	4
6. Trusts and respects subordinates	63	30	13
7. Runs spot-checks on how well subordinates are accomplishing assigned duties and responsibilities	66	28	4
8. Exhibits sense of fair play	71	38	10
23. Expresses self clearly both verbally and in writing	68	29	11
28. Establishes priorities	83	30	2
29. Completes tasks without being prompted	67	27	3
33. Puts mission ahead of personal interests	74	27	6
35. Demonstrates a clear ability to learn from mistakes	81	31	5, 12
37. Avoids letting personal differences interfere with the mission	67	32	6, 10
38. Demonstrates tact when dealing with both superiors and subordinates	67	32	10

b) Characteristics rated high for success and low for threshold

2. Makes provision for unforeseen events	66	22	2, 3
4. Remains coherent and rational when under pressure	84	26	5
11. Checks for possible problems before they occur	62	20	3, 4
12. Does not wait until a job has to be done	57	14	3
13. Briefs superiors when a problem occurs, even when personally responsible	61	20	5, 10
17. Aggressively pursues duties and does not let small problems get in the way	58	20	3, 4
18. Gives orders by specifying standards, conditions and time	58	23	11

(continued)

Table V.2, continued

c) Characteristics rated low for success but high for threshold

	<u>Mean Success</u>	<u>Mean Threshold</u>	<u>Related Competencies</u>
15. Sets an example to troops in terms of physical condition and appearance	55	27	10
21. Constantly aware of rank and its responsibilities	39	28	10
24. Possesses and maintains extensive familiarity with branch related equipment	52	28	16
26. Even when basically disagrees, demonstrates a willingness to accept decisions of superiors rather than complaining	57	27	6
30. Uses hands-on training methods rather than lectures	49	27	14, 15
31. Performance-oriented	55	29	4
36. Talks easily with others	51	27	

d) Characteristics rated low for success and low for threshold

1. Plans tasks in great detail	55	26	2
9. Able to get to the root of the personal problems of subordinates	44	19	12
10. In counseling situations, identifies specific ways of identifying problems	38	22	11
14. Does not take advantage of rank	38	19	10
16. Finds necessary but difficult to find resources without inconveniencing others	28	16	3
19. Has obvious aptitude for the technical or physical aspects of assigned duties	54	22	15
20. Develops possible solutions before outlining a problem to a superior	50	16	2, 3
22. Looks for ways to be involved in work related activities	27	15	6
25. Ability to resolve problems without relying on Army manuals	39	18	3, 12
27. Communicates positive attitude towards unattractive tasks	51	17	6, 10
32. Personally prepares or obtains additional training materials	29	15	6, 14
34. Comprehends the larger picture	55	18	12

TABLE V.3

PCI Items Rated as Most Characteristic of
Outstanding Performers

	<u>Overall Success Rating</u>	<u>Superior</u>	<u>Average</u>
4. Remains coherent and rational when under severe pressure	85.2	88.8	85.0
28. Establishes priorities	82.8	85.0	82.8
35. Demonstrates a clear ability to learn from mistakes	81.1	85.6	77.0
33. Puts mission ahead of personal interests	73.3	78.1*	65.0
8. Exhibits sense of fair play	72.4	75.0	67.9
3. Involves NCOs in planning	71.7	76.1	68.6
5. Delegates tasks to NCOs	71.7	78.3*	65.8
37. Avoids letting personal dif- ferences interfere with the mission	67.8	72.5	63.0
7. Runs spot checks	67.6	65.2	65.8
23. Expresses self clearly both verbally and in writing	67.2	72.9*	62.9
38. Demonstrates tact when dealing with superiors and subordinates	67.2	74.4*	62.0

* Statistically significant at $p < .05$, two-tailed t-test

Table V.4

PCI Items Rated as Least Characteristic of
Outstanding Performers

	<u>Overall Success Rating</u>	<u>Superior</u>	<u>Average</u>
20. Develops possible solutions before outlining a problem to a superior	48.9	55.4	47.5
30. Uses hands-on training methods rather than lectures whenever possible	48.9	51.3	46.0
9. Able to get to the root of personal problems of subordinates	42.8	51.1	38.3
25. Solves problems without continually relying on Army manuals	40.0	40.6	35.8
14. Does not take advantage of rank by avoiding difficult living conditions	37.6	36.1	37.1
21. Constantly aware of rank and its responsibilities	37.6	33.7	39.8
10. In counseling situations, identifies specific ways to solve a problem	37.2	42.9	34.6
32. Personally prepares additional training materials	28.7	32.7	28.5
16. Finds necessary but difficult to obtain resources without inconveniencing others	26.7	36.7	31.4
22. Looks for ways to be involved in work-related activities	26.7	25.5	28.0

additional work on the competencies should be done with this conceptual distinction in mind.

These individual ratings were also analyzed to determine whether the responses from junior officers classified as superior performers differed from those of average performers. An intriguing pattern of results emerges, particularly for the highest-rated PCI items. Of the 11 items, junior officers classified as superior performers rated 10 as more important than their colleagues, with four of the differences being statistically significant (see Table V.3). However, both superior and average junior officers agreed on the relative ranking of the items. These results suggest that junior officers rated as superior performers see greater differences between superior and average performers than do average-rated junior officers. (This would be predicted, in part, from the Diagnostic Understanding and Concern for Standards competencies.)

A standard factor analysis, using a varimax rotation, was also conducted on the success ratings of the PCI data, in order to provide a more parsimonious way of summarizing the data and to examine whether the ratings reflected an implicit theory of leadership that differed from the competency model.

Using standard procedures for determining the number of factors to be interpreted (i.e., eigenvalues greater than unity and a scree test), it was determined that between five and seven factors would provide the best solution. A closer examination of the items indicated that the seven-factor solution produced more readily interpretable factors. The five- and six-factor solutions produced similar factors.

The seven factors accounted for 51.2% of the variance. Table V.5 lists the most significant items for each of the factors (factor loadings greater than .40).

Factor 1: Self-confidence

The six items making up this factor include themes of extroversion, verbal fluency, forcefulness, and independent thinking. Individuals who possessed all these characteristics would clearly be very impressive in face-to-face interactions: they would appear to be 'natural leaders' or to have an obvious aptitude for the job. This factor is similar to the Self-confidence competency derived from the interview data.

Factor 2: Concern for Standards

The six items that define this factor include two related themes: a concern for standards and task accomplishment, and a concern for standards about an officer's personal behavior. In-

TABLE V.5

Factors from Performance-Characteristics Inventory

1. SELF-CONFIDENCE (23.5%)*

- Talks easily with others
- Able to solve problems without relying on Army Manuals
- Demonstrates tact when dealing with superiors and subordinates
- Aggressively pursues duties and does not let small problems get in the way
- Expresses self clearly, both verbally and in writing
- Has obvious aptitude for technical or physical aspects of assigned duties

2. CONCERN FOR STANDARDS (5.9%)

- Runs spot-checks on subordinates
- Plans tasks in great detail
- Does not take advantage of rank
- Constantly aware of rank and its associated responsibilities
- Sets an example to troops
- Gives orders by specifying standards, conditions, and time

* Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage of the variance accounted for by each of the seven rotated factors.

(continued)

Table V.5, continued

3. ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY (5.9%)

- Completes tasks without being prompted
- Establishes priorities
- Develops possible solutions before outlining a problem
- Briefs superiors when a problem occurs

4. POSITIVE REGARD FOR SUBORDINATES (4.2%)

- Delegates tasks to NCOs
- Involves NCOs in planning
- Exhibits sense of fair play when handling disciplinary issues
- Able to get to the root of personal problems of subordinates

5. MISSION-ORIENTED (4.2%)

- Even when basically disagrees, demonstrates a willingness to accept decisions rather than complain
- Performance oriented
- Uses hands-on-training methods rather than lectures whenever possible

6. ANTICIPATES (3.9%)

- Makes provisions for unforeseen events
- Checks for possible problems before they occur

7. PROFESSIONAL DETACHMENT (3.8%)

- Remains coherent and rational under severe pressure
- Puts mission ahead of personal interests
- Avoids letting personal differences interfere with a mission

dividuals who possess these attributes would be concerned about doing things properly. This factor combines the competencies of Concern for Standards and Concern with Image.

Factor 3: Assumes Responsibility

The four items that define this factor suggest a readiness to take the initiative and a readiness to solve or address problems before being told. This factor closely parallels the Initiative competency.

Factor 4: Positive Regard for Subordinates

The four items that define this factor all refer to relationships between an officer and his/her subordinates. All four items suggest a positive attitude towards subordinates. Two items indicate a willingness to involve subordinates through sharing responsibility, while the remaining items reflect a readiness to accept and help subordinates as individuals. Individuals who possess these attributes would be unlikely to describe their subordinates in derogatory terms. This factor combines aspects of the Developing Others and Realistic Positive Attitude competencies.

Factor 5: Mission-oriented

The items that define this factor are more difficult to interpret. Two clearly suggest a focus on accomplishing the assigned mission. The third item refers to a preferred training method. It might be argued that even this item indicates a focus on actual task accomplishment, but it seems more reasonable to assume that the loading of this item is somewhat spurious. The competency most similar to this factor is Job Involvement.

Factor 6: Anticipates

The two items that define this factor both refer to a readiness to anticipate and respond to potential problems. It is similar to the dominant theme in Factor 3 ("assumes responsibility"), but the emphasis here is on taking initiative within already defined tasks rather than assuming additional responsibilities. Individual officers possessing this attribute would seldom be caught unprepared by a change in circumstances. This factor is similar to the Planning competency.

Factor 7: Professional Detachment

The three main components of this factor reflect an ability

of individual officers to distance themselves from their own feelings and preferences. Individual officers exhibiting this attribute would seldom lose their self-control and would demonstrate considerable self-discipline. This factor is similar to the Job Involvement competency.

Overall, the factor analysis of the PCI results in seven factors that bear considerable similarity to the competencies derived from the interviews. As we have seen, eight of the competencies are represented:

- Self-confidence (Factor 1)
- Concern for Standards (Factor 2)
- Concern with Image (Factor 2)
- Initiative (Factor 3)
- Developing Others (Factor 4)
- Realistic Positive Attitude (Factor 4)
- Job Involvement (Factor 5)
- Planning (Factor 6)
- Job Involvement (Factor 7)

In addition, the factor analysis made a distinction between two aspects of the Job Involvement competency: dedication to the mission (Factor 5) and detachment (Factor 7). As in the case of the Developing Others competency, the PCI data indicate that Job Involvement should be examined more carefully.

Based on these seven factors or leadership dimensions, seven scales were developed, using the major items (greater than .40) associated with each factor. All items were equally weighted. Only success values were used in these analyses.

Table V.6 summarizes the overall ratings for the seven leadership dimensions. Professional Detachment stands out as the attribute most frequently seen as distinguishing superior from average performers. Two additional attributes, Positive Regard for Subordinates and Anticipates, form a second cluster in terms of overall rating.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this data is the relatively low rating of the explicitly task-oriented dimensions. Junior officers attach primary importance to personal qualities and interpersonal skills.

In previous work using instruments similar in design to the junior officers' PCI, McBer has found that different groups of job incumbents sometimes differ significantly in the importance they attach to different job attributes. To explore this possibility, and in particular to see whether variations in branch and performance produced such an effect, a two-way analysis was conducted of variance with performance ratings (superior vs. average) and branch designation as independent variables.

TABLE V.6

Overall Ratings of Leadership Dimensions
Derived from the PCI Factor Analysis

	Mean Success Rating <u>(n ≥ 126)</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Self-confidence	56	5
Concern for standards	52	7
Assumes responsibility	57	4
Positive regard for subordinates	63	3
Mission-oriented	54	6
Anticipates	65	2
Professional detachment	75	1

The results of the branch comparison are presented in Table V.7. Significant differences in the absolute ratings by branch were identified for three scales: Concern for Standards, Assumes Responsibility, and Professional Detachment. As Table V.8 suggests, junior officers in the infantry tend to perceive more differences between superior and average performers along all seven leadership dimensions than do officers from other branches. Junior officers in the transportation or quartermaster branches tend to see fewer differences between superior and average performers in these areas. Despite these differences in the absolute ratings, the relative ranking of the attributes remains the same (the smallest Spearman rank correlation is greater than .625 ($p \leq .10$)). This suggests that although significant differences among branches do exist for some of the PCI dimensions, they may be primarily due to a general tendency of junior officers from some branches to see greater differences between superior and average performers. For example, junior officers in the infantry consistently rate all the PCI items as contributing more to outstanding performance than do officers in the transportation and quartermaster branches.

A similar set of findings emerged when the ratings of superior-rated and average-rated junior officers were compared (see Table V.9). Although only Positive Regard for Subordinates reached significance, superior-performing junior officers rated all seven attributes as more likely to distinguish superior from average performers than did junior officers of average performance. Again, the relative rankings were almost identical (Spearman rank correlation = .95).

In short, the relative ranking of the seven leadership dimensions identified from the PCI was consistent across branches and performance levels. The differences in absolute ratings of these dimensions suggest that junior officers systematically varied in their readiness to identify attributes that distinguish superior from average performers.

The reason for these variations in absolute ratings may be differences among branches in the available opportunities to compare superior and average performers.

TABLE V.7

Differential Ratings of Leadership Dimensions
by Branch and Performance Rating (Total Sample $n \geq 92$)

	<u>Branch F-value</u>	<u>Perform- ance F-value</u>	<u>Branch x Perform- ance F-value</u>
Self-confidence	-	-	-
Concern for standards	4.02**	-	-
Assumes responsibility	2.45*	-	-
Positive regard for subordinates	-	4.92*	-
Mission-oriented	-	-	-
Anticipates	-	-	-
Professional detachment	3.20**	-	-

- not significant

** $p \leq .01$

* $p \leq .05$

TABLE V.8

Ratings by Branch of Leadership Dimensions
Derived from a Factor Analysis of the PCI

	<u>Infan-try</u>	<u>Field Artil-lery</u>	<u>Air Defense Artil-lery</u>	<u>Engi-neers</u>	<u>Signal</u>	<u>Trans- porta- tion/ Quarter- master</u>
Self-confi- dence	58 (7) *	58 (4)	56 (5)	53 (5)	68 (3)	45 (5)
Concern for standards	66 (5)	52 (7)	59 (4)	46 (7)	48 (7)	37 (7)
Assumes responsibil- ity	67 (4)	53 (6)	54 (6)	54 (4)	64 (5)	51 (4)
Positive re- gard for sub- ordinates	68 (3)	59 (3)	70 (2)	59 (2)	67 (4)	65 (3)
Mission-ori- ented	62 (6)	54 (4)	49 (7)	51 (6)	55 (6)	43 (6)
Anticipates	70 (2)	63 (2)	61 (3)	56 (3)	74 (2)	69 (1)
Professional detachment	85 (1)	73 (1)	81 (1)	67 (1)	80 (1)	66 (2)

* Figures in parentheses indicate rank.

TABLE V.9

Ratings by Performance Level of Leadership
Dimensions Derived from a Factor Analysis of the PCI

	Superior (n $\geq$ 48)	Average (n $\geq$ 50)
Self-confidence	60 (4) *	52 (5)
Concern for standards	53 (7)	50 (7)
Assumes responsibility	59 (5)	56 (4)
Positive regard for subordinates	70 (2) **	58 (3)
Mission-oriented	56 (6)	51 (6)
Anticipates	70 (2)	60 (2)
Professional detachment	79 (1)	72 (1)

* Figures in parentheses indicate rank.

** Statistically significant difference, $p < .05$ (two-tailed t-test).

CHAPTER VI

Development of Competency Measures

The objective of this phase of the project was to develop paper-and-pencil measures of individual competencies so that ROTC programs could be evaluated in terms of their relative effects on cadets. It was anticipated that this evaluation would occur while ROTC graduates were completing their initial assignments as junior officers.

Testing and Measurement Issues

The development of reliable paper-and-pencil measures of individual attributes such as job competencies presents a number of difficult issues, which still await definitive solution (Mischel, 1968). These issues include:

1. Social desirability, or the tendency of respondents to provide data on themselves or others that makes them appear in a favorable light. This frequently leads to what is called a leniency effect.
2. The halo effect, or the tendency of respondents to provide data on themselves or others that does not differentiate among the component dimensions of a measure. This effect, for example, means that a junior officer who received a low rating on one competency dimension would receive low ratings on most dimensions.
3. Feasibility, or the practicality of using a particular measurement system. Some very effective measurement systems are just too expensive, too time-consuming, or too expert-dependent to warrant widespread use. For example, behavioral observations by trained evaluators, or the behavioral-event interviewing technique described earlier, could be employed to measure the competencies. Unfortunately, while these provide the best measures theoretically (McClelland, 1980), they are also among the most expensive, time-consuming, and expert-dependent measurement systems.

In some instances these sources of error stem from inadequately designed instruments. Highly evaluative or normative statements can trigger socially desirable responses, while imprecise and ambiguous statements can increase the halo effect.

In the majority of instances, however, the source of bias is

not only the instrument but also the rater--and the motivations of the rater at a particular time. For example, an individual privately completing a self-assessment instrument for a training or research program will respond very differently when he completes the same instrument in a competitive situation such as a selection test. Social desirability is much more likely to be an issue in the latter situation.

When the source of bias is within the rater, it is far less amenable to change (Latham and Wexley, 1981).

As a way of responding to these issues, four separate paper-and-pencil instruments were developed:

1. Military Picture Story Exercise (MPSE)
2. Army Leadership Problem Exercise (ALPE)
3. Officer Performance Style Inventory: Supervisor Rating (OPSI-Supervisor)
4. Officer Performance Style Inventory: Self Rating (OPSI-Self)

Copies of each instrument are attached as Appendices F to I.

These four instruments encompass three basically different approaches to the assessment of individual attributes.

The Military Picture Story Exercise

The MPSE asks junior officers to write brief imaginative stories in response to a set of six pictures. Each picture depicts a junior officer in a military setting. The MPSE is designed as a variant of the TAT and is a projective or operant test, in which a junior officer's responses are generated spontaneously to a specific but ambiguous stimulus.

The MPSE differs from the TAT in that the pictures are all task- or job-related. Such pictures restrict the 'fantasy' aspects of stories. The aim of increasing the job content of the pictures was to elicit stories containing data that could be more readily coded for the junior officer competencies. The MPSE responses were coded for the 14 junior officer competencies.

The advantage of the MPSE approach is that by providing relatively ambiguous stimuli, an accurate sampling of the underlying thoughts of junior officers could be obtained. Social desirability and halo effects would be kept to a minimum, since there was no identifiable correct response. Significant halo effects would indicate inadequacies in the coding system (i.e., the instrument), which could be eliminated by refining the coding system.

The potential disadvantages of the MPSE approach are three-fold. First, the pictures may be too task-related, and as a result may generate stories that describe the picture, rather than imaginative stories triggered by the picture. Second, coding systems for TATs are normally keyed to specific sets of pictures. For the MPSE, the coding system is fairly narrowly defined by the competency model. With a larger sample of respondents and stories, a more appropriate coding system for the stories could have been developed. Third, MPSE must be hand-scored. This is expensive and requires the use of expert coders.

The Army Leadership Problem Exercise

The ALPE requires junior officers to read short descriptions of typical problem situations they are likely to have faced. They are then asked repeatedly to choose between two possible actions. One action in each pair is keyed to one of the junior officer competencies, while the other action refers to behavior unrelated to any of the competencies. Each behavior is equally appealing in terms of social desirability. This forced choice between of competency-relevant and nonrelevant items avoids the problems of an ipsative measure, in which the choice of one dimension (or competency) automatically reduces the possible score of another dimension.

The situations in the ALPE were all drawn from the Behavioral Event Interviews with the junior officers; therefore, they represent actual problem situations. The majority of the competency-relevant alternatives were also taken from the interviews, and reflect how junior officers actually handled the situations. Additional competency-relevant alternatives were added to ensure adequate coverage of the competencies in the instrument as a whole. The nonrelevant alternatives comprise essentially four types of actions:

- (a) request guidance or instruction from a superior
- (b) inappropriately share responsibility for action with others
- (c) wait and see what happens
- (d) take action without adequate information

In addition, negative indicators of the competency were included where they were equally socially desirable.

Table VI.1 provides an example of one of the situations and its associated pairs of actions. The ALPE contains 20 situations, each presenting between 4 and 15 pairs of possible actions.

The advantages of the ALPE is that it provides a somewhat ambiguous stimulus, thereby increasing the possibility that the

TABLE VI.1

Situations and Associated Pairs of Actions

You have recently returned to your unit after a few weeks at a special school where you learned how to operate a new missile system. Back on your post, you notice that many of the units do not really know how to use this missile in the field. In one battalion, you find two soldiers who made a dangerous mistake in setting up their equipment. What do you do/think?

1. a. Realize that COs must set priorities for training.
b. Think that all units with that missile should know how to operate it.
2. a. Tell the battalion commander that you could deadline his whole battalion and that something must be done quickly to improve training.
b. Let the battalion commander know you are willing to provide expert assistance to improve training.
3. a. Develop a better training program for use of this missile.
b. Informally talk with other officers and with NCOs to determine the extent of the problem.
4. a. Get your CO's view on what kind of training schedule is most practical.
b. Decide what training activities are most needed, and devote the most training time to these.
5. a. Tell your CO that on the basis of what you have learned in the course, you know what training is needed.
b. Realize that your CO has a broader picture in mind. Ask him to decide what training is really needed.
6. a. Let your CO know what training is needed, so he won't be embarrassed in an inspection.
b. Be ready with expert advice in case the battalion fails the inspection.

responses will reflect the pre-disposition of the junior officers for certain types of behavior. Social desirability is kept to a minimum by the specific balancing of the "correct" answer with an equally socially-desirable alternative. Halo effects are minimized in that there are no obvious right and wrong answers. Compared to the MPSE the coding system can be readily automated.

The disadvantages of the ALPE are twofold. First, in developing alternatives which were equally socially desirable, it is possible that both alternatives represent effective behavior. The early piloting of the ALPE produced a number of examples of this phenomena. Second, and more significantly, the junior officer's responses are dependent upon his ability to read and diagnose a situation. The ALPE, therefore, represents a cognitive test and an individual's responses more accurately reflect his ability to see the right answer rather than engage in the actual behavior.

Officer Performance Style Inventory

The supervisor and self-rating versions of this instrument have 56 items, each consisting of two related behavioral statements. The respondent is asked to rate, using a six-point scale, where the junior officer falls on the continuum defined by the two alternative behaviors. The alternative behaviors in each item are keyed to specific competencies, and there are four items for each competency. Table VI.2 provides an example of the OPSI-Supervisor format. Here the supervisor rates his junior officer as resisting any encroachment on his responsibilities by a superior, but is more likely to let an NCO infringe on his areas of responsibility.

A junior officer's score for each competency is the arithmetic sum of the four items keyed to that competency. In the self-rating version of the OPSI, the items are randomly listed with respect to the competencies; in the supervisor version, the items are grouped by competency. Ideally, these two alternative formats should have been used for both types of raters, but the projected sample size was too small to test both formats. Under these conditions it was more practical to give the supervisors a format in which it was clear what they were rating.

For the junior officers the items were randomized, since there was a greater likelihood that self-ratings would be influenced by the importance attached to the overall competency label.

The major advantage of the OPSI is that it provides a straightforward assessment of the individual junior officer. Both versions are highly practical and do not require expert

TABLE VI.2

Illustration of OPSI-Supervisor Format

WILLINGNESS TO CONFRONT OTHERS

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| a. Officer defends his/her actions against inaccurate criticism from superiors | <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; width: 100px;"> ...X.. </div> <hr style="width: 100%;"/> | Officer sometimes accepts inaccurate criticism from superiors |
| b. Officer stands up to superiors for what he/she believes in | <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; width: 100px;"> .X.... </div> <hr style="width: 100%;"/> | Officer does not express his/her disagreements to superiors |
| c. Officer resists when superiors try to take over his/her responsibilities | <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; width: 100px;"> .X.... </div> <hr style="width: 100%;"/> | Officer shows little resistance when superiors try to take over his/her responsibilities |
| d. Officer refuses to let NCOs infringe upon his/her responsibilities | <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; width: 100px;"> ...X.. </div> <hr style="width: 100%;"/> | Officer sometimes lets NCOs infringe upon his/her responsibilities |

TABLE VI.3

Conceptual Evaluation of Strengths and
Weaknesses of Different Instruments

	<u>Social Desirability</u>	<u>Halo</u>	<u>Feasibility</u>
MPSE	Low	Low	Low
ALPE	Moderate	Low	Moderate
OPSI-Supervisor	Moderate	High	High
OPSI-Self	High	Moderate	High

coding. However, halo effects remain a major concern with this OPSI-Supervisor format, while social desirability and in particular leniency effects remain a potential problem with the OPSI self-rating format.

Table VI.3 provides a summary conceptual evaluation of the ratings of each instrument with respect to the three primary sources of error or difficulty.

Psychometric Characteristics

1. Scale Reliabilities

(a) MPSE

Table VI.4 summarizes the inter-rater reliabilities for the 14 junior officer competencies evaluated in the MPSE. Because of the developmental stage of this instrument, all responses were double-coded by two senior consultants. The inter-rater reliabilities reported in Table VI.4 are for a subset of 15 responses that were coded independently by the two consultants. Disagreements were subsequently resolved.

The formula for calculating the inter-rater agreement is very conservative (Winter, 1973), since agreements on the non-occurrence of a competency are not included in the calculation, and on average only 2 out of the 14 competencies were coded for each story. The formula is this:

$$\frac{2 \times \text{number of agreements}}{(2 \times \text{number of agreements}) + \text{number of disagreements}} \times 100\%$$

Nine of the 14 competencies had inter-rater reliabilities of greater than 67 percent. Of the remainder, 2 competencies (Expert Influence Style and Willingness to Confront) were scored so infrequently in the subset that no meaningful estimate of the inter-rater agreement could be made. Overall, reasonable levels of inter-rater reliability were obtained, although further refinement of the coding categories for a number of the competencies is in order.

(b) ALPE

Table V.5 summarizes the reliability data for the ALPE measure. Clearly the coefficient α 's are marginal at best. However, part of the reason for the low values is that the individual items are dichotomous rather than continuous. Under these circumstances, together with the relatively low correlations among competency scales on the ALPE, the scale reliabilities were considered to be strong enough for the pilot stage of the instrument.

TABLE VI.4

Inter-rater Coding Reliabilities for MPSE (n = 15)

	<u>Percentage of Agreement</u>
Mission Focus	
1. Concern for Efficiency	84
2. Planning	83
3. Initiative	89*
4. Concern for Standards	84
Professional Maturity	
5. Self-confidence	55*
6. Job Involvement	79
Power and Influence	
7. Expert Influence	0*
8. Willingness to Confront Others	50*
9. Forcefulness	74
10. Concern with Image	55
Understanding and Managing Others	
11. Concern for Clarity	82
12. Diagnostic Understanding	63
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	89
14. Developing Others	79

* Coded infrequently.

TABLE VI.5

ALPE Scale Reliabilities: Coefficient α 's

	<u>Number of Items</u>	<u>Coefficient α</u>
Mission Focus		
1. Concern for Efficiency	5	.43
2. Planning	7	.41*
3. Initiative	5	.47
4. Concern for Standards	5	.40
Professional Maturity		
5. Self-confidence	6	.34
6. Job Involvement	7	.44
Power and Influence		
7. Expert Influence	4	.40
8. Willingness to Confront Others	8	.55
9. Forcefulness	6	.63
10. Concern with Image	3	.34
Understanding and Managing Others		
11. Concern for Clarity	5	.42*
12. Diagnostic Understanding	6	.51
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	4	.63
14. Developing Others	9	.66

* Coefficient α increases with the deletion of an additional item.

TABLE VI.6

Scale Reliabilities in Percentages
for OPSI-Supervisor and OPSI-Self: Coefficient α 's

	OPSI- Supervisor (n = 42)	OPSI- Self (n = 48)
Mission Focus		
1. Concern for Efficiency	84	70
2. Planning	84	73
3. Initiative	77	63
4. Concern for Standards	82	62
Professional Maturity		
5. Self-confidence	86	77
6. Job Involvement	90	77
Power and Influence		
7. Expert Influence	88	50*
8. Willingness to Confront Others	82	42*
9. Forcefulness	77	46
10. Concern with Image	77	68
Understanding and Managing Others		
11. Concern for Clarity	81	71
12. Diagnostic Understanding	86	64
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	90	57
14. Developing Others	85	47

* Coefficient α increases if one item is dropped from scale.

(c) OPSI (Supervisor and Self)

As noted earlier, there are two distinct formats for the OPSI. The OPSI-Self provides a more reasonable test of the reliability of the scales, because the items are randomly listed. The OPSI-Supervisor format maximizes the probability of obtaining highly reliable scales by labeling and clustering the items as scales. As Table VI.6 indicates, 9 of the 14 OPSI-Self scales have coefficient α 's greater than .6. Only one scale (Forcefulness) had a coefficient α of less than .5 when the weakest item was dropped from the scales.

The generally acceptable levels of reliability established for the OPSI-Self indicate that the items making up the scales are appropriate for use in the OPSI-Supervisor format.

2. Social Desirability Effects

Social desirability and leniency effects can be estimated for the ALPE and OPSI instruments by comparing actual mean scores with the arithmetic mean for the scale. Table VI.7 indicates that both OPSI instruments result in higher mean scores than the ALPE. For both the OPSI-Self and OPSI-Supervisor instruments, marked leniency effects exist.

While the ALPE suffers least from leniency biases, there is evidence to suggest that social desirability effects exist. Respondents to the ALPE tend to avoid Power and Influence items and to choose Understanding and Managing Others more frequently. This pattern of responses conforms to some well-defined social norms, by which helping others is seen as desirable and confronting or controlling others is seen as undesirable. The pattern also supports the conclusions in Chapter V on the espoused theory of junior officers as defined by the panels.

3. Halo Effects

Halo effects can be estimated for all four instruments by examining the correlation between scales for each instrument. If the average absolute correlation between scales is greater than the intra-scale reliability coefficients, then it is unclear whether the individual scales are measuring independent attributes or some common underlying attribute. Table VI.8 summarizes the average absolute correlations. As predicted, halo effects are minimal for the ALPE and the MPSE. For the OPSI-Self, the halo effects are somewhat greater but are still at acceptably low levels. As expected, the halo effects are most marked for the OPSI-Supervisor instrument. Although the interscale correlations are smaller than the intra-scale reliability coefficients, they are high. This indicates that the supervisor's ratings reflect an overall evaluation of the junior officers.

TABLE VI.7

Comparison of Means for ALPE and OPSI Measures*

	<u>ALPE</u>	<u>OPSI- Self</u>	<u>OPSI- Supervisor</u>
Mission Focus			
1. Concern for Efficiency	.42	.80	.76
2. Planning	.60	.79	.73
3. Initiative	.65	.72	.76
4. Concern for Standards	.55	.72	.72
Professional Maturity			
5. Self-confidence	.53	.76	.80
6. Job Involvement	.57	.76	.81
Power and Influence			
7. Expert Influence	.49	.72	.68
8. Willingness to Confront Others	.43	.75	.81
9. Forcefulness	.27	.71	.73
10. Concern with Image	.61	.76	.71
Understanding and Managing Others			
11. Concern for Clarity	.63	.80	.74
12. Diagnostic Understanding	.70	.71	.69
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	.72	.79	.78
14. Developing Others	.76	.77	.74

* Scales were transformed to range between 0 and 1.00 with a mean = .5

TABLE VI.8

Halo Effects: Correlations between Scales

	<u>MPSE</u>	<u>ALPE</u>	<u>OPSI- Self</u>	<u>OPSI- Supervisor</u>
Mission Focus				
1. Concern for Efficiency	.18	.19	.38	.59
2. Planning	.17	.12	.38	.58
3. Initiative	.24	.11	.30	.56
4. Concern for Standards	.12	.14	.13	.64
Professional Maturity				
5. Self-Confidence	.16	.14	.33	.53
6. Job Involvement	.18	.16	.33	.53
Power and Influence				
7. Expert Influence	.26	.10	.39	.65
8. Willingness to Confront Others	.25	.15	.07	.58
9. Forcefulness	.18	.21	.43	.63
10. Concern with Image	.26	.07	.40	.54
Understanding and Managing Others				
11. Concern for Clarity	.15	.15	.10	.60
12. Diagnostic Understanding	.22	.21	.37	.64
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	.17	.18	.33	.56
14. Developing Others	.18	.19	.43	.56

Results

The basic objective of the battery of instruments was to develop a set of paper-and-pencil measures suitable for evaluating the success of various ROTC programs in developing effective junior officers.

The existing data base includes two related but different measures of effectiveness. Each officer in the data set has both an overall rating (superior and average) and a competency profile. Thus, each of the four instruments can be evaluated in terms of its ability to predict the overall rating of junior officers and the individual competency scores of junior officers.

The instrument's ability to predict the overall rating of a junior officer can be evaluated by comparing the average scores of each competency for superior and average junior officers. An instrument's ability to predict the individual competency scores can be evaluated by correlating the competency scores from the instrument with the competency scores from the BEI.

Table VI.9 summarizes the differences between means for the criterion groups for the four instruments. Of the four instruments, the OPSI-Supervisor and the OPSI-Self are far more successful at obtaining the predicted differences between the criterion groups. The OPSI-Supervisor instrument differentiated superior from average junior officers on 10 of the 14 competencies ($p \leq .05$). Only in the case of Job Involvement was there little evidence that the instrument could distinguish between superior and average performers.

The OPSI-Self was somewhat less powerful. It differentiated superior from average junior officers on 6 of the 14 competencies at the .05 level of statistical significance. At the weaker .10 level of statistical significance, however, 10 of the 14 competencies were found to distinguish superior from average performers.

The ALPE and MPSE both failed to produce any statistically significant differences between superior and average performers.

Table VI.10 summarizes the Pearson correlations between the competencies as measured by the four instruments and by the BEI. Of the four instruments, four of the ALPE competency scores correlated significantly ($p \leq .05$) with the BEI scores:

- Planning
- Self-confidence
- Expert Influence
- Concern with Image

TABLE VI.9

Differences in Means between Criterion Groups by Instrument Using T-test

Mission Focus	MPSE		p ¹	ALPE		p	OPSI-Supervisor		p	OPSI-Self		p
	Sup (n ≥ 21)	Ave (n ≥ 19)		Sup (n ≥ 24)	Ave (n ≥ 20)		Sup (n ≥ 19)	Ave (n ≥ 20)		Sup (n ≥ 25)	Ave (n ≥ 21)	
1. Concern for Efficiency	0.8 (1.1) ²	1.1 (1.1)	ns ³	2.3 (1.4)	1.9 (1.2)	.12	20.4 (2.1)	18.1 (3.9)	.01 ⁵	20.6 (1.9)	19.3 (3.0)	.05 ⁵
2. Planning	1.2 (0.9)	0.8 (0.8)	.10	4.3 (1.3)	4.3 (1.5)	ns	20.2 (2.8)	17.1 (4.1)	.01	20.2 (2.5)	19.3 (3.1)	ns
3. Initiative	0.4 (0.8)	0.4 (0.8)	ns	4.0 (1.4)	3.8 (1.1)	ns	20.1 (2.6)	18.1 (3.8)	.07	19.2 (3.3)	17.5 (3.2)	.05
4. Concern for Standards	2.5 (1.1)	2.4 (1.4)	ns	2.8 (1.1)	2.9 (1.1)	ns	19.8 (2.4)	17.0 (4.1)	.01 ⁵	19.0 (2.7)	17.6 (3.4)	.07
Professional Maturity												
5. Self-confidence	0.5 (0.8)	0.4 (0.7)	ns	3.2 (1.7)	3.3 (1.0)	ns	20.8 (3.0)	14.0 (3.7)	.05	19.9 (2.6)	18.1 (3.9)	.04 ⁵
6. Job Involvement	1.4 (1.2)	1.3 (1.6)	ns	4.2 (1.5)	3.9 (1.4)	ns	20.6 (3.7)	20.0 (4.3)	ns	20.2 (2.5)	17.8 (4.1)	.01 ⁵

¹ One-tailed T-test.² Figures in parentheses indicate standard deviation.³ ns = not significant ($p > .15$).⁴ Difference in wrong direction.⁵ Separate variance estimate, since F-value significant ($p \leq .05$).

(cont inued)

Table VI.9, continued

	MPSE		p ¹	ALPE		OPSI-Supervisor		OPSI-Self	
	Sup (n ≥ 21)	Ave (n ≥ 19)		Sup (n ≥ 24)	Ave (n ≥ 20)	Sup (n ≥ 19)	Ave (n ≥ 20)	Sup (n ≥ 25)	Ave (n ≥ 21)
Power and Influence									
7. Expert Influence	0.5 (0.9)	0.2 (0.5)	0.9	2.1 (0.9)	1.9 (1.2)	18.2 (3.1)	16.8 (3.6)	18.7 (2.4)	17.9 (2.6)
									.10
8. Willingness to Confront Others	0.2 (0.4)	0.3 (0.7)	ns	3.3 (1.4)	3.4 (1.6)	21.2 (2.0)	19.3 (2.9)	19.5 (2.3)	18.3 (2.5)
									.01
9. Forcefulness	0.6 (0.9)	0.5 (0.8)	ns	1.8 (1.3)	1.2 (1.1)	20.7 (2.2)	16.6 (3.7)	10.4 (2.6)	17.9 (2.8)
									.0015
10. Concern with Image	1.4 (1.1)	1.0 (1.3)	ns	1.8 (0.7)	1.7 (0.6)	18.8 (3.3)	17.5 (3.6)	19.6 (2.5)	18.6 (2.9)
									.11
									.12

1 One-tailed T-test.

2 Figures in parentheses indicate standard deviation.

3 ns = not significant ($p > .15$).

4 Difference in wrong direction.

5 Separate variance estimate, since F-value significant ($p \leq .05$).

(continued)

Table VI.9, continued

	MPSE			ALPE			OPSI-Supervisor			OPSI-Self		
	Sup (n ≥ 21)	Ave (n ≥ 19)	p ¹	Sup (n ≥ 24)	Ave (n ≥ 20)	p	Sup (n ≥ 19)	Ave (n ≥ 20)	p	Sup (n ≥ 25)	Ave (n ≥ 21)	p
Understanding and Managing Others												
11. Concern for Clarity	2.3 (1.4)	1.8 (1.4)	.11	3.5 (1.3)	3.5 (0.9)	ns	19.8 (2.7)	17.9 (3.4)	.03	20.5 (2.3)	19.4 (2.9)	.07
12. Diagnostic Understanding	1.0 (0.7)	1.3 (1.3)	0.14 ^{4,5}	4.2 (1.4)	4.4 (1.4)	ns	19.2 (2.8)	16.4 (4.1)	.01	19.1 (2.7)	17.4 (2.6)	.01
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	1.3 (1.4)	1.3 (1.2)	ns	3.0 (0.9)	2.8 (0.9)	.15	21.2 (2.8)	18.3 (4.4)	.01 ⁵	20.2 (2.3)	19.0 (2.7)	.06
14. Developing Others	1.1 (1.1)	1.0 (0.9)	ns	7.0 (1.2)	6.8 (1.6)	ns	20.3 (2.6)	17.3 (3.3)	.001	19.8 (1.9)	18.8 (2.4)	.06

1 One-tailed T-test.

2 Figures in parentheses indicate standard deviation.

3 ns = not significant ($p > .15$).

4 Difference in wrong direction.

5 Separate variance estimate, since F-value significant ($p \leq .05$).

TABLE VI.10

Correlation between Competencies as Measured by BEI and Alternative Measures

Mission Focus	MPSE		ALPE		OPSI-Supervisor		OPSI-Self	
	r (n ≥ 40)	p	r (n ≥ 45)	p	r (n ≥ 40)	p	r (n ≥ 47)	p
1. Concern for Efficiency	-.03	ns	.13	ns	-.21	.09	.18	.11
2. Planning	.16	ns	.25	.05	-.01	ns	.16	ns
3. Initiative	-.16	ns	.17	.13	-.06	ns	-.11	ns
4. Concern for Standards	-.16	ns	.08	ns	.00	ns	.08	ns
Professional Maturity								
5. Self-confidence	-.10	ns	.35	.01	.20	.10	.21	.07
6. Job Involvement	.05	ns	-.04	ns	.03	ns	.25	.05
Power and Influence								
7. Expert Influence	-.03	ns	.32	.02	.01	ns	.17	.12
8. Willingness to Confront Others	-.02	ns	.18	.12	.30	.03	.13	ns
9. Forcefulness	.17	.15	.29	.03	.03	ns	-.04	ns
Understanding and Managing Others								
11. Concern for Clarity	.23	.08	.19	.11	.18	.12	.28	.03
12. Diagnostic Understanding	-.11	ns	-.02	ns	.04	ns	-.01	ns
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	-.03	ns	.08	ns	.30	.03	.06	ns
14. Developing Others	.17	.15	.00	ns	.14	ns	.21	.08

Two of the OPSI-Supervisor competency scores correlated significantly ($p \leq .05$) with the BEI scores:

- Willingness to Confront Others
- Realistic Positive Attitude

Two of the OPSI-Self competency scores correlated significantly ($p \leq .05$) with the BEI scores:

- Job Involvement
- Concern for Clarity

For the MPSE, none of the competency scores were correlated with the BEI scores.

Discussion

No single instrument is suitable for evaluating the success of ROTC programs. While the OPSI-Supervisor and OPSI-Self can be used to predict the overall ranking of a junior officer, neither is particularly successful at predicting individual competency scores. On the other hand, the ALPE is relatively successful at predicting individual competency scores but poor at predicting the overall ranking of junior officers. The MPSE, in its current form, is clearly unsuitable for evaluating the ROTC programs.

Nevertheless, the results are encouraging, given that the original BEI data were collected between 12 months and 18 months earlier from the junior officers. More importantly, there were few possibilities for refining the instruments once they were designed, because the original pool of BEI subjects was limited in size. Finally, as noted in the section describing the development of these instruments, paper-and-pencil tests for individual-assessment purposes continually face the problems of social desirability, halo, and practicality, even when the reliability issues have been determined.

The results indicate that in order to evaluate the ROTC programs some combination of these instruments is necessary, if both the overall ratings and individual competency issues are to be predicted.

This finding is not surprising, given the concerns mentioned above over the adequacy of any single paper-and-pencil instrument to provide an accurate assessment of individuals.

In particular, the OPSI-Supervisor's ability to predict individual competency scores is not surprising, given the halo effects that normally accompany this type of instrument. By the same token, this instrument provides a very powerful prediction of the overall ratings of a junior officer primarily be-

cause the halo effect is based on the individual junior officer's performance level. What is significant is that the criterion groups were determined primarily by the ratings of subordinates, not by superiors. Moreover, the elapsed time between the original rating of the junior officers and completion of the tests was nearly 18 months.

The current OPSI-Supervisor would undoubtedly be improved if the same random format of items were used as is found on the OPSI-Self. The OPSI-Supervisor results suggest that using a format that clearly identifies the assessment dimensions--the 14 competencies--does not make supervisors likely to be more discriminating in evaluating the competencies demonstrated by their junior officers.

The OPSI-Self instrument effectively differentiated superior from average performers, although it was not as strong as the OPSI-Supervisor instrument. Given the leniency bias of this type of self-report instrument, the strength of this finding is surprising.

The OPSI-Self instrument also proved somewhat stronger than the OPSI-Supervisor instrument in its ability to predict individual competency scores. Overall, however, the ability to predict individual competency scores remains of marginal practical significance primarily because of the leniency bias and restricted range of the OPSI-Self scores.

The results from the OPSI-Self instrument could be improved by modifying the scales with marginal reliability coefficients (see Table VI.6) and by utilizing a scale format that increases the variance in the scores, i.e., reduces the leniency bias.

The ALPE instrument failed to distinguish superior from average performers. At the same, the ALPE was the most successful of the instruments in predicting the BEI competency scores. Moreover, the ability of the ALPE to predict BEI competency scores is even stronger for superior performing junior officers (see Table VI.11). Assuming the BEI competency scores accurately measure the competencies of individuals, it appears that superior performers are more aware of how they would respond to different situations than average performers.

The strength of the relationship between the ALPE and BEI competency scores occurred despite the apparently low reliability of the scales.

None of the instruments by itself is adequate for evaluating how successful various ROTC programs are in developing effective junior officers. The OPSI-Supervisor instrument successfully distinguishes superior from average performers but fails to measure specific competencies. None of the instruments is currently capable of predicting more than four of the BEI

TABLE VI.11

Correlations between BEI and ALPE Measures of the
Junior Officer Competencies for Criterion Subgroups

	Total Sample (n = 45)	Super- ior (r_s) (n = 23)	Aver- age (r_a) (n = 20)	$P(z_{r_s} - z_{r_a})$ ¹
Mission Focus				
1. Concern for Efficiency	.13	.14	-.02	
2. Planning	.25*	.43**	-.04	.08
3. Initiative	.17	.16	.20	
4. Concern for Standards	.08	.23	-.06	
Professional Maturity				
5. Self-confidence	.35**	.35*	.41**	
6. Job Involvement	-.04	.07	-.19	
Power and Influence				
7. Expert Influence	.32*	.21	.48**	
8. Willingness to Confront others	.18	.42**	-.11	.06
9. Forcefulness	-.03	-.04	-.22	
10. Concern with Image	.29*	.28*	.27*	
Understanding and Managing Others				
11. Concern for Clarity	.19	.32*	-.06	.12
12. Diagnostic Understanding	-.02	.24	-.32	.05
13. Realistic Positive Attitude	.08	.19	-.14	
14. Developing Others	.00	-.08	.06	

¹ Equivalent to the t-test between correlation coefficients

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

TABLE VI.12

Summary of Correlations of Junior Officer Competencies
as Measured by BEI and Alternative Measures

	ALPE (n ≥ 45)	OPSI- Supervisor (n ≥ 40)	OPSI- Self (n ≥ 47)
Mission Focus			
1. Concern for Efficiency			
2. Planning	**		
3. Initiative			
4. Concern for Standards			
Professional Maturity			
5. Self-confidence	***	*	*
6. Job Involvement			**
Power and Influence			
7. Expert Influence	**		
8. Willingness to Confront Others		**	
9. Unconflicted Use of Position and Power			
10. Concern with Image	**		
Understanding and Managing Others			
11. Concern for Clarity			**
12. Diagnostic Understanding			
13. Realistic Positive Attitude			
14. Developing Others			*

* $p \leq .10$

** $p \leq .05$

*** $p \leq .01$

competency scores. However, the overall results are sufficiently encouraging to suggest that with some modifications the instruments can be combined to provide a composite measure that will be useful in evaluating the relative success of different ROTC programs (see Table VI.12).

Recommendations

1. Changes to the instruments

a. ALPE

The ALPE's main deficiencies were low scale reliabilities and an inability to distinguish superior from average performers. The recommended changes address the first deficiency:

- (i) drop items from the instrument that are not included in the current scales
- (ii) add additional items to the instrument that are similar to those already included in the scale
- (iii) modify format of items from a forced choice to a continuum, with the current behavioral alternatives as the anchors

b. OPSI-Self

The OPSI-Self's main deficiencies were leniency bias and questionable scale reliabilities. The recommended changes address both these deficiencies:

- (i) randomly reverse items so that a response bias does not develop
- (ii) replace with new items those scale items that are marginally correlated with the remaining scale items

c. OPSI-Supervisor

The OPSI-Supervisor's main deficiency was a strong halo effect. The primary recommendation is that the current OPSI-Supervisor instrument be replaced by one similar to the modified OPSI-Self instrument.

2. Use of the instruments to evaluate ROTC programs

a. Development of subordinate version of the OPSI-Self

Given the probability that supervisors will still exhibit a strong halo effect and self-raters will exhibit a leniency bias,

an evaluation of ROTC programs should include data from the NCOs reporting to the junior officers involved in the evaluation study.

This recommendation is based on two pieces of data. First, the distinction between superior and average junior officers used throughout this study was principally based upon the ratings of subordinates. The correlation between this subordinate rating and the supervisor rating as measured by the aggregate sum of the OPSI-Supervisor scales was highly significant ($r = .43$, $p \leq .01$). This indicates that subordinates are a valuable source of additional data.

Second, a large proportion of the WEQ data collected from subordinates has not been reported here. However, this data does indicate that a number of significant relationships exist between the competencies exhibited by junior officers and the work environment dimensions as rated by their subordinates. For example, officers who were rated by their subordinates as providing a great deal of individual support had higher levels of self-confidence ($r = .21$, $p \leq .03$), were more forceful ($r = .23$, $p \leq .02$), were more concerned about their image ($r = .20$, $p \leq .04$), and were more involved in their jobs ($r = .23$, $p \leq .02$). While clearly the WEQ dimensions are different from the competency scales, this data suggests that subordinates could provide data on competencies that supervisors have little opportunity of observing.

CHAPTER VII

A Generic Job-Domain Description for Junior Officers

This chapter summarizes the results of the study in a generic job-domain description of the junior officer's position. Originally it was anticipated that separate job-domain descriptions would be needed for each of the six targeted branches. As noted earlier, however, few substantial differences were found among junior officers in the six branches. On this basis a single, generic job-domain description has been developed. It includes:

1. Definitions and indicators of each of the competencies
2. The situations in which the competencies are most likely to be demonstrated or needed
3. An assessment of the difficulty of acquiring each competency
4. The training techniques that can develop each competency.

Summary of Junior Officer Competency Model

Table VII.1 summarizes the Junior Officer Competency Model. Each competency is defined, and the associated behavioral indicators are listed. The list of behavioral indicators is not exhaustive, but covers those most frequently found in the interviews with junior officers.

TABLE VII.1

Competency Model for Junior Officers

<u>The Competencies</u>	<u>Defining Characteristics</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
<u>Mission Focus Cluster</u>		
1. Concern for Efficiency	Motivation and ability to complete tasks with minimal expenditure of time and resources	• Expresses annoyance at things that slow tasks • Expresses displeasure to specific people when time or effort is wasted • Defines problems or outcomes as significant costs or savings in resources • Explicitly mentions doing something faster or more efficiently • Designs systems to improve efficiency
2. Planning	Ability to think things through systematically ahead of time; to develop ways to keep track of progress on tasks; and to set priorities	• Sets priorities • Develops methods to keep track of tasks' progress • Thinks things through systematically ahead of time
3. Initiative	Ability to use imaginative strategies, personal contacts, and persistence to solve problems and accomplish tasks	• Uses imaginative or other unusual means to overcome an obstacle • Develops innovative strategies to accomplish a mission • Builds and uses personal contacts to solve problems • Persists in order to overcome obstacles

continued

Table VII.1, continued

<u>The Competencies</u>	<u>Defining Characteristics</u>	<u>Diagnostic Methods</u>
4. Concern for Standards	Concern for and skill in maintaining high performance standards for oneself and one's subordinates	• Makes an effort to surpass existing mission standards • Strives for precision in mission accomplishment • Rejects substandard performance in mission-related activities • Requires additional effort from others when mission-related standards are not met • Systematically monitors the performance of subordinates • Takes steps to ensure that subordinates master mission-related tasks and materials
<u>Professional Maturity Cluster</u>		
5. Self-confidence	Belief in one's own expertise and a tendency to compare oneself favorably with others	• Expresses belief in own expertise • Describes self as a star • Compares self favorably with others
6. Job Involvement	Strong commitment to Army officer's job, as shown by self-directed work to develop knowledge and skills; making personal sacrifices for professional gain; enthusiasm for past and future challenges; and willingness to work long hours and fill in for others	• Makes personal sacrifices for professional gain as an Army officer • Works on own knowledge and skill development • Expresses enthusiasm for past or future challenges • Pinch-hits for others when necessary to get job done

continued

Table VII.1, continued

<u>The Competencies</u>	<u>Defining Characteristics</u>	<u>Diagnostic Methods</u>
	in order to get a job done	• Puts in very long hours to get job done
<u>Power and Influence Cluster</u>		
7. Persuading Others	Ability to use knowledge of regulations, technical expertise, and rational arguments to persuade others	• Uses knowledge of regulations to support a position • Uses technical expertise to persuade • Uses two or more reasons in order to persuade
8. Willingness to Confront Others	Willingness to stand up to powerful people to defend one's principles or actions, or to resist encroachment on one's area of responsibility	• Defends his or her actions against others' criticisms • Stands up to others for what he or she believes in • Resists encroachment on his or her area of responsibility
9. Forcefulness	Willingness to use one's power and position to coerce or influence subordinates or to manipulate situations	• Pulls rank to overcome resistance • Coerces when necessary • Manipulates situations and people • Deliberately takes advantage of position and symbolic power
10. Concern with Image	Concern for projecting a favorable image of oneself and one's superiors; ability to anticipate and recog-	• Describes people's perceptions of him or her • Discusses the impact of own behavior on attitudes and

continued

Table VII.1, continued

<u>The Competencies</u>	<u>Defining Characteristics</u>	<u>Diagnostic Methods</u>
	nize the effects of one's behavior or people's attitudes and behavior; awareness of the power implications of situations	behavior of others • Discusses the power implications of situations • Keeps superiors informed, so that they are not embarrassed • Shows awareness of people's interpretation of behavior
<u>Understanding and Managing Others Cluster</u>		
11. Concern for Clarity	Concern for having all the information needed to understand situations and make decisions; ability to get this information from others; ability to communicate (especially to give instructions) clearly	• Uses material aids to increase audience's understanding • Issues instructions and systematically reviews procedures • Asks subordinates to repeat instructions, to be sure they understand them • Demands or develops adequate channels of communication • Probes for information to clarify a problem
12. Understanding People, Situations, and Data	Ability to understand people's motives and behavior and to recognize patterns in situations and data	• Gives clear, reasonable explanations of why people behave in certain ways • Describes a personal experience to communicate that he or she understands

continued

Table VII.1, continued

<u>The Competencies</u>	<u>Defining Characteristics</u>	<u>Diagnostic Methods</u>
13. Positive Attitude toward Subordinates	Tendency to value the contributions of subordinates; to help subordinates; and to take into account their personal concerns	• States another person's viewpoint in a disagreement • Recognizes patterns in situations and behaviors • Analyzes information for differences between "real" and "ideal" • Sees to the comfort and welfare of troops • Expresses concern when subordinates are not respected, rewarded, or thanked • Goes out of way to help subordinates solve personal problems • Rewards troops for a good job • Acknowledges people's contributions to success (gives credit where it is due) • Expresses confidence in subordinates' ability to do well • Demonstrates willingness to learn from subordinates • Makes a realistic assessment of what the individual is capable of, and avoids unfair blame

continued

Table VII.1, continued

<u>The Competencies</u>	<u>Defining Characteristics</u>	<u>Diagnostic Methods</u>
14. Developing Subordinates	Tendency to set an example; to give specific feedback on performance; and to assign tasks that will improve the skills and self-images of subordinates	• Expresses enthusiasm for training • Assigns tasks to subordinates with the stated purpose of developing their skills or self-image • Sets an example • Gives specific feedback on performance • Gives subordinates some freedom to decide how to accomplish tasks

Typical Situations in Which the Competencies are Used.

Table VII.2 identifies the typical situations in which the competencies can be expected to be demonstrated. This table was developed by carefully reviewing a sample (n=4) of the interviews from outstanding junior officers from each of the six targeted branches. Each situation described in the interview was briefly summarized, together with the competencies manifested in the situation. For example:

While at jump master school, interviewee wanted to rank number one. He had an instructor who was tough, so at first he was afraid he would fail. Describes in great detail how he did jump. When it was his turn to supervise this jump, he reassured people. He is very sensitive to technical mistakes he made.

Interviewee (5) ran a live shoot on a chaparral. One private scored 30 out of 100, but later did so well 5 recommended him for promotion. 5 clearly states expectations after the first failure, and describes sitting down with platoon sergeant to gauge what people could do.

These descriptions were then analyzed in terms of the types of situations and activities depicted. Thus, the first example refers to participation in military skill training and being evaluated, while the second example refers to training subordinates, motivating subordinates, and evaluating personnel.

Table VII.2 was developed by sorting these descriptions by the competencies most frequently manifested in the situations. Thus, Concern for Efficiency was typically found in situations where the junior officer redesigned an existing work procedure, selected personnel for an assignment, or completed time-sensitive operations. In more concrete terms, junior officers reorganized supply rooms, transferred or reassigned poorly performing NCOs, or loaded aircraft faster than had been expected.

As can be seen in Table VII.2, a given situation frequently calls for more than one competency. For example, getting a superior officer to change an inappropriate order provides an opportunity to exhibit Self-confidence, Persuasion, and a Willingness to Confront. Which of the competencies will be most important depends upon the precise situation. Persuasion may be sufficient to resolve technical disagreements, while Willingness to Confront will be more important where personal judgment is called for. Self-confidence will be most necessary when dealing with a new CO or a more senior officer.

Table VII.2 also serves to emphasize again why only minimal differences were found among the six branches. The situations facing junior officers and requiring the demonstration of the competencies are themselves generic. There is no reason to believe that differences should exist among branches.

TABLE VII.2

Competencies and Associated Situations

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Typical Situations</u>
<u>Mission Focus Cluster</u>	
1. Concern for Efficiency	Redesign existing work procedures Select individuals for assignments Complete time-sensitive operations (e.g., airlift)
2. Planning	Prepare for inspection Organize unit for field exercise Arrange for joint operation with other units or branches
3. Initiative	Compensate for lack of materials or equipment Respond to emergency situations Overcome red tape
4. Concern for Standards	Seek replacement of inefficient NCOs Correct technical deficiencies in use of equipment Discipline subordinates
<u>Professional Maturity Cluster</u>	
5. Self-confidence	Undertake assignments without prior experience or training Address deficiencies of experienced NCOs Get a senior officer to change an inappropriate order
6. Job Involvement	Volunteer for new assignments Personally participate in training Seek additional specialized training

(continued)

Table VII.2, continued

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Typical Situations</u>
<u>Power and Influence Cluster</u>	
7. Persuading Others	Get superior to change original instructions or orders Obtain resources at short notice Ensure re-enlistment of subordinates Work with senior officers who are not specialists
8. Willingness to Confront Others	Counsel experienced NCOs on their performance Persuade CO to change an existing order
9. Forcefulness	Counsel subordinates with motivational problems Overcome reluctance to follow orders Deal with drug abuse issues
10. Concern with Image	Socialize with subordinates Prepare for inspection Counsel
<u>Understanding and Managing Others Cluster</u>	
11. Concern for Clarity	Delegate tasks to NCOs Deploy branch-related equipment Receive instructions from others
12. Understanding People, Situations, and Data	Identify training needs Counsel individuals with personal problems Diagnose equipment malfunction
13. Positive Attitude toward Subordinates	Counsel individuals with personal problems Seek advice from experienced NCOs Delegate tasks to subordinates
14. Developing Subordinates	Organize training programs Delegate tasks to NCOs Performance counseling of NCOs

Acquiring the Competencies

With an understanding of the situations and tasks associated with the competencies, it is possible to consider the relative difficulty of acquiring each competency and what kinds of training techniques and experiences can be used to develop it. Table VII.3 presents an assessment of these matters in a format that is principally based on McBer's previous experience in developing competency-based training programs such as the Navy's Leadership and Management Effectiveness Training Program.

a. Difficulty of Developing the Competencies

The majority of the junior officer competencies can be developed through informal and formal training programs. Some of the competencies are markedly more difficult to develop than others. Self-confidence, for example, develops over an extended period of time and is very difficult to enhance within a specific time period. Job Involvement can fluctuate dramatically, depending on outside competing interests. The difficulty in developing Willingness to Confront Others and Forcefulness stems principally from the limitations of most training environments. It is difficult, for example, to simulate a situation in which individuals confront a superior.

b. Appropriateness of Training Techniques

Table VII.3 identifies five training techniques: self-assessment, other-assessment, case studies, simulations, and on-the-job experiences.

Self-assessment refers to any procedure whereby individuals evaluate themselves against some well-defined criteria.

Other-assessment refers to any procedure in which an individual is evaluated by those who have observed the individual demonstrate a particular competency. For junior officers or ROTC cadets, superiors, peers, or subordinates could provide the assessments. Other-assessment also includes the use of standardized tests.

Case studies refer to any detailed description (in writing or on film) of situations in which competencies are demonstrated or could have been demonstrated.

Simulations, such as role plays or games, refer to any activity where individuals assume specific roles and are required to reach a goal. Accomplishing the goal provides the opportunity to demonstrate certain competencies.

Table VII.3
Acquiring the Competencies

<u>Mission Focus Cluster</u>	<u>Difficulty of Developing</u>	<u>Self-Assessment</u>	<u>Other-Assessment</u>	<u>Case Analysis</u>	<u>Simulations</u>	<u>On-the-Job Experiences</u>
1. Concern for Efficiency	1		*	*	*	*
2. Planning	1	*	*		*	*
3. Initiative	1	*	*	*		*
4. Concern for Standards	1		*	*	*	*
<u>Professional Maturity Cluster</u>						
5. Self-confidence	2	*	*		*	*
6. Job Involvement	2	*	*	*		*
<u>Power and Influence Cluster</u>						
7. Persuading Others	1	*	*	*	*	*
8. Willingness to Confront Others	2	*	*	*	*	*
9. Forcefulness	2	*	*	*		*
10. Concern with Image	1	*	*	*		*

* Very appropriate

1 Can be developed

2 Very difficult to develop

(continued)

Table VII.3, continued

<u>Understanding and Managing Others Cluster</u>	<u>Difficulty of Developing</u>	<u>Self- Assessment</u>	<u>Other- Assessment</u>	<u>Case Analysis</u>	<u>Simulations</u>	<u>On-the-Job Experiences</u>
11. Concern for Clarity	1	*	*		*	*
12. Understanding People, Situations, and Data	1		*	*		*
13. Positive Attitude toward Subordi- nates	1		*	*		*
14. Developing Subor- dinates	1	*	*	*	*	*

* Very appropriate
1 Can be developed
2 Very difficult to develop

On-the-job experiences include any activities that increase the opportunity of demonstrating particular competencies.

The appropriateness of a given training technique depends upon the nature of the competency, the likely response of an individual, and the constraints of most training environments. For example, self-assessment is seen as least appropriate for competencies such as Concern for Efficiency, Concern for Standards, Understanding People, Situations, and Data, and Positive Attitude toward Subordinates, because these characteristics are generally seen as socially desirable. Case analyses, by comparison, are most useful when the behavior associated with a particular competency is not socially desirable and there is a need to legitimate it (e.g., Willingness to Confront Others). Case analyses are least useful when the associated behaviors are well understood (e.g., Planning). Simulations are most appropriate where the demonstration of specific skills and behaviors does not require significant amounts of time or entail real consequences. A role play calling for a junior officer to reprimand an experienced NCO (illustrating Forcefulness and Willingness to Confront Others) will be limited in its effectiveness unless the participants believe they are actually dealing with an experienced NCO.

On-the-job experience appears to be the most widely useful training technique. However, it is important to emphasize that to be effective, on-the-job training must include detailed discussions of how a junior officer actually performed. In addition, while it is possible to identify the job-related experiences that require using different competencies, there are obvious limitations on the experiences an individual junior officer or ROTC cadet can have access to.

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APPENDICES

- Appendix A Work Environment Questionnaire (WEQ)
- Appendix B Peer Nomination Form
- Appendix C Junior Officer Performance Data: Versions A and B
- Appendix D Task Analysis Inventory and Items
- Appendix E Performance Characteristics Inventory and Items
- Appendix F Military Picture Story Exercise (MPSE)
- Appendix G Army Leadership Problem Exercise (ALPE)
- Appendix H Officer Performance Style Inventory (OPSI)--Supervisory Rating Form
- Appendix I Officer Performance Style Inventory (OPSI)--Self Rating Form

APPENDIX A

Work Environment Questionnaire (WEQ)

W | E | Q

WORK ENVIRONMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Name _____

Date _____

McBer
and
Company

Questionnaire _____

137 Newbury Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02116
(617) 437-7080

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 U.S.C. 552a)

TITLE OF FORM

Army Work Environment Questionnaire

PRESCRIBING OFFICE

AR 70-1

1. AUTHORITY

10 USC Sec 4503

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. When identifiers (name or Social Security Number) are requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses will be maintained in the processing of these data.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information. This notice may be detached from the rest of the form and retained by the individual if so desired.

FORM

Privacy Act Statement: 25 Sep 75

DA Form 4366-R, 1 May 75

Purpose

This survey is part of an effort to improve the jobs and training of Army officers. It asks you to describe how effective your unit is and how satisfied you are with your job and your supervisor.

Confidentiality

Your individual responses are confidential. The survey is not a test and will not be used to evaluate you in any way. In fact, you are asked not to put your name on it. On the preceding page of the survey is a Privacy Act Statement. The number on the document is for recording purposes only.

Instructions

Answer each item as honestly and accurately as you can. The survey can only be of use if it describes how you really see things. Please turn the page and begin the survey. Be certain that you complete each item. Do not leave blanks. There is no time limit so you can work at your own pace.

Please return the questionnaire in the attached envelope to:

Bernard Cullen
McBer & Co.
137 Newbury St.
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

Part I:
Background Data

1. What company are you in? _____
2. My unit is (circle one):
 1. Infantry
 2. Field Artillery
 3. Air Defense Artillery
 4. Engineer
 5. Signal
 6. Transportation/Quartermaster
 7. Armor
 8. Other
3. What is your age? _____ years
4. What is your pay grade? _____
5. Are you a supervisor in your unit's chain of command? (circle one):
 1. Yes
 2. No
6. What is your sex? (circle one):
 1. Male
 2. Female
7. Are you married? (circle one):
 1. Yes
 2. No
8. What ethnic group do you belong to? (circle one):
 1. White American
 2. Black American
 3. Spanish American
 4. American Indian
 5. Asian/Oriental American
 6. Other (please specify): _____

9. What was the date you entered the Army?

 /
Month Year

10. How long have you been in your present job assignment? months

11. How long have you been in your present unit?
 months

12. When does your current term of enlistment end?

 /
Month Year

13. What is the highest grade of school you have finished? (circle one)

1. 8th grade or less
2. 9th to 11th grade
3. High School graduate or G.E.D.
4. 1 to 3 years of college or A.A. degree
5. College graduate (4 years of college or more)
6. Master or graduate work.

Unit Effectiveness and Satisfaction

INSTRUCTIONS: For each item, draw a circle around the number of the alternative that best describes your unit's (platoon or other element lead by a commissioned officer) performance.

1. My unit's rating on the last IG inspection was

1. Satisfactory ("S",1)
2. Unsatisfactory ("U",2)
3. Don't know
4. Does not apply (my unit doesn't have IG inspections)

2. My unit's score on the last ARTEP inspection was

1. Pass
2. Fail
3. Don't know
4. Does not apply (my unit doesn't have ARTEP inspections)

3. My unit's score on the last Technical Standard Inspection (TSI), Command Technical Inspection (CTI), or Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) was

1. Pass
2. Fail
3. Don't know
4. Does not apply (my unit doesn't have this inspection)

NOTE: Please answer this question for tests or inspections used in your MOS--for example, field day scores, firing scores, armor placement or running scores, hours flown in aviation units, etc.

4. On other inspection tests and inspections my unit usually does

1. Much better than other units (we're usually number one)
2. Better than other units
3. Somewhat better than other units
4. Somewhat worse than other units
5. Worse than other units
6. Much worse than other units (we're usually at the bottom)
7. Don't know
8. Does not apply (my unit doesn't have other inspections)

5. My unit's accident rate is

1. Much better than other units
2. Better than other units
3. Somewhat better than other units
4. Somewhat worse than other units
5. Worse than other units
6. Much worse than other units
7. Don't know
8. My unit doesn't keep accident records

6. The operational readiness (OR rate) of my unit's equipment is

1. Much better than other units (maintenance is excellent, most equipment is ready to run)
2. Better than other units
3. Somewhat better than other units
4. Somewhat worse than other units
5. Worse than other units
6. Much worse than other units (maintenance is poor, we have many equipment casualties, most equipment is not ready to run)
7. Don't know
8. My unit doesn't have equipment

7. At this time

1. I definitely intend to re-enlist
2. I probably will re-enlist, but am not sure
3. I don't know if I'll re-enlist
4. I probably won't re-enlist
5. I definitely won't re-enlist

8. The number of Article 15's people in my unit are receiving is

1. Many more than other units
2. More than other units
3. Somewhat more than other units
4. Somewhat fewer than other units
5. Fewer than other units
6. Many fewer than other units
7. Don't know

9. The number of DR's (delinquency reports) people in my unit are receiving is

1. Many more than other units
2. More than other units
3. Somewhat more than other units
4. Somewhat fewer than other units
5. Fewer than other units
6. Many fewer than other units
7. Don't know

10. The extent of unauthorized absenteeism, or people not showing up for work in my unit is

1. Very great: most people don't show up for work on a regular basis
2. Great: more than half the people don't show up for work on a regular basis
3. Significant: about half the people don't show up for work on a regular basis
4. Little: less than half the people don't show up for work on a regular basis
5. Very little: a few people don't show up for work on a regular basis
6. Nonexistent: no one is ever absent from work on a regular basis

11. The extent of people coming to work and not being able to perform at their job is

1. Very great: most people are not able to perform when they come to work
2. Great: more than half of the people are not able to perform when they come to work
3. Significant: about half the people are not able to perform when they come to work
4. Little: less than half of the people are not able to perform when they come to work
5. Very little: a few people are not able to perform when they come to work
6. Nonexistent: no one is unable to perform when they come to work

12. In general, how satisfied are you with most of the things you have to do on your job?

1. Extremely satisfied
2. Very satisfied
3. Somewhat satisfied
4. Somewhat dissatisfied
5. Very dissatisfied
6. Extremely dissatisfied

13. In general, how satisfied are you with the commissioned officer you or your supervisor report to?

1. Extremely satisfied
2. Very satisfied
3. Somewhat satisfied
4. Somewhat dissatisfied
5. Very dissatisfied
6. Extremely dissatisfied

14. In general, how satisfied are you with your unit (platoon or other element lead by a commissioned officer)?

1. Extremely satisfied
2. Very satisfied
3. Somewhat satisfied
4. Somewhat dissatisfied
5. Very dissatisfied
6. Extremely dissatisfied

15. In general, how satisfied are you with your installation or post?

1. Extremely satisfied
2. Very satisfied
3. Somewhat satisfied
4. Somewhat dissatisfied
5. Very dissatisfied
6. Extremely dissatisfied

16. In general, how satisfied are you with the Army as a whole?

1. Extremely satisfied
2. Very satisfied
3. Somewhat satisfied
4. Somewhat dissatisfied
5. Very dissatisfied
6. Extremely dissatisfied

17. If the people in your unit were given the choice of transferring to another unit, in general what would be their reaction?
1. Jump at the chance
 2. Think about it and eventually take it
 3. Think about it, but turn it down
 4. Definitely turn it down
18. If you had to transfer to another unit, how many people in your unit would you want to transfer with you?
1. Everybody in my unit
 2. About three-quarters of the people in my unit
 3. About half of the people in my unit
 4. About a quarter of the people in my unit
 5. None of the people in my unit
19. If you were given the choice of transferring to another unit what would you do?
1. Jump at the chance
 2. Think about it, and eventually take the transfer
 3. Think about it, but turn down the transfer
 4. Definitely turn down the transfer
20. If your immediate supervisor was replaced, what would happen to your unit?
1. The unit would not work well together without him/her
 2. The unit would have difficulty working well together without him/her
 3. The unit would have some difficulty at first, but this would quickly disappear
 4. The unit would continue to work well together without him/her
 5. The unit would function much better without him/her.

Part II:
Army Work Environment Questionnaire

This questionnaire is designed to measure different things that affect your job. There are two parts to this questionnaire. The first part asks you to describe the way things are now, and the second part asks you to describe the way things should be. In the spaces provided next to each question, draw a circle around the answer that best describes how things actually are now:

- Circle: 1 if the statement describes my situation to
a very little extent
- 2 if the statement describes my situation to
a little extent
- 3 if the statement describes my situation to
some extent
- 4 if the statement describes my situation to
a great extent
- 5 if the statement describes my situation to
a very great extent

Also draw a circle around the answer that best describes the way things should be:

- Circle: 1 if the statement should describe my situation to
a very little extent
- 2 if the statement should describe my situation to
a little extent
- 3 if the statement should describe my situation to
some extent
- 4 if the statement should describe my situation to
a great extent
- 5 if the statement should describe my situation to
a very great extent

Now turn to the example on the next page.

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the alternatives that best describe your job situation.

EXAMPLES:

(1) IN MY JOB I SPEND TIME TELLING OTHER PEOPLE WHAT TO DO

(2) I GET SATISFACTION FROM THE JOB I DO

THIS STATEMENT
DESCRIBES MY
SITUATION TO:

THIS STATEMENT
SHOULD DESCRIBE
MY SITUATION TO:

	a very little extent	a little extent	some extent	a great extent	a very great extent
1	2	3	④	5	
1	②	3	4	5	

	a very little extent	a little extent	some extent	a great extent	a very great extent
1	2	3	④	5	
1	2	3	4	⑤	

In the first example, the person who answered this question reports the statement describes the situation to a great extent for his present job. He also thinks that the time he spends telling other people what to do is just about right for his job.

In the second example, the person who answered this question reports the statement describes the situation to a little extent for his present job. But in this example, he also thinks that he should get a great deal of satisfaction from his job, more than he has now.

You will now be asked some questions that have to do with your job and your supervisor. When you answer these questions, keep the following definitions in mind:

Your job refers to your present job, what you spend most of your time doing from day to day.

Your supervisor refers to your closest boss, the person who most often tells you what to do.

Now go ahead and work through the questionnaire. The answers you give will be useful only if you provide a truly accurate description of your job situation. Because of this, be as honest as you can in answering these questions and spend enough time to answer each question to the best of your ability.

DO NOT LEAVE ANY ITEMS BLANK.

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the alternatives that best describe your job situation.

	THIS STATEMENT DESCRIBES MY SITUATION TO:					THIS STATEMENT SHOULD DESCRIBE MY SITUATION TO:				
	a very little extent	a little extent	some extent	a great extent	a very great extent	a very little extent	a little extent	some extent	a great extent	a very great extent
(1) MY SUPERVISOR STICKS UP FOR HIS OR HER PEOPLE	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
(2) MY SUPERVISOR EXPLAINS CHANGES IN PROCEDURES	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
(3) MY SUPERVISOR HOLDS INSPECTIONS WHENEVER HE OR SHE WANTS	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
(4) MY SUPERVISOR PUTS PRESSURE ON ME TO DO MY JOB BETTER	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
(5) IN MY JOB, IT TAKES A LONG TIME TO GET REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
(6) PEOPLE ARE FREQUENTLY TRANSFERRED IN AND OUT OF MY UNIT	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
(7) I CAN SEE WHAT MY JOB HAS TO DO WITH OTHERS IN MY UNIT	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
(8) ARMY RULES AND REGULATIONS MAKE LIFE HARD FOR ME	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX B

Peer Nomination Form

Peer Nomination Form

Name _____

Rank _____

Location _____

Branch (circle appropriate number)

- 1 Infantry
- 2 Transportation
- 3 Air Defense Artillery
- 4 Engineer
- 5 Signal
- 6 Field Artillery

Please list at least six and no more than ten junior officers currently stationed at Ft. Carson who you regard superior performers in their current positions. Please also indicate their branch.

	Branch
1 _____	_____
2 _____	_____
3 _____	_____
4 _____	_____
5 _____	_____
6 _____	_____
7 _____	_____
8 _____	_____
9 _____	_____
10 _____	_____

Please return this form in the attached envelope to:

Bernard J. Cullen
McBer and Company
137 Newbury Street
Boston, MA 02116

McBER and COMPANY

APPENDIX C

Junior Officer Performance Data: Versions A and B

JUNIOR OFFICER PERFORMANCE DATA

The following data is requested to support an ARI/TRADCC study of pre-commissioning training for Junior Officers.

For each officer on the attached sheet please provide the following information for the units they currently are responsible for:

- Comparison with other officers of equivalent rank (top 25%, top 50%, bottom 50%, bottom 25%)
- Name of unit (platoon, company, BN)
- Number of people in unit
- Latest IG results: overall result and date
- Latest ARTEPS: overall result and date
- Last 3 months (June, July, and August) number of AWOLS and Article 15s
- Last 3 months (June, July, and August) re-enlistments as % of those eligible for re-enlistment

Please return information as soon as possible to:

McBer and Company
Attn: Bernard J. Cullen
137 Newbury Street
Boston, MA 02116

JUNIOR OFFICER PERFORMANCE MEASURES

[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING OUT THE ARTEP WORKSHEET

Column

1 Rank and name of officer

From the master list of officer's names, enter those who are in your battalion.

2 Date of the last ARTEP

Enter the date of the most recent ARTEP, unless this officer did not participate in it. If this officer was not with the battalion immediately before the ARTEP, leave columns 2-6 blank.

3 Company rating

Enter the rating this officer's company received in the last ARTEP.

4 Number of platoon deficiencies

Enter the rating of noted deficiencies of this platoon during the ARTEP.

5 Relative platoon performance

Indicate how well this platoon performed during the ARTEP, relative to other platoons in the battalion. Enter:

1 = This platoon performed among the top 25% of other platoons in this battalion.

2 = This platoon performed among the top 50%.

3 = This platoon performed among the bottom 50%.

4 = This platoon performed among the bottom 25%.

6 Officer's contribution during the ARTEP

Indicate your estimation of this officer's contribution to the satisfactory performance of his/her platoon during the ARTEP. Enter significant (S), moderate (M),

or insignificant (I) in this column according to your judgment about this officer's positive impact on the platoon's performance.

7 Overall evaluation

Indicate your estimation of this officer's ARTEP performance to other officers of equivalent rank and responsibility in your battalion. Enter:

- 1 = This officer's performance places him/her among the top 25% of comparable officers in this battalion.
- 2 = This officer's performance places him/her among the top 50%.
- 3 = This officer's performance places him/her among the bottom 50%.
- 4 = This officer's performance places him/her among the bottom 25%.

8 Comments

Please enter any comments you are able to make about this officer's ARTEP performance with respect to mission completion, organization abilities, training abilities, or leadership.

JUNIOR OFFICER PERFORMANCE MEASURES: ARTEP

COLUMN: 1 RANK/NAME	2 DATE OF ARTEP	3 CO RATING	4 PLAT DEF	5 REL PLAT PERF	6 OFF CNTRB	7 OVERALL EVALUA- TION	8 COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING OUT THE IG
AND PLATOON MEASURES WORKSHEET

BACKGROUND DATA

Column

1 Rank and name of officer

From the master list of officer's names, enter those that are in your battalion.

2 Platoon or unit size

Enter the number of persons in this officer's platoon (or other unit, if not a platoon).

IG MEASURES

3 IG Date

Enter the date of the most recent IG, unless this officer did not participate in it. If this officer was not with the platoon immediately before the IG, leave columns 3-8 blank.

4 Overall rating: company

Enter the rating received by the company in the most recent IG.

5 Number of areas inspected: platoon

Enter the number of areas in which this officer's platoon was inspected during the most recent IG. It is not necessary to name those areas.

6 Number of sats/unsats: platoon

Enter the number of satisfactory or unsatisfactory ratings received by this officer's platoon in the areas inspected.

Column

7 Officer's contribution: company performance

Indicate your estimation of this officer's contribution to the satisfactory performance of his/her company during the IG. Enter significant (S), moderate (M), or insignificant (I) in this column according to your judgment about this officer's positive impact on the company's performance.

8 Officer's contribution: platoon performance

Indicate your estimation of this officer's contribution to the satisfactory performance of his/her platoon during the IG. Enter significant (S), moderate (M), or insignificant (I) in this column according to your judgment about this officer's positive impact on the platoon's performance.

PLATOON MEASURES

9 AWOL rates

Enter the number of AWOL's from this officer's platoon for the past three months. If this officer is newly arrived, add an asterisk in the month-column that he/she reported for duty.

10 Platoon performance on AWOL rates

Compare this platoon's performance with other platoons in your battalion. Enter:

- 1 = This rate is low enough to place this platoon in the top 25% of this battalion's platoons.
- 2 = This rate places this platoon in the top 50%.
- 3 = This rate is high enough to place this platoon in the bottom 50% of this battalion's platoons.
- 4 = This rate places this platoon in the bottom 25%.

11 Article 15's

Follow directions for column 9.

Column

12 Platoon performance on Article 15's

Follow directions for column 10.

13 Re-enlistments

Enter the number of re-enlistments as a percentage of those eligible.

14 Platoon performance on re-enlistments

Enter:

- 1 = This rate is high enough to place this platoon in the top 25% of this battalion's platoons.
- 2 = This rate places this platoon in the top 50%.
- 3 = This rate is low enough to place this platoon in the bottom 50% of this battalion's platoons.
- 4 = This rate places this platoon in the bottom 25%.

OVERALL EVALUATION

15 Indicate your estimation of this officer's performance compared to other officers of equivalent rank and responsibility in your battalion. Enter:

- 1 = This officer's performance places him/her among the top 25% of comparable officers in this battalion.
- 2 = This officer's performance places him/her among the top 50%.
- 3 = This officer's performance places him/her among the bottom 50% of comparable officers in this battalion.
- 4 = This officer's performance places him/her among the bottom 25%.

APPENDIX D

Task Analysis Inventory and Items

TASK ANALYSIS INVENTORY

title of job being analyzed

your name

your title

McBER

McBer and Company
137 Newbury Street • Boston, Massachusetts 02116

INSTRUCTIONS

In this inventory you are asked to rate a list of "job tasks" in terms of their importance to your work. These tasks were taken from suggestions made by a group of your peers. They represent many of the major tasks that a person in your position might be expected to perform on the job.

A list of tasks for the job you are evaluating appears in a separate booklet. First, look over the tasks so you are familiar with them. Then rate each task according to four separate rating scales:

Rating 1: Is the task important for outstanding results?

Circle **yes** for each job task that clearly leads to **outstanding** results. Circle **no** for those tasks that may be necessary for routine performance of the job but do not relate to obtaining outstanding results.

Rating 2: Is the task required for routine performance in the job?

Circle **yes** for each job task that all people need to perform as a matter of routine. Circle **no** for those tasks only a few people are required to perform.

Rating 3: Is the task the most critical to consider in performing the job?

Circle **yes** for each task that is **essential** to the majority of assignments in the job being evaluated. Circle **no** for those tasks which are **not essential** to performing the job.

Rating 4: Is the task performed frequently in the job?

Circle **yes** for each task that is performed very frequently — every day or every week. Circle **no** for each task that is performed only seldom or occasionally.

Now turn to the list of tasks provided in this inventory. Using the four rating scales just described, rate each task as it pertains to the job you are evaluating. Since the success of this process depends on your thorough understanding of the four rating scales, be sure you understand them before proceeding.

Task Number	Rating 1 Is the task important to outstanding results?		Rating 2 Is the task required for routine performance?		Rating 3 Is the task the most critical to consider?		Rating 4 Is the task performed frequently?	
	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
1	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
2	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
3	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
4	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
5	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
6	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
7	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
8	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
9	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
10	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
11	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
12	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
13	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
14	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
15	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
16	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
17	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
18	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
19	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
20	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no

Task Number	Rating 1 Is the task important to outstanding results?		Rating 2 Is the task required for routine performance?		Rating 3 Is the task the most critical to consider?		Rating 4 Is the task performed frequently?	
	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
21	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
22	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
23	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
24	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
25	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
26	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
27	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
28	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
29	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
30	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
31	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
32	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
33	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
34	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
35	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
36	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
37	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
38	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
39	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
40	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no

TASK ANALYSIS INVENTORY FOR JR. OFFICERS

1. Personally counsel troops and NCOs
2. Personally train troops in combat skills
3. Acquire related technical knowledge from manuals and publications
4. Schedule personnel and resources for projects
5. Read and interpret plans and/or technical documents
6. Read, interpret and implement directives
7. Develop detailed plans to accomplish branch-related tasks
8. Write personnel-related reports e.g. awards, efficiency reports, discipline
9. Write task-related reports e.g. after action reports, accident reports
10. Personally deliver technical skills training
11. Prepare estimates of personnel and equipment capabilities and requirements
12. Formally brief superiors
13. Informally brief superiors
14. Deploy or set up branch-related resources equipment e.g. troops, construction equipment, electronic signal equipment, charge and small weapons systems
15. Supervise the deployment of branch-related resources
16. Provide technical advice to other units or officers
17. Coordinate use of resources with peers
18. Complete collateral duties
19. Monitor maintenance checks
20. Maintain records
21. Personally employ basic military skills e.g. map reading, individual weapon
22. Personally participate in the completion of branch specific tasks e.g. profile radio shots, combat maneuvers, drive equipment, direct fire.

23. Supervise the completion of branch specific tasks
24. Arrange for maintenance and repair of equipment
25. Schedule own time
26. Monitor the control of inventory and equipment
27. Direct troops and NCOs to sources of help for personal problems
28. Communicate verbally and in writing with staff or other agencies.

APPENDIX E

Performance Characteristics Inventory and Items

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS INVENTORY

title of job being analyzed

your name

your title

McBER

McBer and Company
137 Newbury Street • Boston, Massachusetts 02116

INSTRUCTIONS

In this inventory you are asked to rate a list of traits, skills, knowledges, and abilities as to how they pertain to the job being analyzed. These characteristics have been identified as being of potential importance to various aspects of the type of work that the job to be evaluated represents. Some of these characteristics may not be relevant to the particular job you are evaluating, however.

The performance characteristics for the job you are evaluating are contained in a separate booklet. You are to rate each of them according to four separate rating scales. First, glance over the list of characteristics so that you are briefly acquainted with them. Then, read each characteristic carefully and assign it four separate ratings:

Rating 1: Does this characteristic differentiate between superior and average performance in this job?

In the job you are evaluating, does this characteristic distinguish the superior performer? Or does having more of this characteristic make a person a superior performer in the job? Use the following scale:

- 2 = This characteristic is very important in distinguishing superior performance
- 1 = This characteristic is important but not critical in distinguishing superior performance
- 0 = This characteristic does not distinguish superior from average performance

Rating 2: How many marginal performers in this job possess this characteristic?

Think about people you know now or knew in the past that you feel are or were marginal performers in the job you are evaluating; do all of these marginal performers possess this characteristic, or do none of them possess this characteristic? Use the following scale:

- 2 = Nearly all marginal performers possess this characteristic
- 1 = Some marginal performers possess this characteristic
- 0 = Almost no marginal performers possess this characteristic

Rating 3: Is trouble likely if this characteristic is not considered in selecting or training a person for this job?

You don't have to consider every possible characteristic when selecting or training a person for the job. Some characteristics are very important, while others may be ignored. Use the following scale:

- 2 = Much trouble likely if this characteristic is not considered
- 1 = Some trouble likely if this characteristic is not considered
- 0 = It is safe to ignore this characteristic

Rating 4: How difficult is it to find this characteristic in the people who are normally considered for this job?

Not all characteristics are realistic to expect of applicants for the job you are evaluating. Some characteristics may be possessed by almost no applicants for this job. Use the following scale:

- 2 = The characteristic is easy to find among most job applicants
- 1 = The characteristic is difficult to find, but still available among some job applicants
- 0 = The characteristic is almost impossible to find among any job applicants

Element Number	Rating 1 Does this characteristic distinguish superior performance? 2 = Very important 1 = Important but not critical 0 = Does not distinguish	Rating 2 How many marginal performers possess this characteristic? 2 = Nearly all marginals possess 1 = Some marginals possess 0 = Almost no marginals possess	Rating 3 Is trouble likely if this characteristic is not considered? 2 = Much trouble likely 1 = Some trouble likely 0 = Safe to ignore	Rating 4 How difficult is it to find this characteristic in the group of people who are normally considered for this job? 2 = Easily available 1 = Difficult to find 0 = Almost impossible to find
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				

Element Number	Rating 1 Does this characteristic distinguish superior performance? 2 = Very important 1 = Important but not critical 0 = Does not distinguish	Rating 2 How many marginal performers possess this characteristic? 2 = Nearly all marginals possess 1 = Some marginals possess 0 = Almost no marginals possess	Rating 3 Is trouble likely if this characteristic is not considered? 2 = Much trouble likely 1 = Some trouble likely 0 = Safe to ignore	Rating 4 How difficult is it to find this characteristic in the group of people who are normally considered for this job? 2 = Easily available 1 = Difficult to find 0 = Almost impossible to find
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
29				
30				
31				
32				
33				
34				
35				
36				
37				
38				
39				
40				

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS INVENTORY FOR J7. OFFICERS

1. Plans tasks in great detail
2. Makes provision for unforeseen events
3. Involves NCOs in planning
4. Remains coherent and rational when under severe pressure
5. Delegates tasks to NCOs
6. Trusts and respects subordinates
7. Runs spot-checks on how well subordinates are accomplishing assigned duties and responsibilities
8. Exhibits sense of fair play when handling disciplinary issues
9. Able to get to the root of the personal problems of subordinates
10. In counseling situations, identifies specific ways of solving a problem
11. Checks for possible problems before they occur
12. Does not wait until a job has to be done, but takes the initiative
13. Briefs superiors when a problem occurs, even when personally responsible for problem
14. Does not take advantage of rank by avoiding difficult living conditions or duty assignments
15. Sets an example to troops in terms of physical condition and appearance
16. Finds necessary but difficult to obtain resources without inconveniencing others
17. Aggressively pursues duties and does not let small problems get in the way
18. Gives orders by specifying standards, conditions and time
19. Has obvious aptitude for the technical or physical aspects of assigned duties, e.g. mechanical, electrical or stamina
20. Develops possible solutions before outlining a problem to a superior
21. Constantly aware of rank and its associated responsibilities
22. Looks for ways to be involved in work related activities

23. Expresses self clearly both verbally and in writing
24. Possesses and maintains extensive familiarity with branch related equipment
25. Ability to solve problems without continually relying on Army manuals
26. Even when basically disagrees, demonstrates a willingness to accept decision of superiors rather than complaining
27. Communicates positive attitudes towards unattractive tasks
28. Establishes priorities
29. Completes tasks without being prompted
30. Uses hands-on-training methods rather than lectures whenever possible
31. Performance oriented
32. Personally prepares or obtains additional training materials
33. Puts mission ahead of personal interests
34. Comprehends the larger picture
35. Demonstrates clear ability to learn from mistakes
36. Talks easily with others
37. Avoids letting personal differences interfere with the mission
38. Demonstrates tact when dealing with both superiors and subordinates

APPENDIX F

Military Picture Story Exercise (MPSE)

[REDACTED]

Name _____

Date _____

M

Military

P

Picture

S

Story

E

Exercise

Exercise

Milpercen control number
SCN: ATZI-MA 8217

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 U.S.C. 552a)

TITLE OF FORM

Military Picture Story Exercise

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE

AR 70-1

1. AUTHORITY

10 USC Sec 4503

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. When identifiers (name or Social Security Number) are requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses will be maintained in the processing of these data.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information. This notice may be detached from the rest of the form and retained by the individual if so desired.

FORM

Privacy Act Statement - 26 Sep 75

DA Form 4358-R, 1 May 75

INSTRUCTIONS

On the following pages, you are to make up and write out a brief, imaginative story for each of six pictures. You will have about ten minutes for each story. There is one page for each story (in any case, please do not write more than about 300 words per story).

Try to make your stories interesting and dramatic. Show that you have an understanding of people and can make up stories about human situations. Don't just describe the pictures, but write stories about them.

To help you cover all the elements of a story plot in the time allowed, you will find these questions repeated at the top of each page:

1. What is happening? Who are the people?
2. What has led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past?
3. What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom?
4. What will happen? What will be done?

Treat these questions as guides for your thinking, but do not try to answer each one specifically. Your story should be continuous and not just a set of answers to these questions.

There are no "right" or "wrong" stories. In fact, any kind of story is quite all right. You have a chance to show how quickly you can imagine and write a story on your own.


Now, turn the page, look at the picture briefly, then turn the page again and write the story suggested to you by the picture. Don't take more than ten minutes. Then turn the page, look at the next picture briefly, write out the story it suggests, and so on through the booklet.

Total time for six stories: 60 minutes



Just look at the picture briefly (10-15 seconds), turn the page and write out the story it suggests.

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.



Just look at the picture briefly (10-15 seconds), turn the page and write out the story it suggests.

What is happening? Who are the people? What led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past? What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom? What will happen? What will be done?

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.



Just look at the picture briefly (10-15 seconds), turn the page and write out the story it suggests.

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There is no text or other markings on the paper.



Just look at the picture briefly (10-15 seconds), turn the page and write out the story it suggests.

What is happening? Who are the people? What led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past? What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom? What will happen? What will be done?


This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.



Just look at the picture briefly (10-15 seconds), turn the page and write out the story it suggests.

What is happening? Who are the people? What led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past? What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom? What will happen? What will be done?

[illegible]



Just look at the picture briefly (10-15 seconds), turn the page and write out the story it suggests.

What is happening? Who are the people? What led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past? What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom? What will happen? What will be done?

[illegible]

APPENDIX G

Army Leadership Problem Exercise (ALPE)

A

Army

L

Leadership

P

Problem

E

Exercise

████████████████████

Name

Unit

Date

Milpercen. control number
SCN: ATZI-NCR-MA 8217

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 U.S.C. 552e)

TITLE OF FORM

Army Leadership Problem Exercise

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE

AR 70-1

1. AUTHORITY

10 USC Sec 4503

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. When identifiers (name or Social Security Number) are requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses will be maintained in the processing of these data.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information. This notice may be detached from the rest of the form and retained by the individual if so desired.

FORM

Privacy Act Statement - 26 Sep 75

DA Form 4368-R, 1 May 75

Instructions:

This exercise consists of a set of brief problems based on real experiences of junior officers. Read each problem and consider what you would do or think if you were in the situation. After each problem you will find a series of items consisting of paired statements. For each item you are to choose one of two alternative actions or thoughts. Choose on the basis of what you would most likely do or think if you were in the situation. If you think you might do or think both alternatives, choose the one you would do or think first. Circle the letter (a or b) of the alternative you select. Be sure to answer all the questions.

A. You are the officer in charge. You have young, inexperienced troops, and many of the parts you need for your operation are not readily available to you. A surprise inspection identified some real problems, and the inspector is clearly going to give you a bad report. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Accept the responsibility for the bad report and resolve to do better next time.
 - b. Explain the situation to the inspector and try to delay the report and get another inspection.
2.
 - a. Tell your superior what happened in order to prevent his possible embarrassment.
 - b. Prepare yourself for the meeting that you know your CO will set up when he gets the report.
3.
 - a. Be realistic about the support services you will receive and turn in another request for spare parts.
 - b. Go to other units and try to get them to give you the needed parts.
4.
 - a. Develop a list of the most important problems and work with your NCO on those first.
 - b. Get a list of the problems, give it to your senior NCO, and tell him to fix them as soon as possible.
5.
 - a. Let the troops know that there will be hell to pay if the unit fails the next inspection.
 - b. Let your troops know that you are confident they will be able to improve significantly by the next inspection.
6.
 - a. Make the correction of the problems a high priority, but be aware that too much extra training could backfire and hurt morale.
 - b. Train your troops nights and weekends to correct the problems as soon as possible.
7.
 - a. Let your NCOs help plan the necessary extra training, so that their ability and confidence will grow.

b. Personally organize all the necessary extra training.

[illegible]

B. Although you are an expert in your area, you are relatively new to your current job. Your new unit's past performance has been marginal. On the first day of a scheduled one-week exercise, you realize that the operations took longer than they should have. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Meet with your section chiefs and tell them the times were not good enough and need to be improved.
 - b. Meet with your section chiefs and list any problems that made the operations take more time than expected.
2.
 - a. Tell your section chiefs that they should know where the performance problems lie and what to do about them.
 - b. Draw up a list of the performances in each area and compare the information with the way each part should go.
3.
 - a. Describe the problem areas to your section chiefs, and tell them step by step what needs to be done and how to do it for the next day's operations.
 - b. List the problem areas for your section chiefs and tell them to do whatever they need to do to overcome the problems.
4.
 - a. Make sure you're available the next day to act as a resource for your section chiefs.
 - b. Observe the operations the next day so you can be on top of any problems that arise.
5.
 - a. Tell yourself that the unit screwed up and that you will be able to correct the problems.
 - b. Tell yourself that you are still new to the job and did as well as could be expected, given the situation.
6.
 - a. Take advantage of the opportunity to train your troops.
 - b. Take advantage of the opportunity to understand your NCOs.

C. Using information from your most experienced NCOs and your own technical training, you have developed a series of technical procedures for your unit. Your CO says you ought to handle the operation in a different manner. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Back off and follow his advice for the time being.
 - b. Repeat that you feel your way is the best way to proceed.
2.
 - a. Describe your training and let him know how good you are at these kinds of operations.
 - b. Find out what your CO's background is in this type of operation.
3.
 - a. Realize you may be taking a risk by disagreeing with your CO. He may get annoyed, or he may respect you.
 - b. Recognize that as a good officer you should follow your CO's recommendations.
4.
 - a. Tell your CO that he can decide what your unit should do, but it is your job to decide how to do it.
 - b. Tell your CO that although you disagree, you will do your best to carry out the operations the way he wants them done.
5.
 - a. Ask your NCOs to help you develop a new and acceptable plan.
 - b. Figure out a compromise solution that includes some of the CO's ideas.
6.
 - a. Carry out the CO's recommendations and get on to other issues.
 - b. Spend a Saturday reading everything you can find on the procedures, to add to your understanding and provide new ideas.

D. An E-4 under your command is arrested for drunken driving and thrown in the local jail. During the last few months, this same soldier has been involved in other incidents, including a fight and not paying several bills on time. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. The pattern of behavior indicates that the soldier may have some underlying problem.
 - b. The soldier probably isn't motivated or disciplined, and might be better off separating from the service.
2.
 - a. Conclude that a weekend in jail may be good for the soldier.
 - b. Personally arrange bail for the soldier.
3.
 - a. Check out with the platoon sergeant how good a soldier he is. If he is good, arrange for counseling. If he isn't, try to ship him out.
 - b. When he comes back to the unit, let him know you think his behavior is stupid and make sure he receives the appropriate punishment.
4.
 - a. Realize that it is the soldier's responsibility to straighten himself out, not yours.
 - b. Talk to an Army psychiatrist and chaplain to pick up ideas and pointers on how to deal with this type of situation.
5.
 - a. Play down your role in resolving the situation.
 - b. Make sure your NCOs know that this is how you will handle similar situations.
6.
 - a. Figure that any personal problems the E-4 has are best dealt with by somebody with more training.
 - b. Call the E-4's family and find out if there is anything you should know about.

E. You are selected on short notice to work with the battalion XO on an ARTEP for a sister battalion. You receive virtually no directions from anyone on what to do or how to do it. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Define the needed tasks using guidelines from the ARTEP guide.
 - b. Go to the battalion XO and tell him you need clearer directions on what to do in order to accomplish your objectives.
2.
 - a. Use a word processor to put together an information packet for all personnel involved.
 - b. Brief your NCO and make sure he uses standard operating procedures to get the word to everyone on the ARTEP requirements.
3.
 - a. Decide what actions need to be taken, what problems may be encountered, and what resources can assist you in your work.
 - b. Get together a group of NCOs and discuss ways the exercise can be handled and what problems have occurred in the past.
4.
 - a. Point out to the XO that he may get some complaints from the other battalion if they realize this is your first ARTEP.
 - b. Let the XO know that it would be better to select somebody else.
5.
 - a. Invite a more experienced officer out for a drink, so you can find out how to conduct the ARTEP.
 - b. Prepare to spend all night familiarizing yourself with the inspection requirements.
6.
 - a. Figure that since you have to do it, you might as well try and relax and learn from it.
 - b. Figure that if you can pull it off the XO will recognize your abilities.

F. As a relatively new second lieutenant, you take over a platoon that is having problems. There is a lot of ghosting (people not showing up for work). You tell your NCO, an experienced E-7, to do things one way, and he does the opposite. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Confront the NCO with his behavior and indicate that he reports to you and will therefore follow your orders to the letter.
 - b. Call the NCO in and ask him what you are doing or not doing that has led him to disobey your orders.
2.
 - a. Tell the NCO there is no acceptable reason for what he has done.
 - b. Tell the NCO you can understand how hard it is to take orders from a new and young officer.
3.
 - a. Tell the NCO that he obviously has a lot of experience, and that there will be problems that come up while you are in command when you will need to learn from him.
 - b. Tell the NCO that you have been well trained and expect him to be able to learn a lot from you.
4.
 - a. Have the NCO take attendance on various work details.
 - b. Personally spot-check attendance on various work details.
5.
 - a. Let the NCO know that you will give him the worst performance evaluation he has ever seen if he doesn't straighten out his act.
 - b. Ask your CO about the possibilities of getting a new NCO.
6.
 - a. Contact the old platoon leader and get his opinion of the NCO.
 - b. Review the platoon's inspection scores and discipline records to try to find out what happened in the unit.

7.
 - a. Think about the time being wasted because of people not showing up for work.
 - b. Think about how the NCO's behavior may affect team spirit.

G. During a field exercise, you are informed that there is a botched count on critical supplies. You go to the supply area, which is ten miles away, in order to organize the necessary recount. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Find the person who made the mistake and chew him out for making things difficult for you and your unit.
 - b. Find the person who made the mistake and tell him how angry you are at the extra time and effort needed to conduct the recount.
2.
 - a. Show the person who botched the count how to do it right, and then ask him to repeat your instructions.
 - b. Get two other people to conduct the recount together.
3.
 - a. Let your CO know that the problem exists and that you will try and sort it out.
 - b. Anticipate that you can solve the problem and get back to the field without bothering your CO.
4.
 - a. Contact the officer in charge of the supply detail and let him know what has occurred.
 - b. Figure out what you have to do next time in order to avoid a similar problem.
5.
 - a. Take a young NCO with you, so he can find out what to do the next time something similar happens.
 - b. Take an experienced NCO with you in case you need help.
6.
 - a. Contact the officer in charge of the supply detail and tell him he is not providing adequate support for your unit.
 - b. Contact other units in the field exercise to find out if they are having similar problems.

H. In preparation for a week-long field exercise, you planned operations with your three E-6s. You briefed your CO, a captain, on your unit's plans. A variety of problems occurred during the exercise. Among other things, you find that the platoon wrecked a vehicle and that a major arbitrarily changed procedures without letting the platoon know. Your unit failed to meet a number of its objectives for the exercise. Your E-6s are now trying to blame each other for what happened. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Tell your E-6s that you will take over their functions unless they straighten out their act.
 - b. Tell your E-6s that they are going to have to double their efforts and require more of the troops in order to meet your standards.
2.
 - a. Tell your E-6s you will do everything in your power to transfer out any one of them who persists in passing the buck.
 - b. Tell your E-6s that no single person is really to blame for the problems, and that you all have to pull together to make things work.
3.
 - a. Establish a system for encouraging acceptance of responsibility by your E-6s.
 - b. Think about how you can arrange for the transfer of the most difficult E-6.
4.
 - a. Tell the major he should have informed your platoon about the changes.
 - b. Tell the major that there must have been a misunderstanding about the change in procedures, and expect he will recognize his error.
5.
 - a. Make it clear to your NCOs that it is their responsibility to keep each other informed.
 - b. Hold a meeting with your NCOs to set up a system for quickly passing along information.
6.
 - a. When asked by the captain, tell him that in the past your field-exercise performance has been as good as or better than

the performance of any other junior officer.

- b. When asked by the captain, tell him that you are having some problems with your E-6s that you need to straighten out.
- 7.
- a. Gather information on the sequence of events that led to the E-6s' blaming each other.
 - b. Realize that each E-6 is trying to look good by showing how bad the other two are.
- 8.
- a. Recognize that the E-6s are irresponsible and wonder if, at this point in their military careers, there is anything you or anyone else can do to change them.
 - b. Recognize that the way you deal with the major will serve as a model for the E-6s in dealing with conflicts and other problems.

I. You have recently joined the company, and among other things you are responsible for the arms room. You have quickly noted that the arms-room organization is poor. You also note other problems, such as tardiness and griping. The NCO in charge has been there awhile, and he tells you that he doesn't really think things are all that bad. What do you do/think?

1. a. Listen to the NCO, who has been in the Army a lot longer than you have, to see what his reasons are for coming to his conclusion.
b. Point out to the NCO the specific deficiencies. Tell him that you expect all arms-room requirements to be met.
2. a. Review the NCO's past performance and compare it with your own observations.
b. Report the problems to your CO, and ask his advice in handling this situation.
3. a. Talk with the company sergeant major to get his assessment of the situation and find out what he would do.
b. Tell the NCO that his idea of a good performance is totally unacceptable, and that you are going to try to get him transferred out unless he shapes up.
4. a. Go to your CO and tell him that you want to transfer the NCO, and spell out the main reasons for your action.
b. Ask one of your other NCOs, whom you respect, what he would do to turn the situation around.
5. a. Select a new NCO and tell this person that the organization of the arms room has been poor and that you expect some dramatic and rapid improvements.
b. Select a new NCO to be in charge, and explain in detail what needs to be done and how to do it.
6. a. Request a courtesy inspection from the IG without telling any of your troops.

- b. Tell your troops that an IG inspection is coming soon and that this will be their chance to show how good or bad they really are.
- 7.
 - a. Tell your NCO what your choices are in trying to deal with the problems, and ask him what he would do in your shoes.
 - b. Tell your NCO what his strengths and weaknesses are, and how he might best use his strengths in the future.
- 8.
 - a. Think of ways to reduce tardiness.
 - b. Think of ways to improve morale.
- 9.
 - a. Be concerned about the low level of team spirit in the arms room.
 - b. Be concerned about the time that will be wasted owing to poor organization of the arms room.

J. You have just been told that you will be in charge of running a range for a whole battalion. You have only three days before the operation begins, and you know very little about the whole process. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Start by conducting a thorough personal inspection of the range.
 - b. Figure out the steps you will need to take and how you will accomplish them.
2.
 - a. Realize you have an opportunity to really impress the battalion CO.
 - b. Realize that this is a complex operation and that many things can go wrong.
3.
 - a. See the job as difficult but providing an opportunity to learn.
 - b. See the job as difficult and feel that to do it right you really should have been given more time.
4.
 - a. Ask your CO for additional guidance.
 - b. Contact some NCOs you know to find out what you need to do.
5.
 - a. Set up a system to make sure all the units get to where they have to be at exactly the right times.
 - b. Find out what the past performance in running ranges has been, so that you can use this as a target to shoot for.
6.
 - a. Work nights, if necessary, to take care of all the details.
 - b. Ask your NCOs to put in however much time is necessary to make sure their jobs are done.
7.
 - a. Touch base with the XO's of all the units you will be working with, in order to get their input.
 - b. Make sure that there is a contact person for each unit who can give and receive correct information.
8.
 - a. Make up a chart of who is doing what, when, and where.

- b. Keep your options open on how to handle any situations that may arise.
- 9.
- a. Think about ways to save time in the preparation phase.
 - b. Think about ways to communicate the importance of this task to the NCOs and the troops.

- K. You are assigned to a unit. Among other things, you are responsible for training your personnel in a weapons system. You have one experienced NCO, who knows the system, and two younger ones, who have no experience with it. During field operations you notice that many of the troops don't know the system, either. What do you do/think?
1.
 - a. Sit down with your new NCOs and explain the system, using a chalkboard and a model of the system.
 - b. Give the new NCOs the manuals, and tell them you will be available as an additional resource.
 2.
 - a. Distribute manuals and diagrams, and tell the NCOs and troops that you expect them to become totally familiar with the system.
 - b. After instructing the new NCOs, ask each of them to teach several of the troops how the system works.
 3.
 - a. Tell your new NCOs that you are sure they will quickly learn the weapons system and help bring the whole unit up to speed.
 - b. Tell your new NCOs they will have to quickly bring themselves up to speed on the system so they can go on to other things.
 4.
 - a. Recognize that the experienced NCO may be an expert on the system but may also be a poor instructor.
 - b. Tell the experienced NCO you are holding him entirely responsible for the poor performance of the troops, and that his job is on the line unless he can turn things around.
 5.
 - a. Ask your NCOs to expand the amount of time they devote to training in this weapons system.
 - b. Rework your existing training plan to allow sufficient time to bring your unit up to speed in this area.
 6.
 - a. Arrange a competition among the squads in your unit on handling the weapons system.

- b. Ask your NCOs what they intend to do--to motivate their troops to learn the weapons system.
- 7. a. Ask your experienced NCO what he wants to do to improve existing training.
b. Observe your experienced NCO training others in the weapons system, and let him know what things you believe he should have done.
- 8. a. Let your unit know that there will be Saturday-morning training sessions for anybody who fails a test on the weapons system.
b. Let your NCOs know that you will be very annoyed if performance on the weapons system does not drastically improve.
- 9. a. Wonder why the experienced NCO has not shared his knowledge with the less experienced ones.
b. Feel annoyed at the time being wasted during the field operations due to the lack of training in your unit.

L. You have developed the confidence and trust of the company commander. When a new CO comes in, you find out that things are different. The new CO does not approve your recommendations for awards for several troops. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Find out what types of performance the new CO wants to reward, and adjust your recommendations accordingly.
 - b. Feel annoyed and tell the new CO you feel that your recommendations should have been acted on.
2.
 - a. Recognize that the troops need to see that their good performance is rewarded.
 - b. Realize that soldiers can recognize when they have done a good job.
3.
 - a. Explain to your troops that the CO did not approve the awards.
 - b. Tell the new CO that morale and performance may suffer if the awards are not given.
4.
 - a. Think about how the troops will view you if the awards you recommended are not approved.
 - b. Realize that a new CO will need some time to adjust.
5.
 - a. Tell the old CO about your problem and ask if he can recommend a course of action.
 - b. Tell the new CO that you consider it to be your responsibility to recommend individuals for awards.
6.
 - a. Check existing regulations on recommendations, to find out where you stand.
 - b. Contact a platoon leader at your CO's last unit and ask how he handled recommendations.
7.
 - a. Retype and resubmit the recommendations.
 - b. Re-examine your recommendations, to see if you can figure out why they were not approved.

- M. One of your responsibilities is a special weapons section, although you have no real experience with it. Although your troops seem motivated and capable, they also have little experience with the weapons system. An inspection is scheduled in three weeks. What do you do/think?
1.
 - a. File a request with your superior for someone experienced in the weapons system to train the troops. Indicate that you need such an individual within 24 hours.
 - b. Put in a lot of extra personal time to learn about the technology and the operational procedures.
 2.
 - a. Tell the troops that, although it will take much hard work and effort, you know they can learn the system and come through the inspection with flying colors, on the basis of their past performance.
 - b. Tell the troops that you understand how difficult it is to learn to use a new weapons system, and that they should do the best they can.
 3.
 - a. Shift your priorities so that the upcoming inspection becomes the key focus of your efforts. Make sure everybody in the unit knows that passing the inspection is your highest priority.
 - b. Find out what are the most critical areas in the inspection, so you can focus on these first.
 4.
 - a. Have your NCOs trained and then assign each of them to train a portion of the troops, so that, through this training process, they will become even more familiar and comfortable with the system.
 - b. Personally participate in all the training sessions. Bring in an outside expert on the system and have this individual train your NCOs and your troops.
 5.
 - a. Establish the basic information you want your NCOs to teach the troops, and then let them decide specifically how they want to carry out the training.

- b. Think that it is your personal responsibility to train your troops, and spend time every day going over the information and the steps with them.
- 6.
 - a. Be realistic about what you can accomplish in a short period of time.
 - b. Think that you are as capable as any other officer and that you will be able to quickly learn the system.

N. A new section chief, recently assigned to you, has been a problem. On an FTX that ended yesterday, he was unable several times to get his troops to the right locations on time. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. On the next FTX, have him repeat the instructions to you, so you are sure he understands what to do.
 - b. On the next FTX, make sure he doesn't have any direct responsibility for major operations.
2.
 - a. On the next FTX, put his section under another section leader.
 - b. On the next FTX, have him follow and observe a good senior NCO, so that he will learn needed skills.
3.
 - a. Tell him you will give him one more chance and that you are confident he can do a better job on the next FTX.
 - b. Tell him you know he is always screwing up, and you'll be ready for him when he does it the next time.
4.
 - a. Say something positive to the section chief, and be realistic about the time it will take him to learn the FTX procedures.
 - b. Tell the section chief you are angry because of the delays he caused on the FTX.
5.
 - a. Tell him about a section chief you know who has the right attitude and doesn't make mistakes.
 - b. Tell him about some problems you encountered on your own first FTX and some things you learned from your own mistakes.
6.
 - a. Think about trying to get a new section chief.
 - b. Have confidence that you can straighten this section chief out.
7.
 - a. Hold a Saturday training session with the section chief, so that he can practice the procedures for moving troops to different positions.

- b. Recognize that it takes a while for a new section chief to learn the ropes, and wait to see if his performance improves on the next FTX.

- O. Several times this same section chief has gotten into arguments with other NCOs, and today he cursed another NCO and took a swing at him in front of some troops. What do you do/think?
1.
 - a. Give him an Article 15 and tell him that if he ever takes a swing at another NCO in your unit, you will give him the dirtiest, least attractive assignments for as long as he is with you.
 - b. Urge him to get counseling so that he gets to the root cause of his problems.
 2.
 - a. Think about what the troops will think if they see NCOs fighting.
 - b. Think about how the other NCOs will view this section chief.

P. You have been installing an auxiliary power system at a tactical headquarters. You know that the generators are unable to handle the power surges caused by turning on air conditioners and other large pieces of electrical equipment. Twice you have had to do extensive repairs after circuits have blown. You inform your CO that larger generators will be necessary. Later, you learn that your CO has notified the general that repairs can be made without additional equipment. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Think about the time you will waste repairing the circuits again.
 - b. Recognize that your CO probably had a good reason for not asking for the new generators.
2.
 - a. Ask another technical expert how he would handle the situation.
 - b. Ask your CO to keep you informed about decisions that directly affect your work.
3.
 - a. Order additional parts for circuit repairs, so that you will be ready when circuits blow again.
 - b. Go to your CO and explain that without a larger generator, the installation will be in violation of safety regulations.
4.
 - a. Tell your CO that you will be able to repair the circuits if they blow again.
 - b. Go to your CO and explicitly ask why he ignored your advice.
5.
 - a. Use your contacts with other units to find an old larger generator, and install it yourself.
 - b. Circulate a memo requesting that the use of heavy electrical equipment be kept to a minimum.
6.
 - a. Send your CO a memo stating the technical reasons why a larger generator is necessary.
 - b. Politely ask your CO to reconsider your request for a larger generator.
7.
 - a. Feel sure that you can persuade your CO to order the larger generator.

- b. Feel confident that the CO will change his mind when the circuits blow again.
- 8.
 - a. Consider how frustrated your troops will be if you keep making them fix the circuits.
 - b. Consider how your troops will view you if the circuits blow again.
- 9.
 - a. Feel confident that your CO will change his mind when he sees that the small generator won't work.
 - b. Read up on ways to enlarge the capacity of your existing generators.
- 10.
 - a. List the possible reasons why your CO didn't order the new generator.
 - b. Think about how the general will view your CO if the circuits keep blowing out.
- 11.
 - a. Compare this situation with other times when the CO didn't follow recommendations of junior officers.
 - b. Realize that you do not have all the information and will need to collect it.
- 12.
 - a. Arrange for the generator to break down at a critical time so that your point is brought home.
 - b. Arrange to have troops ready to repair the circuits at a moment's notice.
- 13.
 - a. Set up a meeting with your CO to explain and demonstrate why the existing generators cannot handle the load.
 - b. Set up a meeting with your CO to explore ways to make do with the existing equipment.

Q. You have recently been given the position of motor officer in charge of 33 vehicles. Many of the vehicles are old and keep developing problems. No one seems to have a clear idea of how many tools you have or where they are. One older NCO has a private supply of extra tools. Your NCOs let the troops work on whatever vehicles they want to. Sometimes three or four troops work on the same vehicle at once. As a result, some vehicles have been without repairs for several weeks. Your men have been working hard. A field exercise is coming up, and your CO has told you he wants all of the vehicles to be in perfect running order within two weeks. What do you do/think?

1. a. Think about ways to improve efficiency.
 b. Think about ways to maintain your troops' morale.
2. a. Make a chart to keep track of the work being done on each vehicle.
 b. Talk to your troops individually, to see how they perceive the problems.
3. a. Find out if your troops need additional equipment and tools.
 b. Take an inventory of all tools, and insist that all tools be accounted for in the future.
4. a. Think that it is not important to spell out who works on what vehicle as long as everyone is working hard.
 b. Give systematic instructions to your NCOs about who will work on what vehicles each day.
5. a. Tell your CO that you will try your best to have all the vehicles ready in time for the field exercise.
 b. Tell your CO that if you really push, you will have the vehicles ready in time for the field exercise.
6. a. Tell the NCOs that they will have to pay for any tools that are lost, since they signed for them.
 b. Explain to the NCOs the relationship between tool allocations and motor-pool efficiency.

7.
 - a. Realize that experienced NCOs probably have good reasons for keeping their own supplies of extra tools.
 - b. Tell the older NCO that it is your responsibility to know where the tools are, and that you plan to do so.
8.
 - a. Tell the NCO who is keeping extra tools that as long as you are the officer in charge, no one will have extra tools.
 - b. Ask the NCO who is keeping extra tools to explain his reasons, so that you can better understand his position.
9.
 - a. Consider how your troops will view you if the vehicles are not ready for the field exercise.
 - b. Realize that you can probably get the majority of the vehicles ready in time for the field exercise.
10.
 - a. Analyze past repair records to determine how many vehicles were repaired each month over the past three years.
 - b. Analyze past repair records to determine how many vehicles were not repaired on time, and when this occurred.
11.
 - a. Tell NCOs which vehicles they must have repaired by what dates, but let them determine which troops work on which vehicles.
 - b. Assign specific individuals to specific vehicles and tasks.
12.
 - a. Call the troops together to praise them for their recent efforts.
 - b. Make a point of telling your less productive troops exactly what they are doing that is slowing things down.
13.
 - a. Realize that if you give the troops any time off, they might come to expect it all the time.
 - b. Give the troops an afternoon off after they have worked long hours for two weeks.

- 14. a. Push yourself and your troops as hard as necessary to get the vehicles ready for the field exercise.
- b. Realize that if you put in an honest day's work each day, the truly important things will get done.
- 15. a. Figure that you won't have to disturb the existing work system if you can get everyone to work harder.
- b. Develop a better system for getting the work done.

R. You have recently returned to your unit after a few weeks at a special school where you learned how to operate a new missile system. Back at your fort, you notice that many of the units do not really know how to use this missile in the field. In one battalion, you find two soldiers who made a dangerous mistake in setting up their equipment. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Realize that COs must set priorities for training.
 - b. Think that all units with that missile should know how to operate it.
2.
 - a. Tell the battalion commander that you could deadline his whole battalion and that something must be done quickly to improve training.
 - b. Let the battalion commander know you are willing to provide expert assistance to improve training.
3.
 - a. Develop a better training program for use of this missile.
 - b. Informally talk with other officers and with NCOs to determine the extent of the problem.
4.
 - a. Get your CO's view on what kind of training schedule is most practical.
 - b. Decide what training activities are most needed, and devote the most training time to these.
5.
 - a. Tell your CO that on the basis of what you have learned in the course, you know what training is needed.
 - b. Realize that your CO has a broader picture in mind. Ask him to decide what training is really needed.
6.
 - a. Let your CO know what training is needed, so he won't be embarrassed in an inspection.
 - b. Be ready with expert advice in case the battalion fails the inspection.
7.
 - a. Personally train everyone in your unit in the use of this missile system.

- b. Show the NCOs in your unit exactly what the troops must be able to do with this missile system, but let the NCOs decide how to train for it.
- 8.
 - a. Train your troops nights and weekends, if necessary, so that they will pass the next inspection.
 - b. Put a reasonable amount of time into training, but be realistic about the chances of the troops' passing their first inspection.
- 9.
 - a. Hold off on any new training that might interfere with the training programs already set up by your NCOs.
 - b. Tell any NCO who doesn't want to work on the new training right away that he should think about looking for a transfer.
- 10.
 - a. Tell the battalion commander that, on the basis of what you learned at the special school, better training is necessary.
 - b. Set up a meeting with other junior officers to discuss the problem in depth.

S. You are given the task of clearing an old gunnery range of leftover ammunition. Most troops do not like this kind of assignment. You have never been involved in such an operation before, although you have some knowledge about what to do. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Think about ways to build morale during the task.
 - b. Think about ways to reduce the time and personnel needed for the job.
2.
 - a. Call a meeting of your NCOs and discuss how each person would handle the operation, and push to reach agreement.
 - b. Figure out what resources are needed and what steps should be taken first.
3.
 - a. Realize that problems and mistakes can occur on any new task.
 - b. Think that you have taken on tasks before about which you knew very little, and that you will be able to handle this one, too.
4.
 - a. Think about the worst possible things that could happen, and come up with some ways to overcome them.
 - b. Realize that there is no way you can realistically think of everything that will be needed, but that if you and your troops follow procedures, everything should work out O.K.

T. As this gunnery-range operation is proceeding, several problems crop up. The vegetation is thick and difficult to clear. More vehicles are needed, but there is little chance of getting them. Some of the troops start complaining about the task. What do you do/think?

1.
 - a. Accept the reality that no more vehicles are available, and rather than wasting time trying to get more, push ahead with the resources you have and readjust the time frame.
 - b. Call several different sources to acquire additional vehicles, and in addition, call your CO.
2.
 - a. Think about the problems and try to come up with solutions yourself, since you are in command and you are the best person to tackle these issues.
 - b. See the problems as challenges that provide you with the opportunity to learn new things.
3.
 - a. Find out what the complaints of the troops are and see if the problems can be resolved to everyone's satisfaction.
 - b. Tell the troops who are complaining that you expect them to do their jobs willingly, and that if they can't, you will arrange alternative assignments that will make this job seem like the easiest, safest thing they could do.
4.
 - a. Get hold of an NCO on the range who has dealt with this type of vegetation problem before.
 - b. Push ahead with the operation, and simply make sure everyone works a little more slowly and carefully.
5.
 - a. Think of ways to complete the task more quickly, with fewer troops.
 - b. Hold a gripe session, to hear the complaints and clear the air, so that the operation can resume smoothly.

APPENDIX H

Officer Performance Style Inventory (OPSI) --
Supervisory Rating Form

O

Office

P

Performance

S

Style

1

Inventory

Name of Rater

Unit

Person Rated

Unit

Date _____

Supervisory

Rating Form

Milpercen control number
SCN: ATZI-NCR-NA 8217

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 U.S.C. 552e)

TITLE OF FORM

Officer Performance Style Inventory

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE

AR 70-1

1. AUTHORITY

10 USC Sec 4503

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. When identifiers (name or Social Security Number) are requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses will be maintained in the processing of these data.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information. This notice may be detached from the rest of the form and retained by the individual if so desired.

FORM

Privacy Act Statement - 26 Sep 75

DA Form 4366-R, 1 May 75


INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUPERVISORY RATING FORM

This form is used to rate junior officers on fourteen characteristics associated with different styles of performance. The most effective performance style depends on a person's job or position. For each characteristic there are four items. Each item consists of two statements which describe alternative behaviors. Read both statements and on the six-point scale between them check the block that indicates where you would rate this junior officer.

For example, consider the item below:

Example

Officer anticipates problems and develops resources and plans to deal with them.




Officer acts when problems present themselves and after the situation has been clarified.

The point designated by the "X" would show greater agreement with the statement on the right than with the statement on the left. In other words, the rater saw the officer as more likely to act after problems presented themselves and after the situation had been clarified.

Remember, place the "X" inside one of the six blocks. An "X" at either end of the scale would indicate that the statement is highly descriptive of the officer's performance style. An "X" near the center would indicate that neither of the statements is highly descriptive of the officer's performance style.


1. CONCERN FOR EFFICIENCY

- a. Officer designs systems to improve efficiency




Officer recognizes inefficiency but seldom changes existing systems

- b. Officer frequently identifies ways to save time or money




Officer occasionally identifies ways to save time or money

- c. Officer frequently attempts to change procedures to improve efficiency



Officer recognizes inefficient procedures but makes few attempts to change them


- d. Officer usually expresses displeasure when time and effort are being wasted



Officer sometimes expresses displeasure when time and effort are being wasted


2. PLANNING

- a. Officer thinks things through systematically before starting to work on a task




Officer prefers to work out problems as they arise

- b. Officer develops or uses special methods to keep track of tasks




Officer relies on memory and uses no special methods to keep track of tasks

- c. When faced with several tasks, officer decides which tasks are most important and works on those tasks first



When faced with several tasks, officer starts working but does not always concentrate on the most important tasks first


- d. Officer develops and uses written plans to keep track of the details of complex tasks



Officer relies primarily on memory to keep track of the details of complex tasks


3. TAKES INITIATIVE

- a. Officer uses imaginative or unusual means to overcome obstacles




Officer relies on standard operating procedures to overcome obstacles

- b. Officer has many personal contacts in other units who may be helpful in solving future problems




Officer has few personal contacts outside of his or her own unit

- c. Officer keeps working on a problem despite obstacles



Officer tends to turn to another task when confronted with an obstacle


- d. Officer often seeks the assistance of contacts in other units to help solve problems



Officer prefers to try to solve problems alone, rather than seek assistance from personal contacts in other units


4. CONCERN FOR STANDARDS

- a. Officer tries to go beyond existing mission standards




Officer tries to meet mission standards

- b. Officer always requires additional work when standards are not met




Officer sometimes requires additional work when standards are not met

- c. Officer strives for a high level of precision in completing tasks



Officers tries to meet basic task requirements


- d. Officer always checks carefully to see that subordinates are performing their tasks correctly



Officer occasionally checks to see that subordinates are performing their tasks correctly


5. CONCERN FOR CLARITY

- a. Officer uses charts, diagrams or models when making presentations




Officer prefers not to use charts, diagrams or models when making presentations

- b. Officer usually gives clear, well-organized instructions



Officer's instructions are sometimes confusing


- c. Officer obtains additional information necessary to clarify a problem



Officer sometimes fails to obtain additional information necessary to clarify a problem

- d. Officer usually probes for additional information to clarify a problem that is unclear


Officer sometimes fails to probe for the information needed to clarify a problem



6. SELF CONFIDENCE


- a. Officer shows confidence about his or her ability in all situations

Officer shows confidence about his or her ability in some situations




- b. Officer sees self as a star performer

Officer sees self as a good performer in some areas




- c. Officer talks confidently about his/her skills in a particular area

Officer rarely talks about his/her skills in a particular area



- d. Officer consistently expresses a belief that he/she can get the job done


Officer sometimes expresses doubt that he/she can get the job done



7. PERSUADING OTHERS


- a. Officer uses knowledge of regulations to support his/her position

Officer often does not use knowledge of regulations to support his/her position




- b. Officer uses technical expertise rather than personal opinions to persuade others

Officer uses personal opinions rather than technical expertise to persuade others




- c. Officer usually provides several arguments to support his/her position

Officer relies on a single argument to support his/her position



- d. Officer is always able to persuade others


Officer is sometimes able to persuade others




8. WILLINGNESS TO CONFRONT OTHERS

- a. Officer defends his/her actions against inaccurate criticism from superiors

Officer sometimes accepts inaccurate criticism from superiors




b. Officer stands up to superiors for what he/she believes in



Officer does not express his/her disagreements to superiors

c. Officer resists when superiors try to take over his/her responsibilities



Officer shows little resistance when superiors try to take over his/her responsibilities


d. Officer refuses to let NCOs infringe upon his/her responsibilities



Officer sometimes lets NCOs infringe upon his/her responsibilities


9. FORCEFULNESS

a. Officer pulls rank when necessary to overcome resistance by NCOs




Officer does not always pull rank when necessary to overcome resistance by NCOs

b. Officer does whatever is necessary to get subordinates to perform




Officer relies on his/her formal authority to get subordinates to perform

c. Officer is consistently able to get subordinates to perform



Officer is sometimes unable to get subordinates to perform


d. Officer has a strong personal influence on his/her troops



Officer has some personal influence on his/her troops


10. CONCERN FOR IMAGE

a. Officer always keeps superiors informed about potentially embarrassing problems




Officer sometimes forgets to brief superiors on potentially embarrassing problems

b. Officer accurately describes how he/she is perceived by others



Officer occasionally misinterprets how he/she is perceived by others

c. Officer accurately predicts how senior officers will respond to a situation



Officer is sometimes wrong in predicting how senior officers will respond to a situation

d. Officer always considers the impact of his/her own behavior on the attitudes of troops and NCOs


Officer sometimes considers the impact of his/ her own behavior on the attitudes of troops and NCOs



11. ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND PEOPLE, SITUATIONS AND DATA


a. Officer provides clear and reasonable explanations of why people behave in certain ways

Officer can sometimes explain why people behave in certain ways




b. Officer can accurately state another person's position in a disagreement

Officer mainly sees his/ her own point of view in a disagreement




c. Officer looks for patterns in situations

Officer tries to understand each situation as a separate event



d. Officer analyzes data to identify possible problems


Officer looks at data when necessary, but usually does not use data to identify possible problems



12. POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD TROOPS


a. Officer frequently rewards troops for a good job

Officer occasionally rewards troops for a good job




b. Officer often listens to the advice of NCOs

Officer sometimes listens to the advice of NCOs




c. Officer goes out of his/her way to help subordinates solve personal problems

Officer lets subordinates solve personal problems on their own







d. Officer often expresses confidence in subordinates




Officer sometimes expresses confidence in subordinates



13. DEVELOPMENT OF SUBORDINATES

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| a. Officer demonstrates enthusiasm and energy for training subordinates |  | Officer sometimes demonstrates interest in training subordinates |
| b. Officer delegates important tasks to subordinates to develop their abilities |  | Officer delegates routine and less important tasks to subordinates |
| c. Officer gives subordinates specific feedback about their performance |  | Officer gives subordinates general feedback about their performance |
| d. Officer often lets subordinates decide how they will accomplish tasks |  | Officer usually decides how subordinates will accomplish tasks |

14. PROFESSIONAL COMMITMENT

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| a. Officer actively takes steps to improve his/her professional knowledge or skills |  | Officer uses his/her existing knowledge and skills and participates in any extra training that the Army requires |
| b. Officer voluntarily puts in long hours to get a job done |  | Officer puts in extra hours when required to do so |
| c. Officer requests or volunteers for challenging assignments |  | Officer prefers to volunteer for routine assignments |
| d. Officer often expresses enthusiasm about past or present challenges in his/her job |  | Officer occasionally expresses enthusiasm about his/her job |

APPENDIX I

Officer Performance Style Inventory (OPSI) --
Self Rating Form

[REDACTED]

Name

Unit

Date

O

Officer

P

Performance

S

Style

I

Inventory

Self Rating

Form

Milpercen control number
SCN: ATZI-MA 8217

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 U.S.C. 552a)

TITLE OF FORM

Officer Performance Style Inventory

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE

AR 70-1

1. AUTHORITY

10 USC Sec 4503

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. When identifiers (name or Social Security Number) are requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses will be maintained in the processing of these data.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information. This notice may be detached from the rest of the form and retained by the individual if so desired.

FORM

Privacy Act Statement - 26 Sep 75

DA Form 4368-R, 1 May 75


INSTRUCTIONS FOR SELF RATING FORM

This form is used to rate yourself on some behaviors associated with different styles of performance. The most effective performance style depends on the structure of a person's job or position. Each item consists of two statements which describe alternative behaviors. Read both statements and on the six-point scale between them check the block that indicates where you would rate yourself.

For example, consider the item below:

Example












Officer anticipates problems and develops solutions and plans to deal with them.






















Officer acts when problems present themselves and after the situation has been clarified.












The point designated by the "X" would show greater agreement with the statement on the right than with the statement on the left. In other words, the rater saw himself as more likely to act after problems presented themselves and after the situation had been clarified.

Remember, place the "X" inside one of the six blocks. An "X" at either end of the scale would indicate that the statement is highly descriptive of your performance style. An "X" near the center would indicate that neither of the statements is highly descriptive of your performance style.


1. Officer designs systems to improve efficiency		Officer recognizes inefficiency but seldom changes existing systems
2. Officer thinks things through systematically before starting to work on a task		Officer prefers to work out problems as they arise
3. Officer uses imaginative or unusual means to overcome obstacles		Officer relies on standard operating procedures to overcome obstacles
4. Officer tries to go beyond existing mission standards		Officer tries to meet mission standards
5. Officer uses charts, diagrams or models when making presentations		Officer prefers not to use charts, diagrams or models when making presentations
6. Officer shows confidence about his or her ability in all situations		Officer shows confidence about his or her ability in some situations
7. Officer uses knowledge of regulations to support his/her position		Officer often does not use knowledge of regulations to support his/her position
8. Officer defends his/her actions against inaccurate criticism from superiors		Officer sometimes accepts inaccurate criticism from superiors
9. Officer pulls rank when necessary to overcome resistance by NCOs		Officer does not always pull rank when necessary to overcome resistance by NCOs
10. Officer always keeps superiors informed about potentially embarrassing problems		Officer sometimes forgets to brief superiors on potentially embarrassing problems
11. Officer provides clear and reasonable explanations of why people behave in certain ways		Officer can sometimes explain why people behave in certain ways

12. Officer frequently rewards troops for a good job		Officer occasionally rewards troops for a good job
13. Officer demonstrates enthusiasm and energy for training subordinates		Officer sometimes demonstrates interest in training subordinates
14. Officer actively takes steps to improve his/her professional knowledge or skills		Officer uses his/her existing knowledge and skills and participates in any extra training the Army requires
15. Officer often lets subordinates decide how they will accomplish tasks		Officer usually decides how subordinates will accomplish tasks
16. Officer often expresses confidence in subordinates		Officer sometimes expresses confidence in subordinates
17. Officer analyzes data to identify possible problems		Officer looks at data when necessary but usually does not use data to identify possible problems
18. Officer always considers the impact of his/her own behavior on the attitudes of troops and NCOs		Officer sometimes considers the impact of his/her own behavior on the attitudes of troops and NCOs
19. Officer has a strong personal influence on his/her troops		Officer has some personal influence on his/her troops
20. Officer refuses to let NCOs infringe upon his/her responsibilities		Officer sometimes lets NCOs infringe upon his/her responsibilities
21. Officer is always able to persuade others		Officer is sometimes able to persuade others
22. Officer consistently expresses a belief that he/she can get the job done		Officer sometimes expresses doubt that he/she can get the job done

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| 23. Officer usually probes for additional information to clarify a problem that is unclear |  | Officer sometimes fails to probe for the information needed to clarify a problem |
| 24. Officer usually checks carefully to see that subordinates are performing their tasks correctly |  | Officer occasionally checks to see that subordinates are performing their tasks correctly |
| 25. Officer often seeks the assistance of contacts in other units to help solve problems |  | Officer prefers to solve problems alone, rather than seek assistance from personal contacts in other units |
| 26. Officer develops and uses written plans to keep track of the details of complex tasks |  | Officer relies primarily on memory to keep track of the details of complex tasks |
| 27. Officer usually expresses displeasure when time and effort are being wasted |  | Officer sometimes expresses displeasure when time and effort are being wasted |
| 28. Officer develops or uses special methods to keep track of tasks |  | Officer relies on memory and uses no special methods to keep track of tasks |
| 29. Officer often expresses enthusiasm about past or present challenges in his/her job |  | Officer occasionally expresses enthusiasm about his/her job |
| 30. Officer often listens to the advice of NCOs |  | Officer sometimes listens to the advice of NCOs |
| 31. Officer is consistently able to get subordinates to perform |  | Officer is sometimes unable to get subordinates to perform |
| 32. Officer uses technical expertise rather than personal opinions to persuade others |  | Officer uses personal opinions rather than technical expertise to persuade others |


- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 33. Officer frequently attempts to change procedures to improve efficiency |  | Officer recognizes inefficient procedures but makes few attempts to change them |
| 34. Officer has many personal contacts in other units who may be helpful in solving future problems |  | Officer has few personal contacts outside of his or her own unit |
| 35. Officer always gives clear, well-organized instructions |  | Officer's instructions are sometimes confusing |
| 36. Officer always requires additional work when standards are not met |  | Officer sometimes requires additional work when standards are not met |
| 37. Officer usually provides several arguments to support his/her position |  | Officer relies on a single argument to support his/her position |
| 38. Officer accurately describes how he/she is perceived by others |  | Officer occasionally misinterprets how he/she is perceived by others |
| 39. Officer goes out of his/her way to help subordinates solve personal problems |  | Officer lets subordinates solve personal problems on their own |
| 40. Officer voluntarily puts in long hours to get a job done |  | Officer puts in extra hours when required to do so |
| 41. Officer frequently identifies ways to save time or money |  | Officer occasionally identifies ways to save time or money |
| 42. Officer accurately predicts how senior officers will respond to a situation |  | Officer is sometimes wrong in predicting how senior officers will respond to a situation |
| 43. Officer resists when superiors try to take over his/her responsibilities |  | Officer shows little resistance when superiors try to take over his/her responsibilities |

44. Officer gives subordi-
nates specific feed-
back about their per-
formance




Officer gives subordi-
nates general feedback
about their performance

45. Officer can accurate-
ly state another per-
son's position in a
disagreement




Officer mainly sees his/
her own point of view in
a disagreement

46. Officer does what-
ever is necessary
to get subordinates
to perform




Officer relies on his/her
formal authority to get
subordinates to perform

47. When faced with sev-
eral tasks, officer
decides which tasks
are most important
and works on those
first




When faced with several
tasks, officer starts
working but does not al-
ways concentrate on the
most important tasks
first

48. Officer strives for
a high level of pre-
cision in completing
tasks




Officers tries to meet
basic task requirements

49. Officer talks confi-
dently about his/her
skills in a particu-
lar area




Officer rarely talks
about his/her skills in
a particular area

50. Officer looks for
patterns in situa-
tions




Officer tries to under-
stand each situation as
a separate event

51. Officer requests or
volunteers for chal-
lenging assignments




Officer prefers to vol-
unteer for routine
assignments

52. Officer delegates im-
portant tasks to sub-
ordinates to develop
their abilities




Officer delegates rou-
tine and less-important
tasks to subordinates

53. Officer keeps working
on a problem despite
obstacles




Officer tends to turn to
another task when confront-
ed with an obstacle

54. Officer obtains addi-
tional information
necessary to clarify
a problem




Officer sometimes fails to
obtain additional informa-
tion necessary to clarify
a problem

55. Officer sees self as
a star performer



Officer sees self as a
good performer in some
areas

56. Officer stands up to
superiors for what
he/she believes in



Officer does not express
his/her disagreements to
superiors