


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STUDENT REPORT

DOES NATO WEAKEN THE WEST?

MAJOR WILLIAM F. KUERZ 88-1505

"insights into tomorrow"

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REPORT NUMBER 88-1505

TITLE DOES NATO WEAKEN THE WEST?

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR WILLIAM F. KUERZ, USAF

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT STATEMENT "A" Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 88-1505			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION ACSC/EDC		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code) Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5542			7b. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NOS.		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) DOES NATO WEAKEN THE WEST?			WORK UNIT NO.		
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Kuerz, William F., Major, USAF					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Yr., Mo., Day) 1988 April	
				15. PAGE COUNT 23	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB. GR.			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)					
Book analysis on Melvyn Krauss's <u>How NATO Weakens the West</u>. It is an analysis and critique of his assertions and conclusion.					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☒ DTIC USERS ☐			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL ACSC/EDC Maxwell AFB, AL 36116-5542			22b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (205) 293-2867		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL

PREFACE

This is a book analysis of How NATO Weakens the West by Melvyn B. Krauss. NATO was formed after WW II to protect Western Europe from the Soviets and allow Western Europe to recover economically from the war instead of investing in defense. The United States provided that defense. Now, after over thirty years from its inception, Mr. Krauss, like many others, are asserting the Alliance does not benefit the United States any longer. In fact, he contends it is a liability since the allies do not pull their load. So, this analysis will analyze his reasons for withdrawing from NATO, the possible effects of withdrawal and the development, and reasoning of his argument. Finally, it will close by giving a general opinion on data presentation in books of this kind. This analysis will proceed in the following manner.

Chapter one is a short biography of Melvyn B. Krauss. It brings forth interesting facts that will aid in analyzing his assertions and recommendation.

Chapter two is a quick synopsis of the book. It presents the three primary pieces of evidence Krauss uses to arrive at his conclusion and the conclusion itself.

Chapter three is an analysis of Krauss's evidence. Attempts were made to give two sides to each argument and then arrive at an interim summary on each one.

Chapter four is a critique and analysis of the book's organizational effectiveness and his conclusion. It also presents critics' views of Mr. Krauss's work.

Chapter five sums up the previous four chapters. It gives my recommendation, conclusion, and more importantly, a perception readers should watch for when reading any material.



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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major William F. Kuerz is a KC-135A/R instructor pilot currently attending Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He was initially commissioned in the Army but immediately transferred to the Air Force in 1973. In 1974 he attended pilot training at Reese AFB, Texas. He followed this assignment to Castle AFB, CA, the Combat Crew Training School for the KC-135. He then moved to Grand Forks AFB, ND, where he was a KC-135 copilot, Standardization/Evaluation copilot, and aircraft commander. In 1979 he was transferred to Mather AFB, CA. At Mather he progressed from aircraft commander to instructor pilot, training flight instructor, scheduler, Standardization/Evaluation pilot, and finally Chief of the 135 Stan/Eval Branch. Lastly, in 1983 he transferred to Castle AFB, CA, to become a Combat Crew Training School flight instructor and a member of the Central Flight Instructor Course staff. He has over 3000 flying hours in the KC-135A and KC-135R.

Major Kuerz holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Administration from Central Missouri State University and a Master in Business Administration in Management. He has completed Squadron Officers School, Air Command and Staff College and National Security Management School by correspondence.

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"insights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER 88-1505

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR WILLIAM F. KUERZ, USAF

TITLE Does NATO Weaken the U.S.?

I. Problem: To determine the effectiveness of Melvyn Krauss' argument in his book, 'How NATO Weakens the West'.

II. Objectives: To solve the problem, a stair-step approach was taken. The steps were: a background on the author, a book synopsis, analysis of Melvyn Krauss' evidence, and conclusion and other opinions of the book.

III. Discussion of Analysis: Mr. Krauss uses three major arguments to convince the reader NATO weakens the U.S. financially and politically. First, he shows the U.S. financial burden-sharing is far and above that of the allies. Second, he explains how Europeans are using detente to the detriment of "our" defense. Lastly, he explains how the U.S. is out on a political limb without allied support. Research was first accomplished to see if these arguments were true. Then, an analysis was made on his conclusion of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe.

IV. Findings: Although the facts concerning his evidence were true, the application of the evidence was perceptual. If his argument was strictly one from a U.S. point of view, he made it but from a very biased and sheltered position. His conclusion

CONTINUED

showed a lack of foreign policy and military background. He used economic theory to resolve an international problem.

V. Conclusion: Mr. Krauss made a poor overall argument for a U.S. troop withdrawal from NATO Europe. He delved into international politics with an economic argument.

VI. Recommendation: How NATO Weakens the West would make adequate preparatory reading for a military or international affairs student. It will give the reader a definite point of view concerning NATO's troubles and reinforce, by a bad example, the need for better writing organization.

Chapter One

THE AUTHOR, MR. MELVYN B. KRAUSS

Before analyzing any work, you first need to know where the author is coming from, his background, and any preconceived notions he had when he wrote the book. This can have, especially in this work, an important influence on the point being made.

Melvyn B. Krauss received a PhD in economics from New York University (NYU) in 1968. He is an economics instructor at New York University; a member of the economics faculty, BOLOGNA CENTER at Johns Hopkins University via Belmeloro Bologna, Italy; has authored numerous articles; and been a member of many boards on international fiscal policy, finance, and international trade. (1:294)

Concerning How Nato Weakens the West, Krauss said in a phone conversation he did not have any bias when writing the book. He thinks he knows Europeans very well as an American. He was in Amsterdam, Holland, and Italy, married to a Hollander, and taught in Europe. He believes European politicians can't sell increased defense spending because U.S. troops are there. He says he is against the current INF proposed agreement unless Europe increases its defense spending. (28:--)

A key point he made in the phone conversation did illuminate a bias and put the book's contents in a better perspective. This was his first book which related to foreign policy, and, admittedly, he used an economist argument. (28:--) He is an ardent supply-side economist and is disenchanted with additional military spending.

Chapter Two

SYNOPSIS OF HOW NATO WEAKENS THE WEST

Krauss' general premise is the U.S. should withdraw from NATO for three reasons: the U.S. is paying an inordinate amount of the defensive costs, the Europeans are still using detente as a defense to the detriment of the Alliance, and the Europeans do not politically back the U.S. when they are needed most. After stating his opinion on the U.S./NATO relationship, he moves his sights to the Pacific and uses the same logic with our forces in Korea and Japanese "freeloading." This analysis will concentrate on the U.S./ NATO relationship only. Finally, Krauss provides us with a solution, a troop withdrawal from Europe.

First he analyzes the costs involved for the U.S. to support NATO. The price for forward defense is difficult to specify since "the forces the United States keeps in Europe are only about one-third of the forces it maintains for the support of NATO." (7:30) Of the \$241 billion the U.S. spent in 1986 on its "general purpose" forces, \$134 billion is the estimate for NATO. (7:30) By withdrawing forces he asserts, the U.S. can pay for the Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.) at an estimated cost of \$60 billion and put \$74 billion towards the U.S. deficit. (7:31) This \$134 billion may even be an underestimation since systems such as the Pershing missiles were developed for the Europeans not for the U.S. This is just one of many possible "hidden" costs buried in the defense budget.

He continues his cost argument by reflecting on how we got in this predicament and then presents a recent expense comparison. The lack of European defense spending was encouraged by the U.S. from NATO's inception. The U.S. was paying for Europe's defense after the war so it could recover economically, and, then, the nuclear umbrella the U.S. provided prior to the early 1960's "encouraged Europe to economize on its conventional forces." (7:21) This was the time when the U.S. had the strategic nuclear advantage. For the year 1984, he shows the gross domestic product (GDP) of the U.S. was only 10% greater than that of NATO Europe, but the U.S. share of NATO defense spending was more than double that of the Europeans. (7:18)

His second point is after the U.S. nuclear umbrella became less creditable, the Europeans have relied upon "detente as

defense." In other words, the Soviets would be tied more closely to the economic well-being of Western Europe through increased trade with them. He says during the 1970's when the U.S. was decreasing its defense spending, although it could be said the U.S. was winding down from Vietnam, the Europeans should have increased theirs to pick up the slack. Instead, they relied upon detente. He completes the loop by surmising that since the Europeans are feeding the Soviet "war-machine," then the U.S. must increase its defense spending to counter it. It is a vicious circle of: we aid the Europeans, the Europeans subsidize the Soviets, the Soviets become more formidable, and then we have to increase our defense spending. The U.S. pays twice. He gives two examples of European detente at work: the consortium which sent equipment for the Soviet pipeline and West German trade with the East. (7:--)

Finally, the political disunity or the lack of European support for the U.S. is tugging at the Alliance's ability to survive. He puts forth numerous examples: the European wish for neutrality, West German reunification, European loans to Poland when the U.S. was taking a firm stand, lack of consensus on Libyan economic sanction and the bombing, the Achille Lauro affair where Italian and U.S. troops were about to go toe-to-toe and an international criminal was allowed to go free, the lack of political support when the U.S. invaded Grenada, the German resentment towards the U.S. for its continued occupation after WW II, and finally the French paying nothing into the Alliance but reaping its defense rewards. (7:--) All these issues should make the U.S. wonder why we continue to prop up the Alliance. We support them but don't get any dividends in return.

He concludes by suggesting the U.S. decrease its NATO defense spending and begin a five-year phased withdrawal of U.S. troops. (7:237) The Europeans, by the law of supply-and-demand, will increase their defense spending. This is what the Soviets fear most, a unified European continent, and it can only be done if "Big Brother", the U.S., is gone.

Chapter Three

EXAMINING THE CLAIMS

In analyzing Krauss' contentions, this author will examine them in the same order as the previous chapter: financial burden-sharing, perceptions of detente, and political disunity. To do this, the basic claim(s) will first be re-stated and then evidence/opinion for and against his position will be presented.

Krauss believes the U.S. is spending too much for the defense of Europe. He first uses Earl C. Ravenal's, of the Cato Institute, figure for 1986 saying the U.S. spends \$134 billion on general purpose forces in NATO and then equates this to a savings of \$67 billion if our conventional forces are withdrawn. (Pentagon overhead costs are assumed half of all expenditures.) His major argument on burden-sharing though, is the interpretation of two charts from Secretary of Defense Weinberger's Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense to Congress in March 1985. These are based on "Rate of Defense spending to GDP" and "Growth in Defense Spending of NATO Countries." He shows the U.S. ranks first in defense spending share/GDP share ratio with the first chart. In the second one, he shows the low number of countries that attained the agreed upon 3 percent real increase in defense spending per year. The allies, he concludes, are not pulling their load. (7:--)

It is difficult to dispute the \$134 billion figure since it is an estimate as is the \$67 billion savings. (Some say the expense is \$140 billion. (23:70) He's in the ball park.) The charts he presents from the Sec. of Defense's report, this author assumes, are correct since they were unavailable for analysis. In any case, contention is not with the charts but their interpretation of burden-sharing. Rep. Pat Schroeder while agreeing with Krauss' thesis said in 1987: "It seems absolutely preposterous that we should be underwriting the national security costs of our economic competitors, ... and losing our economic independence as a result...." (19:16)

In the same article, it quotes "administration analyses do confirm an imbalance of effort." (19:16) Another person on Krauss' side said:

Its (NATO allies) combined population and GNP (Gross National Product) now exceed that of the United

States.... By my calculations in constant 1986 dollars, the United States has contributed roughly \$1.1 trillion dollars more than its equal share since 1961. (22:7)

To show the other side of the coin, Michael Kinsley points out that "figuring in reserves, the Europeans have a larger fraction of their population ready for battle than we do" (17:A23) Another NATO supporter presents the opinion/fact that military spending is not an adequate gauge and there are intangibles of military exercises being held in their country and installations and areas provided to perform exercises that do not have a price tag. (14:A23) From the European point of view, one individual said burden-sharing is always put in financial terms. "Too often, however the concept has been given too narrow a definition, reflecting mainly U.S. views and queries." (8:26) They put forth the argument that they provide "90 to 95 percent of the ground forces, 80 to 85 percent of the tanks, 80 percent of the combat aircraft and 70 percent of the fighting ships." (9:82) So, how is the burden-sharing issue resolved?

To present you with the absolute answer for these differences in defense spending perceptions, this author can think of no better sources than a report completed by, to name just one, the Congressional Research Service, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger's report on "Allied Contribution to the Common Defense" in March 1983. The Congressional report says it's difficult but it depends on whether you're measuring input or output. Input is the "total expenditure of defense, percentage of GDP, per capita expenditures, and percentage of National budget." Output is the "percentages allotted to certain key areas and the capabilities purchased in terms of manpower and equipment." Then, they add the big "however." The previous figures may not be accurate because of: "variability in exchange rates, definitional problems, measurement based on GDP or per capita, measurement of single year performance, distortions due to tax structures, no indication of how the money is spent, ..." and many more. (26:15-16) If this doesn't convince you this is an exact science, they add one more sentence. "The concept of burden-sharing ... is highly complex and frequently subjective process." (26:17) (Underline is my emphasis.) The Sec. of Defense agreed with this premise in his report by saying, "There is no single indicator which can serve as an adequate basis for the assessment of equitable burden-sharing." (24:1) Nor is there any "agreed upon mathematical formula." (24:17) In a 1984 Congressional Hearing, he said "Moreover, no single criterion is adequate to define equitable burden-sharing." (25 :588)

As you can see, it is difficult for one to take sides when arguing who pays the most for defense. Perceptions play a

major role in the burden-sharing controversy. Since the financial argument appears clouded, Krauss view of detente maybe clearer. (The charts Krauss used were from the 1985 report. The narrative quoted was from March 1983. This author would assume the same explanation of burden-sharing was in the later report but Krauss decided to leave it out to enhance his argument).

Krauss defines detente as the West's way to "tame the Soviet beast" or "a policy to bribe the Soviets not to invade Western Europe." (7:22) He contends the Europeans use detente to get what they want from the U.S. Before examining the pipeline issue and German trade with the East, let's examine detente.

The real meaning of detente is: "easing the strained relation between states, relaxation of tensions." (2:ix) Krauss, as you can see, developed two right wing definitions of detente. The U.S. saw detente as bringing the Soviet Union "into the community of responsible nations" and on a global scale. (3:24) In the same vein, "under Nixon and Kissinger detente evolved into management of East-West relations." (2:61) But the West Europeans, especially, France, saw it in terms of "practical and human aims." (2:62) "The Europeans saw a decline in ideology in Eastern Europe ..., more economic minded leaders in the East, and the Soviet Union easing their tight reign on the East to the political and economic benefits of those countries. (4:77,154) They could not see butting heads with the Soviets achieving anything but hindering their humanitarian and economic aims. (4:160) And Germany, who in the 1950's saw 17 million fellow Germans behind the "curtain," saw detente as a method to "re-emphasize the shared cultural heritage, interests and sympathies, and common responsibilities for peace in Europe." (2:22,4:21) Finally, President Charles de Gaulle saw detente as a way for Europe to become a force by itself. (2:22) In summary, like beauty, detente is in the eye of the beholder. In general though, the U.S. saw it globally, and the Europeans saw it as continental or even country.

Regarding the pipeline issue, the U.S. wanted the Europeans to stop the supporting the Soviet gas pipeline to Western Europe for two reasons: to cease the flow of hard currency to the East and not to increase Europe's dependence on or vulnerability to the Soviets. Since the Europeans are much more dependent than the U.S. on the Third World for petroleum, they saw the pipeline as a diversification of suppliers. (3:50-51) Also, the European view of the pipeline embargo is: "...it is harder for Europeans than for the United States to implement sanctions." (11:63) The Germans in 1976 put their reliance on Eastern trade at 300,000 jobs. (4:75) An embargo could be a disastrous political endeavor. Even in the United States, the farm lobby had an important influence on President

Reagan's lifting of the grain embargo in 1981. (11:63) Besides, the Germans remembered 1962 when the U.S. encouraged a trade embargo against the Soviet Union, and they abided by ceasing the export of steel pipe. They also suffered the consequences when the Soviets got the pipe elsewhere: Japan and Sweden. (11:66-67) They were not about to get burned again. President Mitterand of France encouraged Europeans not to follow the U.S. He saw a chance for the French to become the "spokesperson for Europe." (2:210) The pipeline issue seems to have many sides.

When speaking of the general trade issue with the East, Krauss neglected to present the complicated trade perceptions concerning West Germany and the United States. West Germany began trade with the Eastern zone while the allies were still negotiating the division of Germany. (4:29) In fact, German trade with the East is now equal to its trade with Switzerland, both a very small percentage of its total exports. (3:41) It accounts for "only about 0.06 percent of its annual gross domestic product." (4:47) In contrast, although the dollar figure is still \$7608 to \$4804 million in 1981, German trade as a percentage of total exports, is decreasing while the U.S. trade has tripled. Percentage of GDP figures show an increase of 66 percent for the FRG while the U.S. trade has doubled. (11:62) In summary of these trade issues, the Europeans see it this way: "Trade was increasingly regarded as an economic asset, not a political weapon." (4:35) Krauss put forth two issues in the guise of detente to support his argument: his stand on the pipeline issue and trade with the East. From a U.S. perspective, he maybe correct.

Finally, Krauss spoke of the lack of European support for U.S. worldwide efforts. He says, "The United States spends some \$135 billion a year on NATO and, for good reason, many Americans are wondering why - particularly when, on several occasions, the NATO bases we pay for are not put at our disposal when we need them." (7:68) He adds numerous other discontents: West German and other Europeans' drive toward neutrality, and lack of allied support in Afghanistan and Central America, to name a few. (7:--) Politically, we do not get support so we should withdraw. Some of these discontents will be examined next.

Concerning neutralism, Krauss is correct in saying German people would prefer neutrality. But when given the option of an alliance with the U.S. or neutrality, over half preferred the alliance. Over 80% think American troops are either important or indispensable in Europe. And when 6 countries in NATO (U.K., France, FRG, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway) were asked whether they should belong to the Alliance or become neutral, the average was over 70% preferring to stay with the Alliance. (10:9-14) Perceptions are Germany or Europe in the

face of difficult decisions are turning neutral. Maybe, it is their way of preserving detente.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the U.S. asked for a firm backing from the allies. Why didn't we get it? "Few Europeans agreed with the United States analysis that the invasion was part of a Soviet grand design against the Persian Gulf or any other strategic region of the world." (4:77) When the U.S. asked its allies to meet, French Prime Minister Barre said, "France does not wish to contribute to any reawakening of the Cold War by adopting an extreme attitude." (11:118)

President Mitterand opposed the Afghanistan affair and American policy in the Caribbean for the same reason he opposed the U.S. pipeline embargo. He "wanted to conserve his position as a spokesperson of Europe." (2:26) "Europeans objecting to American policy in Central America in the early 1980's were rooted in political symbolism - image of U.S. interventionism or militarism - ..." (11:72)

Some say "...since differences between America and Europe are of long standing they are rooted in geography: we are here and they are there." (11:167) Others say since the U.S. has lost its predominance as the only world power, economic or military, its allies are not as susceptible to a knee-jerk response to support it. (3:42) The U.S. must realize the European patient of the late 1940's and 1950's has recovered. They will not simply follow our every whim. Kissinger put it simply by saying "our interests are not identical in every single respect," (6:271) If we associate our contribution to NATO as being able to dictate policy, we will never be satisfied. But, as a general answer to all of Krauss' contentions, this says it best:

U.S.-European disagreements about policy in all these many cases stem, rather, from two sources: the very different means of action that are available to the various countries, and their often different perceptions of what is happening in a given case. (12:53)

As far as his conclusion of troop withdrawal, this is not a new proposal. Even "Brzezinski and Kissinger have called for partial redeployments to enable the United States to use their forces at will in locations such as the Middle East." (19:17) But to rebut his summary:

Western Europe is the forward defense line of the United States. Our forces are there not out of charity but self-interest. Their unilateral withdrawal would reduce the nuclear threshold, undo the political bargain that supports the military

alliance, discourage further Western European efforts
... and undermine our security. (9:84)

In summary, are Krauss' claims accurate? The U.S. does supply the largest amount of funds. Detente or the European desire for a smoother relationship with the Soviets is real, and occasionally, we do not get the desired level of political support from the allies. As a general thread to tie it altogether, one word has been used in each claim: perception. Melvyn Krauss perceives a lack of financial support, that detente still hurts the Alliance, and a lack of allied political support. Whether his manner of analysis is logical and his response correct, we'll take a critical look in the next chapter.

Chapter Four

A CRITICAL LOOK

Before this author plays his cards regarding the contents of the book and my and others' criticisms of it, let's take a look at the book itself. Krauss' argument could be improved by changing his topic sentence, his title, and the organization of the book. How NATO Weakens the West can lead a casual observer to believe the Alliance weakens all countries in the West. What he means to say is How NATO Weakens the United States. Furthermore, his thesis is awkward without an introduction. The method in which he attacks the weakness also seems disjointed. This author could have established in an introduction that a sovereign country has three forms of power: political, military and economic. Then, arguments developed under each of these headings as to how NATO weakens each one of "our" powers could be presented.

Although all of his numerical and historical facts are true, as previously mentioned, his perceptions of the situations guided his decision-making. He admitted in my phone conversation this was his first book on foreign policy, and, as this author and book reviewer Alvin Bernstein noted, his approach is of an economist, a "supply-sider" in particular. (13:78) With "Reaganomics" and the assertions of his previous book, Development without Aid, Krauss sees the reduction in subsidies would result in the recipients having to apply themselves more. (20:82) Thus if we simply withdraw our military support from NATO, the Europeans will automatically increase their defense effort. The relationship of economic theories and political realities are the same according to his logic.

You can see perceptions are difficult to attack; so we'll confront his conclusion. Can the U.S. afford to leave Western Europe?

It's true that this main leverage we have in raising the matter of relative defense cost with our allies is the threat, at least implicit, to withdraw our enormous subsidy. And it's also true that we'd be crazy to do this without being sure that the allies would take up the burden themselves. (14:A23)

So, as Krauss suggested, the five-year withdrawal will give the Europeans the opportunity to establish leadership and a

defensive policy. He must conclude the European continent holds no strategic value. Another would argue: "the presence of a free Western Europe is a detriment to the Soviet control of Eastern Europe, bottling up the Soviet submarine forces on the north and south flank would keep sea lines of communication open to Western Europe in times of conflict and "European bases are physically well structured to support operations in various parts of the Third World...." (15:32) These are three points Krauss neglected to present. Is the cost worth the strategic importance?

The Europeans (politicians, military officers, and peace activists) gave a response to a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops. In a near consensus vote they said it "...would seem to signal a reduced Soviet threat...", "...put in doubt the whole concept of forward defense...", "...would force us (Germany) to go to nuclear war even earlier...", "...would signal the end of U.S. interest in Europe.", and "...would also undercut or complicate on-going and proposed arms control talks." (27:73-74) These do not even mention the political ramifications it would have with other allies around the world.

Although he does receive some accolades on his book, here are general comments against it:

... Krauss here stumbles through the thickets of international affairs armed only with the analytical tools...of a free market economist. (13:78)

... his daredevil proposals... (20:85)

... Krauss fails to take account of the actual history of U.S. foreign policy over the past twenty years. (21:45)

This is a risky policy... carrying with it the danger of throwing the baby out with the bath-water. (18:1271)

... brings precious little to support his assumptions than analogies with economic theory ... (16:11)

... author's inattention not only to political effects but to military balance. (16:11)

This author's conclusions run along similar lines.

In his defense, Europe could do more. As a super-economic power it should have a policy "that looks beyond the geographical confines of Europe." (8:365) Better yet, each country will have to make more political concessions for the better of the whole by attempting to look at the situation

through the eyes of others. The U.S. will have to realize its perceptions may not be that of the whole, and it will be able to achieve "more allied cooperation but at the price of diluting American control--more and more often in the future." (11:24) Our perceptions may be different, and we must remember "shared values do not mean identical economic and political interests and responsibilities." (9:106)

But should we be ready to pull out for the sake of unilateralism or isolationism? No! Deterrence is a difficult product to purchase, talk about, or hold in your hand; but it's easy to tell if it's working. Our perception of the situation maybe our own fault. Henry Kissinger said, "Our doctrine of MAD (mutual assured destruction) removed every incentive for the Allies to make substantial military contributions." (5:87) And thus, the current environment could be our own doing.

My opinion is we cannot afford to abandon our long time allies without assurances of their increased input to the new alliance, and they cannot survive the short term without our economic and military commitment to them. Before planes and ships loaded with troops and supplies leave the continent, logistical shortcomings must be resolved. More importantly, political leadership of the new military alliance must be determined. Europe is too strategically important to leave dangling in front of the Soviet influence too and strategically positioned near the Third World for us to abandon as a base of operation.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

To sum up this analysis, were you brought down the desired path? First, a short biography on the author, Melvyn B. Krauss was completed. We saw he is an economist attempting his first book relating to foreign policy. Next, we went through a quick summary of the book. We then arrived at a perceptual stalemate after we examined his three major pieces of evidence: U.S. burden-sharing, detente as defense, and political disunity. From this, we went to Krauss' conclusion of a U.S. troop withdrawal from NATO. Finally, the organization of the book, Krauss' conclusion, and my criticism and that of other book reviewers were examined and presented.

Overall, Krauss brought forth interesting but not new criticisms of the Alliance. He displayed a poor background in international politics, and military strategy and his conclusion reflected this. For the Alliance to survive though, countries are going to have to make the tough economic and political decisions that Krauss referred to. If Europeans want to maintain the way of life they are accustomed, they must subsidize the military to counter the real/perceived threat. A united states of Europe, which some of you have heard about, is a great American idea, but for it to eventually happen is a pipe dream. So many varied cultures willing to sacrifice their political power for that of the whole is unlikely.

In my research, it was interesting to see the varied points of view between continents and countrymen. It was also easy to discover there are many "experts" in isolated fields but to find one with an overall workable plan, there are few. There are many questions (critics) but few answers (actors).

This book analysis should if nothing else, make all of us who are book readers look into the authors' backgrounds and experiences before blindly following their assertions or their interpretations of facts. If you desire a one sided argument on the U.S. participation in the Alliance though, read How NATO Weakens the West.

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