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
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
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JAPANESE REARMAMENT: A SECURITY
DILEMMA FOR U.S. INTERESTS IN
NORTHEAST ASIA

MAJOR RICHARD L. PYATT 88-2180

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
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REPORT NUMBER 88-2180

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requirements for graduation.

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PREFACE

This paper was written because the author believes professional military officers focus too heavily on U.S.-Soviet security issues and consequently fail to theorize on other security dilemmas. Little emphasis is placed on Asian studies, particularly Japan. The economic output of this island nation could surpass that of the U.S. by the year 2000. While an armed Japan helps contain Soviet hegemony, will a heavily armed Japan continue to act in the interest of U.S. security assumptions?

The rising power of Japan poses a complex security dilemma for U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. The following quote from Keith Suter in his article, "The Remilitarization of Japan", symbolizes the evolution of power in the Japanese state:

Japan was the first Third World nation to defeat a Western nation in a major conflict (Tsarist Russia in 1905). It was the first nation to challenge the myth of white supremacy and the prevailing belief that Western nations had a manifest destiny to control the world. Having spent 120 years chasing after, and competing against the world's major nations, Japan will eventually find itself out in front - perhaps by the turn of the century. Where does it go then? If it follows the pattern of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., it could simply try to become a military superpower (39:5).

This paper examines U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia which have fostered Japanese rearmament. It discusses changing Japanese threat perceptions, and the evolving nature of the Self Defense Forces as part of the rearmament cycle. The focus of this study is on US-Japanese relations rather than relations with other regional actors. It is hoped to stimulate thought in today's mid-career officers who may have to face the spectre of a fully armed Japan at the twilight of their careers.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Richard L. Pyatt is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy (BS Medical Sciences, 1975) and the University of Southern California, United Kingdom Program, where he received an MA in International Relations in 1987. Major Pyatt's assignments include tours as a T-38 Instructor Pilot, an F-15 Instructor Pilot, and a NATO Aggressor Dissimilar Air Combat Instructor Pilot. During his last assignment, he was Chief of the 10th Tactical Fighter Wing Standardization and Evaluation Division at RAF Alconbury, United Kingdom. Major Pyatt is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer's School where he received the Wing Individual Outstanding Graduate Award. He is also a Distinguished Graduate from the Aggressor Weapons and Tactics Training Program at Nellis Air Force Base.

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REPORT NUMBER 88-2180
AUTHOR(S) MAJOR RICHARD L. PYATT, USAF
TITLE JAPANESE REARMAMENT: A SECURITY DILEMMA FOR U.S. INTERESTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

This paper was written because the author believes military officers focus too heavily on US-Soviet security issues and fail to recognize developing long-term global security trends. One such trend is the dilemma created by U.S. pressure on Japan to increase its share of the defense burden. Rearming Japan creates a security dilemma for U.S. interests in Northeast Asia because Japanese economic wealth can drive their rearmament beyond purely defensive needs. Factors such as U.S. security interests, changing Japanese threat perceptions, and the evolving capabilities of the Self Defense Forces are responsible for Japanese rearmament.

U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia certainly create pressures which foster rearmament. As an example, the Reagan administration pressured Japan to expand the roles and missions of the Self Defense Forces. But Japanese rearmament has been a slowly evolving process for other reasons as well.

CONTINUED

Changing Japanese threat perceptions have whittled away at Japanese pacifism. Chapter Two details a chronology of events such as the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, the American withdrawal from Vietnam, the oil shocks of the 1970's, and the Soviet military buildup in Northeast Asia as examples of events which have slowly rekindled Japanese support for Self Defense Forces. These historical pressures resulted in incremental adjustments to previous Japanese interpretations of Article Nine of the "peace constitution" and set the stage for a broader range of activities which have stretched the limits of self-defense.

Chapter Three provides further insight into the evolving nature of Japanese rearmament. Former Prime Minister Nakasone's policies, the impact of Vietnam on Japan's defense industry, and growth associated with Japan's robust economy are analyzed. The dilemma created by Japan spending from three to six percent of her Gross National Product on defense spending over the next twelve years is raised. We must ask ourselves if an additional 600 billion dollars of conventional capability, above and beyond planned force structures, serves the interest of the United States in Northeast Asia.

The author does not believe so! First and foremost, the U.S. and Japan must continue to share a common destiny. Parallel security assumptions and convergent national interests are the key. Pressure to rearm Japan simply to improve our economic competitiveness is shortsighted. Additionally, Japan's economic-technological-military capacity is far too great to allow divergent interests to foster poor relations. Long term vision embracing policies which utilize Japan's political, military, and economic capacity to contain Soviet hegemony while nurturing a Japanese-American alliance are essential.

Japanese-American wealth and diplomacy utilized in base availability and base denial strategies are seen as a way of both securing sea lanes of communications in the Pacific and denying them to the Soviets. Political activity which supports a coordinated intragovernmental "Japan policy" is recommended to ensure that U.S. policy is congruous and stable. And finally, a joint space program is recommended which utilizes Japanese wealth and technology to share in the defense burden.

CONTINUED

Japanese rearmament does pose a security dilemma for U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. But political, military, and economic policies can be fashioned which integrate and harmonize the diverse cultures of these two great nations into a more prosperous and stable world order. To do less would be negligent.

INTRODUCTION

The emerging criticality of Northeast Asia as a core arena for U.S. national security interests must not be lost in the parochial interests of American legislators over the next decade. The strategic realization that U.S. security and well-being depends on the maintenance of stability and security in this region and not just Europe or the Persian Gulf is essential. This is the only region of the world where U.S., Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese interests interact directly (15:5). Continued American pressure to arm the Japanese superstate could upset this balance, creating a security dilemma with yet unknown consequences.

We are slowly entering a period of Pax Nipponica. Perhaps the death of 86 year old Hirohito, who is quite ill at present, will accelerate this process. This will bring to an end Emperor Hirohito's reign, known as Showa - the Era of Enlightened Peace. It will give rise to a new era under his son, Crown Prince Akihito, who will undoubtedly lead his nation toward new and different goals (40:44). The destiny of these goals is perhaps linked to former Prime Minister Nakasone's vision:

History teaches us that civilizations shift gradually toward the periphery, creating new civilizations as they move. Flourishing civilizations have constantly moved toward the frontier: from Greece to Rome, from Rome to England, France, and Germany, and from Europe to the American colonies. Even within America itself, the torch of civilization advanced westward, from the Atlantic to the shores of the Pacific Ocean. The compass needle of history has swung from Mediterranean civilization to Atlantic civilization. Now it is pointing toward the Pacific (31:4).

This lesson has not been lost on the Russians. Their center of gravity has been slowly moving toward the Pacific as evidenced by their shift of industry, population and resource development east of the Urals. Speaking at Vladivostok, in July 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev signaled Moscow's intention to expand Soviet economic and political roles in Asia. Moscow's overwhelming strategic buildup supports this assertion and appears aimed at securing the Soviet eastern flank, neutralizing the People's Republic of China, and intimidating Asian states friendly to the U.S., particularly Japan. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo in January of 1986 was

In fact the first visit to Japan by a Soviet Foreign Minister since World War II (36:4).

American security interests in Northeast Asia must be responsive not just to the Soviet challenge but to the consequences of the historical evolution of Japanese power. The problem is not just one of containing Soviet hegemony. Such vision would be myopic. Ensuring that a vigorous and sustained Japanese rearmament serves bilateral interests is perhaps more important. This is especially true considering the economic-technological-military growth potential of Japan, the world's leading creditor nation. Acrimonious attacks such as the Congressional Japan-bashing which followed the Toshiba incident do not serve American interests; nor do ill-conceived trade protectionist measures which serve limited domestic concerns. Congressional pressure for Japanese rearmament does not necessarily check Soviet growth. It does acknowledge American weakness in a region of expressed Soviet interest. More importantly, Japanese rearmament creates a security dilemma which contains both the seeds of stability and the pollen for change in a region where delicate geopolitical balance could crumble under Japanese remilitarization.

This paper considers the security dilemma created by Japanese rearmament. Examined are U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia with emphasis on US-Japanese relations, Japan's commitment to defend its sea lanes out to 1000 miles, and U.S. pressure for Japanese military growth. Discussion also focuses on changing Japanese threat perceptions, as well as pressures and constraints for rearmament. And it demonstrates how Japan has slowly stretched the limits of self-defense while reinterpreting the "peace constitution." Finally, recommendations which limit Japanese rearmament and enhance US-Japanese cooperation are seen as the key to continued regional stability in Northeast Asia.

CHAPTER I

U.S. INTERESTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

The end of the Vietnam War signaled the termination of the period of Pax Americana for Asia. Almost a decade of ambivalence and vacillation in U.S. policy followed. This changed in the early 1980's as Washington consolidated U.S. interests and increasingly turned toward Japan for military assistance to guarantee the security of Northeast Asia (37:30). Additionally, Reagan policy sought to demonstrate loyalty and commitment to U.S. friends and allies in the region. Broader relations with China were established in hopes of stemming the retreat of U.S. influence, thereby minimizing windows of opportunity for activist Soviet policies. Finally, U.S. policy revitalized relations with South Korea and Japan to reassert American leadership in the region (5:3).

According to Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Japan remains the cornerstone of the United States forward defense strategy in the Pacific (12:17). Under U.S. pressure to rearm, Japan's Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan finally agreed in 1981 to a division of roles in the defense of Northeast Asia. This tasked Japan with the defense of its sea lanes out to 1000 miles as well as the air and sea approaches to its territory (3:164).

Secretary of Defense Weinberger reiterated U.S. policy positions to Japan during this period. The U.S. pledged to provide a nuclear umbrella to Japan as it had done in the past. In return, the U.S. expected Japan to acquire the ships, planes, and mines necessary to close off the three principal straits leading from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific, thus preventing Soviet submarines and surface combatants from leaving the Sea of Japan. Additionally, the U.S. sought Japanese cooperation in stockpiling ammunition, supplies and logistical support for its Self Defense Forces, whose war fighting supplies were considered woefully inadequate (5:12).

This was seen as a cost effective method of achieving U.S. regional security objectives, such as limiting Soviet

naval power, as well as enhancing the defense requirements of Japan. It was palatable to both the Americans and the Japanese public and did not arouse a great deal of resentment among the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] (12:18).

Loyalty and commitment to the region were demonstrated by America's continued pledge to the security of South Korea. Not only were U.S. forces kept in South Korea, but they were modernized with the introduction of the F-16 at Kunsan Air Base and the deployment of a squadron of A-10 close air support aircraft to Suwon Air Base (5:7).

Foreign military sales credits and security related economic concessions were also part of the broad range of political, military, and economic policies pursued by the administration in a demonstration of faith and solidarity to allies of the region. The Reagan administration reaffirmed America's nuclear umbrella for South Korea in what was the strongest expression of U.S. support to Korea in over a decade. This was all part of a campaign designed to show an unequivocal commitment to treaty friends and allies (5:9).

The broad security goal of the United States in Asia today is to contain communism and strengthen political and economic ties with a diversity of nations. This has fashioned a trend toward alignment rather than alliance. Broader relations with China is seen as a part of this overall alignment process, which links stability in the Asia-Pacific region to the stability of Northeast Asia.

A coalition of nations including China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN nations, and Taiwan have emerged to challenge the threat of Soviet power or her proxies. This created the delicate situation of U.S. arms sales to both China and Taiwan. The Reagan administration has managed to negotiate a temporary compromise with China over this issue in a communique' which reflects a U.S. policy of gradually reducing arms sales to Taiwan, eventually leading to a final resolution (3:28). Meanwhile, China is a de facto partner in the political-military containment of the Soviet Union. While no formal Japanese, American, Chinese alliance has formed, the military-technological-economic might of these nations is seen as an effective counter to Soviet hegemony and a key to stability in Northeast Asia (3:30).

The most delicate challenge to U.S. security interests and policy in Northeast Asia remains Japan. Friction continues over the level of Japanese defense spending. But the most publicized and damaging aspect of US-Japanese

relations is the growing trade imbalance between the two partners. The core element of America's Asia policy soured between 1981 and 1985. The \$120 billion trade deficit of that period created a strong political backlash in Washington that found the Reagan administration acting as the referee between the rhetoric of Tokyo and the U.S. Congress (3:23).

The Reagan and Nakasone governments hammered out agreements in four key areas: telecommunications, electronics, forest products, and medical/pharmaceutical products which was hoped would open Japanese markets and reduce the trade deficit of \$60 billion a year by 1987. But mounting deficits continue to undermine US-Japanese relations (32:1). Making matters worse, the latest Japanese protectionism over American firms bidding on Japanese construction projects dampened President Reagan and Prime Minister Noburu Takeshita's January 1988 get-acquainted visit and fueled sentiments for retaliatory sanctions from both the U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter and Congressional leaders (32:1).

Despite these economic differences, planned defense increases in 1988 of 5.2% push Japanese defense spending to another all-time high and are a boost to the Reagan administration. Prime Minister Takeshita's already substantial support for U.S. troops stationed in Japan is expected to increase dramatically again in April of 1989, further reducing criticism from U.S. politicians (29:6). These signs of Japanese defense cooperation are important and help limit the political fallout created by economic friction between the two countries.

Unlike Presidents Ford and Carter, who pressured Japan to spend more on defense, President Reagan opted to revitalize US-Japanese cooperation on defense issues by concentrating on the roles and missions of the Self Defense Forces (SDF). Expanding Japanese responsibility for its sea lanes and air corridors out to 1000 miles was part of this plan. Also, the U.S. sought combined training with the SDF to promote closer communication and mutual understanding, not only to improve tactics but overall interoperability in the event combined action to preserve the security of Northeast Asia, was necessary (1:175).

Joint defense planning for the improved defense of Japan was perhaps the most significant step and a core element of U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia. Agreements on the exchange of intelligence information, improved command, control, and communication capabilities,

combined operational procedures, and matters regarding logistical support activities were made (1:174).

The evolution of cooperation on defense matters which support Japan's new roles and missions and serve the U.S. interest of containing Soviet naval power within the Sea of Japan are reflected by Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Japan. In 1985 portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), Harpoon surface-to-ship missiles, C-130H transport aircraft, AH-1S anti-tank helicopters, P-3C Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) aircraft, F-15 fighters and Patriot air defense SAMS were authorized for coproduction in Japan under U.S. license (1:180). Arrangements concluded in 1985 for the transfer of military technology between the two countries promise to benefit both partners of the relationship.

Continued administration resolve to strengthen US-Japanese cooperation is essential to American security interests in Northeast Asia. America's security pledge to South Korea, our ability to deny Soviet naval power access to Pacific sea lanes of communication, containing communism and the continued growth of free market trade are all issues linked in a complex web of relationships with Japan. Failing to recognize the centrality of Japan to stability in the region poses grave consequences, particularly as Japan herself undergoes political, military, and economic changes which affect her perception of the threat.

CHAPTER II

CHANGING JAPANESE THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Historically, a major constraint to Japanese defense policy has been the defense consciousness of the Japanese public resulting in a broad acceptance of pacifism. Recently, a heightened understanding of defense issues in Japan has emerged, partly the result of an increased trend by the mass media to report defense issues more accurately. Also, since about 1975, political opposition on defense issues has declined, allowing a greater degree of consensus to be reached between government and opposing parties (8:6). What facilitated these changes? A series of international events created pressures which increased the sensitivity of the Japanese public, their media, and elite decision-makers to their need for improved defensive capabilities and force structures.

Pressures began building as early as 1969 which caused Japan to reevaluate her national security strategy. This resulted from divergent policy decisions emanating from Washington and Tokyo. As an example, Japanese Premier Sato addressed the National Press Club in Washington saying, "I find the shape of a new Pacific age, where a new order will be created by Japan and the U.S., two countries tied together by common ideals" (2:157). Almost simultaneously, the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 unilaterally consolidated American security commitments, and started the trend toward the reduction of U.S. forces in East Asia, culminating in the American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 (8:100). The American opening of relations with China and the U.S. abolishment of the gold standard, which revalued the yen, were two other Nixon initiatives which startled Japan (4:5).

Events continued to unravel which influenced Japan. The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks certainly aroused the consciousness of the Japanese public regarding their need for guaranteeing supplies of natural resources. Also, the rapid fall of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to communist control in 1975 sent strong vibrations throughout Japan (8:101). Closer to home, the Carter administration's plan to phase down U.S. ground forces in Korea sent yet more

ominous signals to a number of Japanese officials already beginning to question American reliability (37:33).

Numerous other pressures have forced Japan to reconsider national security policy options. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979 piqued Japanese interest more than anything else. They responded by imposing export controls on the Soviets and withdrawing from the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The Iran/Iraq War and the resulting turmoil in the Persian Gulf, from which Japan imports 72 percent of her oil, also changed security perceptions in Japan (7:63). The protracted nature of these two conflicts and their global media coverage continues to focus Japanese attention on security related issues thousands of miles from Tokyo.

Events in Northeast Asia pose security problems for Japan. For example, tensions were high on the Korean peninsula throughout 1975 (8:101). Periodic instability on the Korean peninsula since the assassination of President Park in 1979 concerns Japan which has a large, vocal Korean minority (7:64). Late 1987 showed more signs of unrest in Korea and the potential for violence clouds the horizon of the 1988 Summer Olympics. Korea remains an important security issue in Japan and all of Northeast Asia.

Probably the greatest impetus for public support of increased defense spending has been the activities of the Soviet Union. Threat perceptions of the Soviets have changed substantially in the last decade. Comparing early 1970 support for the US-Japan Security Treaty versus that in early 1980, public support for the treaty has almost doubled (7:63). The following examples serve to highlight the Soviet interest in Northeast Asia and thus Japanese concern.

The Soviets built their most important nuclear submarine base for their advanced Typhoon class submarines at Petropavlosk, not only to ensure access to the Pacific, but to help neutralize the Japanese and abrogate US-Japanese defense cooperation (14:2). They were unsuccessful. Also they have deployed one third of Soviet naval power at Vladivostok, their principle naval base (10:42). Overall Soviet naval power in the region has increased by 600,000 tons since 1970, to a total of 1,620,000 tons. By comparison, the U.S. Seventh Fleet totals 600,000 tons (28:34).

Compounding old wounds, the Soviets have placed a 16,000 man Red Army division on two of the four Kurile Islands which the Soviets seized from Japan at the end of World War II. Forty FLOGGER attack aircraft support these

forces (27:34). The Soviet intent to stay remains a central issue in any Soviet-Japanese bilateral negotiation. Soviet willingness to move is unlikely. These forces are critical to any Soviet attempt to gain sea control because they ensure access to the Soya and Tsugaru Straits. Soviet interest in this area is perhaps highlighted by her willingness to shoot down Korean Airlines Flight 007 on 1 September 1983 (6:79). This callous act demonstrated clearly to the Japanese public the brutality of Soviet power and no doubt influenced Japanese thinking on security issues.

Soviet Far East naval operations and their use of facilities in Vietnam at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay have also gained Japanese attention. This puts the Soviets within easy striking distance of key sea lanes of communication, such as the Malacca Straits, vital to Japan's resource flow. Compounding this problem is the subsequent U.S. redeployment of portions of the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. While this was necessary to support Middle East contingencies, it has heightened Japan's awareness of the need for sea lane control, a dilemma facing all maritime nations. It also served notice to Japan that American power in the Pacific is waning (18:64).

All of these events helped stimulate Japanese public opinion on security issues. A public opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in 1984 indicated 82.6 percent of the population felt it was necessary to have the SDF (1:338). When questioned on defense expenditure levels, only 17.7 percent of those polled felt defense spending, which was at an all-time high, should be lowered (1:339). But this is not to say that Japan is ready and willing to become a military superpower. Constitutional constraints still inhibit defense planning and check unrestrained growth.

Any study of Japanese security must touch upon the constraints imposed on defense planning by the postwar constitution. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has dominated the politics of democratic Japan, interprets Article Nine of the Constitution so as to create four major defense restrictions. While this is just one example, these restrictions have historically served to limit the growth of Japanese military power.

The most enduring restriction to Japanese defense planning is the LDP commitment to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of non-production, non-possession and non-introduction of nuclear weapons (13:15). This restriction has widespread popular support, at least while

Japan enjoys protection under an American nuclear umbrella. But another restriction, the prohibition of collective security has been gradually weakened. Successive LDP governments have evolved to the position where Japanese-American cooperation which closes vital sea straits is acceptable (37:38).

The third LDP restriction under Article Nine, a ban on the dispatch of SDF forces abroad, has already been conceptually abandoned by Nakasone in his August 1987 address to the Japanese Parliament. And finally, the LDP commitment to limit defense spending to less than 1 percent was abandoned by Nakasone in 1986 (38:16). While these four restrictions served to limit the growth of Japanese military power, a slow assault on these institutional values has emerged, which inexorably has moved Japan slowly along the path of increased rearmament. Except for public support of the three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japanese domestic consensus seems to support the evolving capabilities of the SDF.

In summary, international environmental pressures such as the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the oil shocks of the 70's, Persian Gulf tensions, and the Soviet arms buildup are factors which have influenced the buildup of Japan's military forces. Only one of four major interpretations of Article Nine, which limits the growth of Japan's military power, has not been whittled away. The next chapter will examine how Japan has stretched the limits of self-defense.

CHAPTER III

STRETCHING SELF-DEFENSE

Japan is already a regional power; an economic and technological power it is true, but economic and technological power tend to create or facilitate other kinds of power. Japan recognizes this and sees the need to develop other forms of power which reflect her increased international status (2:9).

Japan's defense spending currently ranks seventh in the world, just behind that of France (11:52). Her army's size equals that of the United Kingdom. Moreover, if one were to use the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) method of calculating defense spending, which includes veteran benefits, Japan's defense budget would balloon to \$32 billion, surpassing all nations except for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (35:7). The following discussion analyzes the evolution of Japan's military buildup in terms of U.S. and Japanese interests, as well as economic factors which have slowly stretched the limits of self-defense.

In the summer of 1987, Prime Minister Nakasone stood in the Japanese Parliament and declared that, in theory, Japan could send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf (38:16). No other Japanese leader since World War II has considered sending armed forces abroad because the U.S. imposed "peace constitution" only allows military forces to be used to defend the territorial integrity of the homeland. The boldness of this public declaration emphasizes Japan's new willingness to act in her interests, exercising power commensurate with her status as the world's second-largest economic power (38:16).

This new interpretation of Article Nine of the Constitution typifies the historical evolution of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. The basis for this evolution is linked to early postwar American interests which changed with the nature of the threat. Following WWII, Japan was quickly de-militarized. However, American interest in the region rose sharply in June of 1950 with the invasion of South Korea by North Korea. Japan, critical to the security

of Northeast Asia, served as the logistics base for the Korean effort, in much the same way that England did in World War II. U.S. interests in defending this logistics base created the SDF and served to propel Japan along the path of rearmament.

American pressure to rearm Japan was based on other American interests as well. Shortly after disarming Japan and liberating Korea from 50 years of Japanese domination, MacArthur wanted to field a Japanese force of 75,000 men to fight in Korea (6:31). While rejected by Japan, ultimately, this American brainchild became the Japanese SDF. Although small and ill-equipped, Japan was satisfied with this defense arrangement during the 1950's and 1960's as her economic power was weak. In return, the U.S. received important basing rights which protected American interests in Korea and Vietnam and guaranteed the security of Japan (39:2).

American involvement in Vietnam also played a role in the evolution of the SDF and Japanese rearmament. The economic-military-technological relationship between the U.S., Japan and Vietnam shows surprising results. During the escalation period of the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1969, for every American dollar of aid spent in Vietnam, two were spent in Japan for American defense needs. Japan's economy and defense industry benefitted (9:103). Ironically, the collapse of U.S. policy in Vietnam and the stunning withdrawal of American power from Indochina reminded Japanese policy makers how vulnerable Japan's strategic interests were (39:3). Perhaps this reality motivated Prime Minister Nakasone, who some observers characterized as a Gaullist, for his views which envisioned an independent Japanese military buildup (30:25).

Nakasone's Persian Gulf declaration underscored Japan's growing internationalist vision and recognition of unilateral interests. The evolutionary growth of Japan's military capability supports this duality and necessitates a reinterpretation of the American imposed "peace constitution". The Japanese have proven very adept at Orwellian double-speak allowing them a flexible interpretation of Article Nine of the Constitution (33:108). Several examples of the very latest policy changes which break old defense taboos follow.

In 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone abandoned the ceiling on defense spending which years earlier had set an artificial limit of one percent of Japan's gross national product (GNP) on military spending (29:6). Japan also agreed to share defense technology with the U.S., violating

her previously strict laws on the export of military arms and technology. In July of 1986, she abolished the National Defense Council, creating instead a more powerful Security Council of Japan (1:67). And now, for the first time, Japan plays an active role in Western nuclear strategy (38:16). These fundamental changes are some examples of the historical evolution of the SDF, and hint at the growing interest Japan has in her military capability. Perhaps the next change will be the establishment of the Japanese Defense Agency as a Cabinet level office. The question is, what other changes does the future hold?

The growth of her military capability is due in part to qualitative improvements sought by the National Defense Program Outline of 1976 and follow-on programs such as the Mid-term Defense Program for fiscal years 1986 to 1990. These programs identified the basic defense concept of Japan and the required force levels Japan should possess (1:80). They have specifically targeted for improvement and modernization defensive capabilities of the Ground Defense, Maritime Defense, and Air Defense forces. They have sought improvements to command and communication, and intelligence capabilities, as well as enhancing war sustainability, combat readiness and survivability of high value assets (1:161). Examples of these qualitative improvements include acquisition and production of F-15 air-to-air fighters, Patriot surface-to-air missiles, P-3C ASW aircraft, and Stinger-type short range air defense missiles (1:161).

Japan's robust economy obviously facilitates her arms growth. Even living within the one percent of GNP defense spending limit, Japan's growing economy almost tripled its defense budget between 1975 and 1986 (6:54). The new government-endorsed five year plan allocates 1.84 trillion yen (about \$86 billion) to defense spending, despite cutbacks and slowdowns in all other areas of government spending (25:53). This raises an interesting security question.

Does the U.S. really want Japan spending from three to six percent of her GNP on defense over the next 12 years? Some members of the U.S. Congress endorse this philosophy. By the year 2000, this could add an estimated 600 billion dollars above and beyond currently planned Japanese growth! This even assumes zero growth rate in the Japanese economy.

Japan's defense industry could gladly absorb these excess funds. Nissan, one of Japan's top automobile makers, is already involved in space rocketry and has expanded into missile development. Hitachi and Toshiba created defense divisions in 1980. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki

Heavy Industries and over 1500 other companies would benefit (25:52-3).

The capabilities of Japan's growing defense industry is impressive. Japan's naval shipbuilding industries produce products 30 percent cheaper than those found anywhere else in the world (6:60). Japan's space plans include the development by 1990 of a launch rocket, the H2, of similar proportions to the American Space Shuttle (6:61). Japanese computer research for sixth generation computers is supported by \$200 million per year and designed to put Japan at the forefront of computer technology by the end of the century. By comparison, the United States is spending half this amount on computer research projects run by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (6:63).

Increased Japanese defense spending coupled with relaxed arms export controls could provide Japan's defense industry with more political leverage. The growth of a military-industrial complex would certainly propel Japan along the path of greater rearmament. These are the kinds of dynamics taking place in Japan which resulted in a United States estimate that Japan would become a 'strategic power' by 1990 (6:156). Funded at the level the U.S. Congress desires, Japan could easily become a military superpower by the year 2000, annually adding an impressive 100 billion dollars of conventional military capability to a nation the size of California.

The Korean War, the Vietnam War, Japan's reinterpretation of elements of the "peace constitution", and Japan's economic strength are examples of factors which have improved the military capability of Japan. The evolving capabilities of Japan's SDF, with its qualitative and quantitative growth, currently serve Japanese-American interests. But continued American pressure, economic friction, or Japanese recognition of divergent national interests could change all of this and result in actions not compatible with U.S. interests. The next chapter recommends political, military, and economic initiatives to help resolve the security dilemma posed by expanding Japanese capabilities.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Growing Japanese military power resulting from U.S. pressure to rearm, changing Japanese threat perceptions, and an evolving Self Defense Force has created a security dilemma for the U.S. American interest in containing communism, guaranteeing the security of South Korea, and bottling up the Soviet Pacific Fleet are all conspicuously tied to a successful Japanese-American relationship. The whole American concept of forward basing in Northeast Asia is at stake if our relations deteriorate because Japanese security assumptions do not parallel U.S. assumptions. A vigorous, coordinated defense strategy during the next decade must enhance political, military, and economic activity if continued regional stability is to be enjoyed. Stability in Northeast Asia depends on enhanced US-Japanese defense cooperation which ensures the use and control of the sea and air lanes of communication all along the littoral of the Pacific through a strategy of base availability and base denial (8:65). Additionally, Washington must establish an effective "Japan policy" which goes beyond trade differences. Joint US-Japanese space initiatives are seen as one area which would exploit the technology and wealth of both nations to serve common interests. Public appeal, technology spinoffs and mutual cooperation could create a cobweb of beneficial relationships.

Japan's perceived security interests will ultimately drive Japan's requirements during the rearmament process. The harmonization and integration of Japanese-American security assumptions is therefore critical. Japan's military capabilities will respond impressively to these needs. For example, in November of 1987, the Japanese Defense Agency selected an upgraded version of the F-16C, known as Agile Falcon, for its FSX ground support fighter. Co-developed by Japan and General Dynamics, this aircraft will incorporate stealth technology on its leading edges as well as canard control surfaces for enhanced maneuverability (12:1). Also in November, they unveiled the new Type-90 Main Battle Tank, a third generation vehicle equal to the American M1 or the German Leopard-II tank, which utilizes

the latest available technology in composite armor, weapons, and fire control technology (22:17). Channeling these capabilities toward mutually beneficial needs is obviously important to regional stability.

Monitoring divergent security assumptions provokes stimulating thought. A potentially interesting development is Japan's reported "intense interest" in the British Skyhook system. This technology can provide launch and recovery of Harrier-type fighters from destroyer-class ships using a special crane. While Japan is currently prohibited by its constitution from having large deck carriers, this could provide Japan with a mobile, maritime air capability similar to that advocated by small deck carrier defense reformists (19:4). Coupled with Japan's acquisition of over-the-horizon radars having a range of 3000 km, this would be a significant increase in capability since Japan already has a destroyer force greater than that of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (26:271). Putting this in a historical perspective, it must be remembered that Japan led the U.S. Navy from the battleship era to the era of large deck carriers. Perhaps this technology and Japanese innovation will lead to ocean air defense concepts which revolutionize war at sea again.

This sort of change may not be in America's interest if Japanese security assumptions differ from ours. Continued Congressional pressure, which accuses Japan of its "free ride" on defense and calls for substantially increased levels of Japanese defense spending, may propel Japan toward independent security policies contrapuntal to American interests in Asia. This would be particularly true if Japanese nationalism gets out of control (16:22). A new Japanese assertiveness is emerging which must be shaped in the interest of both democracies. An example of Japan's rekindled assertiveness occurred on the 9 Dec 87 intercept of a Soviet TU-16 BADGER bomber. Two Japanese F-4EJ fighters fired warning shots at the intruder, the first time Japanese forces have fired on Soviets since 1945 (20:1).

Stability in Northeast Asia requires political, military, and economic cooperation aimed at containing Soviet hegemony through strategies of base availability and base denial. For example, the future of American bases in the Philippines or Soviet bases in Vietnam may well be determined by the effectiveness of Japanese-American security ventures. Retired General Richard Stilwell, a counter-insurgency warfare expert, recently predicted a communist victory in the Philippines within two years if major changes in government internal security policies do

not take place (23:1). A retreat of American power to Guam or Hawaii would certainly threaten Japanese security interests, stimulate rearmament, and upset security relationships along the Pacific littoral. Vigorous Japanese support of American bases in the Philippines would be beneficial. Japanese diplomatic, trade, and economic pressure could provide strong leverage supporting American basing rights. The Korean, Chinese, and ASEAN peoples view American presence in the Philippines favorably because this reduces Japanese pressure for remilitarization.

Political, military, and economic efforts to contain Soviet hegemony can also be achieved through a strategy of basing denial. For example, a U.S. rapprochement with Vietnam could regain access to Da Nang or Cam Ranh Bay. This would have the immediate effect of reducing the Soviet ability to control the vital Malacca Strait or the Bashi-Osaka Channel. Not only would this reduce tremendous pressure on Japan's vulnerable sea lanes of communication, it would force a retreat of Soviet naval power back to Vladivostok - some 2000 miles away. US-Japanese cooperation on this issue could provide one of the major geopolitical coups of the 1990's. Joint diplomatic initiatives linking Japanese-American economic support to Vietnam with American basing rights could disenfranchise Soviet access to Southeast Asia in much the same way that U.S. aid froze the Soviets out of Egypt (24:13).

Washington must get beyond its Eurocentric outlook and its fascination with Moscow and establish an effective "Japan policy". The Executive Branch needs to establish an agency responsible for coordinating all aspects of the US-Japan relationship. Conflicting messages from the State and Defense Departments, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture offices do nothing but erode American power and prestige (34:361). Long-term vision must establish a conceptual framework within which specific U.S. policies can be pursued. Serious U.S. national interests are at stake. A proper balance must be struck between policies which treat Japan as a trusted and stable ally, and those which see her as a tough economic competitor (34:362).

This is essential if we are to effectively deal with rising "techno-nationalism" and the increasing levels of exports resulting from Japanese advances in industrial ceramics, lasers, biotechnology, and robotics. In turn, trade protectionism and economic tension could spawn trumped-up charges and countercharges of wrongdoing, setting the stage for falling diplomacy (34:364) Unraveling US-Japanese cooperation would be courting disaster not only

In Northeast Asia, but globally if policies pit these superpowers against each other.

A concerted effort on both sides of the Pacific must work to preclude this sort of escalation. Avenues of cooperation must be sought which provide for a shared destiny between these two great democracies. Joint space development and exploration would do much to further this goal. Alvin Toffler, author of Future Shock, recognizes Japan's long standing cultural infatuation with technology and the future (41:17). Japan's wealth and technology would be a significant shot in the arm to America's space program. This would lower American capital outlay while at the same time reducing the rate of growth of Japanese conventional capabilities. This would serve to limit Japan from exceeding purely defensive requirements while satisfying critics of Japanese defense spending.

Japan's contributions toward terrestrial surveillance from space would also allay critics of Japanese defense spending. Combined surveillance and reconnaissance assets dedicated to the coverage of Northeast Asia would do much to contain Soviet naval power in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk. Additional benefits derived from the joint use of launch sites in Japan would enhance the survivability of U.S. space systems in times of crisis. Achieving new launch parameters for the insertion of covert satellite capabilities is also possible. The low visibility of military space activities offers one final attraction to regional stability because satellites are not as threatening to Japan's Asian partners as are the expanded capabilities of armies, navies, and air forces.

The greatest benefit of joint space development is likely to be the public relations coup of such a program. While there will be tremendous technological spinoffs for industry, media coverage of joint space activities could lead to broad public support in both nations. Japanese and American prestige would prosper in a mutually beneficial environment. The spillover effects in other areas of intergovernmental cooperation would substantially increase domestic consensus for bilateral relationships across a spectrum of activities. Ultimately this enhances regional stability.

Japanese-American cooperation is central to stability in Northeast Asia. Extensive calls for Japanese rearmament do not serve American interests, particularly considering Japan's economic wealth. Japan's growing military capability must be carefully shaped to serve the joint

interests of our two democracies. Propelling Japan along a Gaullist, independent rearmament track by Japan-bashing and demonstrating a lack of statesmanship would adversely affect regional security. Fashioning a balanced strategy which embraces Japanese economic, military, and political cooperation through base availability and base denial strategies, continued US-Japanese diplomacy, and the visible development of joint space activities offers hope to preserving the vitality of US-Japanese relations. The stability of Northeast Asia is at stake. To do otherwise might provide an ironic twist of fate to Admiral Yamamoto's famous quote, "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve" (6:114).

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