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
ISSUES UNDERLYING ARMY POLICY ANALYSIS NEEDS VOLUME 2
AN APPENDIX OF ISSUE NOMINATIONS ARRANGED BY POLICY
AREA(U) FUTURES GROUP GLASTONBURY CT 03 OCT 83


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Volume II

**ISSUES UNDERLYING
ARMY POLICY ANALYSIS NEEDS**

AN APPENDIX OF ISSUE NOMINATIONS

ARRANGED BY POLICY AREA

by

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INTRODUCTION

The material in this volume was developed from interviews with 20 top management personnel in the Army Staff and Secretariat. The interviewees nominated about 160 issues; i.e., subjects or potential problem areas they believed were important to Army policy for the post-POM period and, hence, warranted current policy study and attention.

Many issues nominated were overlapping or largely the same; a result that one would expect from a series of interviews. These inputs were briefly analyzed. Two results emerged: (1) many of the issues were combined on the basis of their similarity, and (2) groups or sets of issues were formulated that represented a common theme or concern. These were designated as "policy areas."

The policy areas are presented here along with the consolidated issues that formed or comprised each area. Also, this volume includes all of the issues, along with various background information, offered by each interviewee.

The material in this volume was intended as background information for a meeting on 3 October 1983 with the Arroyo Center advisory panel; one step in the Policy Committee process of developing a policy analysis program for the Arroyo Center.

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CONTENTS OF this Volume include:

MEANS TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS THE TOTAL READINESS	1
INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE BUDGETARY AND POLITICAL PROCESS	9
DEFINITION OF THE FULL SCOPE OF ARMY ROLES AND MISSIONS	20
DEVELOPING AND MANAGING NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND MODERNIZATION	35
INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE OVERALL DOD	71
RECRUITING/STAFFING, RETENTION AND UTILIZATION OF THE AVAILABLE PERSONNEL	97
STRENGTH AND READINESS, IN LIGHT OF PROLONGED CONFLICT	125
U.S. RELATIONSHIPS WITH AND MILITARY COMMITMENTS TO OTHER NATIONS and	148
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE U.S. PUBLIC AND CITIZENS OF OTHER NATIONS	155

Policy Area: Development and utilization of means to realistically assess the total readiness of forces.

Issues:

- Objective measures of officer quality/capability
- Realistic measures of cost/benefit, especially for logistics
- Ability to realistically spotlight tomorrow's surprises
- Realistic measures of military force capability
- Objective measures of required force structure and posture in face of multiple future eventualities
- Constraints on accomplishing objective policy studies from historic precedent and parochialism

ISSUE: Measurements of officer quality

BACKGROUND:

- o Desire of Army to require that all have a college education
- o Tendency of the National Guard to be composed of rural environments while Reserve has an urban/educated composition.
- o Demonstrated competency of rural/farm population in National Guard positions.

ISSUE: Adequacy of cost benefit measures, especially for logistics

BACKGROUND:

- o Competition for funds among the services constantly requires justification of Army budgets on a cost benefit basis
- o The private sector/industry has made significant advances in recent years in terms of distribution and inventory techniques (e.g. to minimize inventory while still being able to operate/meet customer needs)
- o The Army has not kept pace with advances in the state of the art in in distribution, inventory control and logistics
- o It has become increasingly impossible to stockpile all needs (the Army can no longer afford to build stockpiles)
- o Logistics activities are based upon demand and not on prediction (the Army has a demand system and not a forecasting system)

IMPLICATIONS:

- o Develop a forecasting system (build a computer-based data base/network that can be used to statistically estimate requirements and allow tailoring of logistics packages to anticipated need)
- o Become more familiar with and seek ways of exploiting private-sector techniques and approaches

ISSUE: Inability to realistically see into the future

BACKGROUND:

- o Inability to see beyond relatively near term years has resulted in reactive planning
- o Reward for risks are too low
- o The burden of maintaining a military capability and providing for the Army really rests with Congress (e.g., the authorizations and appropriations come from Congress)
- o Minimize or avoid use of institutionalization of long-range studies because of the tendency of institutional activities to become bureaucratic and non-innovative

IMPLICATION:

- o Exploit Reserve elements (e.g., exploit private sector insights) to enhance innovation and creativity.
- o Increase the emphasis on nontraditional military schools (e.g. ROTC program, VMI, OCS, etc.)
- o Provide other than economic incentives for innovation and creativity (e.g., link them to promotion)

ISSUE: Adequacy of measures of the capability of a military force
BACKGROUND:

- o Reorganizations without the ability to immediately reequip to the new definition (e.g. Division 86)
- o Inability to measure capability of deploying "ready" forces in the overall measure of readiness.

IMPLICATIONS:

- o Difficulty in establishing a methodology to provide adequate measures while minimizing bureaucratic difficulties.
- o Difficulty in establishing measures that capture the full scope of items comprising readiness and that are easily communicated.
- o Difficulty in including various qualitative measures (e.g., esprit d' corps).

Issue: Adequacy of means to measure actual force capability

Background:

- Unit status reports do not realistically reflect or indicate readiness
- The system of readiness measurement does not adequately capture capabilities brought by civilians in the Reserve

Implications:

- Reassess the value of readiness as a measure, as contrasted to measures of unit capability

Issue: Need for Objective Measures of what Army Posture and Structure Should Be

Background:

- The career learning process of the military introduces major inclination to accept particular threat definitions that support a particular branch/viewpoint.
- The management style and emphasis varies with the changes in the top management of the Army.
- Many macro conditions are relatively easy to forecast with certainty, such as demographic shifts. But the Army gets caught up in unpredictable, intense micro conditions that can and do have major impacts.

Issue: Ability of the Army to objectively study certain types of broad policy issues

Background:

- Reticence of senior leadership to reveal its real goals and objectives and priorities
- Promulgation of Army lore and way of thinking (training young, new officers in the old ways)

Policy Area: Influence on military/Army budgets and program stability of economic conditions and the budgetary and political process.

- Issues:**
- Growing costs of retirement and other benefit programs
 - Lack of clear accountability for political/budget decisions, especially for military items
 - Formulating decisions and plans on never realized budget expectations
 - Obsolescence of fielded equipment resulting from lengthy PPBES cycle
 - Effects of economic cycles along with growing obsolescence of the nation's industrial sectors
 - Effects of changing program objectives

Issue: Cost of retirement and benefit programs

Background:

- Population aging and trends toward increased life expectancy
- Use of post and other facilities (e.g., PX, medical) by active and retired people and their families
- Traditional trend in budgeting to include retirement/benefits in the budget for the military

Implications:

- Potential reduction of funds available for active forces

Issue: Level and type of benefits

Background:

- Continued pressures by the public and Congress to reduce military costs
- Growing number of retirees

Implications:

- Expand/resurrect use of the G.I. bill to attract recruits
- Potential need to reduce retirement benefits due to cost pressures

Issue: Lack of clear accountability for political/budget decisions especially for military items

Background:

- Increasing layers of personnel who can veto items but who have no clear responsibility for future defense of the country
- Decline in numbers of congressmen and congressional staff with military background
- Decline in national interest/patriotism on the part of defense contractors

Issue: Formulating decisions and plans that are unrealized/not fully funded

Background:

- Utilization of Extended Planning Annex in an attempt to accomplish/realize items presented/stated in the POM
- Inadequacy of POM to accomplish Army needs

Implications:

- o Inability to accomplish stated missions, especially in conflict, due to unavailable forces/materiel (e.g. plans based on unrealized readiness)

Issue: Coping With Future Budgetary Cuts While Pursuing Modernization and Light Forces

Background:

- The current administration has helped to change public attitudes about and budgets for the military but attitudes about the military and budgets are cyclic (budgets will not continue to remain high indefinitely)
- The Army currently is committed to a massive modernization program
- Personnel costs continue to dominate Army spending and high technology will not significantly replace the soldier
- Soviet use of systems that are simpler/cruiser than those of the U.S.
- Acquisition process results in lengthy programs, contributing high costs

Implications:

- Pursue weapons systems designs that represent a compromise between Soviet simplicity and U.S. complexity

Issue: Equipment obsolescence resulting from the PPBES cycle/system

BACKGROUND:

- Approval steps specified by the process result in long delays in acquisition, from R&D through field deployment

Issue: Impact of budgetary and procurement cycles

Background:

- Long time periods associated with obtaining funds and program approval
- Lack of program continuity
- Difficulties/shortcomings in quality control
- Difficulties in allocating and/or reallocating program funds (e.g. pressures from the administration, Congress and local constituencies to maintain existing programs)

Issue:

Influence of the time constants associated with the acquisition and political processes on military preparedness

Background:

- The Army is continuously pushed and pulled due to national/external events.
- The heated focus on Southeast Asia really deterred the Army from preparing for the long term (e.g., it led to a nonmodernization because huge expenditures were for maintaining the field forces and the post-Vietnam era caused the Army to be in a defensive position for resources because of the adverse/hostile national reaction to the military)
- After the Carter Administration, the American public changed its attitude in response to the military (e.g., the shift from the low point of the 70s was impacted by the Iranian hostage situation, the U.S. victory over the Soviet hockey team in the Olympics, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan)
- People are tired of being second best but support of the military is a fragile consensus
- Inflation and the economic downturn/recession was really a setback to military funding
- The entire system causes the Army to operate in a crisis management mode. The Army is outside of the political process: Congress sets the rules for the nature of military activities which causes the Army to be reactive
- Every four years the Army is under new political pressures
- Other services decide what they wish to have, they put those items in their program plans, and are effective in building into the administration plans, thereby being able to bring their programs to fruition.
- The Army in the field is repeatedly told to keep out of the political process

Implications:

- Examine closely the time constants of the the acquisition process in order to better understand the politics of and best way to resource the Army
- Improve communications with Congress to keep it informed about Army requirements, desired program plans, etc.

Issue: Resource planning and allocation in a cyclic, obsolescent production base

Background:

- The U.S. has a relatively old production base
- Modernization of old plants depends largely upon economic considerations. As economic incentives increase, business will rebuild a more modern production base.
- Although cyclic, the U.S. economy has been generally healthy
- Wars have generally supported the work ethic and have been a major factor in our economy

Implications:

- The Army must continue to struggle for its needs during peacetime with a political and sometimes antagonistic Congress and office of the Secretary of Defense

Issue: Stability in program objectives and continuity

Background:

- Political changes and political inconsistency from four-year presidencies
- Desire of succeeding presidents, even in the same political party, to have their own personal impact on and contribution to national/defense policies
- Long lead times associated with Army weapon system development and acquisition (e.g., 10-12 years).
- Maintenance of options by the Army over prolonged periods of time
- Inability to cancel programs due to the growth of constituencies after a program has been initiated (within Army top management and civilian and political interests)
- Diffusion of power (e.g., environment of compromise where definitive yes or no decisions should be made)
- Relatively short-term headquarters assignments (e.g., 18 months)

Implications:

- Programs are neither terminated or fully funded (e.g., programs are "half funded")
- Program design and direction is a compromise solution
- Program costs are always additive and therefore continue to escalate
- Potential need to restructure assignments requiring four-year terms at headquarters
- Growth in waste, fraud, and abuse

Policy Area:

Realistic definition of the full scope of Army roles and missions in light of expanding U.S. worldwide commitments, new weaponry, staffing and budget constraints, relationships to other services, socioeconomic conditions and attitudes within the U.S.

Issues:

- Role of the Army in space
- Problems of Army-Air Force jurisdictional disputes relative to airspace management
- Relative missions and strengths of active versus reserve components within the Total Army
- Socioeconomic responsibilities appropriate to the Army
- Use of the Army to accomplish social goals or as a model for accomplishing socioeconomic change
- Use of military facilities and personnel in support of local, state or federal government functions
- Participation of the Army in establishing and implementing a long-range approach to managing the water resources of the U.S.

Issue: Role of the Army in Outer Space

Background:

- Space will become a military arena.
- Space is currently not the domain of a single U.S. military service (e.g., the Air Force and the Army have roles and missions in space).
- Historic mission and desire of the Army to maintain its BMD roles and missions.

Implications:

- Reassess the appropriate role of the Army in space activities

Issue: The role of the Army in space

Background:

- The role of space for military activities will continually increase.
- The two superpowers currently have military space activities underway (e.g., intelligence satellites) and they allow each other to engage in those activities.
- Nationstates will survive (i.e., an international order completely controlling space will not emerge) and conflict is inevitable.

Implications:

- The Army should not be constrained by its own conservatism regarding its role in space.
- Need to investigate the potential directions that space wars may take and what equipment, doctrine, materials, and other factors are likely to be involved (i.e., the conflict is inevitable, but we do not understand the factors likely to precipitate it and what the nature of the warfare is likely to be).

Issue: Airspace Management

Background:

- Management of airspace activities is currently resolved through negotiations by local Air Force and Army commanders based on rules of engagement
- Jurisdictional disputes have become standard operating procedure

Implications:

- Establish air space management doctrine for the Army to avoid or minimize future disputes

ISSUE: The role/mission and mix of Active and Reserve forces

BACKGROUND:

- Growing trend in Congress to strengthen the Reserve Component at the expense of the Active forces
- They are many political constituencies supporting Reserve forces
- Reserve forces are viewed as being less expensive.
- Reserve personnel only have limited time to devote to training and, although they are superb people, they cannot really be adequately trained (we may have adequate numbers and units, but they may not be in a proper state to go to war).
- Recent trends toward improving the status of the Reserve forces by working jointly with Active forces thereby upgrading the combat readiness of the Reserve forces
- Simulators can be a major contribution to Reserve readiness but they are exceedingly expensive and also the Reserves *do not* have the *most up-to-date equipment*, thereby making the simulators incompatible with existing Reserve equipment

IMPLICATIONS:

- Inadequate preparedness and false sense of security

Issue: Structure of Active and Reserve Components

Background:

- Roundout units are really Reserve units
- Decisions about role/mission and structure of the National Guard are highly political
- Capabilities of the total Army have markedly improved in recent years (including consideration of the Reserves)

Implications:

- Employ Active forces as the basic cadre
- Examine real utility of the National Guard

Issue: Roles and missions of the Reserves

Background:

- Level and type of training (improper to realistically support NATO)
- Political influences on control of the Reserve, especially the National Guard

Implications:

- Utilize the Reserve as the light forces

ISSUE: Shifting of regular Army missions to the National Guard

BACKGROUND:

- o Peacetime trend to shift what previously were regular Army roles in missions increasingly to National Guard units.
- o The Guard is and has always been a voluntary force.
- o The organizational structure of National Guard units has always been confined to state boundaries.
- o Growth in organizational structure (e.g. Division 86 to 18,000 men)

IMPLICATIONS:

- o Potential need to ask for help in recruiting
- o Potential need to change basic structure (e.g. size, number of organizational units, multi-state deployment/participation)
- o Potential need to take over various additional functions (e.g., land- and air-based participation in drug traffic control, policing/control of illegal immigration, antiterrorist activity, etc.
- o Potential establishment of a nationally integrated National Guard (e.g. encompassing Air Force, and Naval activities)

Issue:

The need for and role of land forces in the modern world

Background:

- o The federal government, including Congress, has a very unclear picture of the application and use of military force and the role of the Army seems even less certain.
- o Historic precedent is strong as a major influence on establishing current attitudes and resulting roles of the Army.

Issue: Conflicting guidance regarding roles and mission

Background:

- The Soviets are increasingly investing in smaller nations who are acting as their surrogates
- The Army has been receiving new roles and missions in the context of the growth of the Soviet worldwide threat (e.g. peripheral wars other than in Central Europe)
- A European force structure is not really adequate for other theaters
- Decisions to move to light forces have not been followed up with clear signals from the Administration and/or the Congress. Conflicting signals from the Congress due to public concerns about the federal budget and general lack of public interest in the specifics of Army roles and missions (especially as that they relate to R&D, weapons development and deployment). The Army proceeds with the signals it gets but finds it difficult to communicate its needs to Congress and the public in light of those signals

Issue: Lack of definition of what the Army roles and missions can actually be

Background:

- Historic trends and patterns of the DOD budget and the Army portion of that budget
- Personnel limitations
- Inadequacy of light forces to reinforce NATO units
- Mismatch of existing and planned technology for use by the light forces
- Potential for inadequate support from the Reserve component

Issue: Definition and mix of light forces with heavy forces

Background:

- Historic precedent makes it difficult to design a light force that's really light and highly mobile and to define the proper mix between light and heavy forces.

Implications:

- Major breakthroughs are required in materials science and technology in order to develop weapon systems that are truly light

Issue:

Desire to Use Army to Accomplish Social Goals or to Conduct Social Experiments/Use of the Army as a Model for Social Tests

Background:

- The special agenda/activities imposed upon the Army have included integration, rehabilitation, and assimilation of minority and women
- Many in top management and military positions do not wish the Army to be used as an experimental ground for social tests; they argue that the mission of the Army is to defend the country
- The social agenda often generates needs for repugnant detailed decisions (e.g., regarding quotas): these needs create friction between civilian and military management of the Army

Issue: Demand for use of military facilities and other support by local and/or state government/agencies

Background:

- Incidents of requests to use vacant or underused military facilities/buildings to alleviate overcrowding and shortages of civilian prison facilities
- Use of military in support of drug law enforcement activities
- Plans to provide support if requested regarding law enforcement associated with 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles

Implications:

- Potential ongoing support in response to domestic terrorism
- Potential requirement to modify the posse comitatus restrictions on use of military forces/facilities

Issue: Long-range water policy for the U.S.

Background:

- Aquifers in the United States are already a critical/very serious national problem (i.e., the world's greatest breadbasket may be drying up)
- Many, including the Corps of Engineers, view the water problem as one for the Department of Interior
- The Army has the capability to address the nation's long-term water problems, which should not be subjected to four-year election cycle changes

Implications:

- Potential need for the Corps of Engineers to assume an aggressive leadership role in developing and discussing a national water plan

Policy Area:

Developing and managing new technologies and modernization in a manner that maintains readiness to deter or defeat threats from the Soviets and any others.

Issues:

- Security of data bases
- Technology transfer (authorized and unauthorized) and loss of U.S. technological superiority (including production)
- Command and control compatibility with advanced tactical weaponry
- Lack of attention to technical developments of others (friend or foe) and inability to exploit insights when obtained
- Management of information, including acceptance and use of new technologies by older officers
- Role and impact of automation/robotics
- Impact on staffing of advanced and new technologies
- Protection of knowledge about capabilities developed through R&D and intentions for their use
- Attention to possible technical breakthroughs (by the U.S. and others)
- Ability to manage R&D and take advantage of technological changes
- Ability to manage the modernization process, including acquisition, distribution and training for all components
- Relationship of new technologies to the ability to engage in a long war

Issue: Security of data bases and intelligence information

Background:

- Recent experiences with and growing ability of persons to develop ways of acquiring access to various data bases in various locations around the country that are presumed secure
- Lack of a adequate approach to encryption

Issue: Loss of technical superiority by the U.S.

Background:

- Emphasis on elementary education in the U.S. has declined enormously while the Soviets put their best teachers in education (low value/image of and rewards for the educator in the U.S.)
- Advancements by allies and adversaries in technology have largely reduced or removed the superiority of the U.S. in many areas
- In spite of the commitment to light forces the technology largely being pursued by the U.S. is for heavy forces that are not redeployable (e.g. the M-1, Bradley, MLRS)

IMPLICATIONS:

- Seek ways to exploit and reward the ingenuity of the combat soldier
- Better understand the conflict between doctrine and improvisation
- Seek ways to better distribute or share the development load with our allies

Issue: Loss of U.S. Technological Superiority

Background:

- Trend of foreign powers (e.g. Japan, Israel, Germany and France) to increasingly develop advanced technologies/weaponry

Implications:

- Necessity for U.S. to obtain rights to produce such technology

Issue:

Loss of technological and production superiority by the U.S.

Background:

- The U.S. has recently turned to Japanese consultants to provide recommendations about production approaches, quality control, etc.
- Major difficulties associated with quality control and production are being experienced/will be experienced in PATRIOT (e.g., in cables and connectors)
- Attention to production and quality control details has declined in America as we have transitioned to the service sector and away from blue-collar industrial activities (e.g., people have become less concerned about producing quality work)
- Difficulties between the rank and file and labor union management have resulted in management no longer really representing the worker
- Application by industry of robotics (e.g., by GM in auto production) cannot be assumed as the model to reduce quality control problems of the services hence the services have to contend with maintenance and repair and the need for on-site innovation under field conditions)
- Decline in the ability of the military to control and motivate its blue-collar workforce regarding attention to detail and quality control
- Reduction or loss by American industry of an interest in and concern about the nation as a whole and their responsibility to provide high-quality products, especially to the military

Issue: Compatibility of command and control system/capabilities with advanced/high technology weapon systems

Background:

- The ability to operate under markedly expanded conditions (e.g., attack helicopters and advanced tanks capable of operating under day and night conditions)

Implications:

- Need for improved intelligence gathering especially shared with tactical units
- Potential application of artificial intelligence to accomplish/assist intelligence gathering and command and control functions
- The need for personnel with sufficient intellectual capacity and skill to cope with the new weapon system technologies and command and control functions

Issue: Ability to obtain and benefit from equipment developed and produced in other countries

Background:

- Political pressures often dictate purchasing from U.S. manufacturers in order to support the economy and provide jobs
- U.S. military specifications often preclude acceptance of foreign technology on a technical and/or cost basis
- Although we have obtained insights about Soviet technology and have reversed engineered various Soviet items (e.g. the ribbon bridge) it remains difficult to interject insights into domestic thinking (e.g. the "not-invented-here" attitude)

Issue: Attention to other nations' (allies and enemies) approaches and inability to benefit from insights that are obtained

Background:

- o Use by the Russians of pipelines to move petroleum, thereby solving or minimizing major logistics problems while the U.S. continues use military trucks for such functions.

Issue: Ability of Command Officers to Cope With New Communications Technologies, In Peace and War

Background:

- Command officers are of an older age and typically unfamiliar with using advanced electronic means of communications (they are comfortable with face-to-face communications)
- Effective command and leadership requires proper use of personal contact including use of emotions. Commanders will rely on advanced techniques in peace time situations but in war time/combat they still will want to "meet people in their tent"

Implications:

- Improved approaches to and designs for man machine interface tailored to more senior/older field commanders.

Issue: Converting data into useful information (e.g., for management and leadership activities)

Background:

- The amount of information being generated is growing in both volume and in frequency of use/distribution.
- The outcome of future conflicts will be decided by a few, very high/critical persons.
- Fewer personnel are performing more and more functions.

Implications:

- A breakthrough in the technology of information is really needed.

Issue: Growth in the Amount and Dispersion of Information

Background:

- The Army currently can't handle/is having difficulties in handling the current amount of information with the personnel it has
- The Army is committed to increasing use of automated systems/MIS but is lagging in the understanding of and the ability to effectively use such systems (especially as compared to others)
- Elements of systems (closed systems) work well internally but often don't fit or work well with other units (e.g., what works well in the CONUS doesn't work worldwide and vice versa)

Implications:

- Develop improved approaches to networking

Issue: Role and impact of automation and robotics

Background:

- Continued pressures/need to maintain technological pace with competition, especially in light of continued advances in technology
- Costs associated with modernization
- Changing skill levels in availability of personnel and changing requirements dictated by new technologies

Implications:

- Potential use of computers/robots to replace/reduce staffing requirements (and possibly preclude need for future draft)
- Ability to reconsider "combat" roles for women

Issue: Ability of robotics/automation to replace/reduce menial tasks

Background:

- Growing capability in automation and robotics
- Growing need to provide stimulating jobs to retain personnel

Issue: The role of robotics

Background:

- The need to cope with personnel shortages
- We will never have a totally automated war or conflict since conflicts are always settled by someone taking and holding the ground (e.g., someone taking charge).

Issue: Impact on personnel of advanced technology

Background:

- Historic trend of increased numbers of personnel and personnel skills associated with introduction of advanced technologies

Implications:

- Employ greater discipline to attain same fire power with fewer people with the application of advanced technology

Issue: Real staffing requirements associated with the adoption and exploitation of new technology

Background:

- Historic trend to use new technology to provide new functions and capabilities not initially anticipated thereby resulting in increased staffing requirements rather than in reductions
- Historic lack of discipline to establish personnel reduction targets and adhere to and account for results

Implications:

- Increase emphasis on logistics R&D and on the logistics tail associated with adoption of new technology
- Establish more rigorous accountability for planning for and tracking the impact of new technology

Issue: Implications on staffing of new/high technology

Background:

- Application/adoption of new technology has historically increased job requirements rather than allowing reductions
- Veneration of fighters and procurers but not logistics personnel, who in reality are absolutely essential in wartime situations

Implications:

- Assess total costs, including logistical, training and personnel tails, associated with implementation/adoption of new/high technologies

Issue: Overemphasis on materiel

Background:

- Escalation of personnel and skill requirements with new weaponry
- Inadequate attention to man machine interface (overly narrow human factors considerations)
- Preoccupation with materiel and "extrapolation" by combat development agencies occurs at the expense of additional personnel, inadequate attention to skill levels and inability to fit new technology with available skill levels.

Implications:

- Increase attention given to materiel characteristics in conjunction with human factors early in the acquisition process.
- Potential for major manpower reductions with proper application of automation and robotics

Issue: Protection of knowledge and capabilities developed through R&D and intentions to use those capabilities

Background:

- Characteristic of the American society to openly publish
- Pressures to sell and transfer technologies important to military capabilities due to considerations of foreign trade and balance of payments
- Long lead time associated with field deployment after laboratory/pilot program demonstration due to military specifications and budget cycles
- Outstripping of areas of military technology by commercial technology (e.g., in communications and computers)

Implications:

- *Increase military/Army participation in decisions of technology transfer and sales*
- Reassess desirability of selling basic technologies/technological capability versus selling obsolescent/yesterday's weapons and weapon systems

Issue: Unauthorized access to U.S. military technology by various nations

Background:

- Trends of technology transfer to be significantly uncontrolled to both friendly and unfriendly nations

Issue: Inadequate attention to possible technological breakthroughs

Background:

- Nuclear weapons breakthroughs, new space applications in technology, etc.

Issue: Equipment generation gap associated with major modernization

Background:

- The massive modernization program will be short of funding, thereby stretching out the program and causing things to be obtained later than planned/desired.
- Units will not all be equipped with the same material at the same time - units will not all have the same capability at once (older units will be less effective). Old and new equipment will exist at the same time causing difficulties in training. This weakens units internally and causes them to also become incompatible with other units thereby also reducing total unit strength.

Implications:

- Reduction in total force readiness

Issue: The ability of trainers/simulators to handle new equipment/high technology

Background:

- Continued proliferation and adoption of new weapons/high technology increasing expense of training with high technology weapons/live ammunition

Issue: Translation of technology into useable/deployable systems

Background:

- The demographic/bureaucratic process has produced impediments to developing and fielding systems (e.g., the system of checks and balances causes us to initiate and often improperly pursue various approaches and often does not allow the ability to establish multiyear contracts in order to reduce costs and enhance total program efficiency)
- Growth of the Congressional staff has contributed to delays, increased program costs, etc.

Issue: Orderly transition to high-technology systems

Background:

- Stated Army plan to modernize (adopt high technology in MIS/ADP and weapons systems)
- Ability to use Army as the vehicle for teaching people new skills
- Current use of statistics by Army to evaluate and assign personnel
- Recognize need to develop new training, basing and attrition approaches compatible with introduction of new technology. Talk within/desire of society to emulate the Japanese experience (e.g., work ethic, comraderie, collegiality) with same need on the part of the military but without constraints of the broader society (e.g., on bringing people together and motivating them in various work situations). Transition to new technology may place greater demands on the military than industry (i.e., it is much more severe for the military) because of necessity to maintain readiness of the old systems while in the transition period.
- Current moves to selectively use attrition in light of the transition to the new technologies and the requirements they place upon personnel. Recent trend toward obtaining new recruits with higher motivation and increased skills/capabilities.

Implications:

- Employ the transition period to develop ways to reassess personnel capability and to restructure approaches to attrition
- Train and improve persons' capability followed by retesting (e.g., do not rate and assess people only on initial testing scores--look at growth)
- Employ Army as a test bed and model for the rest of society in transitioning people to high-technology capabilities

Issue: Ability of the procurement process to cope with new technology/modernization

Background:

- Procurement of high technology may have moved out of the legal control of the Army (e.g., cannot cut off contractors in light of bad performance--no other real competitors)
- Doctrine anticipates and therefore really establishes technology requirements which then are pursued through the acquisition process (they must come to fruition)
- The Army really has adopted a trial-and-error method in training once the technology has become available

Implications:

- Development of a structured system to adequately handle initial training and retraining during the transition period to modernization

Issue: Stability in R&D funding

Background:

- All R&D during the 1960s went into providing support specifically for the Vietnamese War
- In the early 60s, the Soviets were a walking Army and by the end of the 60s they had become a completely modernized, highly mobile force
- During the 1970s the U.S. pursued R&D activities for heavy force purposes
- Current increasing emphasis on light forces
- The country expects the Army to be prepared to fight anywhere in the world (e.g., to be able to engage in heavy or light combat)
- The ability to continuously modernize and update is idealistic because wars/conflicts always interrupt long-range R&D efforts
- R&D has historically been centered on a particular war thus "mortgaging the future"
- Social spending has grown and has impacted the military/Army the most

Issue: Need for and role of Army in-house laboratories

Background:

- Packard Committee recommendations for the nature of Army in-house R&D
- Historic Army trend to accomplish 50 percent of R&D activities in-house and 50 percent on a contract basis
- Historic pattern of other services to largely use out-house/contractor facilities to accomplish R&D
- Political difficulties in closing Army R&D facilities coupled with desire to "inventory" various people/capabilities
- Public pressures/desires of the administration to reduce government competition with the private sector
- Uneven pace/adoption of R&D (e.g., certain areas are highly modernized and are not compatible with older parts of the system)

Implications:

- Inability to obtain proper/necessary private-sector support caused by their perceived inability to commercialize R&D activities
- Relaxation of Army requirements and contracting procedures associated with R&D

Issue: Exponential growth of technology

Background:

- Technological impetus behind arms race
- Increasing pace of obsolescence due to adoption of new technologies
- Increased funding requirements
- Increasing risks in making improper technological decision

Implications:

- Potential inability to afford a triad force for strategic response (e.g. inability to afford three separate systems)
- Basing decisions on plans which are never realized/fully funded

Issue:

Impact of acquisition process/contracting procedures on the ability to incorporate technological advancements and accomplish modernization

Background:

- The technological revolution/significant changes will be with us for some time (e.g., major advances will occur in computers and software every two years)
- Contracting procedures do not allow smooth transition to move from Block/Model I to Block/Model II as technological improvements are made due to contracting/acquisition procedures

Implications:

- Essential need to revise contracting procedures/defense acquisition regulations to allow easier transition to improve systems incorporating technological advancements

Issue: Effectiveness of Modernization Programs

Background:

- Soviet's employ a continuous program of product improvements/modernization
- U.S. has instituted only one major modernization program in the last several decades (continuous modernization is not employed)
- Funding on an annual basis inhibits continuous modernization/long-range planning
- Continuous funding interruptions leading to near-term moves by contractors to maximize profits (thereby weakening the military posture of the U.S.)
- Noncontinuous funding of military programs prevents private sector suppliers from establishing long-term planning/ capitalization programs and providing more attractive prices

Implications:

- Copy/emulate the Soviet acquisition process
- Institute additional cycles of modernization

Issue: Ability to Meet and Manage Continual Changes in the Rate of Modernization

Background:

- Public demoralization (e.g., from the Vietnam War) has undermined the ability to perform continuous modernization
- The Soviets deliberately perturb the U.S. Army modernization process
- Although the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and Acquisition and the Under Secretary of the Army have an excellent R&D program in place, there is complacency in the Army about the period following this current massive modernization
- The Army has resorted to ad hoc methods (via the small, separate Force Modernization Office in DCSOPS) in order to implement and field the many new systems associated with modernization
- In addition to changing force structure, logistical problems are associated with bursts of modernization because nothing is being retired while almost 400 systems are being implemented concurrently
- High management is structured for the routine and steady state

Implications:

The management system must be redesigned to handle change as routine because only rapid change can be foreseen for the future

Issue:

Acceleration of development of new doctrine, training programs, etc. in light of the modernization program and the move to light forces

Background:

- The historic predeliction to utilize/exploit existing doctrine in historic ways for new technology and weapons systems
- The national training center does not have the capability to really train light forces
- Doctrine may be adequate but it takes three to five years to adequately train units
- The strength of the active component is capped but the support tail is growing by way of modernization. Therefore it is important to reduce personnel requirements in the teeth by way of advanced technology

Implications:

- Establish a training center for light forces
- Expand use of trainers/simulators to speed up training
- Construct additional training centers for both heavy and light forces
- The Army must use multiple nodes by way of distributed processing as opposed to centralized control. This gives flexible command the necessary support to perform the mission.

Issue: Ability to define and focus on critical technology areas/needs

Background:

- Many areas of technology are always being pursued but they typically are uncoordinated, resulting in inefficient use of personnel and funds and often causing schedule delays
- With light forces the entire weapon system must be light (all elements of the system must be compatible: a lighter tank requires lighter guns, lighter armor, lighter everything)

Implications:

- Consider potential effectiveness of a coordinated national effort on materials, embracing all services--such as a Manhattan project
- Potential coordination of such a national program by DARPA
- Potential for integration of national efforts to free up funds (e.g., by deleting certain programs) thereby increasing the utility of a existing limited funds

Issue: Ability of the Reserve to remain technologically current

Background:

- Major moves to Army modernization/introduction of high technology
- Moves of the Army to adopt advanced CAMIS/ADP systems
- Widespread and growing application of personal computers in the home and in industry

Implications:

- Requirement to ensure that training, weapons, personnel capabilities/MOS are compatible with modernization
- Employ personal computers for training and networking, (including communicating with personnel in their homes)

Issue: Compatibility of advanced technology to engage in a prolonged or a long war

Background:

- Future wars if they are prolonged will consist of a series of short intensive spurts where there are major losses of men and materiel
- The oceans will be barriers to the major combatants in a long/prolonged war
- It will not be possible to refuel new technology in a short time as was done in World War II
- The RDF and light forces are intrinsically designed to engage in short conflicts (they would have long logistics tails that would be very difficult to support)
- Incompatibilities exist between the threat, the logistics tail and the ability to control

Implications:

- Assess the need to develop a logistics support structure and doctrine to support RDF/light forces
- Incompatibility between worldwide U.S. commitments and decentralized management authority of the Army

Policy Area: Internal organizational efficiency of military and civilian personnel and relationships with the overall DOD structure.

Issues:

- Bureaucratic processes, particularly in acquisition, program approval, program termination, and implementing study recommendations
- Roles and responsibilities of senior civilian and military personnel, particularly in doctrine, strategy, development, procurement, and modernization
- Increasing pressures placed on Army management from increasing scope of activities, staff limitations, job rotation, irrelevance of prior experiences and use of contractors
- Working relationships between logisticians and users, developers and others
- Planning for and management of Army installations (domestic and foreign)
- Adequacy of current (disaggregated) defense intelligence structure
- Adequacy of present organizational structure of the overall DOD
- Clarity and consistency of direction to Army from the DOD
- Potential value of integration of logistics across all services

Issue: Burden of bureaucratic processes

Background:

- Diffusion of power and decentralized authority
- Government by consensus
- Growth in number and type of reports required

Implications:

- Require contractors to prepare reports
- Could require establishment of a system centralizing yes/no authority
- Contributes to inadequacy of acquisition process

Issue: Bureaucratic systems/processes

Background:

- Traditional delay in getting things approved/done
- Revolutions in doctrine, technology, politics or threat seem to be the only things that can create changes or reduce delays
- Increasing trend toward the layering of people who can veto items but who have no significant responsibility for future defense of the country
- Decline in number of congressmen and congressional staff with military backgrounds

Issue: Difficulty in nipping programs in the bud

Issue: Ability to implement study recommendations

Background:

- A proliferation of studies
- Bureaucratic process (e.g., decentralization of authority, the compromise environment, personnel turnover)
- Utilization of studies to prolong or delay the decision point

Implications:

- Wasteful use of resources and personnel
- Frustration and dissatisfaction among both analysts and decisionmakers

Issue: Utilization of SES personnel

Background:

- SES personnel actually train generals in many aspects of their positions, especially when they are reassigned from various commands, overseas, etc.
- SES personnel are not the same, nor should they be viewed the same, as flag officers
- DARCOM collects SES personnel
- SES personnel typically have longer job longevity than military personnel

Implications:

- Reexamine use of SES personnel

Issue: Perception of the role of the military, especially by the staff in peacetime

Background:

- Major difference in role of the military in wartime and peacetime operations (e.g., wartime combat role is clear; in peacetime military contributes to setting defense/Army policies and strategies, sponsoring and participating in R&D)
- Inability of the Secretariat to establish and maintain control and/or nonuse of existing authority
- Requirement by the military for complete demonstration of needs/requirements before accepting direction (Studies are accomplished to "answer these questions" and to maintain a cadre of people in "inventory")
- Long-term social perceptions of and attitudes about military (e.g., the position/role of the military is too strong in U.S. political/economic decisions)

Issue: Participation Among Military and Civilian Personnel in the Requirements Determination Process

Background:

- Responsibility for determining requirements (e.g., weapon system characteristics, size of the force, makeup of the force) is within the purview of the military
- The military erects road blocks to prevent civilians from participating in setting requirements
- Army needs/requirements are often defined as if there were no budgetary constraints (civilians approach these situations with the attitude of seeking the best way to do the job with the funds available whereas in the military requirements are stated assuming the government/civil authorities will provide the funds needed)
- It is difficult to defend proposed programs unless the rationale behind the requirements is completely understood
- Cooperation among military and civilian personnel on requirements items is good, especially in periods of a declining budget

Issue: Working relationships between the military and civilian staff at headquarters

Background:

- Army Secretary specifies resources while requirements are set by the Chief of Staff

Implication:

- Need to abolish positions of Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff and establish a single position under the Secretary of Defense (e.g., a Deputy or Assistant Secretary for the Army)

Issue: The Constraints of Working in the Public Sector

Background:

- The Army is enormously open-minded but is bound by tradition
- It's not like working in the private sector in that one cannot really follow intuition
- Many factors constrain the ability to take action including tradition, laws, rules/regulations and the need to work within political consensus
- A great strength of the United States is that many views exist but they can be brought together in consensus (thus the environment of working within the public sector has both advantages and disadvantages)

Implications:

- Jobs frustrations will persist: "It comes with the territory"

Issue: Growth in the number of areas in which Army management must be expert/knowledgeable

Background:

- Current capping of the Active Army at 780,000 persons has required that fewer people be knowledgeable about and handle more and more subjects.
- The Congressional approach to increasing job complexity has resulted in major increases in the staff assigned to each Senator and Congressman creating increased pressures on the Army (e.g., to answer detailed questions, substantiate requests and plans)
- Congress has fewer and fewer persons with military background and experience, leading to increased requests to the military for information about activities and plans

Issue: Ability to hand off insights to new persons in the job

Background:

- The current rotation system is too people dependent
- Personnel only stay about two years in their assignments, with very little or essentially no overlap to transfer insights/background

IMPLICATIONS:

- Exploitation of existing MIS/computer based systems to collect and pass on accumulated knowledge

Issue: The Preparation, Background and Experience of Army Top Management Personnel Assigned to Headquarters/the Pentagon Regarding their Time Horizons and Appreciation of Total Army-Wide Activities

Background:

- Service schools pay little or no attention to management problems and even when those subjects are covered in the curriculum, the nature of field command centers upon problems of the moment
- Management performance of military officers of the Pentagon is based almost exclusively on practical experience obtained in the field
- Military people find that being assigned to Headquarters at the Pentagon a formidable task. Some can describe functions and activities of their office but do not have a comprehensive view of total Army activities (especially areas addressed at the Headquarters level and especially areas requiring interaction with civilian personnel in the Secretariat)
- Since military personnel are often ill-equipped in management/long-range planning aspects, on the job training occurs at the Headquarters level--but the ability to become proficient is constrained because of the continued rotation

Implications:

- Include additional instruction on long-range planning and management techniques at the service school--especially using case studies (prepared management histories of previous Army experience in a manner similar to that which is offered for the history of military science and tactics)

Issue: Deterioration of Staff Caused by the Use of Outside Contractors

Background:

- None

Issue: Role of OSD regarding logistics

Background:

- Major changes in doctrine, weapon systems, threat, theaters of operation, etc. and roles and missions of the various services since establishment of the DOD

Issue: Lack of knowledge about existing systems, doctrine etc. before recommending and introducing new approaches

Background:

- The current social ethic is to invite and reward innovations by all
- The army is a "rotation base" (jobs/assignments are continuously rotated)

Implications:

- Stick to the existing doctrine and make it work
- Modify existing doctrine/approaches only after it has demonstrated inadequacies to people who are thoroughly familiar with the system and with the reasons underlying existing doctrine

Issue: Isolation of the logistician/logistics inputs from other functional areas

Background:

- Historically the logistician/logistics planner is excluded from setting doctrine, developing weapon systems plans, determining deployment strategy etc.
- Evolution of long logistics tails with new systems

Implications:

- Increased participation of logistician in new weapon systems R&D planning and deployment (including increased Logistics R&D)

Issue: Relationships between the wholesaler and the retailer (between DARCOM and TRADOC)

BACKGROUND:

- The Army has in actuality decentralized authority regarding the total logistics chain

IMPLICATIONS:

- Reassess the validity of organizing Army business functions in the same manner as tactics and combat functions are organized

Issue: Planning for and management of Army installations (domestic and foreign)

Background:

- Major portion of Army budget is allocated to management/operation of installations: \$10 to 12 billion
- Installations in effect are "major cities"
- Decisions associated with siting and management of facilities is highly involved with local politics
- Inability/difficulty of obtaining approvals for making changes (e.g. approval of MIS systems, adoption of advanced business techniques, new accounting techniques) due to bureaucracy and bureaucratic processes
- Multiple layers of approval (e.g. GAO, Congressional, military)

Issue: Effectiveness of Intelligence/C³ Activities

Background:

- Interservice rivalry exists in the area of intelligence
- Because of the interservice aspects, the issue is really a DOD issue requiring a change in the law
- Intelligence collection is really combat (it is not combat support)
- The public will not accept establishment of a centralized intelligence authority because it does not understand the threat

Implications:

- Establish a single intelligence staff (e.g., in the office of the Secretary of Defense) with centralized control over all intelligence activities
- Possible complete reorganization of the DOD (including the elimination of the service secretaries and also reorganization of the JCS)
- If intelligence activities are maintained in the various services, consider providing funding through a centralized source/authority

Issue: Inadequacy of DOD-wide military structure

Background:

- Diffusion of power between military and civilian staff
- Use of doctrine to justify developing and acquiring systems

Implications:

- Reduction in combat flexibility due to doctrine

Issue: The DOD/military organization and structure

Background:

- Following establishment of DOD and its associated structure after World War II, the only significant change occurred during the McNamara years during which time when "Analysis" was introduced
- Analysis helps the Army make its case but the bureaucratic structure continues to represent an impediment.
- The marines have evolved to a force in many regards that looks like the Army heavy forces. The marines want to become more mobile and by the end of the century are likely to look much like the Army light forces

Issue: Obsolescence of the DOD/Military Organization

Background:

- No significant changes have been made in 30 years
- The service Chiefs are really not in charge of anything
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff in actuality have no real authority. The Secretary of the Department of Defense also has little real authority
- The administration decries the situation but Congress will not allow any significant changes to take place because of historic public concerns about a strong centralized military authority and lots of Congressional control of spending/patronage
- The Soviets have implemented an effective, dynamic, centrally controlled military and civilian leadership
- The UK also has an effective, centrally controlled leadership

Implications:


- Possibilities for establishment of a strong general staff

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
 (NBS 1963-A)

Issue: Potential benefit in organizing DOD beyond the service lines

Background:

- Relative roles and justification of a separate Marine Corps.
- The Marine Corps in many regards is more like the Army than the Army. (Brushfire wars)

Implications:

- Political ramifications of a major restructuring of the Marine Corps.
- Restructuring of Army roles, missions and authority.

Issue: Lack of Clarity in Signals/Direction Received from DOD

Background:

- The DOD does not speak with a single voice
- There is no single Congressional view since Congress responds to multiple constituencies
- It is not the Army job to describe its roles and missions and requirements to the public--it's the President's job
- The Secretary of the Army cannot unilaterally or solely handle public relations for the Army
- In many instances there are mixed/varied opinions within the Army as to the threat, or structure, etc. (e.g., positions change along with the background, experience, and particular branch of service that top management brings to Headquarters positions)

Issue: Integration of logistics for all services

Background:

- Political decisions dictate that the Army employ logistics capabilities of other services (e.g. Air Force capabilities)
- Periodic stocking up/building of major inventories by other services creates shortages (e.g. Navy stockpiling of flack jackets because of the long times at sea).

Implications:

- Utilize commercial services to potentially lower costs and reduce logistics time (e.g. Emery Air Freight).
- Assess the validity of an integrated logistics force for all services.

Policy Area:

Recruiting/staffing, retention and maximum utilization of the available personnel pool in the United States.

Issues:

- Changes in the available personnel pool: fewer young adults, more middle-aged and older persons, decreased quality of U.S. education, growing and changing minority component, changing geographic distribution, changing economic conditions
- Bilingualism and other minority problems
- Role of women
- Retention of competent officers
- Recruiting and retention of scientific and technical personnel (including officers)
- Recruiting and retention of bright, highly motivated younger personnel
- Competition with industry
- Competition with other services
- Changing social values (e.g., drug culture)

Issue: Availability, quality, and use of personnel

Background:

- Aging population/decline in number of young adults
- Extension in life expectancy (mental alertness in old age)
- The Army retires senior leaders to keep the force robust and most capable
- The Soviets do not retire older military personnel nor does American industry
- Increasing cost of manpower

Implications:

- Cost will dictate the need to keep the Active Army small, with heavy reliance on the Reserves in peacetime
- Utilize high technology in education to maximize the utility of the small force
- Possibility for new technology to change the nature of the battlefield by reducing the need for young personnel (e.g., smart bombs, air-delivered bombs, maximum use of missiles, laser designators)
- Needs for infantrymen may change to combat support role where they would be used to come in and take over after the battle (but there will always be a need for infantry)

Issue: Reduction in young males

Background:

- The decline in young adults (both males and females) is not only a problem for the Army; it will affect other elements of our economy in the 1990s
- Competition with industry and the other service for personnel in terms of both numbers and skill levels
- Army requirements of the future will demand people with adequate intellectual capacities (the problem is not just one of numbers since the modern Army will require high-level skills)

Issue: Aging population

Background:

- Changing age cohorts resulting in a smaller population from which to recruit
- The National Guard is historically older but more experienced than Active forces. Aging has already caused a problem with Army aviation

Implications:

- Potential need to employ National Guard for training purposes and deploy Reserves and Active forces overseas in case of mobilizations/hostilities

Issue: Implications of life extension

Background:

- A trend toward increasing life expectancy of males and females in the U.S. (e.g. to about 100 years by the year 2000)
- A smaller or reduced manpower pool of younger persons

Implications:

- Roles for older persons in military service
- Retirement requirements
- Longer time in the Reserves

Issue: Utilization of middle-aged individuals

Background:

- Aging the population
- Growing adoption of high technology/automated systems
- Growing need for use of specialists

Implications:

- Develop methods to retain and in particular to recruit middle-aged persons including possibly the spouse

Issue: Declining pool of quality person-power

Background:

- There is a growing tendency toward a bilingual country or a greater number of languages in one area. This creates a training problem.
- Females are participating more and they are being accepted fully. However, emotional differences have yet to be recognized by the leadership.
- Better use of manpower through applications of high technology is important
- The costs of new technology tend to prohibit use of it to offset manpower requirements

Implications:

- Since the U.S. will not lose its technological advantage, it will prevail by exploiting its historic inventiveness relative to other countries

Issue: Population mobility

Background:

- Continued movement to the sunbelt
- Difficulties in recruiting in the north and northeast, with little recruiting difficulties in the south, southeast and southwest

Implications:

- Potential need to increase age limits for National Guard
- Turbulence created in the units/structure
- Potential creation of significant MOS mismatches

Issue: Acceptance/Accommodation/Assimilation of Minorities

Background:

- High percentage of minorities (e.g., Blacks) assigned to combat MOSs
- Trend toward greater number of Hispanics in the Army
- Increasing percentage of minorities in the U.S. population
- Inability of modernization/high technology to remove the need for the foot soldiers/combat positions

Implications:

- Potential public concern about minorities in combat positions protecting the majority
- Potential for high combat fatalities among minorities due to assignment to combat positions
- Develop role models for officers
- Assess/reassess role of quotas in assisting the integration of minorities to officer positions
- Potential creation of inordinate pressures on outstanding minority persons (i.e., those who are moved ahead rapidly or used as models)

Issue: Absorption of Hispanics in the Army

Background:

- Growing Hispanic content of the U.S. population and the Army
- Spanish speaking groups in the U.S. often exhibit hostilities toward each other (e.g., friction among those of Cuban, Puerto Rican, Mexican and other Latin American descent)
- Previous Army experience with integrating Black personnel in the Army at all levels (including difficulties encountered and lessons learned)
- Examples of difficulties with bilingualism (e.g., worldwide air traffic control is in English)

Implications:

- Develop approaches to Hispanic recruiting and training for those who ultimately will be leaders (from noncoms to officers)
- Develop approaches to avoid difficulties associated with assuming bilingualism in the Army

Issue: Moves to bilingualism/multilingualism in the United States (and in the armed forces)

Background:

Implications:

- Need for bilingual training manuals, tech manuals

Issue: Roles for and accommodation of minorities and women

Background:

- Increasing need to obtain and train people to operate on a very lethal battlefield
- In the past the Army left the assimilation and utilization of minorities and women to the individual units
- The Army has promoted many Blacks to NCO positions, but there are relatively few officers, and among Hispanics there are limited NCO positions.
- The number of women in the Army quadrupled in the last decade, but there was little prior consideration given to their placement. Current trend is to increasingly restrict women's roles in "combat" assignments
- The Army will continue to have to contend with bilingualism

Implications:

- Need to reexamine the role of women since in the future they will constitute 10-15 percent of the total force
- Employ automation to allow women to hold administrative positions in combat units

Issue: Role of Women in the Army

Background:

- Although women are now graduating from West Point, which trains personnel for combat, they currently are not assigned to combat positions
- Restriction of women from combat MOSs
- Current withdrawal of women already assigned to combat MOSs
- Support/noncombat MOSs can place personnel in forward/near-combat areas (a condition not recognized by Congress and the public)
- The German Army is currently being faced with the need to draw women into the armed forces for the first time

Implications:

- Prepare the public (including Congress) for the fact that some women will be killed due to hostilities
- Changes in tactics will not be able to completely remove women from hazardous positions associated with combat
- Potential requests from Germany to use the U.S. as a role model in introducing women into the armed forces/Army. The Germany public is likely to raise questions about women in the military which then could spill over into the U.S. and rekindle the debate in the U.S.

Issue: Women in the National Guard

Background:

- Over 75% of the National Guard are combat units and the other units engage in heavy duty maintenance activities requiring upper body strength

Implications:

- Potential need to realign military occupational specialties
- Political ramifications of potential need to utilize fewer women in the National Guard

Issue: Utilization of women

Background:

- Women are currently the most qualified of new recruits (i.e., different standards in recruiting are applied)
- Personnel with combat command experience are viewed as being capable of performing any job

Implications:

- Reevaluate the value and requirement for all Army jobs (assess/establish approach to taking advantage of brain power/the total potential of the country)
- Reassess the requirement of combat MOS for promotion or assignment to various jobs

Issue: Ability to retain competent officers

Background:

- The up-or-out system of personnel management
- Inadequate promotional track for technical/scientific personnel
- Inability to move personnel back to demonstrated levels of competence (e.g., the Peter principle)
- Public fear of the emergence of a "general staff"

Implications:

- Potential requirement for two-track promotional system (e.g., one for command/combat personnel and one for scientific/technical personnel)

Issue: Ability to retain competent officers

Background:

- Policy to promote in waves
- Policy of up-or-out (many officers out when finally become competent)
- Shuffling of officers in and out of positions to provide them with combat command experience (officers are transient resulting in in experienced people at all levels)

Implications:

- Requirement for a two-track promotional system

Issue: Personnel

Background:

- Mandatory retirement and up-or-out policy for Reserve and Active forces
- Different retirement and promotion policies for civilian personnel
- Increased life expectancy with higher productivity and vigor in older years
- Requirements for tactical support are less demanding physically than for combat (and is compatible, therefore, with capabilities and interests of older personnel)
- Persons in management positions reach the height of their productive years in their later years of life (i.e., typically when forced into retirement)

Issue: Retention of technical/scientific personnel

Background:

- Increasing need to rebalance Army personnel (e.g., need in the post-POM period to have other than combat leaders in positions of high decision authority)
- Ability of retirement programs to attract technical/scientific people

Implications:

- Potential need to implement a dual track system

Issue: Advancements/promotion for scientific and technical personnel

Background:

- The other services, especially the Air Force, is twenty years ahead of the Army in instituting policies that allow retention and promotion of technical and scientific personnel
- The management of most of the Army's discretionary funds/budget is under the control and direction of technical and scientific personnel
- Financial compensation is one of many factors that motivates individuals

Issue: Ability to offer satisfactory promotional tracks to technical and scientific officers

Background:

- Historic precedent requiring combat background for top promotional spots
- Competition for personnel with private sector and other services
- History of retirement of technical people after only 10 to 20 years in service

Implication:

- Ability to recruit technical/scientific personnel

Issue: Availability of qualified technicians

Background:

- Sixty percent of skilled technicians in the private-sector workforce will be lost over the next 10-20 years. This trend is coming from more than just demographic changes; it is coming from shifts in the industrial-sector activities/movements to a service sector economy
- Thirty years ago the country consisted of many small businesses that employed technicians and machinists, with few hamburger stands. Today we have many hamburger stands and few small businesses and skilled technicians. Also, in manufacturing/maintenance large tolerances used to be adequate but now, sophisticated machines require high-tolerance skills and equipment
- Competition for skilled technicians does exist and will continue with the Air Force, Navy and private industry.
- The Army is really a training ground for industry
- The situation is likely to become worse and worse since the Army is just starting to field the new equipment and is also living capped in the size of the active component
- The usual procedure was to engage contractors in the initial phases of equipment deployment and then transition maintenance to the Army personnel. Trends indicate that the Army will never be able to transition to Army personnel maintenance (i.e., will not be able to switch to Army personnel maintenance but will have to obtain the skills from industry)

Implications:

- The possible necessity to reexamine approaches to maintenance/repair of sophisticated equipment
- Potential necessity to reexamine the use of civilian personnel in front of the corps boundary, exploit modular/remove-and-replace techniques to a greater extent for maintenance and repair and the use of robots for various activities
- Attempts to obtain technicians from industry could significantly reduce industry's capability to support the Army
- Potential necessity to employ personnel, especially those with the ability to innovate, in order to cannibalize vehicles/weapon systems--especially during intense conflict situations

- Consider the increased application of built-in test
- Even maximum application of automation and robotics and of remove-and-replace maintenance will not completely preclude the necessity to have soldiers because ultimately they are needed to take and hold ground

Issue: Continued acquisition and retention in the military of high I.Q. younger personnel

Background:

- Recent economic difficulties resulting in improved recruiting, especially of higher skill, intellectually capable young people
- Recent trends by the Army stress increased education and backgrounds in high-technology skills to young recruits
- Growing inability of NCOs to cope with the new technology and the new high intellect, education-driven young personnel
- Easy ability to train new highly motivated intellectually capable people
- Attraction to high technology causes young people to reenlist

Implications:

- Potential improvement in the economy could create major recruiting difficulties, especially among the bright/intelligent young people. Develop long-term approaches to ensure job satisfaction, competitive salaries/compensation, training activities that hold interest for aggressive, bright young people
- Create an Army situation where the young people do not feel they are "wasting their time," either in terms of further growth within the military or their subsequent careers after leaving the military

Issue: Availability of personnel

Background:

- Improved economic conditions (i.e., competition with private sector)
- Aging population
- Competition with other services (Army positions less attractive)
- No ability to really substitute technology for people (i.e., still have to take and hold ground).

Issue: Availability, skills and mix of personnel

Background:

- Aging population
- Competition with industry
- Increasing women's participation rates in the labor force
- Continued advance of technology in weapon systems
- Increasing bilingual/multilingualism (continued influx of immigration from Latin America and the Far East/Pacific Basin)
- Continued pressure to reduce retirement benefits and its implications for retention

Implications:

- Potential need to revise exclusion policies for women in combat
- Assess potential role of automation to replace/reduce staffing requirements
- Potential need to establish a selective draft (a draft directed at obtaining specific skills)
- Changes in policy decisions (e.g., regarding personnel and other issues) as increasing numbers of women enter Army middle management, especially with better training (e.g., from West Point)

Issue: Interservice rivalry for high technology people

Background:

- Traditional image of Army as lower/lowest technology branch of service
- High technology required because we will never "outnumber the enemy."
- Recent trend of the young to seek discipline in their lives
- Decline of Vietnam syndrome among the young

Implication:

- Creation/use of incentives (e.g. paid bonuses)
- Emphasis on exploiting new army technology and the army's high technology image

Issue: Implications of the drug culture and U.S. attitude on the military

Background:

- Continued high levels of use of drugs and alcohol by both young and old in the U.S. society
- Relatively lenient attitudes, compared to the military, by the public about the use of drugs and alcohol
- Growing use of drugs by athletes (e.g. steroids)

Implications:

- Difficulties in implementing stringent controls on drug and alcohol use by the military in light of general social attitudes and leniency

Policy Area:

Mobilization and maintenance of adequate strength and readiness, especially in light of prolonged conflict in several theaters.

Issues:

- Growing U.S. commitments worldwide in face of decentralized management authority, fixed end-strength and present force configuration
- Ability to fight prolonged nonnuclear war
- Continued decline in U.S. industrial base and growth of service sector
- Logistics requirements problems (e.g., extensive demands from heavy attrition, differences required to operate in various theaters and with fielded equipment generation gaps, and fossil fuel supply limits)
- Ability to defend or provide functions (military and nonmilitary) in the CONUS during major overseas troop deployments
- Effect on the industrial support base of the activation of Reserves
- Structure and balance of heavy and light forces (including influence of historic precedent)
- Inflexibility in RDA due to long-range government policies and plans
- Relative spending on manpower versus weapons versus logistics
- Problems of developing realistic doctrine
- Ability of training sites to provide adequate geographic conditions
- Erosion of internal capabilities, including training opportunities, from use of contractors

Issue: Incompatibility of worldwide commitments and decentralized management authority

Background:

- The U.S. is uniquely committed to operating around the world while the Soviets have increasingly operated through surrogates (a basic tenet in the Soviet philosophy)
- The recent trends to decentralizing authority or "powering down"

Issue: Ability to Provide Adequate Readiness with a Fixed Endstrength

Background:

- A trend toward expanding U.S. military commitments worldwide
- The recently instituted modernization program
- The moves to develop RDF/light forces

Issue: Configuration and organization of forces

Background:

- Increasing attention to Brushfire wars (non-heavy force European-type land wars)
- Influence of budget cycle/procurement processes on development, acquisition and deployment

Implications:

- Estimate proper/realistic mix of light versus heavy forces as a function of time

Issue:

Ability to engage in a prolonged non-nuclear war

Background:

- Heavy attrition of men and materials in a non-nuclear conflict
- Long logistics lines
- Expansion of personnel numbers and skills due to advanced technology

Implications:

- Become more disciplined in attaining the same fire power with fewer people, especially as weapons technology advances
- Exploit brilliant weapons to reduce ammunition flow/requirements
- Increase emphasis on reliability

Issue: Ability to engage in prolonged combat under major non-nuclear war

Background:

- Major increase in weapon lethality of non-nuclear devices/weapons (i.e., ability to destroy major forces and materiel with non-nuclear weapons)

Implications:

- Need to better estimate the probability and characteristics of long versus short conflicts
- Need for stockpiling of critical materials
- Appropriate deployment of personnel (e.g., in combat positions rather than "in the factories")

Issue: Ability of the industrial base to support a prolonged war (even in a low-intensity non-nuclear war)

Background:

- Since World War II we have not used nuclear weapons, and it is unlikely that use will occur by the end of the century.
- Disarmament is unlikely by the end of the century
- The nature of war has evolved to the point where wars start and then slow down and/or stop while negotiations are conducted
- FEMA is now involved with the industrial base activities of the nation and with the Army

Implications:

- Examine relationships between the Army and FEMA.
- Reexamine plans for defense of the CONUS including the transportation infrastructure of roadways and railroads

Issue: Shift from a heavy industrial economy to a high-technology/service-sector economy in the United States

Background:

- Country is increasingly experiencing job dislocations plus loss of industrial capacity with its heavy tooling and skills needed to maintain a war capability

Implications:

- Army must devise means to be able to effectively operate within the continuing transition in a high-technology/service-sector economy (e.g., approaches to R&D, acquisition/weapon system procurement, deployment, and overall readiness)

Issue: Ability to support mobilization in a service sector economy

Background:

- Continued loss of traditional heavy industrial base (e.g., steel, automotive)
- Continued requirement to provide heavy equipment (e.g., cannons, armor)

Implication:

- Need to subsidize certain industries/companies

Issue: Relative emphasis on total logistics requirements/capability versus that placed on new weaponry

Background:

- Management and its attention are oriented to the weapon system and not to the total system requirement (e.g. including the logistics tail)
- Current modernization will require about 400 new systems over the next 10 years
- Adequate logistics is heavily dependent upon information/statistics and communication among all elements involved (e.g., bottlenecks do not occur when all parties simply are in communication with each other)
- DOD logistics agencies are responsible and do a good job
- Traditional approaches have developed a power-/top-down approach in the Army in order to accomplish/provide adequate control, but logistics requirements come from the bottom up

Implications:

- Introduction of MIS in support of a real-time logistics data base with appropriate access to that system by all appropriate parties

Issue: Energy efficiency of the Army

Background:

- There will continue to be a need for oil, yet oil reserves will decline
- The Soviets will no longer be self-sufficient in oil
- Competition for oil, including the Soviets, will bring the Middle East increasingly into the picture as a potential flash point
- The U.S. continues to develop fuel-eating monsters (e.g., the M-1)
- Various efforts continue in the search for adequate alternative fuel sources

Implications:

- Major breakthroughs in or increased emphasis on synthetic fuels could significantly alter Army R&D policy (and if successful, could reduce the Army's demand for petroleum-based products)
- NASA's resources could be used, if applied in a concerted fashion, to obtain energy self-sufficiency for the United States

Issue: Dependency of the Army on fuels derived from crude oil

Background:

- Insufficient Army R&D on reducing dependency on crude oil products
- The M-1 tank, which is a new system, consumes large amounts of JP fuel

Implications:

- Expand R&D emphasis on developing alternative fuel to crude oil products (e.g., synthetic fuels)

Issue: Ability to adequately defend the CONUS/provide necessary support in the event of major mobilization and deployment overseas

Background:

- Nonexistence of a state defense force/home guard

Implications:

- Potential need to defend/protect major items of infrastructure (e.g. nuclear stations, airfields, water supplies)

Issue: Effect on the industrial base of activation of the Reserves

Background:

- Personnel are viewed as being able to perform two functions/jobs in the case of a call up: their Reserve or military position and their industrial position (a system of double accounting has arisen)

Implications:

- Develop a data base showing peoples' Reserve commitments and industrial jobs

Issue: Structure of the Heavy Forces

Background:

- Soviet mechanized divisions are really like our airborne forces. They consist of about 8,000 men who are not walking but are rolling. In other words, Soviet divisions are fully mechanized and are at a strength of 10,000 or less men. The Soviet Force/Category 3 Division is completely self-sufficient and can be completely deployed in 72 hours

Implications:

- Ready forces should really consist of light and heavy forces in Europe, including the ability to quickly mobilize
- The real mobilization force should include a draft (with the draftee possibly being inducted into the Reserves).
- Heavy forces should be ready and deployed in Europe
- Mechanized forces should be mobile and light

Issue: Tendency toward push-button war when light forces seem increasingly necessary

Background:

- Atrocities and terrorism are more easily accepted by the general public, although they are dangerous to our national interests
- Terrorists seem to value their lives less as they fight for nationalism, religion, etc., but they must be countered
- The Soviet threat is governing the U.S. technological response, thus causing us to lose sight of the need for conventional land forces

Implications:

- The military must be capable of responding to these less technological threats across the globe
- Systems that are now designed for efficiency of manpower must be rebalanced to accommodate light, flexible, fighting forces

Issue: Real commitment to equipping the light forces

Background:

- The light forces are supported by current doctrine but their basic equipment is different than that which would really be compatible with that doctrine

Implications:

- Reassess the distribution of funds (R&D and procurement) allocated to heavy and light forces

Issue: Influence of historic precedent in shaping Army doctrine, plans, readiness, etc.

Background:

- Emphasis on fighting the Russians in the FULDA gap
- Inability to cope with nontraditional situations (e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, Brushfire wars)
- Equipping of the light forces from the heavy forces

Implications:

- Inadequate readiness to fight Brushfire wars
- Improved ability to cope with political, legislative, etc., directions that must be addressed if thinking is to be restructured

Issue: Ability to provide flexibility in RDA in light of long-range government policies and plans

Background:

- National policy to purchase oil from Saudi Arabia and protect those supplies to the United States, Europe and Japan, dictated long-range doctrine, deployment, weapons development, acquisition, etc., and establishment of long-term fixed military approaches
- Long-range implications on Army strategy, weaponry, etc., and budgets stemming from plans to implement RDF and light forces
- Removal of need to continuously rejustify program/projects once in the plan and the POM at the expense of flexibility (e.g., to reduce/cancel items and add new items)
- Inability to obtain project funding if not in the POM, yet no assurance of budget support when in the POM

Implications:

- Need for the Army to maintain keen awareness of decisions regarding international relations/commitments that have a long-term effect on Army programs and posture
- Pressures by the Army for other nations to support protection of major resources important to the rest of the world

Issue: Relative spending on manpower versus weapons

Background:

- Emphasis by the Army on maintaining manpower, especially in relationship to other services.

Issue: Ability of TRADOC to Develop Realistic Doctrine

Background:

- In actuality TRADOC is a surrogate user
- TRADOC has grown and become sufficiently bureaucratic to hinder its ability to develop realistic doctrine

Implications:

- Restructure emphasis between modeling/analytic exercises and the building and testing of real divisions (i.e., increase testing and decrease simulation)

Issue: Lack of realistic geographic conditions in existing training sites

Background:

- Limitations on operations imposed by environmental concerns relating to noise, pollution, smoke, etc.

Implications:

- Reduction in size of military installations
- Acquire/develop basic sites for European, desert, and jungle-type theaters of operation

Policy Area: U.S. relationships with and military commitments to other nations (friend and foe).

Issues:

- Potential military buildup/rearming of West Germany and Japan resulting from broadened U.S. strategic responsibilities
- Ability to maintain friendly relationships with China and Japan concurrently
- Possible consequences of debt management of lesser developed countries on their political stability
- Need for dynamic global strategic plans and forces responsive to emerging international developments, including those in Latin America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East

Issue: Potential Rearming of Germany and Japan

Background:

- Reemergence of West Germany and Japan as large economies, representing aggressive people/nations
- Inability of the U.S. to offer alternatives to Germany and Japan, to major economic and other types of expansion, in order to satisfy the needs of their economies and their aggressive natures
- The realization/bringing to fruition of a comprehensive Soviet military buildup over the last 20 years (the largest military expansion ever by a nation)
- The fusion of economic power among the Western alliance
- Expansion of U.S. military obligations (e.g., establishment of new strategic zones such as the Persian Gulf Latin America, in addition to Western Europe and Northeast Asia)
- The collapse of Western European and Japanese economies without Mid-East oil
- Need to protect all strategic zones concurrently (i.e., Western Europe, the Mid-East and Northeast Asia) to prevent a major collapse
- U.S./Chinese normalization

Implications:

- Ability or inability of the U.S. to realistically protect all three critical zones in light of geographic dispersion, budgetary limitations and public attitudes--concurrent protection
- Appropriate method of arming/rearming Germany and Japan (i.e., source of weapons, source of funds: Should they largely rearm themselves or should the U.S. provide the protection with the countries involved largely providing or being the source of funds)

Issue: Ability of the U.S. to Maintain Friendly Relationships with China and Japan at the Same Time

Background:

- Current positive relationships with China and Japan represent the first time in this century that this situation has occurred
- Rearmament of Japan would threaten China
- U.S. policy until recently of containing China was in actuality supporting the Soviet goals/intentions
- A U.S. mutual defense pact with China and Japan would prevent one from attacking the other since the aggressor could not win without the support of the U.S. which would be on the side of the nation that was attacked

Implications:

- Seek ways of in effect having nations in question fund U.S. military protection (e.g., establish a tax on Japanese imports/autos to the U.S. to be allocated to military preparedness and defense of joint Japanese/U.S. interests
- Maintenance of friendly relationships would reduce U.S. military commitments in total which would otherwise be necessary in the event of hostilities between the two nations

Issue: Implications of the Debts of the LDCs on the Military Posture of the U.S.

Background:

- Enormous unpayable debt by the LDCs (\$70 to \$90 billion apparently requiring immediate near-term rollover)
- Bank loans to LDCs were based on largely stimulating demand/consumption and not on a recapitalization/building new infrastructure
- Moves by LDCs to improve internal control and use of funds would create sufficient turmoil to foster a revolution which creates difficulties for the IMF/lender to impress any significant degree of control
- Moves to control U.S. inflation drive up domestic interest rates creating increased problems for the debtor in terms of paying off loans (inviting a collapse of the U.S. banks)

Implications:

- Assess the impact of variations of exchange rates on political stability, the cost of maintaining military forces in various locations (e.g., Europe), etc.

Issue:

Need for global strategic plans and forces

Background:

- The number of socialistic governments in Europe has increased in the last several years
- Growing pacifist, non-nuclear, and environmental movements and submovements that periodically band together and lean toward a socialist philosophy. (These trends are not limited to West Germany; they are not uncommon in all of western Europe)
- Existence of a very significant generation gap between parents and children/young adults in West Germany. The young have little or no appreciation of history (especially World War II) and in addition to not knowing, don't care to know about past history. The rebuilding of Germany in the post World War II era by America is considered to be irrelevant by the young. The young consider their parents irrelevant in the current world. The situation is similar to that which existed in the early and late 60s in the United States where viewpoints between the young and old were unreconciled. But the situation has not yet reached the same preeminence it did in the U.S. during the 60s.
- Europe has experienced an economic slowdown in the last 3-4 years
- Older Germans claim they have made a mistake in indulging their children and in creating too much of a welfare state. For example, after having invited immigrant workers and providing them with entitlement to various social programs, the economic decline has created frictions among the German workers and the immigrant workers. But Germans have special concerns about the way they treat minority groups as a result of the World War II experience
- Germany has limited natural resources and as a result the Germans have had to live on their ingenuity
- There has been a stagnation and an erosion in NATO
- The Germans have had experience with aspects of socialism from their previous government. They were not completely satisfied with Schmidt's policies and prefer Kuhl's. However, as an individual they found Schmidt more appealing because of his charismatic leadership and ability to engage in a dialog with other leaders
- A largely unrecognized growth in Soviet military threat has occurred in the Pacific area. Soviet naval, air and ground forces have been increased markedly in the area north of Korea and Japan (e.g., from the Kuriles to the Kamcatka Peninsula along the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk and down to Sachalin Island).
- The Soviets are intent on protecting themselves; they have an insular strategy stemming from their paranoia about someone attacking them

- Japan, and especially Korea, have experienced enormous economic growth (e.g., 15 to 20 percent in real GNP growth for Korea over the last several years)
- The U.S. has expressed a desire to strengthen the military capability of Korea and Japan. These two nations will increasingly design and produce their own weapons
- The Japanese airforce and navy have been slowly building up but, because the Army is more visible, its buildup/modernization lags the other services because of the antimilitary sentiment in Japan
- Japanese soldiers are physically among the toughest in the world and are tougher than ever before
- Problems of social justice, land reform and economic difficulties continue to plague Latin America and are causing things to change. But change is not occurring fast enough, thus creating major problems for governments
- The Panama Canal will revert to Panamanian control in 17 years
- Congress periodically wants to disengage from Europe; as a result of the criticality of the Middle East (e.g., to maintain oil supplies to Japan and West Europe) and the increasing interest in Latin America and the Pacific, there is a greater turning away from Europe in the United States
- The U.S. forces in Europe are not really deployable to other parts of the world

Implications:

- Reexamine notion of American/military policy in regards to Cuba
- Need to establish a security system for the Panama Canals: The need actually is to establish a strategy for all of Central America
- Need to establish a strategy and posture to adequately handle growing involvement in the various theaters around the world (e.g., to adequately cope with our growing multiple commitments)
- Need to emphasis/strengthen light forces capable of operating in various geographic situations
- Potential need/desirability to keep a significant percentage of forces (especially light forces) in the CONUS
- Develop better insights about and abilities to empathize with various cultures around the world where military commitments are growing

Policy Area: Relationships between the Army and the U.S. public and citizens of other nations (friend and foe).

Issues:

- U.S. educational attitudes regarding training in foreign languages, social values and history
- Ability of the Army to understand domestic and foreign political trends, particularly peace movements and environmental interests
- Impact on the Army of various social legislation, such as environmental laws
- Ability of the Total Army to influence attitudes and behavior by communicating with the U.S. public and Congress about its roles, missions, needs, and contributions
- Ability of the Army to change or relocate major facilities due to public and Army attitudes
- Public belief that total victory is attainable under conditions of modern warfare, which may no longer be the case

Issue: Ability of Americans to communicate with persons of other countries and understand their values/culture

Background:

- Decline in American educational system in teaching foreign languages

Issue: Need to better understand political trends in the U.S. and in other important regions/countries (e.g., Europe, Japan, China)

Background:

- Growing pacifist movements, demand for nuclear freezes, political candidates supporting disarmament, etc.
- Ability of Soviets to maintain current policies and programs and become dominant/control world by default
- Continued pressure of the Soviets around the world, especially through surrogates
- Situation in Korea likely to remain the same as today
- Inability to operate on multiple fronts (e.g., in Latin America and against Soviet moves in Europe) without adequate funding
- Inadequate resources even under an administration that is pro-military
- Participation in NATO has provided 35 years of peace in Europe
- New generation in Europe now has no experience in war for the first time in centuries (e.g., fostering peace/disarmament movements)
- World politics in the free world have become much more interrelated so that one country can not take unilateral action
- Inability of politics/diplomacy and intelligence networks to keep pace with advances in communication and technology

Issue:

Lack of understanding of the public by the Army and the Army by the public

Background:

- The Army largely responds to "east coast politics" and the eastern media (e.g., the Washington Post and the New York Times)
- The midwest, the south, and the far west have a different set of values and attitudes than the east coast.
- The Army has the attitude that "we think we do know them" but we really don't (for example: a communication gap has evolved between the new younger recruits and the long time noncoms and army top management)
- an age gap that has led to communication gaps. The communication gap is now being bridged by the new young officers/lieutenants

Implications:

- More time should be spent by Army management with middle America at places around the country

Issue: DOD/Army vulnerability to environmental concerns

Background:

- Image of the government, especially large military installations, as the country's largest single polluter
- Large new government projects already constrained by environmental regulations
- Difficulties in demilitarizing obsolete chemical weapons (and associated plants)
- Moves to establish zero discharge requirements

Implications:

- Constraints on development, production, and storage of various types of weapons (e.g., chemical, biological)
- Continued hindrance of certain R&D projects/activities
- Potential need for the Army to request exemption from zero discharge requirements

Issue: Ability to adequately communicate with and obtain and public acceptance of new Army missions

Background:

- Need to operate in other than NATO/European-like environment (e.g., theaters of operation in LDC/have-not nations)
- Growing dependence of the U.S. economy on resources from LDC/have-nots who could prove to be hostile to the U.S. interests

Issue: Ability of Army to communicate its contribution to the U.S. economy

Background:

- Community hostility resulting from Army enclaves

Issue: Ability to maintain a positive image of the military with the public

Background:

- Recent upswing in positive Congressional and public attitudes about the military and its role in the U.S. society/economy -- especially the Army

Implications:

- Need to maintain positive public image of the military in light of continuing need for funding support to modernize and restructure forces to meet demands of the 1990s
- Potential need for increasing attention to and funds directed at public relations
- New demands on TRADOC to provide training and other support that meets the promises of a job, self-actualization and job skills consistent with improving the image of the Army

Issue: Family and employer attitudes about the role of the military including the Reserve (especially Reserve obligations)

Background:

- The close family support, associations and camaraderie existing in active military units, does not exist in Reserve situations.
- Employers have little concern about or interest in the employee's participation in Reserve activities

Implications:

- Develop and continue to improve programs to engender family and employer support for Reserve participation and service.

Issue: Public knowledge and awareness of the role of the National Guard in the readiness and defense posture of the U.S.

Background:

- It is established by the Constitution that the Guard is under the jurisdiction of the governor of the state, but training is "federal" and is directed at going to war
- One-half of the combat readiness of the U.S. forces resides within the National Guard
- The only time the Guard gets public notice is in the event of a state or local emergency
- The importance attached to publicity for the National Guard varies among the governors, who also provide varying amounts of support personally and through their state legislatures
- Mission in role of the Guard is not clear to many since states are responsible for recruiting while the Guard operates to federal standards

Implications:

- Develop public awareness program to communicate that the U.S. has one Army consisting of Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces.
- A potential need to establish a full time force due to new roles and mission (e.g. national air defense/missile activities)

Issue:

Ability of the Army to market its needs and requirements

Background:

- Legislative and other constraints prevent the Army from lobbying
- Historic precedent and legal constraints make the President the only real spokesman for the military services
- The American public desires the military/Army to be prepared to handle all eventualities but is not interested in the details of the threat nor in the detailed military requirements to address the threat.
- Reduced reaction times in the face of conflict demand increasing readiness during peacetime

Implications:

- Improve the Army's understanding about the positions and attitudes of those to whom it would address any sales/marketing campaign, especially those likely to take opposite positions

Issue: Difficulty/Inability in Changing/Relocating Major Fixed Facilities and Installations

Background:

- Local communities resist major reductions or relocations of Army facilities because of the loss in revenue/income to the area
- Traditional use of facilities/resistance by Army elements to abandon long-used sites (e.g., Fort Belvoir is viewed as the traditional post for training officers for the Corps of Engineers)
- Cost and environmental concerns create pressures to reconsider the financial and other justifications for continuing use of various facilities

Implications:

- If an activity is removed from an installation it may be necessary to replace it with something else
- If politics continue to restrain authority to make major changes in installations, conditions could dictate seeking ways for better utilizing sites already used

Issue: American optimism about the ability to win wars and survive as a nation

Background:

- White hats always win; God is on our side
- Problems are always solvable, especially on the spot
- Short-term time horizon in plans and actions (don't worry ahead of time)
- Congress requires a 12-14 month payoff

Implications:

- Military obtains R&D role by default

Issue: Ability to Educate the Public as to the Nature and Implication of the Real Threat

Background:

- Military leaders feel they are constrained in speaking openly to the American public
- The Secretariat can communicate openly to the public but they really do not represent the military establishment, as they are perceived by the public as being part of the political establishment
- Retired flag officers do not really represent current military positions in thinking and may have a credibility gap with public

Implications:

- Reassess the real/actual constraints on the military in terms of their communicating directly with the public

Issue: An unrealistic public desire for return to isolationism

Background:

- Involvement in military action (e.g., Central America) induces public anxiety
- New communication technology allows inordinate media influence on the American public
- Continuing Russian pressure obviates relaxation of the NATO commitment

Implications:

- Because of public anxiety, military actions will be increasingly controlled by the Congress

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