



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
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
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THE RESERVE COMPONENT STRATEGIC OPTION

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

LTC. Edward S. Kowalewski (Author)

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THE RESERVE COMPONENT STRATEGIC OPTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Today the reserves play an increasingly vital role in military planning and in actual operations.²

The increased role of the Reserve Components (RC) in today's Total Force environment has brought to the military strategist a new option in the high stakes world of national defense. The RC are rapidly becoming a major player in the formulation of United States defense policy. However, this increased emphasis in today's defense establishment brings with it a number of questions that must be addressed if we hope to get the full utilization of our Reserve Forces. Previously, the RC have been viewed as the smaller brother of the active force. Structuring, manning, equipping, and, most importantly, budgeting have been issues that, while receiving attention, have not received adequate attention for the mission at hand.

A quick look at recent history will show that in the Vietnam War the failure to call up the RC, in spite of the numerous domestic ramifications that such a call would have entailed, may have been one of the psychological turning points of the war. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., in his book, "On Strategy--A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War," writes,

In retrospect this was a key strategic error. Failure to make this crucial political decision led to fear of making the political decision to mobilize the reserves. Failure to mobilize the reserves led to failure of the military leadership to push for strategic concepts aimed at halting North Vietnamese aggression and led to campaigns against the symptoms of the aggression--the insurgency in the South--rather than against the aggressor itself.³

That flexibility to choose not to mobilize the RC, an option of yesterday's strategist, is no longer an option today. Rather, today's question is how fast can the RC be called and how soon can they be deployed. President Reagan, in his January 1988 address to the Reserve Officers Association in Washington, D.C., stated,

In Grenada, reserve pilots were part of the action. Off the coast of Lebanon, the Reserves relieved our weary sailors on the battleship New Jersey. And in everyday assignments, in arduous missions that need to be done, the Reserves are doing their part.⁴

This implementation of the Total Force policy can best be summarized by this quote from the National Security Strategy of the United States:

The Total Force policy established in the early 1970's places increased responsibilities on the reserve component of U.S. forces. . . . Reserve units perform important functions on a daily basis. Their priority for manning, training, and equipment modernization is not based on their peacetime status as forces [in reserve], but on the basis of their direct integration into nation's operational plans and missions.⁵

The purpose of this research paper is to examine this new strategy option available to today's defense strategist for policy formulation for the 1990's and beyond and how it has been applied in United States Southern Command. Accordingly, this study will focus on: (1) the mission faced by the CINCSO;

(2) an analysis of CINCSO's organizational assets; (3) a historical review of U.S. policy toward Latin America; (4) a current evaluation of U.S. policy in the areas of defense, economics, world order, and ideological interests; (5) the increased responsibility of the CINC's as a result of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; and (6) an analysis of the Reserve Component training program in SOUTHCOM. These factors will form the basis for the conclusions and recommendations found at the end of this paper.

Only Army Reserve programs will be addressed in this paper. While it is recognized the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contribute significantly to the mission requirements of SOUTHCOM, they are not included in this study. The air reserve component, with their crew configuration structure, are vastly more interchangeable with their Active Component counterparts than are their land component brothers and, thus, not a new element of strategy.

This paper is intended to be an initial thrust into the analysis of the use of Reserve Component forces as a strategy option. Topics such as the legal implications of the use of National Guard units out of their respective states, past experience with civic-action programs in other parts of the world, and the behavioral modifications on the host nation require further research and, when completed, will add to the body of knowledge on this subject.

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

Let's begin by examining the missions the CINCSO has and the assets he has to accomplish those missions. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), with headquarters at Quarry Heights, Panama, is responsible for all U.S. military activities in Central and South America (excluding Mexico). The SOUTHCOM missions are:

1. Provide for the defense of the Panama Canal;
2. Exercise operational control over U.S. forces on the land mass of Central and South American (less Mexico);
3. Prepares strategic assessments and contingency plans and conducts training or operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
4. Conducts disaster relief, search and rescue or evacuation of U.S. citizens from endangered areas;
5. Supports and assists U.S. country teams of the region and facilitates coordination of U.S. military activities under their purview;
6. Monitors security assistance programs in South and Central America, including Mexico, and supports security assistance organizations in coordination with the U.S. Ambassador or senior civilian representative of the U.S. government;
7. Promotes mutual security and development among nations of the region through combined intelligence exchanges, planning, training, humanitarian assistance, national development and other operations to maintain peace.⁶

To accomplish these missions, the CINCSO is serviced by three active component elements:

1. The U.S. Army component, with approximately 6,690 troops, has the primary mission of the ground defense of the Panama Canal, but it also supports other regional missions, including deployments to 12 Latin nations for combined training as well as medical and engineering assistance and intelligence support activities.
2. U.S. Southern Air Force with 2,360 personnel, headquartered at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, has the responsibility for controlling the air element in defense of the Panama Canal.
3. U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, located at Fort Amador, Panama, with approximately 419 personnel, maintains a special boat unit, provides fleet support for transient U.S. and Free World naval units, and coordinates plans for naval forces that may be assigned for contingency operations.⁷

To accomplish all these missions with less than 10,000 assigned personnel on a land mass twice the size of the United States is indeed a formidable task. A review of SOUTHCOM's share of the DoD budget paints an even bleaker picture. U.S. Southern Command received only four percent of the worldwide security assistance in Fiscal 1987. This was reduced in Fiscal 1988 from ten countries receiving assistance to only three (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador).⁸ SOUTHCOM received 0.6 percent of the DoD manpower and 0.1 percent of the Fiscal 1987 DoD budget. In the out years, further reductions in funding should be expected as the mood in Washington is to reduce overall federal spending in general, and defense spending in particular.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Historically, U.S. involvement in Central and South America has been one of convenience--convenience for the United States. The U.S. has, since its founding, looked to Europe as its most kindred spirit. Our Latin neighbors to the south were, at best, ignored, and, at worst, exploited. The U.S. wanted only quiet and complacency from south of the border. In order to accomplish this, diplomatic agreements were made with the ruling families in Latin America. As a result, dictators like Batista of Cuba and Somoza of Nicaragua were left alone because they contained the problems of their countries within their own borders and did not bother the United States.

The plague of repression in South America during the 1960's and 1970's was so endemic that by 1975 only two countries on the continent--Columbia and Venezuela--still had civilian regimes. The picture in the rest of South America was indeed bleak, a new breed of modern "bureaucratic authoritarian" regimes ended political life by banning political parties, repressing trade unions, suspending constitutional guarantees, and institutionalizing torture and creating other methods to systematically violate human rights.

South America's wave of repression crested in the mid-1970's, and the authoritarian regimes began to crumble by the end of the decade. These regimes were discredited by their lack of economic success, were unable to institutionalize political support at home, and were disdained by international opinion, especially in the wake of the United States' emphasis on human rights during President Carter's administration.

By 1980, the central concern of South America politics was the transition from authoritarian rule: how and when it would occur in each country, and what kind of politics would take the place of authoritarianism. Since the early 1980's, South America's turn to democratic politics has gained momentum at a dramatic pace. By the mid-1980's, therefore, the key issue has become whether democratic policies can be consolidated throughout South America.

CHAPTER IV
FACTORS AFFECTING U.S. INTERESTS

In the course of the last twenty-five years, despite the turn toward democracy, the Soviet Union has moved from a marginal presence, and of little influence, to a major player with multifaceted activities throughout Latin America.

In 1960, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with only five countries in the region and few significant overt relationships aside from ties to local communist parties. Today, the Soviet Union has diplomatic relations with sixteen countries, and its hemispheric proxy Cuba constitutes a complex military threat to the region.

To critically evaluate the current posture of the United States in Latin America, one must be able to pull together all the areas of U.S. interests (defense, economics, world order, and ideology) and then analyze them in relation to our past experience in Latin America.

Defense Interests: The United States, as previously discussed, has for the most part taken for granted the support of its neighbors to the south. Now with the intervention of the Soviets, Cubans, and the Sandinistas in this hemisphere, the sleeping U.S. giant is slowly awakening. The secure southern flank of the U.S., the unimpeded access to the sea lines of communication, and the unquestioned control of the

Panama Canal gave the U.S. a stability and isolationism in the first half of this century that rivaled that enjoyed by the United Kingdom in the last century.

The Reagan administration's policy statement toward the Central American problem hinges on the four D's of Defense, Diplomacy, Development, and Dialogue, but in this case, with the shield of defense coming from the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, the Contras, who are managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The resulting U.S. policy debate aired to the international community served to weaken the resolve of the Latin American friends of the U.S. The Arias Peace Plan, advanced by the President of Costa Rica, Nobel Peace Prize Winner Oscar Arias, can be a step in the right direction to bring peace, regional security, and stability to Central America. The recent cease fire between the Sandinistas and the Contras may be the solution, but only time will tell.

Economic Interests: Current economic interests in the Latin American countries are on the decline. The debt problems in Latin America are of staggering proportion and have severely limited developmental dollars from being injected into the Latin American economy. Unless major restructuring of the debt is accomplished through the World Bank, the IMF and the major lending institutions, economics will become the real "Achilles heel" of Latin America.

Pervasive poverty and the personal tragedy it brings will lead to insurrection of the people and create further instability

in the region. Today, the average citizen in Latin America is poorer than he was ten years ago. The United States government has provided much rhetoric and little money to solve this problem. What is needed is more economic assistance to create basic national industries and the opening of U.S. markets.

Developmental money is needed to establish local economic structures, thereby creating jobs for the ever increasing population. Unless this is done and done quickly, then Latin America will be lost, not because of Soviet action, but rather through U.S. inaction.

World Order Interests: The largest single enemy to World Order that exists today comes from Columbia and the other Andean Ridge countries--illegal drugs. The illegal drug business costs the United States 156 billion dollars per year; 90 billion in direct costs for narcotics and the balance in indirect costs to the corporate body of the United States. Illegal drugs affect one out of six U.S. citizens and appear to be totally out of control. The burgeoning drug problem now appears to be affecting the illegal drug producing countries, something that was unheard of just a few short years ago. An example of this is the use of the residual Cocaine paste, called bazoco, being used by the youth of Columbia and Bolivia.

The United States has other world order interests, such as keeping the Americas free of Soviet influence, building a security shield around this hemisphere, and insuring the political stability of the American member nations. But none

of these pose the threat to the safety of the United States as does illegal drugs. The United States must implement a massive drug education and rehabilitation program coupled with a very severe enforcement policy if this crisis is to be resolved.

Ideological Interests: The United States shares basic ideological interests with the other nations in the Americas. The principles of democracy, individual freedom, and human rights are upheld by the vast majority of peoples who live in this hemisphere. The difference, however, is in the definition of the words and to the extent that these principles are carried out.

The Bottom Line: The United States still has a secure southern flank. The nations of the Americas will support the United States in a confrontation against the Soviets although with ever increasing trepidation. The United States is not doing badly in the hemisphere; rather, it seems not to be doing anything at all. There appears to be a tremendous amount of rhetoric backed up by poorly implemented programs. The lack of funding and the general lack of interest on the part of the United States Congress to problems in this hemisphere bodes for a bleak future. The insufficient response by this country to tackle the Latin American debt and the United States drug problems means these economic and social nightmares will only get worse with time. The Soviets will not win power in Latin America; rather, they will be given such power by the United States because of our inability to implement a proactive

foreign policy. This, coupled to the Soviets' active participation in the area, paints a very bleak picture. The four D's-- Defense, Diplomacy, Development, and Dialogue--will work not only in Latin America but also in other developing areas of the world. The failure has been in the implementation of this policy and the consistency by which the four D's are employed.

CHAPTER V
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE CINC'S

What follows will be a brief analysis of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. This is important for two reasons: first, it will provide a perspective on the expanding role of the warfighting CINC's; and, secondly, it will show how the CINC can draw on all the tools at his disposal as he tries to project a U.S. presence in his area of responsibility (AOR). The latest tool is the use of Reserve Component units used in the conducting of OCONUS training exercises; a new subnet of the instruments of power.

Virtually all facets of the way DoD conducts business have been affected by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In this Act, Congress has: (1) amended the reporting procedure of the Secretary of Defense; (2) redefined the role of the Chairman, who is now "the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense"; (3) given the Chairman a Vice Chairman who is second in military rank only to the Chairman; (4) given the Chairman singular authority over the staff of the JCS which he previously shared with the other Chiefs; (5) enhanced the roles of the Military Departments' Service Secretaries and, most significantly for this paper, vested new powers in the warfighting CINCS.

The DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 virtually assigns all forces to the warfighting CINCS.

The legislation requires that except for those forces assigned to carry out functions of a military department [basically recruiting, training, equipping, mobilizing, etc.] the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified commands to perform missions assigned to those commands . . . The act also specifies that all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified command combatant command, shall be assigned to and under the commander of that command.⁹

These major organizational changes will take considerable time to implement. Questions such as: Can the Army assign "all" combat forces to the warfighting CINCS? How will the warfighting CINCS exercise their new authority to organize assigned forces and oversee their joint training and logistics? What is the remaining role of the Army component commands? What is the future command relationships between the RC and the warfighting CINCS? This last question is critical to the future of the RC and a keystone of this paper. The CINCSO has, through his exercise program, utilized the RC at the cutting edge of their abilities. The entire mobilization process is exercised when a reserve unit trains OCONUS. The complete cycle of deployment, mission accomplishment, and then redeployment back to CONUS. These areas will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

CHAPTER VI

RESERVE FORCES FORWARD DEPLOYED

The title of this section, Reserve Forces Forward Deployed, is not a misnomer. RC units training in Latin America are indeed the forward edge of United States military involvement in this area and is an essential element of the military instrument of power of the CINCSO. In this section, I will define and develop the term Reserve Forces Forward Deployed.

The use of the RC in United States Southern Command has been the most innovative use of those forces in recent times. Short of combat, the RC training exercises conducted in the CINCSO's AOR has been the most realistic use of RC units and individuals yet devised. The total mobilization process is encountered when a RC unit trains in SOUTHCOM; the entire staff planning process is implemented; joint coordination is required; the unit performs a real world mission; and the impact on the host nation is maximized without the tremendous long term stationing cost associated with an Active Component unit.

The basis of research for this paper consisted of a review of the current literature, a field trip to the United States Southern Command and the United States Army South Command in Panama in January 1988 with subsequent follow-up visits to the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. in February. The

research instrument used was the personal interview, and over twenty were conducted--from the Commander-in-Chief General Fred F. Woerner to the action level planning officers on the staffs. But, to understand the current situation, one must first understand the history behind RC training in SOUTHCOM.

The initial involvement of Reserve Units in SOUTHCOM was in 1980. United States Southern Command and its Army Component, at that time the 193rd Infantry Brigade (Separate), developed a training program with the 53rd Separate Infantry Brigade and the 92nd Separate Infantry Brigade of the Florida and Puerto Rican National Guard, under the CAPSTONE/AFFILIATION Program. This allowed the use of SOUTHCOM's AOR as a training site and served as the foundation for future training exercises. This relationship still exists and has expanded and prospered.

In 1983, a combined engineer exercise between Panama and the United States was the training vehicle used. This exercise was conducted by the Army National Guard with the help of SOUTHCOM and the 193rd planning staffs. These exercises were called MINUTEMEN I and II, lasting for two years and resulting in the construction of over 26 miles of roadway on the west coast of Panama, linking the isolated agricultural peninsula of Azuero with the major road networks of Panama. More than 10,000 RC soldiers participated. These exercises were then followed up by the Blazing Trails series. During 1986, RC engineers working in Panama built 15 kilometers of road from Rio Indio to Miguel de la Borda, southwest of the city of

Colon. This project included the construction of a bridge over the Rio Indio (see photographs at Figures 1-7, Appendix A). It provided training opportunities for over 4,600 RC members.

Blazing Trails then shifted to Honduras in 1986 and 1987. This consisted of an extensive engineer project of a farm to market road from PuenteCita to Jocon in the Aguan Valley of Yoro Department of Honduras. This road building effort in the mountains of northern Honduras was twelve miles in length and resulted in an improved standard of living for the locals in this heretofore isolated area. Over 5,600 National Guard and 3,500 Army Reserve personnel trained during 1986 and 1987. It is projected that over 9,000 active duty and RC Troops will train on this project before the exercise is completed in July of 1988.

As the size of the RC training exercise program increased, so did the confidence of the planners, the host nations, and the RC Command structure. A major upgrade in the level of exercises occurred in Ecuador when an originally scheduled exercise was changed due to a major earthquake. The Reserve Component engineers were planning to improve a portion of a road along the coast of Ecuador. Then in March of 1987, an earthquake struck in the interior of Ecuador at 6.5 on the Richter Scale. This disrupted the oil pipeline through the Amazon Basin, displaced thousands of people, and destroyed all existing roads. The government of Ecuador then requested that the U.S. government change the RC engineer project to the town

of Archidona with a new mission of road reconstruction. The name of the exercise was changed to ABRIENDO RUTAS, meaning opening of the roads. This then became a major portion of the U.S. response to the government of Ecuador.

Vice-President Bush, visiting Ecuador shortly after the earthquake, pledged U.S. assistance; ABRIENDO RUTAS was to be the keystone of that pledge. The new mission was to upgrade 10 km of existing road from Archidona to Rio Hollin; construct a bridge over the Rio Hollin; construct as much road as possible during the exercise period; and perform humanitarian assistance and civic action projects. The following is an excerpt of Headquarters, U.S. Army South's Lessons Learned: The Archidona Report, A Summary of Task Force (TF) 1169:

Force presence through engineer exercises has constituted a major element of Command-in-Chief U.S. Southern Command (CINCOSO) strategy in Central and South America over the last three years. Although numerous training exercises in Central America, ABRIENDO RUTAS was the first major U.S. Army exercise ever conducted in South America and Ecuador.

Adding a different twist, the report went on to say,

ABRIENDO RUTAS was also about war fighting and preparing for war. From a logistics and engineering perspective TF 1169 was fighting a war in the remote, dense jungle of Ecuador.¹⁰

The ability to deploy, successfully perform a mission, and then redeploy to home station is the essence of warfighting.

Quoting from the above report:

TRAINING FOR WAR: Warfighting was what exercise ABRIENDO RUTAS 87 - Ecuador was all about. In Ecuador TF1169 encountered an environment as hostile as any future 'low intensity conflict' LIC battlefield. Working in dense jungle, drenched by tropical rains (average 25 days per

month), and tethered at the end of a 725 kilometer line of communication, TF1169 overcame site conditions not encountered by U.S. Army engineer units since World War II in the Pacific, and in Southeast Asia.¹¹

The results of ABRIENDO RUTAS - 87, considering the obstacles that stood in its path--both jungle and organizational--was outstanding. Quoting again from the above report:

Conclusions: ABRIENDO RUTAS - 87 was a tremendous success. The task force's accomplishments are impressive:

- a. Upgraded ten km. of jungle trail to one lane, class 40 military standard road.
- b. Constructed four km. of new road through dense jungle terrain.
- c. Constructed a 100 meter panel bridge with massive concrete and gabion foundations.
- d. Completed humanitarian and civic action projects to assist local villagers in the surrounding countryside.
- e. Performed medical assistance exercises treating the local populace.¹²

ABRIENDO RUTAS was important not only because of the engineer work accomplished, but for many of the other accomplishments it achieved. Most significantly, this exercise demonstrated that over 8,000 Reserve Component troops could be successfully deployed and redeployed for training in a highly sensitive area--politically, geographically, and environmentally--without incident. It opened the lines of communication between our government and the government of Ecuador and, in some cases, it started a dialogue between U.S. government agencies that seldom seem to talk to each other (i.e., State, US AID, the U.S. and Ecuadoran military, U.S. Peace Corps, and many others coming together for a common purpose). Lastly, it showed U.S. commitment to help our Latin neighbors in time of

need and was widely reported in the press throughout Latin America. (See photographs at Appendix A.)

During the period of 17-24 May 1987, an agency of the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted an evaluation of the use of RC in SOUTHCOM. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the RC."¹³ For the past several years, the board has conducted field studies in areas of the world where the National Guard and the Reserves of the Total Force would have a major role under wartime operations plans (OPLANS) or where significant Reserve Component training is taking place. The RFPB visited SOUTHCOM at the invitation of then CINC, General John R. Galvin, USA. The RFPB, chaired by the Honorable Will Hill Tankersley, consisted of fourteen flag officers plus staff who visited SOUTHCOM over a seven day period. The centerpiece of that visit was the RFPB's trip to ABRIENDO RUTAS. The following excerpts from their report to the Secretary of Defense show their support for the Reserve involvement in SOUTHCOM. Secretary Weinberger, after reading the report, directed that it be sent to the President for his review.

The role of the Reserve Components in SOUTHCOM illustrates an important dimension of the Total Force Policy. The mission of SOUTHCOM, to support U.S. national security policy in Central and South America, is absolutely critical to the United States. The National Guard and Reserves are full partners with the Active Component and are contributing to the accomplishment of SOUTHCOM's mission.¹⁴

Addressing ABRIENDO RUTAS specifically, the RFPB in the Observations and Recommendations section of its report wrote,

The training exercise ABRIENDO RUTAS in Ecuador is a good example. The training could probably not be duplicated in the United States. It is realistic and requires flexibility, responsiveness, and professionalism.¹⁵

The majority of Reserve Component exercises in the SOUTHCOM area are both joint and combined operations, involving host country military forces and more than one service of the U.S. military. The result of these exercises is closer U.S. cooperation with neighboring countries and increased mutual understanding and friendship between citizens of the United States and the Latin American nations. OCONUS RC training provides experience in jointness, and serves as an excellent training vehicle in conducting combined operations with another country's armed forces. Lastly, such training projects a U.S. presence for a short period of time without a major cost to either the gaining CINC or his supporting component commander. This is certainly the definition of Reserve Forces Forward Deployed.

CHAPTER VII

THE ARCHITECTS OF RC STRATEGY

The interviews conducted by the author were done for one purpose: to gain a deeper insight into the use of RC as an element of national strategy. The best way to do this was to gather an oral history of the present key architects of Reserve Component employment. What follows is a series of excerpts from those interviews. While over twenty interviews were conducted, only the principals will be quoted in depth for this paper.

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, has extensive experience in Latin America. He previously served as the Commanding General of the 193rd Infantry Brigade (Panama), now redesignated U.S. Army South. In earlier related assignments, he was the Director of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College and adviser on civil-military operations in Latin America.

General Woerner had the following comments on the use of the RC in his AOR. He framed his interview under the title of multiplicity of purpose in the employment of the RC in his command. A summary of his comments follow:

1. RC training exercises provide an operational element that furthers United States Latin American policy, an element that would not otherwise be available to the command.

2. A very advantageous training operation that could not be duplicated in the United States.
3. RC training exercises contribute to the development of host nations by building roads, bridges, and providing medical care. The results of these exercises strengthen United States' ties with the people in the region, leading to very positive feelings.
4. Depending on design, RC exercises can contribute to the host nation's military skills.
5. These exercises in Latin America strengthen our own people by exposing them to harsher conditions than they would normally encounter. It also makes our people better informed.
6. Contributes significantly to the recruiting and retention campaigns of the Reserve Components.
7. It is extremely cost effective to train in SOUTHCOM when compared to other OCONUS training options such as Korea and Europe.¹⁶

The operational requirements in SOUTHCOM were in perfect juxtaposition with the abilities of the RC. To project a U.S. presence in an area without sufficient assets in a land mass twice the size of the United States forced a new solution to a seemingly impossible situation. How do you show to the Latin Americans that the U.S. cares about what happens to them when you have only 0.1 percent of the Defense budget, less than 100 advisers, a limited foreign military sales program, no security assistance program (except for three countries in Central America), and a foreign policy that, at its best, is ambivalent? Standing on the other side of the line you have the Soviets pouring \$5 billion a year in military and economic aid to Cuba alone, with hundreds of Soviet and Cuban advisers scattered through virtually all the countries of Latin America and the

Caribbean, open ended military sales credits, and, most damaging of all, a diplomatic policy that "speaks with one voice."

The one category of the Army budget that has been growing has been the RC. Most RC elements of the POM have seen, in some cases substantial, upswings while the Active Component has experienced a stabilization despite unsurpassed overall DoD budget growth. This fact is even more significant when you examine the types of units that compose the RC, those that are required in a low intensity environment found in Latin America. The Army RC make, as a percentage of the Total Army picture, 74 percent of the Army Hospitals, 92 percent of the Psychological Operations Units, 100 percent of the Training Divisions, 68 percent of the Combat Engineer Units, 50 percent of the Special Forces Units, 67 percent of the Engineer Bridge Companies, and 67 percent of the Truck Companies.¹⁷ This is the ideal type of force structure to wage a successful campaign in this low intensity environment. General Woerner stated in his interview, "If I have to deploy combat forces, I have lost. What I need are combat support and combat service support units."¹⁸ A true marriage of not only convenience but of necessity.

Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief of the National Guard, has been intimately familiar with the activity of the Reserve in SOUTHCOM. Prior to his appointment as the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, he served first as the Deputy Director and then Director of the Army Guard. General

Temple, when asked to describe his view of the expanding RC mission, stated,

Our mission and own fundamental strategy is deterrence, and my contention from the very beginning is what happens in Central and South America is that it provides an opportunity to test all the elements of deterrence. It shows that we can mobilize and that we can move forces internally within the United States. That we can deploy and they can train and be sustained in remote environments where there is no major U.S. facility to support them. . . . Hell, C-1 to the Russians don't mean a hell of a lot, but the fact that I can take the 32nd Brigade and move it and its equipment to Europe on REFORGER and that you can't tell the 32nd from the 1st Division when it's over there, or I can move our guys into Central America, sustain them for a long period of time . . . It gets their attention.¹⁹

Brigadier General Marc Cisneros, J-3 SOUTHCOM, reflected on the role of the RC in Latin America. "The principal argument for the use of the RC in this theater is to project power. The cutting edge down here is combat support and combat service support. That's what the RC has got; that's what we need."

Going on to address Low Intensity Conflict or the new, more meaningful term High Probability of Conflict (HPC) now used in SOUTHCOM, General Cisneros stated, "HPC does not mean committing combat forces . . . because of its structure, RC units play the paramount role in HPC."

Addressing the stationing issues, General Cisneros commented, ". . . the Active Army has not taken as great an interest in SOUTHCOM, and therefore we were forced to go to the RC. One of the best benefits of RC deployment to South America is that . . . it shows the flag and tells of a commitment to Latin America."²⁰

Colonel Arnie Rossi, Chief of Staff of U.S. Army South, talked about a trilogy of interests when discussing RC employment in Latin America. "The Ecuadoran operation is a good example of the trilogy between the Government of Ecuador, SOUTHCOM, and the RC; all coming together for the benefit of each of the participants."²¹ Colonel J. Cope, G-3 of U.S. Army South, echoes Col. Rossi's comments. "These RC engineer projects in Latin America is just like opening up the old west. This is a combat support and combat service support operation."²²

Summing it all up, Major General William R. Ward, Jr., Chief, Army Reserve, said,

The training in South and Central America is fantastic . . . I'm very enthused about the training. Wished we had done it for a number of reasons thirty years ago during the Alliance for Progress days. It is very relevant training, it's tough, not only the issues of how you deploy people, but the work they do down there, it stretches you not only physically but psychologically, and the kind of psychological tension it puts people under in order to get a job done within a time frame is tremendous. Extremely important, it mentally prepares units for their ability to go to war and get the job done.²³

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

What we have seen unfolding before us is an experiment in national strategy. The elements of crises existed with no apparent solution in view. As a base, we have United States Southern Command, seemingly underfunded when you consider the scope and breadth of its mission. Then, the boiling pot of Central and South America, with its problems of illegal drugs, poverty, class struggle, and emigration--all the ingredients for insurgency. Lastly, the Soviet threat and its desire to infiltrate the "soft underbelly" of the United States adds the final element of crisis.

This situation in 1980 called for new solutions; General Paul Gorman, CINC at that time, was facing difficult decisions and had to pick a strategy that could favorably influence the situation, but at little or no cost. The RC, with its combat support and combat service support force structure, naturally fit the mission requirements for SOUTHCOM, with its need for humanitarian and civic-action type programs. All those interviewed felt that the use of combat troops, either active or reserve in SOUTHCOM's AOR was not required and, in fact, would weaken the U.S. position in the eyes of the Latin Americans. Quoting from the Reserve Forces Policy Board's 1987 report when it met

with then CINC, now SACEUR, General R. Galvin, one of the principal architects of this strategy:

General Galvin was emphatic about the contribution to his mission by the Reserve Components. A substantial portion of the operational activities of SOUTHCOM are being accomplished during training by National Guard and Reserve Forces.²⁴

The four D's: Democracy, Development, Dialogue, and Defense are the elements of the foundation to President Reagan's policy toward Latin America. The shield of Defense is the one that we as military strategists are most concerned with. It is our responsibility to provide the developing countries an opportunity to find their own way. If they are unprotected and are perceived to be weak and without strong friends, they are ripe for subversion and anarchy. It is this country's duty as the preserver of world order to stand in harm's way. The difficulty comes when our government tries to explain complex issues in simple terms. The government's lack of focus on these issues and its inability to develop an orchestrated response results in a loss of credibility with the American people.

The RC experiment in SOUTHCOM does not have to be unique. The problems of Latin America are, for the most part, the problems of the third world with a great deal of overlap existing with the rest of the less developed world. The use of the RC in a forward deployed role can be of immense value to this nation, but only if its use meets the same criteria that is applied to the Active Force. The most important element is the formulation of clear objectives validated by

the consensus of the American people. A policy must be developed that has clearly stated goals, and those goals must reflect the will of the American people. The RC experiment in SOUTHCOM has proved to be a success. Now it is time to expand the use of this force-multiplier to other area of the world, but it must be done carefully and wisely.

CHAPTER IX
RECOMMENDATIONS

While all the supporting issues could not be addressed because of the scope of this emerging strategic philosophy, sufficient material has been provided to at least lay the ground work for a new approach in the way the defense strategist can use the RC in a forward deployed setting. The following recommendations are offered:

1. The Reserve Components should be aligned in support of the warfighting CINC's. complying with the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. This legislation mandates a larger role for those CINC's in almost every category. The RC needs to train as it will fight. If it is to fight in support of an OCONUS CINC, then it should train as much as possible in that theater.
2. The role of the Reserve Components in United States Southern Command should be expanded. Road building projects have been the major training vehicle, but increased emphasis should be placed on smaller medical and civic action type efforts. These smaller inscale training exercises are more manageable and can be easily dispersed over a wider area in the AOR.
3. A Joint Planning Staff should be created in the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, to develop and then implement new strategic doctrine for the utilization of Reserve Components forward deployed.
4. Reserve Component planning cells should be established in every warfighting CINC's headquarters. SOUTHCOM and U.S. Army South have developed RC staffs which have the responsibility for planning and coordinating RC training exercises in this AOR. The personnel for these staffs have been supplied by the Reserve Components through the Active Guard-Reserve Program (AGR). Like staffs should be created by the same process for planning, programming, budgeting, and coordinating RC training in their respective AOR's.

5. A training program should be developed whereby RC units can be used as a supplemental force presence for the warfighting CINC's. Closer examination needs to be done to determine the feasibility of interchanging AC and RC units. This may not be possible on a day-to-day basis, but based on the experience in SOUTHCOM, it can be successful if done on a mission basis. This would give the CINC flexibility in force structuring and allow him greater power projection.

The end result of these recommendations, when implemented, will be to bring the RC into the Joint arena and prepare them for their expanded role in the 21st century.

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
APPENDIX 1

Figures 1-7

Photographs courtesy of the Reserve Forces
Policy Board, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Washington, D.C.

APPENDIX ■ 1

PHOTOGRAPHS




The bridge on the left, over the Indio River in Panama, was constructed in 1986 as part of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve training Exercise COSTA ABAJO, with the Panama Defense Force. Prior to its construction, the only crossing was the pedestrian suspension bridge on the right.

Figure 1



The bridge at the mouth of the Indio River where it empties into the Caribbean Sea.

Figure 2



Bridges over the Indio River -- vehicular bridge constructed in 1986 in the foreground and older pedestrian bridge in the background.

Figure 3



Ribbon cutting ceremony for Exercise ABRIENDO RUTAS at the Hollin River near Archidona, Ecuador, on May 21, 1987. Local officials, representatives of the Ecuadoran Army, and Chairman Tankersley addressed the group gathered for the ceremony.

Figure 4



School children and others present at the ceremony.

Figure 5



Chairman Tankersley speaking at the ceremony.

Figure 6



Aerial view on May 21, 1987, of the base camp established by Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel outside Archidona, Ecuador, to support Exercise ABRIENDO RUTAS.

Figure 7

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