Decision and Judgement.
Abstract
The three-year effort (1984-7) by the two principle investigators is summarized under four major headings: I. The framing of decisions -- Rational decision theory is characterized by two sets of assumptions: coherence and invariance. The requirements of coherence include transitivity, substitution (or cancellation), and stochastic dominance, which are generally taken as the basic axioms of the theory. In modern decision theory, the relation of preference appears as a primitive concept that is interpreted through specific empirical procedures such as binary choice, matching or pricing. The standard theory of choice assumes procedure invariance: normatively equivalent procedures for assessing preferences should give rise to the same preference order. Empirical studies of decision and judgement, however, indicate that procedure invariance is not generally satisfied and that observed choice often depends on the method of elicitation. Our analysis of risky choice assumes that the outcomes of decisions are naturally treated as gains and losses in relation to some neutral reference level. We assumed that prospects are evaluated by invoking a value function, defined on gains and convex in the domain of losses. One of the developments in the study of judgement during the current grant period was the formulation of norm theory. The central idea of this theory is that a memory probe can cause multiple representations of objects or events to be evoked, that these representations can be aggregated, and that the aggregates can be'read' and used for various judgment tasks.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA194770
Entities
People
- A. Tversky
- D. Kahneman
Organizations
- Stanford University