


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
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SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DELAL GURMAN, LT

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
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT	ii
CHAPTER I. Introduction	1
II. Brief Review of the U.S.-Turkey Relations (1945-1987);	2
III. Security Assistance Programs and Applications;	9
IV. Analysis of Motivation for Giving and Accepting Security Assistance;	22
V. Conclusions and Recommendations	33
BIBLIOGRAPHY	40

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the time scale, relations between countries may be changed from one administration to the other, or from one president to the other. This is the normal diplomatic way and it is not necessary to criticize this kind of situation. But there should be some important keystones unchangeable between friendly countries and these should give direction to the internal and external policies of those countries.

Examining the relations between Turkey and the U.S. from this perspective one can easily find two friendly countries since 1945. During this long period, the relationship between them is generally good with the exception of a couple of special situations which played important roles not only in terms of governmental decisions but also in their effect on public opinion.

As for the Security Assistance Program, it is an indispensable tool of American foreign policy and an essential element in strengthening its defense posture around the world. One of the main objectives of this program is to assist allies and friends in strengthening their defenses against external aggression and internal conflict. It should be used in accordance with this principal; not to make any allies or friends weak against their enemies according to political decisions of U.S. It should be determined by considering the relative importance of all countries, friendly and allied to the U.S., and it should be fair between them.

CHAPTER II

BRIEF REVIEW OF U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS (1945-1987)

In 1945 Stalin demanded the cession of three Turkish provinces near the Soviet border and the right to control the Turkish straits, under the guise of their "Joint Defense." That was a dangerous and obvious threat to Turkey's National Security and Territorial integrity.

Turkey didn't hesitate to reject these demands. Her response was unequivocal; "We are under no obligation to give up Turkish soil or Turkish rights to anyone."¹ However, during the next two years, while the East-West "Cold War" was developing, Turkey was alone and uneasy under the Soviet threat. Though the Turkish economy and armed forces remained intact during the war, she was under no illusion that a defensive war could be successfully waged. Thus, during this critical time Turkey began the urgent search for security in the postwar era.

By 1946 it was clear that only the U.S. could project the kind of military power needed to thwart Soviet designs since England was proving unable to maintain her security role in the Mediterranean. Turkey's immediate objectives, therefore, focused on gaining U.S. acceptance of her minimum views concerning the straits as well as to provide for her defense should the Soviet attack.

As early as January 1946 President Truman wrote in a memorandum to Secretary of State Byrnes that, "there was no doubt that Soviets intended to attack Turkey" and that they must not be allowed to violate the sovereignty of Near and Middle Eastern states.² On March 12, 1947, President Truman's statement to Congress rang out loud and clear: ". . . I believe that it must be the policy of the U.S. to support free peoples who are resisting attempted

subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. . . I, therefore, ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey."³

The announcement of the Truman Doctrine was a great reassurance to Turkey as well as Western World's interest in this vital area.

In July 1947, Turkey and the U.S. signed the first in a series of military assistance agreements. Then the Marshall Plan was extended to include Turkey, reconstruction assistance sent into the country amounted to over a half billion dollars in the first ten year period. This figure then rose to nearly five billion dollars over the first twenty-five years. All this aid had a positive effect in terms of modernizing the Turkish armed forces and developing certain segments of the economy.

This doctrine also served as a deterrent to Soviet expansionism in the region and encouraged Turkey to seek membership in NATO.

The period from 1947 to the early 1960's was one of almost full convergence of American and Turkish policies. Turkey had found the strong outside support needed to resist the Soviets over the long haul; and American policymakers, eager to line up reluctant nations in Europe or Asia for defensive pacts such as NATO and SEATO, found the Turks an enthusiastic ally. When American forces came to the aid of South Korea in 1950, Turkey was among the few countries to respond eagerly to the UN's call for troops. The heroism of Turkish soldiers and the important role of the Turkish soldier on Korean battlefields earn the respect of the U.S. military establishment and convinced the North Atlantic representatives of the worthiness of Turkey's membership. Thus, Turkey became a NATO member country in 1952.

Turkish-American relations throughout the 1950's were characterized by nearly identical views on such issues as democracy, anticommunism, bipolarity and massive retaliation. These shared interests prompted Turkey to allow the U.S. to establish numerous bases on her territory though not required to do so by the terms of the alliance. The Status of Forces Agreement signed in June 1951 along with a subsequent Military Facilities Agreement in June 1954 committed Turkey to permit the construction of American and NATO bases and intelligence gathering facilities. This led to an influx of American military personnel and their dependents whose numbers reached 26,000 by 1964.⁴

On March 5, 1959, a new bilateral Executive Agreement brought the two parties into even closer collaboration by providing that in the event of aggression against Turkey, the U.S., "will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon, in order to assist Turkey at her request." It also stipulated that further military and economic assistance would be forthcoming.⁵

The 1950's can be easily described as a "Honeymoon Period" between Turkey and the U.S. as well as between Turkey and Western European allied countries. While the Turkish Armed Forces, supported by an encompassing U.S. security assistance program were modernizing with U.S. weapons and equipments and were adopting U.S. military doctrine and techniques, the Turkish government acted in parallel with U.S. interests, contradicting historic and traditional ties with the Middle Eastern and North African muslim states.

In 1960's up to 1963, Turkish foreign policy toward the U.S. and the Western world remained basically the same.

In 1963, in the Republic of Cyprus, an armed conflict began between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Turkish Prime Minister tried

to find a political solution with the U.N., he also solicited the other two guarantor states (UK and Greece) to force the Greek Cypriots to stop the fighting.

Finally, in desperation the Turkish Government decided to intervene militarily as a guarantor state in the summer of 1964.

At that very critical moment Prime Minister Inonu, a revolutionary war hero, extremely admired by his nation, received a top secret letter from President Johnson on June 5. Among the most damaging passages in the letter was the following: "Your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without full consent and understanding of its NATO allies. . . I must tell you in all candor that the U.S. cannot agree to the use of any U.S. supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances."⁶

This letter quickly became public and shocked the Turkish nation. As a result of Johnson's letter, Turkey reevaluated its national interests, goals and policies.

In July 1974, the Junta of Greek colonels sponsored a coup on Cyprus led by Nikos Sampson. Turkey after a sincere but relatively short attempt to find a political solution within the international political arena, decided to involve its guarantor status under the London/Zurich accords and intervened so as to secure the survival of Turkish Cypriots in the Northern Cyprus.

But Turkish intervention on July 20, 1974, was interpreted by the US. in a different manner. While the U.S. administration regretted the necessity for Turkish Peace Operations, the U.S. Senate condemned the operation with the real pressure from the American Greeks and demanded a cease fire and the

immediate withdrawal of Turkish Forces from the island. Turkish-American relations became strained after this proposal.

The foreign aid authorization bill adopted on December 18, 1974, by the U.S. House of Representatives, suspended all military aid and sales to Turkey effective February 5, 1975.

On July 25, 1975, following the reaffirmation of the embargo by the Congress, the Turkish government abrogated the 1969 Defence Agreement and established command and control over the twenty-six joint Turkish-American bases and military installations.

On March 26, 1976, a new Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed to regulate the status of American facilities in Turkey.

The embargo lasted until September 1978. U.S. bases in Turkey were maintained in a caretaker status. The lifting of the embargo was encouraged by the U.S. administration with the argument that its lifting would provide a much sounder basis for Turkish-American relations.

As the embargo was lifted, for the first time in the history of the Turk-American relationship, the operation of U.S. military installations became a bargaining element in discussions of renewed security assistance. During the embargo, Turkey's ability to carry out NATO functions was severely limited and also a serious imbalance in the arms race with Greece was created. Turkey, recognizing that it had too long depended on U.S. gratuity, now sought to reestablish its own defence industry infrastructure. Turkish Government took measures to develop new foreign sources for military equipment procurement while expanding domestic production capabilities for needed arms.

Turkey and the U.S. entered a "Second Honeymoon" period in their relations following the advent of the Reagan Administration.

The DECA (Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement) signed in 1980 covering the period of 1980-1985, was based on the continuing friendship and common democratic viewpoint of the two nations.

In supplementary agreement No. 1, on defence support, the U.S. government explicitly "recognized the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces for a modernization and maintenance program" and committed itself "to use its best efforts to provide defence to Turkey."

Although the U.S. government acknowledged that Turkey's military required significant modernization to meet its NATO commitments, its action to advance that end after the signing of the DECA were tempered to a degree by the continuing enmity between Turkey and Greece and unsettled Cyprus situation. The Greek Government claimed that Turkey constituted a direct and serious military threat to its security. This claim was a tactical political success in keeping the Greek lobby active in its efforts to diminish the Turk-American relationship. Thus American efforts to help upgrade Turkey's military forces, principally through security assistance program, have been adversely affected, and military modernization has progressed much slower and less effectively than was envisioned in 1980.

In connection with its rhetoric of a "Turkish Threat" Greece speaks of a need for preserving the military balance between Greece and Turkey on the basis of a 7/10 ratio in U.S. military assistance. This ratio is still being applied.

A second DECA agreement was signed in December 1986, covering a 5 year period of time.

ENDNOTES

1. Dankwart A. Rustow, America's Forgotten Ally, p. 88.
2. Sowerwine, James Edward, Dynamics of Decision-Making in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1961-1980, p. 43.
3. Dankwart A. Rustow, America's Forgotten Ally, p. 89.
4. James Edward Sowerwine, Dynamics of Decision-Making in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1961-1980, p.46.
5. Ibid., p. 47.
6. Ibid., p. 99.

CHAPTER III

THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

The purposes of this chapter are to describe and understand what the security assistance is, how it works, some important facts about it, what its role is in terms of the national interests of the U.S.A. and why Turkey plays an important role to protect these national interests. First of all, the military portion of the U.S. Security Assistance Program is comprised of four different programs. These are Foreign Military Sales Credit Financing (FMSCP), Military Assistance Program (MAP), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET).

Security Assistance is a major pillar of U.S. security and foreign policy. These programs bolster the U.S. military defense posture and support other foreign assistance efforts. Security Assistance plays a major role in America's alliance strategy.¹

Formal security assistance programs were initiated by President Truman in 1947 when he granted military aid to the Philippines, Greece, Turkey and the NATO. The national objective was to provide military assistance to these countries until they could achieve a level of economic prosperity and political stability that would enable them to provide for their own national security. The main objective is the same today, but the number of countries given military assistance and their priorities have been changing from one day to another according to area of interest of the U.S. and its national security policy. The number of countries receiving assistance grew from 32 in 1981 to 46 in 1986.²

On the other hand, the key recipients of U.S. Military Assistance are also different from each other, while Taiwan had the first priority in 1959,

Vietnam became the most important state in 1970 and Israel has become number 1 since 1982 because of the changing policy of the U.S. related to its national interests.

In this respect, Turkey was the second in 1959, the fourth in 1970 and 1982, she is also the third country as a result of 5 year average between 1981-1985.³

The reason of having the first priority of Israel is a result of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. "Promot peace in the Middle East" is the first basic element of broad policy goals of the U.S. since 1982 and this principal stayed the same in the congressional presentation for Security Assistance Programs for fiscal year 1988. Reductions by region have also been planned with some changes, while there is 4% increasing for Egypt and Israel, 34% reduction will be applied for Europe in FY88 on FMS and MAP. As for Economic Support Fund (ESF) these figures are 4% addition for Israel and Egypt and 19% reduction for Europe.

What this change shows and proves is the great and close relationship between foreign policy and the national interests of the U.S., and Security Assistance Programs.

Because these programs contribute to U.S. national security objectives by assisting allies and friends to meet their defense needs and supporting collective security efforts, security assistance is an essential element of foreign policy and a cost-effective way to build positive government-to-government relations.

The primary military objectives of security assistance are to assist countries in preserving their independence, promote regional stability, help obtain base rights, overseas facilities, and transit rights, ensure access to critical raw materials, and provide a means to expand U.S. influence. At the

same time, this assistance increases the efficiency of U.S. defense production capabilities and lessens U.S. military requirements.

If the U.S. had to replace the capabilities afforded by security assistance, for example access to foreign facilities, the cost to compensate with the U.S. defense budget would be enormous. Thus, reductions in security assistance that jeopardize these capabilities are false economies that may well create security and defense problems in the future which will be more difficult and expensive to redress.

As an instrument of foreign and national security policy, military assistance covers all forms of military assistance, including advisers, training teams, grant-aid equipment as well as military aircraft, ships, tanks, and other hardware that the U.S. sells to other countries. The decision to give or sell military equipment abroad is based on a decision by the President that doing so is in the national interest, and it must be approved by Congress.

The key consideration is that the recipient country is so important to the U.S. national interest that its military forces should be provided with U.S. military equipment and, if necessary, U.S. advisers. Normally the U.S. does not give or sell military hardware to another country unless that country is an ally, or unless the U.S. government is convinced that its security is a major national interest to this country.⁴

There is another fact that millions of dollars of recoupments and production line savings accrue to U.S. military budgets as a result of FMS, a portion of the U.S. security assistance program. Unlike other "exports" FMS generate special categories of budgetary savings to the U.S. in terms of production line savings, recoupment in Research and Development, benefits to tax revenue, benefits to defense industrial production base, technological and

quantitative benefits.⁵

Now I want to touch some important relations between Turkey and Security Assistance program applied up to now, some contradictions between them and also some mutual benefits of both sides Turkey and the U.S. through the security assistance programs. First of all we should understand better why Turkey has an important portion of U.S. security assistance. The main reason comes from Turkey's geostrategic location and its contribution to the missions of NATO and the Alliance's strategy of deterrence. Security of the U.S. depends on security of Europe and Security of Europe depends in a large measure on the situation in the Southern flank of NATO and the situation in Turkey.

In terms of the Southern flank, this region is critical for the defense of the central front and Europe more generally. At the same time, the southern flank is uniquely important for another reason, as a bridge across Europe linking the Atlantic to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. As NATO foreign and defense ministers regularly note, Western interests outside the formal treaty area can and do affect the well-being of every Alliance member. The countries of the southern flank, by virtue of their location along major East-West air and sea routes, have the potential to make a special contribution to this increasingly important dimension of Western security.

As for Turkey, she has a very special place and importance among the southern flank countries. Turkey, with both land and sea frontiers with the USSR and Bulgaria and holding the key to Soviet access to the Mediterranean, is the anchor of the Southeast flank of NATO.

In addition, Turkey shares borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Given the impact of all three countries on current unrest in the Middle East, Turkey's potential role takes on added significance.

We can also say that no policy of containment of Warsaw Pact expansion is viable without the participation of a strong Turkey allied to the West and neither geography nor any other factor of power permits any other country in the region to fulfill such a role.

Another important fact is that in two crucially important operational theaters namely Thrace and the region of the straits, as well as in the Caucasian theater, Turkey forces vastly superior and modern Bulgarian and Soviet air forces, and very large armored and mechanized ground forces. According to military experts, Turkey faces and ties down more than 40 divisions and 2,000 tactical aircraft to control Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea fleet. Turkish forces not only protect the NATO borders, but also act as a buffer between the Communist world and the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula. This Turkish "Buffer Zone" contains direct Warsaw Pact military influence in the Middle East, gives moderate Arab countries the opportunity to pursue relationship with the U.S., and contributes to the overall stability of the region.

After the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the revolutionary regimes decision to close U.S. military facilities there, Turkey has become even more important to the U.S. as a monitoring post of Soviet missile testing. For this reason, Turkey is the only country in the Middle East that is near the vital level of U.S. defense-of-homeland interest. The loss of U.S. military and intelligence facilities in Turkey would directly affect the defense of North America, and Turkey is therefore an extremely important asset for U.S. defenses.⁶

While the Reagan Administration has recognized and acknowledged publicly Turkey's indispensable role in Western defense, it fell short in its efforts to secure Congressional support to provide the military wherewithal

commensurate with Turkey's NATO roles and missions.

The nature of the security cooperation and the mutual reciprocal commitment between Turkey and the U.S. is described in the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). DECA, with the executive and supplementary agreement, concluded for a period of five years, the U.S. committed itself to make its "best efforts" for providing yearly adequate defense support in order to meet the modernization requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces so that these forces can fulfill the military defense plans of NATO.

The U.S. Security Assistance Program is the most effective way to support Turkey and all planning and programming of modernization depends firmly on this program's implementation.

When we look at the Policy Goals of Security Assistance Program for Turkey we can see these important aims:

- Enhance cooperative defense and security arrangements.
- Strengthen NATO's southern flank and the Turkish Straits, particularly in view of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat and continuing regional conflicts.
- Promote internal stability to counter ongoing challenges from external and internal extremists.
- Support democracy and human rights.
- Assist Turkish economic reforms intended to produce self-sustaining economic growth.
- Encourage Turkish support in the Cyprus peace process.⁷

The Policy Goals are not only related to military goals but also have political and economic objectives. This is one of the applications of the U.S. foreign policy to the allies and friendly countries. Because the U.S. has very limited ways to influence other nations, Security Assistance Programs are

mainly and largely used for this reason. Regarding U.S. aid to Turkey, the Congressional presentation for Security Assistance Programs notes that Turkey is a key NATO ally with important responsibilities for the defense of the vital Southern Flank of the Alliance, that Turkey plays a stabilizing role in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region, and that although she has the lowest national income per capita in NATO, Turkey maintains the second largest Army in the Alliance. She is also a key country for support of U.S. strategic interests in the European, Southwest Asia and Middle East areas.

The presentation mentions that Turkey's Armed Forces suffer from severe equipment deficiencies and require external assistance to meet urgent modernization needs in accordance with Turkey's NATO commitments. The percentage of the Turkish budget contribution to defense is among the highest in NATO with the average of 2.2% of the national budget. While U.S. assistance increased until FY84, the levels are currently insufficient to meet modernization requirements.

U.S. programs since the embargo have done much to keep Turkish equipment working and to upgrade selected capabilities. During the last two years, security assistance efforts have focused on the following: M-48A5 tank modernization; acquisition of tank fire control upgrade kits; F16 acquisition program; procurement of electronic warfare equipment; assembly of UH-1H helicopters; provision of munitions, artillery, spare parts and anti-tank missiles; frigate construction and shipyard upgrade; purchase of communications equipment; and support for operations/maintenance and logistics.

While current efforts to counter obsolescence have contributed to the overall improvement of Turkey's force posture, it is estimated that at least \$13 billion would be required over the next decade to bring Turkey's military

up to NATO minimum standards. The introduction of new U.S. weapons systems like the F-16 C/D, MEKO class frigates and TOW 2 anti-tank missiles have been critical to maintaining Turkey's military capability. It should be noted that the implementation of internal measures such as the Turkish Defense Industrial Support Fund and Turkish defense budget is also necessary for a sufficient long-term modernization effort.

The planned military assistance program subjects for 1988 are composed of Sustain/Spares Support, F-16/F-4 Aircraft, Tank Modernization, Munitions/Howitzers and Training. The total recommended Military Assistance program is \$788.5 million for FY88 with combination of \$3.5 million for IMET, \$550 million for MAP and \$235 million for FMSCP. The actual allocated totals are likely to be much smaller.

The recommended FY88 funds will cover cash flow and some operations and maintenance requirements. Funding limitations will constrain initiation of new procurements, system upgrades or infrastructure enhancements. One important ongoing effort that will continue is the F-16 program. Defensive aircraft are critical, not only to Turkey but also to NATO's Eastern Mediterranean defenses. The only modern defensive airplanes currently stationed in NATO's southern region are the U.S. F-16s at Torrejon Air Base in Spain and the limited number of F4-Es now in Turkish inventories. Turkey needs the F-16, a squadron of which will be delivered by the end of FY88, to replace 1950s-vintage F-100/F-104 aircraft. Without such modern fighters, Turkey's ability to fulfill an effective NATO deterrant role is greatly limited.

The Stinger missile system will enhance air defense from another approach, providing Turkey with a man-portable system for close-in air defense and the protection of tactical formations and critical Turkish and NATO

military installations.

The upgrade of the M-48 to the A-5 configuration represents the most economical way for Turkey to equip its tank fleet with the state-of-the-art optics, armor plating and firepower required to match the Soviet tanks deployed along its frontier. Modernization of Turkish armored capabilities is essential if Turkey is to field adequately equipped divisions to meet its NATO obligations. The TOW missile program will provide Turkey with an additional means to defend against a Soviet armored attack.

In view of the greatly increased debt servicing requirements confronting Turkey in the coming year and the government's need to conserve its own resources for economic stability and growth, the FY88 ESF (Economic Support Fund) recommended program is slightly larger than in previous years. These funds will not only help Turkey overcome its foreign credit liquidity problems, but also enable it to direct domestic resources toward its programs of economic restructuring and military modernization. The planned economic assistance program is \$125 million for FY88.

It is a fact that Turkey really needs Security Assistance programs to be able to modernize its Armed Forces and to meet their needs on different areas. This is very important for not only its security but also NATO's defense system, the security of Southern Flank of NATO and finally for the U.S., its challenges to the Soviet Union. For these reasons the security assistance to Turkey has been increasing every year since at least 1984 in terms of the administrative proposed budgets. But because of some of the negative factors the approved budgets have always been different and less than the proposals. The gap between proposed and approved assistance are \$78 million in 1984, \$56 million in 1985, \$201 million in 1986, \$381 million in 1987 and some new reductions during the first two months of 1988.

What negative factors have been harmful influences on the security assistance programs to Turkey? The principal one is the influence of the Greek lobby on Congress and its insistence on a 7/10 ratio for security assistance provided to Turkey and Greece. Another negative factor has been the influence of the Armenian Lobby. Although the administration has always believed the importance of Turkey and the necessity of modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces, the Congress has generally acted as if military assistance were merely a favor or an act of charity to Turkey instead of being an obligation under a formal agreement and an act of positive self-interest. There is a widespread perception that Congress is collectively unaware of the existence of the provisions of the bilateral agreement that regulates the responsibilities of Turkey and the U.S. The fact that the Congress doesn't want to understand is, that to fulfill adequately their NATO assigned responsibilities, the Turkish Armed Forces must be equipped properly. If this cannot be done and the yawning gap between the responsibilities and capabilities of the Turkish forces is not closed, not only the fulfillment of Alliance defense plans will suffer, but Turkey's security will be gravely jeopardized. It is natural, therefore, that Turkey expects the assistance that is proportionate to her responsibilities.

Another important point is that Turkish approach is not based on merchantilistic greed. Turkey only expects an adequate level of equipment to carry out effectively its role and missions in the context of NATO. Turkey conceives her role within NATO with utmost importance and seriousness. Turkey not only bears allegiance to the West, but also the principles that mold the West together. It allocates a high proportion of its GNP for defense. It is of absolute necessity, therefore, that military assistance to supplement the considerable effort for collective defense made by Turkey should be madewith

preferential conditions similar to those given to some other allied countries.

In fact the negative approach to security assistance to Turkey of the Congress is compounded by ethnic politics. Under the pressure of the vocal ethnic Greek lobby, certain segments of Congress insist on the imposition of a shortsighted and arbitrary seven-to-ten ratio in according military assistance to Greece and Turkey, i.e., Greece is to receive 70 cents for each dollar given to Turkey.

This ratio totally ignores the incomparably high contribution of Turkey to NATO in relation to that of Greece where contribution to the Alliance has diminished to a nominal level. It also undermines our collective security preparedness and deprecates Turkey's importance to the Alliance. This treatment causes a strong adverse reaction in Turkey. In its last session, Congress, in order to maintain this arbitrary ratio, chose to further reduce the Administration's security assistance proposal which was already below the minimum needs of Turkey.

The Greek Government, through the influence of its lobby, was successful in maintaining this ratio and in holding hostage Turkish-American relations to its caprices and to its domestic political intrigues.

To appease the whims of an ethnic minority, Congress denied Turkey an adequate level of arms needed to fulfill its NATO military duties and responsibilities within the Alliance defense plans.

This situation is found humiliating by the Turkish public and body politic. It is extremely frustrating and irritating for the Turkish Government.

As if the strains caused by the activities of the Greek lobby were insufficient, a second ethnic group, the Armenians, has recently emerged in the halls of Congress with its own anti-Turkish agenda. Specifically, the

Armenians lobby for the passage of Congressional resolutions which, if adapted, would indict Turkey on the false charge of genocide. The Turkish public is acutely sensitive to developments affecting this issue since during the past decade 50 Turkish citizens, mostly diplomats, have been murdered by Armenian terrorists. Each murder was proclaimed an act of vengeance for the alleged genocide. The Turkish public equates support for the resolution with support for the terrorists or their aims. Passage of the resolution would fuel terrorism. Turkish officials and Turkish nation believe that this kind of demands and application have the potential of harming Turkish-American relations irreparably.

Briefly, the Security assistance programs constitute the most important part of the modernization programs of the Turkish Armed Forces. Modernization is a necessity for the Turkish forces to defend the Turkish territory, to secure NATO's southern flank and to contribute the U.S. interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This is a multi purpose and multi-sided security issue. Any reduction on the administrative proposed programs has been adversely affecting the modernization process and causing the loss of time and ultimately creating many serious defense problems.

On the plus side, Turkey and the U.S. remain deeply committed to similar strategic orientations, share a common political philosophy and a wide array of common interests, and have the same basic outlook and goals with respect to Western security, all of which are important ingredients for a stable and mutually beneficial partnership. Furthermore, the recent signing of a Bilateral Investment Treaty and the formation of a Turkish-American Business Council are regarded as significant developments establishing the institutional and legal framework for expanded economic relations.

However, due to the injection of the extraneous factors outlined above, a

disturbing element of unpredictability permeates the present relationship. The Turkish government is seriously concerned that if the present conditions are allowed to persist, our relations and cooperation will suffer. This is why Turkey would like to see a more stable and healthier security and economic partnership. In this framework, Turkey seeks stronger assurances of reciprocity in Turkish-American defense cooperation and an expanded and balanced economic relationship.

ENDNOTES

1. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress FY88, p. 272.
2. Ibid., p. 273.
3. John Wilhelm - Gerry Feinstein, U.S. Foreign Assistance Investment or Folly?
4. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted, p. 37.
5. Airpower Research Institute, U.S. Military Security Assistance: Economic Considerations and Policy Implications, pp. 13-20.
6. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted, p. 118.
7. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, FY88, p. 248.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF MOTIVATION FOR GIVING AND ACCEPTING

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

After the first in a series of military assistance agreements was signed between the U.S. and Turkey in July 1947, relations of these two countries reached a very high level. Two important events played a great positive role in these relations; one was Turkey's NATO membership in 1952 and the other was the recognition of Israel as a new state by Turkey in 1949. This action resulted in a very negative response among Turkey's Arab neighbors and it took years for her to reestablish good relations with some of them. Security assistance programs to Turkey have continued during the past years, sometimes increasing sometimes decreasing in amount of assistance and generally with a negative gap between the proposed and approved figures. What the most important thing to remember during this long period of time is 1974-1978 the application of arms embargo on the Turkish Armed Forces. Because this is a very clear example and at the same time a very good lesson learned, I want to try to explain some facts about it.

When Cyprus became independent in 1960, it was hoped that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, as the two peoples of the island, would be able to lie harmoniously side by side, sharing power jointly in a bi-national Republic. But this was not to be. The Greek Cypriots and Greece, not content with independence, sought to bring about Enosis-annexation of the island to Greece--and within three years time, destroyed the partnership by use of force against the Turkish Cypriots.

Some people have been made to believe that "the clock" can be turned back in Cyprus, once the Turkish forces withdraw from the island. These are the

people who think that the Cyprus problem began as a result of the Turkish intervention of July 20, 1974.

In reality the invasion of Cyprus by Greece took place, years before, in violation of the treaties giving birth to the Republic of Cyprus. United Nations reports are the best proofs in this respect. Here are some examples:¹

"41. The UNFICYP observations have established that during the month of July the Cyprus Government imported large amounts of arms and equipment which came in the main through Limasel Docks. In addition, an estimated 5,000 personnel entered the island in the same way presumably from Greece." (S/5950, September 1964)

"24. To the effective total strength of Government armed forces must also be added a substantial number of Greek officers and other categories of military personnel from Greece who are believed to be integrated into the National Guard." (S/7191, March 1966)

"21. The momentum of National Guard training has increased and more activity has been observed outside the normal training season; the efficiency, morale and personal state of readiness of the National Guard has continued to improve." (S/11294, May 1974)

"The coup of the Greek officers is clearly an invasion from outside."

These are the words of Makarios, during the afternoon meeting of the U.N. Security Council on July 19, 1974.²

So, the Peace Operations of the Turkish Armed Forces in 1974 was not an invasion, but an act in response to invasion.

During 1963-1974, the Greek Cypriots with Greek military assistance, isolated the Turkish Cypriot villages and quarters of the towns, pushing the

Turkish Cypriots into even more densely populated enclaves and forcing them to survive on their own meager economic resources.

In 1974, the Greek military junta in Athens organized a coup in Cyprus, proclaiming as "president" a Cypriot terrorist named Nicos Sampson.

Turkey as a guarantor power appealed to Greece and the United Kingdom to join her in a concerted action as envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee, which established the Cypriot Republic in 1960. Greece was deeply involved in the Greek Cypriot leaders' plot aimed at destroying the bi-national state and abrogating the agreements which had created Cyprus. The United Kingdom was reluctant to take concerted action until it was too late to prevent the massacre of Turkish Cypriots and to salvage the bi-national legitimacy.

The Turkish intervention on July 20, 1974, following the failure of consultations and efforts for concerted action, and in accordance with the rights and obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee, was a reaction to Greek inspired coup in Cyprus, and occurred after eleven years of restraint and patience. It ended a long period of oppression of the Turkish Cypriot People, preserved the bi-national independence of the Island which would have otherwise ended through a declaration of Enosis (Annexation of the Island of Greece) and opened the way for the pursuit of a political settlement that would not permit a repetition of the pre-1974 events.

But Turkish intervention on July 20, 1974, was interpreted in the U.S. Congress in a different manner. While the U.S. Administration regretted the necessity for Turkish Peace Operation, U.S. Senate condemned the operation with the real pressure from the American Greeks and demanded cease fire and immediate withdrawal of Turkish Forces from the Island. Turkish-American relations became strained after this proposal.

The Foreign Aid Authorization Bill adopted on December 18, 1974, by the U.S. House of Representatives, suspended all military aid and sales to Turkey, effective February 5, 1975.

President G. Ford expressed this situation in his letter to Congress, July 9, 1975, as follows:³

"The Legislation voted against Turkey last December is sweeping in its effect. It is more extensive than similar legislation enacted in October 1974, with which the Administration was in full compliance. The December legislation provides for not only a total embargo on grant military assistance, and cash and credit sales of defense items by the U.S. Government, but prohibits as well the issuance of licenses to permit the export of military equipment purchased from American firms. Practically all nations of the world can purchase in this country items that are forbidden to Turkey. It is now impossible for Turkey to procure most items produced in third countries under U.S. license; nor can Turkey take possession of merchandise in the U.S. which it paid for prior to February 5 and which is now ready for shipment."

There were also many other reactions against the arms embargo in the U.S. Here are some examples:¹⁷

"In view of these damaging development, I urge the House of Representatives to reconsider its refusal to restore the traditional U.S.-Turkish defence relationship. Prompt, affirmative action by the House of Representatives is essential to the vital national interests of the U.S., our partners in the Eastern Mediterranean, and our allies in the Atlantic Alliance."

(President G. Ford, July 26, 1975)

"We made a mistake by interjecting the Congress in the execution of our foreign policy. It is a mistake for the Congress to continue a selective

embargo against a friend and ally . . . This may be good domestic politics, but it is a dangerous foreign policy tactic."

(Talcott, Representative from California, July 25, 1975)

"The difficulty I see is that the embargo is a one-sided judgment of an event that took place a year ago."

(J. Sisco, July 10, 1975)

"If Turkey did not act to protect Cyprus' independence and the Turkish-Cypriot minority, which it felt were threatened by the July 1974 coup, Turkey would be ignoring its international legal obligations under the 1960 agreements on Cyprus . . . In addition, the U.S. law should not be selectively enforced . . . The U.S. has furnished arms to countries which were in possession of territory of other states. There is, for example, uncontradicted evidence that Greece has transferred U.S. military equipment to Cyprus since the mid-1960's in violation of laws."

(H. Hamilton, Representative from Indiana, July 16, 1975)

"It is now necessary to separate the Cyprus situation completely from our strategic security interests in the eastern Mediterranean."

(Wirth, Representative from Colorado, October 2, 1975)

"The action of Congress is cutting off military aid to Turkey is contrary to the best interests of the U.S. and of the Atlantic Alliance, one of the main pillars of our national safety. It was a short-sighted, self-defeating act of pique, which should be promptly reversed."

(V. Rostow, July 10, 1975)

"If the Government of Turkey is not allowed to purchase arms from the U.S. for defense purposes and for their various NATO responsibilities, it is foolish to believe they will not go elsewhere for such materials . . . I am of

the strong opinion that a continued embargo of arms to Turkey could seriously weaken the effectiveness of the NATO pact."

(Bevill, Representative from Alabama, October 2, 1975)

The Congressional action brought an end to the continuous flow of American military assistance to Turkey which amounted to \$3.7 billion from 1946-1974. Turkey announced this action would force a reassessment of her relations with America and obligations within the NATO framework. The Prime Minister of Turkey stated that "the full responsibility for the reorganization of the present defense cooperation between Turkey and U.S. will rest with the U.S. Congress." He further stated that the Congress had erred gravely for two reasons. The first was a misinterpretation of the obligations of a defense partnership within whose framework the military aid is provided "not as charity but as part of mutual obligations." The second error was to combine the aid issue with the Cyprus question and attempt to pressure Turkey, saying that, "such an attempt at pressuring Turkey was condemned to produce exactly the opposite results." Nine days later the Prime Minister announced the joint defense structure of NATO installations in Turkey as well as the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement would be reconsidered and that Turkey would seek to strengthen her military posture by building new defense industries or buying arms wherever available. The establishment of the Turkish Electronic Industries in 1975 indicated Turkey's determination to reduce her vulnerability to external factors as exposed by the arms embargo.

Because of the arms embargo, the principles of mutual friendship and common interests were severely strained. At this time the Prime Minister of Turkey stated "We have to act accordingly; even though it makes us happy to know the administration does not agree with the Congress. If the

administration cannot change the decision, we have to do what is necessary to our bilateral treaties."

Thus, on July 25, 1975, following the reaffirmation of the embargo by the Congress, the Turkish government abrogated the 1969 Defense Agreement and indefinitely established command and control over the twenty-six joint Turkish-American bases and military installations. The INCIRLIK air base where a squadron of F-4 Phantoms with nuclear weapons stood on alert under NATO's umbrella and two dozen "special ammunition sites" were spared since Turkey did not wish to give the impression of leaving NATO.

On March 26, 1976, a new Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed to regulate the status of American facilities in Turkey. However, the embargo was severely limiting Turkey's ability to carry out NATO functions and also creating a serious imbalance in the arms race with Greece. As a result the Turkish Government took measures to develop new foreign sources for military equipment procurement while expanding domestic production capabilities for needed arms.

The Prime Minister of Turkey began a campaign to increase public support abroad in order to lift the embargo and gain further economic assistance. On a trip to Germany he made it clear that Turkey was not considering leaving NATO, but would consider adjusting Turkey's duties in NATO in accordance with a new defense strategy based on her own resources and national interests.

This campaign proved effective and soon European leaders were pressuring Washington to lift the embargo. In March 1978 Warren Christopher delivered two messages to Ankara stating that President Carter had agreed to set aside the prior Defense Cooperation Agreement and concentrate his efforts on lifting the embargo. As the issue moved to the floor of Congress many representatives stressed Turkey's value as a NATO ally and trading partner and noted the harm

caused by the embargo to Turkey's and NATO's preparedness for war. These efforts paid off when on September 4, 1978, the arms embargo and freeze on American aid was lifted on a conditional basis without any written Turkish commitments concerning Cyprus.

Now let's take a look at some other interrelationships between Turkey and the U.S. during the recent years. The ideological inclinations of both Turkish Government and the Reagan Administration led naturally to an expanded and more harmonious bilateral relationship between these countries in 1981. Increased cooperation in the security area since then has been driven by common views of the uncertainty prevailing in nearby Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and even to a lesser degree in Greece. While Turkey is reluctant to speak of a "Golden Age" in Turkish-U.S. relations, as in the 1950's, the Prime Minister of Turkey struck a positive tone when he referred to "deep and strong bonds of friendship, alliance and cooperation" between Ankara and Washington during his White House visit on April 2, 1985. But it is the U.S. side that has expressed the greatest sense of satisfaction, and the executive branch views the relationship as a dramatic improvement over the tone a decade ago. The President referred to the "long overdue revitalization in U.S.-Turkish relations." Richard Burt, assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs, has called the U.S. effort to improve relations with Turkey one of "Substantial Success" after the Peace Operation of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus in 1974.

Defense issues have dominated the bilateral agenda for the past four years. They have been affected by NATO estimates that the strategic center of gravity has moved southward, calling attention to the greater vulnerability of the Southern Flank.

There has also been a reassessment of the Soviet threat and Turkish capabilities in the aftermath of the new situation in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and general turbulence in the region where Turkey is so strategically placed.

But the fact is that Turkish Armed Forces' readiness has suffered from the poorest quality of equipment in the alliance, due primarily to Turkey's relatively weak economy and, for many Turkish sources, to the damaging effects on the arms embargo. Since 1981, dramatic efforts have been made to modernize virtually every aspect of Turkey's military.

The Reagan Administration has placed Turkey high on the priority list for increased security assistance, calling its needs "urgent", "pressing" and "most demanding", in clear contrast to the merely "necessary" modernization needs of Greece.

But no matter what the Administration says, because of some well-known reason the Congress has always decreased the amount of assistance up to now. Reductions do not have the same impact as an embargo, but the fact is that they have great influence on the modernization of Turkish Armed Forces. Because it is highly difficult for Turkey as a developing country to modernize her forces by using her national budget, the military assistance has a very special part of the modernization programs. And like the U.S., also Turkey has been using the short and long-term planning process and has been trying to plan every program, including modernization, in advance. But after the usual cutting process, many programs must be changed, sometimes at the expense of the national budget. Another dilemma has been occurring recently--economic development have to be stopped or completely cancelled. The result is very bad news all the time. The defense expenditure of Turkey averages 25% and Turkey cannot do more than this, at least today.

Against this fact Turkey needs \$25 billion to modernize its armed forces, but unfortunately a variety of disruptive issues like cuts in security assistance and different lobby actions to Turkey have been injected into congressional debates by "well known alien elements".

Today's Turkey is getting close to making a billion-dollar decision on a low-level air defense system. Also under consideration is purchase of a multipurpose helicopter and transport plane. Negotiating is still continuing for a billion-dollar contract for armored combat vehicles. These are all new projects and in addition to these there are many others explained above.

What Turkey needs to reach its modernization objectives is of course not only the security assistance, but also more economical cooperation and more trade business with the U.S. This kind of application and increased economical relations are much better than any assistance. By this way Turkey may develop and balance its trade, may increase the number of investments and may create more powerful Turkey. This may also help and contribute to apply the modernization plans, by decreasing dependency to any foreign assistance to do it. For those important and vital reasons, while Turkey is making major purchases itself, its industry is working to enter the American defense market. While Turkey bought \$481 million worth of defense equipment from the U.S. in 1986, the U.S. bought only \$2.1 million of products from Turkey--a 228 to 1 ratio. However, Turkish industry is facing the same constraints other nations encounter in entering the U.S. market; a "not invited here" syndrome and protectionist legislation in Congress.

Turkey is asking for easier access to the American market also, which is of course, a very important market. The U.S. imports \$17 billion worth of textiles from all over the world. Turkey has a trade deficit of \$700 million

with the Americans. If she had easier access, she could easily clear this deficit.

Finally, the most important influence of the fluctuating relationship, sometimes at very harmful level to the readiness of the Turkish Armed Forces, during and after the arms embargo, is the decision of Turkey to create its own Defense Industry. After two lessons learned, Johnson's letter and the arms embargo, Turkey understood that she is highly dependent on friendly countries especially the U.S. in terms of the almost all military equipments and decided to establish some new organizations to meet its most critical defense needs.

Today, Turkey is aiming to develop this industry as an integral part of the general industry. However, constraints inhibiting this development are international competition, limited free markets, and changing political situations.

In this respect, Turkey has a foreign investment law which is an encouraging foreign investment. She is supporting joint ventures and offering incentives.

ENDNOTES

1. Turkish Directorate General of Press and Information, Whom to Blame?, pp. 4-7.
2. Ibid., p. 3.
3. Turkish Directorate General of Press and Information, United States Arms Embargo to Turkey, p. 5.
4. Ibid., pp. 6-19.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When one considers the strategic location of Turkey and the worldwide recognized merits of the Turkish Armed Forces, one can easily realize the importance of Turkey's contribution to NATO.

She pursues a peaceful and balanced policy which is an element of stability and security in the Middle East and thus contributes to the efforts aimed at establishing a more stable situation.

Turkey's efforts in this direction are fully appreciated and reciprocated. Turkey has thus the real potential to constitute a bridge between the countries of the region and the Western World.

Especially during recent years, the Middle East has become one of the most sensitive regions of the world and Turkey is the closest country to this region among NATO members. On the other hand, the big threat for Turkey would come from the Warsaw Pact countries, as a global estimation more than 40 divisions and 2,000 tactical aircraft. We should always consider that Warsaw Pact divisions are being continuously modernized, amphibious and airborne capabilities are being increased and WP force projection potential is consequently rising. Syria with present relationship with the Soviets and modern weapons and equipment provided by Russia has been creating a new threat to Turkey and thus dimensions of threat that Turkey would face is enlarging from two front to three, so the possibility to fight at three front simultaneously for Turkey is increasing day by day.

Moreover, should an agreement be reached in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, to pull out some of the forces from central Europe without precautionary measures against Soviet troops to be withdrawn,

then it should be noted that these Soviet forces would constitute an additional threat for the Southern Flank and indeed for Turkey.

Under these circumstances, it has become crucial that the defensive capabilities of Turkey reach a sufficient level of efficiency and deterrence in a very short time.

It is therefore evident that the maintenance of armed forces equipped with modern weapons and material is an absolute necessity for Turkey in order to protect and contribute to the stability of the region and at the same time enable her to carry out her obligations toward national defence and NATO.

But today, almost no NATO member country other than Turkey uses weapons from World War II. And it is not possible to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces by providing disused, technologically outdated and absolent weapons and material either in the short or the long term period.

It is apparent that Turkey's present economic resources are not sufficient to maintain a military force of such magnitude and further, to furnish it with modern weapons and equipment. Turkey has always made the greatest effort to meet her responsibilities towards NATO, because we believe that the existence of NATO is necessary to preserve peace. If Turkey is still a developing country today with many serious problems and with the people who have to pay 5% of their GNP for defence expenditure and for that reason have to endure many difficulties in terms of luxury, standard of living, the main reason of this, first of course, is national security but at the same time the security of the region and to fulfill her responsibilities to NATO and its Southern Flank. To succeed this mission the Turkish people can do everything, because freedom is the most important value for them. But under these limited economical conditions, the modernization program of Turkish Armed Forces, in addition to her own large national efforts, Allied contributions are needed

especially for the supply of modern aircraft, air defense, command and control systems, electronic equipment, modern tanks and other defensive equipment.

Turkey is in the course of developing her own defense-related industry by using the National Defense Industry Fund and by establishing many joint investments and co-productions. But, as mentioned before the Security Assistance Programs also have important role and have been contributing to almost each modernization project.

There are some important factors related to Security Assistance Program to keep the relations at least at the same level or to improve them to a higher level and these factors should be taken into account all the time by both sides, especially by the U.S. Security assistances should not be used as a leverage and should be given in a fair manner without any reductions and having been influenced by different lobbies.

First one is about the arms embargo on the Turkish Armed Forces applied 1975-1978. If we reevaluate this unfair embargo again, we can easily figure out some important facts, in terms of the friendship and relationship between Turkey and the U.S. and security of the region, security of Turkey and NATO. The facts and essential elements of the U.S. security assistance embargo on Turkey were:

1. The U.S. Congress, significantly influenced by Greek sponsored lobbying organizations initiated and continued the embargo on its own council. Two successive administrations, one Republican one Democrat, argued strenuously against the embargo.

2. Security assistance is described as a non-threatening or peaceful use of the military instrument. But in this circumstance, the Congress used the withdrawal of security assistance, as political leverage to a military effect, i.e., forcing Turkey to withdraw its forces from Cyprus. Congress never

understood, or at least never appreciated, the attendant damage that was being done to the overall U.S.-Turkish relationship, or the Alliance's deterrent posture.

3. Cyprus, Turkey and Greece have been enmeshed for over four centuries. In the modern era, the Turkish minority on the Island has come increasingly under the political and economic domination of the Greek majority. As that domination increased, becoming oppressive, the entire Turkish nation and all its people became increasingly sensitized to the essential need to insure the protection, even survival of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. This connection was ethnic, racial, blood - whatever - and a challenge or threat to that connection brought forth a basic emotional response. Congress never understood.

4. Cyprus is only 25 miles off the Turkish southern coast. Many of Turkey's important military installations and lines of communications are located in the adjacent southern region. Cyprus is more than 450 miles from the Greek mainland. If Greece had been successful in annexing Cyprus, which was the immediate objective of the coup, then Greece would have established a huge and unfettered national entity that would militarily dominate the whole eastern Mediterranean. It was, and is, plainly in Turkey's vital national security interest to insure that doesn't happen. Congress never appreciated this point. Still doesn't.

5. ~~Turkey's~~ Turkey's people, in the Muslim and Eastern cultural tradition, consider public humiliation as the ultimate insult. Congress's action was taken to be humiliating. The only possible response was determination to reject the U.S. demand.

6. U.S. military operations in Turkey prior to the embargo served both U.S. and NATO interests. The Turkish response to the embargo, halting all

operations in support of U.S. interests, caused significant damage to intelligence collection and contingency planning. As the Shah's position deteriorated in the late 70's it became increasingly apparent, even to the Congress, that Turkey's geography was vitally important to U.S. strategic interests.

7. Not only did the embargo fail in terms of its immediate objective, the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus, it also had negative effects in many related ways.

A. The embargo made the Greeks believe that the U.S. would impose a Cyprus solution on Turkey. As a result, the Greeks continuously refused to negotiate a resolution with the Guarantor powers--that situation continues today.

B. The modernization program of the Turkish Armed Forces, just begun in the early 1970's, was effectively halted for about six years - 3 1/2 years of the embargo and 2 1/2 years to reorganize and restart the security assistance flow. That delay has been critical - Turkey's Korean war vintage equipment is logistically unsupportable. Turkey's ability to meet NATO's force goals remains very tenuous.

C. The psychological impact of the embargo was very damaging. Turkey had focused its social energy for 50 years on the development of democracy, western liberalization, and economic expansion. The embargo was perceived by the Turkish people, as a refutation of that commitment and effort.

8. The U.S., particularly the Congress, must carefully understand its own security assistance programs. They are not payoffs, or handouts, or charity, or a reflection of good will, or a means to political leverage - they are in fact in direct support of American national interests, which happen to

coincide with the national interests of the recipient nations. Security assistance programs are mutually beneficial - if they are not, they should be terminated.

Second point is about 7/10 ratio in military assistance between Turkey and Greece. In terms of the responsibilities in NATO, this ratio is not fair. It is based on the "imaginary threat" to Greece by Turkey and was initiated by the Greek lobby in the U.S.

This notion is preposterous on several accounts. First of all, this notion runs counter to the very spirit and fundamentals of any Alliance relationship. Secondly, given the fact that the U.S. funds to be allocated in the form of military assistance are limited, if put into practice, this ratio would mean distributing these limited funds between Greece and Turkey in an artificial manner in total disregard of the much higher defense equipment needs of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Furthermore, it would be useful to remember that the land area and population of Turkey to be defended under NATO are 6 and 5 times greater respectively, than the land area and population of Greece. In terms of manpower, Turkish Armed Forces are 4 times larger than the Greek forces. As far as economic ability to purchase defense equipment through national means is concerned, Greece is in a much better position with a per capita national income significantly higher than Turkey.

Any consideration which seeks the achievement of military balance between Turkey and Greece also carries with it the very great risk of injecting the complexities and malaise of Turkish-Greek relations into the defense concept of the West as well as into the strong and sound bilateral relations existing between the U.S. and Turkey. Such an approach would therefore be very ill-advised and dangerous.

It follows from the foregoing that the notion of military balance between Greece and Turkey as well as any artificial ratio in levels of military assistance extended to these countries have no logical or military basis, and are in fact, inimical to collective security interests of NATO.

This does not mean that Turkey is opposed to the strengthening of Greece's defense posture by the U.S., provided that these efforts are not motivated by considerations of creating a so-called balance between Greece and Turkey and are restricted exclusively to the requirements of Western defense. In other words, Turkey welcomed the improvement of Greek-American defense relationship. Turkey cannot, however, accept any linkage whatsoever between Greek-American defense cooperation on one hand, and the Greek-Turkish issues on the other.

So, this unfair assistance ratio application between Turkey and Greece should be evaluated again and ended, if Turkey is really important to NATO and to the U.S. in terms of the U.S. national interests.

The other point is effectiveness of Greek and also Armenian lobbies on the Congress. This kind of activity should have no credibility concerning the interrelationship between friendly countries. The official organizations of the state instead of one-sided and fixed-minded lobbies, should establish the relationships between those states.

As a result, desirable things between the countries that have very close ties for a long time should be good friendship, reliable relationship, and cooperation and coordination on bilateral issues.

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