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
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
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A Theory of Conflict and Operational Art

by

Major David A. Fastabend

Corps of Engineers

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The basic element of the conflict of theory is ideas. Ideas are our perception of reality. Political entities are groups of individuals that share ideas about power and exhibit varying degrees of morale, discipline and cohesion. Conflict is the mutual contradiction of ideas. Conflict resolution is the competition of ideas between political entities. Its ends are the reconfiguration of the contradictory idea set. The fundamental components of its means are reason and violence. The competition is waged in the physical, cybernetic and moral domains. Aspects of that competition include fog, friction and chance.

The basic component of the operational art model is linkage. Political entities designate a desired end state of conflict resolution; operational artists design military conditions that will realize this end state. The mechanism of decision in operational art is the dynamic interaction of combatants contesting their directed will and available means to achieve their respective end states. The operational artist applies military force through a combination of active and reactive measures designed to wrest the initiative from his opponent. Through the intensification of violence in space and time he achieves a series of successes that both destroys enemy forces and disrupts the morale, discipline and cohesion of the surviving forces. The consequence of these successes will be military combinations of dispersion, concentration and resilience of the combatant forces: the military contribution to achievement of the desired end state.

The model has implications for our understanding of the role of ideas in conflict and war. It provides insights into "actions short of war." It suggests some potential deficiencies in the concepts and organization of our current doctrine of operational art. The model also demonstrates the critical consequences of theory for our understanding of war and operational art.

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Corps of Engineers

**School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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ABSTRACT

A THEORY OF CONFLICT AND OPERATIONAL ART, by MAJ DAVID A. FASTABEND, USA,
62 pages

Several theoretical and doctrinal problems limit current US Army understanding of conflict, war and operational art. Those problems include confusion between conflict and war, ambiguity of theoretical terms such as "center of gravity" or "culminating point", and difficulty in describing the mechanism through which operational art links tactical successes to strategic aims. The premise of this monograph is that several of these problems can be attributed to a failure to understand war as a subset of conflict. The monograph attempts to outline a theoretical model of operational art as an aspect of conflict rather than of war.

The theoretical relationship of conflict, war and operational art is presented using a "structure" analogy. Conflict theory is the foundation of the doctrinal structure. The structure itself encompasses both war and warfare ("actions short of war"). Operational art is a structural framework necessary for success in both war and warfare.

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Notes on text emphasis and monograph organization:

This text will introduce several elements of theory and reference them in subsequent text. For clarity purposes each element of theory will receive **bold** text emphasis when first introduced. Subsequent reference to elements of theory will be in *italics*. Underline will be used for normal context emphasis.

Most elements of theory will be defined explicitly; all elements of theory are listed (with definitions) at Appendix A in the order of their introduction. Appendix B is a theory map that depicts an outline of the fundamental theory elements and their relationships. Appendix C is a series of sketches that illustrate the model. Appendix D is an explanation of the decision to build the theory as a model of ideas rather than of power.

I - Introduction

It is useful to view theory and doctrine as a mental "structure" that shelters us from the storms of confusion and doubt that can ruin our understanding of conflict, war, and operational art. Through the organization of concepts, definitions and relationships we seek protection from the chaos of unordered perceptions, impressions and fears. That protection, however, is far from perfect. Our current theoretical-doctrinal structure is a ramshackle construction erected by different builders, at different times, for different purposes. The lack of a comprehensive architectural vision has produced a shelter of disparate concepts, with gaps and disconnects so severe that discomforting drafts of confusion and doubt are all too frequent.

Although the recent revision of FM 100-5 accomplished considerable modification of our theoretical-doctrinal structure, for example, those repairs are not complete. Operational concepts such as "center of gravity" and "culminating point" are now entering the Army lexicon. It is unclear, however, how those notions can be applied to link tactical successes to accomplish strategic aims.

Even the older, more established portions of the theoretical structure are showing signs of wear. The distinction between strategic and tactical levels of war has lost much of its clarity. How does one distinguish between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war? What is their relationship to "operational art"? What hierarchy of command is "operational"?

One portion of the structure has collapsed completely. "Actions short of war" marks the spot where "low-intensity conflict" once stood, but

a positive chill of confusion and doubt plagues this portion of our shelter. An examination of this particular structural failure indicates a foundation problem: there was little apparent theoretical understanding of conflict to support our "Low-Intensity Conflict" (LIC) doctrine.

To our dismay we discover that this foundation flaw jeopardizes not only our LIC doctrine but the rest of our theoretical structure as well. Frequently we equate war to conflict, ignoring their distinctions; on other occasions we attempt to describe war in isolation, disregarding its broader conflict context. The premise of this monograph is that several US Army theoretical and doctrinal problems can be attributed to a failure to understand war as a subset of conflict. A contributing factor to this failure is our general neglect of the role of theory in understanding conflict, war, and operational art.

When a foundation fails it is often easier to build a new structure rather than to salvage the existing one. We will attempt to rebuild our shelter, but on a completely new foundation. The reconstruction plan is as follows:

The first phase will be to establish an entirely new foundation -- a theory of general conflict. We will make a considerable investment in this foundation, carefully defining concepts and establishing their interrelationships. Although the foundation-building process of explicit definition and theoretical description promises to be a tedious one, such preparation is essential if the rest of our structure is to be sound.

We will mark the completion of the foundation and the beginning of our new structure by distinguishing conflict from war. The structure itself will be further differentiated by delineating war from warfare. The

main framework of the theoretical structure -- for both war and warfare -- will be a theory of operational art. In constructing the model of operational art, we will not hesitate to incorporate much material from the previous theoretical structure. In some cases a new concept will be fashioned. If old notions fit firmly and function as required, we will use them. If an idea requires trimming or reinforcement, we will make those modifications. Much of the old theoretical structure will be found in the new building. Some of it will be left lying on the ground.

At the end of our construction the pieces left "lying on the ground" will be of particular interest. We will assess the reasons they could not be used. We will also evaluate our new construction: are the interconnections of the foundation (the conflict model) and structural framework (the operational art model) sound? What are the implications of the new design for the organization of doctrine? What are the advantages and disadvantages of relying on theory as the organizing principle of construction? Most importantly, will the new structure offer improved shelter from the chaos of confusion and doubt associated with conflict, war, and operational art?

II - THEORY

"... the lack of an accepted body of military theory and principle leaves a void in the basic philosophy that should guide people in distinguishing between cause and effect, between the trivial and the important, between the central and the peripheral"¹ -- Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*

A Collective Hunch: Since theory will play an essential role in our reconstruction effort, we should first pause to evaluate this tool. What is theory? The statement that "theory is a collective hunch" is not as flippant as it might appear. A "hunch" is a mental concept, and theory is first and foremost a collection of mental entities or ideas. The statement begs the question "hunch about what?" The what is some aspect of objective reality: theory is a model, an analog of reality. Theory is not reality itself but merely a description (and inevitably a simplification) of reality. Finally, the arbitrary nature of a "hunch" communicates that theory, likewise, is an arbitrary act of creativity. One does not "discover" theoretical notions, one creates them. To determine the value of these arbitrary models of reality we must consider the roles of theory.

The Roles of Theory: Peter Paret suggest that the roles of theory are *utilitarian*, *cognitive* and *pedagogic*.² In its *utilitarian* role theory facilitates the successful execution of the activity it describes. In its ideal *cognitive* role theory promotes understanding, establishing a comprehensive description of the timeless essentials of the activity while distinguishing them from its temporary features.³ The *pedagogic* role of theory originates in the very process of theory creation. Through the process of devising concepts and analytical frameworks firsthand, the theorist establishes a profound understanding of the activity in question.

The great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz had reservations about the *utilitarian* and *cognitive* roles of theory, but he was generally optimistic about its *pedagogic* potential: "The insights gained and garnered by the mind in its wanderings among basic concepts are benefits that theory can provide."⁴

A Caveat: Before applying theory in our reconstruction effort, however, we should post a caution sign at the project site. "To illustrate a principle", says Bagehot, "you must exaggerate much and you must omit much."⁵ This theoretical model will be breathtakingly simplistic, subsuming entire bodies of knowledge as simple summary concepts without further elucidation. It will only outline a basic conflict theory and a skeletal theoretical framework of operational art. We will not finish, paint, or furnish our structure.

Additionally, although historical evidence is the ideal test of military theory, rigorous historical proof of a model of so broad a perspective is not practicable and will not be attempted. Any historical references will be anecdotal.

Finally, one should remember that theory is "a collective hunch." A portion of the model we are about to assemble, however, is merely the personal effort of the author, private theory still in its *pedagogic* phase that has not been subjected to widespread scrutiny and evaluation. It is "a solitary hunch" and therefore can not qualify as theory in the classical sense.

We are now ready to break ground.

III - A Model of General Conflict

"Let us define our terms. What is reason? Reason is the faculty which perceives, identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses. Reason integrates man's perceptions by means of forming abstractions or conceptions, thus raising man's knowledge from the *perceptual* level, which he shares with animals, to the *conceptual* level, which he alone can reach. The method which reason employs in this process is *logic* - and logic is the art of *non-contradictory identification*."⁶ -- Ayn Rand, *Philosophy: Who Needs It*

Reality, Reason and Ideas: Individuals perceive reality through their senses. Reason orders the chaos and complexity of perceived reality into conceptions or *ideas*. One could alternately describe these mental entities as "values", "interests", "beliefs", "ideologies", "purpose", etc. Because *ideas* are the fundamental component of all such entities, the notion of "*idea*" will be the basic "brick" of our theoretical foundation.⁷

"*Idea*" is admittedly a broad notion. *Ideas* range from the mundane ("I will stop digging my foxhole now") to the sublime ("Democracy is worth dying for"). *Ideas* can be subtle, almost unconscious notions of individuals, or they can be explicit tenets of a defined group. *Ideas* are rarely singular concepts but usually are amalgams of several subordinate *ideas* that logic has organized into complex cognitive structures.

It would seem at first glance that "*idea*" is too vague a notion to be a useful basis for theory. Broad theoretical topics, however, require broad concepts. *Ideas* afford an effective basis for a theory of conflict, war and operational art because they are the common element of every aspect of these phenomena. More importantly, *ideas* are the raw material of the decision process, and decision -- individuals and groups of individuals selecting alternate *ideas* -- pervades every aspect of conflict.

Motivation, Desire and Will: Although the complexity and divergence of reality induce countless *ideas* in every individual's mind, these *ideas* are not inherently equal. The individual assigns relative priorities or values corresponding to each *idea's* significance for his present or future sense of well-being. An individual's *motivation* with respect to each *idea* reflects this relative *idea* priority. An essential point is that *ideas* do not have absolute *motivation* potential in and of themselves but only relative to other *ideas*. Personal self-preservation, for example, will generally exercise much greater *motivation* than less vital notions such as "my favorite color is green" or "the Washington Redskins are a superior football team." A useful refinement of the concept of *motivation* is the distinction between *desire* and *will*. *Desire* is mental proclivity. *Will* surpasses mere mental proclivity and constitutes a *commitment* to manifest *desire* through action. An individual's *motivation*, *desire* and *will* with respect to alternate *ideas* is the essence of choice and the basis of the decision process.

Ideas and Groups: Individuals do not execute the logic of *idea* formulation and prioritization in isolation. Man is a social animal who shares *ideas* through the exchange of information. With time and appropriate circumstances, groups of individuals develop *idea sets* -- collections of their most significant *ideas* -- that are shared and valued.⁶ We shall call a group that shares a common *idea set* a *social entity*. Certain *social entities* share a common *idea set* that includes *ideas* about *power* -- the ability to make or destroy. We shall label these groups *political entities*. Group *cohesion* reflects the degree of *idea* correlation

among the members of the *political entity*. A related notion is **discipline** -- each individual's commitment to conform to the group idea set.

Morale is the group (or individual) measure of confidence that their *ideas* are an accurate reflection of reality and will best secure their well-being. Most historical references to loss of *morale* are associated with surprise, prolonged or unexpected failure, or the loss of faith in the validity of one's *ideas*. A common theme seems to include loss of confidence in the veracity of one's appreciation of reality -- be it the local military situation or an ideological "world view" -- combined with pessimism as to future well-being. A passage from Weigley's American Strategy illustrates this point:

...the Confederate newspapers long managed to convey to the people of the interior an impression of impenetrable defenses, but when Sherman came, "as the [Union] army was seen marching on triumphantly, ...the minds of the people became disabused, and they saw the true state of affairs. [emphasis added]"⁹

Conflict: Given divergent local conditions, historical experiences, and the influence of individual personalities, it is not surprising that *political entities* do not develop identical perceptions of reality. The *idea sets* of any two *political entities* may be generally similar -- convergent; generally unrelated -- divergent; or generally contradictory -- in conflict. *Conflict* is the mutually contradictory interpretations of reality between two *political entities*.¹⁰ Just as individuals assign relative priorities to *ideas*, so too *political entities* assign relative significance to conflict relationships. A conflict with Cuba over the legitimacy of Soviet missile basing, for example, is held to be considerably more significant than a conflict with Canada over the authority of the Queen of England. In one instance the *conflict* is

"acceptable;" in the other instance it is "unacceptable." Unacceptable *conflict* usually involves *ideas* about the *power* relationship between *political entities*. Unacceptable conflict is the engine that drives the process of conflict resolution.¹¹

Conflict Resolution: *Conflict* is a "status" -- a relationship between sets of *ideas*; *conflict* is intrinsic to the contradictory nature of the competing *ideas* and is therefore continuous and persistent. Conflict resolution is a "dynamic" -- a "process" that redefines the relationship between conflicting *ideas*. The process continues until the mutual contradiction of *ideas* is "resolved" to an acceptable state. It is important to note that complete conflict elimination is a very rare (and horrible) subset of conflict resolution. *Ideas* die hard, and conflict participants committed to the elimination of competing *ideas* rapidly discover that it is much easier to kill the thinkers than the thoughts. The Russian Gulag, Hitler's "Final Solution," and the excesses of the Khmer Rouge are notorious examples of the frightful consequences of attempts to eliminate conflicting *ideas*. We will assign the label *totality* to describe the degree to which *conflict resolution* approaches *conflict elimination*.

The Ends of Conflict Resolution: The significance of the conflict relationship will determine each *conflict* participant's *ends* -- their goals for the *conflict resolution* process. These *ends* will normally include a reconfiguration of their opponent's *idea set*, a change that will reduce their mutual *conflict* to an acceptable state. The dynamic interaction of *conflict* participants -- each attempting to modify the *idea set* of a thinking, reacting opponent -- is the origin of the Clausewitzian duel.

The Means of Conflict Resolution: The means of conflict resolution -- the activity by which a *political entity* attempts to achieve its *ends* -- is policy.¹² Policy incorporates many forms of power: economic, diplomatic, political, military. The fundamental components of all policy power are reason and violence. Ayn Rand suggested that:

There are only two means by which men can deal with one another: guns or logic. Force or persuasion. Those that know that they cannot win by means of logic, have always resorted to guns.¹³

Reason attempts to revise a conflict opponent's *idea set* through the exchange of information and the logical comparison of *ideas*. *Violence* attempts to impose this revision through the presentation of unfavorable alternatives: injury, destruction or death. *Desire* (mental proclivity) is a consequence of the logical processes of *reason*. *Desire* must discount actual or potential *violence* to initiate action, thereby manifesting *will*.

Each of the instruments of power apply *reason* and *violence* in varying proportions. In economic power *reason* -- the logic of alternative economic decisions -- is the dominant influence. Although *reason* is similarly a principal element in the exchange of information and the comparison of *ideas* in politics and diplomacy, these elements of power also incorporate the latent threat of *violence*: the political and diplomatic process may be "continued by other means" through military action. *Violence* is the obvious component of military power, but not to the exclusion of *reason*. The *rational* projection of the consequences of threatened *violence* can have an impact equal to the application of the *violence* itself.

The Domains of Conflict: A theoretical distinction of conflict's physical, cybernetic, and moral domains completes our model of conflict resolution. *Violence* and action alter the reality of the *physical*

domain. Individuals perceive this altered reality and communicate those perceptions to others in the *cybernetic domain*. These communicated perceptions influence *reason* and alter *discipline*, *morale*, *cohesion* and -- ultimately -- *idea set* configuration: the *moral domain*.

The dominant aspects of the *physical domain* are time and space. Space limits the feasible concentration of power. Time limits the rate at which that power can be applied.

Space and time are also degrading influences in the *cybernetic domain* through their impact on the *cybernetic* factors of *command*, *control*, *communications*, *information* and *organization*. Imperfections in the *cybernetic* process lead to fog -- a discrepancy between perception and reality.

Further discrepancies will be evident in the *moral domain*. The alteration of *discipline*, *morale*, *cohesion* and *motivation* through the *cybernetic* perceptions of *physical* activity is not a perfectly efficient process. The loss of power in reconfiguring an opposing *idea set* -- the inefficiency in power application -- is friction.

Finally, we must note that the cause and effect relationships between *ends* and *means* in the *physical*, *cybernetic*, and *moral domains* can be so extraordinarily complex as to be unfathomable. The outcome of a dice roll, for example, is the effect of initial momentum, spin, impact surface, etc. We can not accurately model the relationship of these causes to their final effect. Inexplicable cause and effect relationships are *chance*. Conflict participants can only estimate *chance*. Their forecasts of the impacts of *chance* on the *conflict resolution* process are *risk*.

Conflict in Summary: *Ideas* are our perception of reality. *Political entities* are groups of individuals that share *ideas* about *power*. Such groups exhibit varying degrees of *morale*, *discipline*, and *cohesion*. *Conflict* is the mutual contradiction of *ideas*. *Conflict resolution* is the competition of *ideas* between *political entities*. Its *ends* are the reconfiguration of the contradictory *idea set*. The fundamental components of its *means* are *reason* and *violence*. The competition is waged in the *physical*, *cybernetic* and *moral* domains. Aspects of that competition include *fog*, *friction*, and *chance*.

To this point we have scraped an outline of the general relationship of the *physical*, *cybernetic* and *moral* domains and poured a base of definitions describing the principle components of *general conflict* and *conflict resolution*. Foundation construction is not particularly satisfying work! The appearance of the final structure is not yet apparent, nor is our foundation useful -- except for further construction. Before proceeding we must determine where the foundation stops and the structure begins. What is the difference between *conflict* and *war*?

Conflict vs War (and War vs Warfare): We cannot have failed to note the many similarities between our model of *general conflict* and *war*. *War* is a subset of *conflict resolution*.¹⁴ As Clausewitz noted:

We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs.¹⁵

Since *war* is a subset of *conflict resolution*, any distinction between the two will be a matter of degree rather than of essence. Our dilemma is that the components of *conflict* do not readily submit to quantification or gradation. How does one measure *morale* and *cohesion*, *communication* and *command*, or even *violence*? To solve this theoretical quandary we will invoke the right of theory's "arbitrary creativity" and simply decree that the distinction between *conflict* and *war* is a legal one. *Conflicts* become *wars* when *political entities* declare them to be so.

This distinction is arbitrary but hardly inconsequential. Upon declaration of *war*, *political entities* extend sanction to a relatively permissive application of *violence*. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, this sanction allowed military forces wide leeway in identifying objectives for the application of *violence*. Rules of engagement were straightforward: *violence* could generally be applied to any component of enemy power.

In this nuclear age, however, societies are less willing to extend a sanction to the general application of *violence*. *Conflict resolution* proceeds, but the escalation of *idea* competition through general *violence* is too fraught with *risk*, particularly for nuclear powers. Acts of military *violence* still occur, but those acts are carefully constrained and restrained -- the sanction for general *violence* is withheld. "Acts of war" that do not enjoy the political entity's sanction for general *violence* are *warfare*. The sanction of general *violence* through *war* is usually limited to the furthering of *ideas* of the highest *motivation*, e.g., national survival.

To distinguish *war* from *general conflict* through the legal sanction of the *political entity*, then, is more than a sterile, arbitrary act of

theory. The societal sanction is probably the most significant factor for public support and cohesion, the dedication of resources, and control of the media -- the society's cybernetic apparatus. The absence of this societal sanction makes *warfare* under *general conflict* significantly different from *war*.

We could, with equal validity, claim that acts of *warfare* are not distinct from *war* but are simply a different kind of *war*. Our decision is a matter of engineering judgment: many theoretical structures will serve our purpose. Our primary concern is a logical design with effective, reinforcing components.

IV - War, Warfare and Operational Art

"You know, when you think about it, war isn't about battles, it is to do with mens' minds ... the war was really about: one set of ideas trying to prevail against another. The battles were almost incidental"¹⁶ -- Captain Warawick Charlton, in Nigel Hamilton's *Monty: Master of the Battlefield*

As we inspect our new foundation of conflict theory our thoughts turn to the structure we intend to erect upon it. Can this new foundation support a model of phenomena so enormously complex as war* and warfare? What function will "operational art" perform in such a model? To envision our future theoretical structure, let us stand back from the site and survey the several aspects of war and warfare: kind, perspective, hierarchy, level and linkage.

Kinds of War: We have already noted that our *conflict* model provides a distinction between war and warfare. It supports further distinctions as well. The various *kinds* of war -- external, internal, revolutionary, international -- all exhibit a competition of *ideas* between *political entities*. Their distinction originates in the identity of the *political entities* (nation-state vs political faction) or in the nature of the competing *ideas*.

The distinction between *conflict resolution* and *conflict elimination* can support a theoretical discrimination between "limited wars" and "total wars." Limited war corresponds to *conflict resolution* in which contradictory *ideas* are not eliminated, but merely reconfigured to an

* Our model of operational art will be applicable to both war and warfare. For succinctness both those terms will be incorporated into the general term "war" in most of the subsequent discussion.

acceptable state of contradiction. Just as *conflict elimination* is a virtual impossibility, so too is "total war." This theoretical construct closely parallels Clausewitz's distinction between Absolute and Real War.¹⁷

In one of those paradoxes encountered so frequently when contemplating war, we note that successful prosecution of a hypothetical *total war* (*conflict elimination*) would entail a massive, but ultimately finite, commitment of time and resources to the conflict. But because *limited war* entertains the possibility of *indefinite conflict resolution*, the commitment of time and resources is theoretically limitless. It is a mistake, therefore, to assume that *limited war* is less demanding than *total war*.

Perspectives of War: The perspectives of war are strategic, tactical, and operational. *Strategy* is the *comprehensive* direction of *power* to attain *ends*. *Tactics* is the employment of *specific* means to obtain *immediate* goals. *Operations* is the *linkage* of tactical actions to achieve *strategic* objectives. Each *perspective* of war has a unique focus:

<u>PERSPECTIVE</u>	<u>FOCUS</u>
STRATEGIC	COMPREHENSIVE
TACTICAL	SPECIFIC
OPERATIONAL	LINKAGE

Hierarchies of War: The hierarchies of war are the several layers of organization and command required to accomplish military activity. The squad leader deploys men and equipment to accomplish tasks designated by his platoon leader. The brigade commander maneuvers his battalions to pursue an objective assigned by the division. At every hierarchy there is the integration of means to achieve some superior end:¹⁸

... each level of command creates a new level of war because it does two things ... first it creates a new perspective for the

commander. Within that perspective he must attain some higher goal. Secondly a new level of war creates a new formation or unit of action. The creation of these new "chess pieces" establishes a new activity uniquely associated with that piece.¹⁹

Levels of War: One of the principle frameworks supporting our previous theoretical structure was the notion of the strategic, operational and tactical "levels of war". Unfortunately, "*the levels of war*" has become a mongrel concept that confuses *perspective* and *hierarchy*:

... the immediate employment of any force or weapon is tactical
... the ultimate effect considered in conjunction with the employment of other forces and elements of power is strategic
... every military situation has both strategical and tactical aspects ... whether an operation is distinctively strategical or tactical will depend, from the standpoint of the commander concerned, on the end which he has in view²⁰

There is room (and need) for both the *perspectives of war* and the *hierarchies of war* in our theoretical-doctrinal structure. But because "*the levels of war*" confuses any distinction between *perspective* and *hierarchy*, it will not be included in our new design.

Linkage: Operational Art: The common aspect of both the *perspectives* and the *hierarchies of war* is *linkage*. Throughout we observe the notion of cause and effect: a *linkage of ends and means* in various *ways*. We will define *operational art* to be the art of *linkage*: the application of *means* in a combination of cause and effect relationships (*ways*) to accomplish *ends*. If *war* and *warfare* are subsets of *conflict resolution*, and *conflict resolution* in turn is the competition of *ideas*, then the key requirement for our theoretical model of *war* and *warfare* is to demonstrate the *linkage* between *military action* and the *movement of ideas*. What is the *mechanism of decision* in *operational art*?

V - OPERATIONAL ART: THE MECHANISM OF DECISION

"Reduced to its essentials, operational art requires the commander to answer three questions:

(1) What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?

(3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?"²¹

-- FM 100-5

End State and Military Conditions: Our *mechanism of decision* must achieve the *ends of conflict resolution*: a reconfiguration of the enemy's *ideas*. What is the *idea set* that we intend to impose on our opponent? To what extent must this *idea set* permeate the enemy society? How soon must he accept it? For how long must he retain it? What *ideas* of our own are we willing to sacrifice in achieving this end? Only the leadership of the *political entity* can answer these questions. Their answers constitute the desired *end state*.

Military power functions in coordination with political, diplomatic and economic power to realize the desired *end state*. The military operational artist's role in *conflict resolution* is to *link* military actions to the *end state* by describing the *military condition* of that *end state*. To do this he must understand *decision* and the components of *military force*.

Military Force: To alter the configuration of an enemy's *ideas* we must 'move' those *ideas*. All movement requires *force*. Clausewitz described the force that must be applied against an enemy's power of resistance as "the product of two inseparable factors, viz, the total means

at his disposal and the strength of his will."²² We will restate this relationship as a direct analogy to physics in which

$$F = M a$$

where

F ---> Military Force
M ---> Military Means
a ---> Directed Will

This relationship between *military force*, *military means* and *directed will* is intuitively apparent. We know from experience that if either *directed will* or *military means* is absent (zero), then the effective *military force* will likewise be zero.

Military force is available to both participants in the *conflict resolution* process. The operational artist is particularly conscious of the **dynamic** interaction of his forces with those of his enemy counterpart. Each participant applies force (**action**) and/or counters the force of his opponent (**reaction**). The sum resultant of these *proactive* and *reactive* forces reflects an advantage of **initiative** to one of the participants. General Manstein's description of the interaction of forces on the Eastern Front conveys the notion of creating *initiative* through the *dynamic interaction* of opponents:

The constantly decisive factor in any shift of forces, however, is which of the two forces gains the lead - in other words, which of them is offered the opportunity, by his own timely action, to seize the initiative at the crucial spot and thereafter to dictate his own terms to the more slowmoving enemy, even when the latter is collectively the stronger.²³

In devising combinations of *action* and *reaction*, the operational artist seeks every opportunity to achieve surprise and deception, for these phenomena degrade enemy *reaction* and thereby enhance the effects of his own actions.²⁴

Military Decision: How does *military force* induce individuals and groups to decide -- to choose their *ideas*? In our model of *general conflict* we already mentioned that destruction of the thinker renders the configuration of his ideas a moot point! Yet we also noted that such attempts at *conflict elimination* (rather than *conflict resolution*) are repugnant and relatively infrequent. Many of the most violent and decisive conflicts, moreover, have entailed the destruction of a relatively small proportion of the participants. At the battle of Koeniggraetz, a classic "battle of decision", the defeated Austrian forces only suffered 5,793 killed. This was 3% of the battlefield force, 1% of the Austrian Army, and a minute fraction of the millions of Austrians who eventually abandoned the *idea* of Austrian supremacy among Germanic states as a result of what happened at Koeniggraetz on 3 July, 1866.²⁵

In military decision, the destruction of pure *violence* is but a complement to *reason* -- the identification and selection of alternatives. Military decision is accomplished by the complementary action of *violence* and *reason*: the *violent* creation of alternatives that induce *reason* to alter *ideas* to a favorable configuration.

This brings us to the wellspring of operational art, for to *link* military action to the movement of *ideas* we must understand the inner workings of the human psyche. In the early 19th Century Clausewitz wrote "... how much more highly do we value the psychiatrist!"²⁶ He would be disappointed to learn that nearly two centuries later the principles of psychology -- if such can be said to exist -- have advanced little since his own time. Psychology is the least scientific of our sciences, this

deficiency is the principle obstacle to operational artists becoming operational scientists.

Nevertheless we must address the mysteries of human decision as best we can. We will do so from both an individual and group perspective.

Individual Decision: An individual ranks his *ideas* in accordance with their contribution to his present or future sense of well-being. His *motivation* with respect to any particular *idea*, therefore, will be highly dependent on his particular role in the *conflict resolution* process. SLA Marshall, for example, has written extensively on the primary motivation of actual combatants:

... it is unworthy of the profession of arms to base any policy upon exaggerated notions of man's capacity to endure and to sacrifice on behalf of ideals alone. In battle, you may draw a small circle around a soldier, including within it only those persons and objects which he sees or which he believes will influence his immediate fortunes. These primarily will determine whether he rallies or fails, advances or falls back.²⁷

A passage from Guy Sajer's The Forgotten Soldier further illustrates the effect of *violence* on the individual's process of decision. Guy Sajer was a French citizen of German parentage who chose to serve with the Wehrmacht on the Russian Front. In the environment of *violence* his original ideals of patriotism and desire for acceptance were soon subsumed in a powerful instinct for self-preservation:

We no longer fought for Hitler, or for National Socialism, or for the Third Reich -- or even for our fiancées, mothers or families trapped in bomb-ravaged towns. We fought from simple fear, which was our motivating power. The idea of death, even when we accepted it, made us howl with powerless rage. We fought for reasons which are perhaps shameful, but are, in the end, stronger than any doctrine. We fought for ourselves, so that we wouldn't die in holes filled with mud and snow.²⁸

Ideology may draw an individual toward combat but once in the environment of violence his "directed will" is towards self-preservation. Self-preservation is the "golden idea" that violence presents as a favorable alternative to the individual's original *idea set*.

It would seem that the powerful dominance of the urge to self-preservation might preclude the utility of military action for furthering the movement of other ideas. Operational artists circumvent this problem by designing weapons, tactics and organizations so that the self-preservation instinct reinforces -- rather than competes with -- group goals. The soldier acquires *discipline* in the use of weapons and organizational procedures because of a high state of *morale* -- confidence that these weapons and procedures will further his self-preservation.²⁹ The *cohesion* among the several individuals of the group insure coordination of their efforts.

Operational artists attempt to impose the degrading influences of self-preservation on opposing forces through the intensification of violence in space (*concentration*) and time (*tempo*). Success will reinforce the *morale* of their own forces and degrade that of their opponents. They know that the effect will be anticipatory rather than retroactive: "It is not the losses they have suffered but those they expect to suffer that affect them."³⁰ The *linkage* of a series of *violent* successes will destroy enemy individuals and erode the *morale*, *discipline* and *cohesion* of the survivors to the extent that *reason* will induce them to opt for self-preservation rather than the original objectives of their group.

Group Decision: "Group decision" may well be a contradictory term. We do not speak of a "decision by committee" but rather of the group

perspective in military *decision*. The group's perspective is the special purview of the operational artist.

Directed Will: The operational artist is himself an individual. His individual decision process is a key aspect of the group decision. Operational artists routinely seek information on the personality and psychological make-up of their enemy counterparts. They frequently target their counterparts for psychological warfare or violent elimination through special action.

The operational artist must further concern himself with the *directed will* of the group as a whole. We have already cited his responsibilities for the *morale* and *discipline* of the individual group members. He must attend to the *cybernetic* considerations that ensure the *cohesion* of his group. He protects the cybernetic components of command, control, communication, information and organization and targets those of his opponent.

Means: The operational artist knows that the most effective way to destroy *will* is to destroy *means*. He concentrates military force in space and time to destroy the means of his opponent. Through the dynamic interaction with a "dueling" enemy, however, such *concentration* risks the destruction of his own means. The antidote for this *risk* is the retention of a reserve and the protective *dispersion* of forces in depth.

The operational artist appreciates that *tempo* -- the rate of violence application -- imparts a quality to violence above and beyond its mere quantity. Human beings have mental processes of rationalization that enable them to reconcile past failure and renew their commitment to their

ideas. These processes of mental restoration require time and are disrupted if rapid enemy *tempo* precludes them.²¹

The limiting factor on potential *tempo* is the *resilience* of the military means vis-a-vis that of the enemy. What is its sustainment capacity compared to the enemy? If a portion (or all) of the military means are destroyed, how quickly can they be reconstituted? How does the rate of sustainment and the speed of reconstitution compare to the *tempo* of enemy violence? A key responsibility of the operational artist is to resolve the tension between *action* and *reaction*, *concentration* and *dispersion*, *tempo* and *resilience*.

The Mechanism of Decision in Summary: Political entities designate a desired *end state* of *conflict resolution*; operational artists design *military conditions* that will realize this *end state*. The mechanism of decision in operational art is the *dynamic interaction* of combatants contesting their *directed will* and *available means* to achieve their respective *end states*. The operational artist applies military force through a combination of *active* and *reactive* measures designed to wrest the *initiative* from his opponent. Through the intensification of *violence* in space and time he achieves a series of successes that both destroys enemy forces and disrupts the *morale*, *discipline* and *cohesion* of the surviving forces. The consequence of these successes will be *military conditions* of *dispersion*, *concentration* and *resilience* of the conflict participants that will comprise the military contribution to achievement of the desired *end state*.

VI - IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL

"The first steps are to have correct concepts of conflict, of power, of objectives, and of strategy. When these are sound, other matters fall into a coherent pattern."³² -- Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*

Having erected a theoretical model of operational art on a foundation of general conflict theory, we are now prepared to assess the merits of this shelter.

Ideas Matter: In a 1987 address to the students of the Command and General Staff College, Major General Frederick Franks adjured his audience that "Ideas matter -- not only ideas on how men fight, but also the ideas men fight for."³³ This view is at odds with the intellectual tradition of many Western theories of international relations, which view *conflict* as an amoral question of "the balance of power." This dismissal of "ideology" is conveyed in Julian Lider's *comment*:

The influence of ideas on current events owes less to their inherent validity than to the material strength of the socio-political forces that believe in them and, being prepared to fight for them, shape their foreign and military policies in accordance with them.³⁴

Our conflict model favors MG Frank's view.³⁵ *Ideas* matter because of the role of *reason* in *conflict resolution*. The operational artist who remembers that both *violence* and *reason* comprise the means of *conflict resolution* will never fail to determine the character of the *ideas* he must move in order to achieve the desired *end state*.

Actions Short of War: In assessing the performance of this theoretical structure, we would be remiss not to consider the most obvious storm of late -- the confusion and controversy surrounding "low intensity conflict" or "actions short of war."

Duration: The identification of *conflict* as the mutual contradiction of *ideas* explains the perplexing persistence and duration of "low-intensity conflict." *Conflict* exists because of the contradictory perceptions of reality. It is continuous rather than episodic: neither "declared" or "terminated." "Actions short of war," then, must adopt an extraordinarily long-term perspective.

The character of the political entity: We know from our Viet Nam experience that the character of the *political entity* is an essential factor in *conflict resolution*. The *discipline, morale* and *cohesion* that binds individuals to the group are fundamental considerations. Eccles states that:

In a free society, strategy ultimately rests and is dependent on the values of the people of the nation concerned. If these values are confused, contradictory, or superficial, the strategy adopted will have similar characteristics³⁶

A more recent example of the impact of a *political entity's* character is the fervor of contemporary extremist Islamic societies. By proffering eternal well-being for action in support of Islam, these societies frequently suppress the individual's natural instinct for self-preservation. Islam (or similar ideologies) thereby generates motivation superior to *ideas* that depend on reinforcement of temporal well-being.

A democracy's challenge in pursuing *conflict resolution* is that one of its more cherished concepts is really an "idea about ideas," specifically: that no specific set of *ideas* merits official sanction and promotion by the *political entity*. This "laissez-faire" attitude toward *ideas* promotes a wonderful diversity but terrible challenges for generating *morale, discipline, and cohesion* in the *political entity*. Such notions are paradoxically "un-American."

Responsibility: A conflict perspective illustrates that military power is but one arm of *policy*. It is an axiom among military professionals that "we are not hired to win battles, we are hired to win wars." A corollary should be that "military professionals are hired to prosecute war and warfare, but not conflicts." There are nonmilitary "operational artists" who link political, economic and diplomatic power to the political entity's *end state*.³⁷

Policy Prosecution Warfare: Having attempted to build a doctrine on theoretical quicksand, US Army attempts to address its most likely form of conflict bogged down immediately in a quagmire of controversy as to the very name of the topic at hand. "Actions short of war" marks the spot where "low-intensity conflict" sank. Finding it intellectually dissatisfying to define through negation ("we don't know what it is but we know what it isn't"), we will propose that military participation in actions previously described as "low-intensity conflict" or "actions short of war" is in fact "**policy prosecution warfare**." This term communicates the political direction, shared responsibility, and constrained application of violence that are the essence of this type of *conflict resolution*.

Theory and the Doctrine of Operational Art: We have tried to demonstrate that our model offers some shelter from the chaos that confuses *conflict* with *war*. But there is more than one storm on the horizon. A strong wind of interest in operational art revealed flaws in our previous theoretical structure. Can this alternate theoretical construction avoid such a fate?

Components: The new theoretical framework incorporates several components of the old. A survey of what remains from the old structure will highlight the differences between the two.

Center of Gravity: We cannot find the concept of a "center of gravity ... the hub of all power and movement"³⁸ in our new theoretical construction. Yet it is also not in the debris of our previous theory. It would seem that the theoretical components of *force, cause and effect* and *linkage* are the essential elements that together comprise the center of gravity concept. Center of gravity is incorporated in the new structure, but as a collection of several elements rather than as a single theoretical notion.

The US Army has had difficulties assimilating the center of gravity concept. In a student monograph Major James O. Klevit noted that:

... the concept of a center of gravity of the enemy force, as the hub of all power and movement, is of utility only insofar as the operational artist uses it as a start point for a much more detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent ... Mere identification of this or that unit, force, or component of force as the enemy's center of gravity may not -- probably will not -- suffice.³⁹

It is difficult to identify "the hub of all power," for in modern warfare power originates from a complex, dynamic series of cause and effect relationships. Mr. James Schneider and LTC Lawrence Izzo have proposed a solution to this dilemma by restricting the center of gravity concept to manifestations of physical power.⁴⁰ This solution is feasible but it demands a level of doctrinal rigor that the US Army has not demonstrated to date. A secondary drawback is that restriction of the enormously popular center of gravity concept to physical considerations might suppress assessment of non-physical components of force such as will.

Although the essential idea underlying the center of gravity concept is the *linkage* of a series of *cause and effect* relationships, the notion communicated by the center of gravity theory is one of "centrality" (hub), "unity" or "singularity." The center of gravity -- the centerpiece of our operational doctrine -- ironically conceals the true character of operational art.

In light of the extended scope, tempo and duration of modern warfare, the proliferation of command and control hierarchies and the multiplication of combat means, Clausewitz today might conclude that his own concept of the center of gravity is "... a telescoped chain of ideas ... one must keep the proper meaning in mind to avoid errors."⁴¹

Culminating Point: The *culminating point* is another "telescoped chain of ideas" that our new theoretical structure extends into its components of *cause and effect*, *linkage*, and *resilience*. Like center of gravity, the culminating point is not incorrect theory, merely maddeningly obscure theory. Citing Major Kievit again:

... the concept of a culminating point for both offense and defense seems perfectly valid, and clearly recognizable in historical hindsight, but it is extremely difficult for an operational commander to make any predictive use of them ... the factors involved are so numerous, and so interrelated, that due to the fog of war even the commander of the force involved may fail to recognize having reached culmination; his opponent will have even greater difficulty recognizing it.⁴²

Defense vs Offense: This new theoretical structure cannot resolve the debate sparked by Clausewitz's assertion that "defense is the stronger form of war." But if we retain our perspective of war as a subset of *conflict*, it is interesting to consider the implications of Arnold Wolfers comment on change and continuity:

It is an open question which is the most striking feature of the international order -- the extent and rapidity of change or the astonishing persistence of tradition. As a matter of fact, if one can criticize some recent studies it is not because they fail to take account of change but because they exaggerate its impact to the point of losing sight of the aspects of continuity and of successful resistance to change that are equally conspicuous in our day.⁴³

We can interpret "resistance to change" as an "idea inertia" which resists the moving effect of *force*. Although it is not Clausewitz's explanation, it is not unreasonable that man's natural inertia of *ideas* is somehow related to the apparent superiority of defense over offense.

Decisive Points/Objective Points/Decisive Moments:

We find these notions in the debris of our old theoretical structure and choose to leave them there. They are ill-named and, in our current conflict context, ill-conceived. They are routinely associated with specific points in space and time, and therefore limit the explanation of military decision to a narrow portion of the physical domain. They do not communicate the dynamic interaction of dueling forces, nor do they adequately address the psychological aspect of the decision process. Although our own mechanism of decision is admittedly less straightforward than the notion of decisive "points" and "moments," it is more faithful to the actual process of conflict resolution through military action.

Conflict Intensity: We have already noted the US Army's failed attempt to distinguish the intensity of conflict. "Actions Short of War" has called off the attack, but should the US Army decide in the future that classification of conflict is necessary, then a concept of potential utility is Clausewitz's notion of "polarity" -- "the extent to which the victory of one side precludes the victory of the other."⁴⁴ Cast in the light of our general conflict model, *polarity* measures the degree of

resolution required to bring mutually contradicting *ideas* to an "acceptable" level of conflict. That measurement is a useful classification with implications for the resources applied to the conflict and the commitment of the *political entity* to successful *conflict resolution*.

Theory and Doctrinal Organization: FM 100-5 Operations is an ambitious document that goes a considerable distance in addressing the Army's needs for history, theory and doctrine. Because the peculiar *perspective* of operational art is *linkage*, and because the *cause and effect* relationship of *linkage* similarly pervades the other (strategic, tactical) perspectives of war and its *hierarchies* as well, the Army's instinct to label FM 100-5 as its premier doctrinal document is a sound one. Nevertheless, logic can improve on instinct by refining our doctrinal organization to correspond with theoretical distinctions of *war*, *warfare*, and *conflict*. In a paper entitled "Removing Square Pegs from Round Holes", Colonel Richard M. Swain notes:

FM 100-5 describes a doctrine of traditional warfare between continental armies. If it is truly to be a warfighting manual it must also address the use of U.S. military forces in revolutionary war, war where the center of gravity is not the enemy but the body politic, where the military operations are not the primary activity but subordinate to political, economic and social initiatives.⁴⁵

During construction of our theory of general conflict, we noted a key distinction in the political entity's sanction of general violence in *war* versus in *policy prosecution warfare*. A logical evolution in our doctrinal organization, then, would be the evolution of the 100-20 series of documents to FM 100-20, Policy Prosecution Warfare, a companion piece to FM

100-5 that outlines operational art in the special context of that particular type of *conflict resolution* process.

The common foundation of both *war* and *policy prosecution warfare* is *general conflict* theory. Our logical revision of doctrinal organization is completed if FM 100-1, The Army, adopts *general conflict* as its theoretical purview. FM 100-1 will require considerable evolution to fulfill this requirement.⁴⁶ FM 100-1 does not currently establish a useful theoretical distinction of *conflict resolution* versus *war* or *war* versus *warfare*. The small portion of the text that addresses *conflict* is squandered on the notion of *conflict intensity*.

A strict interpretation of our theoretical model would establish general conflict theory and doctrine as a multi-agency responsibility beyond the authority of the Department of Defense. It is symptomatic of a democracy's approach to conflict resolution that such a multi-agency document is not a realistic expectation. A body of coherent conflict theory and doctrine at even the DOD level would be an exciting accomplishment.

FM 100-1 has been described as "The Chief's Coffee Table Manual." The Army's best hope is to revise that manual to project its own theoretically sound vision of the proper role of military power in the *conflict resolution* process. Over time, and across that coffee table, that vision may induce similar understanding in the key decision makers of government.

A final consideration of theory's relationship to the organization of doctrine will be whether that relationship should be an explicit one. Does the Army need a document dedicated solely to theory? The Japanese Army

publishes Senri Nyumon (An Introduction to the Principles of War), a comprehensive discussion of military concepts that makes no mention of current context (weapons, organization, equipment) and can only be described as a compendium of military theory.⁴⁷ The Soviet Army can similarly point to a collection of writings that constitute a carefully structured body of explicit military theory.

But there are alternate views on the merits of an explicit, official statement of military theory. Describing the writings of the German General Staff of the late nineteenth century in his The Brain of An Army, Spenser Wilkinson noted that: "... each work is published on the responsibility of its author. There is no official theory; only the theories of individual officers."⁴⁸

We will merely present the two sides of this issue and not attempt to choose between them. The essence of the dilemma is the critical consequence of theory: an endorsed, explicit statement of theory promotes dissemination and understanding -- but at the same time such bureaucratic imprimatur risks rigidity and narrow-mindedness.

VII - THEORY REVISITED

"The fact is that abstract ideas are conceptual integrations which subsume an incalculable number of concretes -- and that without abstract ideas you would not be able to deal with concrete, particular, real life problems"⁴⁹ -- Ayn Rand: *Philosophy: Who Needs It?*

After having tested a new construction technique, any builder will pause to assess the technique's demonstrated advantages and disadvantages. What special observations can we make on theory's role in understanding of *conflict* and *operational art*? What potential advantages does it offer? What are its limitations?

Clausewitz: In assessing our experience with theory, we cannot fail to note the recurring references to one particular theoretician -- Clausewitz. Herbert Rosinski described Clausewitz as "that rare phenomenon, a natural born theorist. Whatever he touched revealed under his hands its hidden secrets."⁵⁰ It is nearly impossible to construct any concept of *conflict* or *war* without discovering the blueprint in Clausewitz's treatise On War. The reasons for Clausewitz's preeminence among the theoreticians of war are at least two-fold:

First, Clausewitz scrupulously concentrated on concept rather than context. This focus has given his work the characteristic of timelessness that is the essence of theory. Julian Linder wrote that:

Clausewitz' lasting contribution, and it is a very great one, amounts to his having provided a framework within which war can be analysed. His formulae express the idea of war at such a high level of generalization that they are still useful today⁵¹

Second, Clausewitz never abandoned his determination that the only feasible philosophical perspective of war was to view war as a whole: "only

the unity of our point of view can preserve us from contradictions."⁵²

Borrowing from Herbert Rosinski again:

It is in this sphere of 'War as a Whole,' touched upon, but fundamentally unexplored by men like Guibert, Jomini, Scharnhorst, and Ruehle, that forms the special discovery and preserve of Clausewitz.⁵³

In undertaking a project that attempted to encompass conflict, war, warfare and their interrelationships, it should not surprise us that we used Clausewitz's holistic perspective again and again.

Analogies of Physics: We noted in the start of this paper that the construction of theory is an arbitrary act of creativity. The theorist may select from innumerable structures and analogies to model the complexity of reality. One particular analogy type, however, demonstrates recurring effectiveness: analogies of physics.

Our model of military force was a physical analogy ($F=Ma$) in which military force corresponded to physical force (F) as the product of military means (M) and directed will (a). Another analogy of physics was the notion of initiative as the resultant vector of the interacting forces of enemy/friendly action/reaction. Analogies of physics dominate Clausewitzian theory as well: "center of gravity," "friction," and "polarity" are but a few.

Analogies of physics owe their efficacy as military theory first to the fact that so much of the process of war is in fact physics. Physics, furthermore, is part and parcel of our everyday existence, so that analogs based on notions such as time, distance, and mass are readily understood. Finally, the laws of physics are relatively immutable, so they are apt analogs for timeless principles and relationships. Before we close this assessment, however, we should note that analogies of physics are not

equally applicable to every aspect of the phenomena of conflict and war.

Clausewitz observed that:

If we break down war into its various activities, we will find that the difficulties are not uniform throughout. The more physical the activity, the less the difficulties will be. The more the activity becomes intellectual and turns into motives which exercise a determining influence on the commander's will, the more the difficulties will increase. Thus it is easier to use theory to organize, plan and conduct an engagement than it is to use it in determining the engagement's purpose.⁵⁴

Analogies of physics are most appropriate to the physical domain. Their applicability to the moral and cybernetic domain are limited, so analogies of physics alone cannot comprise a comprehensive theory of war. Clausewitz deplored theories that "direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities" because in war "all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects."⁵⁵

The Limitations of Military Theory: Just as Clausewitz found it necessary to distinguish "absolute war" from "real war," we must note a distinction between "ideal theory" and "practical theory." In its ideal, theory is a timeless structure of comprehensive concepts that will retain their validity independent of the context of situation and historical developments. In practice theory's very nature as a model dooms it to always fall short of this ideal, with respect both to timelessness and comprehensiveness.

Clausewitz's explanation of the impossibility of comprehensively modelling the phenomenon of war is still applicable:

The conduct of war branches out in almost all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a synthesis. An irreconcilable conflict exists between this type of theory and actual practice.⁵⁶

In The Ascent of Man, Jacob Bronowski traced the history of man's intellectual development:

Every theory, however majestic, has hidden assumptions which are open to challenge and, indeed, in time will make it necessary to replace it ... every theory is based in some analogy, and sooner or later the theory fails because the analogy turns out to be false. A theory in its day helps to solve the problems of the day.⁵⁷

It is a tribute to the genius of the great theoreticians such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu that their concepts still contribute to solutions of "the problems of the day."

Besides the impossibility of ideal timelessness and comprehensiveness, military theory in particular must overcome additional disadvantages. Because military phenomena include the presently incalculable workings of the human psyche, military theory is doomed to relative ambiguity compared to theories in other fields of knowledge:

Military theory can never be formulated or expressed with the precision that we demand of theory in the physical sciences. We can not expect it to be perfect or permanent. It consists, rather, of a set of concepts, a group of interrelationships of cause and effect. These concepts evolve out of the analysis of history, from the records and patterns of the past.⁵⁸

Aggravating the ambiguity of the human psychological process is the fact that military phenomena involve the dynamic interaction of contesting human psyches "dueling" at cross-purposes with each other. This gives rise to what Edward Luttwak describes as war's "paradoxical logic" that "often violates ordinary linear logic by inducing the coming together and even the reversal of opposites" ⁵⁹ The consequence of this ambiguity and paradoxical logic is that:

Theory will never solve a military problem; it will shed light on it, and it will assist those who have responsibility and authority.⁶⁰

The Significance of Military Theory: The limitations of military theory do not diminish its significance. What can have greater impact on decision and understanding than the fundamental components and organization of our ideas?

This brings us back to the vital importance of sound theory. Theory does not tell us the answers to all questions. It does give invaluable aid in asking the right questions, for it helps us to distinguish between the important and the unimportant and it gives us a better understanding of cause and effect.⁶¹

Theory is an aspect of the decision process that an Army neglects at its own peril. In a brilliant essay entitled "Scharnhorst to Schlieffen: The Rise and Decline of German Military Thought," Herbert Rosinski traced the development of German military theory. Rosinski attributed the decline of German military fortunes after the Franco-Prussian War to a corresponding decline in their theoretical focus. Rosinski related a 1934 statement of the German K.L. von Oertzen:

It is a curious fact that in the same days that Clausewitz was given the crown of immortality [after the Franco-Prussian War - author's note] ... he thereby began to be neglected. The theoretical training (at the War Academy) was replaced by the so-called applicatory method. For the last fifty years we have had no advance in the theory of war. The struggle for theoretical problems hardly occupied the minds any longer ... we did, indeed, base ourselves upon the philosophy of war of Clausewitz, but we failed to develop it. We did not want any theory, only practice, and we overlooked completely that the practical man too follows a theory, even when he is himself not conscious of the fact, only he takes this theory on without examination, without real understanding, schematically.⁶²

From "*auftragstaktik*" to "*fingerspitzengefuehl*," the United States Army has consistently demonstrated a penchant for the German military example. US Army attitudes toward theory appear to have a precedent in the German military experience. Will we repeat Germany's strategic catastrophes?

VIII - Summary and Conclusion

"My central thesis is that military planning, education, and discussion are handicapped by the lack of a comprehensive theory of modern conflict"⁶³ -- Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*

Our reconstruction effort is complete. This alternate theoretical structure of operational art emphasizes *linkage*, the criticality of *cause and effect* relationships that function through the *mechanism of decision*. The structure has space dedicated to both *war* in the traditional sense and *policy prosecution warfare*; the *political entity's* sanction of *general violence* is the arbitrary but nonetheless significant partition.

The model of operational art rests on a foundation of *general conflict* theory. *Conflict resolution* is modelled as the competition of *ideas* between *political entities*. The fundamental means of that competition are *reason* and *violence*; its domains are *physical*, *cybernetic* and *moral*.

The structure helps us distinguish the *strategic*, *operational* and *tactical perspectives* of *war* from the *hierarchies of command*. It is a useful framework for understanding the various *kinds* of *war*. *War* is shown to be a subset of *conflict resolution*, and *conflict resolution* itself is distinguished from *general conflict* and *conflict elimination*.

Our reconstruction project has yielded insights into the role of theory in understanding *conflict*, *war*, and *warfare*. Those insights are cause for some uneasiness, however, because we are an Army that scorns semantics. We are reluctant to define. If we reluctantly define, we enthusiastically ignore the definition. In 1965 Henry E. Eccles lamented that "We are in a semantic labyrinth of our own making ... the clarification of terms is no mere academic drill. Terms shape strategy.

And strategy ... shapes our national destiny."⁶⁴ Semantic indiscipline handicaps our efforts to construct a firm theoretical-doctrinal shelter.

Theory, moreover, is a tool that refuses to drop from our hands, because "we theorize even when we are unaware of doing so."⁶⁵ Our option is not "theory: yes or no?;" our choice is "theory: good or bad?" Ayn Rand proposes that:

You have no choice about the necessity to integrate your observations, your experiences, your knowledge into abstract ideas ... Your only choice is whether you define your philosophy by a conscious, rational, disciplined process of thought and scrupulously logical deliberation - or let your subconscious accumulate a junk heap of unwarranted conclusions, false generalizations, undefined contradictions, undigested slogans, unidentified wishes, doubts and fears, thrown together by chance, but integrated by your subconscious into a kind of mongrel philosophy and fused into a single, solid weight: self-doubt, like a ball and chain in the place where your mind's wings should have grown.⁶⁶

Although the new model appears to correct several of the deficiencies of its predecessor, it is obviously an extreme simplification of the complex reality it attempts to model. This alternate theoretical construction is a simple prototype that demonstrates the advantages of conflict theory in understanding war and operational art. We would want to expand and reinforce this structure considerably before attempting to live in it -- we must never underestimate the storms it may have to withstand.

APPENDIX A -- ELEMENTS OF THEORY: DEFINITIONS (in the order of their presentation)

PART I - GENERAL CONFLICT

REALITY The totality of all things possessing actuality, existence, or essence; that which exists objectively and in fact [American Heritage Dictionary]

REASON The ordering of the chaos and complexity of reality into conceptions or ideas

LOGIC The art of non-contradictory identification.

IDEAS A mental entity: that which exists in the mind. Values, interests, beliefs, purpose, etc are also ideas or collections of ideas.

MOTIVATION The relative priority an individual or group assigns to an idea

DESIRE Mental proclivity

WILL A commitment to manifest *desire* through action

SOCIAL ENTITY A group that shares a common idea set

POWER The capacity to make or destroy, the capacity to assert will over another political entity

POLITICAL ENTITY A group that shares a common idea set about power

COHESION The degree of idea correlation among the members of a political entity

DISCIPLINE Each individual's commitment to conform to the group idea set

MORALE The group (or individual) measure of confidence that their ideas are an accurate reflection of reality and will best secure their well-being

CONFLICT The mutual contradiction of ideas or idea sets (a status)

CONFLICT RESOLUTION A redefinition of the relationship between conflicting ideas (a process)

CONFLICT ELIMINATION The complete elimination of ideas in conflict

TOTALITY The degree to which *conflict resolution* approaches *conflict elimination*

ENDS The goals for the conflict resolution process: the intended reconfiguration of the competing idea sets

MEANS A method, course of action, or instrument by which some act can be accomplished or some end achieved [American Heritage Dictionary]

POLICY The combination of *means* by which a *political entity* attempts to achieve its *ends*

POWER The ability or capacity to act effectively (American Heritage Dictionary)

VIOLENCE Physical force exerted for the purpose of violating, damaging, or abusing (American Heritage Dictionary)

PHYSICAL DOMAIN The aspects of conflict and conflict resolution associated with objective reality of time and space

CYBERNETIC DOMAIN The aspects of conflict and conflict resolution associated with the communication of perceptions and ideas between individuals and groups

MORAL DOMAIN The aspects of conflict and conflict resolution associated with individual and group comparison and selection of ideas

FOG A discrepancy between perception and reality

FRICTION The loss of power in moving ideas; the inefficiency in power application

CHANCE Inexplicable cause and effect relationships

RISK Estimate and forecast of *chance* and its impact on the *conflict resolution* process

PART II - WAR AND WARFARE

WAR A subset of conflict resolution; conflict resolution pursued with the political entity's sanction of general violence

WARFARE Acts of war that occur without the political entity's sanction for the application of general violence

KINDS OF WAR Classifications of *war* or *warfare*, e.g., "limited war", "revolutionary war", "internal war", "nuclear war"

PERSPECTIVES OF WAR Strategic, tactical and operational views of war

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE The comprehensive direction of power to attain ends

TACTICAL PERSPECTIVE The employment of specific means to obtain immediate goals

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE The linkage of *tactical* actions to achieve *strategic* objectives

HIERARCHIES OF WAR The several layers of organization required to accomplish military activity (Also the hierarchies of *command*)

LINKAGE The combination of *cause and effect* relationships in various *ways* that use *means* to accomplish *ends*

OPERATIONAL ART The art of linkage: the application of means in a combination of cause and effect relationships (*ways*) to accomplish ends

MECHANISM OF DECISION The mechanism by which operational art effects the reconfiguration of ideas

END STATE The state of reconfiguration of an opponents idea set, to include the identification of that idea set, the extent of its acceptance throughout the enemy political entity, the deadline for that acceptance and the duration of that acceptance

DECISION The selection and prioritization of alternate ideas

MILITARY CONDITION The description of *dispersion, concentration, and resilience* of military forces that constitutes the military contribution to attaining the desired *end state*

MILITARY FORCE The product of military means and directed will

DYNAMIC INTERACTION The duel between military forces

ACTION The independent application of force to an opponent

REACTION The application of force to an opponent in response to his own proactive application of force

INITIATIVE The sum resultant of interacting proactive and reactive forces that reflects an advantage to one of dueling forces

CONCENTRATION The intensification of violence in space

TEMPO The intensification of violence in time

DIRECTED WILL The will of the group as a whole

DISPERSION The distribution of resources in space and time

RESILIENCE The ability to sustain and/or reconstitute military means

APPENDIX B -- THEORY MAP

A MODEL OF GENERAL CONFLICT AND OPERATIONAL ART

REALITY, LOGIC AND IDEAS

REALITY

LOGIC

IDEAS

MOTIVATION

DESIRE

WILL

COHESION

DISCIPLINE

MORALE

CONFLICT

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

CONFLICT RESOLUTION vs CONFLICT

CONFLICT RESOLUTION vs CONFLICT ELIMINATION

CONFLICT RESOLUTION ENDS

CONFLICT RESOLUTION MEANS: POLICY (POWER)

REASON

VIOLENCE

THE DOMAINS OF CONFLICT

PHYSICAL

CYBERNETIC

MORAL

CONFLICT RESOLUTION vs WAR

WAR, WARFARE AND OPERATIONAL ART

KINDS OF WAR

PERSPECTIVES OF WAR

STRATEGIC

TACTICAL

OPERATIONAL

HIERARCHIES OF WAR

LINKAGE: OPERATIONAL ART

OPERATIONAL ART: THE MECHANISM OF DECISION

END STATE AND MILITARY CONDITIONS

FORCE

THE PHYSICS ANALOGY ($F=Ma$)

DYNAMIC INTERACTION

ACTION

REACTION

DECISION

INDIVIDUAL DECISION

GROUP DECISION


CONCENTRATION

DISPERSION

TEMPO

RESILIENCE


APPENDIX C -- Theory Sketches



THEORY SKETCH 1: REALITY, REASON AND IDEAS


Individuals perceive reality through their senses. Reason orders those perceptions into conceptions or ideas -- the basis of "values," "interests," "purpose," "beliefs," etc.

APPENDIX C -- Theory Sketches




THEORY SKETCH 2: IDEAS AND GROUPS

Individuals share ideas through the exchange of information, and develop idea sets -- collections of their most highly valued and accepted ideas. Group cohesion reflects the degree of idea correlation among individuals. Discipline is each individual's commitment to conform to the group idea set. Morale is the group (or individual's) confidence that its ideas are an accurate reflection of reality and will best secure well-being.




THEORY SKETCH 3: CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict is the mutually contradictory interpretation of reality between two political entities. Such conflict may be acceptable (in which case the two political entities "agree to disagree" or unacceptable (in which case the process of conflict resolution begins). The ends of conflict resolution is a reconfiguration of the opposing idea set to an acceptable state. The means of conflict resolution is policy, which in the various elements of power demonstrates various combinations of reason and violence.



THEORY SKETCH 4: THE DOMAINS OF CONFLICT


Violence and action alter the objective reality of time and space -- the physical domain of conflict. Individuals perceive this altered reality and communicate these perceptions to others in the cybernetic domain. These communicated perceptions influence reason and alter discipline, morale, cohesion and -- ultimately -- idea set configuration -- the moral domain.



THEORY SKETCH 5: CONFLICT, WAR AND WARFARE

War and warfare are subsets of conflict. The distinction is a legal one: conflicts become wars when political entities declare them to be so. Declarations of war imply a societal sanction for the general application of violence. "Acts of war" that do not enjoy the political entity's sanction for general violence are warfare.

APPENDIX C -- Theory Sketches



THEORY SKETCH 6: MILITARY FORCE AND DYNAMIC INTERACTION

Military force is the product of available means and directed will. The components of directed will are motivation, cohesion, morale and discipline. The elements of available means include concentration, dispersion, tempo (the rate of violence application) and resilience (the ability to sustain and/or reconstitute military means). The operational artist applies force (action) and/or counters the force of his opponent (reaction). The sum resultant of these active and reactive forces reflects a relative advantage of initiative for one of the combatants.

APPENDIX D -- Design Notes: IDEAS vs POWER as the BASIS OF CONFLICT

A Basic Architectural Decision

When contemplating a new design, an architect's most fundamental decision is his choice of building materials. The use of stone versus wood, for example, has tremendous implications for a building design, construction, and utility. We must confront an analogous decision at the start of our theoretical planning. Should *ideas* or *power* be the basis of our model of conflict? Is conflict the mutual contradiction of ideas -- our mental perceptions of reality, or is it a competition for power -- the capacity to make or destroy?

Two Perspectives on Humanity

The analysis of this design decision leads very quickly to issues of a fundamental, philosophical nature. Conflict, unfortunately, is both unique to man and characteristic of man. If we can discern the key characteristics that distinguish man from animal, then perhaps those distinctions will illuminate the essence of conflict.

The distinction of man as a *thinking* animal -- homo sapiens -- is well established. His ability to formulate mental entities to a high level of abstraction far exceeds other species. The ability to use symbology -- language -- to record and communicate his thoughts is a related characteristic that marks *ideas* as a differentiating trait of humanity.

But our analysis is not complete. An equally distinguishing characteristic of man is his unique accomplishment in generally rupturing those bonds of nature that still govern the animal species. In Power and Human Destiny, Herbert Rosinski argued that man does this through *power*:

As he thus develops himself and little by little conquers a living space from surrounding nature, man unavoidably involves himself in the dialectic of power ... The only way in which he could free himself from the bondage of nature was by substituting for the "organic" living sphere of his self-chosen, self-developed way of life, or culture. To do this he needed to develop the power to create for himself this new world of culture -- new foods, tools, shelter, fire, rites, customs, traditions, societies. Mankind's unceasing quest for freedom was absolutely dependent upon the development of more and more power, higher and higher levels of power. Man's quest for freedom and his quest for power have been but the two faces of a single coin.⁶⁷

Some Theoretical Considerations

The Relationship: The above perspectives of humanity suggest that *ideas* and *power* may be complementary aspects of the conflict phenomenon. Their complementary relationship emerges if we ask: "Why do men seek *power*?" Men seek *power* for the same reasons that they prioritize their *ideas*: to enhance their present or future sense of well-being. This instinct or choice for well-being is the link that binds *ideas* -- the mental model of what constitutes well-being -- to *power* -- the capacity to convert that *idea* model into a reality.

The Distinction: Although the notion of *ideas* and *power* are complementary, they are far from identical. An examination of the distinctions between *ideas* and *power* clarifies their relationship and develops insights as to the nature of conflict.

The resolution of the *conflict* between mutually contradictory *ideas* has a broad range of manifestations. At the benign end of the spectrum there is simple "intellectual conflict," a rational "agreement to disagree" in which the conflict participants acknowledge the contradiction of *ideas* but take no action -- rational or violent -- to preempt their opponent. At the alternate end of the spectrum is the not-so-benign specter of total,

absolute war, competition to the ultimate elimination of the opposing participant. What distinguishes "acceptable conflict" from "unacceptable conflict;" what is the trigger that precipitates the *conflict resolution* process?

Perhaps that trigger is *power*. If the *ideas* in conflict have implications for *power* -- the ability of either participant to assert his will over the other -- then concerns for future well-being will initiate the conflict resolution process -- typically through an attempt to gain more *power*. Herbert Rosinski writes:

... men have been intensively concerned not only with their own power but with that of their neighbors as well. In their pursuit of a larger freedom within their own natural environment, they have also been forced to try to develop the means of avoiding conquest and enslavement or worse at the hands of their neighbors. This basic sense of mistrust and rivalry between human groups has acted right down to the present as a powerful spur to the development of more and more power ⁶⁶

Power is also a useful concept for distinguishing *social entities* from political ones. *Social entities* are groups of individuals that share *ideas*. A subset of these *social entities* are *political entities* -- groups that share *ideas* about *power*. The allocation and distribution of *power* is a key characteristic of *political entities*.

Finally, *power* is distinct from *ideas* just as means are to ends. *Ideas* are the conceptualization of well-being, the motivation for *power*, the ends for which *power* is but a means. In considering conflict aims, for example, preemption of *ideas* is of more consequence than destruction of *power*. History is replete with instances in which *ideas* regenerate *power*.

A Judgment Rather Than a Conclusion

Just as architects can seldom build a structure out of solely one material, *power* and *ideas* will both have a role in our theoretical structure. Conflict is the mutual contradiction of *ideas*, but if those *ideas* influence the *power* relationship of the conflict participants, then a process of *conflict resolution* -- typically a competition for more *power* -- will ensue.

Although we will incorporate both *ideas* and *power* into our theoretical structure, only one of these materials can be the fundamental component, the basic "brick" of the model. In light of the complementary relationship between *ideas* and *power*, our selection will be somewhat arbitrary -- more a judgment rather than a conclusion. That judgment is that *ideas* will be the basis of our model of conflict.

The reasons for that judgment are threefold: First, because *ideas* are the ends of *power*, an *idea* model allows us to address both the ends and means of conflict. While a *power* model could address the process of *conflict resolution*, our *idea* model will enable us to distinguish *conflict* from *conflict resolution*, and understand -- with the help of *power* -- why *conflict* (*idea* contradiction) is sometimes "acceptable," sometimes "unacceptable."

Second, "a theory in its day solves the problems of its day." A utilitarian consideration for our theory must be an attempt to address a consistent theme in our readings of history: our general tendency to overlook the moral, psychological aspects of war. A theory that models conflict as a competition of *ideas* establishes a groundwork for

considerations of *reason*, *will*, *motivation* and the *mechanism of decision* -- psychological aspects of the art of war.

Finally, like an architect who designs his structure to match its environs, we should not overlook the democratic society that this model would serve. For reasons probably grounded in our Judeo-Christian ethic, our democratic society attaches pejorative connotations to "power politics." The presentation of conflict as a competition for the "balance of power" does not seem to reinforce *cohesion*, *morale* and *discipline* in the pursuit of that conflict. Americans will go to war for a Washington or a Lincoln. They are indifferent to a Kissinger.

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¹ Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press), 1965. p22.

² Peter Paret, "The Genesis of On War", Introduction to Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1984. p 11.

³ Ibid, p 11.

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1984. p 578.

⁵ Eric Hoffer, The True Believers, (New York: Harper and Row), 1951. p 579.

⁶ Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It?, (New York: New American Library), 1982, p 62.

⁷ Ideas offer the advantage of being general purpose.

⁸ The term "idea set" is admittedly awkward. The most appropriate term would be "ideology", but that word has acquired such pejorative connotations that it will not be used.

⁹ Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War" in Makers of Modern Strategy (edited by Peter Paret), (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1986, p 439.

¹⁰ We intentionally reject the phrase "two or more political entities" because conflict participants share the same relationship and each contributes to the unique character of that relationship. Events involving more than two conflict participants are in fact multiple dual conflict relationships.

¹¹ The relationship between conflict, power, and conflict resolution is addressed in greater detail at Appendix C.

¹² Julian Lider, On the Nature of War, Swedish Studies in International Relations, Saxon House, 1977, p 1.

¹³ Rand, Op Cit, p 68.

¹⁴ Col Richard M. Swain, "Careless Terms?", MR Letters, Military Review, October, 1987, pp 84-85.

¹⁵ Clausewitz, Op Cit, p 605.

¹⁶ Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, pp 79-82.

¹⁷ Clausewitz, Op Cit, p 579-580.

¹⁸ The Theory of Operational Art, Unpublished Text, p 30.

¹⁹ Professor Jim Schneider, The Loose Marble, Unpublished Paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, p33.

²⁰ Eccles, Op Cit, p 105.

²¹ U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1986, p 10.

²² Clausewitz, Op Cit, p 77.

²³ Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), p 410.

²⁴ "Surprise can now be recognized for what it is: not merely one factor of advantage in warfare among many others, *but rather the suspension, if only brief, if only partial, of the entire predicament of strategy*, even as the struggle continues. Without a reacting enemy, or rather to the extent and degree that surprise is achieved, the conduct of war becomes mere administration." Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 1987, p 8.

²⁵ Gordon A. Craig, The Battle of Koniggratz, Great Battles of History Series, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), 1964, pp 176-177.

²⁶ Clausewitz, Op Cit, p 137.

²⁷ SLA Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, p 154.

²⁸ Guy Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier, (London: Sphere Books Limited), 1967, p 382.

²⁹ SLA Marshall writes: "... one of the oldest myths in the military book (is) that morale comes from discipline. ... The process is precisely the reverse: ... true discipline is the product of morale," Men Against Fire, pp 158-159.

³⁰ GFR Henderson in SLA Marshall's Men Against Fire (Op Cit, p 170). Edward Luttwak also cites this phenomenon in his The Logic of Strategy (Op Cit, p 59): "as the war continues, a shift in perspectives eventually takes place by which the results originally hoped for are finally compared not to the sacrifices already made but rather to the further sacrifices that seem likely if the war continues."

³¹ Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle, (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing), 1982, pp 271-290.

³² Eccles, Op Cit, p 242.

³³ MG Franks, Address to CGSC Class 1986-1987, Spring of 1987.

³⁴ Lider, Op Cit, p 1.

³⁵ See Appendix C for a complete discussion of the decision to base the conflict model on ideas rather than power.

³⁶ Eccles, Op Cit, p 244, 53.

³⁷ The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy recommended that

"We also need to think of low-intensity conflict as a form of warfare that is not a problem just for the Department of Defense"

Article by John Burlage in Army Times, on or about 28 Jan 88

³⁸ Clausewitz, pp 595-596.

³⁹ Major James O. Kievit, Operational Art in the Ardennes Campaign, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p 31.

⁴⁰ James J. Schneider & Lawrence L. Izzo, Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity, Parameters, Vol XVII No. 3, September 1987, pp 46-57.

⁴¹ Clausewitz, Op Cit.

⁴² Kievit, Op Cit, p 32.

⁴³ John Spanier, Games Nations Play, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston) 1984, p vi.

⁴⁴ Clausewitz, Op Cit, p 83-84.

⁴⁵ Col Richard M. Swain, Removing Square Pegs from Round Holes, Military Review, December 1987, p 13.

⁴⁶ Swain, Ibid, p 13.

⁴⁷ Dr. Joseph West, Principles of War: A Translation from the Japanese, CSI Reprint, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁴⁸ Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of An Army, New York, London: MacMillan Publishing, 1890, p 100.

⁴⁹ Rand, Op Cit, p 5

⁵⁰ Herbert Rosinski, Scharnhorst to Schlieffen: The Rise and Decline of German Military Thought, Naval War College Review, p 88.

⁵¹ Lider, pp 358-359.

⁵² Rosinski, p 87.

⁵³ Rosinski, pp 89-90.

⁵⁴ Clausewitz p 140.

⁵⁵ Clausewitz, p 136.

⁵⁶ Clausewitz, p 134.

⁵⁷ Jacob Bronowski, The Ascent of Man, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1974. pp 240, 140.

⁵⁸ Eccles, p 254.

⁵⁹ Luttwak, Op Cit, p 5.

⁶⁰ Eccles, p 254.

⁶¹ Eccles, Op Cit, p 281.

⁶² Rosinski, Op Cit, pp 100-101.

⁶³ Eccles, Op Cit, p vi.

⁶⁴ Eccles, Op Cit, pp 8-13.

⁶⁵ Spanier, Op Cit, p 5.

⁶⁶ Ayn Rand, p 5.

⁶⁷ Herbert Rosinski Power and Human Destiny. (Edited by Richard P. Stebbins), New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. p13.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p 141.

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