The Civil War Campaigns of 1864: Operational and Tactical Defeat Leading to Strategic Victory
Abstract
This monograph analyzes the three major Civil War campaigns of 1864 in regard to several of the precepts of military theory. It uses the Wilderness, Petersburg, and Atlanta Campaigns, which moved the United States of America into the era of modern warfare, as case studies of the applicability of traditional military theory to modern warfare. The monograph first reviews the relationship between politics, strategy, operational planning and tactics, then discusses why these campaigns ended without the classic decisive, climatic battle. Next it offers an explanation of Grant's use of attrition warfare. The monograph concludes that a truly amazing phenomenon occurred during this year of the war. While Grant held Lee to a grinding campaign of attrition, he released Generals Sherman and Sheridan for highly successful campaigns of maneuver warfare in Georgia and the Shenandoah Valley respectively. Sherman and Sheridan provided the only Union tactical and operational successes of 1864, and excitement over their accomplishments gained Lincoln reelection. In the Eastern Theater of Operations, meanwhile, Grant lost almost every operational and tactical contest, but secured for the United States of America strategic victory.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 05, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA194885
Entities
People
- George W. Powers
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College