


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
THE ROLE OF THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG JUNE 30 1863-JULY 1/2
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STUDY PROJECT

THE ROLE OF THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG
JUNE 30, 1863-JULY 3, 1863
A GUIDE TO THE BATTLEFIELD

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PETER M. DAVENPORT

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THE ROLE OF THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG
JUNE 30, 1863-JULY 3, 1863
A GUIDE TO THE BATTLEFIELD

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel Peter M. Davenport, AR (Author)

Professor Jay Luvaas
Project Advisor

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U. S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

The Gettysburg Campaign is of major importance to any study of the American Civil War, being notable as the bloodiest battle of the war and for its pivotal position in the conflict. Occurring very nearly at the half way point of the conflict, the campaign marked the beginning of the decline of Confederate military fortune, particularly for the Army of Northern Virginia's cavalry.

Prior to the Gettysburg campaign, the struggle between the Confederacy and the Union had not produced a clear advantage for either side, thereby allowing the Confederacy to attain its objectives as a political, economic and territorial entity by default; however, diplomatic recognition as a sovereign nation, vital to the continued existence of the Confederacy, although sought had yet to be forthcoming. Spurred by the recent success at Chancellorsville on one hand and by the ominously adverse developments in the Mississippi Valley on the other and banking

on insistence by Washington authorities that the Army of the Potomac be kept at all times between the City of Washington and the Confederate forces, Lee undertook the offensive, advancing into Maryland and Pennsylvania by way of the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys.

It is the role of the cavalry forces in the Gettysburg campaign that will be the focus of this paper.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAVALRY IN THE UNITED STATES

Although cavalry was regaining significance in Europe during the seventeenth century, the wooded terrain of North America made its use difficult. As a result, the use of cavalry was slow to come to the colonies, but as early as 1733, units were found in the colonial militias with the establishment of the Charleston Horse Guards (1733), Chatham's Light Dragoons (Savannah, Georgia-1736), and the First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry (1774).

During the Revolutionary War, certain of the colonial units were redesignated as Continental Light Dragoon Regiments, including those from Virginia, Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania and Maryland. American cavalry units opposed Banastre Tarleton in the Carolinas and played a prominent role in the Battle of Cowpens, but after 1783, no mounted troops were again present in the regular forces of the American army until 1793 when a small band of cavalry was included in Major General Anthony Wayne's Legion which was sent on an expedition into Indian Territory. The Legion was abolished in 1796 and as a practical matter, cavalry ceased to exist except in the militia of the several states.

In 1808, the first regiment of light dragoons was organized with a second regiment being formed in 1812; however, their life was brief as in 1815, both regiments were disbanded. The First Dragoons were reactivated in 1833 and in 1837 the Second Dragoons

were reestablished. In 1855, while Jefferson Davis was Secretary of War, the 1st and 2nd U. S. Cavalry Regiments were formed. In August of 1861, the cavalry was reorganized and the 1st and 2nd Dragoons became the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Regiments, the Regiment of Mounted Rifles originally organized in 1846 became the 3d Cavalry and the original 1st and 2nd Cavalry became the 4th and 5th U. S. Cavalry Regiments and the 6th U. S. Cavalry was formed.¹

Depleted by departures of both officer and enlisted members by those joining the Confederacy, even as late as 1863, the Union cavalry was still in the rebuilding stage. For largely economic reasons, early calls for volunteer forces attempted to discourage cavalry units, as the expense of equipping and maintaining mounted units greatly exceeded the costs for comparable numbers of infantry forces. In sharp contrast to the Confederacy, the Union lacked both the tradition of horsemanship and the pool of experienced horsemen found in the south. Accounts of the training experiences of the Union cavalry during the period amply reflect the magnitude of the task.²

The lackluster performance of the Union cavalry during the early stages of the war and the relative frequency and ease with which they were placed at a disadvantage by their southern counterparts in 1861 and 1862 placed their value as a force in question. Questionable senior leadership, a cumbersome and inefficient

organizational structure which dispersed its effectiveness, and a general lack of experience all contributed to the commonly expressed sentiment that no one ever saw a dead Union cavalryman, a remark that disparaged both the courage and worth of the Union Cavalry Corps. Whatever his deficiencies in other areas, the Union cavalryman was clearly better equipped than his southern counterpart. Nearly every basic item of issue to the Union cavalryman was widely sought by his foe, particularly the saddle, rubberlined poncho and his weapons which included saber, revolver (generally the Army Colt model) and a breech loaded carbine (either the single shot Sharps or the eight shot Spencer repeating rifle).

Although the Union had a large advantage in weapons in general (the Union cavalry at Gettysburg had the latest available), it was in the Union remount system that the Union cavalry had the most decided advantage.³ Confederate cavalymen provided their own horses and were paid forty cents per day for their keep. If the horse were killed in the line of duty, the cavalryman was reimbursed the predetermined fair value of the animal; however, if the horse was captured, became lame, sick or worn out, it was its owner's loss. Cavalymen without mounts were said to belong to Q Troop and were given reasonable periods of leave to attempt to find new mounts. The Union cavalry provided horses to its men and as the war progressed, the quality of remounts steadily improved as the remount purchasers gained experience. By 1863,

the duration of the war had begun to work against the Confederacy and the relative initial advantage of generally superior horseflesh began to be overshadowed by the difficulties inherent in placing the burden of acquiring replacement mounts on an individual basis.

The roots of the improved performance of the Union cavalry at Gettysburg may be traced in no small measure to the changes in organizational structure commenced by Major General Joseph Hooker and completed by Major General George G. Meade. General Hooker had abolished the Grand Divisions created by his predecessor, Ambrose Burnside, and at the same time consolidated the cavalry into a single corps which was commanded by Major General George Stoneman. Prior to the reorganization, the largest cavalry unit was a division and the divisions and brigades had been dispersed among the grand divisions. Stoneman failed to meet Hooker's standards and was replaced by then Brigadier General Alfred Pleasonton who was elevated to two star rank on June 22, 1863 as a result of his "gallant conduct" at Chancellorsville.⁴

Under Hooker's reorganization, the number of corps commanders reporting to him was increased, but the new cavalry corps had greater cohesiveness, purpose and capability to counter their southern counterparts under Major General J. E. B. Stuart, who had used a similar system from the beginning. Hooker's focus upon the cavalry continued even up to the end of his command tenure.

On June 26, 1863, possibly because of Stahel's reputation of commanding his division from the seat of a covered wagon drawn by four white mules,⁵ Hooker requested his reassignment, indicating in the letter that "His presence here as a senior major general will much embarrass me and retard my movement."⁶

The other major factor in the improved performance of the union cavalry was the infusion of younger, aggressive commanders. Captain Wesley Merritt of the 2d U. S. Cavalry was recommended for promotion to Brigadier General by General Pleasonton on June 22, 1863.⁷ One of General Meade's first acts as the new commander of the Army of the Potomac was to request promotion of Elon J. Farnsworth of the 8th Illinois Cavalry and George A. Custer of the 5th U. S. Cavalry from captains to Brigadier Generals.⁸ Stahel's Division became the Third Division of the newly formed Cavalry Corps and Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick, who had been advanced in rank from lieutenant colonel to Brigadier General four days after the battle of Brandy Station, was placed in command with Custer and Farnsworth as the two brigade commanders.⁹ Merritt was assigned to Buford's First Division as the Reserve Brigade commander.¹⁰

STUART'S INSTRUCTIONS

An understanding of the cavalry's role in the Gettysburg Campaign might well start with an excerpt from General Robert E. Lee's Battle Report of the Gettysburg Campaign written in January of 1864:

...The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [Beverly H.] Robertson and [William E.] Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army without delay, and it was expected that General [J. E. B.] Stuart with the remainder of his command would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal Army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, believing that he would by that route be able to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemys' movements....

The prisoners taken by the cavalry and paroled at various places amounted to about eight hundred, and at Rockville a

large train of wagons coming from Washington was intercepted and captured. Many of them were destroyed, but one hundred and twenty-five, with all of the animals of the train, were secured.

The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food and forage, but the day after its arrival at Gettysburg, it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectively protected our left...

Robertson's and Jones' brigades arrived on the 3d July and were stationed upon our right flank....¹¹

The written directives given by General Lee to his Confederate cavalry commander, Major General James Ewell Brown Stuart, are contained in a letter to Stuart dated June 22, 1863 in which Lee wrote:

...I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge & take care of your rear, you can move with the other

three into Maryland & take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, & collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army....¹²

Correspondence from General Longstreet to General Lee that same day suggests that the latitude given Stuart may have originated with General Longstreet:

...Yours of 4 o'clock this afternoon is received. I have forwarded your letter to General Stuart with the suggestion that he pass by the enemy's rear if he thinks that he might get through....¹³

Although the date of the meeting is in dispute, it appears that it was Stuart himself who met with Generals Longstreet and Lee and suggested leaving two brigades of cavalry in the mountains to guard the passes and moving with the other three brigades into Hooker's rear to harrass him if he sought to cross the river. If Hooker moved into Maryland, Stuart could easily rejoin the army. Both Longstreet and Lee approved the proposal; however, Lee conditioned his assent upon Stuart's coverage of the right flank on the move north once he discovered that Hooker was crossing the river.¹⁴

Lee's letter to Stuart had been sent to General Longstreet with instructions to deliver it to Stuart if Longstreet felt that he could be spared:

...General Lee has enclosed to me this letter for you, to be forwarded to you provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think you can cross the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving via Hopewell Gap in the Bull Run Mountains and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route I think you would be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave...

N. B. I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will in a measure disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy...¹⁵

Another letter from Lee dated the following day gave conditional approval provided the passage could be effected without hindrance and stressed that after crossing the river, Stuart should "feel" Ewell's right, collecting information and provisions.

...If Genl Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three

others, but should he not appear to moving northward I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day and move over to Fredericktown.

You will however be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all of the damage you can, & cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on & feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, &c.

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind to watch the flank & rear of the army, & (in event of the army leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, & bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army.

As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner that you cross into Maryland after tomorrow the better....¹⁶

Given the previous operations that had brought Stuart prestige, particularly his encirclement of McClelland in June of 1862 which had advanced his early fame, it was entirely predictable that with the latitude afforded by General Lee's instructions, Stuart would attempt to quiet the criticism of newspaper accounts¹⁷ and redeem any lingering loss of face that he had suffered as a result of the Battle of Brandy Station with an attention attracting operation.

RETRACING STUART'S ROUTE

Rendezvousing with the brigades of Hampton, Fitz Lee and W. H. F. Lee near Salem Depot, Virginia, Stuart departed at one in the morning on June 25, 1863, and passed through Glasscock's Gap in the Bull Run Mountains and the towns of New Baltimore, Haymarket, Fairfax (June 27), crossing the Potomac at Rowser's Ford, and then on through Rockville, Sykesville (June 28), Westminster, Union Mills, Hanover (June 30), Dover, Carlisle (July 1) and finally reaching Gettysburg on July 2, 1863. ¹⁸

At Rockville, Stuart destroyed the telegraph lines for miles, causing a disruption in one of Hooker's major means of communication with Washington. While there, a large wagon train was captured. General Stuart's account relates the events that were to have a serious impact upon his mission:


Soon after taking possession [of Rockville], a long train of wagons approached from the direction of Washington, apparently but slightly guarded...The farthest wagon was within only 3 or 4 miles of Washington City, the train being about 8 miles long. Not one escaped, though many were upset and broken, so as to require their being burned. More than one hundred and twenty-five best United States model wagons and splendid teams with gay caparisons were secured and driven off. The mules and harness of the broken wagons

were also secured.

...I calculated that before the next brigade could...reach the defenses of Washington, it would be after dark; the troops there would have had time to march to position to meet attack on this road. To attack at night with cavalry, particularly unless certain of surprise, would have been extremely hazardous; to wait till morning, would have lost much time from my march to join General Lee, without the probability of compensating results. I therefore determined, after getting the wagons under way, to proceed directly north, so as to cut the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (now becoming the enemy's main war artery) that night. I found myself encumbered by about 400 prisoners, many of whom were officers....¹⁹

FOR THOSE WHO MIGHT WISH TO RETRACE THE ROUTE THAT STUART'S MAIN BODY TOOK FROM JUNE 25 TO JULY 2, 1863, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED. AS SALEM DEPOT IS NOT FOUND ON MOST ROAD MAPS, START AT CULPEPER WHICH IS LOCATED ON ROUTE 29 NEARLY MIDWAY BETWEEN WASHINGTON, D.C. AND CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA. TAKE ROUTE 29 NORTH WHICH WILL TAKE YOU THROUGH NEW BALTIMORE, HAYMARKET AND IN TO FAIRFAX. ALTHOUGH STUART CONTINUED ON TO ANNANDALE, IT SUGGESTED THAT YOU TAKE I-495 AND AVOID THE BUILT UP AREA OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AND GET OFF AFTER CROSSING THE POTOMAC AT MARYLAND EXIT 39 WHERE YOU WILL TAKE ROUTE 190 (NORTH/WEST) UNTIL

YOU REACH ROUTE 112 WHICH YOU WILL FOLLOW TO DRANESVILLE. AT DRANESVILLE, YOU CAN PICK UP ROUTE 28 WHICH WILL TAKE YOU IN TO ROCKVILLE. STAY ON ROUTE 28 THROUGH ROCKVILLE AND CONTINUE ON IT UNTIL YOU INTERSECT WITH ROUTE 97 WHICH YOU WILL TAKE TO THE NORTH. ROUTE 97 WILL TAKE YOU THROUGH COOKSVILLE. AT COOKSVILLE, YOU CAN DETOUR BRIEFLY OVER TO SYKESVILLE, THEN PICK ROUTE 97 UP AGAIN AND CONTINUE NORTH THROUGH WESTMINSTER AND UNION MILLS. AT UNION MILLS, THERE IS A NARROW ROAD THAT FORKS TO THE RIGHT WHICH IS UNDESIGNATED ON MOST ROAD MAPS WHICH WILL TAKE YOU IN TO HANOVER. FROM HANOVER, TAKE ROUTE 216 OVER TO JEFFERSON, THEN PROCEED NORTH ON ROUTE 516 TO DOVER WHERE YOU WILL PICK UP ROUTE 74 NORTH. ROUTE 74 WILL TAKE YOU THROUGH DILLSBURG AND TO CARLISLE. FROM CARLISLE, TAKE ROUTE 34 SOUTH DOWN TO GETTYSBURG.



JUNE 30, 1863

It was at Hanover following the cavalry battle in the city streets that Stuart elected to press on in the direction of Carlisle rather than to Gettysburg where the advance elements of Lee's army were preparing to meet the Union forces. Directions are provided, but the stop is optional as the streets on which the battle was fought are changed from 1863.

HANOVER IS LOCATED AT THE INTERSECTION OF HIGHWAYS OF 94, 116 AND 194 APPROXIMATELY 15 MILES FROM GETTYSBURG. AT THAT INTERSECTION, NOW BROADWAY AND CARLISLE ROAD, THERE IS A HISTORICAL MARKER AND AN EQUESTRIAN STATUE TO COMMEMORATE THE BATTLE.

At approximately 10:00 A. M., the advance element of the 2d North Carolina Cavalry entered the town of Hanover and ran into the rear of a Union cavalry brigade. Major John Hammond, of the Fifth New York Cavalry described the action:

On the morning of June 30, this command left Littlestown, Pa., and took up the line of march, being fourth in the column, the First Vermont, First West Virginia, and Elder's battery being in advance and the Eighteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry in the rear. About noon, we entered the town of Hanover, and halted in the main street. While resting, an attack was made upon the ambulances and stragglers in rear

of the Eighteenth Pennsylvania, driving them in upon the regiment, and completely breaking up the column, which ran in confusion up the street upon the rear of my regiment, which had faced about, and was trying to clear the streets of the fugitives preparatory to making a charge upon the advancing column of the enemy. They finally succeeded; and, without waiting for orders, immediately charged upon the enemy, driving them to the outside of town, where we found a large force drawn up in the road as a reserve, and

received from them a severe fire, causing the men to halt for a moment. General Farnsworth arriving at this time from the front, the men were reformed, and made another charge, driving the rebels in confusion along the road and through the fields...The enemy, finding himself repulsed, opened upon the town with artillery...Finding that our position endangered the town, we moved around to the eastern side ...The enemy, finding what our intentions were, retreated and we immediately started in pursuit, but failed to come up with him...²⁰

The report of Major William B. Darlington, commander of the Eighteenth Pennsylvania's report was both brief and candid:

On June 30, while passing through the town of Hanover, Pa., it was attacked by a brigade of rebel cavalry under General Stuart. Several squadrons had formed, when some ambulances,

which were in the rear, were driven by the frightened drivers through our ranks, creating so much confusion that we were compelled to retreat through the town, when we reformed...This is the only engagement in which the regiment has been broken...²¹

General Kirkpatrick's initial account related only the positive aspects of the engagement and his participation:

Five minutes after your dispatch saying that Stuart was making for Littlestown, my rear guard was attacked in Hanover, driven in, and a vigorous charge was made upon the rear and flanks of my command; at the same time the enemy opened with artillery from the hills at the right of the town. Brigadier-General Farnsworth quickly threw his brigade into position, and, by quick and vigorous charges, checked their attacks and drove the enemy out of town. The enemy soon showed himself in force on the left of the town and foolishly put himself in my rear. After a fight of about two hours, in which the whole command at different times was engaged, I made a vigorous attack upon their center, forced them back upon the road to Littlestown, and finally succeeded in breaking their center. One portion retreated toward York; the other passed to the right, toward Gettysburg. As the enemy was reported to be advancing from the direction of Berlin, I made no further

attempts to intercept Stuart's command...My command will be in readiness to move again at daylight to-morrow morning. We have plenty of forage, the men are in good spirits, and we don't fear Stuart's whole cavalry...²²

In a later report prepared after General Farnsworth's death, Kilpatrick gave the major credit to Farnsworth and the psychological advantage of the Union defenders:

...We reached Hanover at 10 a. m., and, while passing through the town (the Second Brigade in advance), the First Brigade (General Farnsworth) was attacked in flank and rear by the Confederate cavalry under Stuart. Some confusion ensued. The attack was determined and fierce. The main and side streets swarmed with rebel cavalry. The Eighteenth Pennsylvania was routed, but the gallant Farnsworth had passed from front to rear ere the shout of the rebel charge had ceased to ring through the quiet street, faced the Fifth New York about, countermarched the other regiments, and with a rush and blow struck the rebel hosts in full charge. For a moment, and a moment only, victory hung uncertain. For the first time our troops had met the foe in close contact; but they were on their own free soil; fair hands, regardless of the dangerous strife, waved them on, and bright, tearful eyes looked pleadingly out from every window. The brave Farnsworth made one great effort, and the

day was won. The foe turned and fled. He had for the first and last time polluted with his presence the loyal town of Hanover...²³

Stuart's version of the encounter contained a different perspective on the incident and discounted the value of the town as an objective:

About 10 a. m. the head of the column reached Hanover, and found a large column of cavalry passing through, going toward the gap of the mountains which I had intended using. The enemy soon discovered our approach and made a demonstration toward attacking us, which was promptly met by a gallant charge by Chambliss' leading regiment, which not only repulsed the enemy, but drove him pell-mell through the town with half his numbers, capturing his ambulances and a large number of prisoners, all of which were brought safely through to our train, but were closely followed by the enemy's fresh troops. If my command had been well closed now, this cavalry column, which we had struck near its rear, would have been at our mercy; but, owing to the great elongation of the column by reason of the 200 wagons and hilly roads, Hampton was a long way behind, and Lee was not yet heard from on the left...

The delay in getting up re-enforcements enabled the enemy to regain possession of the town, by no means desirable for us to hold, as it was in a valley completely commanded by the heights in our possession, which were soon crowned by our artillery. Our position was impregnable to cavalry even with so small a force...²⁴

His intended route blocked, his forces spread and slowed by the captured wagon train, Stuart decided to make a detour:

Our wagon train was now a serious embarrassment, but I thought, by making a detour to the right by Jefferson, I could save it. I therefore determined to try it, particularly as I was satisfied, from every source of information, as well as from the lapse of time, that the Army of Northern Virginia must be near the Susquehanna. My numerous skirmishers had greatly diminished- almost exhausted- my supply of ammunition. I had this immense train in an enemy's country, very near a hostile army, and besides, about 400 prisoners, which had accumulated since the paroling at Cooksville...²⁵

From Hanover, Fitz Lee was sent in the direction of York where it was hoped that Stuart would find elements of Early's column. The main body of the force turned east toward the town of Jefferson, then north to the town of Dover, arriving there on the morning of

July 1, 1863. Departing again at sunrise, the column continued on through Dillsburg, and from there onto Carlisle, reaching Carlisle in the late afternoon.

In sharp contrast to the paucity of information that was being passed to General Lee by his cavalry elements, the Union command was receiving a steady stream of reports from its cavalry detailing the location and identity of the Confederate forces, as the following accounts from Brigadier General John Buford, Commander of the First Division, reflect.

JUNE 30, 1863- 5.30 a. m.

The enemy has increased his forces considerably. His strong position is just behind Cashtown. My party toward Mummasburg met a superior force, strongly posted. Another party that went up the road due north, 3 miles out, met a strong picket; had a skirmish, and captured a prisoner of Rode's division....²⁶

JUNE 30, 1863- 12.20 p. m.

My extreme left reports a large force coming from toward Fairfield, in a direction to strike the Emmitsburg road this side of Marsh Creek...²⁷

I entered this place at 11 a. m. [June 30] Found everybody in a terrible state of excitement on account of the enemy's upon this place. He had approached to within half a mile of the town when the head of my column entered....I learned from reliable men that [R. H.] Anderson's division was marching from Chambersburg by Mummasburg, Hunterstown, Abbottstown, on toward York....Early's people seized every shoe and nail they could find...²⁸

June 30, 1863- 10.30 p. m.

...I am satisfied that A. P. Hill's corps is massed just back of Cashtown, about 9 miles from this place...The road, however, is terribly infested with prowling cavalry parties. Near Heidlersburg today, one of my parties captured a courier of Lee's. Nothing was found on him. He says Ewell's corps is crossing the mountains from Carlisle, Rode's division being at Petersburg in advance. Longstreet, from all I can learn, is still behind Hill...²⁹

June 30, 1863- 10.40

...I have the honor to state the following facts: A. P. Hill's corps, composed of Anderson, Heth, and Pender, is massed back of Cashtown, 9 miles from this place....Rumor says that Ewell is coming over the mountains from Carlisle Rodes, commanding a division of Ewell's has already crossed....³⁰


July 1, 1863- 10.10 a. m.

The enemy's force (A. P. Hill's) are advancing on me at this point...³¹

July 1, 1863- 3.20 p. m.

I am satisfied that Longstreet and Hill have made a junction...³²

From the 28th of June onwards, Lee had been increasingly concerned at the absence of reports from Stuart, but taking the lack of news to be confirmation that the federal forces had not left Virginia, had ordered Ewell to continue his advance on Harrisburg.³³ The cavalry with the Confederate army at that point consisted of Jenkins' brigade and E. V. White's battalion, both of which had been heavily committed by General Ewell. Imboden, operating on Ewell's left, had driven off the federal troops guarding the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, destroyed a number of important bridges and generally created havoc along the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.³⁴ Ewell's advance had to be halted when Lee received a report late in the evening of June 28, 1863 from an intelligence agent that Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was approaching South Mountain.³⁵ With Imboden two days away, Stuart's location unknown, and the only other cavalry with Ewell, Lee acted decisively, recalling Ewell,³⁶ sending for the two cavalry brigades under Robertson and Jones³⁷ and beginning to consolidate his army at Gettysburg.



JULY 1, 1863

BUFORD'S COVERING FORCE

While Stuart's forces were leaving Hanover, the Union cavalry under General Buford was preparing to meet the advancing Confederate infantry. While the engagement fought by Buford was not a mounted cavalry battle, it reflects an important function performed by the Union cavalry.

FROM THE TRAFFIC CIRCLE IN GETTYSBURG, TAKE ROUTE 30 WEST (PAST THE LUTHERAN SEMINARY GROUNDS) 1.2 MILES TO THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE GUIDE/INFORMATION FACILITY WHICH IS LOCATED (JUST BEYOND THE EQUESTRIAN STATUE OF GENERAL REYNOLDS) IN A SMALL STONE BUILDING ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY. PARKING IS AVAILABLE IN A PARKING LOT BEHIND THE FACILITY WHICH IS REACHED BY TURNING SOUTH ONTO STONE AVENUE.

FROM THE ENTRANCE TO THE PARKING LOT, WALK SOUTH ABOUT 50 YARDS ON STONE AVENUE TO THE 150TH PENNSYLVANIA MONUMENT. LOOKING OVER THE RAIL FENCE, YOU SHOULD SEE THE MCPHERSON BARN TO YOUR LEFT FRONT. AS THE GROUND SLOPES AWAY FROM THE BARN AND RISES AGAIN IT FORMS A PART OF MCPHERSON RIDGE. DEPENDING UPON THE TIME OF YEAR, YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO SEE THE SPIRE OF THE LUTHERAN SEMINARY WHICH IS LOCATED ON SEMINARY RIDGE. FURTHER SOUTH, THERE IS THE DISTINCTIVE OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL TOWER WHICH IS LOCATED ON

CEMETERY RIDGE. THE WOODS TO THE SOUTH ARE HEBST'S WOODS AND TO THE WEST IS SOUTH MOUNTAIN AND HERR RIDGE. THE STREAM RUNNING BETWEEN HERR RIDGE AND MCPHERSON'S RIDGE IS WILLOUGHBY RUN. RETRACE YOUR STEPS PAST THE PARKING LOT TO THE HIGHWAY WHICH IS THE CHAMBERSBURG PIKE AND WITHOUT CROSSING THE HIGHWAY, YOU WILL SEE THE POSITIONS OF CALEF'S BATTERY. ACROSS THE HIGHWAY THERE IS THE GUN POSITION OF HALL'S MAINE BATTERY AND THE EQUESTRIAN STATUE OF GENERAL REYNOLDS.

Major General Peasonton, the Commander of the Union cavalry, summarized the events of July 1, 1863 as follows:

By daylight on July 1, General Buford had obtained positive information of the enemy's position and movements, and made his dispositions to hold him in check until the First Corps, under Major General Reynolds, could arrive on the field.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning the rebels advanced with superior numbers on Buford's position, but for more than two hours were gallantly checked in every attempt that was made, when the troops of the First and Eleventh Corps began to arrive and to relieve the cavalry from their perilous position. This division continued in the fight throughout the day, displaying great obstinacy in holding

all their positions, and splendid courage and skill in their treatment of the rebels.³⁸

The location of the union forces and the events were described in detail by Colonel William Gamble, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, commanding the First Brigade of the First Division:

...My brigade- consisting of the Eighth New York, Eighth Illinois, three squadrons of the Third Indiana, and two squadrons of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, about 1,600 strong, with Tidball's battery, Second U. S. Artillery- was placed in line of battle about 1 mile in front of the seminary, the right resting on the railroad track and the left near the Middletown or Fairfax [Fairfield] road, the Cashtown road being a little to the right of the center, at right angles with the line. Three squadrons, part dismounted, were ordered to the front, and deployed as skirmishers to support the squadron on picket, now being driven back by the enemy's artillery and skirmishers. Our battery of six 3-inch rifled guns was placed in battery, one section on each side of the Cashtown road, covering the approaches of the enemy, and other section on the right of the left regiment, to cover that flank. The enemy cautiously approached in column on the road, with three extended lines on each flank, and his and our line of skirmishers became engaged, and our artillery opened on the

enemy's advancing column, doing good execution. The enemy moved forward; two batteries opened on us, and a sharp engagement of artillery took place. In a short time we were, by overpowering numbers, compelled to fall back about 200 yards to the next ridge, and there make a stand.

In the mean time our skirmishers, fighting under the cover of trees and fences, were sharply engaged, did good execution, and retarded the progress of the enemy as much as possibly could be expected, when it is known they were opposed by three divisions of Hill's corps. After checking and retarding the advance of the enemy several hours and falling back only about 200 yards from the first line of battle, our infantry advance of the First Corps arrived, and relieved the cavalry brigade in its unequal contest with the enemy.³⁹

AFTER LEAVING THE PARKING LOT, TURN RIGHT ON THE CHAMBERSBURG PIKE HEADED BACK TOWARDS GETTYSBURG AND GO .1 MILE TO REYNOLDS AVENUE WHERE YOU SHOULD TURN LEFT AND DRIVE ALONG THE ROW OF MONUMENTS. AFTER PASSING OVER THE RAILROAD YOU WILL BE IN THE APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF DEVIN'S SECOND BRIGADE. CONTINUE ON TO THE INTERSECTION AND TURN LEFT, LOOKING OUT OVER THE NORTHWEST AS YOU PASS THE SECOND BRIGADE MARKER. CONTINUE TO THE INTERSECTION WITH THE MUMMASBURG ROAD AND TURN RIGHT. (THE PEACE MEMORIAL WILL

BE ACROSS THE MUMMASBURG ROAD) GO APPROXIMATELY 400 YARDS AND TURN RIGHT AT THE OAK RIDGE TOWER. THE TOWER AFFORDS A COMMANDING VIEW OF THE APPROACHES FROM CARLISLE AND WITH THE FIRST STOP WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH A PERSPECTIVE OF THE CAVALRY FRONT.

Colonel Thomas C. Devin, Commander of the Second Brigade, was placed on the right of the First Brigade. His account contains the disposition of his troops.

...the Second Brigade was ordered to prepare for action, and form on the crest of the hill on the right of the First Brigade. I immediately formed as ordered, with my right resting on the road to Mummasburg, and deployed a squadron of the Sixth New York to the front and left as skirmishers, dismounted, and connecting with those of the First Brigade, at the same time connecting by skirmishers and vedettes with my pickets on the three roads on the right leading toward Carlisle, thus establishing a continuous line from the York road, on the extreme right, to the left of the First Brigade on the Cashtown road. The infantry not having arrived, and the enemy's artillery fire increasing, I was ordered to retire gradually, as they succeeded in getting the range of my position. This I effected in successive formations in line to the rear by regiment, in the face of the enemy, the troops behaving well, and forming with

perfect coolness and order.

About this time, my skirmishers on the right were forced back by the advance of the enemy's line of battle, coming from the direction of Heidlersburg. Knowing the importance of holding that point until the infantry could arrive and be placed in position, I immediately placed the Ninth New York in support, and, dismounting the rest of my available force, succeeded in holding the rebel line in check for two hours until relieved by the arrival of the Eleventh Corps, when I was ordered to mass my command on the right of the York road and hold that approach. While in that position- immediately in front of the town, the command faced to the front and my pickets advanced three-quarters of a mile- a heavy fire of shells was opened on us from one of our own batteries on Cemetery Hill, immediately in my rear. The fire becoming very hot and persistent, and many of the shells bursting among us, I was led to suppose for a moment that the enemy had succeeded in gaining that position and I immediately moved my command into the town, the column being shelled the entire distance. After I had retired, the battery turned its attention to my pickets on the road, and shelled them out. I was then ordered to the Emmitsburg road, where the brigade was formed in line, in rear of the batteries of the division, with its right flank resting on the town.⁴⁰

Even after relief by the First and Eleventh Corps, the cavalry reformed to the south of the Seminary and continued its defensive mission, the account again being told by Colonel Gamble:

In the afternoon, the enemy, being strongly re-enforced, extended his flanks, and advanced on our left in three strong lines, to turn that flank. The general commanding division ordered my brigade forward at a trot, and deployed in line on the ridge of woods, with the seminary on our right. Half of the Eighth New York, Third Indiana, and Twelfth Illinois were dismounted and placed behind a portion of a stone wall and under cover of some trees.

The enemy being close upon us, we opened a sharp and rapid carbine fire, which killed and wounded so many of the first line of the enemy that it fell back upon the second line. Our men kept up the fire until the enemy in overwhelming numbers approached so near that, in order to save my men and horses from capture, they were ordered to mount and fall back rapidly to the next ridge, on the left of the town, where our artillery was posted....⁴¹

CARLISLE

About dusk on the first, Stuart's cavalry was reaching Carlisle. (Although no stop is indicated, the accounts of the engagement have been included.) Brigadier General William F. Smith, commander of the militia forces in Carlisle, described the action:

...Half an hour later [about dusk], General Fitzhugh Lee, with a force of about 3,300 (?) cavalry and seven guns, approached the town from the direction of Mechanicsburg, not knowing that any of our forces occupied the place. Shots were exchanged with our pickets, and several shells were thrown over the town, and one or two up the Railroad street into the square...

A flag of truce then came in from Lee, demanding the surrender of the town or the removal of the women and children, to which General Smith made answer that the women and children would be removed.

The shelling was resumed, 134 shots being fired by the enemy....

The enemy set fire to a board-yard near the gas works, to the gas works, and to the barracks, all of which were consumed....⁴²


Stuart's forces had been moving as rapidly as they could with the wagon train, and had been able to rest only occasionally. General Stuart provides the details of their stop at Carlisle:

...Our rations were entirely out. I desired to levy a contribution on the inhabitants for rations, but was informed before reaching it that it was held by a considerable force of militia (infantry and artillery), who were concealed in the buildings, with a view to entrap me upon my entrance into the town... I disliked to subject the town to the consequences of attack; at the same time it was essential to us to procure rations. I therefore directed General Lee to send in a flag of truce, demanding unconditional surrender or bombardment. This was refused. I placed artillery in position commanding the town, took possession of the main avenues to the place, and repeated the demand. It was again refused, and I was forced to the alternative of shelling the place.

...not a building was fired excepting the United States cavalry barracks....

The whereabouts of our army was still a mystery; but, during the night, I received a dispatch from General Lee...that the army was at Gettysburg...⁴³

Stuart proceeded to Gettysburg where the traditional accounts indicate that he was greeted by General Lee with the words "Well, General Stuart, you are here at last."⁴⁴



JULY 2, 1863

FROM GETTYSBURG, TAKE ROUTE 116 (HANOVER ROAD) EAST APPROXIMATELY 2.4 MILES (FOLLOWING THE SIGNS TO THE EAST CAVALRY FIELD). STOP AT THE INTERSECTION OF 116 AND HOFFMAN ROAD. AT THE INTERSECTION, THERE IS A MARKER CONCERNING THE EVENTS OF JULY 2, 1863. WALK UP THE HILL TO THE FIRST RISE WHERE YOU CAN LOOK TO THE EAST AND SEE THE VALLEY. THE STREAM APPROXIMATELY A QUARTER OF A MILE AWAY IS CRESS'S [PLUM] RUN. WHERE YOU ARE STANDING AND BEHIND YOU IS BRINKERHOFF'S RIDGE FROM WHICH THE CONFEDERATE INFANTRY ADVANCED. THE UNION CAVALRY APPROACHED YOUR LOCATION FROM BEYOND THE STREAM.

The major cavalry engagement of the Battle of Gettysburg took place on July 3, however, there were two preliminary engagements that occurred on July 2, one a two hour engagement at Hunters-town and the other across the open area which is at this location. General Gregg's account describes the events that took place, beginning on the 2d:

...the Second Division, Cavalry Corps, arrived on the battlefield at Gettysburg, July 2, about noon, the Second Brigade having been sent to Westminster.

...I placed these brigades on the extreme right of our line of battle, and at the point of intersection of the

Gettysburg and Hanover turnpike with the road that ran in rear of the right of our line of battle. A line of pickets was established in front, connecting with the right of the infantry line and extending well to the right of the turnpike. An attempt made to dislodge some of the enemy's sharpshooters posted in front of the center of my line caused the enemy to throw out two regiments deployed. This force advanced against my line, but was soon compelled to withdraw under the admonition of a half dozen well-directed shells and a telling carbine fire from behind a line of stone fence.⁴⁵


The march of the union cavalry to Hanover had taken its toll upon the men, as was related by the account of William Brooke Rawle, then a lieutenant in the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry:

...We had previously been in the saddle on an average for twenty hours out of the twenty-four for three days, without sleep and with scarcely anything to eat for man or horse. The intense heat at times was almost unbearable, the dust almost impenetrable. Horses by scores fell from exhaustion along the road. The route in rear of the column toward the last presented a motley appearance. Officers and men, begrimed past recognition, tramped along on foot, leading their worn-out horses to save their strength, well knowing how much depended upon it. Dismounted cavalrymen, whose

horses had fallen dead or dying, struggled along, some carrying their saddles and bridles in hopes of being able to beg, borrow, buy, or help themselves to fresh mounts, others without anything but their arms....

But little time for rest or other bodily refreshment was allowed ...for by 3 o'clock next morning (July 2) we were off for Gettysburg as hard as we could march...the regiment advanced at a trot along the road to Gettysburg and formed close column squadrons behind Cress' Run. The first two squadrons...were quickly dismounted to fight on foot, plunged through the run and almost in an instant were deployed at close intervals as skirmishers on the summit of the eastern spur of Brinkerhoff's Ridge...A strong, well built stone wall ran along the top of the ridge, and on the other side there was a field of tall wheat just ripe for cutting. The wall was the key of the position, as both the enemy and ourselves both perceived, and by the time our men reached it a line of Confederate infantry was seen running for it at full speed. The fire of Rank's two guns had delayed the enemy's advance long enough to give us time to get there first. The infantrymen were not twenty feet off from the wall when we reached it, and we gave them a withering reception with our breech-loading carbines.⁴⁶

In the meantime, Buford's Division held a position on the Union left until it was relieved by the Third Corps, moving first to Taneytown and then to Westminster, where it proceeded to guard the army trains and attempted to refit.⁴⁷



Hunter

Granite Hill Station

Granite Hill

Chicken

MOUNT JOY

JULY 3, 1863
CAVALRY BATTLE
EAST FIELD

Two Taverns

Little Taverns

One Tavern

Round Top

Little Round Top

Devils Den

Round Top

Sheep Heaven

Wolf Hill

Barker Hill

Zinkard Point

Barren Knoll

Boyd Sch

Katalyst


Run

MADYLAND

Ridge

M B L A D

penmount



Brooke Rawle, William, The Second Division in the Gettysburg Campaign, History of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, opposite page 261

JULY 3, 1863

THE EAST CAVALRY FIELD

CONTINUE ON THE HOFFMAN ROAD 1.6 MILES TO A CROSS ROAD. TURN RIGHT AND GO .6 MILE TO THE STUART CAVALRY MARKER. (YOU WILL PASS THE MARKER FOR FITZ LEE'S BRIGADE.) THE OPEN FIELD BEFORE YOU TO THE SOUTHEAST IS THE VALLEY DESCRIBED IN STUART'S REPORT. TO THE WEST IS BRINKERHOFF'S RIDGE. GRANITE HILL IS TO THE NORTH AND SLIGHTLY EAST. AS YOU LOOK ACROSS THE VALLEY, YOU CAN SEE THE CAVALRY SHAFT (SQUARE COLUMN WITH BALLED TOP) AND THE MICHIGAN CAVALRY MONUMENT. RUMMEL'S BARN IS TO THE RIGHT FRONT WHERE CONFEDERATE SHARPSHOOTERS WERE CONCEALED. PROCEED ON ALONG CONFEDERATE CAVALRY AVENUE AND YOU WILL PASS THE POSITIONS OF HAMPTON AND CHAMBLISS. JENKINS WAS TO THE FRONT OF CHAMBLISS.

The events of July 3, 1863 are possibly best understood if the after-action report of General Stuart is read first:

On the morning of July 3...I moved forward to a position to the left of General Ewell's left, and in advance of it, where a commanding ridge completely controlled a wide plain of cultivated fields stretching toward Hanover on the left, and reaching to the base of the mountain spurs, among which the enemy held position. My command was increased by the

addition of Jenkin's brigade, who here in the presence of the enemy allowed themselves to be supplied with but 10 rounds of ammunition, although armed with the most approved Enfield musket. I moved this command and W. H. F. Lee's secretly through the woods to a position, and hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's rear...⁴⁸

Stuart's objective was to gain position where he could protect the left of Ewell's Corps, observe the enemy's rear, and to attack in the event the Confederate assault on the Federal lines were successful. He proposed, if afforded the opportunity, to create a diversion which would assist the Confederate infantry to carry the heights held by the Federal army, and if fully successful, to roll up the Union flank. While carefully concealing the two brigades, Stuart had one of Griffin's guns moved forward and fired a number of rounds in different directions, giving the orders to the gun personally.⁴⁹

Stuart's account continues:

...Hampton's and Fitz. Lee's brigades, which had been ordered to follow me, unfortunately debouched into the open ground, disclosing the movement, and causing a corresponding movement of a large force of the enemy's cavalry...

...the enemy had deployed a heavy line of sharpshooters, and were advancing toward our position, which was very strong. Our artillery had, however, left the crest, which it was essential for it to occupy on account of being of too short range to compete with the longer range guns of the enemy, but I sent orders for its return. Jenkins' brigade was chiefly employed dismounted, and fought with decided effect until the 10 rounds were expended, and then retreated, under circumstances of difficulty and exposure which entailed the loss of valuable men.

The left, where Hampton's and Lee's brigades were, by this time became heavily engaged as dismounted skirmishers. My plan was to employ the enemy in front with sharpshooters, and move a command of cavalry upon their left flank from the position lately held by me, but the falling back of Jenkins' men...caused a like movement of those on the left, and the enemy, sending forward a squadron or two, were about to cut off and capture a portion of our dismounted sharpshooters.⁵⁰

CONTINUE ALONG CONFEDERATE CAVALRY ROAD, PAST THE RUMMEL HOUSE AND BARN IN THE DIRECTION OF THE CAVALRY SHAFT. STOP AT THE FLAGPOLE WHICH IS BEYOND THE SMALL STREAM BEYOND THE RUMMEL HOUSE. THERE YOU CAN SEE THE OPEN FIELD OVER WHICH THE CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES LASTED FOR SEVERAL HOURS.

Stuart's account of the events continued:

To prevent this, I ordered forward the nearest cavalry regiment (one of W. H. F. Lee's) quickly to charge this force of cavalry. It was gallantly done, and about the same time a portion of General Fitz. Lee's command charged on the left, the First Virginia Cavalry being most conspicuous. In these charges, the impetuosity of those gallant fellows, after two weeks of hard marching and hard fighting on short rations, was not not extraordinary, but irresistible. The enemy's masses vanished before them like grain before the scythe, and that regiment elicited the admiration of every beholder, and eclipsed the many laurels already won by its gallant veterans. Their impetuosity carried them too far, and the charge being very much prolonged, their horses, already jaded by hard marching, failed under it. Their movement was too rapid to be stopped by couriers, and the enemy perceiving it, were turning upon them with fresh horses. The First North Carolina Cavalry and Jeff. Davis Legion were sent to their support, and gradually this hand-to-hand fighting invloved the greater portion of the command till the enemy were driven from the field....⁵¹

Stuart's account was elaborated upon by accounts of Union participants which describe the benchmark of the Confederate

cavalry. Captain William E. Miller, an officer in the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, wrote a colorful account of the events:

...A more determined and vigorous charge than that made by the 1st Virginia it was never my fortune to witness...

...there appeared moving toward us a large mass of cavalry, which proved to be the remaining portions of Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's brigades. They were formed in close column of squadrons and directed their course toward the Spangler house. A grander spectacle than their advance has rarely been beheld. They marched with well-aligned fronts and steady reins. Their polished saber-blades dazzled in the sun. All eyes turned upon them...Shell and shrapnel met the advancing Confederates and tore through their ranks. Closing their ranks as though nothing had happened, on they came. As they drew nearer, cannister was substituted by our artillerymen for shell, and horse after horse staggered and fell. Still on they came.⁵²

RETRACE YOUR WAY BACK TO ROUTE 116 AND CONTINUE FROM THE INTERSECTION OF HOFFMAN ROAD AND 116 ONE MILE TO THE LOW DUTCH ROAD (YOU WILL PASS AN ENTRANCE TO THE PARK). YOU ARE TAKING THE ROUTE THAT GREGG'S DIVISION TOOK TO THE BATTLE. TURN LEFT AND GO .6 MILE TO AN ENTRANCE TO THE EAST CAVALRY FIELD WHICH IS TO YOUR

LEFT. GO ABOUT .2 MILE TO THE CAVALRY SHAFT. [If a hog is observed in the field, take normal precautions.]

General Gregg, seeing the importance of the position that he occupied, despite orders to the contrary, had retained Custer's brigade:

On the morning of July 3, I was again ordered to take a position on the right of our line, and make a demonstration against the enemy. The First and Third Brigades were again posted on the right of the infantry, but about three-fourths of a mile nearer the Baltimore and Gettysburg turnpike. This position was taken because I learned that the First [Second] Brigade, of the Third Division, was occupying my position of the day before. A regiment was dismounted and put in the woods as skirmishers, but the enemy was not found in any considerable force.

At 12 m. I received a copy of a dispatch from the commander of the Eleventh Army Corps to the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac, that large columns of the enemy's cavalry were moving toward the right of our line. At the same time I received an order from Major-General Pleasonton, through an aide-de-camp, to send the First [Second] Brigade of the Third Division, to join General

Kilpatrick on the left. The First Brigade of my division was sent to relieve the brigade of the Third Division. This change having been made, a strong line of skirmishers displayed by the enemy was evidence that the enemy's cavalry had gained our right, and were about to attack, with a view of gaining the rear of our line of battle. The importance of successfully resisting an attack at this point, which, if succeeded in by the enemy, would have been productive of the most serious consequences, determined me to retain the brigade of the Third Division until the enemy were driven back. General Custer, commanding the brigade, fully satisfied of the intended attack, was well pleased to remain with his brigade. The First New Jersey Cavalry was posted as mounted skirmishers to the right and front in a wood, the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry deployed as dismounted skirmishers to the left and front in open fields, and the First Maryland on the Hanover turnpike, in position to protect the right of my line.

The very superior force of dismounted skirmishers of the enemy advanced on our left and front required the line to be re-enforced by one of General Custer's regiments. At this time the skirmishing became very brisk on both sides, and an artillery fire was begun by the enemy and ourselves. During the skirmish of the dismounted men, the enemy

brought upon the field a column for a charge. The charge of this column was met by the Seventh Michigan Cavalry, of the First [Second] Brigade, Third Division, but not successfully. The advantage gained in this charge was soon wrested from the enemy by the gallant charge of the First Michigan, of the same brigade. This regiment drove the enemy back to his starting point. Other charges were made by the enemy's columns, but in every instance were they driven back. Defeated at every point, the enemy withdrew to his left, and on passing the wood in which the First New Jersey Cavalry was posted, that regiment gallantly and successfully charged the flank of his column. Heavy skirmishing was still maintained by the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry with the enemy, and was continued until nightfall. During the engagement, a portion of this regiment made a very handsome and successful charge upon one of the enemy's regiments. The enemy retired his column behind his artillery, and at dark withdrew from his former position. At this time I was at liberty to relieve the First [Second] Brigade of the Third Division, which was directed to join its division.⁵³

The First Michigan was one of Custer's regiments and had been led by him into the fray, as Captain Miller's account indicates:

The 1st Michigan, drawn up in close column of squadrons... was ordered by Gregg to charge. Custer, who was near, placed himself at its head, and off they dashed. As the two columns approached each other the pace of each increased, when suddenly a crash like the falling of timber, betokened the crisis. So sudden and violent was the collision that many of the horses were turned end over end and crushed their riders beneath them. The clashing of sabers, the firing of pistols, the demands for surrender and the cries of the combatants now filled the air.⁵⁴

William Brooke-Rawle's account vividly describes the action:

In close columns of squadrons, advancing as if in review, with sabres drawn and glistening like silver in the bright sunlight- a spectacle called forth a mummur of admiration. ...The two columns drew nearer and nearer...The gait increased- first the trot, then the gallop. Hampton's battle flag floated in the van of his brigade. The orders of the Confederate officers could be heard, "Keep to your sabres, men, keep to your sabres!"....

As the charge was ordered the speed increased, every horse on the jump, every man yelling like a demon. The columns of the Confederates blended, but the alignment was maintained.

Chester put charge after charge of double cannister into their midst, his men bringing it up to the guns by the armful. The execution was fearful, but the long rents closed up at once. As the opposing columns drew nearer and nearer, each with perfect alignment, every man gathered his horse well under him, and gripped his weapon the tighter...Custer, seeing the men in the front ranks of the enemy hesitate, waved his sabre and shouted, "Come on you Wolverines!" and with a fearful yell the First Michigan rushed on, Custer four lengths ahead.⁵⁵

Captain Miller's squadron of the Third Pennsylvania had been posted facing west, in front of the wooded area near the center of Gregg's line with orders to hold the position at all hazards. From the vicinity of the trees, Captain Miller led his squadron of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry in a charge that carried him through the Confederate advance separating one portion from the other. (34 years later, Captain Miller was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his role in that action.)

FAIRFIELD

While the battle was being fought east of Gettysburg, other cavalry units also were moving to engagements. While enroute from Emmitsburg, The Sixth United States Cavalry had been detached

from the Reserve Brigade of the First Division. No stop is described for the events that took place near Hunterstown, but the accounts of the participants are included. Lieutenant Nicholas Nolan, of the Sixth United States Cavalry, reported the events that took place:

...on the 3d instant the Sixth U. S. Cavalry was ordered to proceed in the direction of Fairfield, Pa., for the purpose of intercepting a train of wagons of the enemy, supposed to be in that vicinity...When about 2 miles from the regiment, I saw the enemy's cavalry charge in the direction of Millerstown. I immediately notified the squadron commander of the fact. He then moved the squadron on the enemy's right, and charged them, when he (Captain Cram) was captured...I found I was entirely cut off from the regiment, and had the enemy on both flanks and rear of me. After the regiment was repulsed from Millerstown, I immediately commenced retreating, disputing every inch of ground with the enemy....⁵⁶

The troops that the lieutenant had observed were those of Brigadier General William E. "Grumble" Jones which had only recently arrived in the vicinity of Gettysburg. General Jones' account reflects his frustration from the performance of his troops in the engagement.


About 2 miles from Fairfield, we encountered the Sixth U. S. Regular Cavalry, en route to capture our cavalry division train, which must have fallen an easy prey but for our timely arrival. Many wagons in quest of forage were already within a few hundred yards of the enemy.

We met in a lane, both sides of which were post and rail fences, too strong to be broken without the ax. The country is open, the fields small, and all the fences of the same character as along the lane. No estimate could be made of the opposing force; but knowing a vigorous assault must put even a small force on a perfect equality with a large one until a wider field could be prepared, I at once ordered the Seventh Regiment, which was in front, to charge. Before the enemy could be reached, he succeeded in throwing carbineers through gates right and left; who poured into our flanks a galling fire. The leading men hesitated; the regiment halted and retreated, losing more men than a glorious victory would have cost had the onset been made with vigor and boldness.⁵⁷



FARM NORTH S. CHURCH
JUL 3, 1863

M O U N T



MAP OF FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE. FROM A SKETCH MAP BY CAPTAIN H. C. PARSONS.

FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE

Early on the morning of July 3, Kilpatrick's Division was ordered to move from the vicinity of Two Taverns where it had spent a portion of the night to the extreme right of the enemy and check any movement that they might make. Merritt's Reserve Brigade, coming down the Emmitsburg Road from Emmitsburg, was to reinforce them.

FROM THE VISITOR'S CENTER, PROCEED GENERALLY SOUTH ON THE PARK SERVICE ROAD WHICH FOLLOWS THE LINE OF CEMETERY RIDGE. FROM THE INTERSECTION WHERE THE ROAD CROSSES WRIGHT AND WARREN AVENUES (JUST BEYOND THE 20TH MAINE MONUMENT) PROCEED .4 MILE TO A TURNOUT ON THE RIGHT WHICH OVERLOOKS THE SLYDER FARM AND THE PLUM VALLEY.

A detailed account of the terrain over which the battle was fought is provided by Captain H. C. Parsons, First Vermont Cavalry, in an account which he wrote sometime after the war.

Directly in front of us opened the valley towards Gettysburg, with its wheat-fields; at the right, and less than half a mile distant, rose Round Top; in the intervening valley lay the Slyder farm, with low, cross fences. Projecting from Round Top was a hill, perhaps one

hundred feet high, on the top of which was a field surrounded by high stone walls. The slopes of this hill were covered with immense granite boulders; a road or lane extended from the Emmitsburg pike to its base, and then turned to the left toward Devil's Den. Beyond this road ran a high rail fence, the only openings being at the right and left of the walled field on the hill. Above this, and along the rocky and woody slopes of Round Top, Law's brigade was firmly intrenched, and pressing him in front and on the right was the Union army....⁵⁸

RETRACE YOUR ROUTE BACK .2 MILE TO THE ROUND TOP PARKING AREA WHERE YOU MAY LEAVE YOUR CAR. PROCEED ALONG THE ROAD TO THE SOUTH APPROXIMATELY 100 FEET AND YOU WILL SEE A STONE WALL ON YOUR LEFT WHICH WAS ERECTED BY THE CONFEDERATE INFANTRY ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 2, 1863.

Major General E. M. Law, then the senior brigadier who succeeded to the command of Hood's Division after Hood was wounded, gives an overview of the Confederate positions.

Hood's division held the hill...and the ridge to its left-our right extending across Devil's Den and well up on the north-western slope of Round Top. During the night this line was strengthened by the construction of a breastwork

of loose stones that abounded all along the positions occupied by the troops, and the light of the next morning disclosed the fact that the Federal troops in front of us had improved their time in the same way. In fact, all through the night we could hear them at work as the rocks were dropped in place on the works, and no doubt they heard us just as distinctly, while we were engaged in the same life preserving operation.⁵⁹

CONTINUE ON THE ROAD ABOUT .1 MILE FROM WHERE YOU LEFT YOUR VEHICLE TO A CRISS-CROSS WOODEN RAIL FENCE ON THE RIGHT WHICH MARKS THE BEGINNING OF A PATH INTO THE VALLEY. PROCEED DOWN THE PATH BEYOND THE SLYDER HOUSE AND STOP AT THE WHITE GATE OPENING INTO THE UPPER FIELDS.

General Law's account describes the events as the artillery began its preparation for Pickett's advance.

The cannonade in the center soon began, and presented one of the most magnificent battle-scenes witnessed during the war. Looking up the valley toward Gettysburg, the hills on either side were capped with crowns of flame and smoke as 300 guns, about equally divided between the two ridges, vomited their iron hail upon each other. Dense clouds of smoke settled over the valley, through which the shells

went hissing and screaming on their errand of death. Numbers of these from opposite directions exploded midway over the valley, apparently with venomous impatience, as they met each other in mid-air, lighting up the clouds with their snake-like flashes.

While this grand artillery duel was progressing, and before our infantry had move to the attack, a new danger threatened us on the right. This was the appearance of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, which moved up on that flank and commenced massing in the body of timber which extended from the base of Round Top westward toward Kern's house, on the Emmitsburg road. Reilly's and Bachman's batteries were ordered to change front to the right so as to bear upon this position, and at once opened fire upon thecavalry, which retired beyond the wood and out of sight. In order to protect my flank more fully, I withdrew the 1st Texas regiment of Robertson's brigade from the main line, and placed it in position midway between Round Top and the Emmitsburg road, with skirmishers extending from its left and connecting at right angles with the extreme right of the main line on the slope of the mountain. I also detached the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments of Anderson's brigade, and sent them to the support of the 9th, which had been stationed at Kern's house. About the time these disposit-

ions were completed, Colonel Black of the 1st South Carolina Cavalry, reported to me with about 100 men who had been gathered up from the medical trains, most of them partially disabled and only a part mounted, and with three guns of Hart's battery of horse artillery. Hart's guns were stationed on the Emmitsburg road, and the cavalry extended the right flank beyond that road. This new flanking line was formed at right angles to the main line, and crossed the Emmitsburg road near the Kern's house.

One brigade of the Federal cavalry (Merritt's) moved across the road and deployed a strong line of dismounted skirmishers in front of Colonel Black's command, which was too weak to offer any effectual resistance. Hart's guns, however, were well handled, and did good service as long as the enemy remained in the reach of them. To meet this flanking movement, I had to extend the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments to the right, and heavy skirmishing continued as the lines developed with occasional efforts of the Federals to break through until about half-past three o'clock p. m. when my two regiments were stretched out to a bare line of skirmishers.

It is not an easy task to operate against cavalry with infantry alone, on an extended line, and in an open country

hrough timber, under

close enfilading fire...The direction rapidly, can choose its own points of attack and can elude the blows of its necessarily more tardy adversary. But Merritt's brigade was now dismounted and I lost no time in taking advantage of this temporary equality...Detaching the two remaining regiments of Anderson's brigade (11th and 59th Georgia) from the main line, I moved them rapidly to our extreme right, now about a mile from Kern's house, attacked Merritt's reserve, and then, changing front to the left, struck his skirmish-line "on its end" and "doubled it up" as far as the Emmitsburg road.⁶⁰

About the same time, Captain Parsons was present while General Kilpatrick was giving General Farnsworth the order to charge.

I was near Kilpatrick when he impetuously gave the order to Farnsworth to make the last charge. Farnsworth spoke with emotion: "General, do you mean it? Shall I throw my handful of men over rough ground, through timber, against a brigade of infantry? The 1st Vermont has already been fought half to pieces; these are too good men to kill." Kilpatrick said: "Do you refuse to obey my orders? If you are afraid to lead this charge, I will lead it." Farnsworth rose up in his stirrups- he looked magnificent in his passion- and cried, "Take that back!" Kilpatrick returned his defiance,

but, soon repenting, said, "I did not mean it; forget it." For a moment there was silence, when Farnsworth spoke calmly, "General, if you order the charge, I will lead it, but you must take the responsibility." I did not hear the low conversation that followed, but as Farnsworth turned away he said, "I will obey your order." Kilpatrick said earnestly, "I take the responsibility."⁶¹

The First Vermont Cavalry charged just as the First West Virginia Cavalry was falling back; the account of Captain Parsons continues:

We rode out in columns of fours with drawn sabers. General Farnsworth, after giving the order to me, took his place at the head of the Second Battalion....

...As we passed out from the cover of the woods the 1st West Virginia was retiring in disorder on our left. A frantic horse with one leg torn off by a cannon-ball rushed toward us as if for protection. We rode through the enemy's skirmish line across the fields, over the low fences, past the Snyder house, and down the road. The sun was blinding;...We were immediately upon the enemy, within thirty paces, and the deadly volley...was fired, but it passed over our heads...⁶²

PROCEED ON THE PATH BACK IN THE DIRECTION THAT YOU ENTERED THE VALLEY AND STOP ABOUT 100 FEET AFTER CROSSING THE FOOT BRIDGE. AS YOU LOOK TO YOUR RIGHT YOU SHOULD SEE A STONE FENCE WHICH TIES INTO THE FIELD BOUNDARIES.

General Law's account resumes at this point.

Farnsworth and his cavalry in the meantime were riding in gallant style, with drawn sabers and unopposed, up the valley. As they approached Snyder's house, and as I stood intently watching them, I saw a ragged Confederate battle-flag fluttering among the trees at the foot of the opposite ridge, and the men with it soon after appeared, running out into the open ground on the farther side of the valley. It was the 4th Alabama regiment, Law's brigade, which had been taken from the main line and sent down by Lieutenant Wade. The men opened fire as they ran. The course of the cavalry was abruptly checked and saddles were rapidly emptied. Recoiling from this fire, they turned to their left and rear, and directed their course up the hill toward the position occupied by our batteries.⁶³

Captain Parsons' account disputes the accuracy of Law's narrative, as he wrote the following.

Taken by surprise, they had shot over us; the next, a random volley, was effective. With the head of the column we cleared the wall at the right and formed under the cover of the hill. The rear companies fell back and reformed behind a cross fence and in the edge of timber. In the meantime, the most important movement of the day was being made. The Second Battalion...moved out in splendid form to the left of the First Battalion and swept in a great circle to the right, around the front of the hill and across our track; then guiding to the left across the valley and up the side of the low hill at the base of Round Top, they charged along the wall, and between it and the mountain, directly in the rear of several Confederate regiments in position and between them and the 4th Alabama. It was a swift resistent charge over rocks, through timber, under close enfilading fire...The direction was toward Devil's Den. At the foot of the declivity the column turned left and passed a battery, receiving the fire of its support, then divided into three parties. One swept across the open field and upon the rear of the Texas skirmish line, carrying in a part of this line as prisoners, and one rode through into the Union lines. Farnsworth's horse had fallen; a trooper sprang from the saddle, gave the general his horse and escaped on foot. Captain Cushman and a few others, with Farnsworth, turned back and rode at a full gallop toward

the point of entering. My First Squadron was again ordered forward. The enemy's sharp-shooters appeared in the rocks above us and opened fire. We rode obliquely up the hill in the direction of Wells, then wheeling to the left, between the picket line and the wall....The head of the column leapt the wall into the open field. Farnsworth, seeing our horsemen, raised his saber and charged as if with an army; at almost the same moment his followers, and what remained of the First Battalion, cut their way through the 15th Alabama, which was wheeling into position at a run and offered little resistance. We charged in the same direction, but on opposite sides of the wall that runs parallel with the Round Top range, and within two hundred paces of each other. Sergeant Duncan...flew past me with his saber raised, shouted, "I'm with you!" threw up his left arm, and fell. My horse recoiled over his dead body, my men swept past, and I was for a moment alone on the field....my horse was struck...and broke frantically through the men, over the wall and down the hill. Corporal Waller overtook me from the left, and, riding close, supported me on my horse. As we rode on, he told me how Farnsworth and Cushman had fallen together...⁶⁴

CONTINUE ON BACK TO YOUR VEHICLE; PROCEED .7 MILE ALONG
CONFEDERATE AVENUE PAST THE TURN OUT AT WHICH YOU FIRST STOPPED.

HERE YOU SHOULD SEE A LANE WHICH RUNS TO THE SOUTH. A MARKER CONCERNING THE THIRD DIVISION IS VISIBLE FROM CONFEDERATE AVENUE. AS YOU CONTINUE SOUTH INTO THE WOODS YOU WILL FIND THE POSITIONS OF THE FIRST TEXAS WHICH WERE CHARGED BY THE FIRST WEST VIRGINIA CAVALRY.

General Law's account picks up after Merritt's forces had been encountered and held.

I had just returned to the position occupied by our artillery, which was in the angle formed by the main and flanking lines, when Farnsworth's cavalry brigade charged the line held by the 1st Texas regiment. It was impossible to use our artillery to any advantage owing to the "close quarters" of the attacking cavalry with our own men- the leading squadrons forcing their horses up to the very muzzles of the rifles of our infantry. That portion of the cavalry which covered the front of the first Texas regiment was handsomely repulsed; but the 1st Vermont regiment, forming the Federal right wing, overlapped the 1st Texas on its left, and striking the skirmish-line only, rode through it into the open valley in rear of our main line on the spurs of Round Top...Hearing the firing and knowing its cause, the 9th Georgia came up at a run, just as the 1st Vermont Cavalry rode through our skirmish-line...Instead of

moving directly upon our batteries, the cavalry directed its course up the valley toward Gettysburg, passing between the position of our artillery and our main line. Watching the direction they had taken, I sent Lieutenant Wade, of my staff, rapidly across the valley in advance of them, with orders to detach the first regiment he should come to on the main line and send it down on a run to "head them off" in that direction. He was also ordered to follow the line to the extreme right and direct Colonel Oates (15th Alabama) to strengthen his flanking skirmish-line and to close up the gap on the left of the 1st Texas where the cavalry had broken in.⁶⁵

Major Charles E. Capehart, Commander of the First West Virginia Cavalry, describes the difficulties encountered by his cavalrymen.

I cannot fail to refer to you to the defensive position the enemy had availed themselves of, which is one that above all others is the worst for a cavalry charge- that is, behind stone fences so high as to preclude the possibility of gaining the opposite side without dismounting and throwing them down. The whole ground over which we charged was very adverse in every particular, being broken and uneven and covered with rock. Neither can I fail to bring

to your notice that this regiment charged upon infantry, and still did not falter in any of its movements until it had scaled two stone fences and penetrated some distance the enemy's lines, which had kept up a continuous fire of musketry. The entire regiment was entirely surrounded, when they received an order to return. The First Texas Regiment having occupied the ground over which we had advanced, and that was by far the best way to return, an order was given by Col. N. P. Richmond for the officers and men to cut their way through, which they did, and brought with them quite a number of prisoners. Anyone not familiar with the minutae of this charge upon infantry, under cover of heavy timber and stone fences, will fail to form a just conception of its magnitude.⁶⁶

LESSONS OF THE BATTLE

History's verdict upon the importance of the role of the cavalry at Gettysburg has been far from unanimous; however, one only has to look at the lessons from the fields of Gettysburg and then to current after action reports from units' performance at the U. S. Army's National Training Center in California to note certain similarities. The high correlation between early cavalry performance and ultimate results has remained constant despite substantial changes in equipment and employment.

Buford's appreciation of the importance of the terrain at Gettysburg, his continuous, detailed reporting of unit identity and location and the delay provided by his covering force which allowed reinforcement of the Union positions were all major contributions to the ultimate outcome.

At the same time, Stuart's failure to provide the early warning anticipated by General Lee of the movement to the north by the federal army and the absence of his cavalry from the battlefield until July 2, 1863 deprived Lee of much needed assistance.⁶⁷ Though Stuart had less than half of Lee's cavalry assets (three of the seven brigades), the brigades with Stuart were the ones with which Lee already had an established and trusted working relationship.⁶⁸ More importantly, Stuart's absence had a

profound effect upon the command and control relationship as in his absence, the units became widely spread, were attached (in the case of Jenkin's Brigade) to subordinate units and lacked the elements of coordination and cohesion that had previously distinguished the Confederate cavalry from their Union counterparts.

Stuart's raid did achieve some success in temporarily disrupting communications, raising the apprehension levels in Washington and Baltimore, providing captured equipment and to some extent in keeping additional federal troops in Washington that otherwise might have been sent to aid Meade's forces at Gettysburg; however in the process, the command extravagantly spent its time, ammunition and energy, to the extent that by the time it reached Gettysburg, it was less than at its best.⁶⁹

For those who are inclined to ponder of things that might have been, Gettysburg provides a fertile field. Of the many slender threads that managed to hold in the fabric of history when other results had seemingly equal possibility, the list is lengthy when one looks at the Confederate cavalry at Gettysburg. Stuart's route itself has prompted controversy; the delay which resulted from encountering Hancock's forces near Gum Springs, the difficulties in crossing the Potomac, the slowness of the advance near Washington, the decision to capture rather than destroy the

wagon train, the decision to turn east toward Jefferson, keeping the wagon train rather than west to Gettysburg and the failure to maintain contact with either Lee or Ewell during the advance all had profound impact. On July 3, 1863, the outcome might have been different had Jenkin's brigade had more than ten rounds of ammunition. On a grander scale, more favorable results might have been achieved had Lee selected Stuart to replace the fallen Jackson, noting Stuart's familiarity with the combined arms team of the day, his appreciation of the importance of terrain as a cavalryman, his familiarity with Lee's style of leadership and his performance following Jackson's death.

On the Union side, it might be noted that all three cavalry division commanders received orders on July 1, 1863 to withdraw from the engagement⁷⁰ and Buford was left at Taneytown and Westminster during the balance of the battle. On July 2, 1863, the race for the stone fence which proved crucial to the Union success was won by only the narrowest of margins over the Confederate infantry. The next day, despite orders to join his division where he might have shared Farnsworth's fate, Custer opted to stay with Gregg on the East Cavalry Field where with his assistance the attack by Stuart's cavalry, then four brigades strong, was repelled which otherwise might have overcome the federal flank about the same time that Pickett was advancing.

LOCATIONS OF CAVALRY UNITS

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

JUNE 30, 1863-JULY 3, 1863

JUNE 30, 1863

UNION MOVEMENTS

Buford's Division

Gamble's and Devin's Brigades - near Fairfield via
Emmitsburg, to Gettysburg

Merritt's Reserve Brigade - Mechanicstown, Maryland

Gregg's Division - New Windsor to Westminster, then to Manchester

Kilpatrick's Division - Littlestown to Hanover (Engagement)

JUNE 30, 1863 Continued

CONFEDERATE MOVEMENTS

Stuart's Cavalry

Hampton's, Fitz Lee's and W. H. F. Lee's Brigades -
Littlestown to Hanover (Engagement) then to Jefferson and en
route to Dover

Jenkins' Brigade - (with Ewell's Corps) Near Harrisburg to
Cashtown

Imoden's Command - Hancock to McConnellsburg

JULY 1, 1863

UNION MOVEMENTS

Buford's Division

Gamble's and Devin's Brigades - Gettysburg (Engagement)

Merritt's Reserve Brigade- Mechanicstown, Maryland

Gregg's Division - Manchester to Hanover Junction, then force was divided

McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's Brigades - to Hanover

Huey's Brigade - back to Manchester

Kilpatrick's Division - Hanover to Abbottsville, then to Berlin

JULY 1, 1863 Continued

CONFEDERATE MOVEMENTS

Stuart's Cavalry

Hampton's, Fitz Lee's and W. H. F. Lee's Brigades - Dover,
Dillsburg to Carlisle

Jenkins' Brigade - Gettysburg (with Ewell's Corps)

Robertson's and Jones' Brigades - Berryville

Imboden's Command - McConnellsburg to Chambersburg

JULY 2, 1863

UNION MOVEMENTS

Buford's Division

Gamble's and Devin's Brigades - Gettysburg to Taneytown

Merritt's Reserve Brigade - Mechanicstown to Emmitsburg

Gregg's Division

McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's Brigades - Hanover to near
Gettysburg (Engagement)

Huey's Brigade - Manchester

Kilpatrick's Division - Berlin to Hunterstown (Engagement) to Two
Taverns

JULY 2, 1863 Continued

CONFEDERATE MOVEMENTS

Stuart's Cavalry

Hampton's, Fitz Lee's and W. H. F. Lee's Brigades -
Carlisle to Hunterstown (Hampton's Brigade/Engagement) to
Gettysburg

Jenkins' Brigade - Gettysburg

Robertson's and Jones' Brigades - Williamsport to Chambersburg

Imboden's Command - Chambersburg to Gettysburg

JULY 3, 1863

UNION MOVEMENTS

Buford's Division

Gamble's and Devin's Brigades - Taneytown to Westminster

Merritt's Reserve Brigade (less 6th U. S. Cavalry) -

Emmitsburg to Gettysburg near Round Top (Engagement)

6th U. S. Cavalry - Fairfield (Engagement)

Gregg's Division

McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's Brigades - Gettysburg at East

Cavalry Field (Engagement)

Huey's Brigade - Manchester to Westminster

Kilpatrick's Division

Farnsworth's Brigade - Two Taverns to Gettysburg near Round
Top (Engagement)

Custer's Brigade - Two Taverns to Gettysburg at East
Cavalry Field (Engagement)

JULY 3, 1863 Continued

CONFEDERATE MOVEMENTS

Stuart's Cavalry

Hampton's, Fitz Lee's, W. H. F. Lee's and Jenkins' Brigades
-Gettysburg at East Cavalry Field (Engagement)

Jones' Brigade - Gettysburg to Fairfield (Engagement)

Robertson's Brigade - Arrived at Gettysburg from Cashtown and
stationed on Confederate right flank

Imboden's Command - Gettysburg

UNION ORDER OF BATTLE

CAVALRY CORPS

Major General Alfred Pleasonton

FIRST DIVISION

Brigadier General John Buford

First Brigade

Colonel William Gamble

8th Illinois

Major John L. Beveridge

12th Illinois [4 cos]

Colonel George H.

3d Indiana [six cos]

Chapman

8th New York

Lieutenant Colonel William Markell

Second Brigade

Colonel Thomas C. Devin

6th New York

Major William E. Beardsley

9th New York

Colonel William Sackett

17th Pennsylvania

Colonel J. H. Kellogg

3d West Virginia [2 cos]

Captain Seymour Conger

Reserve Brigade

Brigadier General Wesley Merritt

6th Pennsylvania

Major James H. Haseltine

1st U. S. Cavalry

Captain Richard C. Lord

2d U. S. Cavalry

Captain T. F. Rodenbough

5th U. S. Cavalry

Captain Julius W. Mason

UNION ORDER OF BATTLE-CONTINUED

6th U. S. Cavalry

Major Samuel H. Starr

Lieutenant Louis H. Carpenter

Lieutenant Nicholas Nolan

Captain Ira Claflin

SECOND DIVISION

Brigadier General David Gregg

First Brigade

Colonel John B. McIntosh

1st Maryland [11 cos]

Lieutenant Colonel James M. Deems

Purnell Legion [Maryland]

Captain Robert H. Duvall

1st Massachusetts

Lieutenant Greely S. Curtis

1st New Jersey

Major M. H. Beaumont

1st Pennsylvania

Colonel John P. Taylor

3d Pennsylvania

Lieutenant Colonel E. S. Jones

3d Pennsylvania Heavy

Artillery, Section Battery H Captain W. D. Rank

Second Brigade

Colonel Pennock Huey

2d New York

Lieutenant Colonel Otto Harhaus

4th New York

Lieutenant Colonel Augustus Pruyn

6th Ohio [10 cos]

Major William Stedman

8th Pennsylvania

Captain William A. Corrie

UNION ORDER OF BATTLE- CONTINUED

Third Brigade

1st Maine [10 cos]

10th New York

4th Pennsylvania

16th Pennsylvania

Colonel J. Irvin Gregg

Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Smith

Major M. Henry Avery

Lieutenant Colonel William Doster

Lieutenant Colonel John K. Robison

THIRD DIVISION

Brigadier General Judson

Kirkpatrick

Headquarters Guard

1st Ohio, Company C

Captain Samuel N. Stanford

First Brigade

Brigadier General Elon Farnsworth

Colonel Nathaniel P. Richmond

5th New York

Major John Hammond

18th Pennsylvania

Lieutenant Colonel William Brinton

1st Vermont

Lieutenant Colonel Addison Preston

1st West Virginia [10 cos]

Colonel Nathaniel P. Richmond

Major Charles E. Capehart

Second Brigade

Brigadier General George A. Custer

1st Michigan

Colonel Charles A. Town

5th Michigan

Colonel Russell A. Alger

6th Michigan

Colonel George Gray

ORDER OF BATTLE- CONTINUED

7th Michigan [10 cos]

Colonel William D. Mann

UNION HORSE ARTILLERY

First Brigade

Captain James M. Robertson

9th Michigan Battery

Captain Jabez J. Daniels

6th New York Battery

Captain Joseph W. Martin

2d U. S. Batteries B & L

Lieutenant Edward Heaton

2d U. S. Battery M

Lieutenant A. C. M. Pennington, Jr.

4th U. S. Battery E

Lieutenant Samuel S. Elder

Second Brigade

Captain John C. Tidball

1st U. S. Batteries E & G

Captain Alanson M. Randol

1st U. S. Battery K

Captain William M. Graham

2d U. S. Battery A

Lieutenant John H. Calef

3d U. S. Battery C

Lieutenant William D. Fuller

CONFEDERATE ORDER OF BATTLE

STUART'S DIVISION

Major General J. E. B. Stuart

Hampton's Brigade

Brigadier General Wade Hampton

Colonel L. S. Baker

1st North Carolina

Colonel L. S. Baker

1st South Carolina

2d South Carolina

Cobb's Legion [Georgia]

Jeff Davis Legion

Phillips Legion [Georgia]

Fitz Lee's Brigade

Brigadier General Fitz Lee

1st Maryland Battalion*

Major Harry Gilmor

Major Ridgely Brown

1st Virginia

Colonel James H. Drake

2d Virginia

Colonel T. T. Mumford

3d Virginia

Colonel Thomas H. Owen

4th Virginia

Colonel Williams C. Wickham

5th Virginia

Colonel T. L. Rosser

*Serving with Ewell's Corps

CONFEDERATE ORDER OF BATTLE- CONTINUED

W. H. F. Lee's Brigade	Colonel J. R. Chambliss, Jr.
2d North Carolina	
9th Virginia	Colonel R. L. T. Beale
10th Virginia	Colonel J. Lucius Davis
13th Virginia	
Robertson's Brigade	Brigadier General Beverly H. Robertson
4th North Carolina	Colonel D. D. Ferebee
5th North Carolina	
Jenkin's Brigade	Brigadier General A. G. Jenkins Colonel M. J. Ferguson
14th Virginia	
16th Virginia	
17th Virginia	
34th Virginia Battalion	Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Witcher
36th Virginia Battalion	
Jackson's Battery [Virginia]	Captain Thomas E. Jackson

CONFEDERATE ORDER OF BATTLE- CONTINUED

Imboden's Command	Brigadier General J. D. Imboden
18th Virginia	Colonel George W. Imboden
62d Virginia Mounted	
Infantry	Colonel George H. Smith
Virginia Partisan Rangers	Captain John H. McNeill
Virginia Battery	Captain J. H. McClanahan
Stuart Horse Artillery	Major R. F. Beckham
Breathed's Battery [Virginia]	Captain James Breathed
Chew's Battery [Virginia]	Captain R. P. Chew
Griffin's Battery [Maryland]	Captain W. H. Griffin
Hart's Battery	
[South Carolina]	Captain J. F. Hart
McGregor's Battery [Virginia]	Captain W. M. McGregor
Moorman's Battery [Virginia]	Captain M. N. Moorman

END NOTES

1. Sawicki, James A., Cavalry Regiments of the U. S. Army, (Wyvern Publications, Dumfries, Virginia, 1985) pp. 151-160;
Starr, Stephen Z., The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, Volume I (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1979) p.48, 58-59
2. Starr, p. 65
3. Captain McClellan, Stuart's adjutant, stated "By far the greatest evil of the system was the fact that whenever a cavalryman was dismounted, it was necessary to send him to his home to procure a remount." McClellan, H. B., The Life and Campaigns of Major General J. E. B. Stuart, New York, 1885, p. 259
4. U. S. Department of War, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128 volumes, Washington, 1880-1901) Series I, Volume XXVII, pt. I, p. 51 (Hereafter cited as Official Records or OR with volume and page number) Coddington indicates that in later years, General Hooker expressed the comment that General Buford would have been a better man for the job, but that as Buford was eleven days junior in rank to Pleasonton that he had felt compelled to appoint Pleasonton. Coddington, Edwin B., The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1968) p. 44 Looking at Buford's absence from the field of battle on July 2 and 3, others might disagree.
5. Starr, p. 416
6. O. R. XXVII, pt. I, p.58 Stahel's relief is announced in Special Orders 174, Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, dated June 28, 1863 (O. R. XXVII, pt. III, p. 373)
7. Ibid., pt. I, p.913; pt. III, p.376
8. Ibid., p. 373, 376; Coddington, p. 220
9. O. R. XXVII, pt. I, pp. 166-167; pt. III, p. 376
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., pt. II, pp. 321-322
12. Ibid., pt. III, p. 913
13. Ibid., p. 915
14. Ibid., pt. II, p. 316
15. Ibid., p. 915

16. Ibid, p. 923; Stuart's orders to General B. H. Robertson, who commanded the two brigades are found in O. R. XXVII, pt. III, p. 927; General Jones was considered the "best outpost officer in the Confederate cavalry" and thus was better suited for the mission, but was junior in rank to Robertson.

17. Stuart was discussed widely by the southern press following Brandy Station in papers such as the Richmond Examiner (June 12, 1863), Richmond Dispatch (June 13, 1863), Charleston Mercury (June 11, 1863) and the Richmond Sentinel (June 12, 1863); see Freeman, Douglas S., Lee's Lieutenants, vol 3, p. 51 for additional discussion.

18. O. R. XXVII, pt. II, pp. 692-697

19. Ibid., p. 694; Many of the paroles were not honored by the Union and the soldiers immediately returned to action which added to the criticism that was leveled at Stuart in later years.

20. O. R. XXVII, pt. I, pp. 1008-1009

21. Ibid., p. 1011

22. Ibid., pp. 986-987

23. Ibid., pt. I, p. 992

24. Ibid., pt. II, pp. 695-696

25. Ibid., p. 696

26. Ibid., pt. I, p. 922

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 923

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 924

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., pt. II, p. 316

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., pt. III, p. 943

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THE ROLE OF THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG JUNE 30 1863-JULY 2/2

3 1863: A GUIDE TO THE BATTLEFIELD(U) ARMY WAR COLL


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37. Ibid., pt. II, p. 321
38. Ibid., pt. I, p. 914
39. Ibid., p. 934
40. Ibid., pp. 938-939
41. Ibid., p. 934
42. Ibid., pt. I, p. 224
43. Ibid., pt. II, pp. 696-697
44. Freeman, Douglas S., R. E. Lee, A Biography, vol. III, p. 556; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, vol. III, p. 139; Thomason, John W. Jr., Jeb Stuart, New York, 1930, p. 440; Burke Davis' book which is cited by Longacre indicates that Stuart was rebuked by Lee, however the basis for the account is unclear and is generally felt to have been contrary to Lee's usual practice with his subordinates.
45. Ibid., pt. I, p. 956
46. Brooke Rawle, William, The Second Cavalry Division in the Gettysburg Campaign, History of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, (Philadelphia, 1905) pp. 266-268
47. O. R. XXVII, pt. I, p. 914
48. Ibid., pt. II, p. 697
49. McClellan, p. 337
50. O. R. XXVII, pt. II, pp. 697-698
51. Ibid., p. 698
52. Miller, William E., The Cavalry Battle Near Gettysburg, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, p. 404
53. O. R. XXVII, pt. I, pp. 956-957
54. Miller, p. 404
55. Brooke Rawle, pp. 277-279
56. O. R. XXVII, pt. I, p. 948
57. Ibid., pt. II, p. 952

58. Parsons, H. C., Farnsworth's Charge and Death, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, p. 393

59. Law, E. M., The Struggle for Round Top, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. III, p.326

60. Ibid., pp. 327-328

61. Parsons, p. 394

62. Ibid., pp. 394-395

63. Law, p. 329

64. Parsons, pp. 395-396

65. Law, pp. 328-329

66. O. R. XXVII, pt. I, p. 1018-1019

67. Stuart's failure to serve effectively as the army's eye and ears and his absence from Ewell's flank on the move north has been prominently featured as major causes of Lee's failure to achieve what he had hoped and has been the source of much controversy which is beyond the scope of this paper. For the specifics, one may read The Southern Historical Society Papers, (SHSP) vols. 4-7, General Longstreet's book, From Manassas to Appomattox, Marshall's comments published in SHSP, vol. 23, p. 205 et seq, Colonel John Mosby's replies in SHSP, vol 23, p. 238 et seq and 348 et seq and his book, Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. The debate was later joined by Colonel T. M. Talcott (37 SHSP 210) and Dr. R. H. Kim (37 SHSP 369) which Mosby answered in 38 SHSP 184. When Colonel Charles Marshall's papers were edited and published, his drafting of Lee's letters of June 22 and 23, 1863 were also added to the general debate.

68. McClellan indicates "It was not the want of cavalry that General Lee bewailed, for he had enough of it had it been properly used. It was the absence of Stuart himself that he felt so keenly. McClellan, p. 336

69. O. R. XXVII, pt. II, p. 322

70. Ibid., pt. III, p. 470

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