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LIMITED WAR, NATIONAL WILL,
AND THE
ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY


BY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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LIMITED WAR, NATIONAL WILL,
AND THE
ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Historically, the American national will to fight has been hard to galvanize for anything short of global war or internal and direct threat. Even when we go to war, there has been much less of the patriotic fervor than is romantically written about. The paper examines the All Volunteer Army in relation to national will and limited war. It reviews the difficulty of maintaining the national will when fighting for limited objectives. Though it affirms that limited wars are more probable, it cautions that the all volunteer force is insufficient to conduct a limited war. Further, it points out the improvements in the force composition in a high incentive volunteer system and argues that those improvements can not be sustained in a limited war. And thus the paper concludes, the All Volunteer Army is not the force with which we should plan to fight. Many would argue that if a nation is strong enough to conduct major war, it must possess the ability to conduct a limited war. If so, does this include the national will to do so? American rhetoric implies that the U.S. stands ready to defend its interests and support democracy around the world. The alliance, commitments, and statements of intent are as great as, if not greater than, any time in history. This is so while the costs are growing enormous, and it is increasingly difficult to man the forces. How will America obtain its forces to support a limited war? Who will fight America's limited wars? Chapter II examines briefly the setting of limited war. Chapter III looks at the place of national will in the use of armed forces. And Chapter IV reviews the All Volunteer Army while keeping in mind the relationship of both limited war and national will.

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LIMITED WAR, NATIONAL WILL
AND THE
ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Maxwell D. Taylor wrote in The Uncertain Trumpet, "We have the ability to wage total war. We can trigger near total destruction. But can we defend South Korea, Iran, Vietnam, Thailand, or Europe? Can we fight for limited objectives without committing national suicide?" Again and again we have senior political and military officials affirming that there exists a greater potential for limited wars. But are we structured, trained, indoctrinated, or prepared in any way for limited war? Many would argue that if a nation is strong enough to conduct war, it must possess the ability to conduct a limited war. Is this true? If so, does this include the national will to do so?

American rhetoric implies that the U.S. stands ready to defend its interests and support democracy around the world. The alliances, commitments, and statements of intent are as great as, if not greater than, any time in history. This is so while the costs are growing enormous, and it is increasingly difficult to man the forces. All this is done with very little prioritization, as Donald D. Nuechterlein outlines in his book, America Overcommitted.

Are we learning from history? Historically, the American national will to fight and sacrifice its youth has been hard to galvanize for anything less than global war or internal and direct threats. Even when we go to war, there has been much less of the patriotic fervor than is romantically written about.

As limited wars are more probable, how will America man its forces to support a limited war? Who will fight America's wars?

This paper will examine briefly the setting of limited war, the place of national will in the use of armed forces, and the relationship of both with the All Volunteer Army.

CHAPTER II

LIMITED WAR

Limited wars are more probable as the leaders of most every nation recognize the futility of a major war. Major war risks the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the devastation caused by these outweighs most every advantage humans could envision. Even without the use of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons have increased sufficiently in accuracy, lethality, and destructive power to make a major war questionable. And this trend toward greater destructive power of non-nuclear weapons will accelerate with the introduction of advanced technology weapons. So if limited wars are more probable in the future, we need to understand them and their interaction with society. This chapter is not intended to be a full discussion of limited war. Rather, my intent is to merely get the reader to begin to associate the aspects of limited war with the All Volunteer Army and the effects on people.

People, by nature, are opposed to limitations on them and tend to resist. They accept limitations only by discipline and will suffer under the limitations only as far as they seem to make sense. When limitations are not understood and appear to be unacceptably impeding progress, people may reject the limitations or become less efficient in working within them. This should be understood in waging limited wars.

Limited wars are those that require a commander to restrain his effort or resources. Limited wars are those that are limited by objectives, geography, force level, or type of weapons, or time.¹ Any of these characteristics require commanders to tailor their effort and, most probably, restrain their subordinates. Soldiers risking their lives understand the most basic aspect of the battlefield: death is real and forever no matter who gets elected next year. They understand clearly that there are two ways to avoid death. First, stop the threat to life by eliminating the enemy's ability or will to resist. Or, second, stop the war. American soldiers have fought honorably even when the cause was being questioned. But they are the ones that must carry the greatest burden. And when America is prosecuting a political struggle, it is the soldier's life that is at risk while politicians talk. Those that suffer the physical and emotional burdens of war directly become intensely committed to the effort--to that political objective. Many of these soldiers will become deeply committed to delivering pain to the enemy who is seen as having caused so much anguish. These soldiers become bitter at the limitations and can lose their will to support a limited war that restricts them to what is seen as an unfair advantage of the enemy. Others only identify with the needless slaughter of human beings and the devastation of war. They may never support the war even when they discharge their duties as they believe it is their duty to do.

The people of a nation who are not involved can quickly become disenchanted. They identify more with the negative effects of war and specifically with the death and maiming. As a speaker at the Army War College put it, "One of the most important 'battlefields' is on the television each night between 1800 and 2000 hours." As detached observers, they see the irrationality of war. They are emotionally detached from the objectives, and a war on the other side of the world can seem so unrelated to American interests. To them, the costs will seem too high when weighing the elements of war that touch them.

Most people take little or "no interest in foreign policy. Only a bare majority today believes that the country needs to play an active part in world affairs, and that majority is eroding."² There is an extreme need to educate the public on what are our national interests and why those are our interests.

For these reasons, nations understand that it will be extremely difficult to carry on a protracted limited war. Robert Osgood states, "a limited war is generally conceived to be a war fought for ends far short of complete subordination of one state's will to another's and by means involving far less than the total military resources of the belligerents, leaving the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents largely intact and leading to a bargained termination."³ If the ends (objectives) are insufficient to use the full military power of a nation, then at what point and for what is it worth

risking the lives of the population? And when it is a cause sufficiently great to risk the lives and accept the deaths of our soldiers, we need to have considered what will be our alternatives should we encounter the unexpected resolve and ability to resist of our opponent. Simply put, "how far and for how long are we willing to go to accomplish the limited objectives?" This brings us to the question that will continue to be asked about Vietnam: "If it was not worth staying the course, why did we get involved directly in the first place?" Certainly there are objectives short of total subordination of the enemy. But if we are willing to risk lives to secure a limited objective, we should commit sufficient resources to achieve that objective. If this is not the case, then the political leaders should reassess their reasons for considering the use of military power.

There will never be any exact procedures, and there will always be those that fashion themselves as the expert critics. There will always be opposition to the conduct of our nation's business and, in particular, limited war. We would do well to remember that "there was a war a while back that was not total war. It had substantial opposition throughout the country. It was enormously expensive, and led to uncontrolled inflation. For the few who fought, casualties were severe. Desertions spread and discipline was shaky. Fighting dragged on for eight years, and even then the peace agreement failed to

settle all the disputes between the contending powers. It was called the American Revolution.

When diplomacy fails and force is being considered, a leader must consider what effect limitations on the use of force may have on the military's ability to conduct operations. Further, the leaders must consider the people in any decision to fight a limited war. History informs us that we need their support, and it is difficult to rally support for any war but more so for the unpleasant venture of limited war.

ENDNOTES

1. Arthur E. Brown, Jr., "The Strategy of Limited War" in MILITARY STRATEGY: Vol. III, (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, August 1973), p. 26. Note: My definition of limited war includes involving significant force level and resources of a nation, as we did in Vietnam, and the Soviets are doing in Afghanistan. Grenada is not limited war. It is a hostile operation which at any moment may be just as intense to an individual.

2. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States. (Washington, The White House, 1987), p. 13.

3. William V. O'Brien, "Guidelines For Limited War," Military Review (Ft. Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, February 1979), p. 72.

4. John G. Kester, "Armed Forces For What?" Military Logistics Forum, September 1985, p. 11.

CHAPTER III

NATIONAL WILL

Dominant tendencies make war "a paradoxical trinity-composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.¹

Clausewitz spoke of three aspects which, if ignored, would make any campaign of war useless. These three aspects are manifested in the people, the army, and the government respectively.² This trinity is involved in all wars to some degree. In a democracy, the people's will is the only true reason for committing armed forces in war against another state.

Seventeenth century rulers used forces to settle minor differences without regard to the civilian population. But, this was before the rise of nationalism.³ With the rise of modern nations, the people element of the trinity espoused by Clausewitz has increased proportionally to the other two aspects.

The power of national will has played a prominent part in the wars of the United States. Russell F. Weigley points out that "like Lincoln's government before it, President Roosevelt's in World War II labored under an acute awareness that the American electorate might not show patience with a prolonged war."⁴ The American public demonstrated this tendency and the

power of national will during our war in Vietnam. As Harry Summers succinctly said, "One of the simplistic explanations for our failure in Vietnam is that it was caused by the collapse of national will."⁵ President Johnson decided to involve the armed forces in Vietnam, but not the will of the people. "It can be argued that President Johnson's deliberate refusal to mobilize the will of the American people for fear of jeopardizing his domestic Great Society programs was one of the primary causes of our failure."⁶ President Johnson ignored the concept of the trinity and the people decided that the war was not worth fighting. The North Vietnamese successfully waged war against our strategic rear. Though they lost in direct and traditional military fighting, they won in the more valuable war for the hearts and minds of the American people. As appropriately stated in FM 100-5, "Neither Dien Bien Phu nor Tet seriously threatened the operational capacity of French and American forces respectively. But both attacks struck directly at their strategic centers of gravity, popular and political support of the war."⁷

War is a contest of wills. And that contest begins with the population of which the soldier is a part. It is difficult to arouse the will and support of the people for limited and distant objectives. In the words of Sir John Hackett, "Where a nation is involved in a war which cannot be described as one of immediate national survival and whose aims, however admirable they may be, are not universally supported at home and perhaps

not even fully understood there strains can be acutely felt. Limited wars for political ends are far more likely to produce moral strains."⁸ This nation had first-hand experience with this in Vietnam.

National will can be divided simply by the national systems we choose. This is seen in President Johnson's decision to rely on a draft; and a draft that provided for exemptions. This caused extreme divisions and segregated the society into at least four groups. There were those who chose to serve, those that were drafted to serve, those exempted from service, and those unable to serve. From these groups came those that resisted the draft, dodged the draft, deserted the military, and others.

Our national will was splintered and we lost our desire to oppose an enemy or support a friend. This will be repeated if we are not honest with ourselves as to what the American people are willing to support. This was recognized by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In his article, "The Uses of Military Power," he states that "there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and elected representatives in Congress."⁹

The government's use of an instrument of power should express the will of the American people. Therefore, the decision to commit the military should absolutely support the will of the people. For it is at this time that the government will risk the very lives of the sons and daughters, husbands

and wives of the American people. The All Volunteer Army is meeting our needs in peacetime. Officials must understand it will not during hostilities. We need to understand just what it is and what will change if we commit our Army to a protracted, limited war. This is the subject of the next chapter.

ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, indexed edition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 89.

2. Ibid., p. 89.

3. Arthur E. Brown, Jr., "The Strategy of Limited War" in MILITARY STRATEGY: Vol. III, (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, August 1973), pp. 37-38.

4. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 281.

5. Harry G. Summers, Jr., ON STRATEGY: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 1983), p. 7.

6. Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Vietnam: Lessons Learned, Unlearned and Relearned" in The Art of War Quarterly (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, June 1983), pp. 30-43.

7. Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, Headquarters, Department of Army, 5 May 1986), p. 180.

8. Sir John W. Hackett, "The Military in the Service of the State" in Malham M. Wakin, ed. War, Morality, and the Military Profession (Boulder, Westview Press, 1986), p. 119.

9. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power" Defense 85, January 1985, pp. 2-11.

CHAPTER IV

THE ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY

This chapter reviews the strategic human resources planning, execution performance, and future of the All Volunteer Army in providing for the common defense.

Human resources planning is that "process of analyzing an organization's human resources needs under changing conditions and developing the activities necessary to satisfy these needs."¹ The Department of Defense has done and is doing this by planning for and using a system of volunteers rather than a system of conscription. The methods and possibly the results are different. The results are particularly critical as human resources are a major function of the readiness of our armed forces and thus the security of our nation.

Department of Defense (DOD) has always been staffed to perform the work force planning functions of forecasting requirements by skills, determining attrition rates, and projecting and assessing recruiting potential. Beyond this, DOD human resource "programs seek to engender human readiness by fostering the personal commitment of soldiers to each other, to their units, and to the [Service] . . . The ultimate goal of these programs is to create a positive influence on human readiness, thereby improving the Army's war fighting capability."²

Sustaining the force to "provide for the common defense" has always been paramount and a basic obligation of our government, as provided for in Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution. The fact is this responsibility has become increasingly more difficult, and success in attracting the necessary quantity and quality of people is highly dependent on good resources planning. To meet this challenge, staff organizations as the Directorate of Human Resources Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army are more prevalent. Their job is strategic human resource planning. To be effective, their "strategic planning approach must involve a systematic process of analyzing external conditions and organizational needs and delineating management strategies and tactics to make responsive changes."³ Our government's highest executive and legislative officials need to understand what the all volunteer force represents, why and how it has been successful, and what happens to it if committed to a protracted limited war.

The current use of volunteers began over fifteen years ago. In December 1972, President Richard M. Nixon directed the military services to rely only on volunteers to meet work force requirements and the use of the conscription, which began in 1948, ended. He based his decision on recommendations of the President's Commission on an All Volunteer Armed Force. Their report, completed in early 1970, concentrated mainly on manpower supply, civilian substitution, and equity issues,

giving little attention to the manpower requirements.⁴ The President made this decision six months prior to the expiration of his authority to involuntarily induct males for military service. (His authority expired in July 1973.) The nation was "free" of a system that had been divisive and represented the then unpopular war in Vietnam. But was this, in reality, more a political move convenient with our disengagement from a limited war? Could the personnel system of the U.S. Department of Defense meet its work force requirements with this new personnel acquisition system? What would it take to attract and retain sufficient numbers of military personnel, especially in time of conflict?

The United States has relied on conscription numerous times throughout history. The basic response has not been that different. However, the country had experienced public violent resistance only once before over the draft--that being the Civil War. Deferments and substitutes had split the people into the rich and the poor. The rich could buy their way out of military service and the poor were left with their only means to resist: physical resistance. This class difference, in managing the military force requirements, would repeat itself in the 1960's. The draft in World War I was a success,⁵ but there was draft evasion and resistance.⁶ Though history tends to portray overwhelming willingness to join the fight in World War II, "sixty-six percent of those who served were draftees."⁷ The conclusion may be that though many are willing

to answer the call of their country, they are reluctant to simply enlist even in a major war.

Selective service had never been popular. The Selective Service Act of 1948, the basis of the draft, had been bitterly contended in Congress prior to becoming law June 24, 1948. Since that time, the draft continued to be contested in courts and in the Congress. Only in recent years have we ceased to change the basic law that remains in effect (between 1967 and 1982, the latest change, Congress passed 14 public laws revising the procedures under which a draft would be conducted.⁸) Though debate has continued since President Nixon's decision, the Armed Forces have supplied their peacetime work force needs with volunteers.

Several things contributed to the initial success of attracting enough volunteers to meet requirements. These need to be understood to avoid drawing false conclusions about how a personnel system based on volunteers has been sufficient. This may help us understand when a draft may be necessary and what is changing about our current force to meet requirements. First, the military work force reduced from 3.55 million in 1968 to 2.1 million in 1974.⁹ This not only reduced the requirement, but it is much easier to recruit individuals into a military force that is not actively fighting and dying. Second, the Nixon Doctrine lessened the role of U.S. Forces in defense of other nations. Third, "Force structure planning, which had been based on the assumption of 2½ wars, now assumed

1½ wars . . ."¹⁰ During the years that followed, civilian unemployment rose to greater than eight percent in 1975.¹¹ This high unemployment provided adequate prospects for the military recruiting effort. Demographics received little attention during President Nixon's Commission on the All Volunteer Force because the number of 17 to 21 year olds was growing in the early 1970's. Specifically, they grew from about 9.5 million in 1971 to 10.8 in 1978, which supported the volunteer experience.¹² Additionally, the nation was reluctant to commit its military forces due to the Vietnam experience. This kept work force authorizations from increasing.

Our conventional force requirements are a function of Soviet force levels, our alliances, commitments, challenges to democracy, our vital national interests, and the foreign policy of our nation. The Soviets continue to maintain and improve a large standing army and they are improving their capability to project their forces.¹³ Since 1972, with the exception of Vietnam, our commitments to alliances have not reduced. Neither have our needs for strategic metals. This latter category is as fundamental to our continuing, if not increasing, need for the alliances as most any other. And if for only selfish reasons, we should understand that there are at least nine metals of which the U.S. imports greater than seventy percent, and each is critical to our nation.¹⁴

Though the probability of a major war, especially a nuclear war, is unlikely, there remains a significant requirement

for forces prepared to support our national interests. We do this most visibly by our presence, as in Europe and Korea, and by being ready to react to challenges, as in Grenada. Credible deterrence includes having a force of sufficient size that other nations believe that the United States could react and hold a position until mobilization could respond to fully counter a challenge to our national interest. The need to use our military as a national instrument of power is most likely to occur in those areas where we have alliances. Further, there is a growing need for a type of force that did not exist fifteen years ago. This requirement is in response to the growing incidents of international terrorism. There were more than 700 in 1985 as compared to just over 100 in 1968.¹⁵ This requires a more active defense to secure certain properties and people here and abroad as well as forces that may be used to directly aggress terrorists in the act.

Whether the military force is maintained at the current levels or expanded, as many feel it must, it will be supported predominantly by the 17-21 age group. But in 1979, the number of 17-21 year old males began to decline and that trend will continue until 1994.¹⁶ Because this group is declining, we must accept some differences in structuring and maintaining the force.

We are in a new era of intense competition for the youth of America. This could extend until at least 1999 when the 17-21 age group is projected to be about the size it was in

1970.¹⁷ There are many things which can assist or compound the problem. This can include the personality of a president as Ronald Reagan, who has been a particularly good president at promoting patriotism and a national atmosphere that supports military service. Conversely, low unemployment appears to make recruiting difficult. This was experienced in 1979 when unemployment decreased and recruiting was especially tough. To such an environment, we must always be prepared to respond. In the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress, FY 87 it states,

"Alarmed by the poor state of recruiting and retention in Fiscal Year (FY) 1980, this Administration introduced a comprehensive program to improve the Services' ability to attract and retain quality people. Included were programs designed to restore military pay and benefits to competitive levels, provide the Services with adequate recruiting resources, and improve the quality of life for military members and their families."¹⁸

This may have been a foreshadow of the competitive recruiting environment that we will face each time employment opportunities are good. A similar scenario of events occurred after the unemployment rate decreased from a high of over 9% in 1982 to near 7% in 1984.¹⁹ The new "GI Bill" was enacted as a major defense work force legislation. It provides "educational assistance ranging from \$250 to \$350 per month for thirty six months" for all recruits entering service between July 1, 1985 and June 30, 1988 who chose to have \$100 a month deducted from their pay for only twelve months.²⁰ With options in designated critical skills, individuals could earn up to \$45,600 for serving five years on active duty and four years in the selected

reserves, or eight years on active duty.²¹ The "GI" Bill is an effective inducement to serve in the military. There are "remarkably high participation rates for the . . . GI Bill. Army participation was highest among the Services with 91.8 percent of recruits electing to join the program. Overall DOD enrollment was 75.5 percent."²² The chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Subcommittee on Education, Training, and Employment said, "These and other available statistics dramatically illustrate a key to the survival of the All Volunteer Forces . . . good incentives are necessary to draw bright recruits in large numbers, and the opportunity for an education seems to be the best incentive of all."²³ In their annual joint statement to committees and subcommittees of Congress on the posture of the Army for FY88, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army reported that "with the potential pool of applicants declining, these incentives are a primary tool to attract, distribute, and align quality accessions. The GI Bill has strong public identification and support and will continue to play a major role in future manpower programs. It must be made permanent."²⁴ We must look honestly at the effort and incentives that it takes to recruit a civilian during a time of peace. How much more difficult will it be if we engage in a limited war or even a low intensity conflict that results frequently in American deaths? We must consider the effect of a limited war on recruiting, training, and overall effectiveness.

The debate over whether we should be recruiting volunteers or drafting conscripts to fill the ranks of our military continues. There are those that firmly believe in a draft. Brigadier General, retired, John D. Lawlor wrote, "One way by which large economies can be effected without injuring national security is through a return to the draft and abolition of the concept of the all volunteer force (AVF)."²⁵ In February 1985, the Secretary of Defense stated that:

Whereas in FY 80, there was genuine concern that the all volunteer concept might not succeed in FY 1984, all Services met their recruiting goals. Retention was up, the quality of our recruits exceeded that of the civilian youth population, and our Selected Reserve Forces increased their strength by 22 percent to the highest in history.²⁶

The report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on January 12, 1987 squarely faced the debate over how to raise our standing armed forces. The report states:

Despite 13 years of success with the volunteer force, the desirability of returning to conscription continues to receive a great deal of attention. Typically, criticism of the volunteer force stems from the mistaken belief that conscription will produce a higher quality force and be less expensive. Also at issue is the notion that the decline in the youth population and reduced youth unemployment will make it impossible to recruit sufficient numbers of quality young people. None of these concerns is supported by fact. The quality of the force is better today than at any previous time. There also is no evidence that a return to the draft will save money; indeed, recent research indicates that conscription would increase costs up to \$2.5 billion a year. Finally, changing demographics and the improved economy make recruiting more difficult, but certainly not impossible. Even with the declining youth population and improving economic conditions, the Services have achieved their recruiting objectives with higher quality each year since 1981.²⁷

While it is true that recruiting goals have been made, the Services have changed while accomplishing these goals.

Changes were recognized as necessary from the beginning. General William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff from 1968 to 1972, directed the transition to the all volunteer force. He states that the recruiting force was doubled as well as the Women's Army Corps in preparation for the new means of manning the force. Additionally, more jobs were open to women.²⁸ The fact that change was inevitable was accepted. But where would it go and what would it mean to the force?

The changes have included racial and gender composition of the forces, education levels, and marital status.

The racial composition has dramatically increased in the military, while formal racial equal opportunity complaints have decreased.²⁹ An example of the racial composition change is that blacks comprised 31% of the Army's enlisted force in 1984, down 2 percentage points from 1979.³⁰ Yet this is up from 11.8% in 1964, 17.5% in 1972, and 25.8% in 1977.³¹ While this has concerned blacks and whites for various reasons, equal treatment and opportunity have been the largest concerns. Many remember when disproportionate numbers of blacks were drafted. This was followed by a racially imbalanced number of blacks being assigned to combat. Then as MacPherson brings out in her book, Long Time Passing, Vietnam & The Haunted Generation, "In 1969, Army draftees were killed at nearly double the rate of nondraftee enlisted men. Draftees comprised 88% of infantry riflemen in 1969, while first term regular Army comprised 10 percent."³² This included the infamous

Project 100,000. These were males that would have normally been rejected from military due to low aptitude, but they were accepted annually under a program to provide an opportunity to underprivileged youths. It would teach them new skills, give them self confidence, and qualify them for veterans benefits, all while reducing unemployment. MacPherson notes that of 354,000 taken in the program, 41% were black. A disproportionate number entered combat and were killed between 1965 and 1970. But "their combat force helped stave off the politically nettlesome possibility of dropping student deferments or calling up the reserves."³³

The draft, with its deferments, has historically set up an army of lower class and underprivileged to fight a war. It cost about \$300 to avoid service in the civil war, while it took enough money to go to college to avoid service in World War II.³⁴ "By the time of Vietnam, military deferments via the college and graduate school route had become one of the most divisive factors in American society."³⁵ The war in Vietnam had less than 50% public support after late 1967.³⁶ We may need the draft in limited war. The potential for the divisiveness to reoccur is high. We should seriously review our current system to remove any unintended bias or imbalances which can systemically contribute to poor morale and deteriorating national will if we were to use our military force.

The number of women in the military has continued to grow from 1% in 1971 to 9.5% in 1984.³⁷ They have increased more

than 45,000 just since FY 1980 to a total of 10.1% in FY 1986. The number of women officers has grown by 46.9%, or 10,000, during the same period.³⁸ Women comprised 10.2% of the 776,576 people in the Army in 1985. The same year, females represented 11.2% of the Army officers while 14.4% of the lieutenants and captains were female.³⁹ This higher proportion is indicative of the growth of women that we are seeing in the higher grades. As an example, "The number of women colonels increased from 101 to 106; lieutenant colonels from 482 to 509; majors from 1371 to 1500" in FY 1987. "The number of women sergeants major increased from 17 to 28; master sergeants from 227 to 255; sergeant first class from 1800 to 2175 . . ." in FY 1987.⁴⁰

Congress has legislated that women will not be assigned to combat duties. This is supported by the national opinion. Therefore, women are concentrated in support units. This appears sound, given history, but may ignore the advances in technology and doctrine. From history, we have the example of the 12th Army Group which suffered 40,000 infantry casualties from a total of 50,000 in the Battle of the Bulge. This illustrates that while the riflemen made up 68.5% of a World War II infantry division, they suffered 94.5% of the casualties.⁴¹ But this was the case when the rear areas were relatively invulnerable to enemy weapons, unlike today. Further, doctrine now recognizes that many high priority targets are in the rear areas and we should expect such attacks which are designed to reduce our ability and will to prosecute a war. This may

place the women in positions that they may die in greater proportion than they represent in the force. And the death of large numbers of women may very well break our will. More specifically, just how prepared is our nation to see (on television's living color) the death and dying of any of our women? Still further, the long term effect of even a small number of maimed and disabled female veterans will touch us more deeply than the maimed and disabled male veteran which we have difficulty accepting as a price of war.

The Israelis were ahead of us in the use of women in the military, but they have experienced having a unit with large numbers of women overrun in their 1968 war. They have since reversed their policy on use of women and have returned to more traditional uses of women.⁴² With our current international defense alliances/commitments, we could hardly reduce the roles of women.

Technological advances have also changed human resource planning issues for managing the force. Modernization has created weapon systems that are more technical to operate and maintain, as well as more accurate and lethal. We can expect higher casualty rates on the modern battlefield. We can counter this by recruiting more individuals who test in the higher mental categories because there is a high correlation between mental test scores and combat effectiveness. As an example, mental category IV "kills" by an Infantry soldier is 1:1 compared by 2:1 for mental category III A-1. For Armor

soldiers, it is 1.5:1 compared to 7:1. And for Air Defense, successful engagements improve from 48% to 67%.⁴³ Quality is important in recruiting. A quality soldier is more effective on the battlefield. That means that not only do we need better educated soldiers to conduct war, we will need better educated personnel for replacements than we have had in the past. But remember, even protracted limited war requires a draft.

The availability of greater numbers of better educated people is, to some degree, a product of society and the military is one beneficiary. High school graduates constituted 88% of the recruits for the first time in FY 1983. This trend continued to 90.7% in FY 1985.⁴⁵ More importantly, we are seeing greater balance between racial groups. The Army reported that greater than 28% of its junior enlisted (E-1 to E-4) had at least some college (28.2% for Whites; 28.2% for Blacks; 25.8% for Hispanics; and 41.0% for others). The percent of sergeants with at least some college was even better (Whites 58.2%; Blacks 74.4%; Hispanics 51.8%; and others 61.9%).⁴⁶ The increased education level of our recruits has contributed directly to the increase in mental aptitude that we see in test scores. In 1971-73, less than 20% of those entering the Army during these draft years tested in the bottom 30% while fifty percent tested in the top 30%. The quality began to fall with the institution of the All Volunteer Army. The worst year was 1980 when there were greater than 45% who tested in the bottom 30% and only about 28% tested in the top 50%. This has improved dramatically

to the point in 1984 when only 10% tested in the bottom 30% and greater than 60% tested in the top 50%.⁴⁷ This, in summary, shows that we have recruited quality across racial groups which should allow for a more equitable distribution in combat and support jobs. It shows that those remaining on active duty are increasing their education. Therefore, we should meet the challenge of recruiting and retaining quality personnel to keep up with our technological advances. But remember, a protracted limited war requires a draft.

Another change and indirect cost to the military has been the increasing numbers of military personnel with families. This includes single parent families. However, the married Army population was still lower than the civilian population in 1985 (50.9 to 63.2%).⁴⁸ This has been recognized in DOD and many of the newer programs we established were designed with the idea of improving the quality of life for the family. The ulterior motive was and is to retain the military person. This change will cause an increase in the number of families (and children) affected by the casualties of war. From this we could experience an accelerated effect on national will during weakly supported limited wars.

Increasing retention of military people beyond their first enlistment is, of course, the next challenge to the all volunteer personnel system. But in 1978, the immediate retention challenge was to lower an attrition rate of nearly 40% of all soldiers and sailors before the completion of their first

enlistment.⁴⁹ Many others only completed their enlistment and left service. This aggravates the recruiting problem and increases both training and recruiting costs. Recruiting high school graduates has helped. Consider this:

A DOD study revealed that the attrition rate for high school graduates is considerably lower than that for enlistees from the other categories. The 30 month attrition rates for the various educational categories were 23 percent for high school diploma holders, 37 percent for adult education diploma holders, 39 percent for GED certificate recipients and 45 percent for nongraduates . . . Officials estimate the savings from this policy could exceed \$20 million a year in reduced training and recruiting costs associated with the present rate of first term attrition.⁵⁰

The first term attrition rate (that is failure to reenlist) had been growing after having reached a low of 41 percent in FY 82. We recorded the highest attrition rate in FY 86 (59%) since FY 78 (64%). The record since FY 77 is as follows:⁵¹

FY 77	67%	FY 82	41%
FY 78	64%	FY 83	55%
FY 79	57%	FY 84	57%
FY 80	49%	FY 85	57%
FY 81	45%	FY 86	59%

The high attrition was also a drain on experience. "For example, about 50 percent of the force on active duty at the end of FY 1964 had less than three years of service."⁵² This illustrates the point of high turnover and low experience levels. In 1984, less than 15% of the enlisted force had less than 3 years of service.⁵³ Retention and, therefore, experience, has improved since 1980 with an increasing number of enlisted

in the grades E5 to E9 as well as an increase in the number with greater than four years of service.⁵⁴ This means less personnel turnover, fewer newcomers to be trained, more professional leaders, and enhanced motivation.⁵⁵ But the gains here could be reversed if the first term attrition rates are not improved. The lower first term reenlistments mean increased requirements on the recruiter who is already facing a declining market. It also means increased pressure to retain career soldiers. The former solution increases training and reduces experience of the force. The latter solution ages the force. Either way, the experience we have enjoyed from the higher first term reenlistments of Fiscal Years 1981 and 1982 will decline over the next few years. Though this will not significantly damage our personnel readiness, force managers and leaders should simply be aware of the change and the accompanying challenges associated with higher turnover. As a positive effect, many of the departing soldiers will choose to continue their service in the reserve components. Those that do not are part of a trained force on which the nation could call.

Simpl said, the all volunteer force is currently working in peace time. We must not forget what is making it work or of whom it is composed. It is an expensive force to recruit and maintain, but efficient in terms of lower disciplinary rates, greater efficiency in training, and quality performance. Congress and our critics could raise a serious challenge to the all volunteer method if first term reenlistment rates

remain low or, worse, decline. As it stands, we have a ready force that will be the first to fight. And by its characteristics, it is a deterrent force. But altering the standards or incentives could render it vulnerable and weak in support of our national interests. Finally we should understand that this is not the force with which we would be fighting a war. We must understand how it will change, how that will affect our business, and what effect both changes will have on the nation and our national will.

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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

War is a contest of wills. National will is in our strategic rear as well as one of our strategic centers of gravity. As war is an extension of politics, wars can be lost in this area as well as any other. It was in this area that the North Vietnamese successfully waged war against us. Other opponents may also if we fail to take action appropriate to this area. We need to listen to our critics now to understand the basis of their opposition. We can find this productive in at least three ways. First, we need to keep in touch with the American public. Second, the critics will espouse some valuable and valid points for our consideration. Third, if after serious consideration we disagree, we are better prepared to address our position in terms that may be more readily understood.

The destructive forces of a major war make it highly improbable, but this is not the case for limited war. So as nations' interests clash, there is less deterrent to testing the will of the United States in distant areas of limited value. While major wars require little effort to mobilize national will, support for a limited war can be difficult to rally or maintain. The nation has always been reluctant to involve itself in a war, but even more so with a limited war. We must not ignore that a major lesson of Vietnam is that

military campaigns cannot be waged without sustained public support. Military leaders do, in fact, have grave reservations about the commitment of troops without significant public support. In the words of General (retired) Edward C. Meyer, "Soldiers should not go off to war without having the nation behind them."¹

National will is not public opinion, but public opinion is the seed of national will. Public opinion will grow into national will. We must educate and nurture public opinion. It is as important to develop a "campaign plan" for this critical area as any other. Public opinion will translate to the Congress at the ballot box, if not before, and the Congress will translate the wishes of their constituents into votes for the funds of any operation we think necessary to conduct.

"The military establishment, in any historical period, is both a reflection of the larger society and an institution in its own right with a distinctive environment and ethos." However, the boundary between military forces and civilian society has weakened as total mobilization requires larger and larger segments of the population to become part of the war apparatus."² This is one of the points of this paper. The military community is a part of and reflects the nation to an extent. But, we must recognize that as we draw conclusions based on the All Volunteer Army, this force is a select force and does not represent the population at large or what the expanded force would be should we become involved in a protracted

limited war. While the All Volunteer Army may support military action, the nation may not or would not over time. We must remember that the American people, as a whole, take little or no interest in foreign policy, do not understand how some distant places are connected to our national interests, and would become disenchanted with a protracted limited war. To sustain the resolve of our nation to endure the hardships of war, we need to educate the nation on what are our national interests and explain why those are our interests.

When and if we have to defend our interests, we will always have dissent and resistance. As the force expands, and/or the time of the conflict is extended, the draft will be required to provide the force. This will engender additional resistance. People who honestly disagree with the policy will be legally required to serve. The resistance can become pronounced and unnecessarily bitter at this point if we have not gained the public support prior to this point. Additionally, we must avoid class differences that have been so divisive in the past. Draft deferments institutionally and systemically cause this problem. We should seriously review our current system to remove any unintended bias or imbalances which contribute to poor morale and decrease support of the force. When the force itself begins to have misgivings, it will cause significant deterioration of national will.

With the declining male youth population, there are limited alternatives to expanding the force. These include:

1. Increase participation by women.
2. Lower the mental standards.
3. Waive the disqualifying convictions or unfavorable conduct or lifestyle.

The increased use of women in the military will continue if not expand. They are performing well in peace, and I believe they will in war. The major question open is: "How will the American people react to the death and maiming of relatively larger numbers of women in war?" The maimed and disfigured female veteran will evoke more emotion and have a greater effect on our national will than the male veteran in the same condition.

We must be extremely careful with lowering the mental standards for military service. We now know that there is a direct correlation between mental aptitude and combat effectiveness. We must never again rely on the mentally inept to fight. It is morally unjust; and as we know, they are less effective and will die in greater numbers.

We have evidence that if we were to waive convictions and other undesirable traits for potential enlistees, it would lead to higher disciplinary problems. Lower discipline reduces the effectiveness of the force and will result in greater deaths in battle.

Circumstances may dictate that one of the options above must be used. But as leaders commit to the use of force, they must recognize that the all volunteer force is not what they

are committing. Further, they must understand that "the vast resources required for military operations and need to justify prolonged hostilities and mass destruction necessitate an egalitarian ideology, both in democratic and totalitarian societies. Increasingly, men are no longer prepared to fight for nationalist sentiments alone; the cause, rather, must be seen as justified morally."³

Many who enlist today might not during a time of limited war. We now recruit using very attractive incentives with a strong individualized appeal. This is far removed from any identity with fighting for distant and limited objectives that might be required.

We are experiencing difficulty in recruiting when the economy is good and job opportunities are good. When recruiting was low in 1979 and 1984, we responded with more incentives and increased support of the recruiting effort. This resembles the original effort to begin the All Volunteer Army when we doubled the recruiting force to meet the increased effort that would be required. In November 1987, we once again faced problems with recruiting and added 300 more non-commissioned officers to the recruiting force to hopefully boost enlistments.⁴ This seems a continuing trend as the male youth population declines and those bright young people who join to get the benefit of the Army College Fund get out to go to college. The gains in education, experience, and quality may be impossible to hold as the target groups gets smaller.

In summary, the all volunteer force works very effectively in peace. It provides a ready and highly deterrent force. We must not forget what is making it work or of whom it is composed. We must understand that altering the standards or incentives could render it vulnerable and weak contrary to our national interests. Finally, we should understand that this is not the force with which we would be fighting a war. We must understand how it will change; how that will affect our business; and what effect both changes will have on the nation and our national will.

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