Mobilization and Limited Warfare: The Real Worst Case,
Abstract
This document is a product of the Mobilization Concepts Development Center's IDEAS System. The IDEAS System is an information distribution system designed to disseminate timely occasional papers in a series of formats. The goal of the system is to foster discussion and development of ideas by ensuring widespread distribution of papers dealing with mobilization and military and industrial preparedness issues. The term 'mobilization' conjures visions of massive efforts to move the nation toward readiness for a major war. A momentous national decision is made and reserves are called, the draft resumed, gasoline rationed, civilian factories converted to military production, and the government takes control of communications, shipping and the like. That was mobilization as we knew it in the past and may describe a future mobilization. But it is neither the only nor, perhaps, the most likely type of mobilization that this nation must be prepared for in order to protect our national interests. Much has changed since the US molded a system for mobilization based on the experiences of World War II. Prior to WW II, US public opinion and foreign policy was to remain aloof and let others police the world. By the end of WW II most Americans accepted the proposition that the US was obligated to play an active role in the maintenance of world order. We were a world power.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADA195251
Entities
People
- Lee Austin
Organizations
- National Defense University