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COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE HIGH NORTH

BY

COLONEL OLA AABAKKEN

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recognizes that the command and control arrangements within a theater are based on political, as well as military considerations. It concludes that improvements should be made in the NATO command structure in the High North and provides options for how they could be achieved.



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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE HIGH NORTH

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
3 May 1988

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ABSTRACT

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Command and control in Northern Europe is very complicated, with all three Major NATO Commands involved (European, Atlantic and Channel). This study focuses on the AFNORTH area of responsibility and adjacent waters, in particular the maritime-continental interface in the region. It discusses the strategic importance of Northern Europe and the balance of power in that region. The present NATO command structure also has important consequences at the operational and tactical level, in particular in areas such as amphibious operations, shore bombardment, air control and air support. The study recognizes that the command and control arrangements within a theater are based on political, as well as military considerations. It concludes that improvements should be made in the NATO command structure in the High North and provides options for how they could be achieved.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE HIGH NORTH

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General

Command and control of military forces from more than one service seems always to have been troublesome. In an alliance with forces from two or more countries involved, this problem will increase. In addition to the inter-service rivalry, there will often be differences based on national, political, economic and sociological perceptions.

Command and control have always created some problems in NATO, and many have serious implications. Most important may be France and Spain's refusal to join the integrated command structure.

Most of these problems stem from national political considerations and therefore the solution to the problem must be political rather than military.¹

These questions are being discussed more or less continuously. From both sides of the Atlantic we have seen political approaches to several of the important command and control problems in NATO, often in a broad perspective.^{2,3} This paper will leave the political questions to the politicians and concentrate on the military perspective.

In many countries, including the United States, there is an ongoing effort to increase interoperability and jointness. The Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is a new step in that direction.⁴

At the operational level, we have seen that the United States has found it necessary to rapidly rearrange command structures, before or during recent operations. For example, before the 1983 Grenada invasion, special command and control arrangements were implemented. Again, in August 1987, the Defense Department reorganized its operations in the Persian Gulf in an effort to ensure centralized command and control over the United States forces there.⁵

To change command arrangements just before or during a crisis is certainly not desirable and would be far more difficult to do within an alliance than with strictly national forces.

In Northern Europe, command and control is particularly complicated. The main reason for this is the organizational structure, with all three major NATO commands (MNC's) involved.⁶ Split responsibilities do not foster a truly joint approach in planning for the defense of NATO's northern flank. As an example, the boundary between the European (ACE) and Atlantic commands (ACLANT) follows a line 50 kilometers off mainland Norway. Further, the command and control arrangements at the MNC level have serious implications at the operational and tactical levels.

The command and control arrangements in Northern Europe needs to be improved to ensure unity of effort in NATO's northern region. This paper will explore how that could be done within the framework of NATO's command structure.

Command and Control

Command and control is not clearly defined; its relationship with leadership is not understood; its system design is nebulous, its historic importance is unappreciated; and its application is burdened with contentious issues and unsolvable problems. In short, a

fitting topic for examination within the USAWC seminar.
(From Introduction to Lesson No. 3-34-S, USAWC 1987-88)

Command and control is not clearly defined. JCS Pub 1 gives one definition, but AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms presents another definition.^{7,8}

Within NATO a command, control and information system is defined as

An integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications which provides authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct and control their activities.

Martin van Creveld in his book "Command in War" concludes:⁹

Probably the most important point to emerge from these case studies is that command cannot be understood in isolation. The available data processing technology and the nature of the armaments in use; tactics and strategy; organizational structure and manpower systems; training, discipline, and what one might call the ethos of war; the political construction of states and the social makeup of armies--all these things and many more impinge on command in war and are in turn affected by it.

Most military officers will probably agree on that.

This paper however, will focus only on the organizational structure of the problem as it relates to the northern flank of NATO.

Definitions of some terms are important for the understanding of the subject. The command and control definitions which are NATO--agreed may be found in Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6) "NATO glossary of Terms and Definitions."¹⁰ Some of the most important are:

- o Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.

- o Full Command. Full command is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. As used internationally, the term command implies a

lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. In assigning forces to NATO, the nations delegate only operational command or operational control.

- o Operational Command. The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. It may be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

- o Control. Control is the authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.

- o Operational Control. Operational control is the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of the assigned units.

- o Combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies (when all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies).

- o Joint. The term joint connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate.

Some terms, like "operational command," have different meaning in U.S. national forces and in NATO.¹¹

An understanding of the difference between command boundaries on land at sea and in the air is important. On land, boundaries are clearly delineated by lines on the map across which forces do not freely operate. Occupation of the territory is of the essence. But at sea and in the air over it, a command boundary indicates an area of responsibility, but is no more or less than a CHOP line. That is a line at which the responsibility for operational control (not as a rule operational command) of a force or unit passes from one operational control authority to another.

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CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF NORTHERN EUROPE FOR NATO

Northern Europe is diverse, both geographically and politically.¹ It consists of the Scandinavian peninsula (Norway and Sweden), Finland (long border with the Soviet Union), Iceland and Denmark. Denmark consists of various islands and the peninsula of Jutland, which is linked to Northern Germany (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Northern Europe

The geostrategic importance of Northern Europe stems from the Baltic approaches which control access to the Baltic Sea, and the Soviet naval and

air bases at Kola Peninsula. Both are critical to the Soviet Navy's ability to project power. Therefore, in particular Northern Norway and the Baltic approaches have great importance for NATO.

The northern fleet has its bases at Kola Peninsula, some of them not far from the Norwegian border. Unlike the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, which must pass through straits controlled by western countries to reach the high seas, the Northern Fleet has relatively unimpeded access (Figure 2). But before it can try to interdict the Atlantic SLOC's, the Northern Fleet must sail a long route from the Barents Sea across the Norwegian Sea and beyond.




Figure 2 The Soviet Union's access to the Atlantic Ocean

The Northern Fleet also includes over two-thirds of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. The new Typhon-class submarine is based only 50 kilometers from the Norwegian border. Northern Norway, thus, has both regional and strategic importance.²

If the Soviet Union could control ports and airfields in North Norway, that would decrease the vulnerability of their SSBN's and would, at the same time, increase their ability to perform maritime operations into the North Sea and the North Atlantic. Therefore, the defense of North Norway is critical to NATO. However, the threat is such that Norway is unable to maintain a viable defense alone. Consequently, NATO plans to reinforce Northern Norway in the event of war. To secure the timely arrival of these reinforcements, the control of the Norwegian Sea must be in the hands of NATO naval and air forces.

The second area of strategic interest is the Baltic Approaches. These approaches control exit and access into the Baltic Sea. They are formed by the peninsula of Jutland, Schleswig-Holstein and the Danish isles. The importance of the Baltic Approaches for the Warsaw Pact is illustrated by the following figures: Nearly 16,000 commercial ships, 2,600 fishing vessels, and 430 warships from Warsaw Pact countries pass through every year.³ More than 50 percent of the Soviet Union's installations and shipyards are located along the coast of the Baltic Sea. These installations also serve the Northern Fleet. Moreover, the Soviet Baltic Fleet can only provide support to, and operate with, the Northern Fleet after the Baltic Approaches are brought under Soviet control. Because of this, the strategic maritime link between Northern Norway and the Baltic Approaches is evident.

Denmark is also a potential springboard for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As long as NATO controls Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein there is a

flank threat to any Warsaw Pact attack in the Central Region. If the Warsaw Pact could seize this area, they would be in a position to project a flank threat against NATO's Central Region and Great Britain. The area would also be important for possible air attacks against targets in South Norway, the North Sea and the English Channel. The defense of the Baltic approaches is therefore of critical importance to the defense of NATO's Central Region and of NATO's sea lines of communication.

The two non-aligned Nordic nations follow security policies based on history, geography and concern for regional order.

Finland tries to assert itself as a neutral. Sweden's official policy is non-alignment in peace, with the aim of neutrality in case of war. Both maintain a strong military defense, based upon mobilization, to give credibility to their determination to prevent either of the blocs making use of their territory during a conflict.

In 1948 Finland signed an agreement on Friendship Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. If a threat to the Soviet Union was perceived by the Soviets to have developed from Germany, or a state allied with Germany, from or over Finnish territory, there would be a strong Soviet pressure in the form of consultations and possibly positioning of Soviet forces in Finland.

Maintenance of strong defenses by Finland and Sweden is an advantage to Norway and NATO. They screen Norway's long eastern border and allow Norway to concentrate its efforts against an attack in the far north. It is interesting to note that both countries have recently strengthened the defense of the northernmost parts of their countries.

Iceland is a NATO-member, but has no military forces of its own. She has a cardinal strategic location positioned between Greenland and Scotland (GIUK-

gap) or Greenland and Norway (GIN-gap). From Iceland NATO can control both surface and subsurface traffic between the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. Iceland is also a suitable location for controlling and monitoring Norwegian Sea/GIUK Gap air activities.

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CHAPTER III
BALANCE OF POWER

Soviet Forces and Capabilities

When planning for the defense of NATO's Northern European Command one needs to consider the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland and the Baltic Military District as well as the Soviet forces in the Leningrad Military District and on the Kola Peninsula.¹

In a conflict involving Germany, the attack across the North German plain would be given priority. Therefore we can only guess how many of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany (SGFG) as well as GDR and Polish forces would be used against Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark to seize the Baltic Straits.² But the amphibious capabilities of the Baltic Fleet and the Polish Sea Landing Division are probably designed for a seaborne assault against the Danish islands or along the coast in support of Soviet armies. The Baltic fleet and the Polish and GDR navies are designed to gain control of the Baltic Sea and support opening of the straits.

Use of the Danish Straits for transit to and from the base and repair facilities in the Baltic would also require control of the Southern Norwegian coastline. That would require additional forces and time. We must also remember that surface combatants and possibly submarines could be deployed from the Baltic prior to a crisis or conflict, as seen during exercises.

The most important development in the north has been that of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Today it has powerful strategic and general purpose forces, capable of global tasks and deployments.

General Tønne Huitfeldt once listed the following aims for the Soviet naval forces in the North Atlantic area:³

In peace:

- o to maintain a credible strategic nuclear deterrent force, based on SSBN;
- o to create and sustain an impression of Soviet power at sea, to reduce efficacy of NATO reinforcement and support perceived within the Alliance.

In war:

- o to assure transit and secure operations of Soviet strategic missile submarines;
- o to counter the strategic nuclear submarines of the United States;
- o to disarm American strike carriers before they launch their aircraft;
- o to ensure control of the fleet areas;
- o to intercept NATO lines of communication and supply;
- o to provide maritime flank support for land operations in coastal areas.

We don't know what priority the Soviet High Command will give to the respective tasks of protecting the strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN) force, defending the homeland against cruise missile firing ships and submarines in the Norwegian Sea and intercepting western sea lines of communication in the Atlantic. There is obviously competition between these tasks for the available maritime assets.^{4,5}

Another uncertainty is to what degree the major Soviet surface ships would be able to operate beyond the range of their land-based air defense and surface support aircraft. But it must be remembered that the new types of aircraft deployed on Kola and in the Archangel Air Defence District, have considerably greater ranges and operational capabilities than the older types.

The strategic component has become less dependent upon access to the Atlantic and can now reach most of its potential targets from the Barents Sea

and the Polar Basin where it is able to fire its missiles through the pack ice. But SLBM's assigned to a possible first strike and submarines tasked to intercept NATO naval forces and to disrupt Western Sea lines of communications (SLOC's), would still have to cross the Norwegian Sea to reach their operationing areas.

The Naval Infantry Brigade of the Northern Fleet has been upgraded, and there has been an increase in the amphibious exercise activity on the Kola Peninsula, including the use of aircushion landing craft. There is enough amphibious capability to lift the naval infantry and also enough merchant vessels, including Ro-Ro ships, available in Kola ports to transport any follow-on forces in an amphibious operation. There is also believed to be provision for an additional naval infantry brigade in the Murmansk area, either on a mobilization basis or by pre-positioned equipment.⁶

The ground forces on the Kola Peninsula are capable of mounting a surprise attack on Norwegian territory in eastern Finnmark. But to take the strategically more important objectives, particularly in the Troms area, it would be necessary to reinforce the existing forces on the Kola Peninsula.

An attack on Norwegian territory, to achieve any results of importance, would require at least one Combined Arms Army--and probably two, if Finnish territory was to be involved. It would also be necessary to deploy a considerable number of tactical aircraft to Kola airfields to support the attack. Even if these reinforcements were timed to provide maximum surprise, it would be difficult to disguise the fact that preparations for attack were taking place. Furthermore, it is not likely that the Soviet Union would initiate any local military attack without making the necessary deployments to increase the readiness of its strategic forces in case the attack resulted in

an escalation of the conflict. This would also make it more likely that a warning of attack would be available to NATO.

Most threat assessments conclude that an attack on Norway would be a triphibious operation, because of the terrain and the NATO defense posture. The possibility of a limited attack which provides very little warning time, requires an effective command and control organization in place in the Northern Flank and functioning at all times. This in-place command will also play a key role in evaluating possible reinforcement on the Kola Peninsula and deployment of the Soviet Northern Fleet.

Defending Norway

Norway is a fairly large country and covers an area about the size of Denmark, Germany and the Benelux countries combined. But the population is only slightly over four million. Furthermore, the inhabitants are unevenly distributed. The three northernmost countries, covering one-third of the territory have only one-tenth of the population. With the increasing importance of the North, the demographic problem has presented a special challenge.⁷

Norway from Trøndelag north, including Troms, is a long narrow strip of land. Road and rail communications are vulnerable, running parallel to fjords, across bridges, through tunnels and over mountains, and being exposed to winter conditions during a large part of the year. There is only one main road from the south to the north and a railway running two-thirds of the distance, terminating in Bodø. This makes the reinforcement and sustainability of North Norway very dependent on the sea lines of communications. Since 1953 most of the Norwegian army's standing forces have been stationed in North Norway. They include a garrison at the Soviet border

in South Varanger, a battalion group in Porsanger, in Finnmark, and a brigade in the Troms area. These standing forces are there in case of a surprise attack in the area. They also provide unit and formation training in a very realistic and demanding environment.

For geographical reasons the main defenses in North Norway are established in the Troms area. The northernmost county, Finnmark, is less suitable for defense and could be cut off from the rest of the country, by a Soviet attack through the Finnish wedge. In Troms, the access routes from the sea are covered by coastal defences, minefields and coastal artillery forts.

A number of frigates, submarines and MTB's are deployed to North Norway at all times. Additional naval assets earmarked for defense of North Norway can be deployed in one to four days.

Two squadrons of F-16 aircraft are based in North Norway and another two in South Norway. F-16s can operate in North Norway from bases in South Norway. There also are a maritime patrol squadron with P-3B, a helicopter squadron for support of the army, a coastguard squadron with Sea Lynx and a helicopter rescue squadron with Sea-Kings in the area.

Norway has considerable mobilization potential. The total strength in Finnmark can be brought to more than a brigade in less than 48 hours. In Troms and Nordland two additional brigades can be mobilized. There are also the 6th Division headquarters to provide command and control for national and allied units in the area.

National reinforcements for the defense of North Norway include a rapid deployment battalion and two brigades from South Norway. The heavy equipment for these reinforcements is being pre-positioned in North Norway. Call up for refresher training takes place regularly, and deployment to North Norway can be completed in 24 hours. This means that in the strategically important

Troms area more than five Norwegian brigades under the command of the 6th Division would be available initially. The total strength in North Norway, including Home Guard would be more than 80,000 men after mobilization and deployment of national reinforcements.

In South Norway there are small standing forces, but considerable mobilization potential, including 10 brigades as well as command, support and service units. In addition, a large number of local defense units and the Home Guard comprise more than 80,000 men.

The stationing of most of the standing Norwegian forces in North Norway, and their reinforcement, is based on two assumptions.

- o An attack in the north could come with very little warning.
- o An attack on South Norway can only be mounted after the Allied defenses of the Baltic area, and possibly also Swedish defenses, have been overcome. The latter would take time and allow greater dependence on mobilization units for the defense of South Norway. This also means that Norway is dependent upon the defenses of the Baltic area for the use of South Norway as a base and staging area, a prerequisite for a forward defense in North Norway.

Allied Reinforcements

NATO adopted the strategic concept of forward defense and flexible response in 1967. This meant that more attention was given to the ability of the Alliance to react in case of incursions on the flanks and in other exposed areas.⁸ Since then we have seen a slow but steady improvement in the Alliance's ability to reinforce North Norway.

Allied reinforcements are important for two main reasons. The existence of credible reinforcement options, demonstrated in exercises, makes it evident

that the defense of North Norway is a joint NATO venture. And reinforcements make a substantial contribution to the defensive capability in the area.

The ACE Mobile Force (AMF), with air and ground components, has the role of demonstrating NATO solidarity and unity of purpose in any threatened area. Since 1964 it has been deployed to North Norway every second winter to take part in Allied exercises.

The British and Netherlands Marine Commandos have held exercises in Norway for a long time and now conduct winter training and take part in exercises in North Norway every year. Even though they belong to SACLANT's forces, North Norway is considered their deployment priority.

Since 1977 the Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST BG) has been dedicated exclusively as reinforcement for North Norway. The Canadian government has made the decision to end this commitment and NATO is now working to find units that can replace CAST in reinforcing Norway.

In 1981, the United States and Norwegian governments agreed to dedicate a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) as reinforcements for Norway, and to preposition equipment and supplies for it in Trøndelag, in central Norway. In the same agreement the Norwegian government committed itself to preposition equipment and supplies for another Norwegian brigade in North Norway.

A U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is included in SACEUR's strategic reserves and has NEC as priority for deployment.

The deployment times of the reinforcing forces varies from about seven to 20 days, depending upon the degree of preparation and method of transportation.

The reinforcements exercise regularly in Norway, and these exercises are an important contribution to deterrence. But it must be remembered that only

the CAST BG and the U.S. MEB have been specifically dedicated to Norway. There could be competing demands for the other reinforcements in a crisis.

Allied air squadrons are the most important reinforcements to Norway. In addition to the four squadrons in AMF's air component, Canada is committed to providing two squadrons in the event the CAST BG is deployed to North Norway. The Air Group of the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade includes two squadrons of air defense fighters, and two squadrons of ground support aircraft, as well as a number of other types of aircraft and helicopters. In addition, a number of U.S. and British squadrons have been dedicated as air reinforcements to Norway. Fuel, spare parts, medical supplies and ammunition have been pre-positioned for these squadrons on eight airfields in North and South Norway. The reinforcement squadrons also regularly take part in exercises in Norway. Deployment times may vary from about two to seven days.

The reinforcement of Norway in a crises will depend on the method of transportation and the degree of air and sea control which NATO exercises in the area between Norway and the reinforcing nations. To bring in Allied reinforcements after a conflict has started will demand special efforts.

The most important Allied assistance that can be provided to Norway is that provided by SACLANT in keeping the surrounding seas acceptably clear of Soviet forces. That will reduce options for attack against Norwegian territory by amphibious forces, and the air and submarine threat against the transfer of national and Allied reinforcements.

This illustrates the interdependence of ground, air and maritime operations and the need for better in-place peacetime command and control.

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CHAPTER IV
THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

To ensure unity of strategic and operational direction, the United States has divided the world into five unified commands (theaters of war). A theater of war is a geographical area within which land, sea, and air operations are directed toward a common strategic aim.¹

Operations may take place simultaneously in several theaters of war.

Operations in a theater of war are invariably multiservice in character. Responsibility for such operations is vested in a single unified CINC.

The NATO area forms part of two unified commands; EUCOM and LANTCOM. The commanders wear at least two hats. One as the U.S. CINC and one as the Commander of a Major NATO Command (MNC).²

The NATO Military Committee is the highest military authority in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is composed of the Chiefs-of-Staff of each member nation, except France and Iceland.³

The area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is divided among three Allied Commands: Europe (ACE), Atlantic (ACLANT) and Channel (ACCHAN). The commanders are known as Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR-SACLANT) and Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN).

The Major NATO Commanders are responsible for the development of defense plans for their respective areas, for the determination of force requirements and for the deployment and exercise of the forces under their command. Generally the forces of member countries remain under national command in peacetime; however, some are placed under operational command and control of NATO, some are already assigned to NATO Commands and others are earmarked for these Commands. In wartime the MNC's would control all land, sea and air operations in his area.

MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS




Figure 3. The NATO Command Structure

ACE covers an area from the North Cape of Norway to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey. SACEUR is responsible for defense of all NATO territory in Europe except United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal and Iceland. He shares with SACLANT and CINCHAN operational command over NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (AWACS).

ACLANT covers an area from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North America to the coasts of Europe and Africa, except in the Channel and the British Isle. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) made up of ships from NATO navies and normally operating in the Atlantic, is under direct command of SACLANT.

ACCHAN covers the English Channel and the southern areas of the North Sea. CINCHAN also wears another hat as Command-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT) under SACLANT. In that role he is responsible for the North Eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian Sea.

ACE is subdivided into a number of subordinate Commands. Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) is at Kolsås, Norway, near Oslo. The AFNORTH area of responsibility stretches from Finnmark in Northern Norway to the Elbe River in Germany a distance of nearly 3,000 kilometers. The three subordinated AFNORTH commands are Headquarters (HQ) Allied Forces North Norway, HQ Allied Forces South Norway and HQ Allied Forces Baltic Approaches. The Norwegian commands are manned exclusively by Norwegians in peacetime. Baltap is manned in thirds by Danish, German, and British and U.S. personnel. All three commands are triservice, and have a commander for each component, except for BALTAP's two land commands.




Figure 4. Northern European Command

When the NATO command structure was first established in 1951, the Northern European Command consisted only of Norway and Denmark. In 1961 the Baltic Approaches Command was established, comprising Denmark, the Federal German State of Schleswig-Holstein, and the City of Hamburg north of the Elbe River. It was a specific request of Norway that the Commander-in-Chief

(CINCNORTH) should be a British Admiral/General and that the Chief of the Air Staff should be an American Air Force General, in an effort to "nail" the British and the Americans to the Northern Region.⁴

Because of a tug-of-war between Britain and the United States over the Atlantic, the maritime component of the organization and the appointment of SACLANT did not take place until 1952.

Before deciding on the NATO command structure in Northern Europe in 1951, several options were studied. One was that the defense of Norway and Iceland should be the responsibility of SACLANT, because the airfields in both countries and the ports in Norway would be essential to SACLANT's operations in his eastern waters.⁵ But it was decided that it would be unsound to establish a division of responsibility in the water gap of the Baltic Approaches--the Kattegat and Skagerak and that there was greater advantage in assigning Norwegian defense to SACEUR, to avoid fragmentation of the air and land command.

A alternative concept was that Denmark would also come under SACLANT, but this was rejected by SACLANT himself as drawing him into responsibilities distracting from his principal tasks.

These studies naturally were conducted based on the technology and forces of that time as well as the recent experiences from WW II. Those planning for defense of Norway were not concerned by a Russian naval threat.⁶ It was the Red army with its organic air components that threatened Norway. The targets were thought to be the airfields of Northern Norway from where a group of Hitler's squadrons had dominated the Norwegian Sea.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Large Unit Operations FM 100-6, Coordinating Draft, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 September 1987, p. 2-1.

2. National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, Joint Staff Officers Guide 1986, Norfolk, Virginia, 1 July 1986, pp. 2-12 thru 2-35.
3. NATO information service, NATO Handbook 1985, Brussels 1985, pp. 33-39.
4. Tønne Huitfeldt, NATO's Northern Security, Conflict Studies No. 191, Institute for the Study of Conflict, London 1986, p. 21.
5. Anthony Farrar-Hockley, "The Influence of the Northern Flank upon the Mastery of the Seas," Naval War College Review, May-June 1982, p. 5.
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CHAPTER V

CONSEQUENCES AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL

General

Adjacent commands at all levels must coordinate in order to avoid mutual interference. Such coordination is easier said than done, even with a common next higher headquarters and between units from the same service. In the northern region the cooperation must take place between "naval" commands (under SACLANT) and "land" command (under SACEUR) both with their air component. The chains of command have no common direction until they reach the NATO Military Committee level.

Most critical to AFNORTH is the function of air defense because of the speed of modern aircraft and missiles and the need for warning time. In addition, the movement of the surface warships and submarines of several navies and of merchant shipping and fishing vessels must be controlled. If a carrier battle-group enters the Norwegian Sea the opportunities for mutual interference will inevitably increase, particularly in regard to the air defense of Norway and the shipping in its adjacent waters.

Support of land operations by naval forces, and vice versa, is considered a secondary role. Nevertheless, it is an important one and could be decisive in the northern region.

Support of naval operations by "land forces" will be mainly air support, plus some intelligence and logistics. The different types of naval support can be listed under four headings; amphibious assault, shore bombardment, air support, logistic support.

Amphibious Operations

A big part of the possible allied reinforcement for North Norway, in particular the land component, is Marine forces. These forces either belong to SACLANT or would need support from ACLANT to reach North Norway, and later on for sustainment.

Amphibious operations to reinforce the NATO land forces in North Norway, have been practiced during exercises for many years. Amphibious assault is the core of naval support to land operations. The other forms of naval support can be fashioned around that capability.

Command and control arrangements for amphibious operations are complicated in themselves. The transfer of forces from SACLANT to SACEUR's operational control when entering Norway's territorial waters further complicates the problem.

U.S. Marine and Navy doctrine for transfer of command to the Marine commander ashore implies the need for close coordination between naval, land and air forces, operating within two separate chains of command. Some of the implications will be discussed later under air control and air support.

Shore Bombardment

Navies can use both missiles and guns to destroy targets ashore. Traditionally it has been guns, hence the term Naval Gunfire Support (NGS). But more recently missiles have replaced guns as primary anti-ship, anti-air and anti-ground systems. However, the naval gun has not disappeared. The importance of NGS was recognized during the Falkland War and the U.S. Navy's "Maritime Strategy" includes a major role for the battleships.

Standard anti-ship missiles are not likely to be particularly successful against shore targets. But introduction of ship launched cruise missiles provides for missile attacks on targets well inland. For example, an Iowa

class battleship can carry a total of 32 cruise missiles. These vessels represent a formidable armory of firepower that could be used in support of land operations.

North Norway, a long narrow strip of land with deep fjords, narrow valleys, and a very limited road network, could provide good opportunities for shore bombardment. But fire control information has to be provided by some form of forward spotting and communicated to the ships involved. Again, command and control arrangements are essential.

Air Control and Air Support

Many interoperability problems have been solved through the standardization effort in NATO. However, some still persist, in particular those concerning air assets, including naval air in support of land operations and Air Force air in support of naval warfare. Furthermore, problems of command and control of U.S. Marine Corps air assets in the complex NEC environment remain. These are national problems as well. But the problems are exacerbated when the services from two or more countries operate together.

In an effort to sort out these questions nationally, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have provided several joint doctrinal publications. Combined doctrine closely parallels the doctrine found in these publications and in particular that found in JCS Pub 2. However, in some areas there are differences.

The introduction of U.S. Marine Corps forces in AFNORTH in the late 1970's, created new command and control challenges. Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III has documented some of these problems in his book "Command Structure for Theater Warfare-The Quest for Unity of Command." He highlights the fact that the key question is that of command and control of air assets.¹

U.S. Marine forces are formed into Marine Air-ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) for combat operations. MAGTF's are combined-arms forces consisting of ground, air and combat service support under the direction and control of a single commander. The Marine Corps policy is that the MAGTF, when employed in extended land operations, should be used as a uniservice force reporting directly to the joint or unified commander.²

The agreed NATO doctrine states that there shall be only one overall commander who organizes the forces into naval, land and air components, each with a component commander.³

In North Norway the Marine Corps policy implies that the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) will be employed as a uniservice force and therefore the MEB commander will report directly to COMNON.^{4,5}

The NATO doctrine⁶ implies that the MEB commander will report to COMLANDNON or COMAIRNON. The ground combat element of the MEB should come under operational control of a corps or even division commander. This problem has not yet been solved, but workable arrangements have been found for field training exercises, based on an agreement reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1986: "Omnibus agreement on command and control of USMC TAC-AIR during sustained operations ashore."⁷

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF Commander will make sorties available to the Joint Force Commander, for tasking through his air component commander for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force Commander for tasking through the air component commander for the support of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or Joint Force Commander in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions,

redirect efforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the joint force commander that they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in JCS Pub 2.

To carry this a bit further, exercises in AFNORTH show we could have a situation like this: COMMON is fighting the war through his normal chain of command. SACLANT is fighting the Soviet Northern Fleet in the Norwegian Sea and has deployed one (two) carrier battle group(s), parts of them close to Norwegian territory. A MAGTF will make an amphibious landing in support of COMMON.

To focus on Anti-air Warfare (AAW) for a moment it will require both offense and defense in depth as well as long range surveillance and intercept capabilities. Forward, landbased allied air defense forces, airborne early warning aircraft and ground radar systems are operating in the area. These assets obviously need to be operating in concert with the carrier battle groups. Who controls the air, where and when? According to U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine and NATO doctrine we could have three agencies with conflicting interests: COMMON/COMAIRNON-Carrier battle group(s)-amphibious task force.

There is a clear requirement for operational coordination and control of NATO's air assets across the boundaries of the MNC's in the north. This requirement is particularly complicated because it involves employment and coordination of sea-based aircraft in operations ashore and of land-based aircraft in tactical support of maritime operations.

Planning and coordination is needed between Allied and national authorities to ensure that aircraft are assigned to meet the primary operational requirements. The aircraft must be equipped and armed based on

the role they are to perform. Furthermore, there is a need for operational facilities, including protection at the airfields, and prepositioning of stores, fuel and ammunition.

These complex command and control challenges would be easier to resolve if one commander was responsible for all deterrence and warfighting in the northern region.

Tactical Level-Land Forces

Turning to the tactical level in the COMMON area of responsibility, relatively few and small allied land forces have been firmly committed as reinforcements to Norway. Even if all allied land forces having Norway as a commitment option were sent there, Norway itself would provide by far the strongest land component. Because of this Norway must provide the headquarters for command and control above the MEB/Brigade level.

Coordinating combined operations at division and corps level with units from two or more countries in one division is a challenging task. The introduction of a U.S. MEB with its unique organization and uniservice policy has further complicated that demanding task.

Generally, standing operating procedures (SOP's) must be developed to assure effective cooperation between the forces of different nations. In addition, the design of combined operations should make maximum use of the strengths of each participating force while compensating for their comparative vulnerabilities. Plans should reflect the special capabilities of each national contingent. Size and sustainability of formations, the mobility, intelligence collection assets, air defenses, long range fires, special operations forces, NBC protection and training for operations under arctic conditions are some of the significant factors. But all this can not be

accomplished as long as it is not known what Allied forces can/will be available, and at what time.

Tactical cooperation requires precision because it deals with immediate action in combat. Disparities between adjacent and supporting allied units must be reconciled. These could be differences in tactical operating procedures, dissimilar tactical control measures, varying organizational structures and capabilities, and differences in equipment. Liaison and combined training become critical. Habitual relationships between units should be established and maintained, whenever possible.

A "simple" thing like recognition of allied units, soldiers, aircraft, and vehicles must be addressed. Important areas for training and tactical planning are liaison, communication, EW, air support arrangements, fire control measures and movement control.

The commander's intent and concept require careful development because of differences between allies in doctrine and terminology. Tasks such as flank security, passages of lines, and handling of small enemy forces (bypass, allow to penetrate) can create difficulties. The use of special operating forces (SOF) must be most carefully coordinated.

Rear area security will normally be a Norwegian responsibility but must be coordinated between allied units. Rear operations and the passing through of reserves or supporting forces calls for careful coordination.

The logistical support of NATO military forces is normally a national responsibility. But the host nation support (HNS) must be regulated and coordinated, including the use of facilities such as ports, airfields and highways. Some supplies such as water, food, POL, medical supplies and barrier materials can be used by all allies. But limited resources will require prioritization and coordination.

If you add to the above the problems associated with using several different languages, it is obvious that command and control in the high north will be a demanding task. Headquarters in North Norway must therefore be well equipped, manned and trained. Continuous training and exercises, with allied participation, are crucial.

To be able to meet these requirements upgrading of the command and control organization for land forces in North Norway is required.

ENDNOTES

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3. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
4. Ibid. 111-119.
5. Headquarters United States Marine Corps, FMFM 0-1 Marine Air-ground Task Force doctrine, Washington, D.C., 31 August 1979, p. 6-2.
6. Cardwell, pp. 145-153.
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CHAPTER VI

COMBINED DOCTRINE AND THEATER ORGANIZATION

Doctrine

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, sets forth principles, doctrine and military guidance to govern the joint activities and performance of the armed forces of the United States. It states that

The mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained in accomplishment of the mission are the two most fundamental considerations in the establishment of command organization. Sound command organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized direction, decentralized execution, common doctrine, and interoperability.¹

This should apply also to combined planning and warfighting.

Special efforts will always be necessary to coordinate the operations of multinational forces. Important considerations for planning and conducting such operations are command and control, intelligence, operational procedures and combat service support. Interoperability is an essential condition for efficient combat operations in combined warfare.

Combined doctrine for theater warfare is embodied in NATO's Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs). When an ATP is promulgated all nations have agreed to abide by the provisions of that doctrine.² The agreement is called STANAG (Standardization Agreement). STANAGS's are ratified by nations after the services have concurred and agreed to implement the provisions of the ATP.³

There are several ATP's that deal with air-naval-land doctrine, operations and tactical procedures. The underlying theme in all of these ATP's is that warfighting is a combined effort of the national forces under a single commander. The arrangement of a command and control organization at

levels of command below that of the overall commander should be based upon this principle as well. This is reflected in the NATO command structure. NATO commands (MNC, MSC, PSC) are organized with a single commander and with land, sea and air components, as appropriate, to the specified mission. As an example, COMMON will have operational command of his assigned forces. Normally he exercises operational command through his components, COMAIRNON, COMNAVNON and COMLANDNON. Nowhere in the NATO command structure will we find Marines as a separate component.

Several agencies in NATO have put a lot of effort into developing common or compatible doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training methods and exercises, education, organization and materiel. But still there are many differences, as evidenced on allied field training exercises in North Norway, and other areas. Concerning hardware, the former SACEUR, General Bernard W. Rogers, in 1986 summed it up like this:⁴

Command, control and communications (C3) is the vital element in achieving the mission that has been assigned to allied command in Europe. Nevertheless, the current system generally relies on 20-year-old technology that is unreliable, cannot communicate across borders and is vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare measures. . . .

During 1985, seven NATO nations were developing six new tactical communications systems, none of which was interoperable.

The Land Dimension

What are some of the criteria and considerations for theater organization?

Command organization on a geographic area basis is the most commonly used method of organizing a command for implementing strategic and operational plans and guidance. So also in NATO.

The purpose of such an organization is to

- o Provide for centralized direction of the forces within the area.
- o Integrate the efforts of the forces assigned to the area, to achieve truly joint and combined operations.
- o Fix responsibility for certain normal continuing operations.
- o Establish the responsibility of the commander.
- o Effect coordination of logistic support, both nationally and combined, including Host Nation Support.

Today on the northern flank of NATO we don't have centralized direction of the forces within the area. To integrate the efforts of these forces is very time consuming and depends upon the willingness of several national and combined commanders. Coordination of logistic support becomes unnecessary complicated with two MNC's involved. As an example there are a number of logistic and medical facilities established in Norway for use by SACLANT forces. Given the fact that there will often be a lack of resources within a theater, these resources could well be needed by forces under SACEUR. In such a case, who makes the decision and gives priorities? Certainly, command relationship and responsibility for areas like communication and security for these facilities must be sorted out.

When a command is organized, forces assigned and authority given to the commander, the following will be important.⁵

- o Responsibilities, missions and tasks given to the commander.
- o The nature and scope of the tasks.
- o The forces available or to be made available.
- o Geography.
- o Enemy forces.
- o Time available.

In particular in North Norway force organization should take all Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula into consideration. The interdependence of the war at sea, on land and in the air requires a joint approach towards theater organization. Campaign planning, for naval, air and land forces should be integrated. Important considerations for campaign planning are objectives, assumptions, missions, commanders intent, phasing, maneuver, fires, reserves, control measures, deception, sustainment, command and signal. Major operational functions such as operational level intelligence,--maneuver,--fires and--deception must be coordinated. The importance of mutual air support has been previously discussed. To comment on just one other factor; it would not be possible in the long run for COMMON to defend in Troms if SACLANT allowed the Soviet Northern Fleet to operate as far forward as the GIUK gap.

The essence of theater air-land warfare is

- o Fight as combined arms.
- o Fight in depth.
- o Gain positional advantage.
- o Obtain decisive results.
- o Gain/retain initiative.

Because of the terrain and because an attack on North Norway will probably be a triphibious operation, the defense in the region must be a joint and combined air-land-sea effort to maximize power at the decisive point and time. Activities must be sequenced to achieve operational and strategic aims. There is a close interrelationship between the land and sea battle. For example, can a positional advantage on land quickly be threatened or lost because of an enemy landing that cuts off friendly lines of communication? Or, can the fight in depth be won using naval or maritime forces?

The bottom line is that you cannot defend North Norway for an extended period if the enemy controls the Norwegian Sea.

The Maritime Dimension

NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations was approved in 1981. It is based on the concept of deterrence in peace and forward defense and flexible response in war. The concept is based on three operational principles; containment, defense in depth and maintaining the initiative. Should deterrence fail, the MNC's will have to engage in multiple maritime operations. SACEUR must contain the Soviet fleet in the Baltic and keep open the sea routes in the Mediterranean. CINCHAN must keep open the seas in his area and help SACEUR to contain Soviet forces in the Baltic. SACLANT's tasks will be to contain the Soviet Northern Fleet and to defend the SLOC's across the Atlantic. These two tasks are mutually dependent, as are all the other tasks mentioned.

As we know, the command boundaries of the three MNC's are common in North European waters. Therefore, joint planning is absolutely necessary. We have an agreement between the three MNC's on maritime operations in the North Sea and adjacent waters. This contingency operation plan, "Fence-Breaker," makes it possible to transfer responsibility for operational coordination of naval forces to CINCEASTLANT, across the existing command boundaries. This contingency plan could and should be implemented at an early stage of a developing crisis.

There is also a special need for a cohesive and coordinated plan for the maritime operations in the northern region and its adjacent areas. This would have to consider the operational requirements of all services. General Huitfeldt has suggested that CINCHAN in his role as CINCEASTLANT should take the lead in the planning and coordination of an adequate presence in the

Norwegian Sea in peacetime, and for rapid deployment of forces to the area in a crises or conflict.⁷ This could also have a positive effect on other European NATO Navy's contribution to the defense of NATO's northern region.

During exercises there has to be cooperation and mutual support between naval forces operating in the northern region under CINCNORTH command and those operating under SACLANT command. Exercise OCEAN SAFARI 1987 proved that the cooperation and transfer of command and control can work well, but that it is dependent upon previous realistic exercises and close cooperation during the planning process.⁸ There is obviously a strong need for good communication and close cooperation between the NATO commands in Norway and the relevant commands under SACLANT.⁹

NATO Maritime Surveillance Co-ordination Centres (MSCC) have multilateral agreements that make it possible to activate and deploy national naval and air assets on surveillance when required by Warsaw Pact activity. In the area of interest MSCC's are located at AFNORTH (Kolsås, Norway), EASTLANT (Northwood, England) and ACLANT (Norfolk, U.S.), and they make it possible to react quickly in a developing crisis.¹⁰

All these agreements, arrangements and contingency plans are required because of the command and control structure in the region. They are all necessary, but they don't solve the basic problem; the need for unity of effort. And unity of effort will be very hard to achieve before there is unity of command in the region.

During the Soviet exercise given the NATO designation SUMMEREX 85, the aircraft carrier Kiev operated as far south as 65° North. About 40 modern attack and cruise missile submarines took part in the exercise and formed barriers in the following areas: north of Finnmark, Jan Mayen-Lofoten, north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, west of Iceland and in the North

Sea. They operated mainly against the "NATO" forces. According to General Tønne Huitfeldt, given the NATO posture as it was in the Summer of 1985, at least three weeks warning would have been needed in order to deploy in the Norwegian Sea a NATO force capable of countering the combined Soviet Northern and Baltic fleets.¹¹ The reinforcement of Norway and probably also Denmark by sea could not have been achieved in that time. And the Soviet air/sea forces would have been able to give full support to their land/air and amphibious forces, had the naval exercise been a part of an operation to seize and hold northern Norway, and in particular the airfields. A future war in Europe could start this way, and subsequent operations could be dependent upon the result of the Soviet campaign in the Norwegian Sea and in Norway.

A significant aspect of planning and preparing for war in Norway, and particularly North Norway, is the maritime--continental interface of the ACLANT/ACE MNC's in the region. Given today's threat, current technology and the full scope of possible conflict from deterrence and minor crises to nuclear war, Norway and the adjacent waters must be considered as one theater of operation. And from experience over the past 40-50 years we have learned that all theater-assigned assets should be placed under a single combined commander.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 1986, pp. 3-1 and 3-2.

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8. Geoffrey Howlett, "Nye utfordringer i nord for NATO," Norges Forsvar, No. 1, January 1988, p. 13.

9. Johan Jørgen Holst, "Kolaoppbyggingen tilsier klar prioritering av forsvaret i nord," Norges Forsvar, No. 1, January 1988, p. 4.

10. Huitfeldt, p. 21.

11. Ibid., p. 2.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

NATO's organization was established almost 40 years ago. A lot has changed in 40 years, yet some factors remain much the same. Geographically, the NEC still has the same enormous span of territory. But perceptions and interests by the littoral states in the adjacent seas, have changed. As an example, Norway today has a continental shelf which is three times larger than her land territory and 200 mile economic zones--established as a fishery protection zone at Svalbard--which are 5-6 times larger than the land territory.¹ The entire western part of the Barents Sea with the waters around Svalbard and most of the Norwegian Sea are today under Norwegian jurisdiction in the mainland zone and the Jan Mayen zone. This means that more than any other European country, Norway is a maritime country.

As a result, a Coast Guard has been established and is part of the Navy and Air Force. The Coast Guard operates ships and helicopters and tasks the Orion maritime patrol aircraft in their Coast Guard function.

Although waters inside the 200 nm economic zone are still international waters, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) has increased Norway's interest in the adjacent waters considerably. Oil and gas is being pumped from the North Sea and there are several fixed platforms established, with permanent manning. Fisheries Zones have been established and several agreements concerning fisheries have been signed. The fishing grounds in these areas are among the worlds' richest; for several decades the northeast Atlantic catches have constituted about 20 percent of the global total.

Many agreements have been reached during the last 15 years, but there are still many jurisdictional disputes in the Northern waters. Most sensitive and complicated of these are probably the delineation of the boundary between

Norway and the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea, and the questions about the fisheries zones and continental shelves around Svalbard. Seen in a perspective the jurisdiction has been "creeping" and probably still is. Today the 200-mile economic zones are fairly well established. The result of these developments is that the littoral states have become much more concerned about what is happening out to 200 miles from their shores. Unsolved jurisdictional disputes may some time in the future create tension and crisis.

A significant difference between the European (ACE) and Atlantic (ACLANT) commands is that ACE is predominantly a land command and ACLANT a naval command. But the differences and perceived differences go further than that. For many reasons ACE is perceived as a more "European" command than ACLANT. It has to do with location of the headquarters which means that most people in Western Europe know SACEUR, but very few know SACLANT. This has to do with the fact that SACEUR is the one responsible for the defense of the landmass of Western Europe, where people live. It also has to do with perceptions of U.S. EUCOM and LANTCOM. Because of the dominant position of the United States in NATO and because the CINC/MNC wear two (or more) hats there is a close linkage to the U.S. EUCOM and LANTCOM. EUCOM's main responsibility is Western Europe while LANTCOM is more concerned with naval campaigns than direct defense of European countries.

Also, from the United States point of view, it is interesting to note that within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, EUCOM and LANTCOM generally fall under separate divisions.

Norway wants to keep a close relationship with the rest of Western Europe for many reasons; political, economical, cultural as well as for security considerations. Because Norway is not a member of the European Economic

Community (EEC) nor in the Western European Union (WEU), the importance of the linkage with its European allies in NATO has probably increased the last 20 years. Further, it is important for Norway to have multinational commitments for the support and reinforcement to the defense of the country.² That will provide more options, and more freedom to "maneuver" in dealing with different kinds of crises. Such arrangements are probably easier to achieve within the framework of ACE than ACLANT, where bilateral arrangements with the United States could be the only feasible option.

The major decision on the ultimate successful defense of Norway will be a political one. Early reinforcement of Norway, before any hostile action takes place, is the most plausible way to defend this critical area. Reinforcements by U.S., U.K., and Dutch Marines (and the CAST Brigade) supported by accompanying battle groups in the Norwegian Sea, can be accomplished early and quickly, if approved by the Norwegian Parliament. This timely political decision would play a major role in the early stages of any conflict and could determine the outcome of a war. It is likely that this decision process would be simpler, and therefore quicker, if only one MNC was involved.

Realizing that a substantial change of the command structure in NATO is not likely to happen in the near future, the question becomes what could be done in case of war? If we agree that NATO's northern flank should be considered as one land, naval and air theater of operation it follows that there should be one joint and combined commander responsible for the area. That could be achieved by giving CINCNORTH the responsibility for the Norwegian Sea, including Iceland. BALTAP could be transferred to AFCENT. Naval forces would have to be provided by SACLANT and CINCHAN and CHOP-ed to CINCNORTH. This would provide unity of command and effort in the high north

and preserve the linkage to the rest of Western Europe. It would also be consistent with Norway's increased interests and jurisdiction in the Norwegian and Barents Sea.

ENDNOTES

1. Willy Østreng, "Norway in Northern Waters," in Northern Waters, ed. Clive Archer and David Shrivener, Royal Institute of International Affairs 1986, pp. 155-173.

2. Johan Jørgen Holst, "Kolaoppbyggingen tilsier klar prioritering av forsvaret i nord," Norges Forsvar, No. 1, January 1988, p. 4.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

If NATO is to deter war, it must be able to demonstrate to the Soviets that it can deny them the air and sea control of the Norwegian Sea. To do this we must conduct a viable defense in Norway designed to guarantee our continuous use of key air bases and port facilities. If the external reinforcements have not reached Norway before the outbreak of hostilities, NATO must control the Norwegian Sea to permit their safe arrival. The battles for Norway and the Norwegian Sea are therefore interdependent and the loss of one would effect crucially the outcome of the other.

Institutionally, the maritime responsibility lies with SACLANT and the land responsibility with SACEUR. There is a risk that neither, at the crucial time, will have their prime attention fixed on the land-sea interaction in this area.

From a geostrategic and military point of view the defense of Norway should be the responsibility of SACLANT, while the defense of Denmark and the Baltic approaches should remain with SACEUR. But for political reasons this is probably not a viable solution. An alternative solution might therefore be to give CINCHAN, in his role as CINCEASTLANT, the specific responsibility for developing a tri-service cohesive plan for the defense of the northern region. This plan should include the contributions of all countries involved in the defense of NATO's northern region. This solution could also have a positive effect on the involvement of all NATO-countries in Central and Northern Europe--in particular their naval forces--in the defense of the northern flank. Such a cohesive tri-service plan would provide the framework for a triphibious plan for the defense of North Norway. Another option would be to

give that same task to CINCNORTH and make preparations so that the responsibility for the Norwegian Sea and Iceland could be transferred to CINCNORTH.

Unity of command is necessary to achieve unity of effort in the region and overcome some of the serious coordination and cooperation problems that exist today.

Recommendations

That provisions be made to realign the NATO command arrangements in Northern Europe, including boundaries between Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, and Allied Command Channel. (As a practical matter, this has been proposed/discussed a number of times since the establishment of NATO and is not likely to be changed in the foreseeable future.)

That CINCNORTH be given a specific responsibility for developing a tri-service, cohesive plan for the defense of the northern region, including Iceland and the Norwegian Sea. Provisions should be made so that the responsibility for the defense of Iceland and the Norwegian Sea can be transferred to CINCNORTH in time of crisis or war.

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