The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: An Operational Error,
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the operational impact of the INF treaty and what it means for the future of NATO. At this writing, there is considerable debate going on as to whether or not the US Congress should ratify the INF treaty. The political issues are well known and under careful examination. A critical element which still needs to be addressed is the operational impact of the INF treaty. This area may have been neglected because nuclear weapons are viewed primarily as an element of deterrence. Therefore, their warfighting potential is given only minimal consideration. This paper begins with a discussion of the historical use of nuclear weapons in NATO's defensive Alliance. It follows through to the decision in 1979 to modernize NATO's nuclear force. This decision resulted in the deployment of the Pershing II and ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) systems in Europe. The Soviet warfighting concept for Europe is addressed next to place the intermediate-range nuclear forces in their proper perspective. This is followed by a discussion on the operational implications of the INF treaty. The paper concludes by briefly mentioning a few of the 'defensive' proposals for the post-INF period.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 12, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA195451
Entities
People
- William B. Caldwell Iv
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College