Mercury's Dilemma: C3I and the Operational Level of War,
Abstract
In 1982, the US Army began its renaissance of the operational level of war with the publication of a revised Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. The rediscovery of this level and the subsequent experimentation with it strained the very limits of the Army's command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems. Virtually all branches of the Army felt the changes brought on by FM 100-5, especially in the areas of firepower, mobility, and protection. Commanders had to view military operations from a broader perspective and act accordingly. The significant impact of the operational level of war has been in organizational changes, new concepts, and dynamic operations. The effect of these changes on C3I are reviewed and assessed in this monograph. The first topic reviewed is the Army's concept of the operational level warfare. Next, the theoretical and doctrinal bases of the Army's C3I systems are examined. Finally, the requirements for C3I at the operational level are presented and conclusions drawn. Keywords: Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Leadership, Command, Operational art, Operational level.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 08, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA195459
Entities
People
- Paul D. Hughes
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College