


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
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Search for Deployment Theory:
The German Campaign in Norway April 1940

by

Major Nathan J. Power
Quartermaster

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The conclusion is a discussion of key factors and their implications for future deployment planning of the United States. The author proposes that U. S. Army doctrine include deployment planning factors in planning contingency deployments.

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The German Campaign in Norway April 1940

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ABSTRACT

SEARCH FOR DEPLOYMENT THEORY: THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY 1940
by MAJ Nathan J. Power, USA, 39 pages.

This monograph discusses the implications of deployment theory in planning deployment operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. It proposes that there are tenets of deployment planning that are interrelated with the principles of war. The tenets for deployment operations are deception, agility, dispersion, and synchronization. They are interrelated with the principles of war of surprise, security, objective, economy of force and unity of command.)

The monograph examines the deployment operations of the Germans in the Norwegian Campaign, April, 1940, and draws conclusions based on this successful operation. The case study is followed by a review of the current United States deployment management system and the deliberate planning cycle. It then shows the relationship of these two systems to deployment planning and discusses the responsibilities of the Joint Deployment Agency in the planning process. Based on these evaluations, the monograph identifies the key principles and concepts of operational deployment planning.

The conclusion is a discussion of key factors and their implications for future deployment planning of the United States. The author proposes that U.S. Army doctrine include deployment planning factors in planning contingency deployments. (KR)

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

"An error in the original concentration of armies can hardly be corrected during the whole course of a campaign."¹

von Moltke

Even in von Moltke's time, one of the keys to warfighting was the initial deployment of forces for battle. The success of many modern campaigns depend on the planner's ability to forecast the right combination of forces for the initial deployment. Successful combinations include the German invasion of Western Europe in 1940, the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and the Egyptian assault across the Suez Canal during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Another, often overlooked success, was the German invasion of Norway in April 1940. Called "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG", it ranks among the most successful deployment operations of modern times.

"OPERATION WESERUEBUNG" differed from the other plans because of the requirement for joint operations. To succeed the Germans had to project a combination of air, land and naval power into Norway.

The ability to project joint power beyond the borders of contiguous states is key to success in contingency operations today. It requires joint planning for success. Military forces- either land and air or land, naval and air- must coordinate their activities for success. The German invasion of Norway in April of 1940 was no exception. It was the first operation conducted by the Germans that joined land, sea and air forces.

THE PROBLEM

This paper addresses the problems associated with the joint deployment of combat forces overseas. Even though much of today's strategic policy relies on a credible nuclear capability, the importance of conventional forces and the ability to project those forces overseas can not be under emphasized.

Studying the problems associated with the deployment of combat power is founded on an understanding of the joint responsibilities that each service shares. Each branch of the military services have peculiar roles in deployment operations. These responsibilities remain relatively constant even though the theater of operations may vary slightly. For successful deployment operations, joint interface is a necessity, not just a formality.

The rich history of operational deployments provides a background for a discussion for planning and executing deployment operations that support the changing national strategy of the United States. Throughout our military history, the projection of combat power has required joint doctrine and joint operations to be successful.

Geography has destined the United States to be a sea power. The nation has consistently relied on its capabilities as a sea power to project forces overseas in past conflicts. The earliest example of this can be found in the Mexican-American War of 1845, when ground forces were deployed to Vera Cruz for a ground invasion of the Mexico. The most recent example is "OPERATION

URGENT FURY" in Grenada where land forces relied on both air and naval support for success.

Sea power is complimented by our increasing air transport capability. The mammoth tonnages that can be moved by sea far exceed air payloads, and, for the foreseeable future, sea transport will continue to provide the basis of support for combat power projected overseas. However, our ability to deploy quickly is enhanced by our air assets. Similarly, the initial operational deployment of forces overseas will be done with a combination of air and naval assets.

The German campaign in Norway in the spring of 1940 was the initial attempt at true joint operations. In contrast to the United States, German history is steeped in ground operations from the times of Frederick. The approach taken by the Germans in deploying forces to the Scandinavian peninsula was carefully planned and well executed. Although doctrinally different from United States procedures, it bears consideration in the search for a theory for planning deployment operations.

The German method of planning deployment operations contrasts with current United States planning system. The United States has a deliberate planning system for the development and execution of plans. However, there is no theory or doctrine supporting deployment planning, only a system to integrate it. Deployment planning is influenced by both the planning system and the needs of the executing commander. The United States needs a joint doctrine for deployment of forces overseas and that

doctrine should be supported by an underlying theory or principle. This paper will identify some of the theoretical concepts and principles that support deployment planning.

METHODOLOGY

To understand the problems of joint deployment operations better this monograph will review the deployment of German forces during "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG." It will concentrate on the German plan for deploying forces into Norway, not the actual execution of the plan. German invasion planning identifies the dominant principles and theoretical concepts for this particular campaign that seem most useful for future contingency operations.

The case study is followed by a review of the current United States deployment management system and the deliberate planning cycle. It shows the relationship of these two systems to deployment planning and discusses the responsibilities of the Joint Deployment Agency in the planning process.

Based on these evaluations, the monograph identifies the key principles and concepts of operational deployment planning. It is recommended that these be integrated with the current U.S. deployment planning. With this in mind, the deployment planning for "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG" follows.

SECTION II: THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY

"There could be no doubt of what was happening. Without warning of any kind, without any ultimatum, the Germans had started a surprise attack on every strategically important point in Norway. Our army was not mobilized. We were absolutely unprepared to meet the attack."2

C.J. HAMBRO

The President of the Norwegian Parliament's reaction to the German invasion of Norway clearly shows the degree of surprise the operation achieved. The planners' success lay in a combination of effective deployment planning and execution of the basic principles and concepts of operational art.

STRATEGIC SETTING

The deployment planning began six months before the invasion actually took place. As early as October 3, 1939, the German naval Commander-in-Chief, Grossadmiral Erich Raeder noted in his diary,

"We must find out if there is any possibility of obtaining bases in Norway by applying joint pressure with Russia. This would radically improve our strategic situation."3

This was the first step in the German plan to launch an offensive against Great Britain. The choices were few, but to the German High Command (OKW) it appeared that any future operations would require freedom of action in the North Sea. This led to a focus on Norway.

The strategic importance of Norway lay in two areas: first, it had a rich merchant marine, and second, it possessed significant iron ore deposits. Although Norway remained neutral during the First World War, she lost 2000 sailors and 54 ships, which totaled over one million tons of shipping assets.⁴ Despite these losses, she clung to sea commerce with her largest trading partner Great Britain. By the beginning of World War II, Norway's merchant marine was the fourth largest in the world.⁵

The rich iron ore located in the Scandinavian peninsula was shipped through the port facility at Narvik. This port annually shipped 8,000,000 tons of ore to Germany and other countries.⁶ Although a Swedish port could be used, it was ice-locked for up to four months each year and would not support such large ore shipments.

For the Allies, the strategic importance of Norway was primarily in denying it to the Germans. The Russo-Finnish war provided an excuse for British consideration of a plan to invade Norway. A British invasion would provide a land line of communication for the Finns. The war provided the Germans with an excuse to preserve Norwegian neutrality. By March 1, 1939, there were increasing indications that the British planned immediate action against Norway. These indicators generated German fear that the British would not only occupy Norway, but also draw Sweden into the war against them and effectively cut off the shipment of ore to Germany.⁷

The impact of the Russo-Finnish war on German plans for the Scandanavian peninsula became critical in the timing of the operation. Bound by the Russo-Nazi alliance which declared Finland outside the German sphere of influence, Germany was forced to resort to strict neutrality. This alliance resulted in both greater anti-German sentiment in Scandinavia and fear that Russia might continue across Scandinavia.

The first threats to the Norwegian policy of neutrality were the result of her inability to secure her own territorial waters. That inability was highlighted by the "Altmark Incident." The Altmark was a supply ship supporting the German pocket battleship, Graf Spree. The Altmark was transporting captured British crews in Norwegian waters, when it was boarded by the British who liberated 299 prisoners. The boarding took place despite protests of neutrality by two nearby Norwegian torpedo boats. Without a doubt this incident exposed the impotence of Norway's neutrality and fertilized the seeds of German intervention.⁸

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

These seeds first took root as "Studie Norde". Hitler ordered this study restricted to a small group. Their intention was to develop intelligence, maps and information regarding both Norway and Denmark. This was done by Hitler's order to the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht- OKW) on 14 December 1939. At OKW, the Chief of Operations, Generalmajor

Alfred Jodl took responsibility for planning. By the end of the month, a rough outline was ready of the main military and political issues relating to Norway. The plan as released on 10 January, 1940. It called for a special staff, headed by an Air Force general, to create a plan of operations. The Navy was to supply the chief of staff and the Army the operations officer.⁹ Each of the services was also to provide an officer suitable for operations work who also, if possible, had training in organization and supply. In January of 1940, the Kranke Staff was formed to formulate the operation.

The Kranke staff was under the direct supervision of Hitler through the Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command-OKW, Oberstgeneral Keitel. The operation was assigned the code name WESERUEBUNG. The first meeting of the staff was on the 5th of February. The senior officer was Captain Theodor Krancke, commanding officer of the cruiser Scheer.¹⁰ This important event marks a departure from previous operations because the responsibility for planning was taken from the service staffs and given to Hitler's personal staff.

The staff divided Norway into six geographical areas, and proposed simultaneous landings at seven ports. The six geographic regions (See Map A) were the region around Oslo, the narrow strip of southern Norway from Langesund to Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik and Tromso/Finnmark. These small areas included all of Norway's population and trade centers and would

in effect control the country. Strangely, the planners saw no need to link these independent lodgement areas immediately.

All German planning considered the superior British Navy, and its impact on the overall deployment. The initial assault force would be delivered by air, but the majority of forces had to be deployed by sea. The naval phase of the operation was difficult given the superior British Navy. The British ability to interdict the deployment could only be overcome with surprise. This surprise could be magnified by speed and accurate timing on the part of the Germans.

Two deployment schemes existed. The first alternative moved troops in merchant ships disguised as ore transports. This alternative had multiple drawbacks. The large number of ships would cause attention, these slow ships could not be protected, and Norwegian pilots would lead them on the last part of the journey. The second alternative sent the troops on warships. This eliminated the disadvantages of the first alternative, but transport of sufficient supplies and equipment required follow-on merchant steamers.¹¹

A hybrid alternative emerged. Under this course of action, the first wave deployed by warships. Follow-on forces moved by merchant vessels. In this way deception played a part in the German concept of operation. Many of the heavy supply ships and heavy equipment transporters were disguised as ordinary merchant vessels and put into Norwegian ports before the arrival of the warships.

A key weakness of the German Naval plan was the shortage of surface ships. This shortage forced the navy to use the transport ships twice.¹² The German Navy was primarily one of subsurface boats with limited surface ship capability. It was not capable of large amphibious operations necessary to support "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG" with solely naval assets.

GROUND CONSIDERATIONS

As a result of the Altmark incident Hitler sped up the planning for "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG". At the suggestion of Jodl, Hitler turned the planning over to a corps commander and his staff.¹³ The commander chosen was General der Infanterie, Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, at this time the commander of XXI Corps. Falkenhorst made two significant changes to the Kranke plan, first he recommended the occupation of Jutland with a landing at Copenhagen, and, second, he recommended that the Norwegian invasion forces be independent of those programed for the invasion of western Europe. ¹⁴

The Falkenhorst planning staff was designated Group XXI by Hitler in a 1 March Directive. It was subordinated directly to him, although the original Krancke air force and navy representatives remained. This directive formalized the operational planning and identified the strategic objectives for the campaign. There were three objectives: first, to keep the British out of Scandinavia. Second, to secure shipping routes

for iron ore out Sweden and Norway. Third, to provide a base of operations for actions against Britain.¹⁵

The command organization was a patchwork structure with a three way division of command. Initially seen as a unified command, the command and control soon disintegrated into three separate commands with Falkenhorst commanding only the ground forces because of Air Force protests.

"The idea of a Supreme Command of the United Services had always been disliked by the Army as well as the Navy and Luftwaffe because each service was afraid of losing in influence and self-consistency. This was coupled with the fact that Falkenhorst had no training in a universal conception of warfare nor was he the personality to up to the task of a Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Forces. He remained a Army commander and with respect to strategy confined to ground operations."¹⁶

Ground operations planning considered two scenarios. The first was a peaceful occupation, the second was an opposed landing and occupation. The prospect of fighting additional landings by the Allies was also considered, but protection of the established lodgement areas was the primary mission. The German center of gravity was designated as the naval forces during the deployment phase, and ground forces during the lodgement phase. The Norwegian center of gravity was the synergy between the Government, the reserves and the active armed forces.

Six divisions were assigned for the operation. Five, the 69th, 163rd, 181st, 196th and 214th were newly formed Infantry Divisions. Only the sixth, the 3rd Mountain Division had been in combat. A veteran of the Polish invasion, it had only two infantry regiments. The XXI Group also had six batteries of guns, one tank company (Mark I and Mark II tanks), two companies of railroad construction troops, and one signal battalion.

Numerically, if not qualitatively, the invasion forces were evenly matched with the Norwegians. The ground forces would be deployed by sea at Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Kristiansand, and Oslo, and landing parties of one company each sent ashore at Egersund and Arendal. Stavanger was to be taken by air assault. The size of the initial 8,850 man sea-borne force was dictated by the storage space on warships. The Air Force provided three parachute companies and three air defense battalions, however these remained under the control of the X Air Corps. 17

Follow-on German forces were to be brought to the main port of Oslo after it had been secured. They were to arrive no later than Deployment Day + 7. The total follow-on forces to be deployed numbered 48,000 soldiers and airmen.

The decisive point for the campaign was initially thought to be Oslo. This changed during the actual execution when it became clear that Narvik was the key point for the occupation of the country. The importance placed on Oslo was reflected in the plan:

"In the final plan, Oslo was to be taken by elements of the 163rd Infantry Division, two battalions brought in on warships and two battalions arriving by air transport, after parachute troops had secured Fornebu Airfield."18

Oslo was considered of prime importance as both the economical and diplomatic capital of Norway. Other units had responsibility for similar size zones in the country. The invasion would not appear to have a main effort. (See Map A).

The 69th Infantry Division was to occupy the Norwegian west coast from Nordfiord to Egersund. Trondheim was to be taken by two battalions of the 138th Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division. The 196th Infantry Division, after reaching Oslo on D+2, would act as an exploitation force, secure the Northwest coast of the country and be prepared to secure terrain to the Swedish border. The 181st Infantry Division had a similar exploitation mission, arriving at D+6 and securing terrain south and southwest of Oslo. Finally, the 214th Infantry Division would reach Oslo on D+8 and provide security for the southwest coast from the area north of Stavanger to the area Northeast of Arendal.19

The disposition of forces allowed for a clearly defined end state for the political and physical occupation of the country.

"The end state envisioned by the concept of operations was for the 181st Division east of Oslo and to the Swedish border the 163rd Division in Oslo and west to Hamar, the 214th Division would occupy Stavanger - Kristiansand - Arendal, the 69th Division at Bergen, the 196th Division from Andalsnes - Trondheim - Mosjoen,

and the 3rd Mountain Division holding the Narvik
- Tromso area."20

The end state's success was keyed to control of interior lines allowing linkage of their landing teams. This would be an advantage only if the lines permitted the Germans to operate with sufficient space to attack one enemy position without being attacked from the flank or rear by another enemy position. Independent lodgement areas, while not self-sustaining for an extended period of time, would serve to defeat the enemy armed forces. Linkage of the independent lodgement areas became more important given the development of the naval and air campaign.

AIR CONSIDERATIONS

The Norwegian campaign demonstrates the revolutionary effect air power had on traditional concepts of warfare from the very beginning of World War II. The country of Norway, with over 2000 miles of coastline and within twenty-four sailing hours of Great Britain, was invaded by a country that was not a sea power. This campaign linked air power to sea power, and demonstrated that sea power alone was not a match for air power.²¹

Both the naval and air campaigns were developed separately from the ground campaign. The air campaign was developed by the X Air Corps. The XXI Group had no control or direct authority over units of the Air Force. For this campaign a Luftgaukommando (territorial ground command of the Air Force) was formed.²² By the 12th of April, the Fifth Air Force under Generaloberst Erhard

Milch assumed control of both the Luftgaukommando and the Air Corps.

The concept of air operations called for the main bomber force to prepare operations against British naval forces from German bases. However the tactical objective was the support of ground forces. From the Air Force perspective, the objective was to prevent the Allies from intervening in the operation. To this end, one squadron was to land at Stavanger on D-Day and operate against British forces from there. In this manner the air campaign would protect German surface forces on transports during the crucial deployment stage of the operation. The Stavanger portion of the operation called for three parachute companies and three anti-aircraft battalions under the command of the X Air Corps. Air force plans demanded the parachute deployment of about 3000 infantry troops at Fornebu, the commercial airfield at Oslo. 22

The biggest problem for the air campaign was the necessity of forward basing to facilitate the operation. Both the Navy and the Air Force felt that there was a significant need for forward basing of forces and equipment to make the operation successful. Therefore, as an adjunct, the invasion of Denmark was planned to facilitate the attack on Norway.

NAVAL CONSIDERATIONS

Based on the operational directive issued by the Fuehrer on March 1, 1940, the German Navy appointed commanders and established areas of responsibility. Two German naval leaders would be in Oslo; a Commanding Admiral, Norway and the representative of the Commander-in-Chief, Navy. An additional German Admiral would command the Norwegian south coast at Kristiansand. He had under his command the port commanders at Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. During the transport phases of the operation, the Navy had full command of all forces at sea. During the landings, command passed to the senior Army officer at each lodgement area.

The importance of speed and secrecy in the planning of the operation became critical to its success. The German Naval High Command recognized that their navy was no match for the British sea forces. They believed that British intervention during the sea-borne phase of the operation represented failure. They felt that failure could result in elimination of the German Navy as an effective fighting force. The Navy was therefore responsible for protecting the lines of communication as well as the German center of gravity during the deployment phase of the operation. To achieve the speed and surprise necessary for success, it was decided that the initial assault force would be sent on German warships.

The ships used for the deployment ranged from cruisers and destroyers to minesweepers. Assisting in the deception, the Navy proposed that the merchant ships, described earlier, would depart Germany first and remain at sea until five days after the initial landings. Group XXI did not believe that any ships would make port after the initial landings and wanted the merchant ships to be in port first. As a compromise, Group XXI allowed the transport ships to depart German ports at D-6. In the end, this did not allow these ships to reach their destinations on time.²³

The Soviet-Finnish peace pact had a large impact on the planning of the operation. In one stroke it deprived both the Germans and the Allies of an excuse for invading Norway. Nevertheless, Hitler ordered continued planning for "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG". The constant fear that the Allies would interdict the ore shipments to Germany drove the Germans to continue planning the invasion.

Last minute naval considerations almost caused "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG's" cancellation. Most important of these was the impact of "OPERATION GELB" and the commitment of naval assets in support of operations in the west. The Navy reached an earlier point of commitment to the operation than did the Air Force or the Army because of the need to preposition ships in support of the operation. Despite second thoughts on the utility of the invasion to the overall war effort, the Navy briefed Hitler that the operation should be conducted prior to 15 April. This date

was chosen because naval movements would not have sufficient cover of darkness after this date.²⁴

DECEPTION

The importance of secrecy and deception became key to the planning and success of the operation. The security of the planning system was due to the small number of personnel involved in the planning of the operation. However, the diplomatic moves in support of the operation were planned for simultaneous execution with the troop landings to preserve the element of surprise and place the Danish and Norwegian Governments under the greatest possible political pressure to succumb to the Germans.

A great deal of the success of this campaign was a result of the elaborate deception plan the Germans executed to cover the large buildup of ships and troop movements. Under the guise of training maneuvers, the troop ships were able to enter the ports and were poised for combat when the campaign began. War records indicated that only two warnings reached Oslo. The first was from information passed by a German intelligence officer to the Dutch on the 4th of April. The second was from shipwrecked survivors of a German troop transport on the 8th of April. Either could have tipped off the Norwegians. Neither warning was taken seriously by the Norwegian government.²⁵

EXECUTION

The campaign resulted in German possession of southern and central Norway north to Grong and Namsos. The main Norwegian

Army was defeated, and two strong allied landing teams repulsed. Narvik became the decisive point in the campaign for Norway. The Allies had a small but impressive fleet at sea mining the neutral Norwegian water at the time of the invasion. Despite being surprised by the swiftness of the German invasion, the Allies put together a force and landed at three ports. (See Map B). 26 The German air campaign, coupled with the efforts of the ground forces forced the Allies to reevaluate their position. Consolidating only on Narvik they were determined to make a last stand there. This too was unsuccessful. Reluctantly, they evacuated Narvik by the 8th of June and the following day the Norwegian Command signed an armistice which ended the fighting in Norway.

The price had been high for the Germans. The Norwegian Campaign cost them the effective use of their surface ships for the remainder of the war. Additionally, the number of ground forces used solely for occupation of the area for the remainder of the war was high.

SUMMARY

As the case study shows, the German High Command was successful in the Norwegian Campaign as a direct result of a detailed deployment plan that emphasized certain tenets and principles. Without that emphasis success could not have been achieved.

Agility, dispersion and synchronization were closely linked as tenets in their deployment planning. In "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG", the Germans felt that they had to act before the Allies in order to secure the shipping lanes for iron ore. The speed with which the campaign was conducted (it took less than one month) is characteristic of agility. The agility of the forces was coupled with inter-service synchronization to accomplish the simultaneous missions at dispersed locations. The Germans identified numerous objective points in their campaign plan and synchronized the employment of forces in their attack.

Surprise, deception and security went hand-in-hand to protect the planning for and execution of the deployment operation. Surprise is the key ingredient to any success in war. It is recognized as a principle of war. As Sun Tzu says, ". . . if he does not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many places." 27 One of the best methods of attaining surprise is through deception. In the "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG" Campaign the Germans attained surprise on a monumental scale. The result was initial tactical success at all lodgement areas. Surprise is fleeting, it is a temporary condition that depends on the reaction of the opponent. Surprise may isolate or identify the opponent's center of gravity. In this campaign surprise enabled the Germans to cross a large barrier unimpeded. This success is evident in the large number of forces deployed for the invasion, and their commitment in the theater. Neither the

Allies nor the Norwegians uncovered the deception plan until too late.

The center of gravity for the Norwegians was the synergy between the active armed forces, the government and the reservists which made up the majority of the Norwegian combat strength. The German center of gravity was the naval forces during the deployment portion of the campaign. This shifted to their ground forces once they had landed. Objective points were those port facilities designated by the Germans in their campaign plan as key to success. The acquiescence of the government of Norway was the objective. Using the factors of surprise and deception, the Germans hoped to leverage the Norwegian center of gravity by exposing its vulnerabilities in the initial deployment operation. In this manner the objective would be attained.

A supporting pillar of the success of both surprise and deception was the tight security placed on the planning process by the Germans. By limiting size of the planning staff the Germans maintained tight security until just before the invasion.

Economy of force was also a factor in deployment planning. The campaign was initially planned with unlimited resources. It was then reduced to the minimum force levels needed for victory. Each lodgement area was carefully analyzed. Attacks were made with only the forces needed for mission accomplishment. At the operational level the Germans were successful in tying their tactical objectives to the strategic goal of occupying Norway.

Finally, the case study demonstrates the importance of unity of command in deployment planning. At the operational level, Falkenhorst did not maintain command of the deployment phase of the operation. The responsibility was shared, primarily because Falkenhorst did not push for unity of command. The Naval and Air Commanders planned separate campaigns in support of ground operations. The unity of command problem is evident in the after action report that states:

"That the commands and troop contingents of the three armed forces worked together almost without friction cannot be credited to purposeful organization, but entirely an achievement of the personalities involved who knew how to cooperate closely in order to overcome the inadequacies of organization."28

The Germans correctly identified the Norwegian center of gravity and attacked it with sufficient force to defeat it. Their inability to mass at one of the objective points (Narvik), however, nearly cost them the campaign. And, their plan did not adequately consider the Allied response.

As shown, German deployment planning considered both deployment tenets and principles of war. It stressed the principles of surprise, economy of force, security, objective, and unity of command. The supporting tenets are deception, agility, dispersion, and synchronization. They take on a greater significance given the current American deployment planning system. The next section will examine that system.

III. UNITED STATES DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

"Surprise is the most vital element for success in war."²⁹

MacArthur

Modern American doctrine was shaped, to a great extent, by the experiences of the Second World War. General MacArthur's reliance on surprise in the deployment of forces from World War II's Pacific Campaign to the Korean Conflict's Inchon landings are well known. His use of surprise underlines its importance as a principle of war when used in the planning of deployment operations.

As the American decision making system evolved, particularly during the two decades after the Second World War, the Joint Operation Planning System came into being. United States deployment doctrine is directly tied to the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) used for all joint operations. All deployment operations involving American Forces require a combination of ground, air or naval assets. As United States military doctrine currently exists, deployment planning is closely linked to the deliberate planning system outlined in the Joint Operation Planning System family of manuals.

This section first outlines the Joint Operation Planning System and then discusses the doctrine as a planning aid. The areas to be discussed regarding the joint system are deployment planning as outlined in JOPS, the agencies involved in deployment

planning, and the linkage between U.S. deployment planning and the principles of war.

The deliberate planning procedures for joint deployment planning are outlined in Volume 1, Joint Operational Planning System and JCS Publication 3, Joint Logistics Policy and Guidance, Volume 1. JOPS provides a system to the deployment planner, as represented by the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), that can be used to interact with other planners in the development of a campaign plan. It is not a doctrinal document. However, this system allows the planner to sequence and integrate deployment into the scheme of operations allowing the smooth introduction of forces into the theater. JOPS also provides the supported commander a system for voicing his concerns as the campaign plan develops.

The deliberate planning process is broken into five phases, initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review and supporting plans. The bulk of deployment planning is conducted during the concept and plan development stages.

During the concept development phase consultation with the joint deployment agency is required. It is generally regarded as the phase, "In which all factors that can impact significantly on mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed."³⁰ This is the phase in which a course of action is selected and a concept of operations develops.

During the plan development phase the basic plan and supporting annexes are prepared, the force list is structured,

and supply, non-essential personnel evacuation and transportation requirements are developed. Throughout this phase the supported commander has a mechanism for notifying the senior commander of planning shortfalls.

Detailed deployment planning is developed in Phase III of the deliberate planning process. The strategic/operational planning and execution of deployments is the responsibility of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA). This agency, in coordination with the supported commander, initiates planning during the concept development phase. The proposed plan is reviewed by the supported commander, the separate services and the JCS. It includes a Time Phased Force and Deployment List or TPFDL.

The plan development continues as agencies focus on forces, personnel and resupply refinement. During Phase III or the plan development stage, transportation coordination takes place to identify combined requirements and shortfalls and coordinate approval of TPFDL closure. These are included in movement schedules and tables to the deployment data base. Available for periodic review, the deployment plan is maintained in the OPLAN data base for rapid implementation. 31

During peacetime the JDA interacts with the Joint Deployment Community (JDC) and coordinates deployment activities relating to the development, refinement and maintenance of operation plans and deployment exercises and establishes necessary interfaces and procedures for war.

ANALYSIS

The Joint Operations Planning System is designed to allow the planner the maximum amount of time to plan deployment operations. When time is a constraint, this system provides a framework for systematic planning and execution. It is consistent with the American principles of war.³²

At the operational level, the planner designs a deployment scheme based on military theory and the specifics of the problem at hand. That scheme must be compatible with this planning system. The operational planner considers concepts such as the indirect approach, centers of gravity, culminating points and the underlying tenets supporting the principles of war, such as agility, initiative, depth and synchronization. All these impact on deployment decisions. In spite of this, there is no doctrine tailored to planning deployment operations. Considering the experiences of the Germans in the Norwegian Campaign and the Joint Operation Planning System now used at the strategic level, the question must be, what are the underlying tenets of deployment planning?

SECTION IV: DEPLOYMENT THEORY

"A war should only be undertaken with forces
proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome."³³
Napoleon

Napoleon's quote refers to the principle of war called economy of force. It is indicative of the importance of economy of force and its significance in preparations for war. In

preparing plans for war, deployment looms large as one of the first considerations. Using the principles of war and the tenets of AirLand Battle, a framework for developing deployment concepts and their relationship with planning can be constructed. The elements of objective, economy of force, security and surprise should not be overlooked.

As identified earlier, the key factors of deployment planning are deception, agility, dispersion, and synchronization. Each of these factors, and key principles of war will be considered as to their impact in deployment planning.

It is understood that the seed for a sound campaign plan is the identification of an attainable political end state or strategic goal. Identification of a strategic goal allows the operational planner to focus his tactical assets in the campaign plan and link the tactical battles to the strategic goal. The campaign objective must be attainable with the forces available for the mission. This provides the linkage for the operational planner in tying strategic goals to tactical means.

In planning an opposed deployment the factors of surprise, security and deception are foremost. The planning cell should be kept to as small a number as possible. In the words of General Stonewall Jackson, "If I can deceive my own friends, I can make certain of deceiving the enemy."³⁴ Given the planning will be conducted only by those with a need to know, a valid deception plan may be considered.

For a deception plan to be successful, it should meet the five axioms of battlefield deception:

- (1) The deception plan must be formed concurrently with and in concert with the operations or campaign plan.
- (2) Actual resources must be allocated for use in the deception, these may be augmented and magnified by technical means.
- (3) All deception entails risk - that risk must be acceptable.
- (4) Time and place are critical to deception.
- (5) Deception requires centralized control. 35

At the operational level, these five axioms are critical in the development of a deployment plan. The object of a deception plan at the operational level is to create surprise. The deception plan must be targeted for a particular audience. It should be designed to reinforce existing enemy perceptions, and must be controlled centrally.

The elements of economy of force and synchronization are interrelated. Each of the objective points in the campaign plan must be identified in terms of time and space. During the execution of the campaign, any of these objective points may become decisive. These objective points must be identified in the deployment plan to insure that sufficient forces and resources are allocated to each for victory. These objective points must also be synchronized in time and space. Synchronization concerns the jointness of the campaign.

Each service must integrate the deployment of their forces into the theater of operations with the other forces. The synchronization of the deployment operation is designed to

maximize the ability of each of the services to secure the objective points that best fit the campaign plan. To maximize the impact of surprise, the deployment should synchronize simultaneous attacks against as many objective points as feasible. This is compatible with the deception plan because it conceals the main effort.

The impact of dispersion is magnified by surprise. Given surprise, dispersion allows the deployment to spread over a greater geographical area. Because of the geographical aspect, dispersion is more than economy of force. The ability of the force to attack dispersed facilities is based on the forces available. It courts risk. Success is keyed to the ability of the planner to determine the right economy of force for each of the objective points in the dispersed geographical area considered for initial and subsequent deployment operations.

Unity of command is the last of the deployment planning factors to be considered. It should be one of the prime ingredients for the success of the overall campaign plan. Unity of command connotes unity of effort under one responsible commander. For effective joint planning of a deployment operation, the operational commander must integrate the capabilities of each component service to insure the deployment operation is not merely a compromise. The best method of insuring service integration is to have each of the services represented on the planning staff for the operation.

SUMMARY

The key factors of deployment planning are deception, agility, dispersion, and synchronization. They intertwine with certain principles of war, surprise, objective, unity of command, security and economy of force. This creates a web that supports deployment planning. The importance of each has been described. They are compatible with the planning system that is currently in use by the U.S. Armed Forces.

At the joint level, deployment planning is conducted by the Joint Deployment Agency in coordination with the operational commander. The tenets supporting deployment planning expounded here provide a guide in the planning process for the operational planner.

SECTION V: CONCLUSION

"It is extremely important to keep the enemy in the dark about where and when our forces will attack" 36

Mao

Deployment operations, like all other military operations, interact with military concepts at the tactical, strategic and operational levels. The quote from Mao refers to the importance placed on the element of surprise in planning deployment operations. Several key tenets of planning deployment operations are identified in the study of the Norwegian Campaign, "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG."

The objective for the forces in "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG" was the occupation of the country at the strategic level. At the operational level the critical points were those port cities, including the capital, identified by the strategic, and later the operational planning cells. The operational cell also designed the deception plan for the campaign.

The deception plan for "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG", was directed at the Norwegian government. Any deployment plan for hostile territory must be based on surprise, and this campaign was no exception. The deception plan called for the movement of forces on merchant ships and the simultaneous deployment at numerous locations to magnify the impact of surprise. Plan distribution was limited which ensured security and provided the element of surprise when the operation was executed. Security then becomes a precursor of surprise.

Given the objective of securing the Scandinavian littoral, objective points were selected which were key to the success of the campaign plan. They included all likely port and air facilities. The deception plan was designed to unhinge the Norwegian center of gravity. The objective of the deception plan was to delay action by the Norwegian government. By deceiving the government as to the time and place of the deployment, the Norwegians would not activate their mostly reserve armed forces until it was too late.


The dispersed objective points required German agility in the execution of the plan. They struck so many points

simultaneously that the Norwegians were unable to identify a main effort or counter the threat in a reasonable amount of time. The Germans, as a result of their detailed planning and accurate correlation of forces, accomplished the dispersed operation with economy of force.

Finally, the German failure to provide for unity of command shows the fragility of overseas deployment operations. Had the commanders not been united in purpose, the whole operation might have failed. The Germans lacked a theoretical and practical background in joint operations. This contributed to their disregard for the principle of unity of command in deployment operations.


The lessons learned regarding joint planning of deployment operations in this first German deployment operation are invaluable as a guide in discerning supporting theory for a doctrine of deployment operations. Direct analogies can be drawn from "OPERATION WESERUEBUNG". Key factors referred to here as the tenets of deployment planning are deception, agility, dispersion, and synchronization. These interact with key principles of war, objective, surprise, security, unity of command and economy of force. U.S. success in future contingency deployments is dependent on recognition of and correct application of these tenets.

MAP A GERMAN DEPLOYMENT SCHEME



Base 800386 (A04936) 2-86

MAP B ALLIED LANDING SCHEME



Base 800366 (A04936) 2-88

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